LABOUR LAW-I

Course Coordinator
Dr. Jagdish Khobragade
Assistant Professor of Law

MAHARASHTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NAGPUR

 Strike and Lockout
Origin: The word ‘strike’ is derived from an old English word ‘Strican’ meaning, thereby
‘to go away’.

Historical Background of Strike

1.Journey Men Printers, New York in 1776

2.Several strikes in UK and first recorded strike was Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants

3.The Empress Mill, Nagpur, 1877

4.Buckingham Carnatika Mills 1918

Meaning and definition of strike

As per Cambridge Dictionary “Strike is to refuse to continue working because of an argument

with an employer about working conditions, pay levels, or job losses”

General Meaning

A strike is a powerful weapon used by trade unions or other associations or workers to put
across their demands or grievances by employers or management of industries. In another
way, it is the stoppage of work caused by the mass refusal in response to grievances.
Workers put pressure on the employers by refusal to work till fulfilment of their demands.
Strikes may be fruitful for workers’ welfare or it may cause economic loss to the country.

Statutory Definition of Strike

Section 2 (q) " strike" means a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any
industry acting in combination or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common
understanding, of any number of persons who are or have been so employed to continue to
work or to accept employment.
Essential Elements of Strike

1. There should be cessation of work or refusal to work.

2. There should be involvement of body of workmen

3. Workmen should be acting in combination or it should be a concerted

refusal.

4. The workmen should be employed in the industry and

Judicial Interpretation of expression “ Strike”
1.Shamnagar Jute Factory v. Their Workmen, (1950) LLJ 235(IT)
. It was held that the expression concerted action indicates that it has been planned,
arranged, adjudicated or agreed on and settled between the parties acting together pursuant to
some design or scheme.
2. D. N. Banerji vs P. R. Mukherjee,AIR 1953 SC 58
The length of the duration of the concerted action is immaterial.
3. Standard Vacuum Oil Company, Madias Versus Gunaseelen, M.G., and others. (1954 )
2 LLJ 656
Industrial Disputes Act, S.2(q) and Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, S.
22 — Strike — Meaning of — “May Day” celebrations — Demand by workmen for declaring
May Day to be holiday while offering to work on some other holiday — Notification by Central
Government requesting the employers in general to declare “May Day” as holiday with
compensatory working day — Said demand by workmen negatived by employer — Workmen
having casual leave to their credit applying for leave en bloc and remaining absent on May Day
— Such action by workmen if amounts to “strike” within the meaning of S. 2(a) of the Act —
Practice in the company to grant casual leave on festival days which are not declared holidays
— Similar companies declaring “May Day” as holiday — Application under S. 22 of the Act for
permission to dismiss the said workmen for being absent without permission, reflected.
Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, Ss. 22 and 23 — Suspension of a workman
pending enquiry into the charges against him and pending the permission of the Tribunal under
S. 22 of the Act, if contravenes S. 23 of the Act.
Types
.
of Strike

1.Pen-down Strike, Sit-down Strike, Stay-in-

Strike or tool-down Strike:-
2.Hunger Strike
3.Go Slow Strike
4.Lightning Strike
5.Sympathetic Strike
6.Work to rule Strike
7.Gherao
 Forms/Types of Strike
1. Pen-down Strike, Sit-down Strike, Stay-in-Strike or tool-down Strike:-

PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK LTD VERSUS THEIR WORKMEN - LNIND 1959 SC 166 AIR 1960 SC
160[1959 2 LLJ 666[1959] 2 LLJ 666[1960] 1 SCR 806LNIND 1959 SC 166

Industrial Disputes Act — Ss. 2 (q), 10 and 23 (b) —Strike—Pen-down strike, if strike within the
meaning of S. 2 (q) of the Act—Mere participation in a peaceful and non-violent pen down strike,
though illegal being in contravention of S. 23 (b) of the Act, if per se operates as a bar to the grant
of relief of reinstatement to such employees—Workers participating in a peaceful pen down strike,
if could be considered to be guilty of civil trespass or criminal trespass within the meaning of S.
441 of Indian Penal Code?
Employer dismissing number of employees from service for participation in an illegal pen-down strike
—Industrial dispute relating to dismissal of such employees, referred for adjudication—On the
evidence on record some of such employees found guilty and responsible for publishing and
issuing documents and circulars subversive of discipline—On the evidence on record, the tribunal
also finding that the strike though illegal was peaceful and nonviolent—Workers who merely
participated in such peaceful and non-violent strike, directed to be reinstated—Relief of
reinstatement refused in so far as the employees who were found directly responsible for issuing
circulars and documents subversive of discipline—The circumstance that the employer has
engaged fresh hands to fill in the vacancies caused by the dismissal of some workmen and where
dismissal is subsequently found to be illegal or unjustified and void, if and how far relevant to the
grant of relief of reinstatement to the concerned workmen—Pen-down strike, if per se and by itself
unjustified.
2. Hunger strike:

Katona Colliery Of Western Coalfields Ltdv.Central Government Industrial

Tribunal Cum Labour Court, (1978) Lab.IC 1531 ( MP High Court)
The Tribunal has first said that hunger strike is not a strike within the meaning of S. 2 (q) of the Act as
it is resorted to for self-purifications. We do not accept this view as correct. "strike" is defined to mean
" a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination, or a
concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding, of any number of persons who are or
hive been so employed to continue to work or to accept employment. " if hunger strike is not simply
refraining from taking food but is also accompanied by cessation of work by a body of persons
employed in any industry, the same would obviously come within the definition of strike. The tribunal
has, further, held that even assuming that hunger strike amounts to strike the strike in the instant case
was not an illegal strike within S. 22 of the Act.

Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd vs Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor, AIR 1956 SC 84

Held, there should be industrial dispute before there can be reference Fact that
industry has been closed can have no effect Reference of dispute by Govt. was
correct Object to offer share of profit was to disarm opposition of workmen and
get machinery dismantled Workmen did not cooperate No concluded agreement
between parties Not binding on appellant to give workmen share of profit Appeal
allowed.
3. Go Slow Strike:

M/S. Sasa Musa Sugar Works (P) Ltd vs Shobrati Khan And Others, AIR 1959 SC 923,
Employment & Labour Law—Misconduct—Suspension—Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—Sections 33
and 33A—Dispute arose between Workmen/Respondent and management of Appellant—During
pendency of proceedings, management issued notices of its workmen and suspended them for
leading part in protracted go-slow in contravention of Act—Appellant thereafter filed application under
Section 33 of Act for permission to dismissed said Workmen—Workmen meantime filed application
under Section 33A of Act and alleging breach of Section 33 of Act by management in suspending
them by way of punishment—Both applications were dismissed by Tribunal—On appeals, Appellate
Tribunal allowed workmen to withdraw their appeal as well as dismissed appeal of management that
suspension ordered was substantive punishment since notices did not state that it was pending
enquiry—Whether Appellate Tribunal erred in holding that suspension was punishment.
Held, it was not open to Tribunal when it was asked to give permission to dismiss to substitute some
other kind of punishment and give permission for that—Tribunal was satisfied that there was
misconduct and that finding had been upheld by Appellate Tribunal—As such if there was evidence
that forty-eight workmen were guilty of misconduct, Tribunal was bound to accord permission asked
for—Court could not agree with Appellate Tribunal that suspension was substantive punishment and
was not an interim order pending enquiry and proceedings before Tribunal under Section 33 of Act—It
was quite clear that suspension was not punishment but was an interim measure pending enquiry and
proceedings before Tribunal—Finding of Tribunal on basis of which application under Section 33-A of
Act was dismissed and finding stood confirmed when workmen withdrew their appeal with respect to
their application under Section 33-A of Act—Appellate Tribunal therefore was clearly in error in holding
that suspension was punishment—Finding that there was no evidence against sixteen workmen was
patently perverse, for there was same evidence against them as against remaining thirty-two—Set
aside orders of two Tribunals so far as applications under Section 33 of Act were concerned and grant
Appellant permission sought for by it in these applications subject to workmen being paid all their
wages during period of suspension up to date of award of Tribunal—Appeal allowed.

M/S. Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd vs Shri Jai Singh,(1961) 2LLJ 644(SC)
4. Lightning Strike or Wildcat Strike:
A situation where employees stop work suddenly and without warning because
of a disagreement with their employer about job conditions, job losses, pay, etc.
A sudden strike (= act of refusing to work as a protest) without any warning by
the workers and often without the official support of the unions.

Sadul Textile Mills Ltd. vs Workmen Of Sadul Textile Mills And others AIR
1958 Raj 202, (1958) IILLJ 628 Raj.

