Structural theory/ Neo-realism

WEEK 4 LECTURE
Lecture outline:
1. The move to structural theory – neo-realism
3. Neo-liberal institutionalism (& other strands liberal IR theory)
4. Regimes & institutions
5. Cases: China’s rise

Spare slides - Pandemics and IR theory.

 Kenneth Waltz: ‘Three images’ of international
relations

Explains war via 3 levels of analysis:

• 1st Image: Individuals (leaders or
human nature). E.g. claim that U.S. invaded Iraq
because Saddam Hussein tried to assassinate George
Bush’s father.
• 2nd Image: States’ domestic structure.
E.g. Lenin’s theory of imperialism argues war
arises because capitalist states need new
markets for export of surplus capital.
• 3rd Image: International system – anarchy. E.g.
rivalry between any pair of great powers, like
China and US inevitable.
 Waltz: Systemic Theory

• Systemic theory: • Reductionism:

Explains state action Explains state action
with reference to the with reference to
influence of the attributes of units that
international system make up the system
(3rd image) (1st & 2nd image)
Structural Realism (also called Neorealism)

Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics 1979

• seeks to offer a theoretical account of the international
system that will “say a small number of big and important
things.” (nothing to say about climate change, white supremacy,
patriarchy etc)
• Inattention to (in 1st/2nd images) separates international
relations from the rest of political thought.
• Whereas classical realists often concerned with ethics/morality,
structural realism seeks only to describe.

• “a theory of international politics...can describe the range of likely

outcomes of the actions and interactions of states within a given system
and show how the range of expectations varies as systems change. It can
tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by
systems of different structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how
effectively, the units of a system will respond to those pressures and
possibilities.”
 Structural Realism

• Waltz describes three key elements of the international system’s

structure:
– Ordering principle: “decentralised and anarchic” as against ordered
and hierarchical (in domestic politics there is hierarchy as individuals
are subordinated to the state; the tributary international system
centred on pre-modern China was hierarchical))
– Function: each state ‘must be able to take care of itself since no one
else can be counted on to do so’
– Distribution of capabilities: states have varying levels of power.
International orders are defined by the number of great powers. The
‘polarity’ of the system refers to the number of poles.

Notes
1: Waltz is producing a theory of the international system, not a general account of international
relations (which is what Morgenthau was seeking).
2: Waltz (1979, p 4) rejects the ‘inductivist illusion’ which is ‘the belief that … explanation is achieved
through the accumulation of more and more data’.
3: Whereas Morgenthau thought multipolarity was more stable than bipolarity; Waltz argues the
reverse.
Structural Realism & Balancing

Waltz describes balance of power theory

as built on assumption that states are
unitary actors who seek their own
preservation. He distinguishes between:
– Internal balancing: “moves to increase
economic capability, to increase military
strength, to develop clever strategies”
– External balancing: “moves to
strengthen and enlarge one’s own
alliance or to weaken and shrink an
opposing one”
 Challenges for realism 1:
How precarious is state survival?
 Challenge 2: If Structural Realists viewed the US
invasion of Iraq as a strategic blunder, how come
it happened?
• An unrivalled superpower is
relatively unconstrained by the
international system, so it may do
stupid stuff in response to domestic
priorities.
• Structural realism seeks to explain
the international forces states face,
sometimes state will respond to
these forces illogically.
 Challenge 3: To what extent does structure really
shape state behavior?

• If structure is the key influence on state

behavior, why does so much evidence point
toward states having freedom of choice?
• For example, if the democratic peace thesis is
accurate [the claim that democratic states
never engaged in armed conflict with each
other] doesn’t this demonstrate that structure
is far from determinative?
 Challenge 4: Are realists “westsplaining’ and
ignoring the agency of Eastern Europeans?
• Jan Smoleński, Jan Dutkiewicz: “by focusing almost exclusively on
the wrongs of NATO, critics ignore the broader question of
Eastern European states’ right to self-determination, including
the right to join military alliances. Westsplaining ignores Eastern
European history and the perspective of the Eastern Europeans,
and it selectively omits facts on the ground about NATO
expansion.”
• Westsplainers ideas for how to end the conflict through
compromises “even as Ukrainians on the ground call for active
support—may represent American preferences for avoiding
conflict or opposing NATO rather than those of Ukrainians.”
• “The result is that hard-nosed realists see the world not as it is
but as it appears in their theories and, worse, that Western
internationalism, which claims to stand in solidarity with the
oppressed, does the opposite: It asks the subaltern to speak,
only to ignore them when they ask for military support or self-
determination.”

