MENDOZA vs OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER EMPLOYEES UNION Yes.
Yes. The court ruled that the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA erred in
(MWEU), G.R. No. 201595
January 25, 2016
FACTS:
Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union
(MWEU), a (DOLE)-registered labor organization consisting of rank-and-file
employees within Manila Water Company (MWC). The respondents herein
were MWEU officers during the period material to this Petition. In 2007,
MWEU through Cometa informed petitioner that the union was unable to
fully deduct the increased P200.00 union dues from his salary due to lack of
the required check-off authorization from him. Petitioner was warned that his
failure to pay the union dues would result in sanctions upon him. The MWEU
grievance committee recommended that petitioner be suspended for 30 days
and was unanimously approved. The petitioner filed an appeal but was
denied. Petitioner was again penalized for a suspension and filed for an
appeal but was rejected. Consequently, MWEU scheduled an election of
officers and petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for Vice-President, but
he was disqualified for not being a member in good standing on account of
his suspension. For the third time, petitioner was charged with non-payment
of union dues and for failure to attend the hearing, he was meted the
penalty of expulsion from the union, per "unanimous approval" of the
members of the Executive Board. His pleas for an appeal to the General
Membership Assembly were once more unheeded. In 2008, during the
freedom period and negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) with MWC, petitioner joined another union, the Workers Association
for Transparency, Empowerment and Reform, All-Filipino Workers
Confederation (WATER-AFWC). He was elected union President. In the
seeking recourse to the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA, the complaint for unfair
labor practices filed by Mendoza against respondents was dismissed on the
ground, among others, that the complaint covers intra-union disputes which
the mentioned authorities do not have jurisdiction. It also ruled that the
petitioner failed to provide substantial evidences on the violations of the
respondents against his right to appeal and self-organization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of unfair labor practice.
HELD:
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
failing to resolve petitioner’s charge of unfair labor practices against
respondents. It is true that some of petitioner’s causes of action constitute
intra-union cases cognizable by the BLR under Article 226 of the Labor Code.
However, petitioner’s charge of unfair labor practices falls within
the original  and exclusive  jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, pursuant to
Article 217 of the Labor Code. Petitioner contends that respondents
committed acts constituting unfair labor practices – which charge was
particularly laid out in his pleadings, but that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,
and the CA ignored it and simply dismissed his complaint on the ground that
his causes of action were intra- or inter-union in nature. Specifically,
petitioner claims that he was suspended and expelled from MWEU illegally as
a result of the denial of his right to appeal his case to the general
membership assembly in accordance with the union’s constitution and by-
laws. In regard to suspension of a union member, MWEU’s Constitution and
By-Laws provides that when an MWEU member is suspended, he is given the
right to appeal such suspension within three working days from the date of
notice of said suspension, which appeal the MWEU Executive Board is
obligated to act upon by a simple majority vote. When the penalty imposed
is expulsion, the expelled member is given seven days from notice of said
dismissal and/or expulsion to appeal to the Executive Board, which is
required to act by a simple majority vote of its members. The documentary
evidence is clear that when petitioner received Borela’s letter informing him
of the Executive Board’s unanimous approval of the grievance committee
recommendation to suspend him for the second time, he immediately and
timely filed a written appeal. However, the Executive Board did not act
thereon. Then again, when petitioner was charged for the third time and
meted the penalty of expulsion from MWEU by the unanimous vote of the
Executive Board, his timely appeal was again not acted upon by said board.
Thus, contrary to respondents’ argument that petitioner lost his right
to appeal when he failed to petition to convene the general assembly
through the required signature of 30% of the union membership in good
standing pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEU’s Constitution and By-
Laws or by a petition of the majority of the general membership in good
standing under Article VI, Section 3, the Court finds that petitioner was
illegally suspended for the second time and thereafter unlawfully expelled
from MWEU due to respondents’ failure to act on his written appeals. The
Executive Board must first act on his two appeals before the matter could
properly be referred to the general membership. Because respondents did
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not act on his two appeals, petitioner was unceremoniously suspended,
disqualified and deprived of his right to run for the position of MWEU Vice-
President in the 2007 election of officers, expelled from MWEU, and forced to
join another union, WATER-AFWC. For these, respondents are guilty of unfair
labor practices under Article 249 (a) and (b) – that is, violation of petitioner’s
right to self-organization, unlawful discrimination, and illegal termination of
his union membership – which case falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, in accordance with Article 217 of the Labor
Code.
In essence, [unfair labor practice] relates to the commission of acts
that transgress the workers’ right to organize." "[A]ll the prohibited acts
constituting unfair labor practice in essence relate to the workers’ right to
self-organization." "[T]he term unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of
offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their core, violates the
constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization."
Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the ‘right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.’ The right of self-organization
includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine
which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in
concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and
protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights
and interests.
As members of the governing board of MWEU, respondents are
presumed to know, observe, and apply the union’s constitution and by-laws.
Thus, their repeated violations thereof and their disregard of petitioner’s
rights as a union member – their inaction on his two appeals which resulted
in his suspension, disqualification from running as MWEU officer, and
subsequent expulsion without being accorded the full benefits of due process
– connote willfulness and bad faith, a gross disregard of his rights thus
causing untold suffering, oppression and, ultimately, ostracism from MWEU.
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT v. ASIAN INSTITUTE OF
MANAGEMENT FACULTY ASSOCIATION
GR No. 207971, January 23, 2017
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Asian Institute of Management (AIM) is a duly registered
non-stock, non-profit educational institution.
2. Respondent Asian Institute of Management Faculty Association (AFA)
is a labor organization composed of members of the AIM faculty,
duly registered under Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-12-
4076-2004.
3. On May 16, 2007, respondent filed a petition for certification
election (DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-M-0705-007) seeking to
represent a bargaining unit in AIM consisting of forty (40) faculty
members.
4. Petitioner opposed the petition, claiming that respondent's members
are neither rank-and-file nor supervisory, but rather, managerial
employees.
a. Petitioner filed a petition for cancellation (DOLE Case No.
NCROD-0707-001-LRD) of respondent's certificate of
registration on the grounds of misrepresentation in
registration and that respondent is composed of managerial
employees who are prohibited from organizing as a union.
5. On August 30, 2007, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order denying the
petition for certification election on the ground that AIM' s faculty
members are managerial employees.
6. On appeal before the Secretary of Labor, the latter reversed the
decision of the Med-Arbiter through an order issued dated
Feb. 20, 2009.
7. Meanwhile, in DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-0707-001-LRD (petition for
cancellation), an Order dated February 16, 2009 was issued by
DOLE-NCR Regional Director Raymundo G. Agravante granting AIM's
petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration and
ordering its delisting from the roster of legitimate labor
organizations.
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 a. The Order was appealed by respondent before the Bureau
labor Relations (BLR), which, in a December 29, 2009
Decision, reversed the same and ordered respondent's
retention in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
b. The BLR held that the grounds relied upon in the petition for
cancellation are not among the grounds authorized under
Article 239 of the Labor Code, and that respondent's
members are not managerial employees.
c. Petitioner moved to reconsider, but was rebuffed in a March
18, 2010 Resolution.
8. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, questioning the
DOLE Secretary's February 20, 2009 Decision and respondent's
petition for certification election.
a. The petition is based on the arguments that 1) the
bargaining unit within AIM sought to be represented is
composed of managerial employees who are not eligible to
join, assist, or form any labor organization, and 2)
respondent is not a legitimate labor organization that may
conduct a certification election..
