CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE DIGEST COMPILATION

Article 1 (National Territory)

1) Magallona v. Ermita

FACTS: RA 3046 was passed in 1961 which provides among others the demarcation lines of the
baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I. 

RA 5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the
government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo. 

RA 9522 took effect on March 2009 amending RA 5446. The amendments, which are in
compliance with UNCLOS III in which the Philippines is one of the signatory, shortening one
baseline while optimizing the other and classifying Kalayaan Group of Island and Scarborough
Shoal as Regimes of Island.

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA
9522:- it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the
country to maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the
economy, sovereignty, national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the
classification of Regime of Islands would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen. 

ISSUE(S):

1. WON the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit; and
2. WON RA 9522 is unconstitutional

RULING:

Petition is dismissed. 

1st Issue: 
The SC ruled the suit is not a taxpayer or legislator, but as a citizen suit, since it is the citizens
who will be directly injured and benefitted in affording relief over the remedy sought. 

2nd Issue:
The SC upheld the constitutionality of RA 9522. 

First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory the Philippines but is merely a statutory tool to
demarcate the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III. SC emphasized
that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as provided under the laws of
nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a long-time negotiation to establish
a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from
the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone
[200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves. In order to measure said
distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their archipelagic doctrines measured in
accordance to the treaty—the role played by RA 9522. The contention of the petitioner that RA
9522 resulted to the loss of 15,000 square nautical miles is devoid of merit. The truth is, RA
9522, by optimizing the location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of
145,216 square nautical miles.
Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is consistent with
the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the archipelago, the
country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the length of the baseline
shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So what the legislators did is to carefully analyze the
situation: the country, for decades, had been claiming sovereignty over KGI and Scarborough
Shoal on one hand and on the other hand they had to consider that these are located at non-
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago. So, the
classification is in accordance with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III.  

Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without prejudice with delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which
the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitution’s
delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the internal waters
of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent
and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution
hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water
lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However, sovereignty will not bar
the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of navigation and the
generally accepted principles of international law. It can be either passed by legislator as a
municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the Philippines law since the
right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated
thereto. 

This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser footing; it just signifies concession of
archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all waters inside the baseline. In fact, the
demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within
such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is
in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the
international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

The Court expressed that it is within the Congress who has the prerogative to determine the
passing of a law and not the Court. Moreover, such enactment was necessary in order to comply
with the UNCLOS III; otherwise, it shall backfire on the Philippines for its territory shall be open
to seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas
around our archipelago and it will weaken the country’s case in any international dispute over
Philippine maritime space.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and
adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the
breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most
vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the
Constitution and our national interest

Article 2, Section 1 (Government)

 2) Funa v, MECO

FACTS:.
- The Philippines subscribes to the “One China Policy” of the Communist People’s
Republic of China (PROC) under the Joint Communique between RP and PROC.
- The Philippines ended its diplomatic relations with the government of Taiwan (nationalist
Republic of China ) on June 9 1975.
- Despite this the Philippines and Taiwan maintained an unofficial relationship facilitated
by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office for Taiwan and the MANILA ECONOMIC
AND CULTURAL OFFICE(MECO) for the Philippines
- MECO was organized on Dec 16 1997 as a non-stock non-profit corporation. from then
on MECO became the corporate entity entrusted by the Philipine Government with
maintaining the friendly and unofficial relations with the People of Taiwan.
- In order to carry out its functions, MECO was authorized by the Government to perform
certain consular and other functions that relate to the promotion, protection and
facilitation of Philippine interests in Taiwan
o At present, MEco oversees the rights and interests of OFWs in Taiwan, promotes
the Philippines as a tourist and investment destination for the Taiwanese and
facilitates travel of Filipinos and Taiwanese from Taiwan to the Philippines and
vice versa.
- Dennis AB Funa wrote to COA requesting for the latest financial and audit report of
MECO. HE invoked his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
He believed that MECO was under the supervision of DTI and is a GOCC thus subject to
the audit jurisdiction of COA.
- COA asst. Commissioner Naranjo issued a memorandum which stated that MECO is not
among the agencies audited by any of the three clusters of the Corporate Government
Sector.
- This prompted Funa to file this mandamus petition in his capacity as "taxpayer,
concerned citizen, a member of the Philippine Bar and law book author” he alleged that
COA neglected its duty under Sec. 2(1) Art IX-D of the Constitution. He claimed that
MECO was a GOCC or at least a government instrumentality whose funds partake the
nature of public funds.
- To support his argument he presented the following points
o It is a non-stock corporation vested with governmental functions relating to
public needs
o It is controlled by the government thru a board of directors appointed by the
Philippine President
o It is under the operational and policy supervision of DTI
- He also compared MECO with the American Institute in Taiwan. AIT is supposedly
audited by the US Comptroller General.
- MECO: prayed for the dismissal of the mandamus petition on procedural and substantial
grounds.
o Procedural: prematurely filed. Funa never demanded for COA to make an audit.
The only action he took was to request for a copy of the financial and audit report
of MECO. This request was not finally disposed of by the time the petition was
filed
o Substantial: MECO is not a GOCC. The “desire letter” of the President sends to
MECO is merely recommendatory and not binding on the corporation (in relation
to the election of the Board of MECO). In the end the members are the ones who
 elect the directors and these directors are private individuals and not government
officials. MECO also argued that the government merely has a policy supervision
over it. The government merely sees to it that the activities of MECO are in tune
with the One China Policy under the PROC. The day-to-day operations of
MECO are still under the control of the Board.
o It also argued that for MECO to be considered a GOCC would be a violation of
the One China Policy of the PROC
- COA: wanted the petition to be dismissed on procedural grounds and that the issue is
already moot
o Procedural: lacks locus standi Funa wasn’t shown to have been aggrieved or
prejudiced by COA’s failure to Audit MECO. Also, that the case violated the
doctrine of hierarchy of Courts. Funa failed to justify a direct petition to SC
o Moot: COA Chair already sent a team to Taiwan to audit MECO and other
government agencies based there.
o Although the COA concedes that MECO is within its jurisdiction, it maintains
that MECO is not a GOCC nor is it a Government instrumentality, instead
MECO is a non-governmental entity.
 MECO may still be audited with respect to Verification Fees. These fees
are what MECO collects from Taiwanese employers. A portion of these
fees are remitted to DOLE. ‘Under Sec 26 of PD 1445 or the STATE
AUDIT CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MECO is a non-governmental
entity required to pay government share and is subject to partial audit

ISSUES & RATIO.

