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Lozande
Presenter
Guardianship( Rules 92-97)
Topics to be discussed:
Guardianship (Rules 92-97)
Francisco v. CA, GR L-57438. Jan. 3, 1984, 212 Phil.
346
Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte De
Piedad y Caja De Ahorras De Manila, GR L-9959. Dec.
13, 1916, 35 Phil. 72
A. General powers and duties of guardians
B. Conditions of the bond of the guardian
C. Rule on Guardianship over minor (AM 03-02-
05-SC)
Cabales v. CA, GR 162421. Aug. 31, 2007, 531
SCRA 691
Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, GR 166470, Aug.
7, 2009, 595 SCRA 464
People v. Flores, GR 188315. Aug. 25, 2010, 629
SCRA 478
Uy v. CA, GR 109557. Nov. 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 246
Guardianship
It is the power of protective authority given by law and
imposed on an individual who is free and in the
enjoyment of his rights, over one whose weakness on
account of his age or other infirmity renders him unable
to protect himself.
It may also describe the relation subsisting between the
guardian and the ward and involves the taking of
possession of a management of the estate of another
unable to act for himself.
Basis of Guardianship
Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae.
Purpose and Nature of Guardianship
1. The Court agree with the trial court and the appellate court
that there is need for petitioner Feliciano Francisco to be retired
from the guardianship over the person and property of
incompetent Estefania San Pedro. The conclusion reached by the
trial court about the "rather advanced age" of petitioner at 72
years old (petitioner is now 76 years old) finding him unfit to
continue the trust cannot be disturbed.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, this
finds direct support in the delay of the accounting
and inventory made by petitioner. To sustain
petitioner as guardian would, therefore, be
detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a
control criterion in determining a person's fitness or
qualification to be appointed or be retained as
guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.
2. No.
As to the issue concerning the appointment of respondent Pelagio
Francisco as the new guardian, We likewise agree with the
respondent appellate court in denying in its resolution of June 26,
1981 for lack of merit the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner questioning the appointment of private respondent Pelagio
Francisco. We also find no abuse of discretion committed by the
appellate court.
The rule is well-established that appellate courts may not entertain
issues brought before it for the first time on appeal.
Government of the Philippine Islands v. El Monte De Piedad y Caja
De Ahorras De Manila, GR L-9959. Dec. 13, 1916, 35 Phil. 72
Facts:
The Philippine Islands filed a suit against the Monte de Piedad to recover,
“through the Attorney-General and in representation of the Government of the
Philippine Islands,” the $80.000, together with interest. After due trial,
judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed and made
the following contentions:
that the $80,000, given to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros, were so
given as a donation, and that said donation had been cleared;
that the Government of the Philippine Islands has not subrogated the Spanish
Government in its rights
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25.
The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2004, which denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners may redeem the subject land from respondents-
spouses
Ruling:
Legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or co-owners who
did not part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the property held in
common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner
Rito became valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986 when he
received his share of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, when he was
24 years old. As a result, he lost his right to redeem subject property.
However, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Nelson
and his mother was not valid such that they were not divested of
their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject
property from respondents-spouses. But they must do so within
thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners
vendors. The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of
the sale to petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day redemption period
commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought the barangay
conciliation process to redeem his property. By January 12, 1995,
when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal redemption and
damages, it was clear that the thirty-day period had already
expired.
Hernandez v. San Juan-Santos, GR 166470, Aug. 7, 2009, 595
SCRA 464
Facts:
The respondent in this case filed a petition for guardianship and demanded an inventory and accounting of
Lulu’s estate from petitioners. Lulu sought the help of the respondent because she was suspecting that the the
herein petitioners, her half siblings, and her father are dissipating her estate. Medical specialists testified to
explain the results of Lulu’s examinations which revealed the alarming state of her health.Not only was Lulu
severely afflicted with diabetes mellitus and suffering from its complications,she also had an existing
artheroselorotic cardiovascular disease (which was aggravated by her obesity). Furthermore, they
unanimously opined that in view of Lulu’s intelligence level (which was below average) and fragile mental
state, she would not be able to care for herself and self-administer her medications.
Issue:
Whether or not Lulu is an incompetent who requires the appointment of a judicial
guardian over her person and property
Ruling:
Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court,31 persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes are incapable of
taking care of themselves and their property without outside aid, are considered as
incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA
both found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of herself and her properties
without outside aid due to her ailments and weak mind. Thus, since determining
whether or not Lulu is in fact an incompetent would require a reexamination of the
evidence presented in the courts a quo, it undoubtedly involves questions of fact.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court only resolves questions of law in a
petition for review. It only takes cognizance of questions of fact in
exceptional circumstances, none of which is present in this case.It thus
adopts the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.Similarly,
the Court see no compelling reason to reverse the trial and appellate
courts’ finding as to the propriety of respondent's appointment as the
judicial guardian of Lulu. Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for
and take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as well.Inasmuch
as respondent’s appointment as the judicial guardian of Lulu was proper,
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order.
People v. Flores, GR 188315. Aug. 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 478
Facts:
This is an appeal on the decision of the Court of Appeals finding
appellant Isidro Flores y Lagua guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of rape.
In the pieces of information given, which are similarly worded
except for the dates of the commission of the crime and the age of
the complainant, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati City, Branch 140, appellant was accused of raping AAA.
Issue:
Whether or not appellant can be considered as guardian to prove
qualifying circumstance of relationship in a rape case
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in considering
the qualifying circumstance of relationship. The appellant cannot be
considered as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory
provision introduced by Republic Act No. 7659. He would not fall either in
the category of the "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" in the
same enumeration, since his liaison is with respect to the aunt of [AAA].
Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a
custodian, that is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a
limited degree of authority for a temporary period, the Court cannot impose the
death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under the amendments introduced
by Republic Act No. 7659, since he does not fit into that category.
Further, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned
in the Information. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the "adopting
father" of AAA, which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship,
appellant could only be convicted for two (2) counts of simple rape, and not
qualified rape.
Uy v. CA, GR 109557. Nov. 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 246
Facts:
The case is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals and
its resolution denying reconsideration reversing that of the Regional Trial Court,
Iloilo, Branch 323 and declaring void the special proceedings instituted therein
by petitioners to authorize petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza, in view of the comatose
condition of her husband, Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., with the approval of the court,
to dispose of their conjugal property in favor of co-petitioners, their daughter and
son in law, for the ostensible purpose of "financial need in the personal, business
and medical expenses of her ‘incapacitated’ husband."
"This case stems from a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza
(herein respondent) on the one hand, against his mother Gilda L.
Jardeleza, and sister and brother-in-law, the spouses Jose Uy
and Glenda Jardeleza (herein petitioners) on the other hand.
The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr.’s suffering of a stroke which left him comatose
and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Said Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. is the father of herein respondent Teodoro
Jardeleza and husband of herein private respondent Gilda
Jardeleza.
Issue:
Ruling: