Network Security: A Note On The Use of These PPT Slides

Chapter 7
Network Security
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A Top Down Approach
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7: Network Security 1
Chapter 7: Network security
Foundations:
 what is security?
 cryptography
 authentication
 message integrity
 key distribution and certification
Security in practice:
 application layer: secure e-mail
 transport layer: Internet commerce, SSL, SET
 network layer: IP security
 Firewalls
What is network security?
Confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver
should “understand” message contents
 sender encrypts message
 receiver decrypts message
Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm

identity of each other
Message Integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure
message not altered (in transit, or afterwards)
without detection
Access and Availability: services must be accessible
and available to users
8: Network Security 8-3

Internet security threats
Packet sniffing:
 broadcast media
 promiscuous NIC reads all packets passing by
 can read all unencrypted data (e.g. passwords)
 e.g.: C sniffs B’s packets
A C
src:B dest:A payload

B
IP Spoofing:
 can generate “raw” IP packets directly from application, putting any value
into IP source address field
 receiver can’t tell if source is spoofed
 e.g.: C pretends to be B
A C
src:B dest:A payload
Denial of service (DOS):
 flood of maliciously generated packets “swamp” receiver
 Distributed DOS (DDOS): multiple coordinated sources swamp receiver
 e.g., C and remote host SYN-attack A
A C
SYN
SYN
SYN SYN SYN
B
SYN
SYN
Cryptography
Principles
Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy
 well-known in network security world
 Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate “securely”
 Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages
Alice Bob
data, control
channel
messages
data secure secure data

sender receiver
Trudy
Who might Bob, Alice be?
 … well, real-life Bobs and Alices!
 Web browser/server for electronic
transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
 on-line banking client/server
 DNS servers
 routers exchanging routing table updates
 other examples?

The language of cryptography
Alice’s Bob’s
K encryption K decryption
A
key B key
plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

algorithm algorithm
symmetric key crypto: sender, receiver keys identical

public-key crypto: encryption key public, decryption key
secret (private)
8: Network Security 8-
10
Symmetric
Key
Cryptography
Symmetric key cryptography
substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another
 monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another
plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq
E.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice

ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc
Q: How hard to break this simple cipher?:

•brute force (how hard?)
•other?
Perfect cipher
 Definition:
 Let C = E[M]
 Pr[C=c] = Pr[C=c | M]
 Example: one time pad

 Generate random bits b1 ... bn
 E[M ... M ] = (M  b ... M  b )
1 n 1 1 n n
 Cons: size
 Pseudo Random Generator
 G(R) = b ... b
1 n
 Indistinguishable from random (efficiently)
Symmetric key crypto: DES
DES: Data Encryption Standard
 US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
 56-bit symmetric key, 64 bit plaintext input
 How secure is DES?
 DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase (“Strong
cryptography makes the world a safer place”) decrypted
(brute force) in 4 months
 no known “backdoor” decryption approach
 making DES more secure

 use three keys sequentially (3-DES) on each datum
 use cipher-block chaining
Symmetric key
crypto: DES
DES operation
initial permutation
16 identical “rounds” of
function application,
each using different
48 bits of key
final permutation
Block Cipher chaining
 How do we encode a large message
 Would like to guarantee integrity
 Encoding:
 Ci = E[Mi  Ci-1]
 Decoding:
 Mi = D[Ci]  Ci-1
 Malfunctions:
 Loss
 Reorder/ integrity
Cipher block chaining (CBC)
 Break plaintext into blocks
 XOR previous round ciphertext with new plaintext
Block 1 Block2 Block3 Block 4
IV + + + +
DES DES DES DES
Cipher 1 Cipher 2 Cipher 3 Cipher 4
Cipher Block Chaining Mode
 Cipher block chaining. (a) Encryption. (b) Decryption.
DES performance
 DES relies on confusion and diffusion
 not mathematically proven to be secure
 More secure: 3DES (triple DES) with cipher block

