CHAPTER 6

IDENTITY THEORY
 IDENTITY THEORY
 After behaviorism, we would move on to
the next important theory of mind

 The identity theory of mind

 Is it a Reductionist or Non-reductionist
theory of mind?

 Why?
 https://youtu.be/UwgHIzAto9U
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=i8E4mcfJnzc
Mind-brain correlations
Common observations (alcohol and other
drugs) and neuropsychological evidence
(electro
encephalography, magneto encephalography,
evoked potentials, positron emission tomo-
grams) suggest strict correlations between
mental occurrences and neurological goings-
on in the brain.
There exists very strong correlations
between mental events and brain
processes

 Brain lesion (damage) can disturb

virtually every mental/mind function
 Stroke victim frequently loss speech
compr.
 Various brain injuries cause memory
loss/personality change
 Concussion cause us to lose
consciousness
 Chemical changes in the brain affect
MIND
 Caffeine make us alert
 Alcohol decrease our inhibition and
affect mood
 LSD make us see things
 Anesthesia causes us to lose
consciousness
 Analgesics relieve our pain
DRUGS
 The mind-brain correlation
thesis
Each mental state (or process)
correlates with some neurological

state (or process)

**Definition:
Thesis
The main idea, opinion or theory of a person, group, piece of
writing or speech:
Example: Their main thesis was that war was inevitable.
PHNIEAS CAGE
PHINEAS CAGE PAPER CUTTING
 https://www.bbc.com/news/disability-
45804613
AD/STROKE
ALZHEIMER’S
SCHIZOPHRENIA/PARKINSON
VISUAL AREA/COGNITIVE FUNCTION
NORMAL VISUAL ACTIVATION
CORRELATION
CAUSE???
CAUSE VS CORRELATION
For each type M of mental event that
occurs to an organism O, there exists
a brain state of kind B such that M
occurs to O at time t if and only if B
occurs to O at time t.
CORRELATION   CAUSE
Two things to note

 There seems to be a lawful regularities,

not mere accidental co-occurences
 The minimal condition of supervenience
seems to hold here: There cannot be
any change in mental life without a
change in your brain state.
(Meaning to Say)
Different mental states correlate
with different neurological states
(though one and the same mental
state can have different neural
correlates)
Now, those are what we call the FACTS.
No one would dispute (or argue with
that). But what shall we make of this
facts. What does it mean in terms of the
MIND/BODY problem?
FACT/THEORY???
This correlation calls for
explanation.
So, what do we do?
(We try to come up with a
theory that explain the facts)
FOUR POSSIBLE
FOUR REACTIONS
POSSIBLE REACTIONS
 1. The correlations are based on causal
interactions between minds and brains (Cartesian
 Dualism)
 2. The correlations are the result of epiphenomenal
by-products of neural activity (like the
 shadow of a billiard ball rolling across the table
(Epiphenomenalism)
HANTU???
 3. Each mental and material event is willed
by God in such a way that they occur in
 orderly patterns (Parallelism,
Occasionalism)
 4. Mental occurrences can simply be taken
as brain processes (Identity Theory)
What is the basic claim of I/T
 The identity thesis
 pain = C-fiber activation. (a kind of nerve
that generates pain)
 Visual consciousness = continuous firing in
cortex area V1.
What do you think the sign
“=”
suggests?
Quiz
 It means mind is parallel to brain events
 It means mind coincident with brain events
 It means mind correlates with brain events
 It means mind is caused by brain events
 It means mind is accompaniment of brain
event
 It means mind are (identical to) brain events
Why do the IT theorists hold
this equation to be true, is
there any examples from
other science where this is
also true!!!!
Use of Other Scientific Example

