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F. Camerlengo,StateBar No. 50232

GO & JOHNSON
3 Bair Island Road. Ste. 400

woodCity, CA 94063 elephone:(650) 366-2911 ax: (650)365-7981

ilaw.com for Plaintiff

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TINNA GROTZ IN THE LINITED STATESDISTRICTCOURT NORTHENDISTRICTOF CALIFORNIA

STINNA GROTZ, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. CaseNo.

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JURY TRIAL REOUESTED

ER FOUNDATIONHOSPITALS, THE PERMANENTEMEDICAL ROUP.INC.. SEIU-UNITED THCAREWORKERSWEST" Defendants.

Now comesplaintiff Kristinna Grotz who requestsa trial by jury and for her complaint

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inst defendant,allegesas follows:

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1. At all times relevant hereto,plaintiff Kristinna Grotz ("Plaintiff) has residedin San

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County, California, and has been a citizen of the stateof Califomia and the United Statesof

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nca.

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2. On information and belief, at all times relevant hereto,the defendantKaiser Hospitals, Inc. ("KFH") is a California hospital corporation licensedto do businessrn

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stateof California which provides inpatient care to Kaiser Foundation Healthcaremembers.

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Medical Group, Inc. ("TPMG") which is managedand operatedby defendantThe Permanente

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s a physician-ownedprofessionalcorporation, and provides and aranges for medical care for

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Foundation Health plan members.TPMG's main office is located at I Kaiser Plaza,#2600, Alameda County, Califomia. DefendantsKFH and TPMG are collectively referred to as "Employer." 3. During all times relevant hereto,defendantSEIU-United HealthcareWorkers West

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for ("Union"), was the recognizedcollective bargaining representative the admitting ives, including the plaintiff, employed at the Employer's facility in South San Francisco,

JURISDICTION AND VENUE jurisdictionoverthis claim undersection301 of the Labor matter This courthassubject
RelationsAct ("LMRA")(29 USCA $ 185 et seq).

4.

At all times relevant hereto, defendantEmployer was engagedin interstate and at all times mentionedherein, was an employer in an industry affecting corlmerce

and29USCA$142(1), and as defined in gg2(2) 501(l)and(3) ofthe LMRA (29USCA$152(2) of withinthemeaning $301of the LMRA (29 USCA $ 185). 5. in on Venueis properin thisjurisdictionbased the fact thatthe claimsall arose this

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT 6. in Plaintiff wasemployed SanMateoCounty,Californiaandthe unlawfulunion

and wrongful dischargeby the Employer complained of herein all occurred in San Mateo . California.

FACTS RELEVANT TO ALL CLAIMS 7. Employerfor almost9 l/2 by employed defendant Plaintiff KristinnaCtrotzwas

in She beganher employment in February, 2002 andworked as an admitting representative admitting departmentin the Employer's South San Franciscofacility located at 1200 El Camino , South San Francisco,Califomia. At all relevant times, Debbie Taylor was her immediate isor; Taylor servedas the managerof the admitting department.Ms. Taylor in tum reported the admitting director, Diane Keefer. Prior to the eventsdescribedbelow culminating in her

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on July 7,2011, plaintiff had never been disciplined, and had consistentlyreceived isfactory evaluations,and had never filed any previous grievances. 8. Beginning on or about January2008, plaintiff and a number of her coworkers

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increasingly concemedabout the conduct of Ms. Taylor and its impact on the working vironment and the admitting department. Plaintiff and others became aware that Ms. Taylor was dwing the ing and under the influence of illegal drugs, in all likelihood methamphetamine, y. On approximately twelve occasionsduring this time period, plaintiff personally observed Taylor engagedin suspiciousbehavior strongly indicating shewas ingesting, using, and/or the influence of drugs in the workplace. 9. to On October 15,2010, a letter was hand delivered by a union representative a

