SCHED

UNIT
ULE PROFESS
CODE DESCRIPTION DAY TIME
S OR
DR.
3 GEC 006 ART APPRECIATION TUESDAY 10:00 – 1: 00 PM
BIENVENIDO

THE CONTEMPORARY PROF.

3 GEC 003 TUESDAY 6:00 – 9:00 PM
WORLD FUENTES

MATHEMATICS OF THE WEDNES PROF. SAN

3 GEC 004 1:00 – 4:00 PM
MODERN WORLD DAY JUAN

10:00 – 12: 00
2 P.E. 002 RHYTHMIC ACTIVITIES FRIDAY DR. PATAG
PM

LIFE AND WORKS OF SATURDA PROF.

2 GEC 001 10:00 – 1:00 PM
RIZAL Y NOVILLA

POLITICS AND
PROF.
3 PSM 221 GOVERNANCE OF SOUTH SUNDAY 10:00 – 1: 00 PM
MATULA
EAST ASIA

PHILIPPINE POLITICS PROF.

3 PSM 121 SUNDAY 1:00 – 4: 00 PM
AND GOVERNANCE MINOZA

PROF.
3 NSTP 112 NSTP – CWTS 2 SUNDAY 4:00 – 7:00
JABELO

NOTE
FREE TIME
SPEND THESE DAYS PRODUCTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY.
• MONDAY
GIVE YOURSELF A BREAK, ME TIME.
• THURSDAY
PHILIPPI
NE
POLITIC
POLITICS
S
AND
AND
GOVERN
GOVERN
ANCE
FELICITY ANN FELICIANO
SOLEDAD
POLSCI B

ANCE
POLITICS 2. Power: the main source of
reign of the
Politics is a process by which government .The
individual interest is reconciled possession to govern or
with collective action and the rule the state.
provision of a public good.
denotes a social activity is the 3. Justice: the process of
creation, maintenance and legalizing and penalizing
amendment of social norms or the abuse of political power
rules. Is an art and science of the and power to rule.
government. Is the realm of
public affairs or the state. “If the government gives what
people need, protect and respect
Basic concepts of Politics their rights, and put the common
1. Order: is the central to the good over and above the personal
study of politics because it interest of the leaders then there
shows different is said to be justice.”
components of human
society. Structures of order; Two Approaches to the study of
a. Community – Politics
is one kind of
social order a. Political Philosophy - It is
which refers to the traditional approach in
the association which the primary goal is
of individual to understand the essence
who shares a or the truth about politics.
common b. Political Science - It is the
identity. empirical/ objective
b. Government – approach in which it places
is a higher level little emphasis on abstract
of social order and normative question,
that exist and concentrates on a
primarily for dispassionate and objective
the of the realities of politics.
maintenance
and
perpetuation of
the community.
c. State - is the
largest social
order today and
in which the
term politics
originally
derived
Science of Politics: Notes:
a. It is the basic knowledge
and understanding of the Development of Political
state and the principles and Science:
ideals which underlie its
organization and activities  Aristotle: wrote “Politics”,
b. It is primarily concerned the first systematic work on
with the association of political affairs. Father of
human beings into ‘body Political Science
politic’ or in a political  Niccolo Machiavelli: wrote
community “The Prince”, a handbook
c. It deals with those relations for rulers in the art of
among men and groups government. Father of
which are subject to control Modern Political Science
by the state with the  Prof. Francis Lieber: wrote
relations of men and groups “Manual of Political Ethics”;
to the state itself and the the first systematic treatise in
relations of the state to political science.
other state
Scope Of Political Science
 Political Theory is the entire
POLITICS body of the doctrines relating
GOVERNANCE to the form, behavior and
purposes of the state are
dealt with in this study
 Public Law
a. Organization of
PEOPLE governments
b. Limitations
upon
government
authority
CONSTITUTION c. Powers and
Duty of
Interpretation of the Diagram: government
People as the focal of all areas of offices and
politics, government and officers
constitution because it is the
human individual who is the
revolving actor of the state, it is
to people why there is an existent
laws. the right is vested to and it
simply denotes that the he/she is
the main actor.
GOVERNANCE b. Actors and Structures - An
actor is a sector or group or
Governance is the exercise of institution that participates
power or authority by political in the process of decision-
leader for the well being at their making and
country’s citizens or subject. implementation. A structure
Refers to the manner of steering refers to an organization or
or governing and or directing and mechanism that formally or
controlling a group of people/ the informally guides the
state. decision-making process
and sets into motion the
Importance: Governance, the different actors and
people, most especially the apparatuses in the
citizens, will be aware of the implementation process.
need for good governance. c. Informal Actors and Bad
Consequently, such awareness Governance - Their
should move them to action. For influence is felt more
their continued empowerment clearly in local
and sustainable development, governments, such as
they have to know how to fight organized crime syndicates
for their rights by knowing what and powerful families, and
to expect from Philippine in rural and urban areas.
governance. Most often than not, these
actors are the cause of
Processes and Actors in corruption, in that
Governance: legitimate government
a. Decision-Making and objectives are distorted by
Implementation: decision- their illegal and private
making refers the process interests. Worse, they
by which a person or group manipulate government
of persons, guided by officials and agencies, and
socio-political structures, cause widespread yet
arrive at a decision organized violence in the
involving their individual community. In urban and
and communal needs and rural areas, for example,
wants. Implementation is the rich and powerful
the process that logically families control the
follows the decision. economy by controlling the
local government officials.
They bring about a
controlled environment so
that decisions must always
favor them
Indicators Good Governance
a. Participation - active
involvement of all affected
and interested parties in the
decision-making process.
Participation is one of the
strengths of Philippine
governance. The 1987
Philippine Constitution is
replete of provisions
dealing with relational and
inter-sectoral governance.
The Local Government Act
of 1989 was borne out of
the need for
decentralization in
Philippine governance. As
such, these and other
related legislations may be
considered as normative
standards for good
governance.
b. Rule of Law - Democracy
is essentially the rule of
law. Rule of law demands
that the people and the civil
society render habitual
obedience to the law. It also
demands that the
government acts within the
limits of the powers and
functions prescribed by the
law. The Philippines does
not fare well in this aspect
of good governance. In
spite of being one of the
oldest democracies in the
region, the Philippines
ranked as last among seven
indexed Asian countries
according to the World
Justice Project Rule of Law
Index.
Generally, the reasons for
ranking last are “lack of respect
for law,” “pervasive and systemic
corruption in the government,”
and “circumvention of the law.”
Lack of respect for law is
generally caused by distrust on
the integrity of law enforcement
agencies. Order and security are
compromised and criminal justice
is rendered ineffectual.
c. Effectiveness and
Efficiency - actors meet the
needs of the society means
that there is effective
governance. That the
valuable resources are
utilized, without wasting or
underutilizing any of them,
means that there is efficient
governance. - enhancement
and standardization of the
quality of public service
delivery consistent with
international standards,
professionalization of
bureaucracy. Efforts were
made to attain effectiveness
and efficiency in Philippine
governance. The Anti-Red
Tape Act of 2007 (ARTA),
for instance, was passed to
require the setting up of
Citizen’s Charter for a
simplified procedure and to
facilitate governmental
transactions. Also, many
government departments
and agencies pursued a
rationalization program to
check excessive and
redundant staffing.
d. Transparency - e. Responsiveness - means
Transparency, as an that institutions and
indicator of good processes serve all
governance, means that stakeholders in a timely
people are open to and appropriate manner. It
information regarding also means that actors and
decision-making process structures of governance
and the implementation of easily give genuine
the same. In legal terms, it expression to the will or
means that information on desire of the people. Some
matters of public concern of the important efforts
are made available to the made to attain responsive
citizens or those who will governance in the
be directly affected. - It Philippines are
also means that transactions decentralization, creation
involving public interests of citizen’s charter in all
must be fully disclosed and frontline agencies (as
made accessible to the required by ARTA), and
people. Efforts were made gender sensitivity
in pursuit of transparency programs. First, through
in Philippine governance. decentralization, local
As far as the government governments, which are
sector is concerned, the more proximate to their
current administration, constituents, serve more
consistent with its drive of promptly the people, who
curbing corruption, in turn become more
promotes honesty and involved in decision-
integrity in public service. making. Second, every
It is currently pursuing the government agency now
passage of the Freedom of has it Citizen’s Charter,
Information Bill and other which provides timeframes
related legislations, as well for every step in attaining
as intensifying people’s frontline services. Agencies
engagement in local now must also respond to
governance. Transparency written queries sent by the
in budget and stakeholders or interested
disbursements are, parties within a period of
however, still far from ten days, otherwise there
being substantially will be delayed service.
implemented.
However, this aspect of
governance still remains to be
one of the causes for the decline
of public’s confidence in the
public sector. Although the ARTA
has been passed, there is still so
much delay in public service
delivery. The failure of the
government agencies to explain
the charters to the stakeholders is
one of the main reasons why
there is still delay.
Gender and Development
programs are in the process of
being integrated with the various
structures and institutions in the
country. But legislation is one
thing; implementation is another.
It is in the faithful
implementation of these laws that
the country failed. Inequality is
especially felt in the justice
system, electoral system, and
even in the bureaucracy itself.

f. Equity and Inclusiveness - g. Consensus Oriented -

Equity and inclusiveness Governance is consensus
means that all the members oriented when decisions are
of the society, especially made after taking into
the most vulnerable ones or consideration the different
the grassroots level, must viewpoints of the actors of
be taken into consideration the society. Among the
in policy-making. - Social things done by the
equity refers to a kind of Philippines in promoting a
justice that gives more consensus oriented
opportunity to the less governance are:
fortunate members of the 1. creation of a
society. The Philippine wide-based of
Government has done representation
extensive efforts in in the
promoting equity and Congress;
inclusiveness. The 2. a two-tiered
Constitution makes it as legislature or
one of its state policies the bicameralism
promotion of social justice. which subjects
legislation to
Pursuant to this, the Congress has the evaluation
enacted social legislations like of national and
the Comprehensive Agrarian district
Reform Law which aims at legislators; and
freeing the farmer tenants from 3. necessity of
the bondage of the soil. Also, public hearings
representation in the Congress, or consultations
under the party list system, is of various
constitutionally mandated to have governmental
sectoral representation of the policies and
underprivileged. actions.
h. Accountability - The Office of the Ombudsman,
Accountability means
answerability or
responsibility for one’s
action. It is based on the
principle that every person
or group is responsible for
their actions most
especially when their acts
affect public interest. -
Accountability comes in
various forms: political,
hierarchical, and
managerial accountability.
Political accountability
refers to the accountability
of public officials to the
people they represent.
Hierarchical accountability
refers to the ordered
accountability of the
various agencies and their
respective officers and
personnel in relation to
their program objectives.
Managerial accountability
refers to employee
accountability based on
organization and individual
performance.
The Philippines in the recent
years had endeavored to comply
with the requirements of
accountability. It had put in
action the concept of political
accountability as it held
answerable erring public officials
involved in graft and corruption
and for acts contrary to the
mandate of the constitution. It
had also strengthened
parliamentary scrutiny through
legislative investigations and
creation of special committees
exercising oversight functions.
considered as the public
watchdog, has become ever so
active in investigating and
prosecuting graft and plunders
cases. Citizen’s Charter, as
required by ARTA, was also an
important tool in promoting
professional public service
values. In this area, Philippine
governance has done relatively
well.
Current State Governance
Philippines: The Philippines is
plagued by bad governance.
Based on the six dimensions of
governance in the Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI), it
ranks in the lower half of the
percentile. In 2010-2011, the
Philippines ranked only 85th in
the Global Competitive Index
(GCI), lagging behind most of its
Southeast Asian neighbors. The
decline of trust on the actors of
governance and the consequential
poor economic condition were
brought about by the systemic
corruption among and between
public officials and private
organizations. In 2013, it ranked
94th among 177 countries in the
Corruption Perception Index.
Among the key institutions in the
Philippines perceived to be most
corrupt based on the Global
Corruption Index are “political
parties,” “judiciary,” “police,”
“public officials and civil
servants,” and “legislature.” This
means all branches of the
Philippine government are now
challenged.
EVOLUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
The Philippines has had a total of
six constitutions since the
Proclamation of Independence on
June 12, 1898. In 1899, the
Malolos Constitution, the first
Philippine Constitution—the first
republican constitution in Asia—
was drafted and adopted by the
First Philippine Republic, which
lasted from 1899 to 1901.
During the American Occupation,
the Philippines was governed by
the laws of the United States of
America. Organic Acts were
passed by the United States
Congress for the administration
of the Government of the
Philippine Islands. The first was
the Philippine Organic Act of
1902, which provided for a
Philippine Assembly composed
of Filipino citizens. The second
was the Philippine Autonomy Act
of 1916, which included the first
pledge of Philippine
independence. These laws served
as constitutions of the Philippines
from 1902 to 1935.
In 1934, the United States
Congress passed the Philippine
Independence Act, which set the
parameters for the creation of a
constitution for the Philippines.
The Act mandated the Philippine
Legislature to call for an election
of delegates to a Constitutional
Convention to draft a 1943 Constitution was used by
Constitution for the Philippines.
he 1934 Constitutional
Convention finished its work on
February 8, 1935. The
Constitution was submitted to the
President of the United States for
certification on March 25, 1935.
It was in accordance with the
Philippine Independence Act of
1934. The 1935 Constitution was
ratified by the Filipino people
through a national plebiscite, on
May 14, 1935 and came into full
force and effect on November 15,
1935 with the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Among its provisions
was that it would remain the
constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines once
independence was granted on
July 4, 1946.
In 1940, the 1935 Constitution
was amended by the National
Assembly of the Philippines. The
legislature was changed from a
unicameral assembly to a
bicameral congress. The
amendment also changed the
term limit of the President of the
Philippines from six years with
no reelection to four years with a
possibility of being reelected for
a second term.
During World War II the
Japanese-sponsored government
nullified the 1935 Constitution
and appointed Preparatory
Committee on Philippine
Independence to replace it. The
the Second Republic with Jose P.
Laurel as President.
Upon the liberation of the
Philippines in 1945, the 1935
Constitution came back into
effect. The Constitution remained
unaltered until 1947 when the
Philippine Congress called for its
amendment through
Commonwealth Act No. 733. On
March 11, 1947 the Parity
amendment gave United States
citizens equal rights with Filipino
citizens to develop natural
resources in the country and
operate public utilities. The
Constitution, thereafter, remained
the same until the declaration of
martial law on September 23,
1972.
Before President Marcos
declared Martial Law, a later, President Aquino issued
Constitutional Convention was
already in the process of
deliberating on amending or
revising the 1935 Constitution.
They finished their work and
submitted it to President Marcos
on December 1, 1972. President
Marcos submitted it for
ratification in early January of
1973. Foreseeing that a direct
ratification of the constitution
was bound to fail, Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 86, s.
1972, creating citizens
assemblies to ratify the newly
drafted constitution by means of
a Viva Voce vote in place of
secret ballots. Marcos announced
that it had been ratified and in
full force and effect on January
17, 1973. Although the 1973
Constitution had been “ratified”
in this manner, opposition against
it continued.
Chief Justice Roberto V.
Concepcion in his dissenting
opinion in the case of Javellana v.
Executive Secretary, exposed the
fraud that happened during the
citizen’s assembly ratification of
the 1973 Constitution on January,
10 – 15, 1973. However, the final
decision of this case was that the
ratification of the 1973
Constitution was valid and was in
force.
When democracy was restored in
1986, President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Proclamation No.
3, suspending certain provisions
of the 1973 Constitution and
promulgating in its stead a
transitory constitution. A month
Proclamation No. 9, s. 1986,
which created a Constitutional
Commission tasked with writing
a new charter to replace the 1973
Constitution. The commission
finished its work at 12:28 a.m. of
October 16, 1986. National
Plebiscite was held on February
2, 1987, ratifying the new
constitution. On February 11,
1987, by virtue of Proclamation
No. 58, President Aquino
announced the official canvassing
of results and the ratification of
the draft constitution. The 1987
Constitution finally came into full
force and effect that same day
with the President, other civilian
officials, and members of the
Armed Forces swearing
allegiance to the new charter.
COMMEMORATION OF
CONSTITUTION DAY
For every constitutional change
the Philippines has experienced, a
corresponding proclamation was
issued in order to celebrate the
date that each charter was put
into full force and effect—with
the exception the 1943
Constitution.
President Emilio Aguinaldo
issued the first proclamation that
celebrated the effectiveness of a
constitution in 1899 on January
23, 1899. In the Proclamation,
President Aguinaldo ordered the
release of Spanish prisoners
under the custody of the
Philippine revolutionary forces,
to mark the inauguration of the
First Philippine Republic. No
subsequent proclamations were
issued because of the outbreak of
the Philippine-American War and
the fall of the First Philippine
Republic in 1901.
When the United States Congress
authorized the creation of a
constitution for the Philippines in
accordance with the Tydings-
Mcduffie Act of 1934, a
Constitutional Convention was
established to draft a charter for
the Philippines and it finished its
work on February 8, 1935. On
the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the
Philippines on November 15,
1935, the new charter came into
full force and effect.
A year later, President Manuel L.
Quezon issued Proclamation No.
36, s. 1936, declaring the 8th of
February of every year as
Constitution Day to
commemorate the completion of
the 1934 Constitutional
Convention’s task. This
commemoration was observed
throughout the Commonwealth of
the Philippines and the Third
Republic, up until the declaration
of martial law on September 23,
1972. (President Ferdinand E.
Marcos reiterated President
Quezon’s original proclamation
by issuing Proclamation No. 10,
s. 1966.)
In 1973, after the declaration of
martial law, the 1935 Constitution
was replaced by a new charter,
the 1973 Constitution. In
commemoration, President
Marcos, repealed President
Quezon’s Proclamation No. 36, s.
1936, by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1219, s. 1973, which moved
Constitution Day from February
8 to January 17 of every year.
This proclamation
commemorated the day when
President Marcos certified that
the new Constitution had been
ratified. Constitution day was
commemorated until the end of
President Marcos term but was
overshadowed by the
Proclamation making September
21st of every year “Thanksgiving
day”, the date indicated on
Presidential Proclamation No.
1081, s. 1972:
COMMEMORATION OF
CONSTITUTION DAY
For every constitutional change
the Philippines has experienced, a
corresponding proclamation was
issued in order to celebrate the
date that each charter was put
into full force and effect—with
the exception the 1943
Constitution.
President Emilio Aguinaldo
issued the first proclamation that
celebrated the effectiveness of a
constitution in 1899 on January
23, 1899. In the Proclamation,
President Aguinaldo ordered the
release of Spanish prisoners
under the custody of the
Philippine revolutionary forces,
to mark the inauguration of the
First Philippine Republic. No
subsequent proclamations were
issued because of the outbreak of
the Philippine-American War and
the fall of the First Philippine
Republic in 1901.
When the United States Congress
authorized the creation of a
constitution for the Philippines in
accordance with the Tydings-
Mcduffie Act of 1934, a
Constitutional Convention was
established to draft a charter for
the Philippines and it finished its
work on February 8, 1935. On
the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the
Philippines on November 15,
1935, the new charter came into
full force and effect.
A year later, President Manuel L.
Quezon issued Proclamation No.
36, s. 1936, declaring the 8th of
February of every year as
Constitution Day to
commemorate the completion of
the 1934 Constitutional
Convention’s task. This
commemoration was observed
throughout the Commonwealth of
the Philippines and the Third
Republic, up until the declaration
of martial law on September 23,
1972. (President Ferdinand E.
Marcos reiterated President
Quezon’s original proclamation
by issuing Proclamation No. 10,
s. 1966.)
In 1973, after the declaration of
martial law, the 1935 Constitution
was replaced by a new charter,
the 1973 Constitution. In
commemoration, President
Marcos, repealed President
Quezon’s Proclamation No. 36, s.
1936, by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1219, s. 1973, which moved
Constitution Day from February
8 to January 17 of every year.
This proclamation
commemorated the day when
President Marcos certified that
the new Constitution had been
ratified. Constitution day was
commemorated until the end of
President Marcos term but was
overshadowed by the
Proclamation making September
21st of every year “Thanksgiving
day”, the date indicated on
Presidential Proclamation No.
1081, s. 1972:

