General Exceptions

in Criminal Law
 Exemptions
• Executive authorities of State not answerable to any court regarding-
- Execution of sovereign functions
- During the tenure of their office
- Immunity against arrest, detention or imprisonment
• SS. 76- 106 of the IPC
• Two broad categories of exemptions:
- Excusable- lack of requisite mens rea
- Justifiable- a wrongful act done mala fide
SS. 76 and 79- Mistake of Fact
• Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law
- Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of
a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.
• Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believ­ing himself justified, by law
- Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and
not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it.
• Acts must be bona fide
• Mistake must be such that had the circumstances been real, the act would have no
criminal liability
• Belief of legal compulsion- justification in law; believed facts vs. real facts
• Reasonable mistake- no superstitious belief- due dillligence
• Mistake must be mistake of fact
- The accused while guarding his field shot an arrow on the moving object in a
good faith that it was a bear, but the shot results in the death of a person (State
of Orissa vs. Khora Ghasi). The court made him free from any liability and he got
the immunity under the mistake of fact.
- Let us assume that a bookseller has agreed to sell a copy of a Virginia Woolf
novel that was signed by the late author. Further, the buyer is precisely
interested in buying the book as that contains the Woolf's signature. The seller
selling the book knows that with this authentic signature, the book fetches a
very high price. Later it is discovered that the signature was forged. The buyer
sues the seller for defrauding her and asks for compensation. Is her claim
legitimate?
• Ignoratia facti doth excusat- ignorance of facts is an excuse
- A was sexually involved with B with the latter’s consent. When B’s
legal guardians learnt this fact, they filed a criminal complaint against
A for having sexual relations with a minor as B was only 15. A
pleaded that he was genuinely mistaken about B’s age as the latter
appeared older than 15. Will this defence hold valid before a court?
• Ignorantia juris non excusat- ignorance of law is no excuse
• Is ignorance of law ever an excuse?
- Raj Kapoor vs. Laxman (1980)- Satyam, Shivam, Sundaram-
obscenity-censor board- exonerated- justifiable
• A, a doctor, while operating a patient, fails to remove his ring from the
hand and the ring negligently remains in the patient’s stomach.
Recently a law is passed that doctors have to remove all the
accessories before the operation. A demands defence as he doesn’t
know about this law because it is recently passed.
• Here A is not liable because the act has been done negligently and
not in bad faith.   
 • Nothing is an offence done by a judge when
acting judicially in the exercise of any power
that is, or which in good faith he believes to
be, given to him by law.
- Power provided by the law
Sec. 77- - Power believed to have been provided by
Judicial the law
Acts - Tackle bias or influence; prevent
administrative scrutiny
- Absolute protection for judicial acts- done in
judicial capacity
 • Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or
Sec. 78- Act which is warranted by the judgment or order
of a Court of Justice; if done whilst such
done judgment or order remains in force, is an
pursuant to offence, notwithstand­ing the court may have
the judgment had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or
order, provided the person doing the act in
or order of good faith be­lieves that the court had such
court jurisdiction.
- Bonafide
- Within jurisdiction
- Judicial and law enforcement officers
• Acting judicially
- Anowar Hussain vs. Ajoy Mukherjee (1965)
1. The accused officer was an executive sub-divisional officer and sub-
divisional magistrate;
2. Ordered arrest in the case of ownership of agricultural estate without
any formal complaint against the respondent;
3. A suit was filed for false imprisonment; a decree of Rs. 5000 was granted
consequently;
4. The accused officer sought the defence of judicial act but was denied as
he acted in his executive capacity;
- Rachapudi Subba Rao vs. AG, AP (1981)
1. The petitioner filed a suit declaring his title in order to get an injunction order from the court
2. The suit was dismissed by the judge without alleged consideration of the merits of the titular
claim
3. The petitioner issued a legal notice to the judge alleging bad faith, biased and discrepant
judgement
4. The notice also alleged that although acting judicially, the judge acted maliciously and in abuse
5. The AP High Court initiated contempt proceedings against the petitioner, and he was sent to a
month of imprisonment
6. Held (SC): The Judicial Officers Protection Act (1850) grants absolute immunity against all civil
liabilities- possibility of malice in case of excessive jurisdiction- absent in this case
7. Appeal was dismissed and the sentence passed by the high court was upheld by the SC
• Acting under judicial orders
- Sheo Narain vs. State of Rajasthan (1999)
1. The petitioner had acquired a decree in a civil suit which authorized him
to become a khatedar tenant for a piece of land
2. Later, it was discovered that he acquired this tenancy by suppressing the
fact that the land belonged to a person from an SC community and was
charged under SS. 209, 210 and 420 of IPC by an FIR
3. The Raj. HC quashed the FIR on the grounds that the tenancy was by way
of a judicial decree and can be revoked only after the decree is set aside
- Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court vs. State of Gujarat (1991)
1. Feud between the CJM and local Gujarat police (Nadiad)
2. False charge of liquor consumption
3. Public ridicule of the CJM
4. The SC initiated contempt proceedings against all the officials
5. Instructed that in the event a judicial officer needs to be arrested, it cannot be
done without intimation to either the district judge or the CJ of the HC
6. The arrested officer cannot be taken to a police station without such
permission
7. The arrested officer must not be handcuffed under any circumstance
 • Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune…
- Without criminal intention
- Without knowledge of the consequences of the act
- Lawful act by lawful means
- Due diligence
Ex: A, B, C and D are construction workers at X’s company. They have been working on

Sec. 80- taking down a huge iron gate in a certain building. While A, B and C were responsible
for balancing the fall of the gate, D was responsible for detaching the bolts which were
placed at a considerable height.

Accident 1) While D was engaged in doing so, a portion of the gate comes off on B who
loses balance and crushes under its weight and dies. Will D be held criminally
responsible for the death of B?
2) Will X be held criminally responsible for the death of B? (The situation is silent
on the company policy on compensating for death/injuries of its employees
during business)
3) While D was engaged in doing so, his hammer drops on B who, later, succumbs
to his injuries. Will D be criminally liable for the death of B?
- State of MP vs. Rangaswamy (1952)
1. The accused believed he was aiming at a hyena while in reality it was human being
2. Protected under Section 80
- State of Orissa vs. Khora Ghasi (1978)
1. The accused shot an arrow at a bear in a maize field but ended up killing a human being
2. Protected under Section 80
- Girish Saikia vs. State of Assam (1993)
1. The accused was in a scuffle with his brother during which he picked up a bamboo stick to
strike him
2. He, accidentally, struck his father who, later, succumbed to his injuries and died
3. Protected under Section 80
- Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar vs. State of Maharashtra
1. The accused “accidentally” shot a person dead after “deliberately”
unlocking his rifle and loading it with cartridges
2. Absence of sue diligence. Not protected under Section 80
- Celebratory fires at weddings in certain regions in India- absence of
due diligence, presence of knowledge, most likely the exploitation of
local arms laws
 • Nothing is an offence merely because it is
done with the knowledge of harm, if it is
done without any criminal intention and in
good faith…
- The purpose is to prevent a bigger harm/for
greater good
Sec. 81- - R vs. Dudley and Stephens
Necessity - US vs. Holmes
1. Necessity of homicide- never justified
2. Self-preservation is not a valid defence
3. Self-protection is a valid defence
 • 82- Nothing is an offence which is done by a child below
seven years of age
• 83- Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above
seven years and below twelve years of age in the
absence of maturity to understand the nature and
consequences of his conduct on that occasion

SS. 82 and - Doli incapax- incapable of committing crime below 7

years
83- Infancy - Krishna Bhagwan vs. State of Bihar
1. The appellant had been convicted under SS. 302, 307
and 324 of the IPC by the sessions judge
2. Had attained the age of 7 in the course of the hearing
3. Was not protected under Section 82 but the court
directed the case to be handed over to the JJ court in
Bihar
• A child above 7 and below 12 years of age
• quia malitia supplet aetatem- malice makes up for age- qualified immunity
- Hiralal Mallick vs. State of Bihar (1977)
1. A 12-year-old boy, along with his two elder brothers, was charged for murdering a
man, under SS. 302, 307 and 34 of IPC. The trial court awarded a life sentence to each
of the accused.
2. The Patna HC reduced Hiralal’s sentence to 4 years owing to his age at the time of the
commission of the crime.
3. An appeal was filed in the SC on the ground of doli incapax. But the court upheld the
sentence stating inter alia that doli incapax is not so much measured by the years or
days as it is by the strength of an accused to comprehend his actions and their
consequences
The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection)
Act 2015
• Child in conflict with the law
• Child in need of care and protection of the law
• Section 3(i) stipulated presumption of innocence until the age of 18
• Section 15 empowers the JJ board to conduct a preliminary
assessment of the physical and mental status of a delinquent between
the age 16 and 18 to determine if they can be tried as adults for a
heinous crime (2012 Delhi Gang Rape Case)
- Determination of age of an accused juvenile
- Gopinath Ghosh vs. State of WB (1983)
1. The appellant A was accused of murdering X and was awarded life
imprisonment by the sessions judge
2. The appeal before the SC stated that the appellant was below 18 years at the
time of commission of the act ergo was a ‘child’ within the meaning of the WB
Children Act 1959. Therefore, the sessions court lacked jurisdiction to try the
case at all.
3. The HC was compelled to consider a fresh investigation into the age of the
appellant pursuant to which the sentence by the sessions court which was
upheld by the HC was set aside.
 • Nothing is an offence which is done by a
person who, at the time of doing it, by
reason of unsoundness of mind, is

Section 84-
incapable of knowing the nature of the act,
or that he is doing what is either wrong or
contrary to law.

Unsoundness - At the time of the act

- Unsoundness of mind
of mind - Incapability of knowing the nature and
consequences of the act
• R vs. M’Naghten (1843) 1. Presumption on innocence until insanity is
established
- The accused had murdered Edward Drummond
who was the secretary to the then PM of Britain, 2. The standard of proof must establish insanity at
Robert Peel, believing him to be Peel. On arrest, the time of commission of the act in a way that
the accused stated that he was supposed to kill the it must prove-
PM because he was “told to do so”.
a. Failure to understand the nature and
- He was held ‘not guilty’ by the jury on the ground consequences of the actions, or
of ‘unsoundness of mind’.
b. If understood, the accused must believe it to be
- The defence of insanity was considered by the jury right
based on an expert’s opinion on the accused’s
3. The test of wrongfulness is in the ability to judge
perpetual state of mind.
right from wrong with regard to the act in question
- The case was further debated in the HL to and not in general
ascertain uniform grounds of the defence of
insanity. This gave rise to the M’Naghten Rules-
• Hari Singh Gond vs. State of MP
- The accused A got up in the middle of the night and committed an aggressive physical
assault on his relative, X (the deceased)
- In addition to this, he also set sacks of grains of fire which set the entire house ablaze
leading to the death of X who was already injured with all the beating from A
- During the trial, A sought the defence of insanity which was rejected by the court based on
evidence
- The case reached the SC which upheld the decisions of the subordinate courts and made
pertinent observations on insanity as defence:
i. Legal insanity vs. medical insanity
ii. Mere unsoundness is not a legitimate defence per se
• Surendra Mishra vs. State of Jharkhand (2011)
- The accused A shot the deceased X point-blank, in a sudden turn of events
- At the time of the act, X was in a car with his driver D who escaped the scene of crime after
he was threatened by A of dire consequences if he spoke of the event to anyone
- Shortly after, A fled the scene of crime, disposing his pistol in a nearby well
- A was charged with murder by the trial court. An appeal, eventually, filed before the SC
citing the defence of insanity
- The evidence produced before the courts showed that the event occurred in August 2000
and that the accused had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and prescribed with
medication several times between 1997-99
- The court rejected the appeal on the ground of absence of “legal insanity”
• State of Assam vs. Inush Ali (1981)
- The accused A and the deceased D were ploughmen in a field
- On the day of the murder, D was being chased by A and was later found with an abdominal wound in the field to
which he, eventually, succumbed
- In his statement to the police, A stated that he had an aggressive argument with D and had also seen D carrying a
sharp weapon which A believed was to cause grievous harm to him. The argument had subsided and both A & D
had their afternoon meal together after. However, as soon as D finished his meal and proceeded to work, he was
stabbed by A
- A claimed the defence of irresistible impulse and delusion. Was awarded a sentence under 302.
- The court rejected his appeal on the following grounds:
i. Delusion is an evidence of insanity
ii. Insanity has to exist per se
iii. If the defendant apprehended any danger to his life from D then he should have approached the law
enforcement
iv. The existence of such danger was, in fact, believed to be true by A ergo it was not a figment of his imagination
ergo no delusion
• Dayabhai Thakkar vs. State of Gujarat (1964)
- The accused A inflicted 44 knife injuries on his wife W, the deceased in the middle of the night
- W’s father recorded that 20 days before the murder, A and W had been fighting, and A had clearly told
W’s father to take her back as he did not liker her anymore
- On the night of the murder, the accused unlocked the door after the act and appeared to the
witnesses in a state of hallucination owing to the statements he was yelling out
- The trial court sentenced him under Section 302 of the IPC and his appeals were rejected by the HC
and the SC. The SC made certain observations on the ‘burden of proof’-
i. Insanity prior to or after an unlawful act is not “legal insanity” and the burden of proof lies on the
prosecution to establish this beyond reasonable doubt
ii. An acquittal in such a case may not always owe to the merits of the evidence produced by the
accused but insufficient evidence by the prosecution that could cast a doubt on the latter’s case
 • Nothing is an offence which is done by a person
who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of
intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of
the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong,
or contrary to law; provided that the thing which
Section 85- intoxicated him was administered to him
without his knowledge or against his will.
Intoxication - Intoxication at the time of commission of the act
- Diminished reason and rationality
- Involuntary intoxication
- Knowledge and intent vitiate the defence of
intoxication (Sec. 86)
• Involuntary intoxication/Incapable of knowing the nature if the act/
- Bablu @ Mubarak Hussain vs. State of Rajasthan (2006)
1. The accused killed his wife and 5 children
2. He was awarded capital punishment by the trial court which was upheld by the HC. The
case was taken in appeal to the SC which had the following observations:
- The insanity whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise is a defence to the crime
charged;
- Evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific
intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into account with the other facts
proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent; and
- The evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved incapacity in the accused to form
the intent necessary to constitute the crime and merely establishing that his mind is
affected by drink so that he more readily give to some violent passion, does not rebut the
presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts.
3. The court held that the accused was voluntarily intoxicated and his violent behavior
towards his wife and children, days before the killings established malice. Sentence upheld.
• Intention
- Shankar Jaiswara vs. State of WB (2007)
1. The accused A had a filthy argument with the deceased D during
which the latter asked A to leave his house
2. Enraged by this, A stabbed him to death; claimed protection under
Section 86
3. The SC observed that while intoxication leads to a loss of mental
control, it cannot be a defence ipso facto if ‘intention’ can be
established
4. The court upheld his conviction under Section 302
• Basdev vs. State of Pepsu (1956)
1. The appellant was attending a wedding where he was ‘heavily intoxicated’.
2. He asked a boy to vacate the chair for him to sit on, but the boy refused. The accused, then,
pulled out a gun and shot the boy dead.
3. He pleaded the defence of insanity and intoxication.
4. The SC observed that-
- If actual insanity in fact supervenes as the result of excessive alcohol it furnishes as complete
an answer to a criminal charge as insanity induced by any other cause
- But in cases falling short of insanity evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused
incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into
consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this
intent
- But evidence of drunkenness which falls short of proving such incapacity and merely
establishes that the mind of the accused was so affected by drink that he more readily gave
way to some violent passion does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural
consequences of his act
5. The court upheld the capital punishment of the accused
 • 87- Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or
grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to
be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence
by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be
intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above
eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether
express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of
SS. 87- 92- any harm which it may be known by the doer to be
likely to cause to any such person who has consented

Consent
to take the risk of that harm.
- Absence of mens rea.
- Absence of knowledge of the consequences of the act
- Consent; volenti non fit injuria
- Consent must be given by the person aged 18 and
above
- Consent can be express or implied
Express or Implied Consent
• The term ‘express consent’ as far as criminal law is concerned is used to give
permission for something either verbally or in writing.
• The term ‘implied consent’ in criminal law is used to obtain either
(1) Consent by acts and conducts, or
(2) Consent presumed 
• 88- Nothing, which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any
harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by
the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good
faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that
harm, or to take the risk of that harm.
- Absence of mens rea for murder
• Your friend agreed to rent you her apartment and stated that you
would have to pay a monthly rent of Rs. 20,000. You replied “Yes” and
moved in with your belongings. However, at the time of payment, you
refused to pay the sum on the ground that there is no written
contract to enforce the rent. Can your friend hold you liable?
• X, on being friendly terms with Z, goes into his wardrobe in his
absence and takes away his shirt without Z’s express consent for the
purpose of attending a party tonight, and the intention of returning
it. Later, Z sues X for theft. Is this a legitimate claim?
 • Nothing which is done in good faith for the
benefit of a person under twelve years of
age, or of unsound mind, by or by consent,
either express or implied, of the guardian or
other person having lawful charge of that
Sec. 89- person, is an offence by reason of any harm
which it may cause, or be intended by the
Consent for doer to cause or be known by the doer to be
a minor likely to cause to that person.
- Bona fide
- 12 years
- Express or implied consent
- Guardian or lawful in-charge
Provisos
• Act shall not extend to intentional causing of death, an
attempt to cause death. For instance, A in good faith
intentionally kills his son, who is suffering from incurable
heart disease just to give him a peaceful death. A would
not be protected under this section.   disease or infirmity. For instance, A in good faith, for his
• This provision will not apply in the situations wherein the
person was aware or had a knowledge of his act which is
likely to cause death unless it was done for the
prevention of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any
grievous disease or infirmity. For instance, A in good
faith, for his daughter’s benefit without her consent, has
consented for transplantation, knowing it to be likely to
cause death in the process, but not intended to cause her
death. A will be given the defence of section 89, since his
objective was to cure her daughter.
• This provision will not apply in the situations wherein the
person voluntarily causes grievous hurt or attempted to
cause grievous hurt unless it was done for prevention of
death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous
child’s pecuniary benefit, emasculates him. Here A would
not be protected under this provision as A has caused
grievous hurt to his child for a purpose, other than
preventing death or grievous hurt.
• This provision will not extend to the abetment of any
offence, which is not covered under this provision. For
instance, A, in good faith, abets B, his friend, to sleep
with his daughter Y, who is under 12 years of age for
pecuniary benefits. Neither A nor B would be given
protection under this section. 
 • A consent is not such a consent as is intended by
any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a
person under fear of injury, or under a
misconception of fact, and if the person doing the
act knows, or has reason to believe, that the
90- Consent consent was given in consequence of such fear or
misconception; or
under fear or 1. Consent of an insane person- if the consent is
misconceptio given by a person who, from unsoundness of
mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the
n nature and consequence of that to which he gives
his consent; or
2. Consent of a child- unless the contrary appears
from the context, if the consent is given by a
person who is under twelve years of age
- Consent given under fear or injury
- Consent given under misconception
- Consent given with an unsound or intoxicated mind
- Consent given by a child below 12 years of age
 • The exceptions in sections 87, 88 and 89 do
not extend to acts which are offences
independently of any harm which they may
91- Exclusion cause, or be intended to cause, or be known
to be likely to cause, to the person giving the
of acts which consent, or on whose behalf the consent is
are offences given.
independentl - An act is punishable even if there is no harm
to the person consenting to it
y of harm - For those acts which are independently
punishable by the law
 • Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it
may cause to a person for whose benefit it is done
in good faith, even without that person's consent, if
the circumstances are such that it is impossible for
92- Act done that person to signify consent, or if that person is
in good incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian or
other person in lawful charge of him from whom it
faith, is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to
be done with benefit.
without - Bona fide
consent - Without consent- impossible to signify-
communicate- no guardian
- Act done for the benefit of the person
- Any harm done as a consequence will be excused
Provisos
• That this exception shall not extend
to the intentional causing of death,
or the attempting to cause death;
• That this exception shall not extend
to the doing of anything which the
person doing it knows to be likely to
cause death, for any purpose other
than the preventing of death or
grievous hurt, or the curing of any
grievous disease or infirmity;
• That this exception shall not
extend to the voluntary causing
of hurt, or to the attempting to
cause hurt, for any purpose other
than the preventing of death or
hurt;
• That this exception shall not
extend to the abetment of any
offence, to the committing of
which offence it would not
extend.
- Bishambhar vs. Roomal (1950)
1. Rumal Singh and others (R and others) were charged under IPC for causing grievous hurt and
criminal intimidation against Bishambhar (B)
2. B had molested a girl from the ‘Chamar’ community which had agitated the members of the
community. As a result, around 200 members of the community approached B with the
intention of punishing him. R and others were a part of this act as well. However, they tried to
intervene to bring about a settlement.
3. They organized a Panchayat which decided to blacken the face of B and have him go around
the village, as a punishment. B had also agreed to this punishment by providing a written
consent to it, in order to avoid any aggression from the members of the community.
4. B contended that he did so under duress; to save himself and that such behaviour must not go
unpunished . He blamed R and others as chief perpetrators behind the social embarrassment
he had to suffer.
5. The courts accepted the defence of Section 87 for R and others and dismissed B’s complaint.
- Baldev Gora and Anr. vs. State (2017)
1. The complainant C registered an FIR against petitioner P on charges of rape and cheating
2. It was alleged that P had tricked C into establishing a sexual relationship on the pretext of marriage
but refused later. Therefore, her consent was obtained under a misconception.
3. C, who was 19 years of age at the time, had agreed to accompany P in his endeavours and had
expressly consented to engage sexually with him
4. The court dismissed the complain on for the lack of compelling evidence under Section 91.
Exception under Section 87 was applied
- Rao Harnarain Singh Sheoji Singh v. State (1957)
1. In this case, the accused who was an advocate and Additional Public Prosecutor forced his
tenant to give his wife for satisfying the carnal lust of Rao Harnarain and his friends.
2. The wife died shortly after the act for reasons that could not be diagnosed by medical
experts.
3. Upon being prosecuted, the accused pleaded that the deceased husband had consented
for this and also the woman came with her own, therefore they should not be held liable.
4. The Court made clear the distinction between consent and submission. 
• The Court said all consent involves submission but not all submission is consent. Here, in
this case the deceased made her submission before the accused because her husband was
threatened with severe consequences. The Court held all of them liable for committing and
rape and murder.
Sec. 95- Trivial Acts

• Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or

that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no
person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.
- Trivial harm
- A person of ordinary temper would not complain
- An act per se falls within the literal scope of the law but falls outside the
spirit/objectives of the law
Ex.- Eating lunch from your friend’s lunchbox without their permission
• Nature of harm
- Veeda Menezes vs. Yusuf Khan (1966)
1. T was a tenant of W. W’s servant S called T’s wife a thief, angered by which T slapped S the next
day.
2. This resulted into a heated exchange of arguments between T and H (W’s husband) followed by
T throwing a file at H.
3. Although the file did not hit him, it left his forearm bruised.
4. Consequently, W and H filed a compliant against T on account of house trespass to commit
punishable offences like slapping W, inflicting a wound on H and slapping S.
5. Investigation revealed that the allegations in the complaint were exaggerated, and T was
acquitted by the HC under Section 95
6. W took the matter to the SC, in appeal, which upheld the decision of the HC on the ground
that the injury intended to be caused was too trivial to be legally challenged by a person of
ordinary temper
• Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. KPS Gill (1996)
1. The petitioner P was an IAS officer in Punjab and was present at a social gathering alongside
the respondent R who was the DGP, Punjab
2. At the gathering, R asked P to come and sit next to him. When P approached the chair next to
R, the latter pulled it closer just when P was about to sit on it.
3. P pulled the chair back and tried to sit again but R repeated his mischief. Embarrassed, P left to
join the others. A few minutes later, R got up to come and stand very close to P. He also
signaled P to accompany him after which P got upset and asked him to leave.
4. P was apprehensive of R’s behaviour because she was unable to leave herself as R had blocked
her way. He was standing so close to her that she could not have got up without touching him.
5. P, decided to pull her chair as far back as possible and get out of the situation. As she turned
around to leave, R slapped her posterior. The entire gathering was a witness to the series of
events.
6. P filed an FIR against him alleging offences under ss. 341, 342, 352, 354 and 509
R filed an application with the PH high court to quash the FIR against him, The court allowed his
application on the following grounds:
i. the allegations made therein do not disclose any cognizable offence;
ii. the nature of harm allegedly caused to Mrs. Bajaj did not entitle her to complain about the
same in view of Section 95 IPC;
iii. the allegations are unnatural and improbable;
iv. the Investigating Officer did not apply his mind to the allegations made in the F.I.R., for had he
done so, he would have found that there was no reason to suspect commission of a cognizable
offence, which was the `sine qua non' for starting an investigation under Section 157 Cr. P.C.;
and
v. there was unreasonable and unexplained delay of 11 days in lodging the F.I.R.
vi. As regards the complaint of Mr. Bajaj, the High Court observed that the allegations were
almost identical with some improvements made therein.
• Offences under the Food Adulteration Act 1955
- Generally, not exempted under Section 95
i. Jagdish Prasad vs. State of UP (1966)
ii. State of Maharashtra vs. Taher Bhair (1978)
• Pharmaceutical frauds
i. State of Karnataka vs. Lobo Medicals
- The seller has collected excess money above the MRP of two essential
supplements- Neurobion and Sclerobion
- The excess amount was Rs. 1.69 and Rs. 0.69 in excess on the respective
supplements
- The HC of Karnataka deemed this as a socio-economic offence and rejected the
defence of Section 95
Sec. 96 and 97- Private Defence

• Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right to private defence
• Right to defend own body or the body of another
• Right to defend own property or the property of another
• It is a circumscribed right which is meant only to protect oneself or another and not to punish the
wrongdoer for their act
• The right ceases to exist the moment the need to defend ceases to exist
• The right ceases to exist the moment the injury/damage caused to the wrongdoer is disproportionate
to the wrongful act
• Nabia Bai vs. State of MP (1992)
1. The accused A was working in her field along with her mother and sister
2. The deceased D, who was passing by the neighbouring field saw the
three women and attacked them on their field with a knife he possessed
3. In order to protect themselves, the women resisted and after some
grappling, A managed to get hold of the knife that was D’s. She inflicted
serious injuries upon him which resulted in D’s death
4. A was acquitted on the ground that she was trying to save herself, her
mother and her sister from an armed intruder. Therefore, her act was
excusable under Sections 96 and 97
• V Subramani vs. State of TN (2005)
1. Dispute over grazing of cattle on another’s property
2. Altercations and physical violence between the owner O of the property, owner of the cattle and
the neighbour of O.
3. The deceased D reached the scene of altercation and suffered physical injuries by a blow on his
head with a wooden yoke.
4. He was later declared dead at the hospital
5. The defendants sought self-defence under 96 and 97
6. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds of disproportionate aggression by the defendants
• Mano Dutt vs. State of UP (2012)
1. The accused persons A, B, C and D apprehended the deceased D for doing land-filling on
his land
2. D refused to give up and assembled the villagers to avert the dispute. The villagers
supported D and dispersed after the meeting
3. Some time later A, B, C and D came back with lathis, chased D, hit him with the lathis.
D’s family members tried to intervene but were stopped by other accomplices
4. D was taken to the hospital with grievous injuries and succumbed to them later
5. The accused persons who were charged under 302 and 34 appealed on the ground that
the altercation was last minute, they were trying to defend the land which was allegedly
theirs, the lathi was charge in self-defence against the deceased and his family members
6. The appeal was dismissed
Buta Singh vs. State of Punjab (1991)
• The deceased and his companions had gone to a disputed
land to have it tilled.
• The appellant’s son attempted to stop their efforts which
enraged them. In response, the deceased launched an attack
on the appellant and his wife.
• During the course of the incident, both sides sustained serious
injuries and the deceased got stabbed to death. The
prosecution argued that the appellant exceeded his right to
self defence.
• The court observed that it is difficult to say that he exceeded
the right of private defence for the obvious reason that he
could not have weighed in golden scales in the heat of the
moment the number of injuries required to disarm his
assailants who were armed with lethal weapons.
• The conviction was set aside, and the appeal was allowed
• Vidhya Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
1. The appellant A was passing by a village when he saw X and Y sitting in a veranda of a house
2. A approached them and asked X for some water. X directed Y to get A a glass of water. Things were fine until
this point.
3. The prosecution’s case states that A started abusing X or not getting water himself and hit him with a on his
arm which fractured it. X made a hue and cry about the attack and some villagers gather around.
4. The prosecution claimed that A stabbed all the villagers as soon as they attempted to stop him from attacking
X.
5. The court was unable to tell truth from lie and chose to rely on human probabilities- It is probable that when
the appellant was encircled and assaulted he in the heat of the moment and fearing that he might be dealt
with severely went on attacking those who encircled him.
6. The HC had held in the favour of the accused recognizing his right to self-defence but the SC said that the right
to self-defence is a valuable right with a social purpose. Therefore, it should not be construed narrowly
7. Consequently, the SC held the accused had the right to self-defence but had exceeded by launching an armed
attack on the villagers. The appeal
Sec. 98- Private Defence against the act of
a person of unsound mind
• When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence, is not that offence, by
reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the unsoundness of
mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by reason of any
misconception on the part of that person, every person has the same right of
private defence against that act which he would have if the act were that
offence.
- youth/maturity
- Unsoundness
- Intoxication
- Misconception
- Same right to private defence i.e., incapacity of the offender is no qualification
Sec. 99- Exceptions to the right to private
defence
• There is no right of private defence against an act which
1. Does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt if done, or attempted to be done, by a public
servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act, may not be strictly justifiable by law.
2. There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of
grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant acting in good faith under colour of
his office, though that direction may not be strictly justifiable by law.
3. There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public
authorities.
Extent to which the right may be exercised:
- The right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose
of defence.
- A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant,
as such, unless he knows or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is such public servant.
- A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a
public servant, unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direc­tion, or
unless such person states the authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such
authority, if demanded.
• A prosecutorial sanction is a form of permission/allowance, and it should not be granted for just any complaint
against a sovereign authority which requires a certain amount of liberty to fulfil the ends of justice.
• Since the prime responsibility of these authorities is to fulfil their duties without fear & coercion, it is
necessary to accord them protection from prosecution that might arise maliciously from those who had to be
punished in the pursuance of such duty.
- Matajog Dubey vs. H.C. Bhari (1955)
1. In pursuance of a search-warrant issued under Section 6 of the Taxation on Income (Investigation
Commission) Act, four officials forcibly broke open the entrance door of a premises;
2. Upon being confronted with the proprietors, tied one of them with a rope, causing him injuries & leading to
a complaint under the relevant sections of the IPC.
3. The Supreme Court held that in the present matter, the sanction was necessary to initiate prosecution &
elaborated on the scope of section.
4. The connection between the act & the discharge of duty must be connected to the extent that it can be
reasonably presumed that it was done by the accused in the performance of his official duty, though it might
be possible that the act was excess of the needs of the situation.
• V.D. Rajagopal vs. State of Telangana (2018)
1. The petitioner was an IAS officer at an influential position in the
Mining and Minerals Department
2. It was alleged that he connived with private companies with respect
to the grant of mining lease to such companies which would bring
him monetary advantage as well. Further investigation revealed that
one such company was also involved in illegal mining activities.
3. The petitioner claimed immunity by his office and position, but the
SC denied the petition
Sec. 100- Right to private defense
extending to causing death
• Sec. 100- Subject to the restrictions under Sec. 99, the right to private defense
applies to voluntary causing of death or grievous hurt under the following
circumstances:
1. Reasonable apprehension of death as a consequences of assault
2. Reasonable apprehension of grievous hurt as a consequence of assault
3. Assault with the intention of rape
4. Assault with the intention of gratifying lust
5. Assault with the intention of kidnapping and abduction
6. Assault with the intention of wrongful confinement which may cause the victim to
reasonably believe that they will be unable to have legal recourse
7. Act or attempt to throw or administer acid (2013 Amendment)
• Amjad Khan vs. State (1952)
- A communal riot broke out in a town between some Sindhi refugees and the local Muslims.
- The trouble started in a locality where most of the shopkeepers were Sindhis. The goods in the Muslim
shops were scattered and some Muslims lost their lives.
- Alarm spread to another locality where the shops of appellant and his brother (both Muslims) were
situated and the people there, including the appellant, started closing their shops.
- The family of the appellant's brother had taken shelter in the appellant's portion of the building through
a hole in the wall between the two portions of the building in which the two shops were situated.
- A mob collected there and approached the appellant's locality and looted his brother's shop and began
to beat the doors of his shop with lathis. The appellant fired two shots from his gun which caused the
death of one Sindhi and injured three other Sindhis.
- The question for determination was whether the appellant acted in his right of private defence
- Held- The circumstances in which he was placed were amply sufficient to give him a right of private
defence of the body even to the extent of causing death as the appellant had no time to have recourse
to the authorities and has reasonable grounds for apprehending that either death or grievous hurt
would be caused either to himself or to his family. These things could not be weighed in too fine a set
of scales or "in golden scales."
• Parshottam Lal Ji Waghela vs. State of Gujarat (1992)
- Assault of a chamar woman by the vankar community passing by their
area. The chamars were not allowed to take the street in that area
- The members of the community who had gathered at a temple elsewhere
were outraged at the incident and proceeding towards the accused to
confront him
- In anticipation of violence against him, the accused gathered members of
his community and was armed. The chamars were unarmed but started
pelting stones on the other party
- The vankars responded by pelting back but the accused also opened fire
and killed two members of the chamar community; no vankar was hurt in
the stone pelting
- They pleaded self-defence but were denied the exception by the court as
there was no reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt
• Yashwant Rao vs. State of MP (1992)
- A minor girl was found having sexual intercourse with the deceased
when her father found them
- Assured that his daughter was being molested by the man, hit him with
a spade. In an attempt to flee, the deceased fell and hit himself, and
later succumbed to his injuries
- The prosecution said that the daughter had given consent to the sexual
act, but the court rejected this argument as the girl was a minor
- It was held that the father acted in private defense and was acquitted
• Union of India vs. Vansh Sharad Gupta (2016)- Petition filed with respect
to the delay in publication of the amendment to Section 100
“seventhly” and the delay in the response of an RTI application by the
petitioner
Sec. 101- Right to private defense
extending to causing harm other than
death
• The offence must not be not of any of the descriptions under section
100
• The right of private defence of the body does not extend to the
voluntary causing of death to the assailant
• But subject to the restrictions under section 99 it extends to causing
to the assailant any harm other than death
• Yogendra Morarji vs. State of Gujarat (1980)
- Dispute regarding the payment of dues to the deceased by the accused
- In this regard, the deceased and his party stopped the jeep in which the
accused was travelling, and started pelting stones on the vehicle
- In response, the accused opened fire on the group and took three rounds of
shots during which the deceased got hit by a bullet and succumbed to his
injuries
- The accused claimed self defense under Section 100
- The court acknowledged the apprehension to bodily injury in this case which
granted the accused the right to protect himself
- However, since he was sitting in a closed wagon, the likelihood of death was
significantly low. Therefore, firing three rounds amounted to disproportionate
aggression. The court held that the accused had exceeded his right to self
defense and convicted him under Section 304 of the IPC
Sec. 102- Commencement and continuance
of the right to private defense
- The right commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension to
danger begins:
i. Attempted harm, or
ii. Threat to harm
- The need not be committed
- The right continues as long as such apprehension lasts
• Deo Narain vs. State of UP (1973)
- The accused had received a blow on head by a `lathi' and in self-defence
he had used his spear in retaliation
- The threat must reasonably give rise to the present and imminent, and not
remote or distant danger
- This right rests on the general principle that where a crime is endeavoured
to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force in self- defence
- To say that the appellant could only claim the right to use force after he
had sustained a serious injury by an aggressive wrongful assault is a
complete misunderstanding of the law embodied in the above section.
- The right of private defence is available for protection against
apprehended unlawful aggression and not for punishing the aggressor for
the offence committed by him. It is a preventive and not punitive right.
• James Martin vs. State of Kerala (2004)
- The accused, who is an owner of a flour mill, did not close his shop on the
day of an all-India strike, “Bharat Bandh”
- The activists entered the mill forcefully and demanded closure; they were
armed with sharp objects as weapons
- They threatened assault and attack in response to which the accused
opened fire on the crowd
- The Trial Court and the HC convicted him under Section 304 on the
grounds of exceeding his right to private defence
- The SC reversed the judgements and stated that the accused had a
reasonable apprehension of danger to his life. Hence, his actions were
justified under the laws of provate defence
*Yogendra Morarji vs. State of Gujarat
Sec. 106- Right of private defense causing
unavoidable harm to innocent persons
- An assault causes a reasonable apprehension of danger
- The accused is placed in a situation where they cannot exercise their
right without harming an innocent person, they will be protected by
this provision in the exercise of their right
- Read with ss. 99 and 100
• Wassan Singh vs. State of Punjab (1995)
- During a fight between two groups, the accused sustained several physical injuries
- In order to protect himself he fired at the assailants using his gun and killed an innocent bystander women
- He was accused of attempt to murder and unlawful use of his gun
- The accused pleaded self defence on the ground that he acted on spur of the moment; without any
intention to kill the women; she got hit by virtue of her proximity to the site of the incident
- It is obvious that if an accused with an intention to kill his victim fires a shot at him which misses the target
and hits any other innocent person fatally he would remain guilty of an offence of murder but if the
accused had no such intention and was protected by right of private defence under the situation and
circumstances in which it could extend to even causing death of assailant as laid down by Section 100 and
if in exercise of that right of private defence the blow fatally falls on an innocent person the action would
still remain protected under Section 100 of the IPC.
- it is difficult to judge the action of the accused from the cool atmosphere of the court room. Such situations
have to be judged in the `light of what happens on the spur of the moment on spot and keeping in view the
normal course of human conduct as to how a person would react under such circumstances in a sudden
manner with an instinct of self-preservation.
- The SC overturned his conviction on both accounts and held that his exercise of right to provate defense
was reasonable
To sum up the right to self defence of body-
• Darshan Singh vs. State of Punjab (2010) (Suresh Singhal vs. Delhi Administration (2017))
- Regular family feud related to a land dispute
- Various members of the family were found guilty of attacking and injuring each other with sharp weapons
- The case is known to have set principles laid down by the SC with regard to the right to self defence, it’s scope and
limitations:
i. It is not a right to take revenge. It is a right to defend and not to retaliate. It can be exercised only where the
immediate aid from the State machinery is not available.
ii. It should not be an act of self-creation but an act of necessity to avert an impending danger and should not
exceed its legitimate purpose. One may cause such injury as may be necessary to ward off the apprehended
danger or threat.
iii. Once the reasonable apprehension disappears, there is no occasion to exercise the right of self-defense.
iv. The plea of reasonable apprehension is essentially a question of fact.
v. It is unrealistic to expect a person under assault to regulate their behaviour or exercise control with “arithmetic
exactitude”
vi. Even if the accused does not plead self defence, the courts can still consider it based on the material on record
vii. There is no need for the accused to prove the existence of the right to self defence beyond reasonable doubt
viii. The Penal Code considers the right to defence only against the acts that are offence under the law
Right to Private Defence of Property