San FranciscoTPMG Administrator, Martha Gilmore, a member of defendantEmployer's leadership.The letter was signedby plaintiff and six other employeesof the admitting nt. (SeeExhibit 1, accuratecopy of the October 15,2010letter signedby plaintiff and six their employeesincorporatedby this reference.)In this letter, the employeesexpressed to about Ms. Taylor and felt it necessary alert the Employer's senior leadershipof their working conditions, which included a hostile work environment,retaliation, favoritism, and drug use on the part of their manager.The October 15, 2010 letter statedthat the progftrm, and had notified the union and the had already utilized the employeeassistance Regional Corporatecompliance office about theseissues. Permanente

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to On or aboutNovember| , 2010,andin response the October15,2010letter,the

s senior leadershipinitiated an investigation and appointedDiane Keefer and a Human urcesmanager,Alan Burnett, to conduct the investigation. Plaintiff and the other employees initially assuredthat the investigation would be thorough and that the staff would be immune any discipline or retaliation regarding their testimony, which, unfortunately, proved to be

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Thereafter,plaintiff and others were called in one at a time and were interviewed by

Keefer and Mr. Bumett. During her interview, plaintiff informed Ms. Keefer and Mr. Burnett

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abuseproblem in detail. She informed them that shehad Ms. Taylor's ongoing substance ly observedMs. Taylor and anotheremployee,Terry Caballero,an employeefrom another department,in Ms. Taylor's office, with rolled up bills in their nosessnorting a white Plaintiffalso said she was awarethat Ms. Taylor's apparentdrug use had been substance. bservedby at least two other individuals who signedthe October 15, 2010 lefier, Amber Rhodes Janelle Soriano.Plaintiff statedthat shebelieved that Ms. Taylor received most of her drugs other employeeswithin the facility. 12. The investigation by the employer proved to be biasedand a sham.One of the

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nvestigators,Ms. Keefer, was friends with Ms. Taylor, had protectedher, and helped her cover up criminal drug use over many months, andjoined in Ms. Taylor's efforts to intimidate the ff. The Employer'sinvestigationendedby early December2010. On Decembet3,2010, a ing was held with Ms. Keefer, Mr. Bumett, most of the admitting staff, the Employer's senior JoseHernandez. At the meeting, Diane Keefer claimed tp, and a union representative, Ms. Taylor's drug use, and Mr. Burnett addedthere was not was no basisto substantiate evidenceto supportthe allegation that Debbie Taylor used drugs. Both managersignored contrary eyewitnesstestimony of Ms. Taylor's drug use from plaintiff and other staff. 13. Insteadof proceedingwith disciplinary proceedingsagainstMs. Taylor or taking

to to remedial measures addresswhat appeared be her seriousdrug problem, the Employer the matter over to an Employee AssistanceProgram (EAP) counselor.On January27,2011, counselorheld an abortedmeeting with Ms. Taylor, plaintiff and others in the admitting . During that meeting, Debbie Taylor looked plaintiff right in the eye while mouthing words, "You fucking bitch." The EAP counselorquickly closedthe meeting. Only one meeting but place after this abortedmeeting and only the admitting staff was in attendance, not Ms. aylor. In fact, none was ever scheduledagain with Debbie Taylor present.To plaintiffs ledge, Employer did nothing fuither to remedy the hostile working environment or addressthe

26 llegal use of drugs by Taylor and others in the workplace. Instead,plaintiff and the other 27
remainedin constantfear of retaliation by Ms. Taylor and Ms. Keefer, which did not 4

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long to materialize. 14. During this sameNovember-December2}l},timeframe, plaintiff was falsely accusedof threatening"Ms. Taylor and a disciplinary investigation was initiated againstthe plaintiff. The ion lastedapproximately one month and was eventually dropped due to lack of evidence.