“https://newrepublic.com/article/165603/carlson-russia-ukraine-
imperialism-nato
 Prisoners dilemma and ‘game theory’
• Structural theorists have often used
mathematical/economic methods. One
of these methods is ‘game theory’ –
this is a theoretical framework for
analysing strategies in competitive
situations where outcomes are
partially shaped by the actions of other
participants.
• a paradigmatic example is the
‘prisoners dilemma game’.
• Prisoner's dilemma-type puzzles were
devised by Merrill Flood and Melvin
Dresher in 1950, as part of the Rand
Corporation's investigation into game
theory and global nuclear strategy.
One product of game theoretical reasoning: Offense/defence
theory

• When defence is easer than offense (or when people believe this
is the case) cooperation is easier.
• If states can distinguish between offensive and defensive
weapons, they can acquire the means to defend themselves
without ratcheting up security dilemma.
• When offense is easier, reverse applies.
• Key theorists: Robert Jervis, George Quester, Steven Van Evera etc
Jervis. 1978. Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics 30: 167-214
Offensive realism:

• John Mearsheimer, outlines a

new strand of ‘offensive
neorealism’ in Tragedy of Great
Power Politics 2001:
– Focuses on great powers (not all
states)
– argues great powers can only
guarantee their survival by
seeking to become regional
hegemons.
– ‘In essence, great powers are
trapped in an iron cage where
they have little choice but to
compete with each other for
power if they hope to survive.’
 Is offensive realism accurate?
• John Mearsheimer (offensive realist) observes: ‘The United States is the
only regional hegemon in modern history, although other states have
fought major wars in pursuit of regional hegemony: imperial Japan in
Northeast Asia, Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Nazi
Germany in Europe. But none succeeded.’

• Jonathan Kirshner argues Mearsheimer fails “to distinguish between

being a hegemon and bidding for hegemony. It may indeed be that ‘the
ideal situation is to be the hegemon in the system.’ But according to his
theory, ‘survival is the number one goal of great powers’ (46). The central
question for a great power mulling a bid for hegemony, therefore, is not
‘If I was the hegemon, will I be more likely to survive?’ It is, ‘If I make a
bid for hegemony, will I be more likely to survive?’
Source: Kirshner, J. (2012). The tragedy of offensive realism: Classical realism and the rise of China. European Journal of International
Relations, 18(1), 53-75
 Defensive realism:

• Most structural realists can be called ‘defensive realists’

as they view international anarchy as less threatening
to state survival.
• Defensive realists argue that states rarely seek to
become hegemons.
• Stephen Walt examines alliance behaviour and argues
states balance against threat not power (e.g. US treats
UK & India differently from Russia & China).

https://www.statista.com/chart/16878/militar
y-expenditure-by-the-us-china-and-russia/
 Stephen Walt on
US Grand Strategy
Grand strategy describes how a nation will deploy its
resources (to achieve security in Realism).

Stephan Walt argues that Realism suggests a US Grand

Strategy of offshore balancing:

“Offshore balancing begins by recognizing that the United

States is the luckiest and most secure great power in
history, for the reasons discussed above. Its primary goal,
therefore, is for the United States to remain the only
great power in the Western hemisphere so that its
citizens do not have to worry about being attacked,
blockaded, or coerced by a nearby rival with comparable
capabilities. For the foreseeable future, this goal will be
easy to achieve. Second, unlike isolationists, offshore
balancers believe three distant regions are worth fighting
to defend: Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf…

When a potential hegemon is present, the United States

should rely on regional actors as the first line of defense
because they have the greatest interest in preventing any
state from dominating them. If possible, in other words,
Washington should ‘pass the buck’ to them. But if the
local powers cannot contain the potential hegemon on
their own, then the United States must do more,
deploying enough firepower to shift the balance in its
favour”
Walt, Stephen M. "US grand strategy after the Cold War: Can realism explain it?
US Defense Spending
Major power defense spending
Neoclassical realism

• Seeks to retain the strengths of structural

analysis but to integrate some elements
of second-level analysis (domestic
factors).
• Argues “systemic pressures are filtered
through intervening domestic variables
to produce foreign policy behaviors”
• “States assess and adapt to changes in their
external environment partly as a result of
their peculiar domestic structures and
political situations”, so policy as much
influenced by unit-level factors as by system
ones.
Source: Schweller, Randall L. "Unanswered threats: A
neoclassical realist theory of
underbalancing." International security 29, no. 2 (2004):
159-201.
 Neoclassical realism
• Argues elites create (false)
myths which suggest that
expansion (e.g. invasion of Iraq,
Ukraine) is necessary for
security. Why?
• Snyder argues that domestic
groups that favour specific
narrow forms of imperial
expansion (e.g. those who will
benefit from military build-ups,
access to foreign resources
markets etc) form domestic
coalitions advocating for
expansionist policy.
Neoclassical realism
Randall Schweller seeks to explain “underbalancing”

Examples of underbalancing:
- none of the great powers except Britain consistently balanced
against Napoleonic France, and none emulated its nation-in-arms
innovation.
- Later in the century, Britain watched passively in splendid isolation
as the North defeated the South in the American Civil War and as
Prussia defeated Austria in 1866, and then France in 1871,
establishing German hegemony over Europe. Bismarck then defied
balance of power logic by cleverly creating an extensive "hub-and-
spoke" alliance system that effectively isolated France and avoided
a counterbalancing coalition against Germany”
- “Likewise, during the 1930s, none of the great powers (i.e., Britain,
France, the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan)
balanced with any sense of urgency against Nazi German”

Why? Schweller argues: “social divisions produce elite fragmentation,

which in turn contributes to underbalancing and policy paralysis”

“Leaders of incoherent states are less willing and able to undertake

high political and policy risks to balance than are leaders of coherent
states.”