Dismissal — Dismissal for misconduct — Strike — Under the standing orders of

a concern striking work either singly or with other operatives without giving
fourteen days? previous notice made punishable with summary dismissal or
suspension — Workers participating in such strike, if could claim wages for the
strike period on the ground that strike was justified — Stay -in-strike — Peaceful
stay-in-strike even for reasonable grievance, if justified — Workers, participating
in such strike, if entitled to any wages for the strike period — The question as to
whether a strike is justified or not in any given case, if a pure question of fact. It
is subject matter of judicial interpretation.
5. Work to rule:

Work-to-rule is a job action in which employees do no more than the minimum

required by the rules of their contract, and precisely follow all safety or other
regulations, which may cause a slowdown or decrease in productivity, as they
are no longer working during breaks or during unpaid extended hours and
weekends (checking email, for instance).Such an action is considered less
disruptive than a strike or lockout, and obeying the rules is less susceptible to
disciplinary action.
Notable examples have included nurses refusing to answer telephones,
teachers refusing to work for free at night and during weekends and holidays,
and police officers refusing to issue citations. Refusal to work overtime, travel on
duty, or sign up to other tasks requiring employee assent are other
manifestations of using work-to-rule as industrial action.

It is not covered under the definition of strike.

6. Sympathetic Strike:

Kambalingan v. Indian Metal and Metallurgical Corporation 1964 (1) LLJ

SC81.

The Supreme Court examined the issue on the basis of the essential ingredients
of strike and held that the workmen resorting to sympathetic strike do not have
any grievance of their own in relation to their employment or even regard to the
conditions of service and the element of mens rea i.e. the mental element on the
part of the strikes is not there to pressurize the employer..
Therefore, it is not strike under Section 2 (q) the definition of strike.
7. Gherao.

JAY ENGINEERING WORKS LTD VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL &

OTHERS LNIND 1967 CAL 171
The term gherao is interpreted in this case.

Procedure—Validity of Circulars—Indian Penal Code—Section 447—Whether,

two circulars issued on behalf of Government were competent—Held, impugned
circulars held to be lawful—Respondents Nos. 6 and 7 failed to perform their
duties in obedience to two impugned circulars—Respondents Nos. 6 and 7
failed to discharge duties imposed upon them by law and this failure must be
held to have been induced by directions and instructions in two impugned
circulars—Charges of violation of provisions of IPC and other statutes as
practised in this case must be held to be unlawful—Question that Respondents
workmen were guilty of charges and as such punishable must be determined in
other proceedings and in other forums.
Thus it may be concluded that the gherao as long as it is remaining peaceful
and simple may not amount to criminal offence as the criminal law did not
prescribed it as much. But if gherao is accompanied by wrongful confinement,
violence, assault, trespass or mischief to the person gheraoed it is criminal
offence.
Bandh Under Industrial Disputes Act

1.The Meaning of Bandh

2.Bandh is illegal and Unconstitutional
BHARAT KUMAR VERSUS STATE OF KERALA LNIND 1997 KER 212
We are of the view that this court has sufficient jurisdiction to declare that the calling of
a’bundh’ and the holding of it, is unconstitutional especially since, it is undoubted, that the
holding of ’bundhs’ are not in the interests of the Nation, but tend to retard the progress of the
Nation by leading to national loss of production. We cannot also ignore the destruction of
public and private property when a bundh is enforced by the political parties or other
organizations. We are inclined to the view that the political parties and the organizations
which call for such bundhs and enforce them are really liable to compensate the
Government, the public and the private citizen for the loss suffered by them for such
destruction. The State cannot shirk its responsibility of taking steps to recoup and of
recouping the loss from the sponsors and organizers of such bundhs. We think, that these
aspects justify our intervention under , Art.226 of the Constitution , In view of our discussion
above, we allow these Original Petitions to the extent of declaring that the calling for a bundh
by any association, organization or political party and the enforcing of that call by it, is illegal
and unconstitutional. We direct the State and its officials, including the law enforcement
agencies, to do all that is necessary to give effect to this declaration. The Original Petitions
are allowed to the above extent We make no order as to costs.

T.K. Rangarajan vs Government Of Tamil Nadu & Others, 2003 SCC (L&S) 970.
Right to Strike Not fundamental Right

All India Bank Employees vs National Industrial Tribunal & others AIR1962
SC 171, 1962 SCR (3) 269
Held: that s. 34-A of the. Banking Companies Act, 1949, was constitutionally valid
and did not and either Art. 19(1)(c) or Art. 14 of the Constitution. The right
guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution does not carry with it a concomitant
right that unions formed for protecting the interests of labour shall achieve their
object such that any interference to such achievement by any law would be
unconstitutional unless it could be justified, under Art. 19(4) as being in the'
interests of Public order or morality.
The right under Art. 19(1)(c) extends only to the formation of an association or
union and insofar as the activities of the association or union are concerned or as
regards the steps which the union might take to achieve, its object, they are
subject to such laws as, may be framed and such laws cannot be, tested under Art.
19(4).
Right to Strike Not fundamental Right