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15.

unprofessional On March 16,2011,Ms. Taylorwroteplaintiff up for allegedly

Plaintiff had,in employee. with another involvingplaintiffs interactions uct in the workplace, The with the otheremployee. write up by Ms. duringtheseinteractions actedappropriately
avlor was not basedon facts, containedfalse criticisms, and was retaliatory. Plaintiff thereafter her union her written appealabout this write up. (SeeExhibit 2, acaxate copy of March 19, I I "appeal" letter from plaintiff to Roberto Rivera regarding "Written Letter of Waming, nprofessionalBehavior in the Workplace," incorporatedby this reference.) 16. to After October 15, 2010, plaintiff also noticed that Ms. Taylor appeared be

1 3 bllowing or "shadowing" her in the workplace for no apparentwork related reason. t4 15 t6 I7 l8

17. At a meeting held on April 13,2011, plaintiff was informed by Ms. Taylor she was

ing investigatedfor a timecard discrepancythat had supposedlytaken place on March 14,2011. Mr. Roberto Rivera, handedMs. Taylor the ing this samemeeting, a union representative,

the by letterprepared theplaintiff. (Exhibit 2.) However, union laterurged 19,20ll appeal
plaintiff to withdraw her appealbecause"this would start a big war" and that plaintiff should be about Ms. Taylor accusingher of defamation.Plaintiff refusedto withdraw her appeal

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On April 22,2011, another "investigatory" meeting was held regarding timecard

told the plaintiff shewould not be able to bring up anything the union representatives garding retaliation, drugs, or issuesincluded in October 15, 2010 letter (which was contrary to the ion's earlier statementto plaintiff that she could raise theseissuesat this meeting). During this i\22,2011 meeting, plaintiff raisedtheseissuesand statedthe allegationsof timecard

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were retaliatory in nature. The meeting becameheatedand Ms. Taylor and Ms. Keefer to have plaintiff chargedwith defamation.As the meeting ended,Ms. Keefer informed aintiff shewas being placed on paid administrative leave, at which point plaintiff then gatheredup and left the facility. While plaintiff was on leave, she learnedthat other personalpossessions of the admitting department had complained to upper management about the ongoing ile working environment,to no avail. 19. On May 5,2011, anothermeetingwas held regardingthe allegedtimecard

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ies. At this meeting with the Employer's managersand the union, plaintiff made it clear

in 9 hat the discrepancies questionwere made on days that she had medical appointmentsthat were

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known to Ms. Taylor and others in the department and had been posted on the department hedule.Plaintiff also statedthat shebelieved shehad punchedin and out correctly. Plaintiff was permitted to seeany of the documentationfrom the TIMS systemto be able to adequately

furtherto the allegations.

20. At all relevant times, managerssuch as Ms. Taylor had the capability and

rtunity to subsequentlyand unilaterally alter an employee'stime card entries on the tenzedtimecard system(refened to as "TIMS"). On information and belief, plaintiff is the in y employeeever terminated for time discrepancies her department,despitethe fact that such happenedon a regular basis in her department. 21. Thereafter,on May 20,2011, plaintiff met with a Kaiser employee,Veronica

Departmentin Oakland. Ms. Regional Human Resources lementsfrom Kaiser Permanente's lementshad askedto meet with the plaintiff becauseshewas conducting an investigation which triggered by a complaint from anotheremployee(whose identity was not told to the plaintiff) to the compliance departmentregarding Ms. Taylor. At the offsite meeting with Ms. lements,plaintiff went through all of the above information relatedto the October 15, 2010 letter what had transpiredthereafter.Ms. Clementsaskedthe plaintiff about Ms. Taylor's supervisor, s. Keefer. The complaining employeehad notified the compliance departmentthat Ms. Keefer "dirty" and Ms. Clementswanted to know if plaintiff knew what that meant. Plaintiffstated

shebelieved it meant that Ms. Keefer was covering up Ms. Taylor's drug problem in the tting department. 22. Plaintiff is informed and believesthat both the union and the Employer were well

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are of Ms. Taylor's drug problems and that her complaints about thesedrug problems were a ivating reasonfor her termination. 23. On July 7,2011, plaintiff, who was still on administrative leave, returned for a