9. CA reversed the decision of the SOLE and reinstated the decision of
the Med-Arbiter (December 2009 and May 4, 2010 Decisions)
10. CA denied the petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the
BLR dated December 29, 2009.
ISSUE: Petitioner claims that the CA seriously erred in affirming the
dispositions of the BLR and thus validating the respondent's certificate of
registration notwithstanding the fact that its members are all managerial
employees who are disqualified from joining, assisting, or forming a labor
organization.
Petitioner's Arguments:
1. Petitioner maintains that respondent's members are all managerial
employees;
2. That the CA erred in declaring that even if respondent's members
are all managerial employees, this alone is not a ground for
cancellation of its certificate of registration; and
3. That the grounds for cancellation of union registration enumerated in
Article 239 of the Labor Code are not exclusive.
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
Respondent's Arguments:
1. Respondent maintains that the CA was right to treat petitioner’s case
for cancellation of its union registration with circumspection; that
petitioner's ground for filing the petition for cancellation is not
recognized under Article 239;
2. That petitioner's accusation of misrepresentation is unsubstantiated,
and is being raised for the first time at this stage;
3. That its members are not managerial employees; and that
petitioner's opposition to respondent's attempts at self-organization
constitutes harassment, oppression, and violates the latter's rights
under the Labor Code and the Constitution.
HELD: The SC refused to answer the issue and ordered the consolidation of
the case with GR No. 197089 which is still pending as of the moment.
But for academic purposes, please see the decision of the case below:
1. In Holy Child Catholic School v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, this Court declared
that "[i]n case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a
union, the proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to
directly file a petition for cancellation of the union's certificate of
registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under
the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as
amended."
2. On the basis of the ruling in the above-cited case, it can be said that
petitioner was correct in filing a petition for cancellation of
respondent's certificate of registration. Petitioner's sole ground for
seeking cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration - that
its members are managerial employees and for this reason, its
registration is thus a patent nullity for being an absolute violation of
Article 245 of the Labor Code which declares that managerial
employees are ineligible to join any labor organization --- is, in a
sense, an accusation that respondent is guilty of misrepresentation
for registering under the claim that its members are not managerial
employees
3. However, the issue of whether respondent's members are
managerial employees is still pending resolution by way of petition
for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 197089, which is the culmination
of all proceedings in DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-M-0705-007 -- where
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 the issue relative to the nature of respondent's membership was first about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the
raised by petitioner itself and is there fiercely contested. Labor Code.
a. The resolution of this issue cannot be pre-empted; until it is
determined with finality in G.R. No. l 97089, the petition for
cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration on the
grounds alleged by petitioner cannot be resolved. As a FACTS:
matter of courtesy and in order to avoid conflicting
decisions,
1.     Petitioner Union filed a petition for certification election among the
b. We must await the resolution of the petition in G.R.
regular rank-and-file employees of respondent Company with the Mediation
No. 197089.
Arbitration Unit of DOLE-NCR
i. x x x If a particular point or question is in issue in
the second action, and the judgment will depend on
the determination of that particular point or 2.     Respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on the
question, a former judgment between the same ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because of
parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in (1) failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law, and
the second if that same point or question was in (2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union
issue and adjudicated in the first suit. x x x Identity
of cause of action is not required, but merely 3.     Med-Arbiter Falconitin: dismissed petition for certification election
identity of issues. (Citation omitted)
-       Petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization because the
WHEREFORE, considering that the outcome of this case depends on the Charter Certificate, “Sama-samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi at Authorization,”
resolution of the issue relative to the nature of respondent's membership and “Listahan ng mga Dumalo sa Pangkalahatang Pulong at mga Sumang-
pending in G.R. No. 197089, this case is ordered CONSOLIDATED with G.R. ayon at Nagratipika sa Saligang Batas” were not executed under oath and
No. 197089. certified by the union secretary and attested to by the union president; thus,
fatally defective
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY
-       the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of 12 batchman,
UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS
mill operator and leadman who performed supervisory functions thus
VS. CHARTER CHEMICAL AND COATING CORPORATION G.R. No.
prohibited from joining union to represent rank-and-file employees of
169717 March 16, 2011
company
TOPIC: Effect of Including Employees Outside the Bargaining Unit
-       not being a legitimate labor organization, petitioner union has no right
to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective
DOCTRINE: While there is a prohibition against the mingling of supervisory
bargaining
and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the Labor Code does
not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, after a labor organization has been
4.     DOLE: in favor of respondent company dismissing petitioner union’s
registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor
appeal because it is filed out of time
organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees
in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the
grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought 5.     On MR, DOLE reversed its earlier ruling: no certification election was
previously conducted in favor of company; however, the prior certification

MICHEL LOUISE BAJO 4

was denied by Med-Arbiter and, on appeal, was dismissed by DOLE for being
filed out of time.
6.     CA:
-       petitioner union failed to company with the documentation
requirements under the Labor Code;
-       that union consisted both rank-and-file and supervisory employees;
-       the issues as to the legitimacy of petitioner union may be attacked
collaterally in a petition for certification election and the infirmity in the
membership of petitioner union cannot be remedied through the exclusion-
inclusion proceedings in a pre-election conference
-       considering that the union is not a legitimate labor organization, it has
no legal right to file a petition for certification election
ISSUE: Whether or not the mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory
employees in petitioner union nullifies its legal personality as a legitimate
labor organization
RULING: NO. R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the exact effect of any
violation of the prohibition (on the co-mingling of supervisory and rank-and-
file employees) would bring about on the legitimacy of a labor organization.
It should be emphasized that the petitions for certification election involved
in Toyota  and Dunlop  were filed on November 26, 1992 and September 15,
1995, respectively; hence, the 1989 Rules was applied in both cases.
But then, on June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further
amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the 1989
Amended Omnibus Rules – that the petition for certification election indicate
that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has not been mingled
with supervisory employees – was removed. Instead, what the 1997
Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a plain description of the bargaining unit
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
The Court abandoned the view in Toyota and Dunlop and reverted to its
pronouncement in Lopez  that while there is a prohibition against the
mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor
organization, the Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus,
the Court held that after a labor organization has been registered, it may
exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any
mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership
cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation
of its registration, unless such mingling was brought about by
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor
Code.
DISPOSITIVE: Petitioner Union won.
Guagua National Colleges vs. Guagua National Colleges Faculty
Labor Union (GNCFLU) and Guagua National Colleges Non-Teaching
and Maintenance Labor Union (GNCNTMLU). G.R. No. 204693. July
13, 2016.
Facts of the case:
GNC is an educational institution located in Pampanga. GNCFLU and
GNCNTMLU were the bargaining agents for GNC’s faculty members and non-
teaching and maintenance personnel, respectively. Both parties concluded in
their Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) the economic provisions which
are applicable to both unions without distinction. Significantly, in the 1994-
1999 CBA, a “no-strike, no lock-out” clause was provided under Section 17
thereof which likewise provides for mechanism of grievance resolution and
voluntary arbitration. The provision was carried out over in the subsequent
CBAs.