The Tydings–McDuffie Act,
officially the Philippine
Independence Act, is a United
States federal law that established
the process for the Philippines,
then an American territory, to
become an independent country
after a ten-year transition period.
THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES IN
TRANSITION
 The pre-Spanish
government
a. Unit of government: Prior
to the arrival of the
Spaniards, the Philippines
was composed of
settlements or villages,
each called barangay
(consisting of more or less
100 families), named after
balangay, a Malayan word
meaning "boat" (thereby
confirming the theory that
the early Filipinos came to
the Philippines in boats).
Every barangay was
virtually a state, for it
possessed the four basic
elements of statehood. At
times, however, some
barangay joined together as
"confederations'' mainly for
the purpose of mutual
protection against common
enemies
b. Datu: Each barangay was
ruled by a chief called datu
in some places, and rajah,
sultan, or hadji in others.
He was its chief executive,
lawgiver, chief judge, and
military head. In the
performance of his duties,
however, he was assisted
usually by a council of
elders (maginoos) which
served as his advisers. One
could be a datu chiefly by
inheritance, wisdom,
wealth, or physical
prowess.
In form, the barangay was a
monarchy with the datu as the
monarch
c. Social classes: In the
barangay. The people of the
barangay were divided into
four classes, namely: the
nobility (maharlika), to
which the datu belonged,
the freemen (timawa), the
serfs (aliping namamahay),
and the slaves (aliping
magigilid)
d. Early laws: The early
Filipinos had both written
and unwritten laws. The
written laws were
promulgated by the datus.
The two known written
codes in the pre-Spanish
era are the "Maragtas Code
which was said to have
been written about 1250
A.D. by Datu Sumakwel of
Panay, and the "Kalantiaw
Code" written in 1433 A.D.
by Datu Kalantiaw, also of
Panay. The unwritten laws
consisted of customs and
traditions which had been
passed down from
generation to generation.
e. Comparison with other
ancient governments. It can
be said that the laws of the
barangay were generally
fair.
The system of government,
although defective, was not so
bad considering the conditions in
other lands in the age during
which it flourished. An eminent
scholar has written: "The Filipino
people, even in the prehistoric
times had already shown high
intelligence and moral virtues;
virtues and intelligence clearly
manifested in their legislation,
which, taking into consideration
the circumstances and the epoch
in which it was framed, was
clearly as wise, as prudent, and
as humane, as that of the nations
then at the head of civilization.“
 Government during the
Spanish period
a. Spain's title to the
Philippines: It was based
on the discovery made by
Ferdinand Magellan in
1521, consummated by its
conquest by Miguel Lopez
de Legazpi forty-five years
later and long possession
for almost four centuries,
until it was terminated in
1898, when by the Trenty.
of Paris, the Philippines
was ceded by Spain to the
United States
b. Spanish colonial The barangays were consolidated
government: From 1565 to into towns (pueblos) each headed
1821, the Philippines was by a gobernadorcillo (little
indirectly governed by the governor), popularly called
King of Spain through capitan, and the towns into
Mexico. From 1821, when provinces, each headed by a
Mexico obtained her governor who represented the
independence from Spain, Governor-General in the
to 1898, the Philippines province.
was ruled directly from
Spain. The council in Spain Cities governed under special
responsible for the charters were also created. Each
administration of the of these cities had an
Philippines was the Council ayuntamiento or cabildo (city
of the Indies. In 1837, it council), Cebu was the first city
was abolished and to be established in 1565 in the
legislation for the Philippines. The second was
Philippines was temporarily Manila, in 1571.
performed by the Council
of Ministers. From 1863, d. The Governor-General: The
the Ministry of Ultramar powers of the government
(colonies) exercised were actually exercised by
general powers of the Governor-General who
supervision over Philippine resided in Manila. He was
affairs. "Governor-General,"
"Captain General," and
Three times during the Spanish "vice-royal patron." As
period (1810-1813, 1820-1823, Governor-General, he had
and 1836-1837), the Philippines executive, administrative,
was given representation in the legislative, and judicial
Spanish Cortes, the legislative powers. As Captain-
body of Spain. A basic principle General, he was
introduced by Spain to the Commander-in-Chief of all
Philippines was the union of the the Armed Forces in the
church and the state Philippines. As the vice-
royal patron, he exercised
c. Government in the certain religious powers.
Philippines unitary: The Because of these broad
government which Spain powers, it has been said
established in the that the Governor-General
Philippines was centralized enjoyed more powers than
in structure and national in the King of Spain himself.
scope. This was justified,
however, because of the
distance of the Philippines
from Spain.
In the administration of the At the bottom of the judicial
Philippines, the Governor- system were the justice of the
General was associated with peace courts which were
many boards and officers, established in the different towns
particularly the Board of in 1885. In addition, there were
Authorisation and the Council of special courts, like the military
Administration. and naval courts which had
jurisdiction over military
The first Spanish Governor- offenses, and the ecclesiastical
General in the Philippines was courts which had cognizance of
Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (1565- canonical matters and
1571) and the last was Gen. ecclesiastical offenses. Treasury
Diego de los Rios (1898). and commercial courts were also
created but were later abolished.
e. The Judiciary: The Royal
Audiencia which was f. Evaluation of the Spanish
established in 1583 was the Government in the
Supreme Court of the Philippines: The
Philippines during the government that Spain
Spanish times. Its decision established in the
was final except on certain Philippines was defective.
cases of great importance It was a government for the
which could be appealed to Spaniards and not for the
the King of Spain. It also Filipinos. The Spanish
performed functions of officials were often
executive and legislative inefficient and corrupt. The
nature. union of church and state
produced serious strife's
Below the Royal Audiencin, were between the ecclesiastical
two Territorial Audiencias and civil authorities.
established in 1893- one in Cebu Equality before the law was
and the other in Vigan-which denied to the Filipinos.
exercised appellate jurisdiction
over criminal cases coming from
the surrounding territory. In
1886, courts of the first instance
with both civil and criminal
jurisdiction were established in
the provinces.
The demerits, however, of the  Governments during the
Spanish administration were Revolutionary era
more than offset by its merits.
a. The Katipunan
i. The Spanish rule, when government: The
viewed in the broader Katipunan was the secret
light of global society that precipitated our
colonization, was glorious revolution on
generally mild and August 26, 1896. It was
humane. The Filipino organized by Andres
people were not Bonifacio, who, together
brutalized. Spaniards and with a group of Filipino
Filipinos intermarried and patriots, signed the
mingled socially. Slavery covenant of the Katipunan
and tribal wars were with their own blood on
suppressed: July 7. 1892 The central
government of the
ii. It brought about the Katipunan was vested in n
unification of the Filipino Supreme Council
people. The diverse tribes (Kataastansang
were molded into one Sangguniani. In each
people, under one God, province, there was a
one King, and one Provincial Council
government, and out of (Sangguniang Belangay)
their common grievances and in each town, a Popular
against Spain blossomed Council (Sangguniang
the spirit of nationalism; Bayan). The judicial power
and was exercised by a Judicial
Council (Sangguniang
iii. Spain uplifted the Hukuman).
Filipines from the depth
of primitive culture and The Katipunan was the first clear
paganism and gave them break from Spanish rule with the
the blessings of ultimate goal to establish a free
Christianity and European and sovereign Philippines. It was
civilization." replaced by another government
whose officials headed by Gen,
Emilio Aguinaldo as President,
were elected in the Tejeros
Convention held on March 22,
1897.
b. The Biak-na-Bato Gen. Aguinaldo established the
Republic: On November 1, Revolutionary Government
1897, a republic was replacing the Dictatorial
established by Gen. Government with himself as
Aguinaldo in Biak-na-Bato President and a Congress whose
(now San Miguel de function was advisory and
Mayumo, Bulacan), It had ministerial. The decree making
a constitution which was to such change stated that the aims
take effect for two years of the new government were "to
only. It declared that the struggle for the independence of
aim of the revolutions was the Philippines, until all nations
the "separation of the including Spain will expressly
Philippines from the recognize it." and "to prepare the
Spanish monarchy and their country for the establishment of a
formation into an real Republic.“
independent state." The
Biak-na-Bato Republic e. The First Philippine
lasted up to December 15, Republic: On September
1897, with the conclusion 15, 1898, a revolutionary
of the "Pact of Biak-na- Congress of Filipino
Bato.“ representatives met in
Malolos, Bulacan at the
c. The Dictatorial call of the Revolutionary
Government: Following the Government. The Malolos
outbreak of the Spanish- Congress ratified on
American war on April 25, September 29, 1898 the
1898, Gen Aguinaldo, in proclamation of Philippine
view of the chaotic independence made by
conditions in the country, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo in
established the Dictatorial Kawit, Cavite on June 12,
Government on May 23, 1898 and framed the so-
1898, The most important called Malolos
achievements of the Constitution. This
Dictatorial Government Constitution was the first
were the Proclamation of democratic constitution
Philippine Independence at ever promulgated in the
Kawit, Cavite on June 12, whole of Asia. It
1898, and the established a "free and
reorganization of local independent Philippine
governments. Republic which was
inaugurated on January 23,
d. The Revolutionary 1899, with Gen Aguinaldo
Government: On June 29, as President.
1898,
Additional Notes:
Our First Philippine Republic
was not recognized by the family
of nations. It was nevertheless an
organized government because it
actually existed and its authority
was accepted by the people. It
existed from January 23, 1899 to
March 23, 1901.
In February, 1899, the United
States annexed the Philippines as
a result of the Spanish-American
War and in April, 1901, Gen.
Aguinaldo was captured. Thus,
the Republic was short-lived, its
independence cut short by the
superior might of a new colonial
power. The Malolos Constitution
which provided for the
establishment of a Philippine
Republic had no opportunity to
operate. However, this in no way
diminishes the historical
significance of the Philippine
Revolution of 1896. It was the
first war of independence fought
by Asians against foreign
domination and it gave birth to
the first constitutional democracy
in Asia and the West Pacific.
 Governments during the
American regime
a. The Military Government:
The American military rule
in the Philippines began on
August 14. 1898, the day
after the capture of Manila.
The existence of war gave the
President of the United States the
power to establish a Military
Government in the Philippines, as
Commander-in-Chief of all
Armed Forces of the United
States. His authority was
delegated to the military
governor who exercised, as long
as the war lasted, all powers of
government-executive,
legislative, and judicial. The first
American Military Governor was
General Wesley Merritt, the
second was General Elwell E.
Otis, and the third and last was
Major General Arthur
MacArthur.
b. The Civil Government:
Pursuant to the so-called
Spooner Amendment (on
the army appropriation act
passed in the U.S. Congress
on March 3, 1901) which
ended the military regime
in the Philippines, the Civil
Government was
inaugurated in Manila on
July 4, 1901, headed by a
Civil Governor whose
position was created on
October 29, 1901, The
Civil Governor (the title
was later changed to
Governor-General on
February 6, 1905) also
exercised legislative
powers. He remained as
President of the Philippine
Commission, the sole
lawmaking body of the
government from 1901 to
1907.
From 1907 to 1916, the
Philippine Commission acted as
the upper house of the legislative
branch with the Philippine
Assembly serving as the lower
house. With the passage of the
Spooner Law in 1901, these two
bodies gave way to the Philippine
Legislature. The Philippines was
represented in the United States
by two Resident Commissioners
who were elected by the
Philippine Legislature. These
commissioners had seats in the
United States House of
Representatives, receiving the
same emoluments and other
privileges as the American
members of that body, but
without the right to vote. The first
Civil Governor was Judge
William H. Taft (1901-1903). He
was succeeded by Luke F. Wright
(1904-1906) who was the first
American to enjoy the title of
Governor-General of the
Philippines. The last Governor-
General was Frank Murphy
(1933-1935) who was also the
first High Commissioner of the
United States to the Philippines
upon the inauguration of the
Commonwealth Government of
the Philippines.
c. The Commonwealth
Government of the
Philippines: The next stage
in the political development
of the Filipinos was the
establishment of the
Commonwealth
Government of the
Philippines pursuant to an
act of the United States
Congress on March 24,
1934, commonly known as
the Tydings-McDuffie Law.
The new government of the
Commonwealth of the
Philippines deemed a successor
to the Government of the
Philippine Islands, was
inaugurated on November 15,
1935, following the first national
election under the 1935
Constitution held on September
12, 1935, with Manuel L. Quezon
and Sergio Osmena, as President
and Vice-President, respectively.
The Commonwealth Government
of the Philippines was republican
in the form under the presidential
type. The legislative power was
first vested in a unicameral
National Assembly and later in a
bicameral Congress composed of
the Senate and the House of
Representatives. The judicial
power was vested in the Supreme
Court and inferior (ie, lower)
courts provided by law. The
Government of the
Commonwealth of the
Philippines was very
autonomous. The Filipinos had
almost complete control over the
domestic affairs, the United
States retaining control only over
matters involving foreign affairs.
During World War II, the
Commonwealth Government
functioned in exile in Washington
from May 13, 1942, to October 3,
1944. It was reestablished in
Mamla on February 27, 1945
when Gen. Douglas MacArthur,
in a ceremony held at
Malacañang Palace on behalf of
the United States Government,
The 1935 Constitution served as
the fundamental law not only for
the Commonwealth Government
which was interrupted by the
Second World War but also for
the Republic of the Philippines
until the "ratification" of the 1973
Philippine Constitution
establishing a parliamentary form
of government, affected by virtue
of Proclamation No. 1102 of
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on January 17, 1973, after the
declaration of martial law on
September 21, 1972.
b. The First Republic was
established on January 23,
1899, under the Malolos
Constitution; the Second,
on October 14, 1943, under
the Japanese sponsored
Constitution, and the Third,
on July 4, 1946, under the
1935 Constitution.
President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, in his inaugural
address on June 30, 1981,
proclaimed the birth of the
Fourth Republic under the
1973 Constitution which, as
amended in a plebiscite on
April 7, 1981, installed a
modified parliamentary
system of government, thus
making him its first
President. All in all, there
were nine Presidents in the
previous three republics,
including President Marcus
in his two (2) terms in the
Third Republic.
The present Republic came into
being upon the ratification of the
1987 Constitution on February 2,
1987."
 The Provisional
Government of 1986
Before Corazon C. Aquino took
her oath of office on the morning
of February 25, 1985 at Club
Filipino, San Juan, Metro Manila,
the last day of a four-day "people
power" revolt (Feb. 22-25) that
culminated in the ouster of
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
read Proclamation No. 1 wherein
he declared that she and her Vice-
President were "taking power in
the name and by the will of the
Filipino people" on the basis of
the clear sovereign will of the
people expressed in the election
of February 7, 1986. In her oath,
she swore to preserve and defend
the "fundamental law" (not the
"Constitution") and execute "just
laws" instead of "its laws").
a. Revolutionary: The
government was
revolutionary because it
was instituted not in
accordance with the
procedure provided in an
existing Constitution.
There is a definite
acknowledgment in Proclamation
No. 3 that the provisional
government established
thereunder was revolutionary in
character (without calling itself
as such) having been installed by
direct action of the people or by
"people power," deriving its
existence and authority directly
from the people themselves and
not from the then operating 1973
Constitution.
b. De jure de facto: The first
is one constituted or
founded in accordance with
the existing constitution of
the state (according to law),
while the other is not so
constituted or founded but
has the general support of
the people and effective
control of the territory over
which it exercises its
powers. A de facto
government acquires a de
jure status when it gains
wide acceptance from the
people and recognition
from the community of
nations.
At its inception, the revolutionary
government was illegal for lack
of constitutional basis not having
been sanctioned by either the
1935 or the 1973 Constitution. It
was a de facto government but
acquired a de jure status.
There was no question then that
the revolutionary government had
won continuous public
acceptance and support without
any resistance whatsoever
anywhere in the Philippines and
the recognition of practically all
foreign governments.
c. Constitutional and
transitory: The provisional
government was not a
purely revolutionary one
but a hybrid constitutional
revolutionary government,
i.e A revolutionary
government governing
under a provisional or
interim constitution the
people could invoke to
protect their rights and to
promote their welfare, to
exist for a limited period
until the ratification and
effectiveness of a
permanent constitution.
There was nothing,
however, to prevent the
government from
amending, suspending or
abrogating the Provisional
Constitution and adopting a
new one or operating
without any constitution.
In other words, the Provisional
Constitution did not have the
status of a supreme or
fundamental law because the
government was not created by it
and was not bound to obey it.
d. Democratic: The 3 promulgated a Provisional
provisional government Constitution to replace the
was claimed to be former, adopting in to insofar as
democratic because it was they are not inconsistent with the
installed by the direct provisions of the Proclamation,
action of the people as a certain provisions of the 1973
direct expression or Constitution.
manifestation of their
sovereign will, and, By its very nature, the
therefore, it was based on Provisional Constitution as well
the consent of the governed as the revolutionary government
or the approval of the which operated under it! self-
people destruct upon the ratification and
effectivity.
e. Pourers: A revolutionary
government being a direct
creation of the people CONSTITUTION OF THE
derive its powers from the REPUBLIC OF THE
people to whom it is PHILIPPINES
accountable. able. It is said
that a revolutionary From:
government is clothed with
unlimited powers because it  The 1935 Constitution
makes its own laws; it is "a
law unto itself." However, a. Framing and ratification:
with the adoption of the Briefly stated, the steps
Provisional Constitution, which led to the drafting
the revolutionary and adoption of the 1935
government opted to abide Constitution of the
by and subject itself to the Philippines are as follows:
provisions thereof. pending
approval of a new charter. i. (a) Approval on March
24, 1934, by President
f. (6) The Provisional Franklin D. Roosevelt of
Constitution. Instead of the Tydings-McDuffie
declaring the 1973 Law, otherwise known as
Constitution with certain the Philippine
amendments and minus Independence Act,
certain articles and enacted by the United
provisions, as the interim States Congress,
Constitution, Proclamation authorizing the Philippine
No. Legislature to call a
constitutional convention
to draft a constitution for
the Philippines:
ii. Approval on May 5,
1934, by the Philippine
Legislature of a bill
calling a constitutional
convention as provided
for in the Independence
Law;
iii. Approval on February 8,
1935, by the convention
by a vote of 177 to 1 of
the Constitution (the
signing began on the
following day and was
completed on February
19, 1935); (d) Approval
on March 23, 1935, by
Pres. Roosevelt of the
Constitution as submitted
to him, together with a
certification that the said
Constitution conformed
with the provisions of the
Independence Law; and
(e) Ratification on May
14, 1935, of the
Constitution by the
Filipino electorate by a
vote of 1,213,046, with
44,963 against.
b. Limitations and conditions:
While the Tydings-
McDuffie Law empowered
the Filipinos to frame their
own constitution, it
contained, however,
provisions limiting such
authority.
Aside from other specific
limitations and conditions laid
down therein, it enjoined that the
constitution to be drafted should
be republican in form, should
include a bill of rights, and
should contain certain provisions
intended to define the relations
between the Philippines and the
United States during the
commonwealth period and after
the establishment of the
Philippine Republic. The 1935
Constitution ceased to operate
during the Japanese occupation
from 1942 to 1944. It
automatically became effective
upon the re-establishment of the
Commonwealth Government on
February 27, 1945 (supra) and
the inauguration of the Republic
of the Philippines on July 4,
1946.
c. Sources: The 1985
Constitution of the
Philippines did not contain
original ideas of
government. While the
dominating influence was
the Constitution of the
United States, other sources
were also consulted by the
framers, particularly the
Malolos Constitution and
the three organic laws that
were enforced in the
Philippines
before the passage of the Tydings
McDuffie Law, namely: the
Instruction of Pres. William
McKinley to the Second
Philippine Commission on April
7, 1900, the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902; and the Jones Law
of August 26, 1916, which, of the
three mentioned, was the nearest
approach to a written
constitution.
d. Scope: The Constitution as
approved by the 1935
Constitutional Convention
was intended both for the
Commonwealth and the
Republic. Thus, Article
XVII (which later became
Article XVIII after the
Constitution was amended)
declares: "The government
established by this
Constitution shall be
known as the
Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Upon the final
and complete withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the
United States and the
proclamation of Philippine
Independence, the
Commonwealth of the
Philippines shall henceforth
be known as the Republic
of the Philippines."
e. Amendments: The 1935
Constitution had been
amended three times.
Among the amendments
are:
i. that establishing a
bicameral legislature;
ii. that allowing the
reeligibility of the
President and the Vice
President for a second
four-year term of office;
iii. that creating a separate
Commission on Elections,
and
iv. the so-called Parity
Amendment which gave
American citizens equal
rights with the Filipinos in
the exploitation of our
natural resources and the
operation of public
utilities.
Concerning women's suffrage,
this issue was settled in a
plebiscite held on April 30, 1937,
when 447,725 women reportedly
voted yes and 44,307 women
voted no, in compliance with the
1935 Constitution (Art. V, Sec. 1
thereof), the National Assembly
passed a law which extended the
right of suffrage to women.
 The 1973 Constitution
a. Framing: The experience of
more than three decades as
a sovereign nation had
revealed flaws and
inadequacies in the 1935
Constitution.
i. Taking into account the
"felt necessities of the
times, particularly the
new and grave problems
arising from an ever-
increasing population,
urgently pressing for
solution, Congress in joint
session on March 16,
1967, passed Resolution
of Both Houses No. 2 (as
amended by Resolution
No. 4. passed on June 17,
1969), authorizing the
holding of a constitutional
convention in 1971.
ii. On August 24, 1970,
Republic Act No. 6132
was approved, setting
November 10, 1970, as
election day for 320
delegates to the
Constitutional
Convention. The
convention started its
work of rewriting the
Constitution on June 1,
1971.
The 1935 Constitution, with
reference to the Malolos
Constitution, was made the basis
for the drafting of amendments to
the new Constitution. The
proposed Constitution was signed
on November 30, 1972.
b. (2) Approval by Citizens
Assemblies. Earlier on
September 21, 1972, the
President of the Philippines
issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the entire
country under martial law.
i. “To broaden the base of
citizens' participation in
the democratic process,
and to afford ample
opportunities for the
citizenry to express their
views on important
matters of local or
national concern,"
Presidential Decree No.
86 was issued on
December 31, 1972,
creating a Citizens
Assembly in each barrio
in municipalities and in
each district in chartered
cities throughout the
country. Subsequently,
Presidential Decree No.
86-A was issued on
January 5, 1973, defining
the role of barangays
(formerly Citizens'
Assemblies).
ii. Under the same decree,
the barangays were to
conduct a referendum on
national issues between
January 10 and 15, 1973,
Pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 86-A, the
following questions were
submitted before the
Citizens' Assemblies or
Barangays
1. "Do you approve of the
New Constitution?" and
2. "Do you still want a
plebiscite to be called to
ratify the new
Constitution?"
c. Ratification by Presidential
proclamation: According to
Proclamation No. 1102
issued on January 17, 1973,
14,976,561 members of all
the Barangays (Citizens'
Assemblies) voted for the
adoption of the proposed.
Constitution, as against
743,869 who voted for its
rejection. On the question
as to whether or not the
people would still like a
plebiscite to be called to
ratify the new Constitution,
14,298,814 answered that
there was no need for a
plebiscite.
On the basis of the above results
purportedly showing that more
than 95% of the members of the
Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
were in favor of the new
Constitution and upon the
allegedly "strong
recommendation" of the
Katipunan ng mga Barangay, the
President of the Philippines,
through Proclamation No. 1102
on January 17, 1973, certified
and proclaimed that the
Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention
had been ratified by the Filipino
people and had thereby come into
effect.
d. Amendments: The 1973
Constitution had been
amended on four occasions.
Among the important
amendments are:
i. that making the then
incumbent President, the
regular President and
regular Prime Minister;
ii. that granting concurrent
law-making powers to the
President which the latter
exercised even after the
lifting of martial law in
1981;
iii. that establishing a
modified parliamentary
form of government;
iv. that permitting natural-
born citizens who have
lost their citizenship to be
transferees of private
land, for use by them as a
residence:
v. that allows the "grant" of
lands of the public
domain to qualified
citizens; and if that
provides for urban land
reform and social housing
programs.
 The 1987 Constitution
a. Framing and ratification:
The 1987 Constitution was
drafted by a Constitutional
Commission created under
Article V of Proclamation
No. 3 issued on March 25,
1986, which promulgated
the Provisional Constitution
or "Freedom Constitution"
following the installation of
a revolutionary government
"through a direct exercise
of the power of the Filipino
people."
i. Pursuant to Proclamation
No. 3, the President
promulgated on April 23,
1986 Proclamation No. 9.
the "Law Governing the
Constitutional
Commission of 1986," "to
organize the
Constitutional
Commission, to provide
for the details of its
operation and establish
the procedure for the
ratification or rejection of
the proposed new
Constitution." Under the
Proclamation, the
Constitutional
Commission shall be
composed of not more
than fifty (50) national,
regional, and sectoral
representatives who shall
be appointed by the
President." As constituted,
the Commission was
composed only of forty-
eight (48) members-forty
two (42) men and six (6)
women, with a
preponderance of lawyers
- because of the
withdrawal of an
opposition appointee and
non-acceptance by the
Iglesia ni Kristo of the
President's offer to submit
a nominee.
ii. The Constitutional Another Commissioner had
Commission, which resigned earlier. The two
marked the fourth Commissioners who dissented
exercise in the writing of also signed to express their
a basic charter in dissent and to symbolize their
Philippine history since four (4) months of participation
the Malolos Constitution in drawing up the new
at the turn of the century, Constitution.``
convened on June 2,
1986, at the Batasang iv. The Constitutional
Pambansa Building in Commission held its final
Diliman, Quezon City. session in the morning of
With the Malolos October 15, 1986, to sign
Constitution of 1898, the the 109-page draft
1935 Constitution, and the consisting of a preamble,
1973 Constitution as 18 Articles, 321 Sections,
"working drafts.'' The and about 2,000 words
Commission in addition to after which, on the same
committee discussions, day, it presented to the
public hearings, and President the original
plenary sessions copies in English and
conducted public Filipino. It was ratified by
consultations in different the people in the
parts of the country. plebiscite held on
February 2, 1987. It
iii. The proposed new superseded the
Constitution was Provisional Constitution
approved by the which had abrogated the
Constitutional 1975 Charter.
Commission on the night
of Sunday, October 12, b. Merits and demerits of an
1986, culminating 133 appointive framing body:
days of work, by a vote of Admittedly. There were
44-2. A Commissioner" some merits or advantages
signed subsequently by in delegating the drawing
affixing his thumbtack at up of the new charter to an
his sickbed on October appointed Constitutional
14. 1986 so that he Commission rather than to
actually voted in favor of an elected Constitutional
the draft. Convention.
i. For one, the
Constitutional
Commission was cut
expensive and time-
consuming, as was our
experience with the 1971
Constitutional.
Convention and it was
thus practical because the
country could not then
afford the cost of electing
delegates because of lack
of funds, and time was of
the essence in view of the
instability inherent in a
revolutionary government
and the need to accelerate
the restoration to full
constitutional democracy.
ii. However, the strongest
and most fundamental
argument propounded
against this method is that
an appointive body is
susceptible to the charge
of lack of independence
and the suspicion of
pressure and even
manipulation by the
appointing power. The
writing of a Constitution
as the highest expression
of the people's "ideals and
aspirations" to serve the
country for generations to
come is a political
exercise of transcendental
importance in a
republican democracy
and, therefore,
only those directly elected and
empowered by the people must
be entrusted with the task to
discharge this grave and solemn
responsibility.
c. Need to cure defects in the
Constitution. To have a
truly democratic and
constitutional government,
it is absolutely necessary
that the Constitution be
initially drafted by duly
elected members of a
representative constituent
assembly or convention and
later on approved by the
people in a plebiscite.
Some see the need to
straighten out the present
Constitution which was
drafted by non-elective
commissioners and ratified
under the authority of a
revolutionary government.
The theory is posited that
by having it amended by
elected delegates and
having constitutional
amendments ratified under
the democratic
government, we will have
now cured any defect in its
formulation and ratification
 Basic principles underlying vii. Guarantee of human
the new Constitution rights (see Art. III, Secs.
1-22.);
The 1987 Constitution is founded
upon certain fundamental viii. Government through
principles of government which suffrage (Art. V, Sec. 1.);
have become part and parcel of
our cherished democratic ix. Separation of powers
heritage as a people. A (Art. VI, Sec. 1.);
knowledge of these principles is,
therefore. essential to a proper x. Independence of the
understanding of our organic law. judiciary (Art. VIII, Sec.
1.);
Among these principles as
contained in the new Constitution xi. Guarantee of local
following autonomy (Art. X, Sec.
2.);
i. Recognition of the aid of
Almighty God (see xii. High sense of public
Preamble) service morality and
accountability of public
ii. Sovereignty of the people officers (Art XI, Sec. 1.)
( Art. II. Sec. 1.);
xiii. Nationalization of natural
iii. Renunciation of war as an resources and certain
instrument of national private enterprises
policy (Sec. 2.); affected with public
interest (Art. XII. Secs. 2,
iv. Supremacy of civilian 3, 17, 18.3;.
authority over the military
(Sec. 3.) xiv. Non-suability of the State
(Art XVI. Sec. 3.);
v. Separation of church and
State (.Sec. 6.) xv. Rule of the majority; and

vi. Recognition of the xvi. Government of laws and

importance of the family not of men The above
as a basic social principles except Nos. 15
institution and of the vital and 16 are discussed
role of the youth in under the corresponding
nation-building (Secs. 12, provisions indicated.
13; Art. XV.);
 Rule of the majority:
a. Concept: The observance
of the rule of the majority
is an unwritten law of
popular (t.e., democratic
government. The wishes of
the majority prevail over
those of the minority. It
does not mean that the
minority is left without
rights. It is given certain
fundamental rights, like the
right to express their
opinions, or to protest the
acts of the majority
although it is bound to
abide by the decision of the
latter.
b. Instances: In many
instances, the rule of the
majority is observed in our
government. Thus, under
the new Constitution:
i. A majority vote of all the
respective members of the
Congress is necessary to
elect the Senate President
and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives
(Art. VI, Sec. 16111), and
a majority of all the
members of Congress to
concur to a grant of
amnesty (Art. VII, Sec.
19.) and to pass a law
granting tax exemptions.
(Art. VI, Sec. 284.)
In case of a tie in the election for
President (or Vice-President), the
President shall be chosen by the
majority vote of all the members
of both Houses of Congress. (Art.
VII, Sec. 4.)
ii. A two-thirds majority of
all its respective members
is required to suspend or
expel a member of either
House (Art. VI. Sec.
16(31.); of all the
members of Congress to
declare the existence of a
state of war. (bid., Sec.
23121), to reconsider a
bill vetoed by the
President. (This, Sec
27121.), and to call a
constitutional convention
(Art. XVII, Sec. 3.); and
of all the members of the
Senate to concur to a
treaty or international
agreement (Art. VII, Sec.
21.) and to render a
judgment of conviction in
impeachment cases. (Art.
XI, Sec. 3161.)
iii. Any amendment to, or
revision of the
Constitution may be
proposed by Congress
upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its members
Art. XVII, Sec. I111), and
it shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a
plebiscite. Ibid., Sec. 4.)
iii. Decisions of the Supreme
Court en bane have to be
concurred in by a
majority of the members
who actually took part in
the deliberations on the
issues in the case and
voted thereon, to
pronounce a treaty,
international or executive
agreement, or law
unconstitutional xxx (Art.
VIII, Sec. 4.)
In the Court of Appeals, the vote
of at least the majority is
necessary in many cases. Even in
the passage of local ordinances,
the rule of the majority is
observed.
c. A practicable rule of law:
The device of the majority
is a practicable rule of law
based on reason and
experience. Democracy
assumes that in a society of
rational beings, the
judgment and experience of
the many will, in most
instances, be superior to the
judgment and experience of
the few; and hence, that the
verdict of the majority will
more likely be correct than
that of the minority.
It is, of course, to be understood
that the majority acts within the
pale of the law.
 Government of law and not
of men
i. Concept: By this
principle, which is also
known and has the same
importance as the rule of
law, means that no man in
this country is above or
beyond the law. Every
man, however high and
mighty his station may be,
possesses no greater
rights than every other
man in the eyes of the
law.
ii. Exercise of government
power: A government of
laws, as contrasted with a
government of men, is a
limited government. It has
only the powers given it
by the Constitution and
laws, and it may not go
beyond the grants and
limitations set forth
therein." Its authority
continues only with the
consent of the people in
whom sovereignty
resides. Art. II. Sec. 1.)
Where personal whims and
uncontrolled discretion guide the
conduct of governmental action,
what exists is not a rule of law
but a reign of men without law.
All officers of the government,
from the highest to the lowest,
are creatures of the law and are,
therefore, bound to obey it. A
government that fails to enforce
the law, in effect, fails to govern.
iii. Observance of the law.
The same is true of
private individuals in the
community. They are also
bound to respect the
sovereignty of the law. A
person may not agree
with the wisdom and
expediency of the law but
it is his duty to follow the
law so long as it remains
in the statute books. He
cannot take the law into
his own hands by
resorting to violence or
physical force to enforce
his rights or achieve his
ends without being
criminally held liable for
his action.
The principle thus protects most
especially the liberties of the
weak and underprivileged.
d. Significance of the
principle: It is basic that
laws must be obeyed by all
and applied to everyone-
rich or poor, lowly or
powerful--without fear or
favor.
The observance of the supremacy
of the rule of law by officials,
individuals, and the people as a
whole is what will sustain our
democracy and assure the
existence of a truly free, orderly,
and equitable society. (see
Preamble:)
Every citizen has thus a stake in
the rule of law as contrasted to
the "rule of men." Without it,
there is only anarchy, or a mere
semblance of order under a
dictatorship.
Former constitutions of the
Philippines:
The 1986 Freedom Constitution:
promulgated by Presidential
Proclamation, March 25, 1986.
The 1973 Constitution: as
Amended in October 16-17,
1976, on January 30, 1980, and
April 7, 1981.
The 1973 Constitution: draft
presented to President Marcos by
the 1971 Constitutional
Convention on December 1,
1972; deemed ratified by
Citizens’ Assemblies held from
January 10 to 15, 1973,
proclaimed in force by
Proclamation by President
Marcos, January 17, 1973.
The 1943 Constitution: as
approved by the Preparatory
Committee on Philippine
Independence, September 4,
1943 and ratified by the
KALIBAPI Convention,
September 7, 1943.
The 1935 Constitution: as
amended on June 18, 1940, and
on March 11, 1947.
The 1935 Constitution: as
approved by the 1934
Constitutional Convention on
February 8, 1935, certified by the
President of the United States on
March 25, 1935, and ratified by
plebiscite on May 14, 1935.
The Jones Law of 1916: enacted
into law by the United States
Congress on August 29, 1916.
The Philippine Organic Act of
1902: enacted into law by the
United States Congress on July 1,
1902
The 1899 Malolos Constitution:
approved by the Malolos
Congress on November 29, 1898,
draft returned by President
Aguinaldo on December 1, 1898
for amendments, which the
Congress refused; approved by
President Aguinaldo on
December 23, 1898; formally
adopted by the Malolos Congress
on January 20, 1899,
promulgated by President Emilio
Aguinaldo on January 21, 1899.
Notes:
Wordings of the law:
Shall is an imperative command,
usually indicating that certain
actions are mandatory, and not
permissive. This contrasts with
the word “may,” which is
generally used to indicate a
permissive provision, ordinarily
implying some degree of
discretion.
What is a permissive provision?
a. referring to any act which
is allowed by court order,
legal procedure, or
agreement.
b. tolerant or allowing of
others' behavior, suggesting
contrary to others'
standards.
As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz said
that, Social justice – or any
justice for that matter – is for the
deserving, whether he be a
millionaire in his mansion or a
pauper in his hovel. It is true that,
in case of reasonable doubt, we
are called upon to tilt the balance
in favor of the poor, to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But
never is it justified to prefer the
poor simply because they are
poor, or to reject the rich simply
because they are rich, for justice
must always be served, for poor
and rich alike, according to the
mandate of the law.
STRUCTURE AND POWERS
OF THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
A. Legislative Department
(Article VI)
Legislative Power: Authority to
make laws and to alter and repeal
them
Advantages of Bicameralism
1. Allows for a body with a
national perspective to
check the parochial
tendency of
representatives elected by
district;
2. Allows a more careful
study of legislation;
3. Makes the legislature less
susceptible to control by
the executive; and
4. Serves as a training ground
for national leaders
Advantages of Unicameralism
5. Simplicity of organization
resulting in economy and
efficiency;
6. Facility in pinpointing
responsibility for
legislation; and
7. Avoidance of duplication
Kinds of Legislative power
a. Original: possessed by the
sovereign people.
b. Derivative: that which has
been delegated by the
sovereign people to
legislative bodies
(Congress) and is
subordinate to the original
power of the people.
Also;
1. Constituent: power to amend
and revise the constitution
2. Ordinary: power to pass
ordinary laws
The people, through the
amendatory process, exercise
constituent power, and, through
initiative and referendum,
ordinary legislative power
Kinds of limits on legislative
power
1. Substantive limits: curtail
the contents of the law. Ex.
“ No law may be passed
which impairs freedom of
speech”
2. Procedural limits: curtail
the manner of passing laws.
Ex. A bill must generally be
approved by the President
before it becomes a law
a. The power of congress to
legislate is PLENARY, that
is it may legislate on any
subject matter
b. Congress may not pass
irrepealably laws, the
power of present and future
legislatures must remain
plenary
c. Legislative power may be
delegated either by a
specific constitutional
provision or by the
immemorial practice of it
being delegated to local
governments
HOW A BILL BECOMES A
LAW?
1. Preparation of the bill:
The Member or the Bill
Drafting Division of the
Reference and Research
Bureau prepares and drafts
the bill upon the Member's
request.
2. First Reading
a. The bill is filed with the
Bills and Index Service and
the same is numbered and
reproduced.
b. Three days after its filing,
the same is included in the
Order of Business for First
Reading.
c. On First Reading, the
Secretary General reads the
title and number of the bill.
The Speaker refers the bill
to the appropriate
Committee/s.
3. Committee
Consideration/Action:
a. The Committee where the
bill was referred to
evaluates it to determine
the necessity of conducting
public hearings. If the
Committee finds it
necessary to conduct public
hearings, it schedules the
time thereof, issues public
notics and invites resource
persons from the public and
private sectors, the
academe and experts on the
proposed legislation. If the
Committee finds that no
public hearing is not
needed, it schedules the bill
for Committee discussion/s.
b. Based on the result of the
public hearings or
Committee discussions, the
Committee may introduce
amendments, consolidate
bills on the same subject
matter, or propose a
subsitute bill. It then
prepares the corresponding
committee report.
c. The Committee approves
the Committee Report and
formally transmits the same
to the Plenary Affairs
Bureau.
4. Second Reading
a. The Committee Report is
registered and numbered by
the Bills and Index Service.
It is included in the Order
of Business and referred to
the Committee on Rules.
b. The Committee on Rules
schedules the bill for
consideration on Second
Reading.
c. On Second Reading, the
Secretary General reads the
number, title and text of the
bill and the following takes
place:
• Period of Sponsorship and
Debate
• Period of Amendments
• Voting which may be by:
 viva voce
 count by
tellers
 division of the
House; or
 nominal
voting
5. Third Reading 7. Senate Action On
a. The amendments, if any, Approved Bill Of The
are engrossed and printed House: The bill undergoes
copies of the bill are the same legislative process
reproduced for Third in the Senate.
Reading.
b. The engrossed bill is 8. Conference Committee
included in the Calendar of a. A Conference Committee is
Bills for Third Reading and constituted and is
copies of the same are composed of Members
distributed to all the from each House of
Members three days before Congress to settle,
its Third Reading. reconcile or thresh out
c. On Third Reading, the differences or
Secretary General reads disagreements on any
only the number and title of provision of the bill.
the bill. b. The conferees are not
d. A roll call or nominal limited to reconciling the
voting is called and a differences in the bill but
Member, if he desires, is may introduce new
given three minutes to provisions germane to the
explain his vote. No subject matter or may
amendment on the bill is report out an entirely new
allowed at this stage. bill on the subject.
• The bill is c. The Conference Committee
approved by an prepares a report to be
affirmative vote signed by all the conferees
of a majority of and the Chairman.
the Members d. The Conference Committee
present. Report is submitted for
• If the bill is consideration/approval of
disapproved, the both Houses. No
same is amendment is allowed.
transmitted to the
Archives. 9. Transmittal Of The Bill
To The President: Copies
6. Transmittal Of The of the bill, signed by the
Approved Bill To The Senate President and the
Senate: The approved bill Speaker of the House of
is transmitted to the Senate Representatives and
for its concurrence. certified by both the
Secretary of the Senate and
the Secretary General of
the House, are transmitted
to the President.
10. Presidential Action On
The Bill
a. If the bill is approved the
President, the same is
assigned an RA number
and transmitted to the
House where it originated.
b. If the bill is vetoed, the
same, together with a
message citing the reason
for the veto, is transmitted
to the House where the bill
originated.
11. Action On Approved Bill:
The bill is reproduced, and
copies are sent to the
Official Gazette Office for
publication and distribution
to the implementing
agencies. It is then included
in the annual compilation
of Acts and Resolutions
12. Action On Vetoed Bill:
The message is included in
the Order of Business. If
the Congress decides to
override the veto, the
House and the Senate shall
proceed separately to
reconsider the bill or the
vetoed items of the bill. If
the bill or its vetoed items
is passed by a vote of two-
thirds of the Members of
each House, such bill or
items shall become a law.
Notes:
Bills: A bill is the form used for
most legislation, whether
permanent or temporary, general
or special, public or private. A
bill originating in the House of
Representatives is designated by
the letters “H.R.”, signifying
“House of Representatives”,
followed by a number that it
retains throughout all its
parliamentary stages. Bills are
presented to the President for
action when approved in identical
form by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
Resolution: Legislation
introduced in either the House of
Representatives or the Senate, but
unlike bills they may be limited
in effect to the Congress or one
of its chambers. The three types
of resolutions are joint
resolutions, simple resolutions
and concurrent resolutions.
Joint Resolutions: Joint
resolutions may originate either
in the House of Representatives
or in the Senate. There is little
practical difference between a
bill and a joint resolution. Both
are subject to the same
procedure, except for a joint
resolution proposing an
amendment to the Constitution.
On approval of such a resolution
by two-thirds of both the House
and Senate, it is sent directly to
the Administrator of General
Services for submission to the
individual states for ratification.
It is not presented to the
President for approval. A joint
resolution originating in the
House of Representatives is
designated “H.J.Res.” followed
by its individual number. Joint
resolutions become law in the
same manner as bills.
A bill may become a law, even
without the President’s signature,
if the President does not sign a
bill within 30 days from receipt
in his office. A bill may also
become a law without the
President’s signature if Congress
overrides a presidential veto by
two-thirds vote.

