Bayon, a grab food service provider slammed the rear of a luxury vehicle,

while driving his motorcycle to deliver food to a client.

Right after the impact, Bayon immediately apologized to the driver, who refused to accept his apology,
stating that he was firmly instructed by his boss to demand payment for the amount of the damage.
Bayon, however, pleads for mercy,
since he barely has enough to feed his family and could not afford to pay for the damage.
A traffic enforcer arrived at the same time that the owner of the luxury vehicle, Atty. Tranny, alighted.
Atty. Tranny got impatient with the lengthy discussion of Bayon and his driver,
and shouted that he will be late for his hearing.
Bayon continued to plead, which led to Atty. Tranny snapping and saying: “I am an attorney de campanilla!
No one goes around bumping my car and wasting my time! Pay for the damages!
My insurer will contact you.” They left immediately thereafter.
The traffic enforcer prodded Bayon to file a case against Atty. Tranny hoping that it could prevent the lawyer from
demanding him payment, which he did with the assistance of the traffic enforcer.
Asked to answer, Atty. Tranny explained that whatever he did, he did it in the heat of the moment,
as he was running late for a crucial hearing, but apologized to Bayon and offered to settle the same.

Decide the case.

Atty. Tranny violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 7 of Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers not to engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, whether in public or private life,
and not to behave in a scandalous manner to discredit the profession.
Applying the foregoing rule, Atty. Tranny’s words confirm such character and potential to abuse the profession
as a tool for bullying, harassment, and discrimination.
It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of the nobility of the profession.
As officers of the court and the law, lawyers are granted privilege to serve the public, not bully them into submission.
Considering however his apology and willingness to settle, the same may be considered in deciding his penalty.
(Ricafort v. Medina, A.C. No. 5179, 31 May 2016).
Nonetheless, the Code of Professional Responsibility was violated by Atty. Tranny.
In a case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s permission to leave while the trial
was ongoing, respondent Judge declared in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused,
as the latter had an important appointment to attend.

Can the judge be penalized? Explain.

Yes. A judge may be penalized due to impropriety if during the hearing of a case, where a party stepped out of the
courtroom to take a call and exited through the door used by the judge and the employees of the court,
and the judge suddenly explained that the party ha to excuse himself for an important appointment.
Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. (Canon 4).
The above provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing acts of impropriety,
but even acts that have the appearance of impropriety.
This is because appearance is as important as reality in the performance of judicial functions.
A judge — like Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but must also be above suspicion.
(Dionisio v. Escañ o, 362 Phil. 46 [1999]).
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality,
which may erode the people's faith in the Judiciary.
(Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692
[Antonio Rosete v. Securities and Exchange Commission], 586 Phil. 321 [2008]).
Members of the Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their conduct, and should be free from any
appearance of impropriety in the discharge of their official duties, as well as in their personal behavior and everyday life.
(Ladignon v. Garong, 584 Phil. 352 [2008]; Ascano, Jr., et al. v. Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405,
January 12, 2015).
During the hearing of the election protest involving his brother, Judge Dojillo sat beside the counsel of his brother and
actively coached, aided, assisted, and guided the counsel, including whispering and passing notes during the hearing.
When asked to comment, Judge Dojillo claimed that he was there to observe how an election protest is being
conducted, inasmuch as he has never conducted one and to give moral support to his brother.

Can Judge Dojillo be held liable administratively?

Yes.
Judges must avoid not only impropriety but mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge,
should bear in mind that he is called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the judiciary.
The fact that neither the complainant nor his counsel objected to the presence of respondent during the hearing is
immaterial.
(See Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, AM MTJ-05-1591, July 14, 2005).
May a judge who raised his voice and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to party litigants or witnesses be
penalized? Explain.
Yes, for failure to conduct himself in accordance with the mandate of Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary, (A.M. NO. 03-05-01-SC [2004]) which provides that:
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to his court,
(De la Cruz v. Carretas, 559 Phil. 5 (2007) citing Retuya v. Equipilag, 180 Phil. 335 [1979]), viz:

It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer, litigant or witness.

The act betrays lack of patience, prudence and restraint.
Thus, a judge must at all times be temperate in his language.
He must choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost care and sufficient control.
The wise and just man is esteemed for his discernment.
Pleasing speech increases his persuasiveness.
(Ascano, Jr., et al. v. Judge Jose Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015).
K received a copy of a complaint filed against her for collection of sum of money.
K immediately contacted her lawyer-friend, X, regarding this matter and relayed to X that the allegations in the
complaint are false and completely baseless.
In fact, the facts were reversed and K should be the one filing the complaint.
Outraged with the atrocity of the circumstances and the difficulty his friend is going through,
X, in a strongly worded Answer, pointed out these false and malicious allegations,
calling complainant and counsel as sly manipulators of truth.
Complainant and counsel then filed an administrative complaint against X, for use of abusive language.
X, in his Answer, argued that his statements are true, and he was merely constrained to use such language,
because of the counsel’s actions, which are in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Decide.
X violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer shall not, in his/her professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise improper
(Rule 8.01, Canon 8, Code of Professional Responsibility).
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public of private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession
(Rule 7.03, Canon 7, Code of Professional Conduct).
A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and
in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.
A lawyer’s arguments should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel.
Calling complainant and counsel “sly manipulators of truth” hardly measures to the sobriety of speech
demanded of a lawyer
(Heuysuwan-Florido v. Florido, 465 Phil. 1 [2004]).
Thus, X must be held liable for the unethical conduct.
After a judicial audit in the court where the judge was assigned, the following were found:
1) The judge indiscriminately dismissed criminal case despite finding probable cause and even if they were
already set for pre-trial;
2) He decided actions for nullity of marriages prematurely;
3) He granted bail in non-bailable cases without hearing on petition for bail.

The judge in the administrative case never denied such acts and even apologized for the procedural lapses.

Is he guilty of serious misconduct? Explain.

Yes. It is settled that, unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, the respondent judge may not be administratively liable for gross misconduct,
ignorance of the law, or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases (Andrada v. Judge Banzon, 592 Phil. 229, 233-234 [2008]).
However, when the inefficiency springs from a failure to recognize such a basic and fundamental rule, law, or principle,
the judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title vested upon him, or he is too vicious that he
deliberately committed the oversight or omission in bad faith and in grave abuse of authority
(DOJ v. Judge Mislang, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2369 and A.M. No. RTJ-14-2372, July 26, 2016, 798 SCRA 225, 235).
Here, the attendant circumstances would reveal that Judge Salise's acts contradict any claim of good faith.
Although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary actions for every erroneous order or decision he issues,
that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives.
If judges wantonly misuse the powers granted to them by the law, there will be, not only confusion in the administration of
justice, but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements under the law and established rules.
For repeatedly and deliberately committing irregularities in the disposition of his cases, thereby manifesting corrupt
inclinations, Judge Salise can be said to have misused said powers
(OCA v. Judge Hector Salise, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514, January 30, 2018).
What are the Constitutional safeguards to ensure the independence of the Judiciary?
The following are the Constitutional safeguards to ensure the independence of the Judiciary.
1) The Supreme Court is a constitutional body, it cannot be abolished by the Legislature;
2) The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment;

3) The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction,
its appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice or concurrence;
4) The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel;
5) The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts;
6) The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure;
7) The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial
or administrative functions;
8) Salaries of judges may not be reduced, the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy.

(See Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2015 edition, p. 380).