Whether MECO is a Governmental entity and is subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA.
MECO is not a GOCC nor is it a Governmental entity, however, certain transactions of
MECO are subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA (verification fees and consular fees)

Procedural issues:
Mootness: the issue is not moot. Despite the existence of supervening events( the eventual
auditing done by COA in Taiwan), the issue is within the exceptions of rule on dismissal of moot
cases.
-The issue deals with a supposed grave violation of the constitution ( Funa alleged that
COA neglected to audit MECO),
-that the issue is of paramount public interest (the failure of COA to audit MECO if it
was supposed to audit MECO shows that COA failed to fulfill its duties as guardian of
the public treasury AND the status of MECO has a direct bearing on the country’s
commitment to the One China Policy)
-and that it is susceptible to repetition (COA suddenly decided to audit MECO, unless the
issue is decided, the successor of the current COA chair might decide to not auditing
MECO)

Standing: the instant petition raises issues of transcendental importance

Principle of Hierarchy of Courts: transcendental importance of the issues raised in the mandamus
petition, hence the court waives this procedural issue

MAIN ISSUE

Jurisdiction of COA
Under SEC 2(1) ART IX-D of the constitution, COA was vested with the power, authority and
duty to examine, audit and settle the accounts(revenue," "receipts," "expenditures" and "uses of
funds and property") of the following entitites:
- Government , or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities
- GOCCs with original charters
- GOCCs without original charters
- Constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy
under the Constitution and
- Non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly from or
through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit
to the COA for audit as a condition of subsidy or equity.

Complementing the constitutional power of the COA to audit accounts of "non-governmental

entities receiving subsidy or equity xxx from or through the government" is Section 29(1)80 of
the Audit Code, which grants the COA visitorial authority over the following non-governmental
entities:
1. Non-governmental entities "subsidized by the government";
2. Non-governmental entities "required to pay levy or government share";
3. Non-governmental entities that have "received counterpart funds from the government"; and
4. Non-governmental entities "partly funded by donations through the government."

The Administrative Code also empowers the COA to examine and audit "the books, records and
accounts" of public utilities "in connection with the fixing of rates of every nature, or in relation
to the proceedings of the proper regulatory agencies, for purposes of determining franchise tax."

SC: MECO is not a GOCC or Governmental Instrumentality

Government instrumentalities are agencies of the national government that, by reason of some
"special function or jurisdiction" they perform or exercise, are allotted "operational autonomy"
and are "not integrated within the department framework. They include:
1.regulatory agencies; 2.chartered institutions; 3.government corporate entities or government
instrumentalities with corporate powers (GCE/GICP); and 4. GOCCs

GOCCs: "stock or non-stock" corporations "vested with functions relating to public needs" that
are "owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities."

By definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC: first, its organization as stock
or non-stock corporation; second, the public character of its function; and third,
government ownership over the same. Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an
entity a GOCC

MECO is a non-stock corporation based on the records and based on the fact that its
earnings are not distributed as dividends to its members

MECO performs functions with a Public Aspect. MECO was "authorized" by the
Philippine government to perform certain "consular and other functions" relating to the
promotion, protection and facilitation of Philippine interests in Taiwan. The functions of
the MECO are of the kind that would otherwise be performed by the Philippines’ own
diplomatic and consular organs, if not only for the government’s acquiescence that they
instead be exercised by the MECO.
 The MECO Is Not Owned or Controlled by the Government. The "desire letters" that
the President transmits are merely recommendatory and not binding on it. Under its by-
laws, the election of its directors are done by the members themselves, its officers are
elected by the directors and members are admitted through a unanimous board resolution.
None of the incorporators of MECO were government officials and up to this day, none
of the members, directors or officers are government appointees or public officers
designated by reason of their office.

SC: it is a sui generis entity

Since MECO is not a GOCC, it cannot also be either of the other government instrumentalities
primarily because these instrumentalities are creatures of law (meaning an actual law was passed
for their creation) while MECO was incorporated under the Corporation code.

The reason behind it being under the supervision of the DTI is because its functions may result in
it engaged in dealings or activities that can directly contradict the Philippines’ commitment to the
One China Policy. This scenario can be avoided if theExecutive exercises some sort of
supervision over it. But this aspect was not questioned by the petitioner, so this was deemed
irrelevant to the issue by the SC.

Certain accounts may be audited by the COA

MECO should be subjected to the auditing of COA as regards its collection of verification and
consular fees.
Pertinent is the provision of the Administrative Code, Section 14(1), Book V thereof, which
authorizes the COA to audit accounts of non–governmental entities “required to pay xxx or have
government share” but only with respect to “funds xxx coming from or through the government.”
The said fees collected by MECO are receivables of DOLE.

As to the verification fees("service fee for the verification of overseas employment contracts,
recruitment agreement or special powers of attorney"): Under Section 7 of EO No. 1022, DOLE
has the authority to collect verification fees. But it entered into a series of MoA with MECO
authorizing the latter to collect such fees since the PH does not have an official post in Taiwan.

As to the consular fees: The authority behind “consular fees” is Section 2(6) of EO No. 15, s.
2001. The said section authorizes the MECO to collect “reasonable fees” for its performance of
consular functions. Evidently, and just like the peculiarity that attends the DOLE “verification
fees,” there is no consular office for the collection of the “consular fees.” Thus, the authority for
the MECO to collect the “reasonable fees,” vested unto it by the executive order (EO No. 15, s.
2001)

Update of PCA Judgment

3) Permanent Court of Arbitration, South China Sea (SCS) Dispute Between

Philippines and People`s Republic of China

Article 2; Section 3 (AFP as Protector) in Relation to Article 3, Section 1 and Article 14,
Section 5 (2) (Academic Freedom)
 4) First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia of the PMA v, The Superintendent of the
PMA

Facts:
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the
Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with honors as the class salutatorian,
receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate and be commissioned as an
ensign of the Navy.

Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR) because he was late for two minutes in his ENG
412 class, other cadets were also reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached the Department of
Tactical Officers and were logged and transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for
explanation. Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours.

Several days after, Cudia was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of the Honor
Code. Lying that is giving statements that perverts the truth in his written appeal stating that his
4th period class ended at 3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class.

Cudia submitted his letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC constituted a team to
conduct the preliminary investigation on the violation, it recommended the case be formalized.
Cudia pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the Chairman,
the HC reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict.

The HC denied Cudia’s appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted a formal
review and checking of findings. Special orders were issued placing Cudia on indefinite leave of
absence and pending approval of separation from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Cudia
submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets requesting his re-instatement. The
matter was referred to Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision.

Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but the President sustained the findings of the CRAB.
CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding probable cause for Human Rights Violations.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cudia in
utter disregard of his right to due process and in holding that he violated the Honor Code
through lying.
2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs

Ruling:
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process, education,
and property should be placed in the context of the Honor Code. All the administrative
remedies were exhausted. A student of a military academy must be prepared to
subordinate his private interest for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMA
may impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it deems fit and consistent with
the peculiar needs of the institution. PMA has regulatory authority to administratively
dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement
of the internal rules and regulations.
2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated by Article VIII of
the Constitution. The court’s mandate (according to Section 1, Article 8) is expanded that
the duty of the courts is not only to “settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether or not there has
 been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government” even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions. No one is above the law, including the military, especially in violations of
Constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Dispositive:
The petition is denied. The dismissal was affirmed.

ISSUE(s):
(1) Whether or not the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing cadet first class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia from the
academy in utter disregard of his right to due process. [NO]
(2) Whether the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and Appeals Board
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that cadet first class Aldrin Jeff P. Cudia lied,
thereby violating the Honor Code. [NO]

(3) Whether the result of the fact-finding investigation independently conducted by the CHR is of
such great weight and persuasive nature that the Court may honor, uphold, and respect. [NO]

RULING:

AFP Code of Ethics, Oath of Cadet Corps to the Honor Code and the Honor System, military
professionalism, and, in general, military culture.

Section 31, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 1 (also known as "The National Defense Act")

o Sections 30 and 31 of C.A. No. 1, only President Aquino as the Commander-in-Chief has the
power to appoint and remove a cadet for a valid/legal cause. The law gives no authority to the HC
as the sole body to determine the guilt or innocence of a cadet. It also does not empower the PMA
to adopt the guilty findings of the HC as a basis for recommending the cadet’s dismissal. In the
case of Cadet 1CL Cudia, it is claimed that the PMA blindly followed the HC’s finding of guilt in
terminating his military service.

Section 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expanded the scope of judicial power by
mandating that the duty of the courts of justice includes not only “to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable” but also “to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government”

Section 3, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 (as amended by
E.O. No. 1005),

Art. XIV, Sec 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning."

As the premiere military educational institution of the AFP in accordance with Section 30, Article
III of C.A. No. 1 and Sections 58 and 59, Chapter 9, Subtitle II, Title VIII, Book IV of E.O. No.
292, the PMA is an institution that enjoys academic freedom guaranteed by Section 5 (2), Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

APPLICATION:

In this case, as shown in the previous discussions, there is no evidence that the findings of the
investigating and reviewing bodies below are not supported by evidence or vitiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion; that the procedure which led to the findings is irregular; that palpable
errors were committed; or that a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest.

With respect to the core issue whether lying is present in this case, all investigation and reviewing
bodies are in consonance in holding that Cadet 1CL Cudia in truth and in fact lied. Respondent
insist that violation of the Honor Code warrants separation of the guilty cadet from the cadet
corps, under the Cadet Corps Armed Forces of the Philippines Regulation, a violation of the
Cadet Honor Code is considered Grave (class 1) delinquency which merits a recommendation for
a cadet`s dismissal from the PMA Superintendent. The same is likewise clear from the Honor
Code and Honor System Handbook.

Cadet Cudia has necessarily and voluntarily relinquished certain civil liberties by virtue of his
entry to the PMA. The PMA enjoys Academic Freedom which authorized it to impose
disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit and consistent with the peculiar needs of the
academy. Cadet Cudia was properly afforded due process. The Court Differs with Petitioners.
Petition is Denied Dismissal of Cadet First Class Cudia was affirmed by the SC.

Article 2, Sec. 14 (Equality Between Women and Men) in Relation to Article 3, Sec. 1
(Equal Protetion) and Article 8, Section 1 (Judicial Power)

5) Garcia v. Hon Judge Drilon

FACTS: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical,
emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of
her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth
by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.
The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment
on why the TPO should not be modified.  After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner
no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an
invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure
to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said
law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

ISSUES:

WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was
not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the
validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect
the family as a basic social institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

RULING:

1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the
Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and
apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification
and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of
violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.

4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled
that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence
is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.  The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. 
The same holds true with the issuance of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

HELD:

RA 9262 is NOT UNCONSITUTIONAL.

1.      RA 9262 - compliance with the CEDAW

It has been acknowledged that "gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously

inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men." RA 9262
can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’ compliance with the CEDAW, which is committed to
condemn discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay, all
appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in
practice. 

CEDAW

Known as the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most
comprehensive document for the advancement of the welfare of women. The CEDAW, in its
preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination against women, and
emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect for human
dignity.

RA 9262 justified under the Constitution

The Constitution abundantly authorize Congress or the government to actively undertake
ameliorative action that would remedy existing inequalities and inequities experienced by women
and children brought about by years of discrimination. The equal protection clause when
juxtaposed to this provision provides a stronger mandate for the government to combat such
discrimination. Indeed, these provisions order Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities."

The gender-based classification of RA 9262 does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause (application of the substantive equality model)

The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put
them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the
equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed
differences between men and women.

RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental
objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The
gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women
and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives.
Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-
based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied in
the 1987 Constitution.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Article 2, Sec. 12 in Relation to Article 3, Sec. 1, Article 3, Sec. 3, Article 3, Sec. 6, Article 3,
Sec. 18, Article 6, Sec. 1 and Article 6 Sec. 26.

6) Imbong v. Hon. Ochoa

FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act.
The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
 8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the
Constitution
 
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule
 
 
ISSUES:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the:
1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude
 
PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Actual Case or Controversy
2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule
 

RULING:

SUBSTANTIAL
1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express their
own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.” In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the
traditional meaning of “conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by
the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that
 conception begins at fertilization. The framers of the Constitution also intended for
(a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the protection of the
unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives
for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female
ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-
abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child
was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the
RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that
induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH
Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients
only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s
womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives
that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This
violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be
struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are
made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure
shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9
of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and materials
have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in
support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or
wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom. The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and
thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control
program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to
the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes
 into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood
and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe
upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the
family. The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure
is already a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: “The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written
consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental
authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid
as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-
surgical procedures.” However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to
procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance
and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether
to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in
life-threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before
it. Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education
has not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in
the development of their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents
in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State. The provisions of Section 14 of
the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant)
the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children. By
incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the
program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions
of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague. The definition of “private
health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution”
cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service
provider. The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing
of information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as
provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures. The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation
to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice
and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.
 7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII
of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers. The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to
reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition,
the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not
impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to
provide priority to the poor. The exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize
the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive
health education.

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to
involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only
encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono  Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise. However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their
religious beliefs do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
 
 

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited
by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of
specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of
the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other
rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.

Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter
of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers,
and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ
in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and
where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one
title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another
or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act.”  
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view,
the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it
finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the
rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute
prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial
unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s), usually
shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand
independently as law.    

 
1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out
the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also
a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the
case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being
criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.
2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and
other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For
unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated
by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of
the Constitution. Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously
alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the
RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a
reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. The present action cannot
be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take
primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation,
specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This
is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs,
the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis
of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and
“responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human
 rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. Considering the close
intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive
the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

6. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except
with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of
his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily”
in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and
void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution
Article 2, Sec. 16, in relation to Article 8, Sec. 5 (2) (a); Article 10, Sec. 2, and Sec. 59 of the
Indigenous People`s Rights Act.

7) Paje v. Casino et al

FACTS:
 In February 2006, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), a government agency
organized and established under Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, and Taiwan Cogeneration
Corporation (TCC) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) expressing
their intention to build a power plant in Subic Bay which would supply reliable and
affordable power to Subic Bay Industrial Park (SBIP).
 On July 28, 2006, SBMA and TCC entered into another MOU, whereby TCC undertook
to build and operate a coal-fired power plant.
 On April 4, 2007, the SBMA Ecology Center issued SBFZ Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) in favor of Taiwan Cogeneration International Corporation (TCIC), a
subsidiary of TCC, for the construction, installation, and operation of 2x150-MW
Circulating Fluidized Bed (CFB) Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant at Sitio Naglatore.
 On June 6, 2008, TCC assigned all its rights and interests under the MOU dated July 28,
2006 to Redondo Peninsula Energy, Inc. (RP Energy).
 RP Energy then contracted GHD Pty., Ltd. (GHD) to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the proposed coal-fired power plant and to assist RP Energy in
applying for the issuance of an ECC from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
 The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 131, Series of
2008, expressing the city government’s objection to the coal-fired power plant as an
energy source and urging the proponent to consider safer alternative sources ofenergy for
Subic Bay.
 On December 22, 2008, the DENR, through former Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., issued
an ECC for the proposed 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant.
 Sometime thereafter, RP Energy decided to include additional components in its
proposed coal-fired power plant. On July 8, 2010, the DENR-EMB issued an amended
ECC (first amendment) allowing the inclusion of additional components, among others.
 Several months later, RP Energy again requested the DENR-EMB to amend the ECC.
Instead of constructing a 2x150-MW coal-fired power plant, as originally planned, it now
sought to construct a 1x300-MW coal-fired power plant.
 On May 26, 2011, the DENR-EMB granted the request and further amended the ECC
(second amendment).
 The Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Zambales issued Resolution No. 2011-149, opposing
the establishment of a coal-fired thermal power plant.
 The Liga ng mga Barangayof Olongapo City issued Resolution No. 12, Series of 2011,
expressing its strong objection to the coal-fired power plant as an energy source.
 Hon. Casino’s group filed for a writ of kalikasan against RP energy, SBMA, DENR. The
Casiño Group alleged, among others, that the power plant project would cause
environmental damage. that it would adversely affect the health of the residents of the
municipalities of Subic, Zambales, Morong, Hermosa, and the City of Olongapo.
 While the case was pending in the CA, RP Energy applied for another amendment to its
ECC proposing the construction and operation of a 2x300-MW coal fired power plant
 CA:
Denied the writ of kalikasan due to the failure of the Casiño Group to prove that its
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology was violated or threatened
- no reason also to nullify sec 8.3 of DAO 2003-30) which allows amendments of ECCs.
Not ultra vires, as the express power of the Secretary of DENR, director and regional
directors of the EMB to issue an ECC impliedly includes the incidental power to amend
the same.
- The validity of the said section cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for a writ of
kalikasan
But invalidated the ECC for non-compliance with the IPRA law and LGC and failure to affix
the signature in the sworn statement of full responsibility
- Non-compliance with sec 59 of IPRA Law (enjoins all departments and other
governmental agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification that the area
affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain)
- The CA also invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy as it was issued
without the prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as required
under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC
- For failure of Luis Miguel Abolitz, director of RP Energy to affix his signature in the
sworn statement of full responsibility (integral part of the ECC)
- The first and second amendment for failure to comply with the restrictions in the ECC
which requires that any expansion of the project beyond the project description or any
change in the activity shall be subject to a new environmental impact assessment
Invalidated the LDA entered into by SBMA and RP Energy
- Issued without prior consultation and approval of all the sanggunians concerned as under
secs 26 and 27 of the LGC
- In violation of sec 59 chapter VIII of the IPRA Law which enjoins all departments and
other governmental agencies from granting any lease without a prior certification that the
area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain
- no CNO was secured from the NCIP prior to the execution of the LDA and that
the CNO dated October 31, 2012 was secured during the pendency of the case
and was issued in connection with RP Energy’s application for a 2x300 MW
Coal fired plant
ISSUE

1. Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan;
and
2. Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan

Ruling

1. Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan
because the Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases) allow the parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact— and, thus,
constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court— because of the extraordinary nature of
the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan.
2. Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is
principally predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology, which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends
political and territorial boundaries.