Schweller, Randall L. "Unanswered threats: A neoclassical realist theory

of underbalancing." International security 29, no. 2 (2004): 159-201.
 Does Neoclassical Realism align with
historical sociology
• Theda Skocpol’s account of revolution
(France, Russia, China) is connected to the
state’s participation in international conflict
– a “structural perspective”.
• “To explain revolutions…[we must focus]
simultaneously upon the institutionally
determined situations and relations of
groups within society and upon the
interrelations of societies within world-
historically developing international
structures” (Skocpol 1978, p 18)
• Her account of international structure
includes both ‘anarchy’ and capitalism’
• The revolutionary state rationalizes society
(internal balancing?) in order to maximise Theda Skocpol
its competitiveness.
See - Skocpol, Theda. States and social revolutions: A comparative
• during periods of crisis, state elites may analysis of France, Russia and China. Cambridge University Press, 1978.
Skocpol, Theda. Social revolutions in the modern world. Cambridge
implement social reforms, that concede to University Press, 1994
subordinate class demands rather than - Hobden, Stephen. "Theorising the international system: perspectives from
Historical Sociology." Review of International Studies 25, no. 2 (1999): 257-
reflecting the domestic interests of elites. 271
 Liberal critiques of structural theory:
Beth Simmons/ Lisa Martin: International
institutions are both an object of strategic choice &
a constraint on actors’ behaviour.
Key questions is to ask how institutions shape
outcome.
In addition to focus on how regimes/institutions Beth Simmons
create incentives, increase transparency etc, also
asks how international institutions shape domestic
politics (and vice versa)

Source: Martin, Lisa L., and Beth A. Simmons. "Theories and empirical studies of international
institutions." International organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 729-757.
 Neo-Neo debate over relative and absolute
gains
• Joseph Grieco: whereas liberals believe states are
content with an absolute gain (wishing to become
richer/stronger than before), realists say states seek
relative gains (wishing to increase their power
relative to their rivals).
• Realists argue that states will cheat or abandon
cooperative institutions if they think this will serve
their interests/ enhance their power.
• See: Grieco, Joseph, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal. "The relative-gains problem for international
cooperation." American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 729-743
 Realism & China’s Rise:
Hugh White – Australia’s leading realist
• Australia’s alliance with the US needs to
be debated
• As China’s economy grows it will seek to
push the US out of its ‘sphere of
influence’ in East Asia and the Western
Pacific
• The US will likely lack the capacity or will
to defeat China
• The coming decades will be multipolar,
with our region dominated by China,
India and – possibly – Indonesia.
• In this context Australia needs a more
independent and creative defense policy.
 Mearsheimer: Predicted China to become
a military competitor to the United States

• Writing in 2006 “The rise of China ‘has the potential to fundamentally alter the
architecture of the international system. If the Chinese economy continues growing
at a brisk clip in the next few decades, the United States will once again face a
potential peer competitor, and great-power politics will return in full force.”
• Beijing would be making a huge mistake to pick a fight with the U.S. military
nowadays. Contemporary China is constrained by the global balance of power.
• As China’s power grows it will attempt to imitate the United States.

SOURCES: Mearsheimer The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics (concluding chapter) available via
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204 & Mearsheimer, ‘China's Unpeacefu
Rise,’ Current History, April 2006 at http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0051.pdf
 The likely US
reaction:
containment

Mearsheimer: The United States

does not tolerate peer competitors.
As it demonstrated in the twentieth
century, it is determined to remain
the world’s only regional hegemon.
Therefore, the United States can be
expected to go to great lengths to
contain China and ultimately weaken
it to the point where it is no longer
capable of ruling the roost in Asia. In
essence, the United States is likely to
behave towards China much the way
it behaved towards the Soviet Union
during the Cold War.
 China’s military
future

• China will try to push the United States out of the

Asia-Pacific region
• Chinese leaders would like to develop the capability
to push the U.S. Navy beyond the “first island
chain,” which is usually taken to include the Greater
Sunda Islands, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
• There is discussion of eventually pushing the U.S.
Navy beyond the “second island chain,” which runs
from the eastern coast of Japan to Guam and then
down to the Moluccan Islands
• China maintains that it has sovereignty over almost
all of the South China Sea, a claim disputed not only
by its neighbors but by the United States as well.

SOURCES: Mearsheimer The Tragedy of the Great Power

Politics (concluding chapter) available via
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-
rise-peacefully-10204
& Mearsheimer, ‘China's Unpeaceful Rise,’ Current
History, April 2006 at
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0051.pdf
 Conclusion:
Is structural theory still relevant?

• Critique: structural theory ignores many important

features of world politics.
• Ignores elements that are ‘below’ the state, has
limited interest in political economy or cultural factors.
• Acknowledges that its assumption overstates
rationality of states.
• But if structural realism usefully explains a ”few
important things”, such as great power relations, does
it continue to be relevant?