• Section 97 read with Section 99

• Right available for movable and immovable property
• Not available to the aggressor
• Right available to defend personal property and the property of another
• Right available against robbery, mischief, criminal trespass or their attempts
• Khuddu Singh vs. State of UP (1993)
- Land dispute between UC and LC; no defined boundaries
- The accused, a harijan had forcibly occupied the part of the land in the possession of the deceased
and his friends
- A confrontation by the deceased led to a fight between the parties; both parties were armed but just
one party used it upon another; the accused shot the deceased during the fight; took the plea of
private defence
- The SC overturned the HC conviction under 302 to 304. Recognized the right but it was exercised in
excess
Against criminal trespass only

• Sec 441- Criminal Trespass:

1. Entering the property of another
2. To commit an offence or- to intimidate, insult, annoy
3. Enter the property lawfully but remain there unlawfully with the
above intent
4. Mere entry is trespass; presence of intention to cause harm results
into criminal trespass
• Cherubin Gregory vs. State of Bihar (1964)
1. Illegal use of the toilet of the accused by the deceased
2. The deceased ignored the verbal warnings of the accused.
Consequently, the accused put a live wire around his toilet on which
the deceased stepped accidentally and got electrocuted
3. The accused contended that he did so while exercising private
defence
4. The court held that this was simple trespass. Therefore, his actions
amounted in excess of his right
 • The principle of “settled possession” protects the
trespasser from any attack by the owner
• Puran Singh vs. State of Punjab (1975)
Private 1. Dispute regarding a forced occupation of a land that was
defence of a 2.
mortgaged by X to Y+
It was alleged that even though Y+ had paid the
trespasser mortgage in full, had cultivated crops on the land
thereafter, X tried to trespass the land and destroy their
crops
3. In a fight between the parties, one of the complainant
parties was killed and some injuries were sustained by
both the sides
Principles of settled possession:
• Actual and physical possession by the trespasser
• Sufficiently long period of time
• Possession must be in the knowledge of the owner-
express or implied
• Without any concealment and with an animus
possidendi
• The process of dispossession of the true owner by
the trespasser must be complete and final
• Munshi Ram vs. Delhi Administration (1968)
1. X was in possession of an evacuee land which had been sold to Y by a public auction
2. The possession of the land could be taken by following the procedures laid down by the
government which was the original owner of the land
3. After the auction, Y+ went to the land with a tractor in order to level the field. They were
also carrying weapons anticipating an attack by X
4. In order to prevent the encroachment by Y+, X apprehended them and in the process
inflicted injuries on them. Both parties had suffered injuries
5. It was contended by X that he had been the occupier of the land for 30+ years and that in
the absence of an actual transfer of possession, he was still a legitimate tenant. Therefore,
whatever he did was to defend his land.
6. However, since Y contended that he already owned the land by virture of a provisional
certificate provided by the government. Therefore he had the right to enter the land. He
also contended that X was a criminal trespasser
7. However, the court held Y+ to be criminal trespassers and charged them under Section 34.
Applied the rule of settled possession. Acknowledged the existence of X’s tenancy and
thereby his right to possess the land against Y+
• Hukam Singh vs. State of UP (1961)
1. The appellants one of whom was armed with hatchet and others with lathis, were passing through H’s fields,
carrying carts in order to reach the main road
2. On being prevented by H and his supporters, they appellants attacked H+ and in the process killed them
3. The defence was that on H's protest the appellants asked to be excused and pleaded to be allowed to cross
the remaining small portion of the field to reach the public passage, whereupon they were attacked and in
self defence they attacked back
4. The appellants' case was that H's right of private defence of the property had ceased for the reasons that the
criminal trespass was over on the appellants having indicated their intentions, and they were no more an
unlawful assembly as their common object had ceased and thereafter all were not responsible for acts of
another
5. It was held that that when a criminal trespass is committed it does not come to an end just because the
trespasser expresses regret and pleads to be allowed to proceed further with a view to end such a trespass
6. The aggrieved party had the right to prevent the trespasser from continuing to commit such further criminal
trespass, and his directions had to be abided by the trespasser, whatever be the degree of patience required
7. The trespasser had no right to insist on proceeding further even if not allowed to move in any direction in
order to leave the field.
8. It was also held that when several persons were with lathis and one of them was armed with hatchet, the
general understanding among them was that they will use the arms if the intention of crossing the field is
met with resistance and that it may also lead to serious injury or death of the opposing party
 • Subject to section 99
• Voluntary causing of death or grievous hurt is excusable in
the event of-
• Robbery
Sec. 103- • House breaking
Defence • Mischief by fire committed on any building with human
dwelling or is a place of custody of custody of property
causing death • Theft, mischief or trespass which causes apprehension of
death or grievous hurt
• Sec. 104- any act not of the description in 103 will not
excuse causing of death or grievous hurt in the event of
defending property
• Nathan vs. State of Madras (1973)
1. X and his father were lessees of the land owned by A. They had been cultivating the land.
However, they had had fallen short of the rent for a few months owing to which it was
alleged that they had surrendered the land
2. A had leased the cultivated the land to J and K who, after a year of the alleged surrender,
decided to harvest the crops. This is when X apprehended them. There was aggression on
both ends but one of J’s men was killed in the process
3. At the time of the hearing of this appeal, A could only produce a counter-lease document
and not the original deed of surrender which led the court to believe that there was no
surrender.
4. The court observed that if there was a surrender, A should not have allowed X+ to continue
the cultivation. Therefore, in this case, the cultivation belonged to X+ and they had full
right to defend it. Due diligence was also absent on J+’s part who failed to enquire about
the crops from the lessor at the time of signing the deed
5. However, since J and K were not carrying any weapons, X had exceeded his right to private
defence of property by voluntary causing of death without any reasonable apprehension
of the same to his life. Capital punishment was modified to life imprisonment
Sec. 105- Commencement and
continuation of private defence of property
• Commences when the danger to the property commences
• The right against theft continues till the offender has:
- Actually retreated from the property, or
- Been caught and removed with the help of public authorities, or
- Property has been recovered,
• The right against robbery continues as long as:
- The offender causes or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt
- The offender causes or attempts to cause wrongful restraint
- Fear or instant death or instant hurt must prevail
• The right against mischief or criminal trespass continues as long as the offences continue
• The right against house-breaking continues as long house trespass as a result of such
break-in continues