1. Gene is said to play the role of an

internal factor in an organism (living
body) that is causally responsible for
the transmission of heritable
characteristic
2. Watson and Crick discover that DNA
molecules perform that role
3. Very naturally, we say that gene =
DNA
WATSON & CRICK (NOBEL)
WHAT IS GENE?
Similarly, in the context of mind
1. Pain is a result of bodily damage that
causes pain behavior syndrome
2. Neurophysiology reveals C-Fiber
activation occupies this role
3. Conclusion: Pain = C-Fiber Activation
Some philosophers hold that though
experiences are brain processes they
nevertheless have
fundamentally non-physical, psychical,
properties, sometimes called ‘qualia’. The
identity
thesis is denying the existence of such
irreducible non-physical properties.
The identity theorists argue that
Mind could be REDUCED to brain
states
Mind = Brain
(Mind is the Brain)
WHERE IS MIND???
Any sentence of the form A=B is an
identity statement

Some examples
 Hans Blix=the chief UN weapon
inspector
 Bumi Kenyalang = Sarawak
 4+9 = 13
 The number of planets = 9
 Water = H20
 Heat = Motion of molecules
The identity theory for our purpose is
supposed to be a kind of ‘scientific’
identity claim like (5) and (6)
Can you think of examples of the sciences
that use similar logic?

 Water = H2O
 Salt=NaCl
 Lightning=electrical discharge
 So, in the context of mind, PAIN =????
But we could also give a more
precise definition to the
meaning of identification here.
All means to identify
something with something
else in three contexts
 The concept of identity: Three kinds of
empirical identification
 Identification #1
 Identification of two observable entities
 The morning star X is the evening star
Y
 Uluru is Ayres Rock (in Australia)
AYRES ROCK
 Identification #2

 Identification of an observable with a

theoretical phenomenon
 Water is H2O (on earth)
 Temperature is mean kinetic energy of
molecules
 Lightning is an electrical discharge
 Identification #3
 Identification of a functionally (meaning here
in this context, it has certain functions, it
carries out some fungsi, like the heart fungsi
is to pump blood) defined phenomenon with
a theoretical phenomenon
 Gene is DNA
 Pain is C-fiber firing
 Consciousness is X process in the brain
Can you note the distinction
between second and third
conception of identification?
Can you note the distinction between
second and third conception of
identification
 Second Conception
A posteriori, identification after the fact. We
know something about water b4 we know
anything about H2O
 Third Conception
Would-be (belum lagi) Empirical, we have a
conception of the phenomena b4 we have
any empirical fact to support our claim (the
reverse of second conception)
Proponents of the identity theory
H. Feigl: The "Mental" and the "Physical"
J.J.C. Smart: Sensations and Brain Processes
(1959)
U.T. Place: Is Consciousness a Brain
Process? (1956)
D.M. Armstrong: A Materialist Theory of the
Mind (1968)
(See J. J. C. Smart’s paper The Identity
Theory of Mind )
Motivation (Reason) for IT
 Simplicity (Occam’s razor): Identification in
general reduces the number of entities and thereby
enhances ontological simplicity.
 Simplest way to explain the causal efficiency of
mental states in agreement with the assumption
that the domain of physical phenomena is causally
closed.
 Allows speculations about law-like psycho-
physical correlations (consider the phenomenon of
colour perception, for example).
Principle of Parsimony or Simplicity
 Do Not multiply entities beyond necessity
 What it means is that if you need to explain
X, and if there are two choices. Theory A
involves two processes/entities, say Y, Z,
compared to Theory B that explain the same
thing with five processes. Which is to be
preferred?
So, in the context of IT theory,
everything we know seems to consist
of some arrangement of physical
stuffs. To suppose the mind or
consciousness to be something
nonphysical would be to
acknowledge a wholly new/novel
type of thing.
So, it would be a considerable gain in
simplicity to identify mental
processes with physical processes
IT achieve Parsimony in the ways
follow
 Ontologically (Token simplicity: fewer
phenomena; Type simplicity: of a single
(physical) sort.
 Linguistic/Conceptual: mentalistic talk
replaceable by neurophysiological talk.
 Theoretical simplicity: if we identify B
and M their correlation become self-
explanatory. And this is simpler than
other kinds of explanation.
 Two Main Types of IT
 Type Identity Theory
 Token Identity Theory
Type vs. Token Identity
When asking whether mental things are the
same as physical things, or distinct from
them, one must be clear as to whether the
question applies to concrete particulars
(e.g., individual instances of pain occurring in
particular subjects at particular times)
or to the kind (of state or event) under which
such concrete particulars fall.
Token Identity theories hold that every
concrete particular falling under a mental
kind can be identified with some
neurophysiological happening or other:
instances
of pain, for example, are taken to be not only
instances of a mental state (e.g., pain),
but instances of some physical state as well
(say, c-fiber excitation).
Token Identity is weaker than Type
Identity, which goes so far as to claim that
mental kinds themselves are physical kinds.
So the Identity Theory, taken as a
theory of types rather than tokens, must
make some claim to the effect that mental
states such as pain (and not just individual
instances of pain) are contingently
identical with physical states such as c-fiber
excitation.
What is Type and Token
HINT
1. THINK OF “TYPE” AS OPERATING
LIKE “CLASS”.
2. THE CLASS OF ALL PEOPLE BORN IN
FINLAND
3. THE CLASS OF ALL COKE PRODUCED
4. THE CLASS OF ALL PERSONAL
COMPUTER
HOW TO DISTINGUISH TYPE/TOKEN