Concurrent Resolutions: Matters

affecting the operations of both
the House of Representatives and
Senate are usually initiated by
means of concurrent resolutions.
A concurrent resolution
originating in the House of
Representatives is designated
“H.Con.Res.” followed by its
individual number. On approval
by both the House of
Representatives and Senate, they
are signed by the Clerk of the
House and the Secretary of the
Senate. They are not presented to
the President for action.

Simple Resolutions: A matter

concerning the operation of either
the House of Representatives or
Senate alone is initiated by a
simple resolution. A resolution
affecting the House of
Representatives is designated
“H.Res.” followed by its number.
They are not presented to the
President for action.
Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR
No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Facts: Petitioners seek the
nullification as unconstitutional
of Republic Act No. 9716,
entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st)
and Second (2nd) Legislative
Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative
District From Such
Reapportionment.“
Petitioners contend that the
reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the
creation of a legislative district.
The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act
No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population
standard.
Held: Petition Denied. There is
no specific provision in the
Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.
The petitioners rely on the second
sentence of Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution,
coupled with what they perceive
to be the intent of the framers of
the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000
for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section
5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, succinctly provides:
"Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at
least one representative.“
The provision draws a plain and
clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district
on one hand, and the entitlement
of a province to a district on the
other. For while a province is
entitled to at least a
representative, with nothing
mentioned about population, a
city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to
be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision
of a comma to separate the
phrase "each city with a
population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" from the
phrase "or each province" point
to no other conclusion than that
the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not
for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the
Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a
city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a
province.
The 250,000 minimum
population requirement for
legislative districts in cities was,
in turn, the subject of
interpretation by this Court in
Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC (242
SCRA 211).
In Mariano, the issue presented
was the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7854, which
was the law that
converted the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized
City. As it happened, Republic
Act No. 7854 created an
additional legislative district for
Makati, which at that time was a
lone district. The petitioners in
that case argued that the creation
of an additional district would
violate Section 5(3), Article VI of
the Constitution, because the
resulting districts would be
supported by a population of less
than 250,000, considering that
Makati had a total population of
only 450,000. The Supreme
Court sustained the
constitutionality of the law and
the validity of the newly created
district, explaining the operation
of the Constitutional phrase "each
city with a
population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the
addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord
with section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the
population of Makati stands at
only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). Said section provides,
inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that
the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000),
its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement
of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides that a city
whose population has increased
to more than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one
congressional representative 28
(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the
application of the 250,000
minimum population requirement
for cities only to its initial
legislative district.
In other words, while Section
5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution requires a city to
have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another
250,000 to be entitled to an
additional district.
There is no reason why the
Mariano case, which involves the
creation of an additional district
within a city,
should not be applied to
additional districts in provinces.
Indeed, if an additional
legislative district created within
a city is not required to represent
a population of at least 250,000
in order to be valid, neither
should such be needed for an
additional district in a province,
considering moreover that a
province is entitled to an initial
seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its
population.
Apropos for discussion is the
provision of the Local
Government Code on the creation
of a province which, by virtue of
and upon creation, is entitled to at
least a legislative district.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local
Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A
province may be created if it has
an average annual income, as
certified
by the Department of Finance,
of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either
of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at
least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the
Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than
two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office
Notably, the requirement of
population is not an indispensable
requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the
indispensable income
requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but
a reflection of the pertinent ideas
that ran through the deliberations
on the words and meaning of
Section 5 of Article VI.
Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976,
September 18, 1995 (248 SCRA
300)
Issue: The residency requirement
of Former First Lady Imelda
Marcos is being questioned in
this case.
Held: The 1987 Constitution
mandates that an aspirant for
election to the House of
Representatives be "a registered
voter in the district in which he
shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately
preceding the election." The
mischief which this provision
seeks to prevent is the possibility
of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions
and needs of a community and
not
identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that
community.“
A perusal of the Resolution of the
COMELEC's Second Division
reveals a startling confusion in
the application of settled
concepts of "Domicile" and
"Residence" in election law.
While the COMELEC seems to
be in agreement
with the general proposition that
for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a
tendency to substitute or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual
residence, a conception not
intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's
qualifications for election to the
House of Representatives as
required by the 1987
Constitution. As it were,
residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an
elective position, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code
decrees that "[f]or the exercise of
civil rights and the fulfillment of
civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of
habitual residence." In Ong vs.
Republic (19 SCRA 966) this
court, took the concept of
domicile to mean an individual's
"permanent home", "a place to
which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one
intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent."
Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of "the
fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place" and
animus manendi, or the intention
of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary
conception, implies the factual
relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The
essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is
that residence involves the intent
to leave when the purpose for
which the resident has taken up
his abode ends. One may seek a
place for purposes such as
pleasure, business, or health. If a
person's intent be to remain, it
becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his
purpose is established it is
residence.
It is thus, quite perfectly normal
for an individual to have different
residences in various places.
However, a person can only have
a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In
Uytengsu vs. Republic (95 Phil.
890), we laid this distinction
quite clearly:
"There is a difference between
domicile and residence.
Residence is used to indicate a
place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary;
'domicile' denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may
have a residence in one place and
a domicile in another. Residence
is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of
residence. His place of residence
is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means
necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of
remaining will constitute
domicile.“
For political purposes the
concepts of residence and
domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws.
As these concepts have evolved
in our election law, what has
clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence
for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray (52 Phil.
645), the Court held that "the
term residence .is synonymous
with domicile which imports not
reside in a fixed place, but also
personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention." Larena vs.
Teves (61 Phil. 36) reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving
the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of
Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental.
Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil.
294), held that the absence from
residence to pursue studies or
practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected
does not constitute loss of
residence. So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our
election law that in these and
other election law cases, this
Court has stated that the mere
absence of an individual from his
permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not
result in a loss or change of
domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987
Constitution on the residence
qualification for certain elective
positions have placed beyond
doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it
actually means only "domicile" to
wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to
Section 5, I remember that in the
1971 Constitutional Convention,
there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less
than one year immediately
preceding the day of the
elections. So my question is:
What is the Committee's concept
of residence of a candidate for
the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive
residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President.,
insofar as the regular members of
the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section
merely provides, among others,
'and a resident thereof', that is, in
the district for a period of not less
than one year preceding the day
of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution,
the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next
question is on Section 7 page 2. I
think Commissioner Nolledo has
raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So,
would the gentleman consider at
the proper time to go back to
actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might
encounter some difficulty
especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in
the Article on Suffrage says that
Filipinos living abroad may vote
as enacted by law. So, we have
to stick to the original concept
that it should be by domicile and
not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives
(199 SCRA 692), this Court
concluded that the framers of the
1987 Constitution obviously
adhered to the definition given to
the term residence in election
law, regarding it as having the
same meaning as domicile.
Domino vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No.134015, July 19,1999 (310
SCRA 546)
 Concept of Residence and
Domicile
Held: It is doctrinally settled that
the term "residence," as used in
the law prescribing the
qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as
"domicile," which imports not
only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such
intention. "Domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to
which, whenever absent for
business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return.
"Domicile" is a question of
intention and circumstances.. In
the consideration of
circumstances, three rules must
be borne in mind, namely: (1)
that a man must have a residence
or domicile somewhere; (2) when
once established it remains until a
new one is acquired; and (3) a
man can have but one residence
or domicile at a time.
Records show that petitioner’s
domicile of origin was Candon,
Ilocos Sur and that sometime in
1991, he acquired a new domicile
of choice at 24 Bonifacio St.
Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
Quezon City,
as shown by his certificate of
candidacy for the position of
representative of the 3rd District
of Quezon City in the May 1995
election. Petitioner is now
claiming that he had effectively
abandoned his "residence" in
Quezon City and has established
a new "domicile" of choice at the
Province of Sarangani.
A person’s "domicile" once
established is considered to
continue and will not be deemed
lost until a new one is
established. To successfully
effect a change of domicile one
must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In
other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at
the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
It is the contention of petitioner
that his actual physical presence
in Alabel, Sarangani since
December 1996 was sufficiently
established by the lease of a
house and lot located therein in
January 1997 and by the
affidavits and certifications under
oath of the residents of that place
that they have seen petitioner and
his family residing in their
locality.
While this may be so, actual and
physical is not in itself sufficient
to show that from said date he
had transferred his residence in
that place. To establish a new
domicile of choice, personal
presence in the place must be
coupled with conduct indicative
of that intention. While
"residence" simply requires
bodily presence in a given place,
"domicile" requires not only such
bodily presence in that place but
also a declared and probable
intent to make it one’s fixed and
permanent place of abode, one’s
home.
As a general rule, the principal
elements of domicile, physical
presence in the locality involved
and intention to adopt it as a
domicile, must concur in order to
establish a new domicile. No
change of domicile will result if
either of these elements is absent.
Intention to acquire a domicile
without actual residence in the
locality does not result in
acquisition of domicile, nor does
the fact of physical presence
without intention.
The lease contract entered into
sometime in January 1997, does
not adequately support a change
of domicile. The lease contract
may be indicative of DOMINO’s
intention to reside in Sarangani
but it does not engender the kind
of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one’s original
domicile.
The mere absence of individual
from his permanent residence, no
matter how long, without the
intention to abandon it does not
result in loss or change of
domicile. Thus the date of the
contract of lease of a house and
lot located in the province of
Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997,
cannot be used, in the absence of
other circumstances, as the
reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement.
Further, Domino’s lack of
intention to abandon his
residence in Quezon City is
further strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in one of the
precincts in Quezon City. While
voting is not conclusive of
residence, it does give rise to a
strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where
DOMINO registered in his
former barangay. Exercising the
right of election franchise is a
deliberate public assertion of the
fact of residence, and is said to
have decided preponderance in a
doubtful case upon the place the
elector claims as, or believes to
be, his residence. The fact that a
party continuously voted in a
particular locality is a strong
factor in assisting to determine
the status of his domicile.
His claim that his registration in
Quezon City was erroneous and
was caused by events over which
he had no control cannot be
sustained.
The general registration of voters
for purposes of the May 1998
elections was scheduled for two
(2) consecutive weekends, viz.:
June 14, 15, 21, and 22.
While, Domino’s intention to
establish residence in Sarangani
can be gleaned from the fact that
be bought the
house he was renting on
November 4, 1997, that he sought
cancellation of his previous
registration in Quezon City on 22
October 1997, 34 and that he
applied for transfer of registration
from Quezon City to Sarangani
by reason of change of residence
on 30 August 1997, 35 DOMINO
still falls short of the one year
residency requirement under the
Constitution.
In showing compliance with the
residency requirement, both
intent and actual presence in the
district one intends to represent
must satisfy the length of time
prescribed by the fundamental
law. Domino’s failure to do so
rendered him ineligible and his
election to office null and void
Dimaporo vs. Mitra, G.R. No.
96859, October 15, 1991 (202
SCRA 779)
Facts: Petitioner Mohammad Ali
Dimaporo was elected
Representative for the 2nd
Legislative District of Lanao del
Sur during the 1987
congressional elections.
In Jan., 1990, petitioner filed
with the COMELEC a Certificate
of Candidacy for the position of
Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. Upon being informed
of such development by the
COMELEC, respondents Speaker
and Secretary of the House of
Reps. excluded petitioner's name
from the Roll of Members of the
House of Reps. pursuant to Sec.
67, Article IX of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881)
Having lost in the elections,
petitioner then tried but failed in
his bid to regain his seat in
Congress. Hence, this petition.
He maintains that he did not lose
his seat as congressman because
Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881
is not operative under the present
Constitution, being contrary
thereto, and therefore not
applicable to the present
members of Congress.
Issue: Whether Sec. 67, Art. IX
of B.P. Blg. 881 is operative
under the present Constitution
Held: YES. Sec. 67, Art. IX of
B.P. Blg. 881 reads: "Any
elective official whether national
or local running for
any office other than the one
which he is holding in a
permanent capacity except for
President and Vice President shall
be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy."
Petitioner failed to discern that
rather than cut short the term of
office of elective public officials,
this statutory provision seeks to
ensure that such officials serve
out their entire term of office and
thereby cutting short their tenure
by making it clear that should
they fail in their candidacy, they
cannot go back to their former
position. This is in consonant
with the constitutional edict that
all public officials must serve the
people with utmost loyalty and
not trifle with the mandate which
they have received from their
constituents.
In theorizing that the provision
under consideration cuts short the
term of office of a Member of
Congress, petitioner seems to
confuse "term" with "tenure" of
office.
"The term of office prescribed by
the Constitution may not be
extended or shortened by the
legislature, but the period during
which an officer actually holds
the office (tenure), may be
affected by circumstances within
or beyond the power of said
officer. These situations will not
change the duration of the term
of office.“
Under the questioned provision,
when an elective official covered
thereby files a cert. of candidacy
for another office, he is deemed
to have voluntarily cut short his
tenure, not his term. The term
remains and his successor, if any,
is allowed to serve its unexpired
portion.
The fact that the ground cited in
Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881
is not mentioned in the
Constitution itself as a mode of
shortening the tenure of office of
the members of Congress does
not preclude its application to
present members of Congress.
Sec. 2, Art. IX of the Constitution
provides that "xxx All other
public officers and employees
may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by
impeachment." Such
constitutional
expression clearly recognizes that
the 4 grounds found in Art. VI of
the Constitution by which the
tenure of a Congressman may be
shortened are NOT exclusive.
Moreover, as the mere act of
filing the certificate of candidacy
for another office produces
automatically the permanent
forfeiture of the elective position
being presently held, it is not
necessary that the other position
be
actually held. The ground for
forfeiture in Sec. 13, Art. VI of
the Constitution is different from
the forfeiture decreed in Sec. 67,
Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is
actually a mode of voluntary
renunciation of office under Sec.
7, par. 2 of Art. VI of the
Constitution.
Lozada vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. L-59068, January 27, 1983
(120 SCRA 337)
Facts: This is a petition for
mandamus filed by Lozada and
Igot as a representative suit for
and in behalf of those who wish
to participate in the election
irrespective of party affiliation, to
compel the respondent
COMELEC to call a special
election to fill up existing
vacancies numbering 12 in the
Interim Batasan Pambansa. The
petition is based on Sec. 5 (2),
Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution
which reads:
"In case a vacancy arises in the
BP 18 months or more before a
regular election, the COMELEC
shall call a special election to be
held within 60 days after the
vacancy occurs to elect the
Member to serve the unexpired
term.“
Petitioner Lozada claims that he
is a Tax Payer (TP) and a bona
fide elector of Cebu City and a
transient voter of QC, MM, who
desires to run for the position in
the BP; while petitioner Igot
alleges that, as TP, he has
standing to petition by mandamus
the calling of a special election as
mandated by the 1973 Consti.
Held: I. a. As taxypayers,
petitioners may not file the
instant petition, for nowhere
therein is it alleged that
tax money is being illegally
spent. Xxx
b. As voters, neither have
petitioners the requisite interest
or personality to qualify them to
maintain and
prosecute the present petition.
Petitioners' standing to sue may
not be predicated upon an interest
of the kind alleged here, which is
held in common by all members
of the public because of the
necessarily abstract nature of the
injury supposedly shared by all
citizens.
II. a. The SC's jurisdiction over
the COMELEC is only to review
by certiorari the latter's decision,
orders or rulings. xxx There is in
this case no decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC which is
sought to be reviewed by this
Court under its certiorari
jurisdiction.
b. Mandamus does not lie. There
is total absence that COMELEC
has unlawfully neglected the
performance of a ministerial duty
or has refused on being
demanded, to discharge such a
duty.
The holding of special elections
in several regional districts where
vacancies exist, would entail
huge expenditure of money. Only
the
BP can make the necessary
appropriation for the purpose,
and this power of the BP may
neither be subject to mandamus
by the courts much less may
COMELEC compel BP to
exercise its power of
appropriation.
III. Perhaps the strongest reason
why the said provision is not
intended to apply to the Interim
National Assembly is the fact that
as passed by the Con Con, the
Interim NA was to be composed
by the delegates to the Con Con,
as well as the then incumbent
President and VP, and the
members of the Senate and
House of Rep. of Congress under
the 1935 Constitution. With such
number of representatives
representing each congressional
district, or a province, not to
mention the Senators, there was
felt absolutely no need for filling
up vacancies occurring in the
Interim NA, considering the
uncertainty of the duration of its
existence.
Philconsa vs. Mathay, G.R. No.
L-25554, October 4, 1966 (18
SCRA 300)
Facts: PHILCONSA has filed in
this Court a suit against the
Auditor General of the Phils., and
the Auditor of the Congress,
seeking to permanently enjoin the
aforesaid officials from
authorizing or passing in audit
the payment of the increased
salaries authorized by RA 4134
(approved 6/10/64) to the
Speaker and members of the
HRep before 12/30/69.
The 1965-1966 Budget
implemented the increase in
salary of the Speaker and
members of the HRep set by RA
4134. The petitioners contend
that such implementation is
violative of Art VI, Sec. 14 of the
1935 Constitution, which
provided that: "xxx No increase
in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of
the full term
of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of
Representatives approving such
increase. xxx“
The reason given being that the
term of the 8 senators elected in
1963, and who took part in the
approval of RA 4134, will expire
only on 12/30/69; while the term
of the members of the House who
participated in the approval of the
said Act expired on 12/30/65.
Held: The Court agrees with
petitioners that the increased
compensation provided is not
operative until 12/30/69, when
the full term of all members of
the Senate and House that
approved it will have expired.
Purpose of the provision.-- The
reason for the this rule, the Court
said, is to place a "legal bar to the
legislators yielding to the natural
temptation to increase their
salaries. Not that the power to
provide for higher compensation
is lacking, but with the length of
time that has to elapse before an
increase becomes effective, there
is a deterrent factor to any such
measure unless the need for it is
clearly felt.“
Significantly, in establishing what
might be termed a waiting period,
the constitutional provision refers
to "all members of the Senate
and of the House or Rep." in the
same sentence, as a single unit,
without distinction or separation
between them. This unitary
treatment is emphasized by the
fact that the provision speaks of
the "expiration of the full term"
xxx using the singular form, and
not the plural, despite the
difference in the terms of office,
xxx thereby rendering more
evident the intent to consider
both houses for the purpose as
indivisible
components of one single
Legislature.
The use of the word "term" in the
singular, when combined with the
following phrase "all the
members of the Senate and of the
House," underscores that in the
application of said provision, the
fundamental consideration is that
the terms of office of all
members of the Legislature that
enacted the measure must have
expired before the increase in
compensation can become
operative.
Term of all the members of the
Congress, instead of all the
members of the Senate and of the
House." This is a distinction w/o
a difference, since the Senate and
the House together constitute the
Congress.
The use of the phrase "of the
Senate and of the House" when it
could have employed the shorter
expression "of the Senate and the
House" is grammatically correct.
To speak of "members of the
Senate and the House" would
imply that the members of the
Senate also held membership in
the House.
Ligot vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-
34676, April 30, 1974 (56 SCRA
823)
Facts: Petitioner served as a
member of the House of
Representatives of Congress for 3
consecutive 4-yr terms covering
a 12-yr span from 12/30/57 to
12/30/69. During his 2nd term in
office, RA 4134 was enacted into
law.
Petitioner was reelected to a 3rd
term (12/30/65 to 12/30/69) but
was held not entitled to the salary
increase of P32,000 during such
third term by virtue of this
Court's unanimous decision in
Philconsa v. Mathay. Petitioner
lost his bid for a consecutive 4th
term in the 1969 elections and his
term having expired on 12/31/69,
filed a claim for retirement under
CA 186, Sec. 12 (c), as amended.
The HRep thus issued a treasury
warrant in petitioner's favor as
his retirement gratuity, using the
increased salary of P32,000 p.a.
Respondent Congress Auditor did
not sign the warrant pending
resolution by the Auditor Gen. of
a similar claim filed by Cong
Singson. When the Auditor Gen.'s
adverse decision on Singson's
claim came out, resp Auditor
requested petitioner to return the
warrant for recomputation.
Petitioner's request for recon
having been denied by the
Auditor Gen. he filed the present
petition for review.
Held: 1. [T]he "rate of pay as
provided by law" for members of
Congress retiring on 12/30/69,
such as petitioner, must
necessarily be P7,200 p.a., the
compensation they received "as
provided by law" and the Consti
during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to
members of Congress whose
terms expired on 12/30/69
computed on the basis of an
increased salary of P32,000 p.a.
would be to pay them prohibited
emoluments w/c in effect
increase the salary beyond that
w/c they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during
their incumbency. This would be
a subtle way of going around the
constitutional prohibition and
increasing in effect their
compensation during their term
of office and of doing indirectly
what could not be done directly.
3. Petitioners' contention that
since the increased salary of
P32T p.a. was already operative
when his
retirement took effect on
12/30/69, his retirement gratuity
should be based on such
increased salary cannot be
sustained as far as he and other
members of Congress similarly
situated are concerned for the
simple reason that a retirement or
benefit is a form of compensation
within the purview of the
Constitutional provision limiting
their compensation and "other
emoluments" to their salary as
provided by law.
People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. No.
132875-76, November 16, 2001
(324 SCRA 689)
Held: The immunity from arrest
or detention of Senators and
members of the House of
Representatives, the
latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The
history of the provision shows
that the privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The
provision granting an exemption
as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not
be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable
considerations
The 1935 Constitution provided
in its Article VI on the
Legislative Department:
SECTION 15. The Senators and
Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace be privileged
from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of
Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; . .
Because of the broad coverage of
felony and breach of the peace,
the exemption applied only to
civil arrests.
A congressman like the accused-
appellant, convicted under Title
Eleven of the Revised Penal
Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from
arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all
persons still to be tried or whose
convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened
the privilege of immunity as
follows: Article VIII, Sec. 9. A
Member of the Batasang
Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his
attendance at its sessions and in
going to and returning from the
same.
For offenses punishable by more
than six years imprisonment,
there was no immunity from
arrest. The
restrictive interpretation of
immunity and the intent to
confine it within carefully
defined parameters is illustrated
by the concluding portion of the
provision, to wit:
“but the Batasang Pambansa shall
surrender the member involved to
the custody of the law within
twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its
next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its
failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres
to the same restrictive rule minus
the obligation of Congress to
surrender the subject
Congressman to the custody of
the law. The requirement that he
should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also
been removed. For relatively
minor offenses, it is enough that
Congress is in session.
Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, G.R.
No. L-15905, August 3, 1966 (17
SCRA 876)
Facts: This is an ordinary civil
action for the recovery by
plaintiffs Jimenez, et al., of
several sums of money, by way
of damages for the publication of
an allegedly libelous letter of
defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang. An open letter of
the President, published in
several newspapers of general
circulation saying that certain
members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines had been
preparing for a coup and working
for the candidacy of the
Secretary of Defense for the
Presidency. Upon being
summoned, the Cabangbang
moved to dismiss the complaint
upon the ground that the letter in
question is not libelous, and that,
even if it were, said letter is a
privileged communication.
Issues: Whether the publication
in question is a privileged
communication; and, if not,
whether it is libelous
or not.
Held: (1) The determination of
the first issue depends on w/n the
publication falls w/in the purview
of the phrase "speech or debate
therein"-- that is to say, in
Congress -- used in this
provision.
Scope of Parliamentary Freedom
of Speech and Debate. -- "Said
expression refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official
functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or
votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in
session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether
the same is in session or not, and
other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress
or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as
members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its
functions as such, at the time of
the performance of the acts in
question."
The publication involved in this
case does not belong to this
category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open
letter to the President dated
11/14/58, when Congress
presumably was not in session,
and defendant caused said letter
to be published in several
newspapers of general circulation
in the Phils., on or about said
date.
It is obvious that, in thus causing
the communication to be so
published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a
member of Congress of as officer
or any Committee thereof.
(2) Letter was not libelous.-- The
letter was not libelous because it
mentions that herein appellants as
possibly "unwitting tools of a
plan of which they have
absolutely no knowledge." In
other words, the very document
upon which plaintiffs' action is
based explicitly indicates that
they might be absolutely unaware
of the alleged operation plans,
and that they may be unwitting
tools of the planners. The
statement is not derogatory to the
plaintiffs to the point of entitling
them to recover damages.
Osmena vs. Pendatun, G.R. No.
L-17144, October 28, 1960 (109
Phil 863)
Facts: In 1960, Cong. Osmena
delivered a privilege speech in
Congress entitled "A Message to
Garcia," maliciously denouncing
and charging the administration
of Pres. Garcia. As a result of
this, the House of
Representatives through House
Resolution No. 59 created a
special committee to investigate
the veracity of the charges and
for him to show cause why he
should not be punished by the
House if he failed to substantiate
his charges.
On his side, Osmena contended
in his petition that: (1) the
Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so,
for words spoken in the House,
he ought not to be questioned; (2)
that his speech constituted no
disorderly behaviour for which
he could be punished; (3)
supposing he could be
questioned and disciplined
therefor, the House had lost the
power to do so because it had
taken up other business before
approving House Resolution No.
59; (4) that the House has no
power, under the Constitution, to
suspend one of its members.
Resolution No. 175 found
Osmena guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour. He was
suspended for 15 months.
Held: 1. Sec. 15, Art. VI of the
1935 Constitution provides that
"for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the
Senators or Members of the
HRep "shall not be questioned in
any other place." Observe that
"they shall not be questioned in
any other place" than Congress.
But they may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the
House which petitioner himself
has invoked recognize the
House's power to hold
a member responsible "for words
spoken in debate."
The provision guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being
made responsible
in criminal or civil actions before
the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional
Hall. But it does not protect him
from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever
his words and conduct are
considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a
member thereof.
For unparliamentarily conduct,
members of Congress have been,
or could be censured, committed
to prison, suspended, even
expelled by the votes of their
colleagues.
2. On the third point of petitioner
that the House may no longer
take action against him, because
after his
speech and before approving the
Resolution No. 59, it had taken
up other business.
Courts have declared that "the
rules adopted by deliberative
bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body appointing
them." And it has been said that
"Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural and with their
observance, the courts have no
concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative
body."
3. On the question whether or not
delivery of speeches attacking the
President constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmena may
be disciplined, we believe that
the House is the judge of what
constitutes disorderly behavior,
not only because the Constitution
has conferred jurisdiction upon it,
but also because the matter
depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the
House knows best but which can
not be depicted in black and
white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts.
Adaza vs. Pacana, Jr., G.R. No.
L-68159, March 18, 1985 (135
SCRA 431)
Facts: Petitioner Homobono
Adaza was elected governor of
Misamis Oriental in the 1/30/80
elections. Elected vice-gov. for
said province in the same
elections was resp. Fernando
Pacana, Jr. Both qualified and
assumed their respective offices.
Both Adaza and Pacana filed
their certificates of candidacy for
the 5/14/84 BP elections. In the
said elections, petitioner won
while respondents lost.
On 7/23/84, respondent took his
oath of office as governor of
Misamis Oriental and started to
perform the duties of governor.
Claiming to be the lawful
occupant of the governor's office,
petitioner has brought this
petition to exclude respondent
therefrom. He argues that he was
elected to said office for a term
of 6 yrs., that he remains to be
the governor of the province until
his term expires on 3/23/86 as
provided by law, and that within
the context of the parliamentary
system, a local elective official
can hold the position to which he
had been elected and
simultaneously be an elected
member of Parliament.
Held: 1. The constitutional
prohibition against a member of
the BP from holding any other
office of
employment in the government
during his tenure is clear and
unambiguous. Sec. 10, Art. VIII
of the 1973 Constitution
provides that: "Sec. 10. A
member of the National
Assembly shall not hold any
other office or employment in
the government xxx except that
of prime minister or member of
the cabinet.
It is of no avail to petitioner that
the system of gov’t in other states
allows a local elective official to
act as an elected member of the
parliament at the same time. The
dictate of the people in whom
legal sovereignty lies is explicit.
xxx [T]he incompatibility herein
present is one created by no less
than the constitution itself.
2. The second proposition
advanced by petitioner is that
resp. Pacana, as a mere private
citizen, had no right
to assume the governorship left
vacant by petitioner's election to
the BP. He maintains that resp.
should be considered as having
abandoned or resigned from the
vice-governorship when he filed
his cert. of candidacy. The point
pressed runs afoul of BP 697,
Sec. 13 (2) of w/c provides that
governors, mayors, members of
the various sangguniang or
barangay officials shall, upon
filing a cert. of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of
absence from office." Respondent
falls within the coverage of this
provision considering that he was
a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan.
Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr., G.R.
No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
(113 SCRA 32)
Facts: On 5/14/79, an election
for the 11 Directors of the
International Pipe Industries
Corp. (IPI) was held.
There were two groups, the Puyat
Group and the Acero Group. The
Puyat Group would be in control
of the Board and of the
management of IPI. On 5/25/79,
the Acero Group instituted at the
SEC quo warranto proc.
questioning the 5/14/79 election.
The said group claimed that the
votes were not properly counted
May 25-31, 1979, the Puyat
Group claims that at the
conferences of the parties with
respondent SEC Commissioner,
Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez,
then a member of the Interim BP,
orally entered his appearance as
counsel for resp. Acero to which
the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds. Sec. 11,
Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution
provided that no Assemblyman
could "appear as counsel before
xxx any administrative body,"
and SEC was an administrative
body.
On 7/17/79, the SEC granted
leave to intervene on the basis of
Atty. Fernandez' ownership of ten
shares. It is this Order allowing
intervention that precipitated the
instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition w/ Prel. Inj.
On 9/4/79, the Court en banc
issued a TRO enjoining resp SEC
Commissioner from allowing the
participation as an intervenor, of
respondent Fernandez at the
proceedings in the SEC case.
Held: The intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the
SEC case falls w/in the ambit of
the prohibition contained in the
Constitution. There has been an
indirect "appearance as counsel
before xxx an administrative
body."
Ordinarily, by virtue of the
Motion of Intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot
be said to be appearing as
counsel. Ostensibly, he is not
appearing on behalf of another,
although he is joining the cause
of the private respondents. His
appearance could theoretically be
for the protection of his
ownership of 10 shares of IPI in
respect of the matter in litigation.
However, certain salient
circumstances militate against the
intervention of Assemblyman F.
in the SEC case. He had
acquired a mere P200 worth of
stocks in IPI. He acquired them
"after the fact," that is, on
5/30/79, after the contested
election of Directors on 5/14/79,
after the quo warranto suit had
been filed on 5/25/79 before
SEC and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case
before the SEC on 5/31/79. And
what is more, before he moved
to intervene, he had signified his
intention to appear as counsel for
resp. Acero, but w/c was
objected to by petitioners.
Realizing, perhaps, the validity of
the objection, he decided, instead
to "intervene" on the ground of
legal interest in the matter under
litigation.
Santiago vs. Guingona, G.R.
No. 134577, November 18, 1998
(298 SCRA 756)
Held: While the Constitution is
explicit on the manner of electing
a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting
the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that
the Charter says is that "[e]ach
House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem
necessary." To our mind, the
method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional
provision. Therefore, such
method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution
vests in each house of Congress
the power "to determine the rules
of its
proceedings." Pursuant thereto,
the Senate formulated and
adopted a set of rules to govern
its internal affairs. Pertinent to
the instant case are Rules I and II
thereof, which provide:
"Rule I: ELECTIVE OFFICERS
"SEC. 1. The Senate shall elect,
in the manner hereinafter
provided, a President, a President
Pro Tempore, a Secretary, and a
Sergeant-at-Arms.
"These officers shall take their
oath of office before entering into
the discharge of their duties.
RULE II: ELECTION OF
OFFICERS
"SEC. 2. The officers of the
Senate shall be elected by the
majority vote of all its Members.
Should there be more than one
candidate for the same office, a
nominal vote shall be taken;
otherwise, the elections shall be
by viva voce or by resolution.“
Notably, the Rules of the Senate
do not provide for the positions
of majority and minority leaders.
Neither is there an open clause
providing specifically for such
offices and prescribing the
manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof. At
any rate, such offices, by
tradition and long practice, are
actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or
statutory guidelines or specific
rules, this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the
Senate relative thereto. On
grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers,
courts may not intervene in the
internal affairs of the legislature;
it is not within the province of
courts to direct Congress how to
do its work.
 Paraphrasing the words of
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano,
this Court is of the opinion that
where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the legislature must be
given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to
implement them, before the
courts may intervene.
Needless to state, legislative
rules, unlike statutory laws, do
not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact,
they "are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting
them." Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance are