Atty. Jorge Sebastian was retained by Dominga Cruz to recover a parcel of land in Manila from illegal settlers.
Per agreement, she gave the lawyer P50,000.00 as acceptance fee, and P25,000.00 a month later.
She subsequently gave him P50,000.00 as deposit to cover expenses of the suit.
Another month later, the lawyer borrowed another P200,000.00 from the client in the form of a cash advance for his wife’s
hospitalization, to be charged against his future appearance fees.
The client agreed to give him a cash advance of P100,000.00, and another P100,000.00 as cash assistance to this wife.
In return, the client inquired about the status of the case, and the lawyer sent her a copy of the complaint for ejectment filed with
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, with a handwritten docket number.
Thereafter, the client received no report from the lawyer for six months. At the end of such period,
she personally went to the court to inquire about the status of the case.
To her surprise, she was informed that no such complaint had been filed in court,
and the copy given her by her lawyer to her, was fake. She confronted Atty. Sebastian about it,
and he lawyer blamed his messenger for the non-filing of the complaint he allegedly prepared.
She had another complaint filed through another lawyer, which was also dismissed due to late filing.
She filed a disbarment case against Atty. Sebastian wherein she also demanded the return of the P50,000.00 acceptance fee,
P50,000.00 for deposit fee, and the P100,000.00 loan.

Decide the case.

For non-filing of the complaint for ejectment within the reglementary period, which resulted in the dismissal of the complaint,
and for the alleged filing of a complaint which even had a handwritten case number,
Atty. Sebastian deserves to be disbarred.
He should also be ordered to return the amount of P50,000.00 he received as acceptance fee and P50,000.00 as deposit,
because he rendered no service his client at all, but she cannot recover the P100,000.00 loan, because the sole from in a
disbarment case is the moral character of the lawyer.
(Rosalie P. Domingo vs. Atty. Jorge C. Sacdalan, A.C. No. 12475, March 26, 2019)
State the quantum of evidence to prove gross misconduct, ignorance of the law.
Explain.
To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the
exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption,
malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice.
The judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties
that his decision will be just. The litigants arc entitled to no less than that.
They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice.
They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all.
They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the Justice they expect
(Lai v. People, 762 Phil. 434, 443 [2015]; See also: OCA v. Judge Hector Salise, A.M. No. RTJ-18-2514, January 30, 2018).
Atty. Juan de la Cruz was the counsel for his son Benjamin who was accused of murder in the RTC of Ozamis City.
One day, he appeared before the said court for the approval of a bail bond in the amount of P200,000.00
for the temporary release of his son. He presented an order of release said to have been signed by the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Cagayan de Oro City, and the bail bond itself, with the alleged signature of the Presiding Judge of the said court.
At that time, the accused was detained in Cagayan de Oro City. On the strength of the said documents,
the presiding judge of the Ozamis RTC approved the bail bond and issued the order of release.
Not long after, the presiding judge of the Ozamis court received word from the presiding judge of the Cagayan de Oro court, that it
did not receive any bail bond for Atty. de la Cruz’s son and it did not issue any order for his temporary release.
In fact, murder is a non-bailable offense. The Ozamis judge filed an administrative complaint against Atty. de la Cruz
with the IBP.

How should the IBP rule on the matter?

The circumstances are such as to produce the conclusion that Atty. dela Cruz had conceptualized,
planned and implemented the falsification of the bond for the temporary release of his son.
As counsel for his son, he very well knew that the offense charges is non-bailable.
He knew that no petition for bail could have been filed with the court, but a false petition for release and order of release were
produced. (Judge Nimfa P. Sitaca vs. Atty. Diego M/ Palomares, Jr AC No. 5285, August 14, 2019.
May a judge be sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law for recalling a judgment of acquittal?
Explain.
Yes. Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to
correct errors which are clerical in· nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive
portion or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial.
A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.
In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation.
It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order
reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend
to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision.

Applying the aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same day.
As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and judicial developments,
more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal
without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law
(Argel v. Judge Pascua, 415 Phil. 608 [2001]; People v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 223099, January 11, 2018, Tijam, J).
Atty. Lucas Mondragon accepts cases for declaration of nullity of marriage provided that the plaintiff will establish residence for
at least six months in the municipality of Vallehermoso, Benguet Province, and the judge is a “friendly judge”, and the client will
pay him a P250,000.00 acceptance fee and P250,000.00 success fee. The truth is that he has an arrangement with the Clerk of
Court, whereby the latter inserts a favorable decision in the Book of Judgments of the court, for the price of P200,000.00.