Roberto Rivera and Sonia with Ms. Keefer and Mr. Bumett, and two union representatives, Plaintiff was handeda document,describedas a "last chance" agreement,and told to sign it that time or she would be fired. The document contained false and inaccurate information and the plaintiffof intentionally committing "time fraud" and obtaining "stolen time." Plaintiff (SeeExhibit 4, accuratecopy of 3-page also going to be placed on a S-dayunpaid suspension. and Last Chance datedJuly 6, 2011, titled "Written Notice of Unpaid Suspension ," incorporatedby this reference.)Plaintiff was not allowed to ask questionsor discuss contentsof the document and was repeatedlyurged by the Employer's managersand her union ives to immediately sign the document.When she refused,she was terminated.Plaintiff leamedthat Ms. Taylor was terminated on the sameday, July 7,20T 1. Additional facts appear

rIRST CAUSE OF ACTION for and Breachof Union'sDuty of Fair Representation Damages Unlawful Discharge
under 29 USCA $185 et seq (Against All Defendants)

24. 25.

Plaintiff incorporatesthe precedingparagraphsas if set forth here in full. As of October 1, 2005, defendantsUnion and Employer enteredinto a collective

agreement("CBA") covering the specified employees,including the plaintiff, in various gaining units, which agreementwas enforced during the relevant times involved herein. Both have copies of the voluminous CBA and for that reason,none is attachedhereto. The was entered into by the defendants for the benefit of the employees in the bargaining units and iff, as a member thereof, is accordingly entitled to the benefits of the agreementand to enforce

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provisions thereof. 26. Article XXI, "Discipline and Discharge" of the CBA provides that no employeeshall

disciplined or dischargedwithout "just cause."Such article readsin full as follows: Just Cause. No Employee shall be disciplined or dischargedwithout just cause.Any Employee who is dischargedshall be informed in writing at the time of the dischargeof the reason(s)for the discharge. a Further, article XXIII, "Grievance and Arbitration Procedure"of the CBA establishes ure, culminating in binding arbitration, for the presentation,negotiation, settlement,or other on of grievances,and expresslyprovides for time limits, good faith efforts to resolve exchangeof necessaryand relevant information and selectionof an impartial arbitrator. Accurate copies of Articles XXI and XXIII of the CBA are attachedas Exhibit 3 to this complaint incorporatedby this reference.)

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Employeron July 7,2011, plaintiff wasdischarged defendant by As setforth above,

of of ing a meeting with two representatives the Employer and two representatives the union. Plaintiff deniesthat she had ever engagedin any type of time fraud or stolen time

as by for that furtherdenies therewasjust cause her dismissal required the CBA. Plaintiff
legesthat the true reasonfor her dischargewas retaliation by the Employer becauseshehad iously complained about a hostile working environment causedby her managerbuying, using, being under the influence of drugs in the workplace. 28. Plaintiff protestedher dischargeto the defendantUnion. A Step II grievancewas

by the defendantUnion on plaintifPs behalf. (SeeExhibit 5, accuratecopy of filed Step II evance.)Plaintiff was told by the Union that the meeting with the Employer about her Step II evancewas "informational only" and that Plaintiff would not be allowed to talk, and that nothing be discussedregarding the October 15, 2010 letter. After the meeting, plaintiff was told that Union would be filing a Step III grievance.Plaintiff was later informed that her grievancewas ied to Step III of the grievanceprocedurewhich, as appearsfrom the CBA, was the final step bre arbitration, without resolution.

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29.

On January 12,2}l2,plaintiff

was informed by Stanley Young, a Union

ive, "that her casehad no merit," without any further explanation, and that the union was ithdrawing her grievance. Thereafter, defendant Union failed to make a demand for arbitration insteadpermitted the time for doing so to lapse. 30. Plaintiff allegesthe defendantUnion, in breachof its statutory duty of fair