of no concern to the courts, for
said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative
body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing,
Congress verily has the power
and prerogative to provide for
such officers as it may deem.
And it is certainly within its own
jurisdiction and discretion to
prescribe the parameters for the
exercise of this prerogative.
This Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude
into that exclusive realm, without
running afoul of constitutional
principles that it is bound to
protect and uphold — the very
duty that justifies the Court's
being. Constitutional respect and
a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents this Court from
prying into the internal workings
of the Senate. To repeat, this
Court will be neither a tyrant nor
a wimp; rather, it will remain
steadfast and judicious in
upholding the rule and majesty of
the law.
To accede, then, to the
interpretation of petitioners
would practically amount to
judicial legislation, a clear breach
of the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. If for this
argument alone, the petition
would easily fail.
Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-
2821, March 4, 1949 (83 Phil
17)
FACTS: Jose Avelino was Senate
President in 1949. On 2/21/49,
Senators Tanada and Sanidad
filed a
resolution (Resolution 68) against
Avelino calling for an
investigation. During the session,
Avelino and 6 others walked out
leaving 12 senators behind.
The 12 senators continued the
session and passed resolution no.
67 declaring the Senate President
seat vacant. Senator Cuenco was
eventually elected as the acting
President of the Senate.
By his petition in this quo
warranto proceeding petitioner
asks the Court to declare him the
rightful President of the
Philippine Senate and oust
respondent, Senator Cuenco.
Issues: a. Does the Court have
jurisdiction over the subject-
matter?
b. It if has, were resolutions Nos.
68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
Held: a. To the first question, the
answer is in the negative, in view
of the separation of powers, the
political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional
grant to the Senate of the power
to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the
judiciary.
b. The second question depends
upon these sub-questions: (1)
Was the session of the so-called
rump Senate
a continuation of the session
validly assembled w/ 22 Senators
(2 were absent-- one was abroad;
the other was confined in a
Manila hospital) in the morning
of 2/21/49? (2) Was there a
quorom in that session?
(1) Supposing that the Court has
jurisdiction, there is unanimity in
the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a
continuation of the morning
session and that a minority of 10
senators may not, by leaving the
Hall, prevent the other 12
senators from passing a
resolution that met w/ their
unanimous resolution.
(2) If the rump session was not a
continuation of the morning
session, was it validly
constituted?
Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo and
Bengzon say there was for the
following reasons: (i) the minutes
say so, (ii) at the beginning of
such session there were at least
14 senators including Senators
Pendatun and Lopez, and (iii) in
view of the absence from the
country of Senator Confessor, 12
senators constitute a majority of
the Senate of 23 senators. When
the Constitution declares that a
majority of "each House" shall
constitute a quorom, "the House"
does not mean "all" the members.
Even a majority of all the
members constitute the "House."
There is a difference bet. a
majority of "all the members of
the House" and a majority of "the
House," the latter requiring less
number than the first.
Therefore, an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23) constitutes
constitutional majority of the
Senate for the purpose of the
quorom. J. Pablo believes further
that even if the 12 did not
constitute a quorom, they could
have ordered the arrest of one, at
least, of the absent members
People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. No.
132875-76, November 16, 2001
(324 SCRA 689)
Held: The accused-appellant
argues that a member of
Congress' function to attend
sessions is underscored by
Section 16 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House
shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of
absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such
House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant
has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the
operation of
Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of
Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a
legitimate one.
The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a
crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six
months is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional
foundations.
Pacete vs. Sec. of the
Commission on Appointments,
G.R. No. L-25895, July 23, 1971
(40 SCRA 58)
Doctrine: The rules of the
Commission on Appointments
concerning its internal business
could be reviewed
by the Courts, that is, it is a
justiciable matter, when a certain
construction of such rules would
defeat the right of the individual
to a public office.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R.
No. 127255, August 14, 1997
(277 SCRA 268)
Held: It is clear from the
foregoing facts that what is
alleged to have been violated in
the enactment of R.A. No. 8240
are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather
than constitutional requirements
for the enactment of a law, i.e.,
Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do
not claim that there was no
quorum but only that, by some
maneuver allegedly in violation
of the rules of the House, Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented
from questioning the presence of
a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the
House rules were adopted
pursuant to the constitutional
provision that "each House may
determine the rules of its
proceedings" and that for this
reason they are judicially
enforceable. To begin with, this
contention stands the principle on
its head. In the decided cases, the
constitutional provision that
"each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings" was
invoked by parties, although not
successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the
legislative branch to conduct its
business free from interference
by courts. Here petitioners cite
the provision for the opposite
purpose of invoking judicial
review.
But the cases, both here and
abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts
the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law,
a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there
was a violation of a constitutional
provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v.
Pendatun (109 Phil. 870), it was
held: "At any rate, courts have
declared that 'the rules adopted
by deliberative bodies are subject
to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.' And it has been
said that 'Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no
concern.
They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative
body.' Consequently, 'mere failure
to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative
body) when the requisite number
of members have agreed to a
particular measure.'“
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph
& Co. (144 US 5), the rule was
stated thus: "The Constitution
empowers each house to
determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its
rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be
attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method
are open to the determination of
the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say
that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even
more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different
one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and
within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or
tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist (64 Fla.
41), it was held: "The provision
that each House shall determine
the rules of its
proceedings does not restrict the
power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or
to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but
in the absence of constitutional
restraints, and when exercised by
a majority of a constitutional
quorum, such authority extends
to a determination of the
propriety and effect of any action
as it is taken by the body as it
proceeds in the exercise of any
power, in the transaction of any
business, or in the performance
of any duty conferred upon it by
the Constitution.“
In State ex rel. City Loan &
Savings Co. v. Moore (124 Ohio
St. 256), the Supreme Court of
Ohio stated: "The
provision for reconsideration is
no part of the Constitution and is
therefore entirely within the
control of the General Assembly.
Having made the rule, it should
be regarded, but a failure to
regard it is not the subject matter
of judicial inquiry. It has been
decided by the courts of last
resort of many states, and also by
the United States Supreme Court,
that a legislative act will not be
declared invalid for
noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank (79
Conn. 141), the Supreme Court
of Errors of Connecticut declared
itself as follows:
"The Constitution declares that
each house shall determine the
rules of its own proceedings and
shall have all
powers necessary for a branch of
the Legislature of a free and
independent state. Rules of
proceedings are the servants of
the House and subject to its
authority. This authority may be
abused, but when the House has
acted in a matter clearly within
its power, it would be an
unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative
department for the court to set
aside such action as void because
it may think that the House has
misconstrued or departed from its
own rules of procedure.“
In McDonald v. State (80 Wis.
407), the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held: "When it appears that
an act was so
passed, no inquiry will be
permitted to ascertain whether
the two houses have or have not
complied strictly with their own
rules in their procedure upon the
bill, intermediate its introduction
and final passage. The
presumption is conclusive that
they have done so.
We think no court has ever
declared an act of the legislature
void for non-compliance with the
rules of procedure made by
itself , or the respective branches
thereof, and which it or they may
change or suspend at will. If
there are any such adjudications,
we decline to follow them.“
Schweizer v. Territory (5 Okl.
297) is illustrative of the rule in
these cases. The 1893 Statutes of
Oklahoma
provided for three readings on
separate days before a bill may
be passed by each house of the
legislature, with the proviso that
in case of an emergency the
house concerned may, by two-
thirds vote, suspend the operation
of the rule. Plaintiff was
convicted in the district court of
violation of a law punishing
gambling. He appealed
contending that the gambling
statute was not properly passed
by the legislature because the
suspension of the rule on three
readings had not been approved
by the requisite two-thirds vote.
Dismissing this contention, the
State Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional
provision requiring that the
legislature should read a bill in
any particular manner. It may,
then, read or deliberate upon a
bill as it sees fit, either in
accordance with its own rules, or
in violation thereof, or without
making any rules.
The provision of section 17
referred to is merely a statutory
provision for the direction of the
legislature in its action upon
proposed measures. It receives its
entire force from legislative
sanction, and it exists only at
legislative pleasure. The failure
of the legislature to properly
weigh and consider an act, its
passage through the legislature in
a hasty manner, might be reasons
for the governor withholding his
signature thereto; but this alone,
even though it is shown to be a
violation of a rule which the
legislature had made to govern its
own proceedings, could be no
reason for the
court's refusing its enforcement
after it was actually passed by a
majority of each branch of the
legislature, and duly signed by
the governor. The courts cannot
declare an act of the legislature
void on account of
noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself to
govern its deliberations.
McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407,
50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis.
414, 50 N.W. 187; State v.
Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641;
Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101,
15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the
useful summary of the rulings by
former Chief Justice Fernando,
commenting on the power of
each House of Congress to
determine its rules of
proceedings. He wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in
character. The prevailing view is
that they are subject to
revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with
their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently,
mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is
subject, however, to this
qualification.
Where the construction to be
given to a rule affects persons
other than members of the
legislative body the question
presented is necessarily judicial
in character. Even its validity is
open to question in a case where
private rights are involved. In
this case no rights of private
individuals are involved but only
those of a member who, instead
of seeking redress in the House,
chose to transfer the dispute to
this Court. We have no more
power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than
members of that House have to
look over our shoulders, as long
as no violation of constitutional
provisions is shown.
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, G.R.
No. 22041, September 11, 1924
(46 Phil. 83)
FACTS: The petitioner in this
original petition for mandamus
and injunction is Jose
Alejandrino, a Senator appointed
by the Governor General to
represent the 12th Senatorial
District. The casus belli is a
resolution adopted by the
Philippine Senate composed of
the respondent Senators, on
2/5/24, depriving Alejandrino of
all the prerogatives, privileges,
and emoluments of his office for
the period of 1 yr from 1/24
having been declared guilty of
disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the
Senate for having treacherously
assaulted Senator de Vera on the
occasion of certain phrases being
uttered by the latter in the course
of the debate regarding the
credentials of Mr. Alejandrino.
The burden of petitioner's
complaint is that the resolution is
unconstitutional and entirely of
no effect.
Held: The Organic Act
authorizes the Governor-General
to appoint 2 senators and 9
representatives to represent the
non-Christian regions in the
Legislature. These senators and
representatives "hold office until
removed by the Governor-
General" They may not be
removed by the Legislature.
However, to the Senate and the
House of Representatives
respectively, is granted the power
to "punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of 2/3, expel an
elective member." xxx. The
Constitution has purposely
withheld from the 2 Houses of
the Legislature and the Governor
General alike the power to
suspend an appointive member.
The reason is obvious.
Punishment by way of reprimand
or fine vindicates the outraged
dignity of the House without
depriving the constituency of
representation; expulsion, when
permissible, likewise vindicates
the honor of the legislative body
while giving to the constituency
an opportunity to elect anew; but
suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without
that district being afforded any
means by which to fill the
vacancy. By suspension, the seat
remains filled but the occupant is
silenced. Suspension for 1 yr. is
equivalent to qualified expulsion
or removal.
However, the writ prayed for
cannot issue, for the reason that
the SC does not possess the
power of coercion to make the
Philippine Senate take any
particular action.
Osmena vs. Pendatun, G.R. No.
L-17144, October 28, 1960 (109
Phil. 863)
Compared with Alejandrino v.
Quezon:
It is true that in Alejandrino an
obiter dictum that "suspension
deprives the electoral district of
representation without that
district being afforded any means
by which to fill that vacancy."
But the remark should be
understood to refer particularly to
the appointive senator who was
then the affected party and who
was then the affected party and
who was by the same Jones Law
charged with the
duty to represent the 12th District
xxx.
It must be observed, however,
that at that time the Legislature
had only those powers which
were granted to it by the Jones
Law; whereas now the Congress
has the full legislative powers
and prerogatives of a sovereign
nation, except as restricted by the
Constitution. xxx Now, the
Congress has the inherent
legislative prerogative of
suspension which the
Constitution did not impair.
"The Legislative power of
Congress is plenary, subject only
to such limitations as are found in
the Constitution So that any
power deemed to be legislative
by usage or tradition, is
necessarily possessed by the
Congress, unless the Constitution
provides otherwise." (Vera v.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192.)
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, G.R.
No. L-1123 March 5, 1947 (78
Phil. 1)
Facts: Three of the plaintiff
senators and 8 of the plaintiff
representatives had been
proclaimed by a majority vote of
the COMELEC as having been
elected senators and
representatives in the elections
held on 4/23/46. The 3 senators
were suspended by the Senate
shortly after the opening of the
first session following the
elections, on account of alleged
irregularities in their election.
The 8 representatives since their
election had not been allowed to
sit in the lower House, except to
take part in the election of
Speaker, for the same reason,
although they had not been
formally suspended.
As a consequence, these 3
senators and 8 representatives did
not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was
their membership reckoned in the
computation of the necessary 3/4
vote which is required in
proposing an amendment to the
Constitution (the Parity Rights
Amendment.) If these members
had been counted, the affirmative
votes in favor of the proposed
amendment would have been
short of the necessary 3/4 vote in
either branch of Congress.
HELD: 1. Jurisdiction.-- Both
notions of jurisdiction and
conclusiveness of legislative
enactment are synonymous in
that both are founded upon the
regard which the judiciary
accords a co-equal, coordinate,
and independent branch of Govt.
If a political question
conclusively binds the judges out
of respect to the political
departments, a duly certified law
or resolution also binds the
judges under the "enrolled bill
rule" born of that respect.
2. Enrolled Bill Theory.-- The
respondent's other chief reliance
is on the contention that a duly
authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verity and is
binding on the courts. Sec. 313 of
the old Code of Civil Procedure,
as amended, provides: "Official
documents may be proved as
follows: ***(2) the proceedings
of the xxx Congress, by the
journals of those bodies or of
either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions,
or by copies certified by the clerk
or secretary, or printed by their
order; Provided, that in the case
of Acts of xxx the Phil. Leg.,
when there is an existence of a
copy signed by the presiding
officers and secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such
Acts
and of the due enactment
thereof."
Reasons in support of enrollment:
Sec. 150. Reasons for
Conclusiveness.-- xxx [T]he rule
against going behind the enrolled
bill is required by the respect due
to a co-equal and independent
dept of govt, and it would be an
inquisition into the conduct of the
members of the legislature, a
very delicate power, the frequent
exercise of w/c must lead to
endless confusion in the admin.
of the law. The rule is also one of
convenience, bec. courts could
not rely on the published session
laws, but would be required to
look beyond these to the journals
of the legislature and often to any
printed bills and amendments w/c
might be found after the
adjournment of the legislature.
(Am. Jur.)
3. Compared w/ US v. Pons.--
The Court looked into the
journals in US v. Pons because,
in all probability, those were the
documents offered in evidence. It
does not appear that a duly
authenticated copy of the Act
was in existence or was placed
bef. the Court; and it has not been
shown that if that had been done,
this Court would not have held
the copy conclusive proof of the
due enactment of the law.
Casco Chemical Co. vs.
Gimenez, G.R. No. L-17931,
February 28, 1963 (7 SCRA
347)
Facts: Pursuant to the provisions
of RA 2609 (For-Ex Margin Fee
Law), the CB issued Circular No.
95, fixing a
uniform margin fee of 25% on
for-ex transactions. xxx Several
times in Nov. and Dec. 1959,
petitioner Casco,
w/c is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin
glues xxx, bought for-ex for the
importation of urea and
formaldehyde-- w/c are the main
RM in the production of said
glues and paid the corresponding
margin fee. Petitioner had sought
the refund claiming that the
separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from
said fee. Although the CB issued
the vouchers for the refund, the
Auditor of the Bank refused to
pass in audit and approve said
vouchers upon the ground that
the exemption granted by the MB
for petitioner's separate
importations of urea and
formaldehyde is not in accord w/
the provisions of sec. 2, par.
XVIII of RA
2609.
Petitioner maintains that the term
"urea formaldehyde" appearing in
the provision should be construed
as "urea and formaldehyde" and
that the resps herein have erred in
holding otherwise.
"Urea formaldehyde" is a
finished product, w/c is patently
distinct and different from "urea"
and "formaldehyde," as separate
articles used in the manufacture
of the synthetic resin known as
"urea formaldehyde." Petitioner
contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" bet.
the terms "urea" and
"formaldehyde" and that the
members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as
essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic
resin glue xxx citing the
statements made on the floor of
the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill bef. the
House xxx.
Held: Said individual statements
do not necessarily reflect the
view of the Senate. Much less do
they indicate the intent of the
HRep. Further, the enrolled bill--
w/c uses the term "urea
formaldehyde" instead of "urea
and formaldehyde,"-- is
conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure
passed by Congress and adopted
by the Pres. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill
before it was certified by the
officers of Congress and
approved by the Pres., the
remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation.
US vs. Pons, G.R. No. L-11530,
August 12, 1916 (34 Phil. 729)
Facts: Juan Pons was accused of
violating Act 2381 which
prohibits the illegal importation
of opium. In his motion for the
reversal of his conviction,
counsel contented that the last
day of the special sessions of the
Legislature for 1914 was 2/28;
that Act 2381, under which Pons
must be punished if found guilty,
was not passed or approved on
2/28 but on 3/1 of that yr; and
that, therefore, the same is null
and void. The validity of the Act
is not otherwise disputed. As it is
admitted that the last day of the
special session was, under the
Gov. Gen's proclamation, 2/28
and that the appellant is charged
w/ having violated Act 2381, the
vital question is the date of the
adjournment of the Legislature,
and this reduces itself to 2 others,
namely, (1) how that is to be
proved, whether by the legislative
journals or extraneous evidence,
and (2) whether the court can
take judicial notice of the
journals.
Held: A. While there are no
adjudicated cases in this
jurisdiction upon the exact
question w/n the courts may take
judicial notice of the legislative
journals, it is well settled in the
US that such journals may be
noticed by courts in determining
the question w/n a particular bill
became a law or not. And these
journals show, w/ absolute
certainty, that the Legislature
adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock
on 2/28/14.
B. We will inquire w/n the courts
may go behind the legislative
journals for the purpose of
determining the date
of adjournment when such
journals are clear and explicit.
Counsel for appellant, in order to
establish his contention, must
necessarily depend upon the
memory or recollection of
witnesses, while the legislative
journals are the acts of the Govt
or the sovereign itself. From their
very nature and object the
records of the Leg are as
important as those of the
judiciary, and to inquire into the
veracity of the journals of the
Leg., when they are clear and
explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and spirit of the organic
laws by w/c the Phil. Govt was
brought into existence, to invade
a coordinate and independent
dept of the Govt, and to interfere
w/ the legitimate powers and
functions of the Leg. xxx
If the clock, was, in fact stopped,
as here suggested, "the resultant
evil might be slight as compared
w/ that of altering the probative
force and character of legislative
records, and making the proof of
legislative action depend upon
uncertain oral evidence, liable to
loss by death or absence, and so
imperfect on account of the
treachery of memory xxx.
Astorga vs. Villegas, G.R. No.
L-23475, April 30, 1974 (56
SCRA 714)
FACTS: House Bill No. 9266,
which was filed in the House of
Representatives, passed on 3rd
reading without amendments. It
was sent to the Senate for
concurrence. It was referred to
the appropriate Senate
Committee, w/c recommended
approval w/ a minor amendment
recommended by Sen. Roxas.
When the bill was discussed on
the Senate floor, substantial
amendments to Sec. 1 were
introduced by Sen. Tolentino, w/c
amendments were approved in
toto by the Senate. xxx On
5/21/54, the Sec. of the Senate
sent a letter to HRep that the
House bill had been passed by
the Senate w/ amendments.
Attached was a certification of
the amendment, w/c was the one
recommended by Sen. Roxas,
and not the Tolentino
amendments w/c were the ones
actually approved by the Senate.
The HRep signified approval as
sent back to it. The printed copies
were then certified and attested to
by the Secretaries of the Senate
and of the HRep, the Speaker of
the HRep, and the Senate Pres.
It was later made public by Sen.
Tolentino that the enrolled copy
of House Bill no. 9266 signed
into law by the President was a
wrong version of the bill actually
passed by the Senate and
approved on the Senate floor. The
Senate Pres. admitted this
mistake in a letter to the
President. As a result, the
President sent a message to the
presiding officers of both Houses
informing them that in view of
the circumstances he was
officially withdrawing his
signature on House Bill no. 9266.
Upon the foregoing facts, the
Mayor of Manila issued circulars
ordering the disregard of the
provisions of RA
4605. He also issued an order
recalling 5 members of the city
police force who had been
assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of
RA 4065.
Reacting to these steps, the then
Vice-Mayor Astorga, filed a
petition eith this Court for
"Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary
Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction" to compel compliance
with the provisions of RA 4065.
Respondents' position is that RA
4065 never became law since it
was not the bill actually passed
by the Senate, and that the entries
in the journal of that body and
not the enrolled bill itself should
be decisive in the resolution of
the issue.
Held: 1. Petitioner's argument
that the attestation of the
presiding officers of Congress is
conclusive proof of a bill's due
enactment, required, it is said, by
the respect due to a co-equal
department of the government, is
neutralized in this case by the
fact that the Senate President.
declared his signature on the bill
to be invalid and issued a
subsequent clarification that the
invalidation of his signature
meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the
Senate. Obviously this
declaration should be accorded
even greater respect than
the attestation it invalidated,
which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and
indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is
concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification
made by the presiding officers. It
is merely a mode of
authentication. It is the approval
by Congress and not the
signatures of the presiding
officers that is essential.
2. Petitioner agrees that the
attestation in the bill is not
mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate
President, granting it to have
been validly made, would only
mean that there was no attestation
at all, but would not affect the
validity of the statute. xxx This
arguments begs the question. It
would limit the court's inquiry to
the presence or absence of the
attestation and to the effect of its
absence upon the validity of the
statute. The inquiry, however,
goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the
disclaimer, and consequently
there being no enrolled bill to
speak of, what evidence is there
to determine w/n the bill had
been duly enacted? In such a
case, the entry in the journal
should be consulted.
Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark,
143 US 649 (1891)
It is not competent for the
appellant to show from the
Journals that the enrolled bill
contained a section that
does not appear in the enrolled
Act in the custody of the State
Department.
Facts: In accordance w/ the
Tariff Act of Oct. 1, 1890, duties
were assessed and collected on
woollen dress goods, woollen
wearing apparel, and silk
embroideries imported by Field
& Co.;
on silk and cotton laces imported
by Sutton & Co.; and on colored
cotton cloths imported by
Sternbach & Co.
The importers severally protested
against the assessment upon the
ground that the Act was not a law
of the US. It was contended,
among others, that the Tariff Act
was a nullity bec. "it is shown by
congressional records of
proceedings, reports of
committees of conference, and
other papers printed by authority
of Congress, and having
reference to House Bill 9416, that
a section of the bill as it finally
passed, was not in the bill
authenticated by the signatures of
the presiding officers of the
respective houses of Congress,
and approved by the Pres."
Held: The signing by the House
Speaker and by the Senate Pres.
of an enrolled bill is an official
attestation by the two Houses
that such bill is the one that has
passed Congress. It is a
declaration by the 2 houses,
through their presiding officers,
to the Pres. that a bill, thus
attested, has received, in due
form, the sanction of the
legislative branch of the govt,
and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills w/c pass
Congress shall be presented to
him. And when the bill thus
attested is signed by the Pres. and
deposited in the archives, its
authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be
deemed complete
and unimpeachable.
Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. L-
29658, November 29, 1968 (27
SCRA 131)
Facts: The present insistence of
the petitioner is that the version
of the provision (Sec. 10 of the
Police Act of 1966), as amended
at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo,
was the version approved by the
Senate on 3rd reading, and that
when the bill emerged from the
conference committee, the only
change made in the provision was
the insertion of the phrase "or has
served as chief of police with
exemplary record." In support of
this assertion, the petitioner
submitted certified photo static
copies of the different drafts of
House Bill 6951 showing the
various changes made. It is
unmistakable that the phrase
"who has served the police dept
of a city or," was still part of the
provision, but according to the
petitioner the House bill division
deleted the entire provision and
substituted what is now Sec. 10
of the Act which did not carry
such phrase
It would thus appear that the
omission of the phrase "who has
served the police dept of a city
of", was made not at any stage of
the legislative proceedings but
only in the course of engrossment
of the bill, more specifically in
the proofreading thereof; that the
change was not made by
Congress but only by an
employee thereof xxx.
Held: The petitioner wholly
misconceives the function of the
judiciary under our system of
govt. [T]he enrolled Act in the
office of the legislative secretary
of the Pres. of the Phils. shows
that sec. 10 is exactly as it is in
the statute as officially published
in slip form by the Bureau of
Printing. We cannot go behind
the enrolled Act to discover what
really happened. The respect due
to the other branches of Govt
demands that we act upon the
faith and credit of what the
officers of the said branches
attest to as the official acts of
their respective departments.
Otherwise, we would be cast in
the unenviable and unwanted role
of a sleuth trying to determine
what actually did happen in the
labyrinth of law-making, w/
consequent impairment of the
integrity of the legislative
process. The investigation w/c
the petitioner would like this
Court to make can be better done
in Congress.
[W]e are not to be understood as
holding that in all cases the
journals must yield to the
enrolled bill. To be
sure, there are certain matters w/c
the Const. expressly requires
must be entered on the journal of
each house. xxx [W]ith respect
to matters not expressly required
to be entered on the journal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event
of any discrepancy.
Pimentel vs. HRET, G.R. No.
141489-90, November 29, 2002
(393 SCRA 227)
• Proportional representation
in the House of
Representatives electoral
Tribunal (HRET) – Party
List Representatives
Held: The Constitution expressly
grants to the House of
Representatives the prerogative,
within constitutionally defined
limits, to choose from among its
district and party-list
representatives those who may
occupy the seats allotted to the
House in the HRET and the CA.
Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution explicitly confers on
the
Senate and on the House the
authority to elect among their
members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12
seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments.
Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution, each chamber of
Congress exercises the power to
choose, within constitutionally
defined limits, who
among their members would
occupy the allotted 6 seats of
each chamber's respective
electoral tribunal.
Thus, even assuming that party-
list representatives comprise a
sufficient number and have
agreed to designate common
nominees to the HRET and the
CA, their primary recourse
clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with this
Court.
Under Sections 17 and 18, Article
VI of the Constitution, party-list
representatives must first show to
the House that they possess the
required numerical strength to be
entitled to seats in the HRET and
the CA. Only if the House fails to
comply with the directive of the
Constitution on proportional
representation of political parties
in the HRET and the CA can the
party-list representatives seek
recourse to this Court under its
power of judicial review. Under
the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, prior recourse to the
House is necessary before
petitioners may bring the instant
case to the court. Consequently,
petitioners' direct recourse to this
Court is premature.
The discretion of the House to
choose its members to the HRET
and the CA is not absolute, being
subject to the mandatory
constitutional rule on
proportional representation.
However, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, the Court
may not interfere with the
exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty,
absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise,
the doctrine of separation of
powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to
discharge its duties as it sees fit.
Neither can the Court speculate
on what action the House may
take if party-list representatives
are duly nominated for
membership in the HRET and the
CA.
The instant petitions are bereft of
any allegation that respondents
prevented the party-list groups in
the House from participating in
the election of members of the
HRET and the CA. Neither does
it appear that after the May 11,
1998 elections, the House barred
the party-list representatives from
seeking membership in the HRET
or the CA. Rather, it appears
from the available facts that the
party-list groups in the House at
that time simply refrained from
participating in the election
process. The party-list
representatives did not designate
their nominees even up to the
time they filed the instant
petitions, with the predictable
result that the House did not
consider any party-list
representative for election to the
HRET or the CA. As the primary
recourse of the party-list
representatives lies with the
House of Representatives, the
Court cannot resolve the issues
presented by petitioners at this
time.
Request of Justices Melencio
Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano to
be relieved as members of the
HRET (Res. March 19,1991) -
G.R. No. 97710, September 26,
1991
• This resolution should be
read in connection with the
case of Bondoc vs. Pineda,
which is discussed under
Independence of the
Electoral Tribunals.
Facts: In said request, the three
justices asked to be relieved from
membership in the HRET.
According to them, political
factors which have nothing to do
with the merits of the case, were
blocking the accomplishment of
their constitutionally mandated
task. They therefore suggested
that there should be a provision
in the Constitution that upon
designation to membership in the
Electoral Tribunal, those so
designated should divest
themselves of affiliation with
their respective political parties,
to insure their independence and
objectivity as they sit in Tribunal
deliberations.
Held: The SC resolved to direct
them to return to their duties in
the Tribunal. According to the
court, in view of the sensitive
constitutional functions of the
Electoral Tribunals
as the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the
members of Congress, all
members of these bodies should
be guided only be purely legal
considerations in the decision of
the cases before them and that in
the contemplation of the
Constitution, the members-
legislators, thereof, upon
assumption of their duties
therein, sit in the Tribunal no
longer as representatives of their
respective political parties but as
impartial judges. To further
bolster the independence of the
Tribunals, the term of office of
every member thereof should be
considered co-extensive with the
corresponding legislative term
and may not be legally
terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability,
or removal for valid cause, not
including political disloyalty.
Guerrero vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 137004, July 26, 2000 (336
SCRA 458)
• Demarcation between the
jurisdictions of the
COMELEC and Electoral
Tribunals regarding
questions as to its elections
and qualification
Held: In the present case, we
find no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC
when it held that its jurisdiction
over Case No. SPA 98-277 had
ceased with the assumption of
office of respondent Fariñas as
Representative for the first
district of Ilocos Norte. While the
COMELEC is vested with the
power to declare valid or invalid
a certificate of candidacy, its
refusal to exercise that power
following the proclamation and
assumption of the
position by Fariñas is a
recognition of the jurisdictional
boundaries separating the
COMELEC and the Electoral
Tribunal of the House of
Representatives (HRET). Under
Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution, the HRET has sole
and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election,
returns, and qualifications of
members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a member of
the House of Representatives,
COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his
election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the
HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
Thus, the COMELEC's decision
to discontinue exercising
jurisdiction over the case is
justifiable, in deference to the
HRET's own jurisdiction and
functions.
Lazatin vs. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 80007, January 25, 1988
(157 SCRA 337)
• Demarcation between the
jurisdictions of the Regular
Courts and Electoral
Tribunals regarding
questions as to its elections
and qualifications
Held: The petition is impressed
with merit because petitioner has
been proclaimed winner of the
Congressional elections in the
first district of Pampanga, has
taken his oath of office as such,
and assumed his duties as
Congressman. For this Court to
take cognizance of the electoral
protest against him would be to
usurp the functions of the House
Electoral Tribunal. The alleged
invalidity of the proclamation
(which had been previously
ordered by the COMELEC itself)
despite alleged irregularities in
connection therewith, and despite
the pendency of the protests of
the rival candidates, is a matter
that is also addressed,
considering the premises, to the
sound judgment of the Electoral
Tribunal.
Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No.
97710, September 26, 1991 (201
SCRA 792)
Facts: Pineda (LDP) and Bondoc
(NP) both ran as congressional
reps for the 4th district of
Pampanga. Pineda won but
Bondoc filed a protest in the
House of Reps Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), which is composed of 9
members, 3 of whom are SC
justices,
and the remaining 6 are members
of the House chosen on the basis
of proportional representation
from the political parties & the
parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system
represented therein. The HRET
decided in favor of Bondoc.
Cong. Camasura, an LDP, voted
in favor of Bondoc. Before
Bondoc could be proclaimed, the
LDP expelled Camasura as
member of the party. The 3
justices who also voted for
Bondoc asked to be relieved from
their assignment in the HRET
because the withdrawal of
Camasura as HRET rep of LDP
in effect was a way of aborting
the proclamation of Bondoc
(NP). [Request of Justices
Melencio Herrera, Cruz and
Feliciano to be relieved as
members of the HRET (Res.
March 19,1991)]
Issues: 1. May the House of Reps
at the request of the dominant
political party therein, change the
party's representation in the
HRET to thwart the promulgation
of a decision freely reached by
the tribunal in an election contest
pending therein?
2. May the Supreme Court
review and annul that action of
the House?
Held: as to Issue #1: No. The use
of the word "SOLE" in both Sec.
17 of Art. VI of the 1987 Consti
& Sec. 11 of Art. VI of the 1935
Consti underscores the
EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction of the
HRET as judge of contests
relating to the Election, Returns
& Qualifications of the members
of the house (robles V. Hret, gr
88647,1990).
The tribunal was created to
function as a non-partisan court
although 2/3 of its members are
politicians. It is a non-political
body in a sea of politicians. To be
able to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction, the HRET must be
independent. Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional
election contests is not shared by
it with the Legislature nor with
the courts.
2. As judges, the members of the
tribunal must be NON-
PARTISAN. They must discharge
their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality, & or prejudiced by such action, as
independence- even
independence from the
politicalparty to which they
belong. Hence, disloyalty to party
& breach of party discipline are
not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the
tribunal. In expelling Cong.
Camasura from the HRET for
having cast a "conscience vote"
in favor of Bondoc, based strictly
on the result of the examination
& appreciation of the ballots &
the recount of the votes by the
tribunal, the house committed a
grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Camasura is
null & void.
As to issue #2: Yes. The power &
duty of the courts to nullify, in
appropriate cases, the actions of
the executive & legislative
branches of the Govt., does not
mean that the courts are superior
to the President and the
legislature.
It does mean though that the
judiciary may not shirk the
"irksome task" of inquiring into
the constitutionality & legality of
legislative or executive action
when a justiciable controversy is
brought before the courts by
someone who has been aggrieved
in this case. It is "a plain exercise
of the judicial power, that power
to hear and dispose of a case or
controversy properly brought
before the court, to the
determination of which must be
brought the test & measure of the
law (Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil
192).
Vilando vs. HRET, GR Nos.
192147 & 192149, August 23,
2011
• Citizenship issues regarding
members of Congress within
the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunals
Held: Citizenship, being a
continuing requirement for
Members of the House of
Representatives, however, may
be questioned at anytime. The
HRET has jurisdiction over quo
warranto petitions, specifically
over cases challenging
ineligibility on the ground of lack
of citizenship.
Co vs. HRET, G.R. Nos. 92191-
92, July 30, 1991 (199 SCRA
692)
Facts: Co, Balinquit & Ong ran
for representative of the 2nd
legislative district of Northern
Samar in the May 11, 1987
elections. Ong won but pets (Co
& Balanquit) protested Ong's
election on the ground of non-
citizenship. The HRET found for
Ong.
Held: 1. Judgments of electoral
tribunal are beyond judicial
interference save only in the
exercise of the Court's so called
extraordinary jurisdiction, upon a
determination that the tribunal's
decision or resolution was
rendered
without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion or upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal
of its power as constitutes a
denial of due process of law, or
upon a demonstration of a very
clear unmitigated error,
manifestly constituting such
grave abuse of discretion that
there has to be a remedy for such
abuse.
2. In the absence of a showing
that the HRET has committed
grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
the Court cannot exercise its
corrective power.
Vilando vs. HRET, GR Nos.
192147 & 192149, August 23,
2011
Held: Well-settled is the
principle that the judgments of
the HRET are beyond judicial
interference. The only instance
where this Court may intervene