 THINK OF “TOKEN” AS MEANING A

PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL MEMBER OF
THE CLASS
 REFERING BACK TO PREVIOUS
EXAMPLES, WHAT ARE THE TOKEN OF
THE CLASS
1. ONE PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL
(INSTANCE) IN Malaysia, SAY Tun M
2. THE COKE U SEE IN POHON MAS IN
AN INSTANCE (ONE MEMBER/TOKEN)
OF COKE
3. THE PARTICULAR PC (COMPAQ 5600)
U FIND IN MY OFFICE IS ONE
INSTANCE/TOKEN OF PC.
TAKE ONE MORE EXAMPLE

LIGHTNING IS A TYPE OR TOKEN

IDENTITY?
 LIGHTNING IS A TYPE IDENTITY BECOS IT
IS A CATEGORY (OR TYPE) OF NATURAL
PHENOMENA THAT IS IDENTICAL TO A
CATEORY OF ELECTRICAL DISCHARGE

 HOWEVER, A SINGLE LIGHTINING FLASH IS

A TOKEN IDENTITY. AN INDIVIDUAL FLASH
OF LIGHTNING IS TOKEN IDENTICAL TO
INDIVIDUAL INSTANCE OF ELECTRICAL
DISCHARGE.
REMEMBER
A TYPE OF STATE, PROPERTY,
PROCESS, OBJECT, OR EVENT
(HEREAFTER SIMPLY OBJECT), IS A
CLASS OR KIND OF OBJECT THAT
ADMITS (ADA) OF INDIVIDUAL
INSTANCES.
 XYZXYZXYZ
 CAN YOU TELL ME HOW MANY TYPE
IDENTITY IN THE ABOVE?
 CAN YOU TELL ME HOW MANY TOKEN
IDENTITY IN THE ABOVE?
 THINK ABOUT IT YOURSELF!!!
In the context of philosophy of
mind, what would discussion of
type-type and token-token
identity theory be like?
Which is Which?
 At a recent party to celebrate ROZ’S
birthday, half the class drank too much
& become horribly nauseous. Example,
BEE, NORA, CHEW, DEBRA, INA,
FELICIA all become mabuk!
 Question
 Are Bee, Debra and all the rest nauseous
experience type or token experience of
nauseous?
 What about NAUSEOUS EXPERIENCE IN
GENERAL?
Each of Bee, Debra etc is nauseous,
each has a token experience (their
own personal nausea) of the
general class or type nausea.
If I would to hold a purple scarf in
my hand, humans with good vision
would see the scarf as purple in color