A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance
of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a
causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the
issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition
should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed before the proper forum with due regard to
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted
relative to the aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or
irregularities in the issuance of the ECC.
The appellate court correctly ruled that the Casino group FAILED to substantiate its claims that
the construction and operation of the power plant will cause environmental damage of the
magnitude contemplated under the writ of kalikasan. On the other hand, RP Energy presented
evidence to establish that the subject project will not cause grave environmental damage through
its environmental management plan which will ensure that the project will operate within the
limits of existing environmental laws and standars.

OTHER ISSUES:
 CA erred in invalidating the ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr. Abolitz in the
ECC’s statement of accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP
Energy to the CA. The circumstance of the case show that the DENR and RP Energy
were not properly apprised of the issue of lack of signature in order for them to present
controverting evidence and arguments on this point, as the issue only arose during the
course of the proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the CA.
 CA erred when it ruled that the first and second amendments to the ECC were invalid for
failure to comply with a new EIA and for violating DAO 2003-30 and the Revised
Manual. DENR reasonably exercised its discretion in requiring an ERMP and a
PDR for the first and second amendment respectively. Through these documents
which the DENR reviewed, a new EIA was conducted relative to the proposed
project modifications. No showing of grave abuse of discretion or patent illegality.
 CA erred when it invalidated ECC for failure to comply with sec 59 of the IPRA Law.
The ECC is not the license or permit contemplated under sec 59. There is no
necessity to secure the Certificate of Non Overlap (CNO) under sec 59 before and
ECC may be issued and the issuance of the subject ECC without first securing the
aforesaid certification does not render it invalid.
 CA erred when it ruled that compliance with sec 27 in relation to sec 26 of the LGC
(approval of the concerned sanggunian requirement) is necessary prior to issuance of the
subject ECC) issuance of the ECC does not, by itself, result in the implementation of the
project. Hence, there is no necessity to secure prior compliance with the approval of
the concerned sanggunian requirement and the issuance of the subject ECC without
first complying with the aforesaid requirement does not render it invalid.

8) West Tower Condominium Corporation v. FPIC

 9) LNL v. Agham Party List

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Amended Decision dated 13
September 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00012.
1. Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (“LAMI”) is the operator of a mining claim located
in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, non-commercial port in
Brgy. Bolitoc which is about 25 kilometers away from the mine site.
a. A port is a vital infrastructure to the operations of a mining company to ship out ores and
other minerals extracted from the mines.
. LAMI secured the following permits and compliance certificates for the port project:
DENR Environmental Compliance Certificate
DENR provisional foreshore lease agreement with LAMI
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) Clearance to Develop a Port
PPA Permit to Construct a Port
PPA Special Permit to Operate a Beaching Facility
Tree Cutting Permit/Certification from the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the DENR.
. LAMI was supported by the Zambales Alliance, Bolitoc community, and even the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz. However, the local government refused to issue
business and mayor’s permits despite complying with the requirements. Mayor Marty
issued an order directing LAMI to refrain from continuing with its clearing works.
. DENR Environmental Management Bureau in Region III (DENR-EMB R3) received a
letter dated from Mayor Marty inquiring if the ECC the DENR issued in favor of LAMI
allowed LAMI to cut trees and level a mountain. It was found that LAMI violated some of
its conditions under the ECC. A Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued against LAMI for
violation of certain conditions of the ECC with a cease and desist order from further
constructing and developing until such time that the ECC conditions were fully complied.

. However, DENR found that LAMI's activities in its property would not result to any
environmental damage to its surrounding communities and lifted the cease and desist
order after LAMI was found to have complied with the requirements.
. Respondent Agham Party List (Agham), through its President, former Representative
Angelo B. Palmones (Rep. Palmones), filed a Petition for the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan. Agham alleged that: Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, or the Revised Forestry Code; and Sections 57 and 69 of RA No. 7942,
or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Philippine Mining Act). LAMI cut mountain trees
and flattened a mountain which serves as a natural protective barrier from typhoons and
floods not only of the residents of Zambales but also the residents of some nearby towns
located in Pangasinan.

ISSUES:
1. Is LAMI’s project violative of the environmental laws as alleged by
Agham? NO, LAMI did not violate laws as alleged by Agham.

2. Did LAMI flatten any mountain and cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces? NO, LAMI
did not flatten any mountain which caused environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
[Revised Forestry Code] LAMI was given a Tree Cutting Permit 45 by the CENRO dated 17
April 2012.
[Philippine Mining Act] These two provisions are inapplicable to this case. First, LAMI is not
conducting any mining activity on the port site. LAMI's mine site is about 25 kilometers away
from the port site. Second, LAMI secured all the necessary permits and licenses for the
construction of a port and LAMI's activity was limited to preparatory works for the port's
construction.
The Philippine Mining Act deals with mining operations and other mining activities. Sections 57
and 69 deal with the development of a mining community and environmental protection covering
a mineral agreement or permit.

[Section 2 of Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases] The Rules are clear that in a Writ of
Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation
violated or threatened to be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
. In accusing that LAMI allegedly flattened a mountain, Agham did not cite any law
allegedly violated by LAMI in relation to this claim.
. Agham did not present any proof to demonstrate that the local residents in Zambales, and
even the nearby towns of Pangasinan, complained of any great danger or harm on the
alleged leveling of the land formation which may affect their lives, health or properties.
Neither was there any evidence showing of a grave and real environmental damage to the
barangay and the surrounding vicinity.
1. Witnesses claim that the project “does not in any way affect or cannot affect the Province of
Pangasinan as alleged.”
b. [Existence of a mountain] Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Geosciences Division of the DENR
concluded that the "mountain" is only an elongated mound.