in the exercise of its so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction is upon
a determination that the decision
or resolution of the HRET was
rendered without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion or upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of its power
to constitute a denial of due
process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of
discretion that there has to be a
remedy for such abuse.
Coseteng vs. Mitra, G.R. No.
86649, July 12, 1990 (187 SCRA
377)
Facts: During the 1987
Congressional elections,
Coseteng was the only candidate
elected under the KAIBA party.
Of the 12 elected to the
Commission on Appointments,
Roque Ablan of the KBL,
represented the Coalesced
Minority.
When the LDP was organized a
year later, the House Committees
including the House
representation in the Commission
on Appointments had to be
reorganized. Coseteng requested
Mitra that she be appointed a
member of the CA as a
representative of KAIBA. Ablan
was however retained as the 12th
member representing the House
minority.
Coseteng filed a petition to
declare null and void the
appointment of the members of
the CA on the theory that their
election to the CA violated the
constitutional mandate of
proportional representation.
Held: The petition should be
dismissed not because it raises a
political question, which it does
not, but because the revision of
the House representation in the
CA is based on proportional
representation of the political
parties therein.
The issue is justiciable. The
legality, and not the wisdom, of
the manner of filling the CA, is
justiciable. Even if it were a
political question, such would
still come within judicial review
on the issue of whether there was
grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
The composition was based on
proportional representation of the
political parties therein. The other
minority parties are bound by the
majority's choices. Even if
KAIBA were an opposition party,
its lone member represents
only .4%of the House, thus she is
not entitled to one of the 12 seats.
The other representatives to the
CA were duly elected by the
House not by their party as
provided in Art. VI, Sec. 18. The
validity of their election to the
CA - eleven from the Coalesced
Majority and one from the
Coalesced Minority - is
unassailable.
Guingona vs. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 106971, March 1, 1993 (214
SCRA 789)
Facts: As a result of the 1992
Senatorial elections, the LDP was
entitled to 7.5 seats in the CA, the
NPC to 2.5, the LAKAS-NUCD
to 1.5 and the LP-PDP-LABAN
to .5. The problem arose as to
what to with the 1/2 to which
each of the parties is entitled. The
LDP majority converted a
fractional half-membership to a
whole membership (7.5 + .5) to
be able to elect Senator Romulo.
In so doing, one other party's
fractional representation in the
CA was reduced.
This is clearly a violation of Sec.
18, Art. VI because it is no longer
based on proportional
representation of the political
parties.
Senator Tanada claimed that he
has a right to be elected as
member of the CA because of the
physical impossibility of dividing
a person (need to round off .5 to
one senator) and because as the
sole representative of his party,
his party is entitled to
representation.
Held: The provision of Section
18 on proportional representation
is mandatory in character and
does not leave any discretion to
the majority party in the Senate
to disobey or disregard the rule
on proportional representation.
No party can claim more than
what it is entitled to under such
rule. Section 18 also assures
representation in the CA of any
political party who succeeds in
electing members to the Senate,
provided that the number of
senators so elected enables it to
put a representative in the CA.
Therefore, in the Senate, a
political party must at least have
2 duly elected senators for every
seat in the CA.
The SC does not agree that it is
mandatory to elect 12 Senators to
the CA. What the Constitution
requires is that there be at least a
majority of the entire
membership.
The Constitution does not require
the election and presence of 12
senators and 12 members of the
House in order that the
Commission may function.
Do away with the fractional
differences! Do not round off!
The election of Senator Romulo
and Tanada as members of the
CA was clearly a violation of Art.
VI, Sec. 18.
Araullo vs. Aquino III, GR No.
209287, July 1, 2014 – DAP
case
Held: Congress acts as the
guardian of the public treasury in
faithful discharge of its power of
the purse whenever it deliberates
and acts on the budget proposal
submitted by the Executive. Its
power of the purse is touted as
the very foundation of its
institutional strength, and
underpins "all other legislative
decisions and regulating the
balance of influence between the
legislative and executive
branches of government." Such
enormous power encompasses
the capacity to generate money
for the Government, to
appropriate public funds, and to
spend the money. Pertinently,
when it exercises its power of the
purse, Congress wields control by
specifying the PAPs for which
public money should be spent.
It is the President who proposes
the budget but it is Congress that
has the final say on matters of
appropriations. For this purpose,
appropriation involves two
governing principles, namely: (1)
"a Principle of the Public Fisc,
asserting that all monies received
from whatever source by any part
of the government are public
funds;" and (2) "a Principle of
Appropriations Control,
prohibiting expenditure of any
public money without legislative
authorization.“ To conform with
the governing principles, the
Executive cannot circumvent the
prohibition by Congress of an
expenditure for a PAP by
resorting to either public or
private funds. Nor could the
Executive transfer appropriated
funds resulting in an increase in
the budget for one PAP, for by so
doing the appropriation for
another PAP is
necessarily decreased. The terms
of both appropriations will
thereby be violated.
Araullo vs. Aquino III, GR No.
209287, July 1, 2014 – DAP
case
Held: The Constitutional
Commission included Section
25(5), to keep a tight rein on the
exercise of the power to transfer
funds appropriated by Congress
by the President and the other
high officials of the Government
named therein. The Court stated
in Nazareth v. Villar:
In the funding of current
activities, projects, and programs,
the general rule should still be
that the budgetary amount
contained in the appropriations
bill is the extent Congress will
determine as sufficient for the
budgetary allocation for the
proponent agency. The only
exception is found in Section 25
(5), Article VI of the
Constitution, by which the
President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional
Commissions are authorized to
transfer appropriations to
augmenting item in the GAA for
their respective offices from the
savings in other items of their
respective appropriations. The
plain language of the
constitutional restriction leaves
no room for the petitioner’s
posture, which we should now
dispose of as untenable.
It bears emphasizing that the
exception in favor of the high
officials named in Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution
limiting the authority to transfer
savings only to augment another
item in the
GAA is strictly but reasonably
construed as exclusive. As the
Court has expounded in Lokin, Jr.
v. Commission on Elections:
When the statute itself
enumerates the exceptions to the
application of the general rule,
the exceptions are strictly but
reasonably construed. The
exceptions extend only as far as
their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved
in favor of the general provision
rather than the exceptions. Where
the general rule is established by
a statute with exceptions, none
but the enacting authority can
curtail the former. Not even the
courts may add to the latter by
implication, and it is a rule that
an express exception excludes all
others, although it is always
proper in determining the
applicability of the rule to inquire
whether, in a particular case, it
accords with reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural
office of the exception is to
exempt something from the scope
of the general words of a statute,
which is otherwise within the
scope and meaning of such
general words. Consequently, the
existence of an exception in a
statute clarifies the intent that the
statute shall apply to all cases not
excepted. Exceptions are subject
to the rule of strict construction;
hence, any doubt will be resolved
in favor of the general provision
and against the exception.
Indeed, the liberal construction of
a statute will seem to require in
many circumstances that the
exception, by which the operation
of the statute is limited or
abridged, should receive a
restricted construction.
Accordingly, we should interpret
Section 25(5), supra, in the
context of a limitation on the
President’s discretion over the
appropriations during the Budget
Execution Phase.
The transfer of appropriated
funds, to be valid under Section
25(5), must be made upon a
concurrence of the following
requisites, namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing
the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker
of the House of
Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional
Commissions to transfer
funds within their
respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred
are savings generated from
the appropriations for their
respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer
is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law
for their respective offices.
1st requisite: Section 25(5), not
being a self-executing provision
of the Constitution, must have an
implementing law for it to be
operative. That law, generally, is
the GAA of a given fiscal year.
To comply with the first requisite,
the GAAs should expressly
authorize the transfer of funds.
2nd requisite: In ascertaining the
meaning of savings, certain
principles should be borne in
mind. The first principle is that
Congress wields the power of the
purse. Congress decides how the
budget will be spent; what PAPs
to fund; and the amounts of
money to be spent for each PAP.
The second principle is that the
Executive, as the department of
the Government tasked to enforce
the laws, is expected to faithfully
execute the GAA and to spend
the budget in accordance with the
provisions of the GAA. The
Executive is expected to
faithfully implement the PAPs for
which Congress allocated funds,
and to limit the expenditures
within the allocations, unless
exigencies result to deficiencies
for which augmentation is
authorized, subject to the
conditions provided by law. The
third principle is that in making
the President’s power to augment
operative under the GAA,
Congress recognizes the need for
flexibility in budget execution.
In so doing, Congress diminishes
its own power of the purse, for it
delegates a fraction of its power
to the Executive. But Congress
does not thereby allow the
Executive to override its
authority over the purse as to let
the Executive exceed its
delegated authority. And the
fourth principle is that savings
should be actual. "Actual"
denotes something that is real or
substantial, or something that
exists presently in fact, as
opposed to something that is
merely theoretical, possible,
potential or hypothetical.
The foregoing principles caution
us to construe savings strictly
against expanding the scope of
the power to
augment. It is then indubitable
that the power to augment was to
be used only when the purpose
for which the funds had been
allocated were already satisfied,
or the need for such funds had
ceased to exist, for only then
could savings be properly
realized. This interpretation
prevents the Executive from
unduly transgressing Congress’
power of the purse.
The Executive could not
circumvent this provision by
declaring unreleased
appropriations and unobligated
allotments as savings prior to the
end of the fiscal year
3rd requisite: The third requisite
for a valid transfer of funds is
that the purpose of the transfer
should be "to augment an item in
the general appropriations law for
the respective offices." The term
"augment" means to enlarge or
increase in size, amount, or
degree.
Augmentation implies the
existence in this Act of a
program, activity, or project with
an appropriation, which
upon implementation, or
subsequent evaluation of needed
resources, is determined to be
deficient. In no case shall a non-
existent program, activity, or
project, be funded by
augmentation from savings or by
the use of appropriations
otherwise authorized in this Act.
In other words, an appropriation
for any PAP must first be
determined to be deficient before
it could be augmented from
savings. Upon careful review of
the documents contained in the
seven evidence packets, we
conclude that the "savings"
pooled under the DAP were
allocated to PAPs that were not
covered by any appropriations in
the pertinent GAAs
Araullo vs. Aquino III, GR No.
209287, July 1, 2014 – DAP
case
Held: By providing that the
President, the President of the
Senate,
the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the
Heads of the Constitutional
Commissions may be authorized
to augment any item in the GAA
"for their respective offices,"
Section 25(5), has delineated
borders between their offices,
such that funds appropriated for
one office are prohibited from
crossing over to another office
even in the guise of augmentation
of a deficient item or items. Thus,
we call such transfers of funds
cross-border transfers or cross-
border augmentations. To be sure,
the phrase "respective offices"
used in Section 25(5), refers to
the entire Executive, with respect
to the President; the Senate, with
respect to the Senate President;
the House of Representatives,
with respect to the Speaker; the
Judiciary, with respect to the
Chief Justice; the Constitutional
Commissions, with respect to
their respective Chairpersons.
Araullo vs. Aquino III, GR No.
209287, July 1, 2014 – DAP
case
Held: According to Philippine
Constitution Association v.
Enriquez:
24 "Impoundment refers to a
refusal by the President, for
whatever reason, to spend funds
made available by Congress. It is
the failure to spend or obligate
budget authority of any type."
Impoundment under the GAA is
understood to mean the retention
or deduction of appropriations.
Pelaez vs. Auditor General,
G.R. No. L-23825, December
24, 1965 (15 SCRA 569)
Facts: At issue here was the
validity of Sec. 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code empowering
the President of the Philippines to
create, merge, divide, abolish or
otherwise alter the boundaries of
municipal corporations. Pelaez
contended that it was an invalid
delegation of legislative power.
The govt. argued that it was not,
invoking the earlier case of
Cardona vs Binangonan, 36 Phil
547, where the power of the
governor-general to transfer
territory from one municipality to
another was sustained.
Held: The SC upheld Pelaez. It
ruled that the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test
must be applied together or
concurrently. The SC declared
that the Cardona case involved
not the creation of a new
municipality but merely the
transfer of territory from one
municipality to another. The
power to fix such boundaries of
existing municipalities may
partake of an administrative
nature but the creation of
municipal corporations is strictly
legislative in nature.
Although Congress may delegate
to another branch of the Govt. the
power to fill details in the
execution,
enforcement or administration of
a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said
law: (a) be complete in itself -- it
must set forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate --
and (b) to fix a standard -- the
limits of which are sufficiently
determinate or
determinable-- to which the
delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Indeed, without a statutory
declaration of policy, which is the
essence of every law, and without
the aforementioned standard,
there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate
has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.
Sec. 68 of the RAC does not
meet these well settled
requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the
details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any
policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard
sufficiently precise to avoid the
evil effects of undue delegation.
Senate of the Philippines vs.
Ermita, GR No. 169777, April
20, 2006
FACTS: In the exercise of its
legislative power, the Senate of
the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation
which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and
employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in
Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations, the
Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the
Committee of the Senate as a
whole issued invitations to
various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear
on September 29, 2005 as
resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project of
the North Luzon Railways
Corporation with the China
National Machinery and
Equipment Group (hereinafter
North Rail Project).
On September 28, 2005, the
President issued E.O. 464,
“ENSURING OBSERVANCE
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS,
ADHERENCE TO THE RULE
ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
AND RESPECT FOR THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLIC
OFFICIALS APPEARING IN
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES IN
AID OF LEGISLATION
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION,
AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.”
Section 1 states among others
that “all heads of departments of
the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the
consent of the President prior to
appearing before either House of
Congress”
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner
Senate of the Philippines,
alleging that it has a vital interest
in the resolution of the issue of
the validity of E.O. 464 for it
stands to suffer imminent and
material injury, as it has already
sustained the same with its
continued enforcement since it
directly interferes with and
impedes the valid exercise of the
Senate’s powers and functions
and conceals information of great
public interest and concern, filed
its petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as G.R. No.
169777 and prays that E.O. 464
be declared unconstitutional.
Held: Section 1 is similar to
Section 3 in that both require the
officials covered by them to
secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing
before Congress. There are
significant differences between
the two provisions, however,
which constrain this Court to
discuss the validity of these
provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to
department heads. It does not,
unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official
whether they are covered by E.O.
464. The President herself has,
through the challenged order,
made the determination that they
are. Further, unlike also Section
3, the coverage of department
heads under Section 1 is not
made to depend on the
department heads’ possession of
any information which might be
covered by executive privilege.
In fact, in marked contrast to
Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2,
there is no reference to executive
privilege at all. Rather, the
required prior consent under
Section 1 is grounded on Article
VI, Section 22 of the Constitution
on what has been referred to as
the question hour.
Determining the validity of
Section 1 thus requires an
examination of the meaning of
Section 22 of Article VI. Section
22 which provides for the
question hour must be interpreted
vis-à-vis Section 21 which
provides for the power of either
House of Congress to “conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.”
A distinction was thus made
between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to
be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation.
In the context of a parliamentary
system of government, the
“question hour” has a definite
meaning. It is a period of
confrontation initiated by
Parliament to hold the Prime
Minister and the other ministers
accountable for their acts and the
operation of the government,
corresponding to what is known
in Britain as the question period.
There was a specific provision
for a question hour in the 1973
Constitution which made the
appearance of ministers
mandatory.
The same perfectly conformed to
the parliamentary system
established by that Constitution,
where the ministers are also
members of the legislature and
are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the
parliamentary system of
government is the immediate
accountability of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet to the
National Assembly. They shall be
responsible to the National
Assembly for the program of
government and shall determine
the guidelines of national policy.
Unlike in the presidential system
where the tenure of office of all
elected officials cannot be
terminated before their term
expired, the Prime Minister and
the Cabinet remain in office only
as long as they enjoy the
confidence of the National
Assembly. The moment this
confidence is lost the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet may be
changed.
The framers of the 1987
Constitution removed the
mandatory nature of such
appearance during the question
hour in the present Constitution
so as to conform more fully to a
system of separation of powers.
To that extent, the question hour,
as it is presently understood in
this jurisdiction, departs from the
question period of the
parliamentary
system. That department heads
may not be required to appear in
a question hour does not,
however, mean that the
legislature is rendered powerless
to elicit information from them in
all circumstances. In fact, in light
of the absence of a mandatory
question period, the need to
enforce Congress’ right to
executive information in the
performance of its legislative
function becomes more
imperative. As Schwartz
observes:
Indeed, if the separation of
powers has anything to tell us on
the subject under discussion, it is
that the Congress has the right to
obtain information from any
source –even from officials of
departments and agencies in the
executive branch. In the United
States there is, unlike the
situation which prevails in a
parliamentary system such as that
in Britain, a clear separation
between the legislative and
executive branches.
It is this very separation that
makes the congressional right to
obtain information from the
executive so essential, if the
functions of the Congress as the
elected representatives of the
people are adequately to be
carried out. The absence of close
rapport between the legislative
and executive branches in this
country, comparable to those
which exist under a
parliamentary system, and the
nonexistence in the Congress of
an institution such as the British
question period have perforce
made reliance by the Congress
upon its right to obtain
information from the executive
essential, if it is intelligently to
perform its legislative tasks.
Unless the Congress possesses
the right to obtain executive
information, its power of
oversight of administration in a
system such as ours becomes a
power devoid of most of its
practical content, since it depends
for its effectiveness solely upon
information parceled out ex
gratia by the executive.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore,
while closely related and
complementary to each other,
should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of
Congress.
One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation, the aim of which is
to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the
objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to
be informed on how department
heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its
right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty.
In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may
only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in
which Congress requires their
appearance is “in aid of
legislation” under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the
same reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of
Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the
extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation. This is
consistent with the intent
discerned from the deliberations
of the Constitutional
Commission.
Ultimately, the power of
Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of
it under Section 22 find their
basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal
branch of the legislature, it
cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing
to comply with its demands for
information.
When Congress exercises its
power of inquiry, the only way
for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a
valid claim of privilege. They are
not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only
one executive official may be
exempted from this power — the
President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond
the reach of Congress except
through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her
being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal
branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing
custom
By the same token, members of
the Supreme Court are also
exempt from this power of
inquiry.
Unlike the Presidency, judicial
power is vested in a collegial
body; hence, each member
thereof is exempt on the basis not
only of separation of powers but
also on the fiscal autonomy and
the constitutional independence
of the judiciary. This point is not
in dispute, as even counsel for
the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo,
admitted it during the oral
argument upon interpellation of
the Chief Justice.
Having established the proper
interpretation of Section 22,
Article VI of the Constitution, the
Court now proceeds to pass on
the constitutionality of Section 1
of E.O. 464.
Section 1, in view of its specific
reference to Section 22 of Article
VI of the Constitution and the
absence of any reference to
inquiries in aid of legislation,
must be construed as limited in
its application to appearances of
department heads in the question
hour contemplated in the
provision of said Section 22 of
Article VI. The reading is
dictated by the basic rule of
construction that issuances must
be interpreted, as much as
possible, in a way that will
render it constitutional.
The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under
Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour,
is valid on its face. For under
Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question
hour is discretionary on their
part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be
applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in
aid of legislation. Congress is not
bound in such instances to
respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid
claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive
Secretary.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3:
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all
the public officials enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent
of the President prior to
appearing before either house of
Congress. The enumeration is
broad. It covers all senior
officials of executive
departments, all officers of the
AFP and the PNP, and all senior
national security officials who, in
the judgment of the heads of
offices designated in the same
section (i.e. department heads,
Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief
of the PNP, and the National
Security Adviser), are “covered
by the executive privilege.”
The enumeration also includes
such other officers as may be
determined by the President.
Given the title of Section 2 —
“Nature, Scope and Coverage of
Executive Privilege” —, it is
evident that under the rule of
ejusdem generis, the
determination by the President
under this provision is intended
to be based on a similar finding
of coverage under executive
privilege.
En passant, the Court notes that
Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually
states that executive privilege
actually covers persons. Such is a
misuse of the doctrine. Executive
privilege, as discussed above, is
properly invoked in relation to
specific categories of information
and not to categories of persons.
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of
E.O. 464 which deals with the
nature, scope and coverage of
executive privilege, the reference
to persons being “covered by the
executive privilege” may be read
as an abbreviated way of saying
that the person is in possession of
information which is, in the
judgment of the head of office
concerned, privileged as defined
in Section 2(a). The Court shall
thus proceed on the assumption
that this is the intention of the
challenged order.
Upon a determination by the
designated head of office or by
the President that an official is
“covered by the executive
privilege,” such official is
subjected to the requirement that
he first secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing
before Congress. This
requirement effectively bars the
appearance of the official
concerned unless the same is
permitted by the President. The
proviso allowing the President to
give its consent means nothing
more than that the President may
reverse a prohibition which
already exists by virtue of E.O.
464. Thus, underlying this
requirement of prior consent is
the determination by a head of
office, authorized by the
President under E.O. 464, or by
the President herself, that such
official is in possession of
information that is covered by
executive privilege. This
determination then becomes the
basis for the official’s not
showing up in the legislative
investigation. In view thereof,
whenever an official invokes
E.O. 464 to justify his failure to
be present, such invocation must
be construed as a declaration to
Congress that the President, or a
head of office authorized by the
President, has determined that the
requested information is
privileged, and that the President
has not reversed such
determination
Such declaration, however, even
without mentioning the term
“executive privilege,” amounts to
an implied claim that the
information is being withheld by
the executive branch, by
authority of the President, on the
basis of executive
privilege. Verily, there is an
implied claim of privilege.
The letter dated September 28,
2005 of respondent Executive
Secretary Ermita to Senate
President Drilon illustrates the
implied nature of the claim of
privilege authorized by E.O. 464.
It reads:
In connection with the inquiry to
be conducted by the Committee
of the Whole regarding the
Northrail Project of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation on
29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m.,
please be informed that officials
of the Executive Department
invited to appear at the meeting
will not be able to attend the
same without the consent of the
President, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled
“Ensuring Observance Of The
Principle Of Separation Of
Powers, Adherence To The Rule
On Executive Privilege And
Respect For The Rights Of Public
Officials Appearing In
Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of
Legislation Under The
Constitution, And For Other
Purposes”. Said officials have not
secured the required consent
from the President.
(Underscoring supplied)
The letter does not explicitly
invoke executive privilege or that
the matter on which these
officials are being requested to be
resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence.
Nor does it expressly state that in
view of the lack of consent from
the President under E.O. 464,
they cannot attend the hearing.
Significant premises in this letter,
however, are left unstated,
deliberately or not. The letter
assumes that the invited officials
are covered by E.O. 464. As
explained earlier, however, to be
covered by the order means that a
determination has been made, by
the designated head of office or
the President, that the invited
official possesses information
that is covered by executive
privilege. Thus, although it is not
stated in the letter that such
determination has been made, the
same must be deemed implied.
Respecting the statement that the
invited officials have not secured
the consent of the President, it
only means that the President has
not reversed the standing
prohibition against their
appearance before Congress.
Inevitably, Executive Secretary
Ermita’s letter leads to the
conclusion that the executive
branch, either through the
President or the heads of offices
authorized under E.O. 464, has
made a determination that the
information required by the
Senate is privileged, and that, at
the time of writing, there has
been no contrary pronouncement
from the President. In fine, an
implied claim of privilege has
been made by the executive.
While there is no Philippine case
that directly addresses the issue
of whether executive privilege
may be invoked against
Congress, it is gathered from
Chavez v. PEA that certain
information in the possession of
the executive may validly be
claimed as privileged even
against Congress. Thus, the case
holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the
information demanded by
petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the
separation of powers. The
information does not cover
Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet
meetings which, like internal
deliberations of the Supreme
Court and other collegiate courts,
or executive sessions of either
house of Congress, are
recognized as confidential.
This kind of information cannot
be pried open by a coequal
branch of government. A frank
exchange of exploratory ideas
and assessments, free from the
glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, is essential to
protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked
to exercise Presidential,
Legislative and Judicial power.
This is not the situation in the
instant case.
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore,
cannot be dismissed outright as
invalid by the mere fact that it
sanctions claims of executive
privilege. This Court must look
further and assess the claim of
privilege authorized by the Order
to
determine whether it is valid.
While the validity of claims of
privilege must be assessed on a
case to case basis, examining the
ground invoked therefor and the
particular circumstances
surrounding it, there is, in an
implied claim of privilege, a
defect that renders it invalid per
se. By its very nature, and as
demonstrated by the letter of
respondent Executive Secretary
quoted above, the implied claim
authorized by Section 3 of E.O.
464 is not accompanied by any
specific allegation of the basis
thereof (e.g., whether the
information demanded involves
military or diplomatic secrets,
closed-door Cabinet meetings,
etc.).
 While Section 2(a) enumerates
the types of information that are
covered by the privilege under
the challenged order, Congress is
left to speculate as to which
among them is being referred to
by the executive. The
enumeration is not even intended
to be comprehensive, but a mere
statement of what is included in
the phrase “confidential or
classified information between
the President and the public
officers covered by this executive
order.”
Certainly, Congress has the right
to know why the executive
considers the requested
information privileged. It does
not suffice to merely declare that
the President, or an authorized
head of office, has determined
that it is so, and that the President
has not overturned that
determination. Such declaration
leaves Congress in the dark on
how the requested information
could be classified as privileged.
That the message is couched in
terms that, on first impression, do
not seem like a claim of privilege
only makes it more pernicious. It
threatens to make Congress
doubly blind to the question of
why the executive branch is not
providing it with the information
that it has requested.
A claim of privilege, being a
claim of exemption from an
obligation to disclose
information, must, therefore, be
clearly asserted. As U.S. v.
Reynolds teaches:
The privilege belongs to the
government and must be asserted
by it; it can neither be claimed
nor
waived by a private party. It is
not to be lightly invoked. There
must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of
the department which has control
over the matter, after actual
personal consideration by that
officer. The court itself must
determine whether the
circumstances are appropriate for
the claim of privilege, and yet do
so without forcing a disclosure of
the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.
(Underscoring supplied)
Absent then a statement of the
specific basis of a claim of
executive privilege, there is no
way of determining whether it
falls under one of the traditional
privileges, or whether, given the
circumstances in which it is
made, it should be respected.
Due respect for a co-equal branch
of government, moreover,
demands no less than a claim of
privilege clearly
stating the grounds therefor.
Upon the other hand, Congress
must not require the executive to
state the reasons for the claim
with such particularity as to
compel disclosure of the
information which the privilege is
meant to protect.
A useful analogy in determining
the requisite degree of
particularity would be the
privilege against self-
incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v.
U.S. declares:
The witness is not exonerated
from answering merely because
he declares that in so doing he
would incriminate himself – his
say-so does not of itself establish
the hazard of incrimination. It is
for the court to say whether his
silence is justified, and to require
him to answer if ‘it clearly
appears to the court that he is
mistaken.’ However, if the
witness, upon interposing his
claim, were required to prove the
hazard in the sense in which a
claim is usually required to be
established in court, he would be
compelled to surrender the very
protection which the privilege is
designed to guarantee. To sustain
the privilege, it need only be
evident from the implications of
the question, in the setting in
which it is asked, that a
responsive answer to the question
or an explanation of why it
cannot be answered might be
dangerous because injurious
disclosure could result.”
The claim of privilege under
Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation
to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per
se. It is not asserted. It is merely
implied.
Instead of providing precise and
certain reasons for the claim, it
merely invokes E.O. 464,
coupled with an announcement
that the President has not given
her consent. It is woefully
insufficient for Congress to
determine whether the
withholding of information is
justified under the circumstances
of each case. It severely
frustrates the power of inquiry of
Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section
2(b) of E.O. 464 must be
invalidated. No infirmity,
however, can be imputed to
Section 2(a) as it merely provides
guidelines, binding only on the
heads of office mentioned in
Section 2(b), on what is covered
by executive privilege. It does
not purport to be conclusive on
the other branches of
government. It may thus be
construed as a mere expression of
opinion by the President
regarding the nature and scope of
executive privilege.
Petitioners, however, assert as
another ground for invalidating
the challenged order the alleged
unlawful delegation of authority
to the heads of offices in Section
2(b). Petitioner Senate of the
Philippines, in particular, cites
the case of the United States
where, so it claims, only the
President can assert executive
privilege to withhold information
from Congress.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section
3 virtually provides that, once the
head of office determines that a
certain information is privileged,
such determination is presumed
to bear the President’s authority
and has the effect of prohibiting
the official from appearing before
Congress, subject only to the
express pronouncement of the
President that it is allowing the
appearance of such official.
These provisions thus allow the
President to authorize claims of
privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization,
however, is contrary to the
exceptional nature of the
privilege. Executive privilege, as
already discussed, is recognized
with respect to information the
confidential nature of which is
crucial to the fulfillment of the
unique role and responsibilities of
the executive branch, or in those
instances where exemption from
disclosure is necessary to the
discharge of highly important
executive responsibilities. The
doctrine of executive privilege is
thus premised on the fact that
certain information must, as a
matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the
public interest.
The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose
information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be
of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a
particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional
nature of the privilege, the Court
finds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the
privilege. She may of course
authorize the Executive Secretary
to invoke the privilege on her
behalf, in which case the
Executive Secretary must state
that the authority is “By order of
the President,” which means that
he personally consulted with her.
The privilege being an
extraordinary power, it must be
wielded only by the highest
official in the executive
hierarchy. In other words, the
President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such
power. There is even less reason
to uphold such authorization in
the instant case where the
authorization is not explicit but
by mere silence. Section 3, in
relation to Section 2(b), is further
invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when
an official is being summoned by
Congress on a matter which, in
his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege,
he must be afforded reasonable
time to inform the President or
the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the
privilege. This is necessary in
order to provide the President or
the Executive Secretary with fair
opportunity to consider whether
the matter indeed calls for a
claim of executive privilege. If,
after the lapse of that reasonable
time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the
privilege, Congress is no longer
bound to respect the failure of the
official to appear before
Congress and may then opt to
avail of the necessary legal
means to compel his appearance.
Right to Information: E.O 464 is
concerned only with the demands
of Congress for the appearance of
executive officials in the hearings
conducted by it, and not with the
demands of citizens for
information pursuant to their
right to information on matters of
public concern. Petitioners are
not amiss in claiming, however,
that what is involved in the
present controversy is not merely
the legislative power of inquiry,
but the right of the people to
information.
There are, it bears noting, clear
distinctions between the right of
Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry
and the right of the people to
information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of
a citizen for the production of
documents pursuant to his right
to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a
subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right
to information grant a citizen the
power to exact testimony from
government officials. These
powers belong only to Congress
and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is
composed of representatives
elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every
exercise of its power of inquiry,
the people are exercising their
right to information.
To the extent that investigations
in aid of legislation are generally
conducted in public, however,
any executive issuance tending to
unduly limit disclosures of
information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of
information which, being
presumed to be in aid of
legislation, is presumed to be a
matter of public concern.
The citizens are thereby denied
access to information which they
can use in formulating their own
opinions on the matter before
Congress — opinions which they
can then communicate to their
representatives and other
government officials through the
various legal means allowed by
their freedom of expression. Thus
holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State
that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may
perceive and be responsive to the
people’s will. Yet, this open
dialogue can be effective only to
the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently.
Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues
and have access to information
relating thereto can such bear
fruit.
The impairment of the right of
the people to information as a
consequence of E.O. 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained
above, just as direct as its
violation of the legislature’s
power of inquiry.
Conclusion: Congress
undoubtedly has a right to
information from the executive
branch whenever it is sought in
aid of legislation.
If the executive branch withholds
such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason
therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O.
464, however, allow the
executive branch to evade
congressional requests for
information without need of
clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons
therefor. By the mere expedient
of invoking said provisions, the
power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible.
For [w]hat republican theory did
accomplish, was to reverse the
old presumption in favor of
secrecy, based on the divine right
of kings and nobles, and replace
it with a presumption in favor of
publicity, based on the doctrine
of popular sovereignty.
Resort to any means then by
which officials of the executive
branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed
valid. Otherwise, we shall not
have merely nullified the power
of our legislature to inquire into
the operations of government, but
we shall have given up something
of much greater value – our right
as a people to take part in
government.
B. Executive Department
(Art. VII)
1. Qualifications, Election,
Term and Oath
Art. VII, Sec. 2. No person may
be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years
immediately preceding such
election.
Art. VII, Sec. 4. The President
and the Vice-President shall be
elected by direct vote of the
people for a term of six years
which shall begin at noon on the
thirtieth day of June next
following the day of the election
and shall end at noon of the same
date six years thereafter. The
President shall not be eligible for
any reelection. No person who
has succeeded as President and
has served as such for more than
four years shall be qualified for
election to the same office at any
time.