Question: Is this a token or type

experience?
If I show it to YOU now, and you
also have an experience of a purple
scarf, is YOUR experience a token or
type????
Remember that mental state TYPES
are the sorts of mental states we
could share.
We cannot share mental state of the
TOKEN sorts.
IDENTIFY THE FOLLOWINGS
 1.The belief (example of mental state)
that Trump is the President of U.S., as a
result from firing pattern of Neuron Z.
(assume)
 2.Roz’s belief that Bush is the President
of US, as result from firing patterns of
Neuron ZR
 Which is Token/Type?
 What is the IMPLICATION (IMPLIKASI?)
 What is the implication for (1)?
 To have the TYPE of belief about
Trump, one would need to have the
TYPE of firing in the neuron
 What is the implication for (2)?
 To have the TOKEN of the belief about
Trump would need to have the TOKEN
of firing in the neuron
SO, CAN YOU SEE THE DISTINCTION
HERE BETWEEN THE TWO
DIFFERENT FORMS OF IDENTITY
THEORY???
There are essentially two ways we
could claim that every mental state is
identical with some bodily/brain
state.
 TYPE-TYPE  IDENTIFY MENTAL
STATE WITH A WHOLE CLASS OR TYPE
OF FIRING OF CERTAIN NEURON.
 TOKEN-TOKEN  IDENTIFY MENTAL
STATE WITH A PARTICULAR
TOKEN/INSTANCE OF A FIRING OF
CERTAIN NEURON
WHICH IS A STRONGER
VERSION OF IDENTITY
THEORY???
If for TYPE identity theorist, PAIN =
activation of the firing of c-fiber in
the brain.
If Type identity theory is true,
what does it take for person,
alien (ET), Machine/Robot to
feel pain.
REMEMBER

TYPE (MENTAL) 
TYPE (PHYSICAL)
THIS WOULD MEAN THAT IF TYPE
IDENTITY THEORY IS TRUE, IF YOU
SEE A TREE (A), IF U MULTIPLY
(2X2) (B), IF U LISTEN TO
BEETHOVEN ©, ALL BRAIN (IN ALL
HUMAN, ET, ROBOT) MUST HAVE
THE SAME PHYSICAL PATTERN TO
HAVE THE SAME SIMILAR STATE
(EXPERIENCE)
WHAT ABOUT TOKEN IDENTITY
THEORY, WHAT DOES IT TAKE
TO BE TRUE???
TO BE IN PAIN ACCORDING TO THE
TOKEN IDENTITY THEORIST DOES
NOT NEED THE IDENTIFICATION OF
THE MENTAL STATE WITH A CLASS
OR CATEGORY OF PHYSICAL/BRAIN
STATE (EXAMPLE FIRING OF C-
FIBER)
 Roz is in pain due to the firing of C-
Fiberr which is slightly different from
Bee’s pain due to firing of C-FiberB
 ET is in pain due to the activation of
some other kind of circuit that is not
familiar to us
 Robot is in pain due to the activitation
of other kinds of wiring XYZ.
So, we note that for TOKEN I/T

 One TYPE of mental state is realized in

many different form or TOKEN of
physical state (C-fiber in Roz, Bee, ET,
Robot)
 It needs not be identified with the same
class/category of physical state (namely
the firing of C-Fiber)
According to the token-token identity
theory, the brain of Roz, Bee, ET and
Robot need not share much in
common in order for them to be in
pain or to believe that Bush is the
President or to appreciate
Beethoven’s music!!!!
So, which is the stronger version of
the identity theory, and which is the
weaker version?
Certainly, TYPE identity theory is the
stronger version of the theory.
WHY?
WHICH THEORY IS MORE
RESTRICTIVE?
If TYPE identity theory is true, to be
in pain, C-fiber MUST be activated
(whether its human brain, snail,
monkey, squid, ET, Robot, bird,
chicken)
WHERE DO YOUR BRAIN BELONG?
This is certainly a very
restrictive condition, whereas
we find that TOKEN I/T is
more liberal, the same mental
state (pain) could be realized
in different INSTANCES of
physical state.
Hence, the TYPE version of
the Identity Theory is the
STRONGER version.
Because unless you have C-Fiber
firing, you do not, and cannot have
pain, no matter how you exhibit the
behavior of pain.
So, we have seen that when
we say that mental state is
identical (=) to mental state,
there are TWO versions of
identity here.
When identity theorists identify
mental state with brain state, are
they identifying TYPES or TOKENS?
ARE THEY SAYING THAT EACH TYPE
OF MENTAL STATE IS SOME TYPE
OF BRAIN STATE?
OR ARE THEY SAYING EACH TOKEN
MENTAL STATE IS SOME TOKEN
BRAIN STATE?
REMEMBER

