The Chernobyl

Incident
By Nandhanasai
8P8-A1
Contents
• Background
• Accident
• Reactor Shutdown and Steam excursions
• Steam explosions
• Aftermath
• Important Points
Background
• Reactor cooling after shutdown
• Decay Heat
• Decay heat is the heat released as a result of radioactive decay.
• RMBK Reactors Reactor decay heat shown as % of thermal
power from time of sustained fission
• Coolant – Water shutdown using two different correlations.
• Safety Test
• Test Preparation:
• Prior to scheduled reactor shutdown
• RMBK thermal power to be reduced
• Steam-Turbine generator to be run at normal operating speed
• 1 Half of the main circulating pumps were to be supplied with off-site power where the other
Half would be powered by the turbine
• Electrical test: Process flow diagram of the reactor
• When correct conditions were achieved, Steam supply to the power generator was to be
turned off
• The voltage provided by the coasting turbine would be measured, along with the voltage and
RPMs of the four main circulating pumps being powered by the turbine.
• When the emergency generators supplied full electrical power, the turbine generator would
be allowed to continue free-wheeling down
 The Accident
• Test Execution:
• The Test commenced on 01:23:04
• Reactor Shutdown and Power Excursion:
• At 01:23:40, as recorded by the SKALA centralized control system,
a scram (emergency shutdown) of the reactor was initiated. Plan view of reactor No. 4
• Within three seconds of the insertion of the control rods the reactor output rose
core.
above 530 MW
• Steam Explosions:
The reactor lid (upper biological
shield) nicknamed "Elena" with torn
off fuel channel piping is shown
lying on its side where it came to rest
in the explosion crater. The view
transitions to showing the relative
position of the paired steam tanks,
reactor hall floor and roof trusses
overlaid on the explosion crater.
Design Flaw
Aftermath of the
incident
• INSAG-7 Report
• Control Rod design
• Void co-efficient:
• The reactor had a dangerously large positive void coefficient
of reactivity.
• Management and operational deficiencies:
• The plant was not designed to safety standards in effect and incorporated
unsafe features
• "Inadequate safety analysis" was performed
• There was "insufficient attention to independent safety review“
• "Operating procedures not founded satisfactorily in safety analysis“
• Safety information not adequately and effectively communicated between
operators, and between operators and designers
• The operators did not adequately understand safety aspects of the plant
• Operators did not sufficiently respect formal requirements of operational
and test procedures
• The regulatory regime was insufficient to effectively counter pressures for
production
• There was a "general lack of safety culture in nuclear matters at the
national level as well as locally"
Thank you