On April 3, 2009, the Presidents of both unions wrote to the President of
GNC, Atty. Ricardo Puno to inform him of the former’s intention to open the
negotiation for the renewal of the then existing CBA which would expire on
May 31, 2009. Instead of sending a reply/counter-proposal within ten (10)
days from its receipt, GNC wrote respondents calling for a meeting on May
15 regarding CBA negotiations. No agreements took place during said
meeting except that GNC would notify respondents of the next negotiation
meetings. However, respondents later received a letter from Atty. Sampang
5
stating that the management is not inclined to grant the
economic/monetary-related proposals. Still, respondents on June 1, 2009,
requested for a conference with GNC to discuss the ground rules. The
meeting transpired on June 11, 2009 where respondents reckoned thereon
the start of the negotiation proper between the parties despite GNC to be
apparently “non-commital”.
Respondents thereon detailed the negotiations that allegedly ensued, to wit:
(1.) Another meeting was held on June 16, 2009 but GNC at that time did
not have any reply/counter-proposal to respondent’s proposal, and instead
asked for three weeks to submit the same. (2.) On July 10, 2009, GNC failed
to submit the counter-proposal. (3.) In the Meeting of July 31, 2009, Cita
Rodriquez, the school treasurer and a member of the management panel,
discussed with respondents some of the economic items, particularly those
relating to longevity pay, birthday gift, family assistance, medical check-up
and clothing allowance. (4.) Some of the items were further discussed in the
August 11 meeting including therewith an increase in the rice subsidy. (5.) In
the August 17 meeting, Rodriquez stated that longevity pay shall be deemed
as loyalty pay and an increase on P5.00 was given as an additional. (6.) An
increase in the benefits were agreed upon. Rodriguez likewise confirmed the
grant of a Union Office. However, respondent’s demand for an increase in
the signing bonus from P50,000 to P100,000 remained unsettled. (7.) On
September 23, 2009, respondents submitted to GNC a draft of the CBA
containing all the benefits agreed upon. GNC requested that some revisions
be made thereon. (8.) On October 9, 2009, another meeting took place
where the parties reviewed all the benefits agreed on. Rodriguez stated that
the signing of the CBA may take place on the next meeting. (9.)
Respondents submitted to Atty. Sampang the agreed terms of the CBA which
includes all the benefits reviewed upon and the signing bonus of P100,000
for each union. (10.) Respondents made several follow-ups on the signing of
the CBA to both Atty. Sampang and Rodriguez but to no avail. (11.)
Respondents received from Atty. Sampang through a letter dated December
21, 2009, GNC’s counter-proposal. Respondents were surprised since they
thought that all matters except on the signing bonus were already agreed
upon. Besides, the three-week period previously requested by GNC had long-
lapsed. (12.) Atty. Sampang requested respondents to attend a meeting with
Atty. Puno on January 5, 2010. Despite Atty. Puno’s presence in the school
premises, he did not however faced the respondents. (13.) In view of the
foregoing, respondents wrote a letter to Atty. Puno. They stressed that while
they have been bargaining in good faith, it was otherwise on the part of the
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
GNC. Respondents thus expressed their belief that the parties have already
reached an impasse. As respondents did not receive any reply from the GNC,
they filed on February 3, 2010 a preventive mediation case with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB).
Under the proceedings before the NCMB, both parties differ in their accounts
with what happened before the Board. Respondents averred that both
parties have already agreed on the details regarding the grant of the signing
bonus. As part of the agreement, the parties also settled to sign the CBA on
May 28, 2010, but the same was never realized. Instead, Atty. Padilla
requested for 10 days or until June 7, 2010 for GNC to submit its
Comment/Counter-Proposal to the Union’s CBA Draft. However, respondents
manifested that they would want the parties to meet again on June 1, 2010
but come said date, no one appeared on the part of the GNC. Thus,
repsondents filed on the same day a Notice to Strike charging GNC with bad
faith bargaining, violation of its duty to bargain, gross violation of the
provisions of the CBA and gross and blatant diminution of benefits.
Subsequent to this, GNC allegedly stopped the grant of certain benefits to its
employees.
GNC, on the other hand, contended that during mediation meetings with the
NCMB, respondents submitted several CBA drafts for its consideration. Upon
its receipt on May 21, 2010 of another draft CBA from respondents under
cover letter dated May 20, 2010, it decided to secure the services of Atty.
Padilla to assist it in its negotiations with respondents. Hence, on May 28,
2010, Atty. Padilla appeared before the NCMB and asked for 10 days to
submit GNC's comment/counter-proposal to the purported draft CBA of
respondents. However, on June 1, 2010, respondents filed a notice of strike.
In view of the notice of strike, the NCMB called for a conciliation
conference. Meanwhile on June 7, 2010, GNC filed with the NCMB its
counter-proposal to respondents' purported final CBA draft.
Subsequently during the June 9, 2010 conference, GNC filed a Motion to
Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer Dispute to Grievance Machinery and
Voluntary Arbitration Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. It
invoked the "no-strike, no lock-out" clause and the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration provision of the parties' existing CBA which was carried
over from their 1994-1999 CBA and the CBAs subsequent thereto. According
to it, the four grounds cited by respondents in their notice of strike, i.e., bad
6
faith bargaining, violation of the duty to bargain, gross violation of the
provisions of the CBA, and gross and blatant diminution of benefits, all come
within the definition of "grievance" under their CBA, hence, not strikeable.
Since the NCMB had not yet acted upon GNC's Motion to Strike Out Notice of
Strike and to Refer Dispute to Grievance Machinery and Voluntary Arbitration
Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement despite the looming strike
of respondents, GNC urged the Secretary of Labor and Employment to
assume jurisdiction over the dispute.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment, after finding the subject labor
dispute as one affecting national interest, assumed jurisdiction over the case;
certified the same to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
immediate compulsory arbitration; and, accordingly enjoined the intended
strike.
The NLRC ruled that The Secretary is explicitly granted by Article 263 (g)
of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to
the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Inevitably, this
authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute must include and extend
to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over
which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction. Anent the merits of the
case, the NLRC held that based on the totality of conduct of GNC, it was
guilty of bad faith bargaining and therefore committed an unfair labor
practice. This was on account of GNC's submission of a counter-proposal
despite the parties already having reached an agreement regarding the
terms of the CBA.  Petitioner hence sought recourse from the Court of
Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari.
The Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part
of NLRC in issuing its assailed orders. Hence it denied the Petition for lack of
Merit. Thus, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issue:
1. Whether the subject labor dispute should have been ordered
submitted to voluntary arbitration by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment pursuant to the parties' CBA and not certified to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration;
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
2. Whether GNC is guilty of bad faith bargaining and thus violated its
duty to bargain;
3. Whether the final CBA draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB
was correctly declared to be the parties' CBA for the period June 1,
2009 to May 31, 2014.
Ruling:
1. Indeed, the parties through their CBA, agreed to a "no-strike, no
lock-out" policy and to resolve their disputes through grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration. Despite these, respondents
were justified in filing a notice of strike in light of the facts of this
case. It is settled that a "no strike, no lock-out" provision in the CBA
"may only be invoked by an employer when the strike is economic in
nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other agreements
from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by law. It is
not applicable when the strike is grounded on unfair labor
practice." Here, while respondents enumerated four grounds in their
notice of strike, the facts of the case reveal that what primarily
impelled them to file said notice was their perception of bad faith
bargaining and violation of the duty to bargain collectively by GNC -
charges which constitute unfair labor practice under Article 248(g) of
the Labor Code.