Qualifications of President No Vice-President shall serve for

1) Natural- more than two successive terms.
born citizen of the Voluntary renunciation of the
Philippines office for any length of time shall
2) not be considered as an
Registered voter interruption in the continuity of
3) Able to the service for the full term for
read and write which he was elected.
4) 40 years
of age on the day of Unless otherwise provided by
election law, the regular election for
5) Resident President and Vice-President
of the Philippines for shall be held on the second
at least 10 years Monday of May.
immediately
preceding the The returns of every election for
election President and Vice- President,
duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each provinces or
city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of election
(which is the 2nd Tuesday of
June), open all the certificates in
the presence of the Senate and
House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress,
upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution
thereof in the manner provided
by law, canvass (i.e., tally the
certificates of canvass) the votes.
The persons having the highest
number of votes shall be pro-
claimed elected, but in case two
or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes (tie), one
of them shall forth with be
chosen by the vote of a majority
of all the members of Congress,
voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate
its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en
banc, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the
election, returns, and
qualifications of the President, or
Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
Election and Term of President
a. Regular Election and Term
The President and Vice-President
(who shall be elected with and in
the same manner as the
President) shall be elected by
direct vote of the people for a
term of 6 years, which shall
begin on the noon of June 30 next
following the day of election. The
regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on
the 2nd Monday of May. (Art.
VII, Sec. 4 pars. 1 & 3).
The six (6) year term for the
incumbent President and Vice-
President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for purposes
of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June
30, 1992. The first regular
elections for the President and
Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the
2nd Monday of May, 1992. (Art.
XVIII, Sec. 5.)
In the case of In re: Saturnino
Bermudez,1 the SC held that the
"incumbent President and Vice-
President" referred to above are
Pres. Corazon Aquino and Vice-
President Salvador Laurel (even
if they were not the ones declared
by the Batasang Pambansa as the
winners of the February 7, 1986
Snap Election).
b. Special Election and Term
If a vacancy occurs in the offices
of President and Vice- President
more than eighteen
(18) months before the date of
the next regular presidential
election, a special election to
elect the President and Vice-
President shall be called by
Congress, pursuant to article VII,
section 10. (See discussion under
Other Powers of Congress, supra
and Succession, infra.)
The Constitution is silent as to
whether the persons elected in
the special election shall serve
only for the unexpired portion of
the term, and whether the new
President can run for re- election
if he has not served more than
four (4) years, which depends on
the construction of the phrase
"has succeeded as the President,"
discussed in the next section. *
Only unexpired portion.
c. Re-election
The President shall not be
eligible for any re-election.
Furthermore, no person who has
"succeeded" as President and has
served as such for more than 4
years, shall be qualified for any
election to the same office (the
Presidency) at any time. (Art.
VII, Sec. 4, par. 1)
The person who succeeds as
President and not just in an acting
capacity, could either be (i) the
Vice-President, or (ii) one who
was elected President in a special
election. In both cases, if he has
served for more than 4 years, he
is ineligible for re-election as
President.
If he served for 4 years or less,
he can run for re- election, since
(a) the term "succeeded"
encompasses election and (b) the
general rule prohibiting the
President to run for re-election
refers to the President elected
during the regular election.
The Vice-President on the other
hand, shall not serve for more
than 2 successive terms. And for
this purpose, a voluntary (but not
involuntary) renunciation of
office for any length of time,
shall not be considered an
interruption in the continuity of
the service for the full terms for
which he was elected. (Art. VII,
Sec. 4, par. 2).
This is applicable, however,
beginning 1992, because of the
Transitory Provisions. (This
prohibition is similar to that
applicable to Senators.)
d. Canvassing of Election
Returns
As already noted in the Other
Powers of the Legislature, supra,
it is the Congress that acts as
Board of Canvassers of every
election for President and Vice-
President. The provision reads:
"The returns of every election for
President and Vice-President duly
certified by the Board of
Canvassers of each province or
city, shall be submitted to the
Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than 30
days after the date of the election,
open all the certificates in the
presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in a
joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due
execution thereof, in the manner
provided by law, canvass the
votes.
The person having the highest
number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case 2
or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of
them shall forthwith be chosen by
the vote of a majority of all the
members of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate
its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates." (Art. VII, Sec. 4,
pars. 4 - 6).
e. Electoral Tribunal for the
Election of the President
and Vice- President
The Supreme Court, sitting en
banc, shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the
election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or
Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for that
purpose. (Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7.)
Note that while election
controversies in the Congress are
under the exclusive jurisdiction
of their respective Electoral
Tribunals, those in the Executive
are under the Supreme Court
itself.
2. Prohibitions
Art. VII, Sec. 13. The President,
Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by
the Government or any
subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict
of interest in the conduct of their
office.
The spouse and relatives by
consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his
tenure be appointed as Members
of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or
heads of bureaus or offices,
including government- owned or
controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries.
a. Compare Prohibitions
against other officials
Art. VI, Sec. 13. No Senator or
Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government
owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his
term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to
any office which may have been
created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term
for which he was elected.
Art. IX, A, Sec. 2. No Member of
a Constitutional Commission
shall, during his tenure, hold any
other office or employment.
Neither shall he engage in the
practice of any profession or in
the active management or control
of any business which in any way
may be affected by the functions
of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or
indirectly, in any contract with, or
in any franchise or privilege
granted by the Government, any
of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Art. IX, B, Sec. 7. No elective
official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law
or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government
or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Art. VIII, Sec. 12. The Members
of the Supreme Court and of
other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative functions.
3. Removal
Art. XI, Sec. 2. The President,
the Vice-President, the Members
of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed
from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal or public trust. All other
public officers and employees
may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by
impeachment.
Art. XI, Sec. 3. (1) The House of
Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
A verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof, which
shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days,
and referred to the proper
Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority
vote of all its Members, shall
submit its report to the House
within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House
within ten session days from
receipt thereof.
A vote of at least one-third of all
the Members of the House shall
be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the
Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded.
In case the verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a
period of one year.
The Senate shall have the sole
power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. When sitting for
that purpose, the Senators shall
be on oath or affirmation. When
the President of the Philippines
is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but
shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.
Judgment in cases of 5. Placing on calendar of the
impeachment shall not extend Committee resolution
further than removal from office within 10 days from
and disqualification to hold any submission.
office under the Republic of the
Philippines, but the party 6. Discussion on the floor of
convicted shall nevertheless be the report, then a vote by
liable and subject to prosecution, the membership of the
trial, and punishment according House of Representatives.
to law.
7. If 1/3 vote to affirm a
a. Initiation Stage at the favorable resolution or
House of Representatives override a contrary
resolution, the case is
1. Filing of verified complaint forwarded to the Senate for
for impeachment of the trial.
President or Vice-President,
on the ground of culpable b. Trial Stage at the Senate
violation of the
Constitution, treason, 1. The Senators take an oath
bribery, graft and or affirmation. The Chief
corruption, other high Justice of the Supreme
crimes, or betrayal of Court presides over the
public trust. trial, but does not vote.

2. Inclusion of the complaint 2. After trial, the Senators

in the Order of Business vote to convict or acquit. A
within 10 session days. vote of 16 (2/3 of all the
members) is required to
3. Referral of complaint to the convict the President or
Committee on Justice Vice-President.
within 3 session days from
its inclusion. c. Post-trial

4. Hearing, voting, and 1. If the President is acquitted

submission of report by the
Committee within 60 days
from referral.
by the Senate, he shall
continue in office. No
impeachment proceeding
can again be initiated
against him within a period
of one year.
2. If the President is
impeached, he shall be
removed from office at
once, and shall be
disqualified to hold any
office in the Republic. His
criminal liability under Art.
XI, Sec. 3(7) may be
subject to him immunity
from suit.
4. Powers And Functions Of
The President
(1) Executive Power
Art. VII, Sec. 1. The executive
power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines.
Id., Sec. 17. The President shall
have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
The executive function is
essentially the duty to implement
the laws within the standards
imposed by the legislature. Under
the Constitution, this power is
exercised by the President. Thus,
when the Cabinet and other
branches of the Executive
Department implement the law,
they are acting under the control
of the President.
“Faithful Execution clause” or
“Take Care Clause” (Sec 17, Art.
VII)
The President shall ensure that
laws are faithfully executed.
It is not for him to determine the
validity of a law since this is a
question exclusively addressed to
the judiciary. Thus, until and
unless a law is declared
unconstitutional, the President
has the duty to execute it
regardless of his doubts on its
validity. A contrary opinion
would allow him to negate the
will of the legislature and to
encroach upon the prerogative of
the judiciary. (Nachura, pp 224-
225)
(2) Control of executive
departments
Art. VII, Sec. 17. The President
shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.
"Control" is the power to
substitute one's own judgment in
that of a subordinate.
• Under the qualified
political agency doctrine, the
different executive departments
are mere adjuncts of the
President. The secretaries are the
alter ego of the President, men of
his bosom confidence whom he
designated to assist him in his
otherwise physically impossible
multifarious functions, the
extension of the President in the
particular field in which they act.
Their acts are presumptively acts
of the "President, until
countermanded or reprobated by
him". The President can
substitute his will over those of
the secretaries, and they cannot
complain. Furthermore, they hold
their office subject to the
discretion of the President, who
can replace them anytime once
he loses his confidence in them.
Thus, it was ruled in the case of
Planas vs. Gil,3 that since the
Civil Service Commissioner, then
not an independent body, was the
alter ego of the President, and the
President could investigate local
officials, the Commissioner could
likewise investigate them.
In the case of Villena vs.
Secretary of the Interior,4 the
investigation of the Mayor of
Makati by the Secretary of the
Interior was deemed an
investigation conducted by the
President himself.
The doctrine on the power of
control remained unchanged in
the jurisprudence under the 1973
Constitution. The case of Free
Telephone Workers Union vs.
Minister of Labor, had occasion
to reemphasize its continuing
validity. Here, the power given
to the Minister of Labor to
assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute affecting the national
interest or to certify it for
compulsory arbitration was
challenged as an undue
delegation of a power which
properly belonged to the
President.
All that was needed to settle the
case was to hark back to the
Villena doctrine that the heads of
ministries are alter egos of the
President. Under the presidential
system, all executive and
administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the
various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive
is required by the Constitution or
the law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed
and promulgated in the regular
course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive.
Each head of a department is, and
must be, the President's alter ego
in the matters of that department
where the President is required
by law to exercise authority. The
President has the constitutional
power of control and direction
over such dept. heads and cabinet
secretaries.
PHILIPPI
NE
POLITIC
POLITICS
S
AND
AND
GOVERN
GOVERN
ANCE
FELICITY ANN FELICIANO
SOLEDAD
POLSCI B

ANCE
 Reading
Checklist:

 Brunei
 Cambodia
 East Timor
 Indonesia
 Laos
 Malaysia
 Myanmar
 Philippines
 Singapore
 Thailand
 Vietnam

EAST TIMOR
SOUTHEAST ASIAN
COUNTRIES
Mainland Southeast Asia is
divided into the countries of
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar
(Burma), Thailand, Vietnam, and
the small city-state of Singapore
at the southern tip of the Malay
Peninsula; Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam, which occupy the
eastern portion of the mainland,
often are collectively called the
Indochinese Peninsula. Malaysia
is both mainland and insular, with
a western portion on the Malay
Peninsula and an eastern part on
the island of Borneo. Except for
the small sultanate of Brunei
(also on Borneo), the remainder
of insular Southeast Asia consists
of the archipelagic nations of
Indonesia and the Philippines.
Southeast Asia stretches some
4,000 miles at its greatest extent
(roughly from northwest to
southeast) and encompasses some
5,000,000 square miles
(13,000,000 square km) of land
and sea, of which about
1,736,000 square miles is land.
Mount Hkakabo in northern
Myanmar on the border with
China, at 19,295 feet (5,881
metres), is the highest peak of
mainland Southeast Asia.
Although the modern nations of
the region are sometimes thought
of as being small, they are—with
the exceptions of Singapore and
Brunei—comparatively large.
Indonesia, for example, is more
than 3,000 miles from west to
east (exceeding the west-east
extent of the continental United
States) and more than 1,000
miles from north to south; the
area of Laos is only slightly
smaller than that of the United
Kingdom; and Myanmar is
considerably larger than France.
ASEAN REGIONAL
ORGANIZATION
The Association of Southeast
Asian Nations is a regional
organization that brings together
disparate neighbors to address
economic, security, and political
issues, but the group’s impact
remains limited.
The bloc’s biggest success has
been promoting economic
integration among members. It
also helped negotiate the RCEP
agreement to create one of the
world’s largest free trade blocs.
ASEAN has struggled to form a
cohesive response to China’s
claims in the South China Sea,
which conflict with those of
several members.
GOVERNMENT
Is the essential instrument or
machinery of the state that carry
out its will, objectives and
purposes.
GOVERNANCE
Governance is the exercise of
power or authority by political
leader for the well being at their
country’s citizens or subject.
Refers to the manner of steering
or governing and or directing and
controlling a group of people or
the state.
The government of the Southeast
Asia counties as follows:
BRUNEI DARASULLAM
Location:
Brunei, independent Islamic
sultanate on the northern coast of
the island of Borneo in Southeast
Asia. It is bounded to the north
by the South China Sea and on all
other sides by the East Malaysian
state of Sarawak, which also
divides the state into two
disconnected segments of
unequal size.
The western segment is the larger
of the two and contains the
capital city of Bandar Seri
Begawan. Brunei achieved
independence in 1984, having
been a British protectorate since
1888. It is a member of the
Commonwealth and ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian
Nations).
Flag:
National flag consisting of a
yellow field (background) with
two diagonal stripes, one black
and one white, and a central red
and yellow coat of arms. Its
width-to-length ratio is 1 to 2.
Although a few countries have
half of their national flag in
yellow, Brunei alone has a yellow
background. The avoidance of
yellow in other flags may in part
be due to the association of the
color with royalty, as in the
former imperial flags of Austria
and Russia, and with disease
(yellow flags are internationally
recognized as symbols of
quarantine). Among the smaller
Southeast Asian states with
Malay populations, however,
yellow is fairly common. The
original state flag of Brunei was
plain yellow.
In the 19th century the state ruled Head Of State And
a substantial portion of the island Government: Sultan and Prime
of Borneo, but gradually this was Minister: Sir Haji Hassanal
lost to enemies or put under Bolkiah Muʿizzaddin Waddaulah
British protection until finally
Brunei was reduced to its present Capital: Bandar Seri Begawan
modest size. Brunei became a
British protectorate in 1888, and Population: (2021 est.) 459,300
in 1906 two diagonal stripes of
different widths were added to its Currency Exchange Rate: 1
yellow flag. The three colors USD equals 1.356 Bruneian
stood for the sultan (yellow) and dollar
his two chief ministers (white and
black). A new constitution was Form Of Government:
adopted in September 1959, and Monarchy (sultanate) with one
simultaneously a modification advisory body (Legislative
was introduced in the flag. Council)

The national coat of arms in red Constitutional Framework: In

and yellow, supposedly designed 1959 Brunei became a self-
in the 15th century by the third governing state and adopted a
sultan of Brunei, Sharif Ali, was constitution, although the British
added in the centre of the flag. Its retained jurisdiction over foreign
crescent is for Islam, the state policy, defense, and internal
religion, while the parasol at the security. Limited attempts at
top is a symbol of royalty in elected representative
Brunei as in many other states. government under this
The inscription at the bottom of constitution were abandoned by
the crescent translates from 1970.
Arabic as “Always render service
by the guidance of God.” A Ultimate authority rests with the
ribbon below the crescent has the Brunei's legalis system
sultan, who is based
both head on
of state
inscription “Brunei Darussalam” British
and headcommon law, with a
of government.
or Brunei, abode of peace. On parallel Syariah law system for
January 1, 1984, Brunei became Muslims, which supersedes the
an independent country; the basic common law system in areas
flag design was retained with such as family and property law.
only minor artistic modifications.
As prime minister, he presides Election Process
over a Council of Ministers
(cabinet) and is advised by Executive: The sultan and prime
several other councils (Religious, minister are hereditary.
Privy, Succession, and
Legislative); the members of Judicial: Supreme court judges
these bodies are appointed by the are appointed by the monarch.
sultan. In 2004 the sultan The sharia court of appeal judges
approved a number of is appointed by the monarch.
amendments to the constitution.
Although a provision for a Legislative: The legislative
partially elected Legislative council has 33 members who are
Council was among the appointed by the sultan.
amendments, elections have not
been held. Election Cycle

Adopted: 1959; Dictates the Executive: Heredity

government including the
executive head of state and Judicial: Supreme Court judges
various councils. Eliminated the can serve until age 65, Sharia
need for elections. Court of Appeal judges have no
term limits.
Government Branches:
Legislative: Until dismissal by
Main Powers sultan

Executive: The sultan has Political System:

absolute executive authority. It
appoints legislative council a. Absolute Monarchy
members and the supreme court. b. Unitary State
c. Constitutional Monarchy
Judicial: The supreme court is the d. Islamic State
highest court of the land. Shariah
deals with Islamic law matters. Notes:
Brunei is a monarchy and has
Legislative: The legislative been ruled by the same family for
council advises the sultan. over six centuries.