Does this constitute a valid practice or not?

This is definitely not a valid practice.
It involves the creation of a false residence in Vallehermoso so that the case can fall under a “friendly judge”.
This is forumshopping. Sharing the attorney’s fees with the Clerk of Court is definitely bribery.
(Vicente Ferrer A. Billanes vs. Atty. Leo Latido, A.C. No. 1066, August 28, 2018)
Respondent was subjected to a quo warranto proceeding before the SC basically questioning her eligibility
for the position of Chief Justice.
She refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the SC but opted to defend herself in public through speeches and
interviews, discussing the merits of the case making comments thereon to vilify the members of Congress,
cast aspersions of the impartiality of the SC, degrade the faith of the people in the judiciary and falsely impute ill
motives against the government that it was orchestrating the charges against her.
In her answer, she argued among others:
(1)Respondent contends that she should not be judged on the stringent standards set forth in the CPR and the
NCJC, emphasizing that her participation in the quo warranto case is not as counsel or a judge
but as a party-litigant.
(2) The imputed acts against respondent did not create any serious and imminent threat to the administration of
justice to warrant the Court's exercise of its power of contempt in accordance with the "clear and present danger"
rule. Respondent avers that she cannot be faulted for the attention that the quo warranto case gained from the
public considering that it is a controversial case, which involves issues of transcendental importance.
(3) Assuming arguendo that the CPR and the NCJC apply, respondent argues that in addressing the matters of
impeachment and quo warranto to the public, she was in fact discharging her duty as a Justice and a lawyer to
uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the law and legal processes pursuant to the said Codes.
(4) Assuming arguendo that respondent violated some provisions of the CPR and the NCJC in her public
statements, the same does not warrant the exercise of the Court's power to discipline in view of the attendant
circumstances, to wit: (a) no less than the Solicitor General repeatedly made personal attacks against her and
publicly discussed the merits of the case, hence, she had to respond to such accusations against her; and (b) she
was not given her right to due process despite her repeated demand.
May respondent be held administratively liable for her actions and public statements as regards the quo warranto
case against her during its pendency?
Yes.
First. The Court cannot subscribe to respondent's position that she was merely a party-litigant in the quo warranto case, not
a counsel nor a judge, hence,
should not be judged on the exacting standards expected of a member of the Bar or of the Court.

The high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing are expected and required of members of the Bar.
Lawyers must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all
times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large.
Lawyers may be disciplined for acts committed even in their private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the
legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.

There can be no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in lawyers' private lives or in their professional
capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.
"Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be
tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in
which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law"
(Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera, 392 Phil. 1, 17 [2000]).

For the same reasons, judges or Justices are held to a higher standard for they should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, and independence, hence, their conduct should be above reproach
(Barrios v. Atty. Martinez, 485 Phil. 1, 14 [2004]; Re: Show Cause Order in The Decision dated May 11, 2018, in G.R. No.
237428 (Rep. v. Sereno, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018, Tijam, J).
Your close friend asked you, a new lawyer, to accompany her in court for the pretrial of her case,
because her counsel of record does not go to court because of fear of the Corona-19 virus,
but you don’t have to enter your appearance formally because she just wants the court to notice that you are
sympathetic to her case.

Will you agree to what she has asked for?