DECISION:
Petition GRANTED. Ammended CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Original CA
decision, which DENIED the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.
Is REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED

10) International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications v. Green

Peace Southeast Asia, et al.

FACTS

 On 24 September 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed between

International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA),
University of the Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and UP Mindanao
Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in pursuance of a collaborative research and development
project on eggplants that are resistant to the fruit and shoot borer. Other partner agencies
involved were UPLB through its Institute of Plant Breeding, Maharastra Hybrid Seed
Company (MAHYCO) of India, Cornell University and the Agricultural Biotechnology
Support Project II (ABSPII) of USAID.
 The UPLB Field Trial Proposal states that the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial
was described as a “bio-engineered eggplant.” The crystal toxin genes from the soil
bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant genome to
produce the protein CrylAc which is toxic to target insect pests. The latter is said to be
 highly specific to lepidopteran larvae such as fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most
destructive insect pest of eggplant.
 NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment which was conducted
from 2007 to 3 March 2009 stating that during the conduct of experiment, all the
biosafety measures have been complied with and no untoward incident has occurred.
 On 16 March 2010 and 28 June 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) issued biosafety
permits to UPLB.
 Field testing commenced on various dates in the following approved trial sites: Kabacan,
North Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City;
and Bay, Laguna.
 On 26 April 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents (Greenpeace,
et.al.) filed a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with prayer
for the issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) alleging that the
Bt talong field trials violate their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology
considering that:
- The required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under PD 1151 was
not secured prior to the project implementation
- There is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bt talong for
human consumption and the environment
- There was a study conducted showing adverse effects on rats who were fed Bt
corn, local scientists likewise attested to the harmful effects of GMOs to human
and animal health
- Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species
- There is a failure to comply with the required public consultation under Sections
26 and 27 of the Local Government Code
- The case calls for the application of the precautionary principle, it being a classic
environmental case where scientific evidence as to the health, environmental and
socio-economic safety is insufficient or uncertain and preliminary scientific
evaluation indicates reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially
dangerous effects on human health and the environment
 The following reliefs are prayed for by Greenpeace, et.al., to wit:
- Issuance of a TEPO enjoining BPI and Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA)
of the Department of Agriculture (DA) from processing for field testing and
registering as herbicidal product Bt talong in the Philippines, stopping all
pending field testing, and ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong; and
- Issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus commanding the ISAAAI, et.al.: (1)
to submit to an environmental impact statement system under the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR-EMB); (2) to submit an independent, comprehensive, and rigid risk
assessment, field tests report, and regulatory compliance reports; (3) to submit all
issued certifications on public information, public consultation, public
participation and consent from the LGUs affected by the field testing; (4) to
submit an acceptable draft of an amendment of the NBF and DAO 2002-08; and
(5) for BPI of DA to conduct balanced nationwide public information on the
nature of Bt talong and Bt talong field trial, and a survey of its social
acceptability.
 On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB, BPI, FPA and
UPLB, ordering them to file a verified return.
 The contentions of the respondents are as follows:
 - All environmental laws were complied with, including public consultations in the
affected communities
- The Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact
Statement Law
- There is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed, on the safety
of Bt talong for human consumption
- Allegations regarding the safety of Bt talong are irrelevant in the field trial stage
as none of the eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals
- There is a non-observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts
- Greenpeace, et.al. have no legal standing as they do not stand to suffer any direct
injury as a result of the Bt talong field tests
- The precautionary principle does not apply since the field testing is only a part of
a continuing study to ensure that the field trials have no significant and negative
impact on the environment
 SC, in a Resolution dated 10 July 2012, referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
 On 12 September 2012, the parties submitted the following procedural issues before the
CA: (1) whether Greenpeace, et.al. has legal standing to file the petition for writ of
kalikasan; (2) whether the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the alleged
termination of the Bt talong field testing; and (3) whether the case presented a justiciable
controversy
 CA, in a Resolution dated 12 October 2012, resolved that: (1) the Greenpeace, et.al.
possess legal standing; (2) the case is not yet moot since it is capable of repetition yet
evading review; and (3) the alleged non-compliance with environmental and local
government laws present justiciable controversies for resolution by the court.
 On 17 May 2013, CA rendered a decision in favor of the Greenpeace, et.al. finding that
the precautionary principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (the Rules) finds relevance in the case.
 CA rejected the Motions for Reconsideration filed by ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB
and UPLBFI rejecting the argument that CA violated UPLB’s right to academic freedom.
The writ stops the field trials of Bt talong as a procedure, it does not stop Bt talong
research. Thus, there is no assault on academic freedom.
 CA further justified its ruling by expounding on the theory that introducing a genetically
modified plant into our ecosystem is an “ecologically imbalancing act.”
 Before the SC is a consolidated petition of ISAAAI, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI
to reverse the CA decision permanently enjoining the conduct of field trials for
Genetically Modified eggplants.

ISSUES

1. WON the law on environmental impact statement/assessment applies on projects

involving the introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country
2. WON there is neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public respondents in the
processing and evaluation of the applications for Bt talong field testing
3. WON the Precautionary Principle applies

RULING

1. Yes. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most particularly petitioners
DENR-EMB, BPI and FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS system should apply to
the release of GMOs into the environment and issue joint guidelines on the matter.
 The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the direct and
indirect impacts of a project on the biophysical and human environment and ensuring that
these impacts are addressed by appropriate environmental protection and enhancement
measures. It aids proponents in incorporating environmental considerations in planning their
projects as well as in determining the environment’s impact on their project.” There are six
stages in the regular EIA process. The proponent initiates the first three stages while EMB
takes the lead in the last three stages. Public participation is enlisted in most stages.

