Professional Documents
Culture Documents
December 9th,
2021 Babandi Ibrahim Gumel, DBA
Purpose of the Presentation
Introduce agency conflicts
How to reduce or eliminate agency conflicts
with corporate Governance Policy.
www.ligsuniversity.com 2
At the end of the presentation,
Learners will understand:
Example of Corporate Governance (Citigroup 2007-2012)
Agency Conflicts
Conflicts between stockholders and creditors
Conflict between Inside Owner/Managers and Outside Owners
Conflict between Managers and Shareholders
The behaviors of managers that will harm the intrinsic value of
a firm
Corporate Governance
The internal control provisions for corporate governance
www.ligsuniversity.com 3
Example of Corporate Governance (Citigroup 2007-2012)
2007 – CEO Vikram Pandit had wild ride regarding
Compensation, where he sold his hedge fund to Citi
group and made $167 million profit.
In late 2007, Pandit was appointed CEO of Citi with cash
pay of $1.2 million and over $19 million in stocks and
options.
Due to global economic crisis of 2008, Pandit offered
and took $1 in salary in 2009 and 2010.
In 2011, as things improved, Pandit received a base
salary of $1.75 million and retention bonuses of $23
million …….Continued
www.ligsuniversity.com 4
Example of Corporate Governance (Citigroup 2007-2012)
Continued
In 2012, the board of Citi recommended a salary
increase to $15 million to Pandit, plus a bonus plan
recommending top five executives could earn up to $18
million if the combined income of Citi exceeded $12
million.
Angrily, the shareholders of Citi voted against the
proposed compensation plans.
The shareholder's reaction was prompted due to the
2011 pretax income earned by Citi which legitimized the
proposed bonus even if Citi lost $7 million pretax income
in 2012
www.ligsuniversity.com 5
Example of Corporate Governance (Citigroup 2007-2012)
Continued
The Board members of Citi considered the voted of the
shareholders as non-binding and ignored the vote.
Large Shareholders of Citi sued the board for breach of
duty.
This is one of similar incidences happening around the
globe and should be taken seriously when handling
corporate governance policies.
Listeners of the webinar are advised to keep this in mind
while we roll through the presentation.
Source: Francesco Guerrera, “Citigroup’s Pay Fiasco: Wake-Up Call Board,” The Wall Street
Journal, April 24, 2012, p. C1.
www.ligsuniversity.com 6
Corporate Governance and Corporate Valuation
Affect
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
5. The Maximization of the
O Value of Stakeholders
n
www.ligsuniversity.com 7
Steps of Agency Conflicts
One Person Company – Owner/Manager
When owner invited outsiders to invest and even went further to invite creditors
The situation changes with conflicts between owners, managers, employees, and
creditors
www.ligsuniversity.com 8
Agency Conflicts
In a situation where a founder or owner of a business
serves as the overall manager of an organization, It is
unlikely for such an organization to have agency
conflict.
When the owner started to employ people to work in the
firm, the situation changes:
The conflict increases if the owner sell shares to an
outsider or employed someone to manage the affairs of
the firm.
www.ligsuniversity.com 9
Sole Owner/Sole Worker
The owner will reap
the benefits accruing
to the organization
At the same time will
take all the liabilities
of the firm.
Agency Conflict is
unlikely.
www.ligsuniversity.com 10
Owner With Hired Employees
• Because the owner will
not share the full benefits
and losses with the
employees: The firm
become vulnerable to
conflicts.
www.ligsuniversity.com 11
Corporate Entity
• Because of new
shareholders, board, and
management: Conflict
arises between owners,
employees, managers,
and the creditors to a
firm.
www.ligsuniversity.com 12
AGENCY CONFLICTS - OVERVIEW
Agency Conflict The agency conflicts are incidences that occur when owners
Defined authorized other people to manage firms on their behalf.
Agency Relationship The agency relationship come into effect whenever a person
(principal) hires another individual (called an agent) to act on his
behalf and perform services with the delegated authority of
making decisions.
Agency Conflicts Agency conflicts results in increased costs leading to reduction
Costs in a firm’s value.
www.ligsuniversity.com 13
Conflicts between stockholders and
creditors
This Kind of agency Conflicts resulted in additional costs to a
firm in two ways:
www.ligsuniversity.com 14
Ways to minimize the costs associated
with Agency conflicts.
There are two ways to minimize the costs associated with
agency conflicts arising between stockholders and creditors:
• from
Creditors may charge high interest rate to
By writing debt covenants detailing the
compensate increased risk they are likely
actions a firm can take and not to take.
exposed to
www.ligsuniversity.com 15
Conflict between Inside
Owner/Managers and Outside Owners
• from
After the motive of increasing
the wealth of the firm, an
owner/manager is bound to
increase perquisites (leisure
time, luxurious offices etc.), and
when owner/manager sell stocks
to outside owners, potential
conflict might arise as a result of
increased perquisites.
www.ligsuniversity.com 16
Conflict between Inside Owner/Managers and Outside
Owners Costs
Avoiding the perquisites will reduce or eliminate cost and the impact.
www.ligsuniversity.com 17
Conflict between Managers and Shareholders
Shareholders hire competent managers with the view to maximizing the value of
the firm, the managers might focus on satisfying their interest rather than value
maximization, which will make the corporate value to decline.