chaining (CBC)
 3DES products for IP security*
 ~10 Mb/s in software
 ~100 Mb/s in hardware
 Both parties must know secret key, and keep it
secret
* source: http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/01dec/slides/ipsec-11.pdf
Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol
 Goal: Allow strangers establish a shared secret key
for later communication
 Assume two parties (Alice and Bob) want to establish
a secret key.
 Alice and Bob agree on two large numbers, n and g
 usually, these are publicly known, and have some additional
conditions applied (e.g., n must be prime)
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
 Alice picks large x, Bob picks large y (e.g., 512 bits)
Man in the middle attack
 Eavesdropper can’t determine secret key (gxy mod
n) from (gx mod n) or (gy mod n)
 However, how does Alice and Bob know if there is
a third party adversary in between?
Exponentiation
 Compute gx mod n
Expg,n (x)
 Assume x = 2y + b
 Let z = Expg,n (y)
 R=z2
 If (b=1) R = g R mod n
 Return R
 Complexity: logarithmic in x
Public Key
Cryptography
Public Key Cryptography
symmetric key crypto public key cryptography

 requires sender,  radically different
receiver know approach [Diffie-
shared secret key Hellman76, RSA78]
 Q: how to agree on  sender, receiver do
key in first place not share secret key
(particularly if  encryption key public
never “met”)? (known to all)
 decryption key
private (known only to
receiver)
Public key cryptography
+ Bob’s public
K
B key
- Bob’s private
K
B key
plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

message, m algorithm + algorithm message
K (m) - +
B m = K B(K (m))
B
27
Public key encryption algorithms
Two inter-related requirements:

. .
1 need d ( ) and e ( ) such that
B B
d (e (m)) = m
B B
2 need public and private keys

. .
for dB( ) and e ( )
B
RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm
RSA: Choosing keys
1. Choose two large prime numbers p, q.
(e.g., 1024 bits each)
2. Compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1)
3. Choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors

with z. (e, z are “relatively prime”).
4. Choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z.

(in other words: ed mod z = 1 ).
5. Public key is (n,e). Private key is (n,d).

+ -
KB KB
29
RSA: Encryption, decryption
0. Given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above
1. To encrypt bit pattern, m, compute

e
c = m e mod n (i.e., remainder when m is divided by n)
2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute

d
m = c d mod n (i.e., remainder when c is divided by n)
Magic d
m = (m e mod n) mod n
happens!
RSA operation
Sender Plaintext (P) Recv plaintext (P)
Public key e Private key d

E(P, e) D(C, d)
Ciphertext (C)
 Encryption & Decryption

E(P) = Pemod n
D(C) = Cdmod n
 Security is based on difficulty of factoring large
numbers (can’t factor n to obtain p and q)
RSA example:
Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24.
e=5 (so e, z relatively prime).
d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z).
letter m me c = me mod n
encrypt:
l 12 1524832 17
d
decrypt:
c c m = cd mod n letter
17 481968572106750915091411825223072000 12 l
RSA example
 An example of the RSA algorithm.
 p = 3, q = 11, n = 33, z = 20, d = 7
 e found by solving 7e = 1 (mod 20)--> 3
d
RSA: Why m = (m e mod n) mod n
Number theory result:
• IF pq = n, p and q primes then:

x y mod n = x (y mod (p-1)(q-1) )
mod n
• (m e)d mod n = m (ed mod (p-1)(q-1))
mod n
•But ed – 1 divisible by (p-1)(q-1) i.e., ed mod (p-1)(q-1) = 1
• = m 1 mod n = m
modified Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchange
 Encrypt 1 with Bob’s public key, 2 with Alice’s public key
 Prevents man-in-the-middle attack
 Actually, nonces and a third message are needed to fully
complete this exchange (in a few slides)
Authentication
Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity
to him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”
“I am Alice”
Failure scenario??
38
Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity
to him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”
in a network,
Bob can not “see”
Alice, so Trudy simply
“I am Alice” declares
herself to be Alice
39
Authentication: another try
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet
containing her source IP address
Alice’s
IP address
“I am Alice”
Failure scenario??
40
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet
containing her source IP address
Trudy can create

a packet
Alice’s
“spoofing”
IP address
“I am Alice” Alice’s address
41
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her
secret password to “prove” it.
Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password
Alice’s Failure scenario??