GNC relies heavily on University of San Agustin vs. CA. According to
it, the facts therein are similar if not identical to the facts of the
present case. It must be noted that under the facts of University of
San Agustin, the dispute between the parties primarily involved the
formula in computing the TIP share of the employees - one which
clearly arose from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA.
Pursuant to Article 261 of the Labor Code, such a grievance falls
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Even if otherwise, the
dispute would still fall under the said jurisdiction pursuant to Article
262 of the same Code since the parties agreed in their CBA that
practically all disputes, including bargaining deadlock, shall be
referred to grievance machinery that ends in voluntary arbitration.
Unlike in University of San Agustin, the main cause of the dispute
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 between the parties in this case, i.e., GNC's alleged commission of
unfair labor practice, did not arise from the interpretation or
implementation of the parties' CBA, or neither from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Hence,
it does not fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators under the
aforementioned Article 261. Be that as it may, GNC argues that since
the grounds cited by respondents in their notice of strike come
within the scope of "grievance" under the grievance resolution and
voluntary arbitration provision of the parties' CBA, the same is
cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator. Otherwise stated, since the
parties allegedly agreed to submit a dispute of this kind to their
CBA's grievance resolution procedure which ends in voluntary
arbitration, it is the voluntary arbitrator which has jurisdiction in view
of Article 262 of the Labor Code.
A charge of Unfair Labor Practice on based on the CBA’s provision under
Grievance Machinery does not fall under the catch-all definition of grievance
because  there is a need for an express stipulation in the CBA that unfair
labor practices should be resolved in the ultimate by the voluntary arbitrator
or panel of voluntary arbitrators since the same fall within a special class of
disputes that are generally within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter by express provision of the law.
2. There is no per se  test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad
faith is an inference to be drawn from the facts. The effect of an
employer's or a union's actions individually is not the test of good-
faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or actions,
considered as a whole. It could not be any clearer from the above
circumstances that GNC has no genuine intention to comply with its
duty to bargain. It merely went through the motions of negotiations
and then entered into an agreement with respondents which turned
out to be an empty one since it later denounced the same by
submitting a reply/counter-proposal. Worse, when respondents tried
to clear out matters with the GNC President through their letter of
January 8, 2010, GNC did not even bother to respond. Regarding
GNC’s averment of its suffering from financial difficulties, instead of
laying all its card on the table, GNC for reasons only known to it,
chose to forego the opportunity of discussing its claimed financial
predicament with respondents as shown by the following: (1) GNC
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
did not submit a reply/counter-proposal within 10 calendar days
from its receipt of respondents' proposed CBA on April 3, 2009 as
required by law; (2) while it later manifested through a letter dated
May 27, 2009 that it is not inclined to grant the economic provisions
in respondents' proposal, it did not fully discuss or explain to
respondents its claimed opposition; (3) Atty. Sampang did not make
good on the promise he made in the meeting of June 16, 2009 that
GNC would submit its counter-proposal to respondents' economic
provisions with the corresponding explanation; 70 and, (4) as shown
by the minutes of the meetings, the members of the management
panel simply made general statements that GNC was having financial
difficulties but failed to elaborate on the same. As it is, GNC allowed
itself to go through the process of negotiating with respondents
without fully discussing its financial status and despite this,
knowingly entered into an agreement with them. It cannot,
therefore, be allowed to later interpose an opposition to the terms of
the CBA based on financial incapacity by belatedly submitting a
counter-proposal, which from the circumstances, is an obvious
attempt to stall what would have been the last step of the process -
the execution of the CBA. The Court cannot be expected to affix its
imprimatur to such a dubious maneuver.
3. In the cases of Kiok Lay, “Divine Word University of Tacloban v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment”, and “General Milling
Corporation, the Court unilaterally imposed upon the employers the
CBAs proposed by the unions after the employers were found to
have violated their duty to bargain collectively. This is on the
premise that the said employers, by their acts which bespeak of
insincerity, had lost their statutory right to negotiate or renegotiate
the terms and conditions contained in the unions' proposed CBAs.
Here, the Court finds nothing wrong in the pronouncement of the
NLRC that the final CBA draft submitted by respondents to the NCMB
should serve as the parties' CBA for the period June 1, 2009 to May
31, 2014. More than the fact that GNC is the erring party in this
case, records show that the said draft is actually the final CBA draft
of the parties which incorporates their agreements. Indeed and as
held by the NLRC, fairness, equity and social justice are best served
if the said final CBA draft shall govern their industrial relationship.
8

CLUB FILIPINO, INC. VS. BAUTISTA, G.R. No. 168406, January 14,
2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. (the company) is a non-stock, non
profit. While, respondents were former officers and members of the Club
Filipino Employees Association (the union).
The union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and failure
to bargain. Afterwards, the company formally responded to the demands of
the union when it submitted the first part of its economic counter-proposal
then the second part.
Meanwhile, the union conducted a strike vote under the supervision
of the Department of Labor and Employment.
In response to the company’s counter-proposal, the union sent the
company its improved proposal, but the company refused to improve on its
offer. This prompted the union to stage a strike on the ground of a CBA
bargaining deadlock.
The company filed before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) a petition to declare the strike illegal. The company further prayed
that all union officers who participated in the illegal strike be considered
separated from the service.
The labor arbiter declared the strike “procedurally [infirm] and
therefore illegal.” NLRC affirmed. However, CA set aside the rulings of the
NLRC and the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike staged by respondents was legal
HELD:
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as
practicable, further state the unresolved issues in the bargaining
negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the
counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference
to settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far
as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the
dispute amicably.
Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of
this and the foregoing section shall be deemed as not having been
filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional
branch of the Board. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the union cannot be faulted for its omission. The
union could not have attached the counter-proposal of the company in the
notice of strike it submitted to the NCMB as there was no such counter-
proposal. To recall, the union filed a notice of strike on April 6, 2001 after
several requests to start negotiations proved futile. It was only on April 22,
2001, or after two weeks, when the company formally responded to the
union by submitting the first part of its counter-proposal. Worse, it took the
company another three weeks to complete it by submitting on May 11, 2001
the second part of its counter-proposal. This was almost a year after the
expiration of the CBA sought to be renewed.
The Implementing Rules use the words “as far as practicable.” In
this case, attaching the counter-proposal of the company to the notice of
strike of the union was not practicable. It was absurd to expect the union to
produce the company’s counter-proposal which it did not have. One cannot
give what one does not have. Indeed, compliance with the requirement was
impossible because no counter-proposal existed at the time the union filed a
notice of strike. The law does not exact compliance with the impossible.
Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.
PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by its Vice-
President for Administration, M/GEN. NEMESIO M. SIGAYA VS.
PHILTRANCO WORKERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF GENUINE LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS (PWU-AGLO), represented by JOSE JESSIE
OLIVAR,  G.R. No. 180962, February 26, 2014
9
FACTS:
On the ground that it was suffering business losses, petitioner Philtranco
Service Enterprises, Inc., a local land transportation company engaged in the
business of carrying passengers and freight, retrenched 21 of its employees.