Maximizing the
With value of the firm
Shareholders the Make the
hire competent view of corporate
managers
value to
decline
They y
Focu Satisfying their The on
s on us
interest rather Foc
than value
maximization
www.ligsuniversity.com 18
The behaviors of managers that will harm the
intrinsic value of a firm
The behaviors of managers that will harm the intrinsic value of a firm include:
Spending less time and less effort on activities that will maximize the value of the firm.
Rather than use the fund of a firm on the activities of the shareholders, some managers behavior is to use funds to satisfy their own
need such as lavish offices and corporate jets etc., called nonpecuniary benefits.
Managers avoid value adding but difficult decisions that may harm their friends.
Avoidance of taking too much or enough risk by managers result in skipping the right project that will
add value due to fear of been sacked or having a distorted image.
Firms with positive FCF can have managers that stockpile in the form of marketable securities, instead of returning
it to investors for possible investment in good opportunity growth firms.
Managers tend to hold certain vital information needed by investors, if such habit is established, investors are likely to discount the
expected free cash flows at higher cost of capital resulting in reduced intrinsic value of the firm.
www.ligsuniversity.com 19
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance is defined as
“the set of laws, rules, and procedures
that influence a company’s operations
and the decisions its managers make”
(Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2014, p. 528).
www.ligsuniversity.com 20
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
There are ten principles of corporate governance:
www.ligsuniversity.com 21
Pathway to Excellent Corporate Governance
Responsibility The Board of Directors are given authority to act on behalf of the
company. The board should therefore accept full responsibility for the
powers that it is given and the authority that it exercises.
Fairness Fairness refers to equal treatment, for example, all shareholders should
receive equal consideration for whatever shareholdings they hold.
www.ligsuniversity.com 22
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS ARE EITHER CARROTS OR
STICKS.
www.ligsuniversity.com 24
MONITORING AND DISCIPLINE BY THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS
Shareholders being the corporate owners of an
organization elect the members of the board who act as
agents on their behalf.
In US, Nigeria, and other countries, their duty includes
monitoring senior managers where they discipline them
if they do not act on behalf of the shareholders through
removal or reduction of compensations.
In Europe, an employee representative is included in
the board
While in Asia, banks have representation on the board.
www.ligsuniversity.com 25
MONITORING AND DISCIPLINE BY THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS CONTINUED …..
Areas needing monitoring and discipline include:
The board of directors have a nominating committee and only
candidate nominated by the committee are on the ballot. In most
cases the CEO is the also the chairman of the board and
influences the nominating committee.
In most cases the management control the 51% of the shares
enabling them to control the voting process.
Also most of the members of the board are insiders (people with
managerial responsibilities).
The system that mitigated this problem of insiders control is the
requirement of NASDAQ and NYSE in US that require majority of
board members to be outside the firm.
www.ligsuniversity.com 26
MONITORING AND DISCIPLINE BY THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS CONTINUED……
Studies suggested that corporate governance improves if:
The CEO is not chairman of the board, majority board
members are business experts from outside
Membership of the board is not too large
Compensation of board members is appropriately (not
too high, not all cash, with exposure to equity risk
through options or stock)
www.ligsuniversity.com 27
CHARTER PROVISIONS AND BYLAWS THAT AFFECT THE LIKELIHOOD OF
HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
In a situation where managers are not able to increase the free cash
flows of a firm, another company can acquire the firm, change the
management, and turn the company around with increased free cash
flows.
Targeted repurchases can be banned through a shareholder friendly
charter also known as greenmail.
The charter does not contain a shareholder rights provision otherwise
called poison fill.
The provision of a poison fill will prevent taking over of the company
which will helps entrench management.
The restricted voting rights in the provisions also entrench
management of a firm.
www.ligsuniversity.com 28
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS OUTSIDE A FIRM’S CONTROL
www.ligsuniversity.com 29
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
www.ligsuniversity.com 30
Corporate Governance Reduces or Eliminate
Cost Associated with Agency Conflicts
thereby Maintaining the Value of a Company.
www.ligsuniversity.com
31
TEST
www.ligsuniversity.com 32
TEST
2. One of the following is a way of minimizing cost associated with agency conflicts
arising between shareholders and creditors.
a. Managers to collect more loan and pay less interest rates over a minimum
number of years
b. Owners/managers to pay for risk and avoid it totally
c. Creditors may charge high interest rate to compensate risk they are likely
exposed to.
d. Managers charge high interest rate and deal with the differences of payment
later.
e. Expose the cost to bank instruments for possible liquidation
f. All the above
www.ligsuniversity.com 33
TEST
www.ligsuniversity.com 34
TEST
www.ligsuniversity.com 35
TEST
www.ligsuniversity.com 36
QUESTION AND
ANSWERS
SESSION
www.ligsuniversity.com 37
THANK YOU!
• Phone: +2348032872204
• Email: bbdgumel@gmail.com
www.ligsuniversity.com
References
Brigham, E. F. & Ehrhardt, M. C. . (2016). Corporate finance: A focused approach . Cengage
Learning.
Chandra, P. (2018). Financial management: theory and practice. Mc Graw Hill India.
Emery, D. R., Finnerty, J. D., & Stowe, J. D. (2011). Corporate financial management: Bridging the
gap between theory and practice. Wohl Publishing.
Fabozzi, F. J., & Markowitz, H. M. (2011). The theory and practice of investment management. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc
www.ligsuniversity.com 39