: Councils Most Bruneians do not shake

a. Privy hands with members of the
b. Council of succession opposite sex.
c. Religious Council
d. Legislative Council
CAMBODIA
Location:
Cambodia, country on the
Indochinese mainland of
Southeast Asia. Cambodia is
largely a land of plains and great
rivers and lies amid important
overland and river trade routes
linking China to India and
Southeast Asia.
The influences of many Asian
cultures, alongside those of
France and the United States, can
be seen in the capital, Phnom
Penh, one of a handful of urban
centres in the largely rural
country.
Flag:
Since around 1850, the
Cambodian flag has featured a
depiction of Angkor Wat in the
centre. The current flag, with a
blue bonce in 1948.
Flag:
It was used until 9 October 1970,
when a new flag was introduced
for Lon Nol's Khmer Republic
that lasted until the takeover of
the Khmer Rouge in 1975. The
subsequent state of Democratic
Kampuchea, which existed from
1975 to 1979, used a red flag
with a three-towered Angkor Wat
design retained in yellow
beginning in 1976. The People's
Republic of Kampuchea was
established in 1979, after the
Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia.
The Kampuchean National
United Front for National
Salvation (FUNSK) revived the
flag adopted by the Khmer
Issarak in the days of anti-French
resistance for the new state. This
flag had the same color pattern as
the DK flag, but with a yellow
five-towered Angkor Wat
silhouette. When the PRK
renamed itself as "State of
Cambodia" (SOC) in 1989, the
flag's lower half became blue.
The UNTAC flag was used
during the 1992–1993 transitional
period along with the flag of the
SOC within Cambodia.
In 1993, the 1948 Cambodian
flag was readopted. The current Liberty, 
Cooperati
Cambodian flag, together with Blue on King
the flags of Afghanistan¹, Bolivia,  and 
Portugal, San Marino and Spain, Brotherho
od
are the only six state flags to
feature a building. Red and blue Red Bravery Nation
are traditional colors of
Cambodia.
Head Of Government: Prime
The flag used today is the same Minister: Hun Sen
as that established in 1948,
although the older flag is Capital: Phnom Penh
sometimes said to have used a
red outline for Angkor Wat while Population: (2021 est.)
the current flag uses black 16,052,000
specifically. Since that time, five
other intervening designs have Head Of State: King: Norodom
been used. Almost all made use Sihamoni
of the image of the temple of
Angkor Wat in one form or Form Of Government:
another. This famous temple site, constitutional monarchy with two
which dates from the 12th legislative houses (Senate and
century, was built by the National Assembly)
Mahidharapura monarchs.
Constitutional Framework: In
It has five towers, but these were 1981 the Vietnam-backed
not always all depicted in the communist government in Phnom
stylized version used on flags. Penh established a government
The monarchy was restored in based on a new constitution. That
September 1993, the 1948 flag government was opposed by
having been readopted in June of three factions that in 1982 formed
Symbol Meaning People
that year.
s a coalition government-in-exile.
Though that coalition was unable
Symbolism: Integrity,  to rule in Cambodia, it gained
Angkor Justice international recognition, held on
Religio
Wat  and  n
Heritage to Cambodia’s seat at the United
Nation (UN), and was able to
negotiate with the Phnom Penh
government.
In 1991 the government and
opposition groups signed peace
accords that provided for the
creation of a new national
government. The UN established
a transitional authority to oversee
the implementation of the
accords, including elections in
1993 that formed a coalition
government led by Prince
Norodom Sihanouk. A new
constitution was adopted in
September that restored the pre-
1970 Kingdom of Cambodia,
though now as a constitutional
monarchy and a multiparty
liberal democracy. Sihanouk
immediately ascended the throne
under the new constitution.
Under the constitution, the king,
who is the head of state, is
chosen from among royal
descendants by the Royal Throne
Council. In 2004 King Sihanouk
decided to abdicate, and Prince
Norodom Sihamoni was selected
to succeed him.
Cambodia’s legislature has been
bicameral since 1999, with the
directly elected National
Assembly as its lower chamber
and the indirectly elected (by
commune councilors) Senate as
its upper chamber. Members of
the parliament serve five-year
terms. Executive power resides
with the cabinet, headed by a
prime minister—who is chosen
by the king, based on the
recommendation of the chairman
of the National Assembly,
from the representatives of the
party with the largest number of
seats in the assembly. Executive
power resides with the cabinet,
headed by a prime minister—
who is chosen by the king, based
on the recommendation of the
chairman of the National
Assembly, from the
representatives of the party with
the largest number of seats in the
assembly. The remaining
government ministers are
selected from all parties
represented in the assembly.
Adopted: 1993; Constitution
outlines several topics including
sovereignty, basic rights and
obligations of citizens, the king
and his responsibilities as chief of
State, defines policy making
process, sets economic rules,
outlines the education, cultural
and social affairs, establishes
liberal democracy, describes and
delegates to legislative, judiciary
and executive branches
Government Branches:
Main Powers
Executive: The king appoints the
prime minister from assembly
and is also responsible for
upholding sovereignty. He is the
supreme commander of the
armed forces. The prime minister
is the head of government,
appointing cabinet members and
leading the government.
Judicial: The judiciary protects
the freedom and rights of the
citizens.
Legislative: The legislature
creates laws.
Election Process
Executive: The king is hereditary.
The prime minister is voted on by
the assembly and appointed by
the king.
Judicial: Judges of both courts
are appointed by the monarch.
Legislative: The senate has 61
members: 57 are elected by
members of the national
assembly and local commune
councilors, 2 are elected by the
national assembly, and
members are appointed by the
monarch. The national assembly
has 123 members who are elected
by universal adult suffrage.
Election Cycle
Executive: Prime Minister: 5
years
Judicial: Supreme Court: no term
limit, Constitutional Court:
judges are appointed for 9-year
terms with one-third of the court
renewed every 3 years
Legislative: Senate: 6 years;
National Assembly: 5 years
Political System:
a. Parliamentary System
b. Unitary State
c. Constitutional Monarchy
d. One-Party State
e. Elective Monarchy
INDONESIA
Location:
Indonesia, country located off the
coast of mainland Southeast Asia
in the Indian and Pacific oceans.
It is an archipelago that lies
across the Equator and spans a
distance equivalent to one-eighth
of Earth’s circumference.
2 Its islands can be grouped into
the Greater Sunda Islands of
Sumatra (Sumatera), Java (Jawa),
the southern extent of Borneo
(Kalimantan), and Celebes
(Sulawesi); the Lesser Sunda
Islands (Nusa Tenggara) of Bali
and a chain of islands that runs
eastward through Timor; the
Moluccas (Maluku) between
Celebes and the island of New
Guinea; and the western extent of
New Guinea (generally known as
Papua). The capital, Jakarta, is
located near the northwestern
coast of Java. In the early 21st
century Indonesia was the most
populous country in Southeast
Asia and the fourth most
populous in the world.
Additional notes:
Indonesia was formerly known as
the Dutch East Indies (or
Netherlands East Indies).
Although Indonesia did not
become the country’s official
name until the time of
independence, the name was used
as early as 1884 by a German
geographer; it is thought to derive
from the Greek indos, meaning
“India,” and nesos, meaning
“island.”
After a period of occupation by
the Japanese (1942–45) during
World War II, Indonesia declared
its independence from the
Netherlands in 1945.
Its struggle for independence,
however, continued until 1949,
when the Dutch officially
recognized Indonesian
sovereignty. It was not until the
United Nations (UN)
acknowledged the western
segment of New Guinea as part
of Indonesia in 1969 that the
country took on its present form.
The former Portuguese territory
of East Timor (Timor-Leste) was
incorporated into Indonesia in
1976. Following a UN-organized
referendum in 1999, however,
East Timor declared its
independence and became fully
sovereign in 2002.
The Indonesian archipelago
represents one of the most
unusual areas in the world: it
encompasses a major juncture of
Earth’s tectonic plates, spans two
faunal realms, and
has for millennia served as a
nexus of the peoples and cultures
of Oceania and mainland Asia.
These factors have created a
highly diverse environment and
society that sometimes seem
united only by susceptibility to
seismic and volcanic activity,
close proximity to the sea, and a
moist, tropical climate.
Nevertheless, a centralized
government and a common
language have provided
Indonesia with some sense of
unity. Furthermore, in keeping
with its role as an economic and
cultural crossroads, the country is
active in numerous international
trade and security organizations,
such as ASEAN, OPEC, and the
UN.
Flag:
The Flag of Indonesia is a simple
bicolor with two equal horizontal
bands, red (top) and white
(bottom) with an overall ratio of
2:3. It was introduced and hoisted
in public during the Proclamation
of Indonesian Independence on
17 August 1945.
in at 56 Jalan Proklamasi
(formerly Jalan Pegangsaan
Timur) in Jakarta, and again
when the Dutch formally
transferred sovereignty on 27
December 1949. The design of
the flag has remained unchanged
since.
The flag of Indonesia is
graphically similar to the Flag of
Monaco, with a slight difference
in the shade of red, and ratio of
its dimensions. The flag of
Poland has similar dimensions
but has the colors reversed: white
on top and red on the bottom. In
both, the red is of a slightly
darker shade.
The Naval Jack of Indonesia is
reserved for sole use by the
Indonesian Navy. It flies from the
mast of every active Indonesian
war ship.
The design of the jack is
described as nine alternating
stripes of red and white. It is
nicknamed Ular-ular Perang (War
Pennant or literally "War
Snakes"), probably due to the
stripes' design. The naval jack
dates to the age of Majapahit
Empire. This empire, renowned
for its great maritime strength,
flew similar jacks on its vessels.
Head Of State And
Government: President: Joko
Widodo
Capital: Jakarta
Population: (2021 est.)
269,804,000
Currency Exchange Rate: 1
USD equals 14372.293
Indonesian rupiah
Form Of Government:
Multiparty republic with two
legislative houses (Regional
Representative Council [132];
House of Representatives [560])
Constitutional Framework: The
1945 constitution invests most of
the power in the executive branch
of the government, particularly in
the president, who is assisted by a
vice president and a cabinet. The
constitution also provides for a
body of presidential advisers,
called the Supreme Advisory
Council (Dewan Pertimbangan
Agung)
the advice of which is not legally
binding, however—as well as a
presidentially appointed Supreme
Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa
Keuangan), which controls state
finance.
Until 2002 the president and vice
president were elected every five
years by the People’s
Consultative Assembly (Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat; MPR),
but in that year a new law
decreed that beginning in 2004
both leaders were to be directly
elected. In addition, legislation
passed in 1999 limited the
president to two five-year terms
Until 2002 the president and vice
president were elected every five
years by the People’s
Consultative Assembly (Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat; MPR),
but in that year a new law
decreed that beginning in 2004
both leaders were to be directly
elected. In addition, legislation
passed in 1999 limited the
president to two five-year terms.
Cabinet ministers are appointed
by the president. Ministries
manage broad areas, such as
economic affairs, foreign affairs,
defense, education, agriculture,
information, and religious affairs.
The number of ministers and the
nature of their areas of
assignment depend on the
president. In addition to
appointing the cabinet, the
president is the supreme
commander of the army, the
navy, and the air force. The
president also has the authority to
introduce bills, issue regulations,
implement acts, and make
agreements with foreign
countries.
The MPR constitutes the
legislative branch of Indonesia’s
government; it is primarily
responsible for interpreting the
constitution and the broad lines
of state policy. Formerly
unicameral, the MPR has been a
bicameral body since the
elections of 2004, with the
Council of the People’s
Representatives (Dewan
Perwakilan Rakyat; DPR) as the
lower house and the Council of
Regional Representatives
(Dewan Perwakilan Daerah;
DPD) as the upper house.
About four-fifths of the MPR’s
seats belong to the lower house.
Members of the DPD are elected
directly from a nationwide pool
of nonpartisan candidates, and
members of the DPR are directly
elected through a province-based
proportional system that allows
voters to cast ballots for
individuals as well as particular
parties. All legislators serve five-
year terms.
Adopted: 1949; Was abrogated
by the Federal Constitution of
1949 and the Provisional
Constitution of 1950, but restored
in 1959. Covers basic topics
including the role, function, and
structure of government; basic
rights of citizens; and nationwide
cultural standards.
Government Branches:
Main Powers
Executive: The president heads
the United Indonesia Cabinet and
is also head of state, commander-
in-chief, and responsible for
domestic governance, policy-
making and foreign affairs.
Judicial: The Mahkamah Agung
(supreme court) is the highest
level of the judicial branch. The
constitutional court rules on
constitutional and political
matters, while the judicial
commission oversees the judges.
Legislative: The Majelis Notes!
Permusyawaratan Rakyat and the
Dewan Perwakilan Rakya serve Can’t run if may criminal record,
as the two legislative bodies for for example treason against the
Indonesia. State.

Election Process Minimum of 20% of State budget

and regional budget needs of
Executive: The president is implementation of national
elected by absolute majority vote. education.

Judicial: Supreme court judges If the President failed to approve

are nominated by a judicial
commission and appointed by the
president with the concurrence of
parliament. The constitutional
court has nominations from the
president, supreme court, and
parliament. Its judges are
appointed by the president.
within 30 days it will legally
became law.
Land, water and natural resources
shall under the power of the
State.
MPR

Legislative: Dewan Perwakilan

Daerah are elected by single non-
transferable vote. The Dewan DPR DPD
Perwakilan Rakya are elected by
open-list proportional
representation in multi-member
constituencies. State

Election Cycle

Executive: 5 years Regencies

Municipalities
Judicial: Life appointment
Question:
Legislative: 5 years
Who became the Vice-President
Political System: of the Philippines when GMA
succeed the President position
a. Unitary Public after Erap Estrada impeached?
b. Presidential
LAOS
Location:
Laos, landlocked country of
northeast-central mainland
Southeast Asia. It consists of an
irregularly round portion in the
north that narrows into a
peninsula-like region stretching
to the southeast. Overall, the
country extends about 650 miles
(1,050 km) from northwest to
southeast. The capital is
Vientiane (Lao: Viangchan),
located on the Mekong River in
the northern portion of the
country.
Colonization by the French from
the late 19th to the mid-20th
century infused Laos with a
European cultural element, which
intensified throughout the
country’s embroilment in World
War II and the Indochina wars, as
well as a civil war of its own in
the second half of the 20th
century. Guided by Marxist-
Leninist ideology, Laos emerged
from the turmoil in 1975 as a
communist country.
Economic reforms of the late
20th and early 21st centuries,
including the development of
tourism, have strengthened
Laos’s economy, gradually
shrinking the country’s debt and
diminishing its dependence on
international aid.
Flag:
The flag of Laos consists of three
horizontal stripes, with the
middle stripe in blue being twice
the height of the top and bottom
red stripes. In the middle is a
white disc, the diameter of the
disc is 4⁄5 the height of the blue
stripe. The flag ratio is 2:3.
In 1353 King Fa Ngum
proclaimed the “Kingdom of the
Million Elephants and White
Parasol,” basing the name on
those traditional symbols of the
Lao people. The mythical first
ruler of Laos had arrived riding a
white elephant, an animal held in
great reverence by peoples of
Southeast Asia, while the parasol,
or royal umbrella, long served as
an important part of the king’s
ceremonial regalia.
The white three-headed elephant
and white parasol on a red field
was chosen by the kingdom of
Luang Prabang, which became a
French protectorate in 1893, and,
on May 11, 1947, by the
Kingdom of Laos.
The modern Laos flag is unusual
in that it is a revival of a flag that
was used by a past government
before falling out of use. It was
designed with the intention of
creating a flag that was distinct
from the royal flag of Laos,
which also helped to make it
distinct from the flag that
represented the nation while it
was part of the French colonial
empire.
The flag of Laos was adopted on
December 2, 1975. The flag had
previously been used by the
short-lived Lao nationalist
government of 1945.
The flag consists of three
horizontal stripes, middle blue
stripe is twice the height of the
top and bottom red stripes. In the
middle is a white circle, the
diameter of the disc circle 8/10
times the height of the blue
stripe. The national flag of Laos
was adopted when the country
became a people's republic in
1975. It is one of the few
Communist flags that does not
use the five-pointed star as an
emblem.
The Laos flag consists of three
horizontal stripes that alternate
between red and dark blue. A
white circle is in the center of the
the blue stripe. The flag was
inspired by the flag of Thailand,
which shares the flag's color
scheme. The colors were also
chosen for their symbolic value.
The blue stripe represents the
Mekong River as well as the
nation's wealth, while the red
stripes represent the blood that
the nation shed during its struggle
for independence and the period
of colonial rule. The white circle
is a symbol of both national unity
and the full moon.
Head Of Government: Prime
Minister: Thongloun Sisoulith
Capital: Vientiane (Viangchan)
Population: (2021 est.) 7,335,000
Head Of State: President:
Bounnhang Vorachith.
Form Of Government: unitary
single-party people’s republic
with one legislative house
(National Assembly [149])
Constitutional Framework:
Since its establishment in
December 1975, the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic (LPDR) has
been effectively controlled by the
communist Lao People’s
Revolutionary Party (LPRP).
This party, in alliance with the
Vietnamese communists, carried
out the revolution that ended in
its seizure of power and the
abolition of the monarchy. Top
government positions—beginning
with the president, who is head of
state, and the prime minister, who
is the head of government—are
selected from high-ranking party
members who constitute a
Central Committee with the
Politburo at the head.
The constitution of 1991, which
declares the party to be the
“leading nucleus” of the political
system, provides for a National
Assembly, the members of which
are elected to five-year terms.
The National Assembly elects the
president and vice president and
approves presidential
appointments of the prime
minister and members of the
cabinet (Council of Ministers).
The president and ministers serve
five-year terms.
Adopted: 1991; Protects the right
to preserve the national culture,
natural heritage, fine tradition,
antiques and historical places of
the country and its ethnic
minorities, the right to transfer of
technology, and the right to
create artistic and literary works
and to engage in cultural
activities.
Local Government: The country
is divided into some 16
provinces, as well as the
Vientiane municipality and the
Xaisomboun special zone; the
provinces are subdivided further
into districts and villages.
Governors of provinces and the
mayor of Vientiane are appointed
by the president, and lower-level
local administrators, including
deputy provincial governors,
deputy mayors, and district
chiefs, are named by the prime
minister. Villages are led by
village heads. At each level of
local government, there are party
committees and administrative
committees, often headed by the
same individuals. Local
administrations have considerable
autonomy in economic matters.
Government Branches:
Main Powers
Executive: Appoints prime
minister and cabinet, and is in
charge of executory tasks of the
government.
Judicial: In charge of interpreting
the constitution and upholding
the law.
Legislative: Elects the president,
approves appointments by
president and is in charge of
creating legislature.
 Election Process Malaysia, country of Southeast
Asia, lying just north of the
Executive: Elected by National Equator, that is composed of two
Assembly. noncontiguous regions:
Peninsular Malaysia
Judicial: Appointed by National (Semenanjung Malaysia), also
Assembly Standing Committee. called West Malaysia (Malaysia
Barat), which is on the Malay
Legislative: 132 members elected Peninsula, and East Malaysia
by plurality vote in multi-member (Malaysia Timur), which is on
constituencies. the island of Borneo. The
Malaysian capital, Kuala
Election Cycle Lumpur, lies in the western part
of the peninsula, about 25 miles
Executive: 5 years (40 km) from the coast; the
administrative centre, Putrajaya,
Judicial: Information not is located about 16 miles (25 km)
available south of the capital.

Legislative: 5 years Malaysia, a member of the

Commonwealth, represents the
Political System: political marriage of territories
that were formerly under British
a. Republic rule. When it was established on
b. Socialist State September 16, 1963, Malaysia
c. Unitary State comprised the territories of
d. Communist State Malaya (now Peninsular
Malaysia), the island of
MALAYSIA Singapore, and the colonies of
Sarawak and Sabah in northern
Location: Borneo. In August 1965
Singapore seceded from the
federation and became an
independent republic.

Flag:
The flag of Malaysia, also known
as the Stripes of Glory, is
composed of a field of 14
alternating red and white stripes
along the fly and a blue canton
bearing a crescent and a 14-point
star known as the Bintang
Persekutuan.
National flag consisting of seven
red and seven white horizontal
stripes and a blue canton with a
yellow star and crescent. The
width-to-length ratio of the flag is
1 to 2.
The flag traditions of the many
independent states now united in
Malaysia emphasized white, red,
yellow, and black; a horizontally
striped flag in those colours
served as the naval ensign for the
Federated Malay States, which
came into existence on July 1,
1896. The traditional royal Malay
tiger appeared on a white oval in
the centre. Some of the larger
states resisted federation and
maintained their own national
symbols, however. After the
Japanese occupied the peninsula
during World War II, efforts
toward unification eventually
gained support.
On April 1, 1946, the Malayan
Union was founded, followed on
February 1, 1948, by the
Federation of Malaya. A ringgit
competition for a national flag
led to the design first hoisted on
May 26, 1950.
It consisted of 11 horizontal
stripes of red and white, the
colours favoured by the dominant
United Malays National
Organization and found in the
flags of neighbouring Indonesia
and Thailand. The canton of the
flag was blue with a yellow star
of 11 points, symbolizing
Malaya’s 11 states, and a yellow
crescent. When additional states
joined on September 16, 1963,
the flag was modified. The
current version has 14 stripes and
a 14-pointed star. Yellow is a
royal colour in Malaysia, and red,
white, and blue indicate the close
association of the country with
the Commonwealth. The flag
design was also influenced by the
flag of the United States. The
crescent and star symbolize the
nation’s majority Muslim
population.
Head Of Government: Prime
Minister: Ismail Sabri Yaakob
Administrative Centre:
Putrajaya
Capital: Kuala Lumpur
Population (2021 est.):
32,779,000
Currency Exchange Rate: 1
USD equals 4.187 Malaysian
Head Of State: Paramount
Ruler: (Yang di-Pertuan Agong)
Sultan Abdullah of Pahang
Form Of Government: Federal
constitutional monarchy with two
legislative houses (Senate [701];
House of Representatives [222])
Official Religion: Islam
Constitutional Framework:
Malaysia is a federal
constitutional monarchy with a
ceremonial head of state—a
monarch—who bears the title
Yang di-Pertuan Agong
(“paramount ruler”) and who is
elected from among nine
hereditary state rulers for a five-
year term. The Malaysian
constitution, drafted in 1957
following the declaration of
independence (from the British)
by the states of what is now
Peninsular Malaysia, provides for
a bicameral federal legislature,
consisting of the Senate (Dewan
Negara) as the upper house and
the House of Representatives
(Dewan Rakyat) as the lower.
The paramount ruler appoints a
prime minister from among the
members of the House of
Representatives. On the advice of
the prime minister, the monarch
then appoints the other ministers
who make up the cabinet. The
number of ministers is not fixed,
but all must be members of the
federal parliament. The federal
government also includes an
independent judiciary and a
politically neutral civil service.
The powers of the federal
parliament are relatively broad
and include the authority to
legislate in matters concerning
government finances, defense,
foreign policy, internal security,
the administration of justice, and
citizenship. The constitution also
provides that some issues may be
addressed by either the federal
legislature or a state legislature.
Of the roughly 200 members of
the House of Representatives,
about two-thirds are from
Peninsular Malaysia, one is from
the federal territory of Labuan,
and the remaining seats are
divided fairly evenly between
Sarawak and Sabah. Members
are elected to office from single-
member constituencies to terms
of five years. The Senate consists
of about six dozen members; of
these, nearly two-thirds
(including those from the federal
territories of Kuala Lumpur and
Labuan) are appointed by the
paramount ruler on the
recommendation of the prime
minister, and the others are
elected by the state legislative
assemblies. Election to either
house is by a simple majority, but
amendments to the constitution
require a two-thirds majority. A
bill passed by both houses and
sanctioned by the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong becomes a federal
law.
Local government: Malaysia
comprises 13 states and 3 federal
territories. Each state has its own
written constitution, legislative
assembly, and executive council,
which is responsible to the
legislative assembly and headed
by a chief minister. The federal
territories, which include the
capital city region of Kuala
Lumpur, the administrative
capital of Putrajaya, and the
island of Labuan off the coast of
East Malaysia, carry the same
status as states, but they do not
have separate legislatures or
heads of state.
Most of the peninsular states are
led by hereditary rulers. Johor,
Kedah, Kelantan, Pahang, Perak,
Selangor, and Terengganu have
sultans, while Perlis has a raja
(“king”), and Negeri Sembilan is
ruled by the Yang di-Pertuan
Besar (“chief ruler”). The heads
of state of Melaka, Penang Island
(Pulau Pinang; also Penang),
Sarawak, and Sabah—known as
Yang di-Pertuan Negeri (“state
ruler”)—are appointed to office.
The ruler of a state acts on the
advice of the state government.
The constitution provides for
federal parliamentary elections
and for elections to state
legislatures, to be held at least
every five years.
All states in Malaysia are
subdivided into districts. In
Sarawak and Sabah, however,
these districts are grouped into
larger administrative units called
divisions. The village, headed by
a tua kampung (“village leader”),
is the smallest unit of
government.
Adopted: 1957; Establishes the
Federation as a constitutional
monarchy with the role of Yang
di-Pertuan Agong (Head of State)
being largely ceremonial. It also
provides for the establishment
and the organization of three
branches of the government: the
bicameral legislative branch
(Parliament) which consists of
the House of Representatives
(Dewan Rakyat) and the Senate
(Dewan Negara); the executive
branch led by the Prime Minister
and Cabinet Ministers; and the
judicial branch.
Government Branches:
Main Powers
Executive: The King is largely a
ceremonial role and is head of
state. The prime minister is the
head of government, leads the
cabinet of ministers and can
choose to not appoint a Deputy
Prime Minister if they so please.
Judicial: The highest court and
the final appellate court in
Malaysia.
Legislative: The Dewan Negara
reviews legislation that has been
passed by the lower house. If the
Dewan Negara rejects a bill, it
can delay the bill's passage by
only a year before it is sent to the
King. The Dewan Rakyat is the
lower house of parliament - all
bills must be passed by both
houses before they are given
Royal Assent.
 Election Process
Executive: Monarchy is elected
by hereditary state rulers. The
prime minister is designated by
parliament.
Judicial: Justices appointed by
the monarch on advice of the
prime minister.
Legislative: The Dewan Negara
has 44 members that are
appointed by the monarch, 26
members are elected by state
legislatures. The Dewan Rakyat
members are elected by plurality
vote in single-member
constituencies.
Election Cycle:
Executive: At least once within 5
years
Judicial: Mandatory retirement
age of 65
Legislative: Dewan Negara: 3
years; Dewan Rakyat: 5 years
MYANMAR
Location:
Myanmar, also called Burma,
country, located in the western
portion of mainland Southeast
Asia. In 1989 the country’s
official English name, which it
had held since 1885, was
changed from the Union of
Burma to the Union of Myanmar;
in the Burmese language the
country has been known as
Myanma (or, more precisely,
Mranma Prañ) since the 13th
century. The English name of the
city that served as the country’s
capital from 1948 to 2006,
Rangoon, also was dropped in
1989 in favour of the common
Burmese name, Yangon.
In 2005 the government began to
shift its administrative centre,
first to the city of Pyinmana
(some 200 miles [320 km] north
of Yangon) and then to Nay Pyi
Taw (Naypyidaw), a newly
constructed city near Pyinmana.
Nay Pyi Taw was proclaimed the
capital of Myanmar in 2006.
Flag:
National flag consisting of three
equal horizontal stripes of yellow,
green, and red, with a central
white star overlapping the three
stripes. The flag has a width-to-
length ratio of 1 to 2.
The flag of Myanmar consists of
horizontal tri-colors yellow,
green and red with a central, five
pointed star overlapping the
stripes. There is no official
explanation for the meaning of
the colors you the generally
accepted implication is that the
colors the following: green
Peace, tranquility and the lush
green landscape of the country,
yellow Solidarity or national
unity and red courage and
determination.
At the center of the flag is a
massive five-pointed star, which
is a symbol of unity in the
country, it was adopted in favor
of the royal peacock insignia that
was initially there The socialist
flag also consisted of one
massive star with fourteen
smaller stars. However, the
recent change in regime coupled
with the destruction of the
rebellious movement triggered
the adoption of one-line star.
The flag of the President of
Burma still retain this peacock
insignia, which is a symbol of
royalty, the sun, Buddhism,
happiness, and unity.
Head Of Government: Prime
Minister: Senior Gen. Min Aung
Hlaing
Capital: Nay Pyi Taw
(Naypyidaw)
Population: (2021 est.)
55,199,000
Head Of State: President: Myint
Swe (acting)
Form Of Government: Military
government and Parliamentary
Republic
Constitutional Framework:
Myanmar’s first constitution
came into force on Jan. 4, 1974,
the 26th anniversary of the
country’s independence, and was
suspended following a military
coup on Sept. 18, 1988. The
country was subsequently ruled
by a military junta, known first as
the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC)
and, between 1997 and 2011, as
the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC).
Under the 1974 constitution,
supreme power rested with the
unicameral People’s Assembly
(Pyithu Hluttaw), a 485-member
popularly elected body that
exercised legislative, executive,
and judicial authority.
The Council of State, which
consisted of 29 members (one
representative elected from each
of the country’s 14 states and
divisions, 14 members elected by
the People’s Assembly as a
whole, and the prime minister as
an ex officio member), elected its
own secretary and its own
chairman, who was ex officio
president of the country. The
secretary and the president were
also, respectively, the secretary-
general and the chairman of the
Burma Socialist Programme
Party (BSPP), which, under
military leadership, was the only
official political party from 1964
to 1988. Civil servants, members
of the armed forces, workers, and
peasants belonged to the BSPP,
and senior military officials and
civil servants were included in
the party’s hierarchy.
After the military took control of
the government in 1988, it
established the SLORC as the
new ruling body, and all state
organs, including the People’s
Assembly and the Council of
State, were abolished and their
duties assumed by the SLORC.
The law designating the BSPP as
the only political party also was
abolished, and new parties were
encouraged to register for general
elections to a new legislative
assembly.
More than 90 parties participated
in the elections, which were held
in May 1990; of these the most
important were the dominant
BSPP, which had changed its
name to the National Unity Party
(NUP), and the main opposition
party, the National League for
Democracy (NLD).
The NLD won some four-fifths
of the seats in the new assembly.
However, after the NLD’s victory
the SLORC announced that the
elections were not actually for a
legislative assembly but for a
constituent assembly charged
with drafting a new constitution;
furthermore, the SLORC did not
permit the assembly to meet.
Instead, in 1993 the SLORC
convened a National Convention
of handpicked participants—
rather than the elected assembly
of 1990—to formulate a new
constitution. This constituent
assembly met intermittently in
1993–96 and then again from
2004 until early in 2008, when it
finally passed a completed draft
constitution. The constitution was
put to a popular referendum in
May and was approved, but the
document did not to go into effect
until Jan. 31, 2011, following
elections for a new parliament
that were held in November
2010.
Under the 2008 constitution,
legislative authority is vested in a
bicameral Assembly of the Union
(Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) consisting
of a 224-seat House of
Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw)
and a 440-seat House of
Representatives (Pyithu
Hluttaw).Three-fourths of the
members of each chamber are
directly elected, and the
remaining one-fourth are
appointed by the military; all
members serve five-year terms.
Executive authority, per the
constitution, rests with the
president, who is elected to a
five-year term by members of the
House of Representatives and
heads an 11-member National
Defense and Security Council
(cabinet). However, it is thought
that the military retained some
level of influence on the
government behind the scenes
after Jan. 31, 2011.
In February 2021 the military
seized power by detaining the
president, upon which one of the
vice presidents, a former military
officer, became acting president
and immediately invoked articles
417 and 418 of the constitution:
the former allowing him to
declare a one-year state of
emergency and the latter
allowing him to transfer power to
the commander in chief of the
armed forces. The legislative
houses were also suspended per
article 418.
The State Administrative
Council, headed by the
commander in chief of the armed
forces, was formed to handle the
functions of government during
the state of emergency.
Adopted: 2008; Was voted on by
a public referendum in attempt to
slowly transition Burma into a
democracy, although opposing
authorities consider it to be more
of a tool for maintaining military
control of Burma. The structure
of government, its powers, and
elections are detailed in depth.
However, revisions in state
structure were not implemented
until August 2010.
Local Government: Myanmar is
divided administratively into
seven states largely on the basis
of ethnicity—Chin, Kachin,
Kayin (Karen), Kayah, Mon,
Rakhine (Arakan), and Shan—
and seven more truly
administrative divisions of
Myanmar proper—Ayeyarwady
(Irrawaddy), Magway (Magwe),
Mandalay, Bago (Pegu), Sagaing,
Taninthary (Tenasserim), and
Yangon. These states and
divisions are subdivided further
into townships, urban wards, and
village tracts.
Until 1988, at each level of local
government there was a People’s
Council that followed the pattern
of the People’s Assembly. Every
local government council also
had an Executive Committee, and
all but the village or ward
councils had a Committee of
Inspectors. Local and national
elections were held
simultaneously. In 1988 the
SLORC dissolved these bodies
and assumed control of local
administration, establishing in
their place military-dominated
Law and Order Restoration
Councils.
Legislative: Members of the
house of nationalities (Amyotha
Hluttaw) are elected on basis of
township and population.
Members of the house of
representatives (Pythu Hluttaw)
are directly elected equally from
regions and states.
Election Cycle
Executive: 5 years
Judicial: Mandatory retirement
age of 70
Legislative: 5 years

