THE SIEGE

OF MARAWI

Aya Mae A. Magno | AB PSY-2A | NSTP-II | Prof. Bonifacio H. Quenano, LPT, MAEd
Agenda
• What were the goals of the campaign or
conflict?

• What military strategy was employed to

achieve these goals?

• Was the strategy successful? Why or

why not?

• What could have been done differently

to improve the outcome of the campaign
or conflict?

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 What were the goals of the campaign or conflict?
THE BATTLES battle for Marawi began on May 23, when the Philippine military tried to capture Isnilon

BEGAN Hapilon, the head of a southern militia that has pledged loyalty to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi. This was intended for Marawi to completely retaken and the final black flag of
IS was torn down.

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What military strategy was employed to
achieve these goals?

Tactical lessons and strategies learned in the modern urban warfare against a
tenacious terrorist threat such as Close Combat – The Fundamentals, Mobility
and Survivability, Precision Fires and Logistics.

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Close Combat – The Fundamentals, Mobility and
Survivability, Precision Fires and Logistics:
 The Battle of Marawi was a battle by individuals and small teams. While the AFP had access to overwhelming
offensive support, armored fighting vehicles, unmanned aerial surveillance and close air support platforms.

 Expertise in combat shooting, battlefield fitness and small team tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)

 Owning the Night: AFP and the insurgents had very limited access to night fighting equipment (NFE). This
meant the majority of forces were static at night and would occupy urban defensive positions until dawn.

 Offensive support and extraordinary firepower was employed to enable the seizure of Marawi City. One
Company from the 2nd Infantry Division employed over 10,000 mortar rounds in three months. Offensive
support came primarily in the form of Close Air Support, intimate support from mortars, and employing 105mm
field guns in a direct fire role. Planners should be alert to the enemy's tendency to monitor CAS flights,
especially if continuous air cover is not available. The number of sorties available, the on-station time, and the
time required to transit and rearm/refuel before returning to the area of operations should be considered
Essential Elements of Friendly Information that need to be protected from the enemy.

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Close Combat – The Fundamentals, Mobility and
Survivability, Precision Fires and Logistics:
 Explosive Breaching, In Marawi, structural integrity varied greatly from building to building. Where in one
building a given charge type would produce a mouse hole, in another it could cause significant damage or
completely level the structure. Charge selection was described as a dark art due to the unpredictable nature of
the structures, and structural assessment skills were identified as a shortfall.

 Safety distances were refined through trial and error and balanced against the tactical scenario. Combat
engineers (CEs) were often only able to move a room or building to the rear; in the classic ‘hugging the belt’
technique used by many insurgents, the enemy continually pushed forward to remain within friendly artillery
safety distances.

 Collapsed Structure Rescue, One of the major threats to friendly forces was enemy snipers. The majority of
these were not the highly trained and well equipped snipers common to many armies, but instead closer to
what might be better termed ‘marksmen’ or ‘sharpshooters’ engaging at short- to medium-ranges. Regardless,
they exacted a heavy toll on friendly forces and often imposed significant delay on manoeuvre.

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Close Combat – The Fundamentals, Mobility and
Survivability, Precision Fires and Logistics:
 Counter-Sniping – Psychological, One of the major challenges faced by the AFP was the severe psychological toll
paid by their snipers. This was a widespread phenomenon, experienced across multiple units of snipers and
sharpshooters. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some individuals personally killed dozens of insurgents, to the
point where some were unfit to continue fighting.

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Was the strategy successful? Why or why not?

Despite this victory it does not mark the end of the Philippines problems. The battle took a significant toll, over
400,000 people fled their homes while 165 AFP soldiers died and over 1,000 were reportedly injured.20.The
Philippine government say 920 militants and 47 civilians were killed in the fighting, though more militants
have been killed during clashes in Marawi following the official end of the battle

MILITARY mistake of the Air Force strikes to stop the rebels and they thought that was the end of it, and that
it would take time before the rebels could regroup and strike somewhere else. As it turned out, the military was
very wrong. Soon after conducting the Piagapo operations, their attention was suddenly diverted towards
going after communist rebels operating at the border into Bukidnon on the eastern flank of Lanao del Sur. The
army camp in Marawi was left vulnerable with only about a company on guard. This explains why, despite
receiving naval intelligence reports all the way from the Western Command in Zamboanga, warning of an
impending threat by Hapilon and his comrades, the local command was in no position to prevent the rebels’
siege of Marawi on May 23

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What could have been done differently to improve
the outcome of the campaign or conflict?

If only these rebels surrender, there will be no destruction or death for those affected by the conflict.
On the other side, as a result of this military exertion, some Maute members were captured, while others
perished in the conflict. It is still inevitable that the rebels will attack again, but this battle has taught the AFP’s
their experience in the Marawi siege has prompted the military to redraft doctrines and revise techniques,
tactics, and procedures to face the challenge posed by terrorist attacks of such nature and magnitude. The AFP
is continuing to monitor reports and do proactive measures to frustrate efforts of the remnants of the Maute
Group to recruit, reorganize, and regroup, aside from enlisting the active involvement and vigilance of the
people and the local government in reporting their observations to security forces. And for the government of
the Philippines to be even more cautious and to strengthen the country's security for the sake of the country's
betterment.

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Thank You

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