I will not agree to what my friend is asking for, because it might be violative of Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that a lawyer shall not directly or indirectly encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer.
You should not enter your appearance in a case already being handled by another lawyer without his consent,
Especially if you believe that he is not appearing in court in order to enforce payment of his attorney’s fees.
What is a contingent fee agreement,
and what are the requisites for its validity?
A contingency fee agreement has been generally rendered as valid and binding in this jurisdiction.
It is a contract in writing in which the fee, generally a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in an action,
is made to depend upon the success of the case. The terms of the contingency fee contract depends largely upon the
reasonableness of the amount fixed as the amount as contingent fee under the circumstances of the case.
Canon 13 of the CPE states that a contract for a contingent fee, when sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation,
but should always be subject to the supervision of the court as to its reasonableness.
A separate contingency fee for the appeal before the RTC and another separate fee for the appeal before the CA is clearly
unreasonable, unjustified and unconscionable.
(Jose Antonio G. Gabucan vs. Atty. Florencio A. Narido, Jr., A.C. No. 12010, Sept.3, 2019)
Respondent argued that the public statements attributed to her must have created a serious and imminent threat
to the administration of justice to warrant punishment.
According to respondent, the public utterances in question did not create such effect of a serious and imminent
threat to the administration of justice; did not, in any way, prevent or delay the Court from rendering its judgment;
and criticism and public reaction remained within the bounds of proper debate and despite widespread dissent,
no violent protest erupted after the decision was promulgated.
Further, respondent averred that considering that the quo warranto case in itself was already controversial and of
transcendental importance, her public statements and actions cannot be blamed for the natural attention that it
gained from the public.

Did she violate the sub judice rule?

Yes. Sub Judice is a Latin term which refers to matters under or before a judge or court;
or matters under judicial consideration.
In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending judicial proceedings.
The restriction applies to litigants and witnesses, the public in general,
and most especially to members of the Bar and the Bench.
Discussions regarding sub Judice often relates to contempt of court.
In this regard, respondent correctly pointed out that the "clear and present danger" rule should be applied in determining
whether, in a particular situation, the court's contempt power should be exercised to maintain the independence and
integrity of the Judiciary, or the Constitutionally-protected freedom of speech should be upheld.
Indeed, in P/Supt. Marantan v. Atty. Diokno, et al., 726 Phil. 642 [2014], the Court explained:
The sub Judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging
the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature.

This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially;
it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.
Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it
(Re: Show Cause Order in The Decision dated May 11, 2018, in G.R. No. 237428
(Rep. v. Sereno, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018, Tijam, J).
From the foregoing, respondent may be correct in arguing that there must exist a "clear and present danger" to the
administration of justice for statements or utterances covered by the sub Judice rule to be considered punishable under the
rules of contempt.
What is the practice of “ambulance chasing” and
why should a lawyer avoid it?
Ambulance chasing is the practice of convincing victims of accidents to file cases for damages, whether valid or not.
The practice can lead to the filing of false claims and clogging of the dockets of the courts.
It can lead to bribery and false testimony. It can lead to the wrong notion that the practice of law is just for the purpose of
making money, and not for the promotion of justice.
How may the sub judice rule be dealt with? Explain.
Actions in violation of the sub Judice rule may be dealt with not only through contempt proceedings
but also through administrative actions.
This is because a lawyer’s speech is subject to greater regulation for two significant reasons:
one, because of the lawyer's relationship to the judicial process; and
two, the significant dangers that a lawyer's speech poses to the trial process

(Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida v. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11, 2018, citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)).

Hence, the Court En Banc resolved to treat this matter in this separate administrative action.
Indeed, the Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of proceeding, aimed to purge the
law profession of unworthy members of the Bar and to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession
(Re: Show Cause Order in The Decision dated May 11, 2018, in G.R. No. 237428 (Rep. v. Sereno, A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC,
July 17, 2018, Tijam, J).
Atty. Baltazar Buendia found guilty of having notarized documents with an expired license,
for which he was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
However, during that year, he was found to have filed pleadings in courts in distant municipalities.
The IBP recommended that he be suspended for another year for unauthorized practice of law.
However, it was found out that the Supreme Court has already imposed the ultimate penalty
of disbarment on Atty. Buendia in another case.

Can the penalty of suspension still be imposed on him?

“The penalty of additional six months suspension from the practice of law can no longer be imposed upon him.
The reason is obvious. Once a lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be imposed regarding his privilege to practice
law. But while the Court can no longer impose the penalty upon the disbarred lawyer,
it can still give the corresponding penalty only for this purpose of recording it in his personal file with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) which should be taken into consideration in the event that,
the disbarred lawyer subsequently file a petition to lift his disbarment.”
(Fe Eufemia E. Valmonte vs, Atty. Jose C. Quesada, A.C. No. 12487, December 4, 2019)