OK
IP addr
42
secret password to “prove” it.
Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password
playback attack: Trudy
Alice’s records Alice’s packet
OK
IP addr and later
plays it back to Bob
Alice’s Alice’s
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password
43
Authentication: yet another try
encrypted secret password to “prove” it.
Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password
Alice’s Failure scenario??

OK
IP addr
44
encrypted secret password to “prove” it.
Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice” record
IP addr password
and
Alice’s
OK playback
IP addr
still works!
Alice’s encrypted
“I’m Alice”
IP addr password
45
Authentication: yet another try
Goal: avoid playback attack
Nonce: number (R) used only once –in-a-lifetime
ap4.0: to prove Alice “live”, Bob sends Alice nonce, R.
Alice
must return R, encrypted with shared secret key
“I am Alice”
R
KA-B(R) Alice is live, and
only Alice knows
key to encrypt
nonce, so it must
Failures, drawbacks? be Alice!
46
Authentication: ap5.0
ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key
 can we authenticate using public key techniques?
ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography
“I am Alice”
Bob computes
R + -
- KA(KA (R)) = R
K A (R) and knows only Alice
“send me your public key”
could have the private
+ key, that encrypted R
KA such that
+ -
K (K (R)) = R
A A
47
ap5.0: security hole
Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as
Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)
I am Alice I am Alice
R -
K (R)
T
R - Send me your public key
K (R) +
A K
T
Send me your public key
+
K
A +
K (m)
Trudy gets T
- +
+ m = K (K (m))
K (m)
A sends T T Alice
m to
- + encrypted with
m = K (K (m))
A A Alice’s public key
ap5.0: security hole
Man (woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as
Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)
Difficult to detect:
 Bob receives everything that Alice sends, and vice
versa. (e.g., so Bob, Alice can meet one week later and
recall conversation)
 problem is that Trudy receives all messages as well!

Message
Integrity
(Signatures etc)
Digital Signatures
Cryptographic technique Simple digital signature
analogous to hand- for message m:
written signatures.  Bob decrypts m with his
 Sender (Bob) digitally signs private key dB, creating
document, establishing he signed message, dB(m).
is document owner/creator.
 Bob sends m and dB(m) to
 Verifiable, nonforgeable:
Alice.
recipient (Alice) can verify
that Bob, and no one else,
signed document.
 Assumption:
 eB(dB(m)) = dB(eB(m))
 RSA
Digital Signatures (more)
 Suppose Alice receives Alice thus verifies that:
msg m, and digital  Bob signed m.
signature dB(m)
 No one else signed m.
 Alice verifies m signed
 Bob signed m and not m’.
by Bob by applying Bob’s
public key eB to dB(m) Non-repudiation:
then checks eB(dB(m) ) =  Alice can take m, and
m. signature dB(m) to court

 If eB(dB(m) ) = m, and prove that Bob
whoever signed m must signed m.
have used Bob’s private
key.
Message Digests
Computationally expensive Hash function properties:

to public-key-encrypt  Many-to-1
long messages  Produces fixed-size msg
Goal: fixed-length,easy to digest (fingerprint)
compute digital signature,  Given message digest x,
“fingerprint” computationally infeasible to

find m such that x = H(m)
 apply hash function H to
 computationally infeasible to
m, get fixed size message find any two messages m and
digest, H(m). m’ such that H(m) = H(m’).
Hash Function Algorithms
 Internet checksum  MD5 hash function widely
would make a poor used.
message digest.  Computes 128-bit message
 Too easy to find digest in 4-step process.

two messages with  arbitrary 128-bit string x,
same checksum. appears difficult to