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ntation owed to plaintiff under the provisions of the Act and the collective bargaining . failed and refusedto demandarbitration to challengeplaintiffs wrongful discharge, though there was no just causeor reasontherefore, and that the defendantUnion's refusal to was carried out in a bad faith and perfrrnctory manner, for reasonswhich were arbitrary, ishonestand irrational. Further, defendantUnion's investigation of plaintiffs grievanceand right arbitratewas handled in a perfunctory and disingenuousmanner, in complete disregardof aintiffs contractualand statutoryright not to be dischargedexcept for just cause.Despite and ample evidenceof Ms. Taylor's drug use and retaliatory actions againstplaintiff, the Union failed to conduct any type of meaningful investigation or challengeto plaintiffs ination. Nor did the defendantUnion make any reasonableefforts to obtain documentationto t the phony allegationsof time fraud being leveled againstthe plaintiff. lnstead, defendant in acquiesced plaintiffs dischargefor its own secretulterior motives in breachof its duty to representthe plaintiff. During the courseof its handling of plaintiffs grievanceand her were openly hostile that the Union demandarbitration, severalunion representatives the plaintiff, and/or indifferent. DefendantUnion has never provided reasonsfor its ion and conclusion that plaintiffs case"had no merit," and ignored strong evidenceto the

The defendantUnion breachedits duty of fair representationin the following ways: . Failing to adequatelyinvestigatethe false allegationsand disciplinary measures

made againstplaintiff by Ms. Taylor and others after October 15, 2010; . Failing to file grievancesfor the retaliatory actions by agentsof the Employer

after October 15, 2010, which retaliation precededplaintiffs termination, thereby

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permitting and encouragingfurther retaliatory actions by defendantEmployer. For example, failing to follow up with promisesof frling additional grievances challenging the intimidating and retaliatory conduct and unwarranted discipline by Debbie Taylor (January27,2011 EAP meeting-"youfucking bitch."); . On April 13, 2011 without obtaining plaintiffs permission,Union representative

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34. 35. 32.

Roberto Rivera gave Debbie Taylor a documentwritten by plaintiff not intendedto (SeeExhibit2,the March 19,20ll appeal letter.) Also, be sharedwith management. plaintiff later learned that Mr. Rivera had never even read Exhibit 2 before tuming it over to Ms. Taylor. . advisedplaintiff to sign the "last On July 7,2011, Union representatives

chance"agreementon July 7,2011 even though plaintiff told them the agreement Roberto Rivera, later One of the Union representatives, containedfalse statements. admitted later he had not even read that agreement either. As a result of plaintifPs dischargeby the defendantUnion, in violation of her rights

owed to the CBA, and in breachby defendantUnion of its duty of fair representation intiff, plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, grievous and extensiveinjuries, uding past and future wage loss, past and future fringe benefit loss, damageto her professional employment, and severeemotional ion and impairment of her ability to find subsequent istress.The amount of thesedamagesis ongoing and is subjectto proof at trial. 33. The above facts, if proven to be willfully intendedto injure plaintiff, warrant

mposition of punitive damagesagainstUnion and Employer. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Wrongful Termination In Violation of Public Policy (Against Defendant Employer) Plaintiff incorporatesthe precedingparagraphsas if set forth here in full. and use of a Firmly establishedpublic policy of this statemakespossession

criminal offense,in violation of various Penal such as methamphetamine ntrolled substance and Safety Code sections,including Health and Safety Code $11377 etseq.

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efforts to provide a drug free workplace such as defendantemployer to make reasonable not to retaliate againstplaintiffbased on her complaints of illegal drug abuseby her supervisor the workplace.(SeeGovernmentCode $8350et seq;41 U.S.C.A. 8102 et seq(Drug Free orkplace for FederalContractors.) 37. After submitting the October 15, 2010 letter, plaintiff was subjectedto the following

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retaliatory actions by agentsof the defendantEmployer: . Plaintiff was falsely accusedof threateningDebbie Taylor and subjectedto a disciplinary investigation that was eventually dropped; . Severalmanagersof the Employer ignored plaintiffs eyewitnessaccount of repeatedlyobserving drug use by Debbie Taylor at work and insteadput plaintiff back in harm's way; . . Plaintiff was cursed at by Debbie Taylor during a EAP meeting; Plaintiff was arbitrarily put on involuntary paid administrative leave (i.e., suspended) April 22,2011 until her termination; on . Plaintiff was threatenedby Debbie Taylor, Diane Keefer, and others with chargesof defamation; . Plaintiff was given an unwarrantedwritten letter of warning on March 16,20ll for nonexistentunprofessionalconduct; . Plaintiff was falsely chargedby the Employer with "time card fraud," and "stolen time" and terminated without any opportunity to review and rebut any documentationallegedly relied upon by the Employer; . Plaintiff was given a choice by the employer to sign a false document on the spot or be fired without just causeor a meaningful opportunity to respond. 38. The Employer's unwarrantedand falsejob criticisms, selectivediscipline, and

termination of the plaintiff, as a result of and in retaliation for her complaints of criminal abuseby her supervisorin the workplace, were in violation of public policy of the stateof 11