Consequently, the company union Philtranco Workers Union-Association of
Genuine Labor Organizations (PWU-AGLU), filed a Notice of Strike with the
DOLE claiming that petitioner engaged in unfair labor practices. Unable to
settle their differences at the preliminary conference, the case was thereafter
referred to the Office of the Secretary of the DOLE who issued a decision in
favor of PWU-AGLU, seeking to reinstate the employees to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights and pay them backwages from the
time of termination until their actual or payroll reinstatement, maintain the
status quo and continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of
the existing CBA and remit the withheld union dues to PWU-AGLU without
unnecessary delay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration while private respondent, on the
other hand, submitted a "Partial Appeal." The Secretary of Labor declined to
rule on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and private respondent’s
"Partial Appeal", citing a DOLE Regulation which provided that voluntary
arbitrators’ decisions, orders, resolutions or awards shall not be the subject
of motions for reconsideration. Hence, petitioner filed before the CA an
original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, and sought injunctive relief
which was dismissed by the CA. The CA held that, in assailing the Decision of
the DOLE voluntary arbitrator, petitioner erred in filing a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, when it should have filed a
petition for review under Rule 43 thereof, which properly covers decisions of
voluntary labor arbitrators.  For this reason, the petition is dismissible. The
CA added that since the assailed Decision was not timely appealed within the
reglementary 15-day period under Rule 43, the same became final and
executory. Finally, the appellate court ruled that even assuming for the sake
of argument that certiorari was indeed the correct remedy, still, the petition
should be dismissed for being filed out of time. Petitioner’s unauthorized
Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Secretary of Labor did not toll the
running of the reglementary 60-day period within which to avail of certiorari;
thus, from the time of its receipt of Acting Labor Secretary’s Decision on
June 14 or the following day, petitioner had until August 13 to file the
petition – yet it filed the same only on August 29.
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
instead of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the proper
remedy to assail the decision of the Secretary of Labor. –
YES
2. Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari was timely
filed. - YES
RULING:
As to the first issue, YES. It has long been settled that the remedy of an
aggrieved party in a decision or resolution of the Secretary of Labor is to
timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. There is no
distinction when the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor
case in an industry indispensable to national interest, "he exercises great
breadth of discretion" in finding a solution to the parties’ dispute. "The
authority of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to national interest includes and extends to all questions and
controversies arising therefrom. The power is plenary and discretionary in
nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary
dispute."  This wide latitude of discretion given to the Secretary of Labor
may not be the subject of appeal.
Accordingly, the Secretary of Labor’s Decision in this case is a proper subject
of certiorari, pursuant to the Court’s pronouncement in National Federation
of Labor v. Laguesma, thus:
Though appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor were eliminated,
presently there are several instances in the Labor Code and its implementing
and related rules where an appeal can be filed with the Office of the
Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of Labor issues a ruling, to wit:
xxxx
10
(6) Art. 263 provides that the Secretary of Labor shall decide or resolve the
labor dispute [over] which he assumed jurisdiction within thirty (30) days
from the date of the assumption of jurisdiction. His decision shall be final and
executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties.
Hence, Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing the decision of the
Secretary of Labor.
On the question of whether the Petition for Certiorari was timely filed, the
Court agrees with petitioner’s submission. Rule 65 states that where a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is
required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than 60 days counted
from the notice of the denial of the motion. This can only mean that even
though a motion for reconsideration is not required or even prohibited by the
concerned government office, and the petitioner files the motion just the
same, the 60-day period shall nonetheless be counted from notice of the
denial of the motion. The very nature of certiorari – which is an
extraordinary remedy resorted to only in the absence of plain, available,
speedy and adequate remedies in the course of law – requires that the office
issuing the decision or order be given the opportunity to correct itself. Quite
evidently, this opportunity for rectification does not arise if no motion for
reconsideration has been filed. This is precisely what the Court said in the
ABS-CBN Union Members case, whose essence continues to this day. Thus:
Section 8, Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, provides:
"The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) calendar days within which to decide
the appeal from receipt of
the records of the case. The decision of the Secretary shall be final and
inappealable." x x x
Petitioner received a copy of the Acting Secretary of Labor’s Decision on June
14, 2007. It timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration on June 25, which was
a Monday, or the first working day following the last day (Sunday, June 24)
for filing the motion. But for lack of procedural basis, the same was
effectively denied by the Secretary of Labor via his August 15, 2007 Order
which petitioner received on August 17. It then filed the Petition for
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
Certiorari on August 29, or well within the fresh 60-day period allowed by the
Rules from August 17. Given these facts, the Court finds that the Petition
was timely filed.
TAKATA (PHILIPPINES) CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF
LABOR RELATIONS and SAMAHANG LAKAS MANGGAGAWA NG
TAKATA (SALAMAT), respondents., G.R. No. 196276. June 4, 2014.
Facts:
On July 7, 2009, petitioner filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Regional Office a Petition 3 for Cancellation of the
Certificate of Union Registration of Respondent Samahang Lakas
Manggagawa ng Takata (SALAMAT) on the ground that the latter is guilty of
misrepresentation, false statement and fraud with respect to the number of
those who participated in the organizational meeting, the adoption and
ratification of its Constitution and By-Laws, and in the election of its officers.
It contended that in the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting of respondent,
only 68 attendees signed the attendance sheet, and which number
comprised only 17% of the total number of the 396 regular rank-and-file
employees which respondent sought to represent, and hence, respondent
failed to comply with the 20% minimum membership requirement. Petitioner
insisted that the document "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon" bore no
signatures on the alleged 119 union members; and that employees were not
given sufficient information on the documents they signed; that the
document "Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi" was not submitted at the
time of the filing of respondent's application for union registration; that the
119 union members were actually only 117; and, that the total number of
petitioner's employees as of May 1, 2009 was 470, and not 396 as
respondent claimed.
Respondent denied the charge and claimed that the 119 union members
were more than the 20% requirement for union registration. The document
"Sama-Samang Pahayag ng Pagsapi sa Unyon" which it presented in its
petition for certification election 5 supported their claim of 119 members.
Respondent also contended that petitioner was estopped from assailing its
legal personality as it agreed to a certification election and actively
participated in the pre-election conference of the certification election
proceedings. 6 Respondent argued that the union members were informed
of the contents of the documents they signed and that the 68 attendees to
11
the organizational meeting constituted more than 50% of the total union
membership, hence, a quorum existed for the conduct of the said meeting. 7
On August 27, 2009, DOLE Regional Director, Atty. Ricardo S. Martinez, Sr.,
issued a Decision 8 granting the petition for cancellation of respondent's
certificate of registration.
In revoking respondent's certificate of registration, the Regional Director
found that the 68 employees who attended the organizational meeting was
obviously less than 20% of the total number of 396 regular rank-and-file
employees which respondent sought to represent, hence, short of the union
registration requirement;
On December 9, 2009, after considering respondent's Appeal Memorandum
with Formal Entry of Appearance and petitioner's Answer, the BLR rendered
its Decision 14 reversing the Order of the Regional Director,
In reversing, the BLR found that petitioner failed to prove that respondent
deliberately and maliciously misrepresented the number of rank-and-file
employees. It pointed out petitioner's basis for the alleged non-compliance
with the minimum membership requirement for registration was the
attendance of 68 members to the May 1, 2009 organizational meeting
supposedly comprising only 17% of the total 396 regular rank-and-file
employees. However, the BLR found that the list of employees who
participated in the organizational meeting was a separate and distinct
requirement from the list of the names of members comprising at least 20%
of the employees in the bargaining unit;
Undaunted, petitioner went to the CA.