construct msg m whose
MD5 hash is equal to x.
 SHA-1 is also used.
 US standard
 160-bit message digest
MD5 for message integrity
 Keyed MD5
 assume sender, receiver share secret key k
 sender: m + MD5(m + k)
(+ means concatenation in this notation)
 receiver computes MD5(m + k) and sees if it
matches
Digital signature = signed message digest
Alice verifies signature and
Bob sends digitally signed integrity of digitally signed
message: message:
large
message H: Hash encrypted
m function H(m)
msg digest
-
KB(H(m))
Bob’s digital large
private signature message
- Bob’s
key KB (encrypt) m digital
public
+ signature
key KB
encrypted H: Hash (decrypt)
msg digest function
-
+ KB(H(m))
H(m) H(m)
equal
?
MD5 with RSA signature
 MD5 with RSA signature
 sender: m + E(MD5(m), private)
checksum
 receiver: compare MD5(m) with D(checksum,
public)
Key
Distribution
Centers
Problems with Public-Key
Encryption
 A way for Trudy to subvert public-key
encryption.
Trusted Intermediaries
Problem: Problem:
 How do two entities  When Alice obtains
establish shared Bob’s public key
secret key over (from web site, e-
network? mail, diskette), how
Solution: does she know it is
 trusted key Bob’s public key, not
Trudy’s?
distribution center
(KDC) acting as Solution:
intermediary  trusted certification
between entities authority (CA)
Key Distribution Center (KDC)
 Alice,Bob need shared
symmetric key.
 KDC: server shares
different secret key
with each registered
user.
 Alice, Bob know own
 Alice communicates with
symmetric keys, KA-KDC KDC, gets session key R1, and
KB-KDC , for KB-KDC(A,R1)
communicating with  Alice sends Bob
KDC. KB-KDC(A,R1), Bob extracts R1
 Alice, Bob now share the
symmetric key R1.
Certification Authorities
 Certification authority
(CA) binds public key to
particular entity.
 Entity (person, router,
etc.) can register its public
key with CA.
 Entity provides “proof
of identity” to CA.
 CA creates certificate  When Alice wants Bob’s public
binding entity to public key:
key.  gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or
 Certificate digitally elsewhere).
signed by CA.  Apply CA’s public key to Bob’s
certificate, get Bob’s public
key
X.509 is the standard for
certificates
 The basic fields of an X.509 certificate.
Public-Key Infrastructures
 PKIs are a way to structure certificates
 (a) A hierarchical PKI. (b) A chain of certificates.
Example revisited (solved with
certificates)
 Trudy presents Alice a certificate,
purporting to be Bob, but Alice is unable to
trace Trudy’s certificate back to a trusted
root
 Be wary if your browser warns about certs!
Secure
email
Secure e-mail
 Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.
KS
m K (.)
S
KS(m ) KS(m )
KS( ) . m
+ Internet - KS
KS
+.
K ()
B + +
- .
KB ( )
KB(KS ) KB(KS )
+ -
KB
KB
Alice:
 generates random symmetric private key, KS.
 encrypts message with KS (for efficiency)
 also encrypts KS with Bob’s public key.
 sends both KS(m) and KB(KS) to Bob.
67
Secure e-mail
 Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.
KS
m K (.)
S
KS(m ) KS(m )
KS( ) . m
+ Internet - KS
KS
+.
K ()
B + +
- .
KB ( )
KB(KS ) KB(KS )
+ -
KB
KB
Bob:
 uses his private key to decrypt and recover KS
 uses KS to decrypt KS(m) to recover m
68
Secure e-mail (continued)
• Alice wants to provide sender authentication
message integrity.
- KA
+
KA
m .
H( )
-.
K ()
A
-
KA(H(m))
-
KA(H(m)) +
KA ( )
. H(m )
+ Internet - compare
m H( ) . H(m )
m
• Alice digitally signs message.

• sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature.
7; Network Security 8-
69
Pretty good privacy (PGP)
 Internet e-mail encryption A PGP signed message:
scheme, a de-facto
---BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE---
standard. Hash: SHA1
 Uses symmetric key
cryptography, public key Bob:My husband is out of town
tonight.Passionately yours,
cryptography, hash Alice
function, and digital
signature as described. ---BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE---
Version: PGP 5.0
 Provides secrecy, sender
Charset: noconv
authentication, integrity. yhHJRHhGJGhgg/
 Inventor, Phil Zimmerman, 12EpJ+lo8gE4vB3mqJhFEvZP9t6n7G
6m5Gw2
was target of 3-year ---END PGP SIGNATURE---
federal investigation.
Secure
Socket layer
(SSl)
Secure sockets layer (SSL)
 PGP provides security for a  Server authentication:

specific network app.  SSL-enabled browser
 SSL works at transport
includes public keys for
trusted CAs.
layer. Provides security to  Browser requests server
any TCP-based app using
certificate, issued by
SSL services. trusted CA.
 SSL: used between WWW  Browser uses CA’s public
browsers, servers for I- key to extract server’s
commerce (https). public key from
 SSL security services: certificate.
 server authentication  Visit your browser’s
 data encryption security menu to see its
 client authentication
trusted CAs.
(optional)
Internet Explorer:
Tools  Internet options  Content  Certificates
Internet Explorer: Error Message
SSL (continued)
Encrypted SSL session:  SSL: basis of IETF