Even without the issuance of EO 514, GMO field testing should have at least been
considered for EIA under existing regulations of EMB on new and emerging technologies, to
wit:
g) Group V (Unclassified Projects): These are the projects not listed in
any of the groups, e.g. projects using new processes/technologies with
uncertain impacts. This is an interim category – unclassified projects will
eventually be classified into their appropriate groups after EMB evaluation.
(Emphasis supplied)

All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who intend to
undertake activities or projects which will affect the quality of environment are required to
prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such
development activity.

An environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as “likely to have

significant adverse impact that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse” and which “include
activities that have significant environmental consequences.”

In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the
potential hazards of GMOs to human health and the environment, their release into the
environment through field testing would definitely fall under the category of ECP.

2. Yes. It must be stressed that DAO 2002-08 and related DA order are not the only legal bases
for regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO 514 clearly provides that the
NBF applies to the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety policies,
measures and guidelines and in making biosafety decisions concerning the research,
development, handling and use, transboundary movement, release into the environment and
management of regulated articles.

The NBF requires the use of precaution, as provided in Section 2.6 which reads:

2.6. Using Precaution. – In accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio

Declaration of 1992 and the relevant provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, in particular Article 1, 10 (par. 6) and 11 (par. 8), the
precautionary approach shall guide biosafety decisions. The principles and
elements of this approach are hereby implemented through the decision-
making system in the NBF.

It likewise contains general principles and minimum guidelines that the concerned
agencies are expected to follow and which their respective rules and regulations must
conform with. In cases of conflict in applying the principles, the principle of protecting the
public interest and welfare shall always prevail, and no provision of the NBF shall be
 construed as to limit the legal authority and mandate of heads of departments and agencies to
consider the national interest and public welfare in making biosafety decisions.

Notably, Section 7 of NBF mandates a more transparent, meaningful and participatory

public consultation on the conduct of field trials beyond the posting and publication of
notices and information sheets, consultations with some residents and government officials,
and submission of written comments, provided in DAO 2002-08.
The Supreme Court found that ISAAAI, et.al. simply adhered to the procedures laid
down by DAO 2002-08 and no real effort was made to operationalize the principles of NBF
in the conduct of field testing of Bt talong. Said failure means that the DA lacks mechanisms
to mandate applicants to comply with international biosafety protocols. For these reasons, the
DAO 2002-08 should be declared invalid.

Parenthetically, during the hearing at the CA, Atty. Segui of the EMB was evasive in
answering the questions on whether his office undertook the necessary evaluation on the
possible environmental impact of Bt talong field trials and the release of GMOs into the
environment in general. While he initially cited lack of budget and competence as reasons for
their inaction, he later said that an amendment of the law should be made since projects
involving GMOS are not covered by Proclamation No. 2146, entitled “Proclaiming Certain
Areas and Types of Projects as Environmentally Critical and Within the Scope of the
Environmental Impact Statement System Established Under Presidential Decree No. 1586”.

The Supreme Court took the above as an indication of the DENR-EMB’s lack of serious
attention to their mandate under EO 514 to ensure that environmental assessments are done
and impacts identified in biosafety decisions.

Section 6 of EO 514 likewise directed the DOST, DENR, DA and DOH to ensure the
allocation of funds for the implementation of the NBF as it was intended to be a multi-
disciplinary effort involving the different government departments and agencies.

The petitioners government agencies clearly failed to fulfil their mandates in the
implementation of the NBF.

3. Yes. The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the
normative idea that governments are obliged to “foresee and forestall” harm to the
environment. The Rules incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:

SEC.1. Applicability. – When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in

establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect,
the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before
it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology

shall be given the benefit of the doubt.

SEC 2. Standards for application. – In applying the precautionary principle,

the following factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human
life or health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to
the environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of
those affected.
 When the features of uncertainty, possibility of irreversible harm, and possibility of
serious harm coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is strongest. The Supreme
Court found all three (3) conditions present.

While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is laudable, independent
scientific studies revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from Bt crops
and plants, adverse effects on the environment associated with the use of GE technology in
agriculture, and serious health hazards from consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-
rich country like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of contamination
and genetic pollution would be disastrous and irreversible.

Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF in the crucial
stages of risk assessment and public consultation, including the determination of the
applicability of the EIS requirements to the GMO field testing, are compelling reasons for the
application of the precautionary principle.

There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of the GMOs into the
environment threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and
eventually the health of our people once the Bt eggplants are consumed as food.

Adopting the precautionary approach, the Supreme Court ruled that the principles of the
NBF need to be operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the concerned departments
and agencies before allowing the release into the environment of genetically modified
eggplant.

Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs from stakeholders, including

marginalized famers, not just the scientific community. This proceeds from the realization
that acceptance of uncertainty is not only a scientific issue, but is related to public policy and
involves an ethical dimension.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

1. The conduct of Bt talong field testing is permanently enjoined.

2. DAO 2002-08 is declared null and void.
3. Any application for contained use, field testing, propagation and commercialization,
and importation of GMOs is temporarily enjoined until a new administrative order is
promulgated in accordance with law.

Article 2 Sec. 16 in relation to Art. 7, Sec. 21, Art 16, Sec. 3 and Article 18, Sec. 25