On December 22, 2010, the CA rendered its assailed decision which denied
the petition and affirmed the decision of the BLR. Hence, the present case.
Issue:
WON the union attained the membership requirements for registration of an
LLO. YES.
Ruling:
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
Petitioner's allegation of misrepresentation and fraud is based on its claim
that during the organizational meeting on May 1, 2009, only 68 employees
attended, while respondent claimed that it has 119 members as shown in the
document denominated as "Pangalan ng mga Kasapi ng Unyon;" hence,
respondent misrepresented on the 20% requirement of the law as to its
membership.
We do not agree.
It does not appear in Article 234 (b) of the Labor Code that the attendees in
the organizational meeting must comprise 20% of the employees in the
bargaining unit. In fact, even the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Labor Code does not so provide. It is only under Article 234 (c) that
requires the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent
(20%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate.
Clearly, the 20% minimum requirement pertains to the employees'
membership in the union and not to the list of workers who participated in
the organizational meeting. Indeed, Article 234 (b) and (c) provide for
separate requirements, which must be submitted for the union's registration,
and which respondent did submit. Here, the total number of employees in
the bargaining unit was 396, and 20% of which was about 79. Respondent
submitted a document entitled "Pangalan ng Mga Kasapi ng Unyon" showing
the names of 119 employees as union members, thus respondent sufficiently
complied even beyond the 20% minimum membership requirement.
Respondent also submitted the attendance sheet of the organizational
meeting which contained the names and signatures of the 68 union
members who attended the meeting. Considering that there are 119 union
members which are more than 20% of all the employees of the bargaining
unit, and since the law does not provide for the required number of
members to attend the organizational meeting, the 68 attendees which
comprised at least the majority of the 119 union members would already
constitute a quorum for the meeting to proceed and to validly ratify the
Constitution and By-laws of the union. There is, therefore, no basis for
petitioner to contend that grounds exist for the cancellation of respondent's
union registration. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for
cancellation of union registration under Article 239 of the Labor Code,the
nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling
enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.
12
The Heritage Hotel Manila vs. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN
THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-HERITAGE
HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC)
G.R. No. 178296. January 12, 2011. NACHURA, J.
FACTS: In 1995, respondent filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition for
certification election which was granted. Subsequently, petitioner discovered
that respondent had failed to submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
its annual financial report for several years and the list of its members since
it filed its registration papers in 1995. Consequently, petitioner filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Registration of respondent, on the ground of the
non-submission of the said documents. Petitioner prayed that respondent’s
Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter be cancelled and its name be deleted
from the list of legitimate labor organizations, as well as for the certification
election proceedings to be suspended. The certification election however
pushed through and respondent emerged as the winner.
Petitioner filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results
and Winner. The Med-Arbiter held that the pendency of a petition for
cancellation of registration is not a bar to the holding of a certification
election. Thus, the Med-Arbiter dismissed petitioners protest, and certified
respondent as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all supervisory
employees.
Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed and when Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, the motion was also denied. In the meantime, DOLE-NCR
resolved the petition for cancellation of registration ruling that while
respondent had indeed failed to file financial reports and the list of its
members for several years, freedom of association and the employees right
to self-organization are more substantive considerations, taking into account
the fact that respondent won the certification election and that it had already
been certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory
employees. The belated submission of the annual financial reports and the
list of members was held as sufficient compliance and the same were
considered as having been submitted on time.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed on the reasoning that the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers to
self-organization outweighed respondents noncompliance with the statutory
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
requirements to maintain its status as a legitimate labor organization.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, raising the issue of
whether the DOLE Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of the appeal and affirming the dismissal of its petition for
cancellation of respondents registration. The CA denied the petition. The CA
opined that the DOLE Secretary may legally assume jurisdiction over an
appeal from the decision of the Regional Director in the event that the
Director of the BLR inhibits himself from the case. The CA also affirmed the
DOLE Secretary’s dismissal of the petition for cancellation of respondents
registration as a labor organization. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the CA denied petitioner’s motion, Hence the petition
before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure to submit annual financial report for
several years and the list of its members warrants the cancellation of
registration of a labor union
RULING: NO. Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code read:
ART. 238.  CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION; APPEAL. The certificate of
registration of any legitimate labor organization, whether national or local,
shall be canceled by the Bureau if it has reason to believe, after due
hearing, that the said labor organization no longer meets one or more of
the requirements  herein prescribed.
ART. 239. GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION. The
following shall constitute grounds  for cancellation of union registration:
 x x x x
(d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau within thirty
(30) days after the closing of every fiscal year and misrepresentation, false
entries or fraud in the preparation of the financial report itself;
 x x x x
13
(i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau once a year or
whenever required by the Bureau.
These provisions give the Regional Director ample discretion in dealing with
a petition for cancellation of a unions registration, particularly, determining
whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law. It is
sufficient to give the Regional Director license to treat the late filing of
required documents as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the
law. After all, the law requires the labor organization to submit the annual
financial report and list of members in order to verify if it is still viable and
financially sustainable as an organization so as to protect the employer and
employees from fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. With the submission of the
required documents by respondent, the purpose of the law has been
achieved, though belatedly.
The union members and, in fact, all the employees belonging to the
appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a bargaining agent,
merely because of the negligence of the union officers who were responsible
for the submission of the documents to the BLR. Consideration must be
taken of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article XIII, Section 3 of the
Constitution, i.e., the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities. Registration
confers upon a union the status of legitimacy and the concomitant right and
privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor organization, particularly the
right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining
unit. Thus, the cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent of
snuffing out the life  of a labor organization. For without such registration, it
loses - as a rule - its rights under the Labor Code.
The Labor Codes provisions on cancellation of union registration and on
reportorial requirements have been amended by R.A. No. 9481, An Act
Strengthening the Workers Constitutional Right to Self-Organization,
Amending for the Purpose the Labor Code of the Philippines . Thus, R.A. No.
9481 amended Article 239 to read:
ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration. The following may
constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the
adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in
the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the
election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the list of voters;
(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.
  Article 242-A. Reportorial Requirements.The following are documents
required to be submitted to the Bureau by the legitimate labor organization
concerned:
(a) Its constitution and by-laws, or amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification of the
constitution and by-laws within thirty (30) days from adoption or ratification
of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto;
(b) Its list of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and list of voters
within thirty (30) days from election;
(c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of every
fiscal year; and
(d) Its list of members at least once a year or whenever required by the
Bureau.
  Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for
cancellation of union registration but shall subject the erring officers or
members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any appropriate
penalty.
ILO Convention No. 87 provides that workers and employers organizations
shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority.
The ILO has expressed the opinion that the cancellation of union registration
by the registrar of labor unions is tantamount to dissolution of the
organization by administrative authority. Although the ILO has allowed such
measure to be taken, provided that judicial safeguards are in place it has
deemed it preferable if such actions were to be taken only as a last resort
14
and after exhausting other possibilities with less serious effects on the
organization.
The amendments and the ILOs opinion on this matter serve to fortify our
ruling in this case. We therefore quote with approval the DOLE Secretary’s
reasons for denying the petition, to wit:
 Appellee’s failure to submit its annual financial reports and list of individual
members in accordance with Article 239 of the Labor Code should not
necessarily lead to the cancellation of union registration.