 Browser generates Transport Layer Security
symmetric session key, (TLS).
encrypts it with server’s  SSL can be used for non-
public key, sends encrypted Web applications, e.g.,
key to server. IMAP.
 Using its private key, server  Client authentication can
decrypts session key. be done with client
 Browser, server agree that certificates.
future msgs will be
encrypted.
 All data sent into TCP
socket (by client or server)
is encrypted with session
key.
SSL basics
Alice validates
RA, RB are “nonces” used with Premaster key to create session key
Bob’s key
EB is Bob’s public key

Other
Security
Layers
Secure electronic transactions (SET)
 designed for payment-card  Customer’s card number
transactions over Internet. passed to merchant’s bank
 provides security services without merchant ever
among 3 players: seeing number in plain text.
 customer  Prevents merchants from
 merchant stealing, leaking payment

card numbers.
 merchant’s bank
 Three software components:
All must have certificates.
 Browser wallet
 SET specifies legal
 Merchant server
meanings of certificates.
 Acquirer gateway
 apportionment of
liabilities for  See book for description of
transactions SET transaction.
IPsec: Network Layer Security
 Network-layer secrecy:
 For both AH and ESP, source,
 sending host encrypts the
data in IP datagram destination handshake:
 TCP and UDP segments;  create network-layer
ICMP and SNMP messages. logical channel called a

 Network-layer authentication service agreement (SA)
 destination host can  Each SA unidirectional.
authenticate source IP  Uniquely determined by:
address  security protocol (AH or
 Two principle protocols: ESP)
 authentication header (AH)  source IP address
protocol  32-bit connection ID
 encapsulation security
payload (ESP) protocol
ESP Protocol
 Provides secrecy, host  ESP authentication
authentication, data field is similar to AH
integrity. authentication field.
 Data, ESP trailer encrypted.
 Protocol = 50.
 Next header field is in ESP
trailer.
Authentication Header (AH) Protocol
 Provides source host AH header includes:

authentication, data  connection identifier
integrity, but not secrecy.  authentication data: signed
 AH header inserted message digest, calculated
between IP header and IP over original IP datagram,
data field. providing source
 Protocol field = 51. authentication, data integrity.
 Next header field: specifies
 Intermediate routers
type of data (TCP, UDP, ICMP,
process datagrams as usual.
etc.)
IPsec authentication (AH)
 The IPsec authentication header in
transport mode for IPv4.
HMAC stands for Hashed Message Authentication Code
IPsec encryption (ESP)
 (a) ESP in transport mode (for end-to-end IPsec).
(b) ESP in tunnel mode (used in VPNs).
Access
Control in
the Network
Firewalls To prevent denial of service
attacks:
firewall  SYN flooding: attacker
establishes many bogus
isolates organization’s internal
TCP connections.
net from larger Internet,
Attacked host alloc’s
allowing some packets to pass,
TCP buffers for bogus
blocking others.
connections, none left
for “real” connections.
To prevent illegal modification
Two firewall types: of internal data.
 e.g., attacker replaces
 packet filter
CIA’s homepage with
 application gateways something else
To prevent intruders from
obtaining secret info.
Packet Filtering
 Internal network is  Example 1: block incoming
connected to Internet and outgoing datagrams
through a router. with IP protocol field = 17
and with either source or
 Router manufacturer
dest port = 23.
provides options for  All incoming and outgoing
filtering packets, based on: UDP flows and telnet
 source IP address connections are blocked.
 destination IP address  Example 2: Block inbound
 TCP/UDP source and TCP segments with ACK=0.
destination port numbers  Prevents external clients
from making TCP
 ICMP message type connections with internal
 TCP SYN and ACK bits clients, but allows internal
clients to connect to
outside.
Filter-based firewalls
Rest of the Internet Firewall Local site
 Sit between site and rest of Internet, filter packets