Government Branches: Political System:

Main Powers a. Parliamentary System

b. Unitary State
Executive: The president appoints c. Presidential System
the cabinet, nominates judges, is d. Parliamentary Republic
the commander-in-chief of armed
forces, and is in charge of SINGAPORE
executory tasks of the
government. Location:

Judicial: The supreme court is the

highest court of the land.

Legislative: The legislative

branch is in charge of creating
legislature and confirms the
president's nominations.

Election Process Singapore is an island country off

the southern tip of the Malay
Executive: The president is Peninsula in Southeast Asia.
elected by the parliament from
among three vice presidents of
the different parliamentary
houses.

Judicial: The chief justice and

judges are nominated by the
president with approval of the
Pythu Hlattaw.
It is separated from Malaysia by
the Straits of Johor, and from
Indonesia's Riau Islands by the
Singapore Strait. Singapore has a
strategic location for Southeast
Asian sea routes. The
government system is a dominates the Strait of Malacca,
parliamentary republic; the chief
of state is the president, and the
head of government is the prime
minister. Singapore has a highly
development free market
economy in which the economy
is open and corruption-free.
Singapore is a member of the
Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), the
Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Singapore, city-state located at
the southern tip of the Malay
Peninsula, about 85 miles (137
kilometres) north of the Equator.
It consists of the diamond-shaped
Singapore Island and some 60
small islets; the main island
occupies all but about 18 square
miles of this combined area. The
main island is separated from
Peninsular Malaysia to the north
by Johor Strait, a narrow channel
crossed by a road and rail
causeway that is more than half a
mile long. The southern limits of
the state run through Singapore
Strait, where outliers of the Riau-
Lingga Archipelago—which
forms a part of Indonesia—
extend to within 10 miles of the
main island.
Singapore is the largest port in
Southeast Asia and one of the
busiest in the world. It owes its
growth and prosperity to its focal
position at the southern extremity
of the Malay Peninsula, where it
which connects the Indian Ocean
to the South China Sea. Once a
British colony and now a member
of the Commonwealth, Singapore
first joined the Federation of
Malaysia on its formation in 1963
but seceded to become an
independent state on August 9,
1965.
Flag:
The national flag of Singapore
comprises two equal horizontal
sections – an upper red section
and a lower white section. A
white crescent moon occupies the
upper left red section, with five
white stars arranged in a circle
beside it.
Each color and symbol on the
flag has a distinctive meaning
and significance attached to it.
The color red symbolizes It separated from Malaysia on
universal brotherhood and the August 9, 1965. On December
equality of man, while white 22, 1965, the Legislative
represents pervading and Assembly passed a Singapore
everlasting purity and virtue. Independence Bill and a
Together, the two colors signify Constitutional Amendment. The
Singapore’s goal to achieve Constitutional Amendment
brotherhood and equality through provided for a parliamentary
purity and virtue. The crescent system of government, with a
moon represents a rising young president, whose duties were
nation, while the five stars depict largely ceremonial, elected every
Singapore’s ideals of democracy, four years by the Parliament.
peace, progress, justice and
equality. Singapore became an
autonomous state within
Regardless of size, the length to Malaysia, with its own
the width of the flag is in the constitution, on September 16,
ratio three to two. The official 1963. It separated from Malaysia
colors are Pantone 032 for the red on August 9, 1965. On December
portion and Pantone White for 22, 1965, the Legislative
the white portion. Assembly passed a Singapore
Independence Bill and a
Head Of State Government: Constitutional Amendment. The
Prime Minister: Lee Hsien Loong Constitutional Amendment
provided for a parliamentary
Head Of State: President: system of government, with a
Halimah Yacob president, whose duties were
largely ceremonial, elected every
Capital: Singapore four years by the Parliament.

Population: (2021 est.) The Constitution can be amended

5,709,0002
Currency Exchange Rate: 1
USD equals 1.345 Singapore
dollar
Form Of Government: Unitary
multiparty republic with one
legislative house (Parliament
[1011])
by a two-thirds vote of
Parliament. A 1966 amendment
allowed appeal from the Court of
Appeal in Singapore to the
Judicial Committee of Her
Majesty's Privy Council in
Britain. In 1968 an amendment
created the office of vice
president and liberalized the
requirements of citizenship.

Constitutional Framework:
Singapore became an
autonomous state within
Malaysia, with its own
constitution, on September 16,
1963.
A 1969 amendment established
the Supreme Court in place of the
High Court and Court of Appeal
as the highest appeal tribunal. A
1972 amendment entitled
"Protection of the Sovereignty of
the Republic of Singapore,"
introduced a measure to ensure
the sovereignty of the city-state.
It prohibited any merger or
incorporation with another
sovereign state, unless approved
in a national referendum by a
two-thirds majority. Under the
same terms, it also prohibited the
relinquishment of control over
Singapore police forces and
armed forces. In 1978 the
Fundamental Liberties section of
the Constitution (Part IV, Articles
9-16) was amended; the
amendment extended government
powers by establishing that
arrests to preserve public safety
and good order and laws on drug
abuse would not be inconsistent
with liberties set forth in that
section of the Constitution.
Adopted: 1965; This constitution
exercises the concept of original
jurisdiction, meaning the power
to hear cases for the first time in
the case of the High Court. This
constitution is considered to be
the supreme law of the land for
the country of Singapore. Basic
topics such as the structure and
functions of the government are
also covered in detail.
Government Branches:
Main Power
Executive: Responsible for the
general direction of the
government and accountable to
the parliament.
Judicial: Administers justice
independently of influence from
other branches of government.
Legislative: Responsible for
enacting legislation.
Election Process
Executive: President is elected by
plurality vote and prime minister
is appointed by the president.
Judicial: Appointed by president
Legislative: 12 members are
elected by plurality vote in
single-member constituencies, 75
members are elected through a
group representation constituency
(GRC) system, 9 members are
nominated by the President and 3
members are appointed from a
national compensatory list.
Election Cycle
Executive: 6 years
Judicial: Life appointment
Legislative: 5 years
Political System:
a. Unitary State
b. Parliamentary Republic
c. Constitutional Republic
THAILAND
Location:
Thailand, country located in the
centre of mainland Southeast
Asia. Located wholly within the
tropics, Thailand encompasses
diverse ecosystems, including the
hilly forested areas of the
northern frontier, the fertile rice
fields of the central plains, the
broad plateau of the northeast,
and the rugged coasts along the
narrow southern peninsula.
Until the second half of the 20th
century, Thailand was primarily
an agricultural country, but since
the 1960s increasing numbers of
people have moved to Bangkok,
the capital, and to other cities.
Although the greater Bangkok
metropolitan area remains the
preeminent urban centre in the
country, there are other sizable
cities, such as Chiang Mai in the
north, Nakhon Ratchasima
(Khorat), Khon Kaen, and Udon
Thani in the northeast, Pattaya in
the southeast, and Hat Yai in the
far south.
Siam, as Thailand was officially
called until 1939, was never
brought under European colonial
domination. Independent Siam
was ruled by an absolute
monarchy until a revolution there
in 1932. Since that time, Thailand
has been a constitutional
monarchy, and all subsequent
constitutions have provided for
an elected parliament. Political
authority, however, has often
been held by the military, which
has taken power through coups.
During the last two decades of
the 20th century and the first
decade of the 21st, parliamentary
democracy steadily gained wider
popular support. Although a crisis
emerged in 2006, when the
military, aligned with the
monarchy, overthrew an elected
government, new parliamentary
elections were held—as promised
by the interim government—in
2007.
Flag:
The flag of the Kingdom of
Thailand shows five horizontal
stripes in the colors red, white,
blue, white and red, with the
central blue stripe being twice as
wide as each of the other four.
The design was adopted on 28
September 1917, according to the
royal decree issued by Rama VI.
Since 2016, that day is a national
day of importance in Thailand
celebrating the flag.
The colors are said to stand for
nation-religion-king, an
unofficial motto of Thailand, red
for the land and people, white for
religions and blue for the
monarchy, the last having been
the auspicious color of Rama VI.
As the king declared war on
Germany that July, some note the
flag now bore the same colors as
those of the UK, France, Russia
and the United States.
The colors are said to stand for
nation-religion-king, an
unofficial motto of Thailand, red
for the land and people, white for
religions and blue for the
monarchy, the last having been
the auspicious color of Rama VI.
Head Of Government: Prime
Minister: Prayuth Chan-ocha
Capital: Bangkok
Population: (2021 est.)
66,873,000
Currency Exchange Rate: 1
USD equals 32.419 Thai baht
Head Of State: King
Vajiralongkorn
Form Of Government:
constitutional monarchy with a
220-member interim legislature
Constitutional Framework:
Thailand is a constitutional
monarchy with the monarch as
the head of state. While almost
every government since 1932 has
accepted constitutional authority,
the country has had 17
constitutions, the most recent
drafted in 2007. All of these
documents have provided for a
National Assembly with a prime
minister as head of government.
Power is exercised by the
bicameral National Assembly, the
Council of Ministers, and the
courts in accordance with the
provisions of the constitution and
laws passed by the National
Assembly.
 The constitution of 2007 (largely
based on that of 1997) provides
for the direct election of
members of the lower house of
the Assembly, the House of
Representatives, to four-year
terms, five-sixths from single-
member districts and the
remainder based on proportional
representation from the political
parties. It also requires the prime
minister to be a member of the
House of Representatives.
Members of the upper house, the
Senate, are directly elected to six-
year terms. Legislation originates
in the House of Representatives,
but it can be modified or rejected
by the Senate.
In May 2014, following a
military coup, the 2007
constitution was suspended
(except provisions pertaining to
the monarchy), and a council of
military leaders took power. That
council appointed a 200-member
single-chamber interim
legislature in late July. The leader
of the council was named interim
prime minister in late August.
The execution of laws is carried
out by the civil service, whose
members are known as
kharatchakan, “servants of the
king.” The bureaucracy,
particularly the Ministry of
Interior, has always enjoyed a
significant degree of autonomy in
administering the country. The
number of elective offices and
senior civil-service positions
occupied by women is small,
though increasing slowly.
Adopted: 2007; Drafted by a
committee established by the
military junta. Additionally, the
junta made it illegal to publicly
criticize the draft. Contents of the
document include the rights and
freedoms of the people, structure
of the government, duties of the
Thai people, direct political
participation of the public, etc.
Local Government: For most
people in Thailand, government
is experienced primarily through
centrally appointed officials who
hold posts in local administration,
the main units of which are
provinces (changwat) and
districts (amphur). In the 1990s
three new provinces were carved
out of the existing ones, resulting
in a total of 76.
A marked devolution of power
has taken place since the 1980s.
By far the most significant of the
local governing bodies are those
in the major cities, including
Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and
Pattaya. Locally elected
provincial assemblies have little
power, but they serve as
incubators for local politicians
who may later be elected to the
National Assembly. In 1997,
communes (tambon), units
consisting of several villages,
were given increased powers and
the authorization to elect
members of tambon
administrative organizations.
With new administrative and Election Process
financial authority, these bodies
have become the most important Executive: Prime minister is
local democratic units in appointed by the monarch.
Thailand. Headmen of villages
(muban) are also elected, but Judicial: Approved by monarch.
their authority is circumscribed
by centrally appointed district Legislative: Senate (Wuthisapha)
officers and the tambon has 73 members appointed by
administrative organizations. judges and independent
government bodies and 77
Government Branches: members elected by plurality
vote in single-member
Main Power constituencies, and the House of
Representatives (Sapha Phuthaen
Executive: Advises the king on Ratsadon) has 375 members
matters of legislation, elected by plurality vote in
government affairs, clemency, single-member constituencies and
awards, and other matters 125 members elected through a
requiring the king’s signature. closed-list proportional
representation system.
Judicial: Interprets the
constitution, as well as adjudicate Election Cycle
disputes involving state agencies,
state enterprises, and local Executive: Prime Minister: 4
government organizations, or years
between state officials and
private individuals. Judicial: Until dismissal by
monarch
Legislative: Appointment of a
regent, declarations by a regent, Legislative: 4 years
amendment of the Palace Law on
Succession, approval of Political System:
succession to the throne,
reconsideration of bills or organic a. Parliamentary System
law bills, constitutional b. Unitary State
amendments, a declaration of c. Constitutional Monarchy
war, and approval of treaties.
TIMOR LESTE
Location:
East Timor, island country in the
eastern Lesser Sunda Islands, at
the southern extreme of the
Malay Archipelago. It occupies
the eastern half of the island of
Timor, the small nearby islands
of Atauro (Kambing) and Jaco,
and the enclave of Ambeno,
including the town of Pante
Makasar, on the northwestern
coast of Timor. Dili is the capital
and largest city.
The geography of Timor-Leste is
mountainous. The government
system is a republic; the chief of
state is the president, and the
head of government is the prime
minister. Timor-Leste has a
mixed economy in which there is
limited private freedom, but the
economy remains highly
controlled by the government.
Flag:
The national flag of East Timor
(Portuguese: Bandeira de Timor-
Leste) is one of the official
symbols of East Timor. It consists
of a red field with the black
isosceles triangle based on the
hoist-side bearing a white five-
pointed star in the center
superimposed on the larger
yellow triangle, also based on the
hoist-side, that extends to the
center of the flag.
The new national flag was
adopted on May 20, 2002, when
East Timor achieved full
sovereignty. The black represents
more than four centuries of
colonial repression, the yellow
the struggle for independence,
and the red the suffering of the
East Timorese people. The white
star symbolizes hope for the
future.
Head Of Government: Prime
Minister: Rui Maria de Araújo
Capital: Dili
Population: (2021 est.)
1,320,000
Head Of State: President:
Francisco Guterres
Form Of Government: Republic
with one legislative house
(National Parliament [65])
Constitutional Framework: The
Portuguese arrived on the island
in the 16th century, looking for a
stopping point for their trade in
the East Indies. Despite a Dutch
claim on the western half of
Timor, the Portuguese managed
to maintain their hold on the
eastern half right up to the period
following World War II. It was
not until 1975, when a new
socialist, anti-imperial
government took power in
Portugal, that the road was
cleared for independence. On 28
November 1975, the
revolutionary Fretilin resistance
movement, led by the popular
Kay Rala Xanana Gusmão,
declared East Timor’s
independence, but the
Indonesians invaded on 7
December and forcibly took
control of the island. This led to a
long and brutal guerrilla war that
followed over the next several
decades.
In 1998, Indonesian President
Suharto was forced to resign due
to internal political pressure
resulting from the Asian financial
crisis, which led to the
appointment of his Vice-President
B.J. Habibie as his replacement.
Habibie allowed more political
autonomy for the region, but it
was a tripartite agreement
between Indonesia, Portugal, and
the United Nations reached on 5
May 1999 that marked the real
turning point for East Timorese
independence.
It was agreed that an
independence referendum would
be held under the supervision of
the United Nations in which the
people themselves would be able
to accept or reject a plan of
increased autonomy under the
Indonesian flag. If the people
rejected this plan, it was agreed
that the United Nations would
assume responsibility for the
territory until it could transition
to full independence. In August
1999, the referendum resulted in
a more than 75% vote in favour
of independence. As a result, the
United Nations set up a
transitional government to
prepare a constitution, as an
international peace keeping force
fought to quell violent protests
that had followed the vote.
The constitution building process
was slowed, however, because
the United Nations did not have a
concrete plan for the formation of
an independent East Timor. It
was not until April 2000 that the
Security Council began talking
about a state-building plan that
included the creation of a
constitution. The shadow
Timorese government, led by
Gusmão, was, however, already
discussing this issue. Many of the
former independence leaders
were members of this group,
called the Conselho Nacional da
Resistência Timorense (CNRT),
which was often called upon to
advise the United Nations
government.
The CNRT had already met in
August 1998 to discuss the
development of the country post-
independence, including the
drafting of a constitution, and
they met twice more in 1999 and
2000 to talk about the creation of
a constitutional convention. Most
were in favour of a full public
consultation process and stressed
the importance of public
participation, but the United
Nations decided that an elected
88-member constituent assembly
would draft the new constitution
within 90 days, with the option of
transforming itself into the first
parliament. The constituent
assembly was sworn in on 15
September 2001, and by 22
March 2002, the nation’s first
constitution went into effect.
Gusmão was elected the nation’s
first President.
Adopted: 2002; Recognizes
Timor-Leste as an independent
republic after centuries of
Portuguese colonization from the
16th century. The Constitution
contains provisions regarding
intellectual property.
Local Government: East Timor
is divided into thirteen
municipalities, which in turn are
subdivided into 65 administrative
posts, 442 sucos (villages), and
2,225 aldeias (hamlets). Articles
5 and 71 of the 2002 constitution
provide that Oecusse be governed
by a special administrative policy
and economic regime.
Municipalities of East Timor:
Aileu, Ainaro, Baucau,
Bobonaro, Cova Lima, Dili,
Ermera, Lautém, Liquiçá,
Manatuto, Manufahi, Oecusse
(SAR), and Viqueque.
The borders between Cova Lima
and Ainaro and between Baucau
and Viqueque were changed in
2003.
Government Branches:
Main Power
Executive: Powers are somewhat
limited by the constitution, but is
able to veto legislation which can
be overridden by the parliament.
Judicial: Independent courts,
described as organs of
sovereignty with competencies to
administer justice in the name of
the people.
Legislative: Pass relevant, well
drafted legislation in a timely
manner, provide a counterbalance
to the powers of the presidency,
and establish and maintain
proper, efficient and effective
communication between the
various branches of government.
 Election Process

Executive: President is elected by

absolute majority vote through a
two-round system, prime minister
is appointed by the president.

Judicial: Appointed by president.

Legislative: National Parliament

members are elected through a Tribal Viets inhabiting the Red
closed-list proportional River delta entered written
representation system. history when China’s southward
expansion reached them in the
3rd century BCE. From that time
Election Cycle onward, a dominant theme of
Vietnam’s history has been
Executive: 5 years interaction with China, the source
of most of Vietnam’s high
Judicial: 4 years culture. As a tribute-paying state
after throwing off Chinese rule in
Legislative: 5 years 938 CE, Vietnam sent
lacquerware, animal skins, ivory,
Political System: and tropical products to the
Chinese emperor and received
a. Democracy scrolls on philosophy,
b. Republic administration, and literature in
c. Unitary State return. Sinic culture seeped
d. Parliamentary System deeply into society, but it shaped
e. Semi-Presidential System the aristocracy and mandarinal
families more than it did the
VIETNAME peasantry, which preserved
distinctive customs, beliefs,
Location: vocabulary, lifeways, and gender
relations. Modeling themselves
Vietnam, country occupying the on Chinese emperors, Vietnam’s
eastern portion of mainland kings exacted tribute from ethnic
Southeast Asia. minorities on the periphery of the
Vietnamese state and called
themselves emperors when not
addressing the Chinese court.
Although cultural and spatial
gaps between the Vietnamese
court and the farthest reaches of
society were not as great as they
were in China (Vietnam is about
the size of a Chinese province,
with a comparable population),
the Vietnamese state’s capacity to
rule diminished with distance
from the capital. The refractory
character of bamboo-hedged
peasant communes was captured
in the cliché, "The emperor’s writ
stops at the village gate.“
Flag:
The flag of Vietnam features a
yellow five-pointed star on a red
background. The flag is a symbol
of the country's struggle against
domination by the French and
communist leadership. The star
on the flag represents the
country's national unity despite
its turbulent past.
The flag was modified on 30
November 1955 to make the rays
of the star pointier. Until the end
of the Vietnam War in 1975,
South Vietnam used a yellow flag
with three red stripes.
The red flag of North Vietnam
was later adopted as the flag of
the unified Vietnam in 1976.
Head Of Government: Prime
Minister: Pham Minh Chinh
Capital: Hanoi
Population: (2021 est.)
98,678,000
Head Of State: President:
Nguyen Xuan Phuc
Form Of Government: Socialist
republic with one legislative
house (National Assembly [500])
Constitutional Framework: The
first constitution of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, adopted in
1980, established a Council of
State as a collective presidency
and a Council of Ministers. In
1992 this document was
superseded by a second
constitution, which, in addition to
replacing the Council of State
with an elected president and
otherwise reforming Vietnam’s
government and political
structure, also outlined major
shifts in foreign policy and
economic doctrine. In particular,
it stressed the development of all
economic sectors, permitted
private enterprise, and granted
foreign investors the right to legal
ownership of their capital and
assets while guaranteeing that
their property would not be
nationalized by the state.
A unicameral, popularly elected
National Assembly is the
supreme organ of the
government. It elects the
president, who is head of state,
and the vice president, who is
nominated by the president. The
cabinet consists of the prime
minister, who is nominated by the
president and approved by the
National Assembly, and deputy
prime ministers and the heads of
government ministries and
various state organizations, who
are named by the prime minister
and confirmed by the Assembly.
The cabinet (which superseded
the earlier Council of Ministers)
coordinates and directs the
ministries and various state
organizations of the central
government and supervises the
administrative committees at the
local government level.
Initially, administrative
responsibilities were divided
along narrow functional lines
among many ministries; there
were, for example, numerous
economic ministries concerned
with agriculture and the food
industry, marine products,
forestry, and water conservancy.
In the mid-1980s, such smaller
ministries were consolidated to
streamline the system. Larger
ministries now tend to be
relatively self-sufficient, with
their own colleges, training
institutions, and health, social,
and cultural facilities.
There are also several
commissions under the cabinet,
such as the State Inspectorate.
The prime minister’s office
oversees a number of general
departments beneath the
ministerial level and committees
that are formed to supervise
major projects which involve
more than one ministry.
Adopted: 1992; Communist Party
of Vietnam holds the central role
in politics and society. The
constitution's focus on strict
communist orthodoxy has
become less important than
economic development as a
national priority as seen through
recent amendments.
Local Government: The
country is divided
administratively into more than
64 provinces (tinh), of which
Hanoi, Haiphong, Da Nang, Ho
Chi Minh City, and Can Tho are
municipalities (thanh pho). These
are further subdivided into
several dozen urban districts
(quan) and hundreds of rural
districts (huyen). Nearly 10,000
communes (xa) comprise
Vietnam’s lowest level of local
administration. At the provincial,
district, and commune levels, the
highest government authority is
an elected People’s Council, the
actual work of which is carried
out by a People’s Committee
elected by the council.
Government Branches: Judicial: Justices are appointed
by the National Assembly of
Main Power Vietnam.

Executive: President serves as Legislative: National Assembly

head of state, nominal
commander of the armed forces
and chairman of the Council of
National Defense and Security.
Prime Minister heads a cabinet
composed of deputy prime
ministers and heads of ministries
and agencies, all confirmed by
the National Assembly.
(Quoc-Hoi) 500 members are
elected by absolute majority vote
through a two-round system.
Electoral Cycle
Executive: 5 years
Judicial: 5 years

Judicial: Responsible for Legislative: 5 years

providing leadership to the
Vietnamese court system,
supervising the judicial process, Political System:
and recommending bills to the a. Socialist State
National Assembly as appropriate b. Unitary State
under law. c. Communist State
d. One-party State
Legislative: Responsible for
fundamental domestic and
foreign policies, socio-economic
policies, defense and security
issues, and it exercises supreme
control over all state activities.

Electoral Process

Executive: The president is

elected by the National Assembly
and prime minister is appointed
by the president.
POLITICS

Is a process by which individual

interest is reconciled with
collective action and provision of
public good.

Struggle of Power.

Power is the ability to make

things and prevent things from
happening, in other words "you
are in control“

Commonwealth is like adulthood,

a parent and child relationship,
you need your parents guidance
in your stage. A country under
commonwealth is supervised by a
foreign country until its
independence.

Suzerainty countries are

politically and militarily
independent while depends on
other country when it come to
their foreign policies.

Protectorate is a state that is

controlled and protected by
another sovereign state. A
country can be a protectorate of
foreign country when his/her
head of State ask for military
assistance.