1. An overly stringent interpretation of the statute
governing cancellation of union registration without
regard to surrounding circumstances would lead to an
unconstitutional application of the statute and
emasculation of public policy objectives The more
substantive considerations involve the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers
to self-organization. Also involved is the public policy to
promote free trade unionism and collective bargaining
as instruments of industrial peace and democracy.
Worse, it can render nugatory the protection to labor
and social justice clauses that pervades the Constitution
and the Labor Code.
2. Submission of the required documents is the duty of the
officers of the union. It would be unreasonable to order
the cancellation of the union and penalize the entire
union membership on the basis of the negligence of its
officers.
3. The submission of appellee of its financial statement for
the years 1996-1999 is substantial compliance with its
duty to submit its financial report for the said period.
The dismissal by the CA of the petition for cancellation of union registration
of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC is AFFIRMED.
Mariwasa Siam Ceramics vs Secretary of Labor and Employment
GR No 183317, (2009)
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
Facts:
In 2005, respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam
Ceramics, Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate of Registration
as a legitimate labor organization by the DOLE.
Petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Union Registration against respondent, claiming that the latter violated
Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20% requirement,
and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in violation of
Article 239 of the same code.
The petitioner insists that respondent failed to comply with the 20% union
membership requirement for its registration as a legitimate labor
organization because of the disaffiliation from the total number of union
members of 102 employees who executed affidavits recanting their union
membership.
Issue: Whether or not the Certificate of Registration of SMMSC-
Independent should be cancelled? (No)
Held:
In the instant case, the affidavits of recantation were executed after the
identities of the union members became public, i.e., after the union filed a
petition for certification election on May 23, 2005, since the names of the
members were attached to the petition. The purported withdrawal of support
for the registration of the union was made after the documents were
submitted to the DOLE. The logical conclusion, therefore, following
jurisprudence, is that the employees were not totally free from the
employer’s pressure, and so the voluntariness of the employees’ execution of
the affidavits becomes suspect.
It is likewise notable that the first batch of 25 pro forma affidavits shows that
the affidavits were executed by the individual affiants on different dates from
May 26, 2005 until June 3, 2005, but they were all sworn before a notary
public on June 8, 2005.
15
Upon perusal of the affidavits, it appears that the affidavits were written and
prepared in advance, and the pro forma affidavits were ready to be filled out
with the employees’ names and signatures. Through these affidavits, it is
made to appear that the affiants recanted their support of respondent’s
application for registration.
Accordingly, the Court cannot give full credence to these affidavits,
which were executed under suspicious circumstances, and which
contain allegations unsupported by evidence. At best, these
affidavits are self-serving. They possess no probative value.
A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. For
this reason, retractions are looked upon with disfavor and do not
automatically exclude the original statement or declaration based solely on
the recantation.
While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a
resignation from the union, the fact remains that at the time of the union’s
application for registration, the affiants were members of respondent and
they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of
registration as a labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a
20% minimum membership during the application for union registration. It
does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum
membership requirement all throughout its existence.
Respondent asserts that it had a total of 173 union members at the time it
applied for registration. Two names were repeated in respondent’s list and
had to be deducted, but the total would still be 171 union members. Further,
out of the four names alleged to be no longer connected with petitioner, only
two names should be deleted from the list. Thus it had a totalunion
membership of 169 at the time of its registration.
Since the total number of rank-and-file employees at that time was 528, 169
employees would be equivalent to 32% of the total rank-and-file workers
complement, still very much above the minimum required by law.
For the purpose of de-certifying a union such as respondent, it must be
shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in
connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto; the minutes of ratification; or, in connection with the
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election of officers, the minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters,
or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly
elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.
The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who
participated in the organizational meeting would not, to our mind, provide a
valid reason to cancel respondent’s certificate of registration. The
cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing dimension
on the right of labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to
be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code, the
nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and
compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union
members.
In the case at bar, the alleged failure of respondent to indicate with
mathematical precision the total number of employees in the bargaining unit
is of no moment, especially as it was able to comply with the 20% minimum
membership requirement.
G.R. No. L-33705 April 15, 1977
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (GASTON
GROUP), petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
and AIR LINES PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(GOMEZ GROUP), respondents.
G.R. No. L-35206 April 15, 1977
CESAR CHAVEZ, et al and AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION. OF THE
PHILIPPINES (GASTON), petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGES
16
ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, et al and PHILIPPINE AIR LINES INC.,
respondents.
Facts
These are two petitions for certiorari (L-33705 and L-35206), consolidated
for purposes of decision because they involve more or less the same parties
and interlocking issues.
In L-33705
A general ALPAP membership meeting was held on October 30, 1970, at
which 221 out of 270 members adopted a resolution amending ALPAP's
constitution and by-laws by providing in a new section thereof that —
Any active member who shall be forced to retire or forced to resign or
otherwise terminated for union activities as solely determined by the
Association shall have the option to either continue to be and remain as an
active member in good standing or to resign in writing his active membership
with the Association.
According to ALPAP (Gaston), the foregoing amendment was adopted "In
anticipation on the fact that they may be forced to resign or retire because
of their 'union activities.' At this period of time, PAL and On December 12,
1970, despite a no-work-stoppage order of the industrial court, a substantial
majority of ALPAP members filed letters of retirement/resignation from the
PAL. Thereafter, on December 18-22, 1970, an election of ALPAP officers
was held, resulting in the election of Felix C. Gaston as President by 180
votes. Upon the other hand, on December 23, 1970, about 45 pilots who did
not tender their retirement or resignation the PAL gathered at the house of
Atty. Morabe and elected Ben Hur Gomez as ALPAP President.
On January 2, 1971, the Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines,
represented by Ben Hur Gomez who claimed to be its President, filed a
petition with the Court of Industrial Relations praying for certification as the
sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of "all the pilots now
under employment by the Philippine Air Lines, Inc, and are on active flight
and/or operational assignments." The petition which was docketed in the
sala of Judge Joaquin M. Salvador as Case 2939-MC was opposed in the
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
name of the same association by Felix C. Gaston (who also claimed to be its
President) on the ground that the industrial court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter.
On May 29, 1971, after hearing the petition, Judge Salvador rendered a
decision in favor of Gomez, ruling that there has been no certification
election within the Period of 12 months prior to the date the petition for
certification was filed. On June 15, 1971, the industrial court en banc, acting
on a motion for reconsideration filed by ALPAP (Gaston) in Case 2939-MC
against the decision of Judge Salvador, denied the same. The said court's
resolution was then appealed to this Court (L-33705).
L-35206
On October 3, 1970, the President of the Philippines certified a labor dispute
between members of ALPAP and the PAL to the Court of Industrial Relation,
docketed as Case No. 101-IPA and was assigned to Judge Ansberto P.
Paredes. On October 7, 1970, Judge Paredes issued a return-to-work order,
considered as a manadatory injunction, against ALPAP members who joined
the strike against PAL. The strike, however, continued until the industrial
court en banc denied, on October 19, 1970, ALPAP's motion for
reconsideration of the said orders.
On October 22, 1970, the strikers returned to work, except (according to the
PAL) two pilots, one of them being Felix C. Gaston who allegedly refused to
take the flights assigned to him. Due to his refusal, among other reasons,
PAL terminated Gaston's services on October 27, 1970. On November 24,
1970, the PAL filed an urgent ex parte motion with the industrial court to
enjoin the members of ALPAP from proceeding with their intention to retire
or resign en masse, docketed as Case No. 101 –IPAB, which was granted.