 Enforce site policy in a manageable way
 e.g. pass (*,*, 128.7.6.5, 80 ), then drop (*, *, *, 80)
 Rules may be added dynamically to pass new connections
 Sometimes called a “ level 4” switch
 Acts like a router (accepts and forwards packets)
 But looks at information up to TCP port numbers (layer
Proxy-Based Firewalls
 Solves more complex policy problems
 Example:
 I want internal company to be able to access entire web
server
 I want outside world only to access public pages
Remote
Web
Firewall only lets proxy
company
user server connect to web server
Internet Proxy Firewall Company net Internal

server
Random
external
user Use proxies outside firewall
Proxy-based firewalls
 Run proxies for Web, mail, etc. just outside
firewall
 In the “ de-militarized zone” DMZ
 External requests go to proxies, only proxies
connect inside
 External user may (“classical model”) or may not
(“transparent model”) know this is happening
 Proxies filter based on application semantics
Virtual Private Networks
 Using firewalls and IPsec encryption to provide a
“leased-line” like connection over the Internet
 (a) A leased-line private network. (b) A virtual
private network.
Application gateways gateway-to-remote
host telnet session
host-to-gateway
telnet session
 Filters packets on
application data as well application router and filter
gateway
as on IP/TCP/UDP fields.
 Example: allow select
internal users to telnet
outside.
1. Require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.

2. For authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to
dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections
3. Router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating
from gateway.
Limitations of firewalls and gateways
 IP spoofing: router  Filters often use all or

can’t know if data nothing policy for UDP.
“really” comes from
 Tradeoff: degree of
claimed source
 If multiple app’s. need communication with
special treatment, each outside world, level of
has own app. gateway. security
 Client software must  Many highly protected
know how to contact sites still suffer from
gateway. attacks.
 e.g., must set IP address
of proxy in Web
browser
Network Security (summary)
Basic techniques…...
 cryptography (symmetric and public)
 authentication
 message integrity
…. used in many different security scenarios
 secure email
 secure transport (SSL)
 IP sec
 Firewalls

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Network Security: A Note On The Use of These PPT Slides

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Chapter 7

A note on the use of these ppt slides:

Authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm

8: Network Security 8-3

src:B dest:A payload

src:B dest:A payload

data secure secure data

8: Network Security 8-9

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

symmetric key crypto: sender, receiver keys identical

E.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice

Q: How hard to break this simple cipher?:

 Example: one time pad

 making DES more secure

Block 1 Block2 Block3 Block 4

DES DES DES DES

Cipher 1 Cipher 2 Cipher 3 Cipher 4

 More secure: 3DES (triple DES) with cipher block

symmetric key crypto public key cryptography

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

Two inter-related requirements:

2 need public and private keys

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

2. Compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1)

3. Choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors

4. Choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z.

5. Public key is (n,e). Private key is (n,d).

1. To encrypt bit pattern, m, compute

2. To decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute

Sender Plaintext (P) Recv plaintext (P)

Public key e Private key d

 Encryption & Decryption

Number theory result:

• IF pq = n, p and q primes then:

Trudy can create

Alice’s Failure scenario??

Alice’s Failure scenario??

8: Network Security 8-49

m. signature dB(m) to court

Computationally expensive Hash function properties:

“fingerprint” computationally infeasible to

 Too easy to find digest in 4-step process.

same checksum. appears difficult to

• Alice digitally signs message.

 PGP provides security for a  Server authentication:

Encrypted SSL session:  SSL: basis of IETF

EB is Bob’s public key

 merchant stealing, leaking payment

ICMP and SNMP messages. logical channel called a

 Provides source host AH header includes:

HMAC stands for Hashed Message Authentication Code

Rest of the Internet Firewall Local site

 Sit between site and rest of Internet, filter packets

Internet Proxy Firewall Company net Internal

1. Require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.

 IP spoofing: router  Filters often use all or

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