B.R. Singh & Ors. Etc. Etc vs Union Of India &-Ors AIR 1990 SC1, 1989 SCR
Supl. (1) 257.
HELD: The right to form association or Unions is a fundamental right under Article
19(1)(c) of the Constitution. The necessity to form unions is obviously for voicing
the demands and grievances of labour. The trade unionists act as mouthpieces of
labour, Strike in a given situation is only a form of demonstration, e.g. go-slow. sit-
in-work to rule absentism etc. Strike is one such mode of demonstration by
workers for their rights. The right to demonstrate and, therefore, the right to strike
is an important weapon in the armoury of the workers. This right is recognised by
almost all Democratic Countries. But the right to strike is not absolute under our
industrial jurisprudence and restrictions have been placed on it by section 10(3),
10A (4A), 22 and 23 the Industrial Disputes Act. These provisions, however, have
no application to the present case since it is no body's contention that the Union's
demands had been referred to any forum under the statute. Though there were
angry protests and efforts to obstruct the officers from entering the precincts
of TFAI there was no convincing evidence of use of force of violence.
Lockout

Lockout is an act of employer. Lock-out means to "to shut or to close" Prior 1860
Lockout was known as "turn off" Lockout is an effective and widely recognized
weapon in the hands of employers. It is the antithesis of Strike.

Section 2 (l) "lock-out "means the [temporary closing of a place of employment], or

the suspension of work, or the refusal by an employer to continue to employ any
number of persons employed by him.

Essentials of Lockout

To constitute Lockout, the Following conditions are to be satisfied.

(i) Temporary closing of a place of employment by the employer or

(ii) or the suspension of work by the employer, or

(iii) refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of persons

employed by him.
Judicial Response

KAIRBETTA ESTATE KOTAGIRI VERSUS RAJAMANICKAM AND OTHERS,

AIR 1960 SC 893.

Industrial Disputes Act, Ss.2 (kkk) . 2 (1), 250 to 25E and 330 (2) —Lay-off and
lockout—Distinction between, explained—Expression any other reason in the
definition of lay-off in S 2 (kkk) of the Act, if should be construed to mean reason
similar or analogous to the preceding reasons specified in the definition—Lockout if
amounts to lay off as defined in S. 2(kkk) —Workmen not given employment on
account of lockout, if entitled to claim lay-off compensation by filing an application
under S. 33C of the Act.
LAKSHMI DEVI SUGAR MILLS LTD VERSUS RAM SARUP AND OTHERS -
AIR1957 SC 82
Held: A lockout is neither an alteration of conditions of service to the prejudice of the
workmen within the meaning of Cl. (a ) nor a discharge or punishment whether by dismissal
or otherwise of the workmen within the meaning of Cl. (b ) of S. 33 of the Industrial Disputes
Act or S. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, and therefore no permission
of the conciliation officer, board or tribunal as the case may be, would be necessary to be
obtained before a lockout could be declared. Suspension without pay pending departmental
enquiry as also pending permission of the tribunal under relevant section [ S. 33 of the
Industrial Disputes Act or S. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act] could not
be considered a punishment as such suspension without payment would only be an interim
measure and would last till the application for permission to punish the workman is made and
the tribunal has passed orders thereupon. If the permission is accorded the workman would
not be paid during the period of suspension but if the permission is refused he would have to
be paid for the whole period of suspension There is nothing like a contingent punishment of a
workman and therefore such suspension could not be deemed to be a punishment of the
workman at all.
Suspension without pay even for an indefinite period pending enquiry or pending per mission
of the appropriate tribunal to dismiss the workman could not be held to be punishment which
would require permission of the tribunal before the same could be meted out to the workman.
The scope of the enquiry before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under S. 22 of the Industrial
Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act has been decided in ; and .
Feroz Din And Others Versus State of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 363

Industrial Disputes Act (XIV of 1947), section 27 —Scope— Section 2(1) —Lock-
out—If includes discharge.

Held: The words refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of

persons employed by him in section 2(l) of the Industrial Disputes Act do not
include the discharge of an employee. The word lockout means a refusal on the
part of an employer to furnish work to his operatives, except on conditions to be
accepted by the latter collectively. Section 27 of the Industrial Disputes Act
provides that a person who instigates or incites others to take part in, or otherwise
acts in furtherance of a strike, which is illegal under the Act, commits an offence.
As the discharge of the employees in the instant case cannot be included in the
definition of lockout. A strike declared in consequence of the discharge will be
illegal and persons instigating the strike will be liable under , section 27 of the Act.
#how to
write?