ALPAP filed a motion for the reconsideration of the foregoing order claiming,
among other, that it subjected them to involuntary servitude. On June 3,
1971, ALPAP (Gaston) filed an opposition in Case 101-IPAB by ALPAP
(Gaston) claiming that, insofar as herein oppositors are concerned, the
allegations of PAL that their 'resignations' and 'retirements' are sham
resignations and retirements and that 'There is no honest or genuine desire
to terminate the employee relationship with PAL are completely false.
The court a quo however, rendered a decision in favor of PAL on December
11, 1970. Thus, on December 12, 1970, a substantial majority of the
17
members of ALPAP staged a mass resignation and/or retirement from PAL.
On December 28, 1970, Ben Hur Gomez, alleging that he was elected
President of ALPAP by its members who did not join the mass resignation
and retirement, filed a motion in Case 101 IPAB by praying that he be
allowed to represent the ALPAP which was theretofore represented by Capt.
Felix Gaston because the pilots who retired or resigned from PAL ceased to
be employees Thereof and no longer have any interest in the subject-matter
of the said case. This was later converted into a motion to intervene on
February 9, 1971.
On September 1, 1971, Felix Gaston filed a motion for Contempt against PAL
stating that his dismissal from PAL. He prayed that he be reinstated. On
October 23, 1971, twenty-one pilots who filed their retirement from PAL ,
also praying that they be readmitted to PAL or, failing so, that they be
allowed to retire with the benefits provided for under the PAL Retirement
Plan or, if there is no plan, that they be given separation pay. ALPAP
(Gomez) opposed the foregoing petitions.
On February 1, 1972, ALPAP (Gaston) joined and consolidated the mentioned
petitions for reinstatement, The same was opposed by both PAL and ALPAP
(Gomez),
On March 24, 1972, ALPAP (Gomez) filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings in Case 101-IPAB until the prejudicial question of who should
prosecute the main case (Case 101-IPA) is resolved. On April 18, 1972,
Judge Paredes issued an order deferring the hearing of the main case until
this Court shall have decided L-33705, but allowing other matters, including
the consolidated petition for reinstatement, to be heard. On May 5, 1972,
ALPAP (Gomez) filed another motion to suspend the hearing on the
mentioned petition for reinstatement on the ground that this Court's decision
in L-33705 should be awaited. The same was denied. On May 18, 1972,
ALPAP (Gomez) filed a motion for reconsideration. On June 19, 1972, the
industrial court en banc passed a resolution reversing Judge Paredes' order
on the ground that the question of the employee status of the pilots who
were seeking reinstatement with PAL has already been raised squarely in
Case 2939-MC, thus the decision of the court relating to Case 101 IPA (L –
33705) is not required to resolved Case 101-IPAB. Aggrieved, ALPAP
members appealed such resolution.
Issues
MICHEL LOUISE BAJO
1. L – 33705: Whether or not the authorization given by the industrial
court to ALPAP (Gomez), in a certification proceeding, to take over
the corporate name, office and funds of ALPAP, valid.
2. L – 35206: Whether or not, suspending hearings on the mentioned
petition for reinstatement is necessary until this Court shall have
decided L-33705.
Ruling
1. YES. This Court has always stressed that a certification proceeding
is not a litigation, in the sense in which this term is ordinarily
understood, but an investigation of a non-adversary, fact finding
character in which the Court of Industrial Relations plays the part of
a disinterested investigator seeking merely to ascertain the desires
of employees as to the matter of their representation (National Labor
Union vs. Go Soc and Sons, 23 SCRA 436;
We have made a careful examination of the records of L-33705 and we find
the adoption of the resolution introducing the questioned amendment to be
substancial compliance with the ALPAP constitution and by-law. On the
other hand, the fundamental assumptions relied upon by the industrial court,
as bases for authorizing ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the office and funds of
ALPAP being, in this Court's opinion, erroneous and was done with grave
abuse of discretion. This Court cannot hold as valid and binding the election
of Ben Hur Gomez as President of ALPAP. He was elected at a meeting of
only 45 ALPAP members called just one day after the election of Felix C.
Gaston as President of ALPAP who, as shown, received a majority of 180
votes out of a total membership of 270. tender the provisions of section 4,
article in of the Constitution and By-Laws of ALPAP, duly elected officers of
that association shall remain in office for at least one year;
However, as the circumstances pertinent to the case at bar presently stand,
ALPAP (Gaston) has extended recognition to ALPAP (Gomez) to enter and
conclude collective bargaining contracts with PAL. Having given ALPAP
(Gomez) this authority, it would be clearly unreasonable on the part of
ALPAP (Gaston) to disallow the former a certain use of the office, funds and
name of ALPAP when such use is necessary or would be required to enable
ALPAP (Gomez) to exercise, in a proper manner, its delegated authority to
bargain collectively with PAL. Clearly, an intelligently considered adjustment
of grievances and integration of the diverse and varying interests that not
18
infrequently and, often, unavoidably permeate the membership of a labor accordance with the applicable procedure prescribed by law, is hereby
organization, will go a long way, in achieving peace and harmony within the ordered to determine whether such claim is in order, particularly in view of
ranks of ALPAP. Of course, in the eventuality that the pilots presently the caveat made by PAL, in accepting the petitioners' individual letters of
employed by PAL and who subscribe to the leadership of Ben Hur Gomez retirement/resignation, that said petitioners shall not be entitled to any
should consider it to their better interest to have their own separate office, benefit or privilege to which they may otherwise be entitled by reason of
name and union funds, nothing can prevent them from setting up a separate their employment with PAL as the former's acts constituted a violation of the
labor union. In that eventuality, whatever vested rights, interest or order of the industrial court dated November 26, 1970.
participation they may have in the assets, including cash funds, of ALPAP as
a result of their membership therein should properly be liquidated in favor of Without costs in both instances
such withdrawing members of the association. On the matter of whether the
industrial court also abuse its authority for allowing ALPAP (Gomez) to
appropriate the ALPAP name, it does not appear that the herein petitioner
has shown below any exclusive franchise or right to the use of that name.
Hence, there is no proper basis for correcting the action taken by the court
below on this regard.

2. NO. This Court finds that the matter of the reinstatement of the
pilots who retired or resigned from PAL was ventilated fully and
adequately in the certification case in all its substantive aspects,
including the allegation of the herein petitioners that they were
merely led to believe in good faith that in retiring or resigning from
PAL they were simply exercising their rights to engage in concerted
activity.

In the light of the circumstances thus found below it can be safely concluded
that the mass retirement and resignation action of the herein petitioners was
intentionally planned to abort the effects of the October 7, 10 and 19, 1970
return-to-work orders of the industrial court (which they, in fact, ignored for
more than a week) by placing themselves beyond the jurisdictional control of
the said court through the umbrella of the constitutional, prohibition against
involuntary servitude, thereby enabling them to pursue their main pressure
objective of grounding most, if not all, PAL flight operations.

Thus, in L-35206, the petition assailing the resolution of the Court of

Industrial Relations dated June 19, 1972, is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit insofar as the petitioners' allegations of their right to reinstatement
with PAL, is concerned. With reference to the alternative action, re: payment
of their claims for retirement or separation pay, the Secretary of Labor, in

MICHEL LOUISE BAJO 19