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lifornia. 39. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of the Employer, plaintiff

sustainedsignificant harm in the form of severeemotional distress,and economic damages are ongoing and subject to proof at trial' 40. As a further result of Employer's action as set forth above,plaintiff has been unable

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obtain subsequentemployment since her termination alter her damage in an amount to be shown ng to proof at trial. 41. Plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore allegesthat her termination by the

yer was done with the intent to causeinjury to her, or in recklessdisregardof the likelihood such injury. Employer's managing agentswere well aware of Ms. Taylor's drug use, but ted her for as long as they could, and ignored plaintiffs employment rights and well-being' of a consequence this oppressive,malicious and despicableconduct, plaintiff is entitled to and punitive damagesin a sum to be shown accordingto proof. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Against Defendant EmPloYer) 42. 43. Plaintiff incorporatesthe precedingparagraphsas if set forth here in full. The conduct of defendantEmployer as alleged above was outrageousand outsidethe

scopeof the employment relationship. Defendant Employer knew that firing plaintiff of her legitimate complaints and without just causewould result in plaintiffs serious tional distress,and said conduct was intentional or perpetratedwith recklessdisregardof the ility of inflicting humiliation, mental anguish,and severeemotional distressupon plaintiff. 44. Such conduct did result in severeemotional distressto plaintiff. As a direct and

imate result of this intentional or recklessconduct, plaintiff has suffered extreme stress,worry, iety, shock, shame,and substantialeconomic damagesin an amount to be determinedat trial. 45. Defendant Employer's conduct toward plaintiff was wanton, willful, and intentional,

ith malicious and recklessdisregardfor the rightt and sensibilities of plaintiff, all of which entitles to punitive damages.

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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Against Defendant EmPloYer) 46. Plaintiff incorporatesthe precedingpafagraphs,exceptthose alleging intentional

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asif setforth herein full.

47. At all relevant times, defendantEmployer owed plaintiff a duty of care. The conduct

of the defendant,as alleged above was negligent and outrageousand outsidethe normal scope Taylor, mployment relationship. This defendantknew or should have known that shielding Debbie in towing her to retaliate against plaintiff, and the retaliatory termination of plaintiff would result perpetratedby this intiffs seriousemotional distress,and said conduct was nevertheless with recklessdisregardof the probability of inflicting humiliation, mental anguish,and vere emotional distressto plaintiff. As a direct and proximate result of defendant'sinfliction of ional distress,plaintiff suffered generaldamagesand economic damagesin an amount to be ined at trial. 48. This defendant'sconduct toward plaintiff was malicious, willful and with reckless

isregardfor the rights and sensibilities of plaintiff, which entitles her to punitive damages.

PRAYER judgment againstdefendantas follows: WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands a. For all economic damages,including, but not limited to, past and future wage and

flrtlosses,impaired earning potential, and consequentialdamageswhich are ongoing and to proof at trial. b. c. For all noneconomicdamageswhich are ongoing and subjectto proof at trial. punitive damageswith respect to the statutory and tort claims set forth above in an

beingjust; d. or by feesaspermitted statute costsandattomeys For an awardof reasonable

For reinstatementto her former or comparableposition with no break in seniority

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all other equitableand legal relief to which plaintiff is entitled, including injunctive orders, k pay, and other appropriate"make whole" relief. Plaintiff hereby demandsa jury trial for all claims for which a jury is permitted.

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Attomev for Plaintiff KRISTINNA GROTZ Dated:

Iuly 6,2012

CAMERLENGO & JOHNSON

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