IDENTITY THEORY THAT WE

ARE LOOKING AT ARE OF
THE STRONG TYPE.
THAT IS TYPE-TYPE
IDENTITY THEORY
THIS WOULD MEAN THAT WHEN
THEY IDENTIFY A MENTAL STATE
WITH A PHYSICAL STATE, THEY ARE
IDENTIFYING A CLASS OF MENTAL
STATE WITH A CLASS OF PHYSICAL
STATE.
Advantages of the identity theory
It solves Descartes’ problem by reducing the
mental realm to the physical. The
strictly materialist position taken by the
identity theory shares its simplicity with
Berkeley’s idealist position. The identity
theory, however, is able to explain the
causal efficiency of mental states in
agreement with the assumption that the
domain
of physical phenomena is causally closed.
Disadvantages of Identity Theory

VIOLATIONI OF LEIBNIZ’S
LAW
1642-1727
BUT WHAT THEN IS
LEIBNIZ’S LAW
 Leibniz was an eminent German
philosopher and mathematician
 Ontological (philosophical term for what
that exist) identity is symmetrical; that is, if
A is identical to B, then B is identical to A.
 Ontological identity also obeys Leibniz's
Law; if A is identical to B, all the properties
of A are also properties of B, and vice-
versa (for example all the properties of the
"morning star" are also properties of the
"evening star").
Also known as the Law of Identity,
Leibniz's Law spells out the necessary and
sufficient conditions of the identity
relation. Bascially it holds that for
'identity' relation to hold for two subjects
they must share all the same properties.
It can be expressed formally as follows:
For any two things 'x' and 'y', x is equal to
y if and only if, for any given property 'F',
x has F if and only if y has F.
For example, what is true of the 'Morning
Star' is also true of the 'Evening Star' for
they are both the planet Venus. This
position, if sound, poses problems for any
'identity theory' that claims that the mind
is the brain. Much can be said about the
mind that cannot be said about a brain.
A brain is a three dimensional object that
weighs about two pounds. The mind
cannot be said to 'weigh' anything.
Accordingly, on this thesis, the brain
cannot be the mind.
 Shape
 Mass
 Locality
 Spatial (Three Dimension)

All these properties can find in brain but

not Mind.
After-images, for
example, may be green or purple in colour,
but nobody could reasonably claim that
states of the brain are green or purple. And
conversely, while brain states may be
spatially located, it has traditionally been
assumed that mental states are non-spatial.
Putnam's multiple realizability argument: (1)
according to the Mind-Brain Type
Identity theorist, for every mental state there
is a unique physical-chemical state of
the brain such that a life-form can be in that
mental state if and only if it is in that
physical state.
(2) It seems quite plausible to hold, as an
empirical hypothesis, that
physically possible life-forms can be in the
same mental state without having brains
in the same unique physical-chemical state.
(3) Therefore, it is highly unlikely that
the Mind-Brain Type Identity theorist is
correct.
This would imply that the TYPE-TYPE
identity theory is too strong. We
ought to opt for the WEAKER
version, that is the TOKEN-TOKEN
identity theory
 It seems unlikely that I’m in the same
physical state on each occasion when I
think the same thought, or have the
same memory.
 There might be a wide type variations
between similar belief states – that
“Snow is white” between different
human individuals
 I say aloud “snow is white”
 I ‘say” subvocally “snow is white”
 I imagine a Godlike voice intoning
“SIW”
 I write “SIW” in white on a blackboard
 I say/imagine/write “le neige est blanc”
Such mental states may be as various in
their physical realization as monetary
transactions: I give you $100/-

 Could write you a check

 Could get a money order
 $100 worth of gold
 Pay you Cash
 Whatelse?
Creatures with brains quite unlike
ours seem nevertheless possessed of
various sorts of MENTALITY/MIND
Mollusks (e.g octopus) exhibit PAIN
syndrome effect. But certainly they
lack C-fibers that causes pain in us.