11) Pedro Arigo v. Scott Swift

FACTS

 Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued
by President Corazon C. Aquino on 11 August 1988.
 In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of
the Philippines’ oldest ecosystems.
 On 6 April 2010, Congress passed R.A. No. 10067 (RA 10067), otherwise known as the
“Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009”, to ensure protection and
conservation of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and
future generations.
 Under the “no take” policy, entry into the waters of the TRNP is strictly regulated and
many human activities are prohibited, penalized or fined, including fishing, gathering,
destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP.
 In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for
the USS Guardian (the ship) “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and
to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment,
maintenance, and crew liberty.”
 On 6 January 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on 13 January
2013. Two days later, it departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia.
 On 17 January 2013, while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest
side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. No one was injured in the incident and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
 On 20 January 2013, US 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift expressed regret
for the incident in a press statement.
 On 4 February 2013, US Ambassador to the Philippine Harry Thomas, Jr. met with
Department of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario regarding the compensation
for damage to the reef caused by the ship.
 By 30 March 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team had finished removing the last piece of
the grounded ship from the coral reef.
 On 17 April 2013, petitioners Arigo, et.al. on their behalf and in representation of their
respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn
filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases. Their contentions are:
- The grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the ship cause and
continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the
provinces of Palawan, Antiques, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Zamboaga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu and Taw-Tawi which events
violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
- There should be a directive from the Supreme Court for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident
- US respondents committed the following violations under RA 10067:
unauthorized entry; non-payment of conservation fees; obstruction of law
enforcement officer; damages to the reef; and destroying and disturbing resources
- The VFA provides for a waiver of immunity from suit
 The respondents consist of the following: Scott Swift in his capacity as Commander of
the US 7th Fleet; Mark Rice as the Commanding Officer of the ship; President Benigno
Aquino III as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; Hon.
Albert del Rosario as the DFA Secretary; Hon. Paquito Ochoa as the Executive Secretary;
Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR Secretary; Vice Admiral Jose Luis Alano as the
Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command; Admiral Rodolfo Isorena as Commandant of
the Philippine Coast Guard, Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista as the Philippine
Coast Guard Palawan, Major Gen. Virgilio Domingo as Commandant of the AFP and Lt.
 Gen. Terry Robling as Co-Director of the US Marine Corps. Forces. The Philippine
respondents contend that:
- The grounds relied upon by petitioners for the issuance of TEPO or writ of
Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the ship were
already completed
- The petition is defective in form and in substance
- The petition improperly raises issues involving VFA between Philippines and
USA
- The determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government
regarding the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the executive
branch

ISSUES

1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents

2. WON the waiver of immunity provisions of the VFA applies
3. WON the petition has become moot
4. WON the Court can determine the extent of responsibility of the US Government

RULING

1. None. The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of
the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The
alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on
the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial
actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one
against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

It is worthy to note that during the deliberations, Justice Antonio Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area
in violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter
within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).

While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of

their flag State, Art. 31 of UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they
fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-
standing policy, the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
“traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

The Court concurs with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a
Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. The Court thus expects the US to
bear “international responsibility under Art. 31 of UNCLOS in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.
2. No. The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan.

In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately:

“SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions. – The filing of a petition for the
issuance of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate
civil, criminal or administrative actions.”

A ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions

of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS
Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of
Kalikasan. The Court found it unnecessary to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute.

In the same vein, the Court cannot grant damages which have resulted from the
violation of environmental laws. Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for
issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:

Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition
is submitted for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or
denying the privilege of the writ of kalikasan.

The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:

(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from

committing acts or neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of
environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or damage;

(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private

person or entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the
environment;

(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private

person or entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders
of the court;

(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or

private person or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the
final judgment; and

(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, except the award of damages to
individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied)
 3. Yes, in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had
already been accomplished. However, insofar as the directives to Philippine respondents
to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef structure and marine habitat adversely affected
by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs
notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.

The Court is mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine governments both
expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the damage
caused by the USS Guardian. After all, exploring avenues for settlement of
environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases.

4. No. The Court deferred to the Executive Branch the matter of compensation and
rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges
on our relations with another State in the context of common security interests under the
VFA.

It is settled that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is

committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative – “the political”
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.

Art. 2, Sec. 25 and 26, Art. 6, Sec. 1, 25(4), 25(6), 29(1), Article 10, Sec. 2 and 3 and Article
11, Sec. 1

12) Belgica v. Hon. Ochoa et al

FACTS: This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress.
It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).

Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard
projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft
projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million
for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects.

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request
for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel

The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called
presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the  Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya
Gas Project – this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is
derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy

Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013,
six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the
pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the
Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. Motivated
by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUES: 
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD: 
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional
because it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the
purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which
the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel
system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in
the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or
the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the legislators only
recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get
the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power

As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative
are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot
delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the
exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances

One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in
the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined
because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to
which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the
constitutionally-given power of the President useless.”

d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies
concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the
house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a
project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local
government – and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the
PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya
and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund,
as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided
for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings
shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Issue on political dynasties

NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” Therefore, since there appears to be no standing
law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer
from ruling on this issue. In any event, the above-stated argument on this score is largely
speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be
able to propagate political dynasties.

6.) …local autonomy

YES.  The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the
avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific
interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district
representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
“underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who
do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF
conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs), instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs. The programs, policies
and resolutions of LDCs should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who
are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

Article 2, Sec. 28

13) En Banc Resolution. Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the
Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Witnesses Under the Subpoena of
February 10, 2012 and the Various Letters of Impeachment Prosecution Panel
Dated January 19 and 25, 2012

Article 2 Sec. 28 and Article 3, Sec. 1 (Full Public Disclosure)

14) Philippine Savings Bank and Pascual M Garcia III v. Senate Impeachment Court

FACTS: Philippine Savings Bank (PS Bank) and its President, Pascual M. Garcia III, filed
before the Supreme Court an original civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The TRO was sought to
stop the Senate, sitting as impeachment court, from further implementing the Subpoena Ad
Testificandum et Duces Tecum, dated February 6, 2012, that it issued against the Branch
Manager of PS Bank, Katipunan Branch. The subpoena assailed by petitioners covers the foreign
currency denominated accounts allegedly owned by the impeached Chief Justice Renato Corona
of the Philippine Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Should a TRO be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further implementing the
subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of CJ Corona?
THE RULING:

[The Court en banc ISSUED A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER enjoining the

respondents from implementing the subpoena. It also REQUIRED the respondents to
COMMENT on the [merits of the] petition.]

YES, a TRO should be issued against the impeachment court to enjoin it from further
implementing the subpoena with respect to the alleged foreign currency denominated accounts of
CJ Corona.

There are two requisite conditions for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:

(1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and

(2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the
violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice.

A clear right to maintain the confidentiality of the foreign currency deposits of the Chief Justice
is provided under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426). This law establishes the absolute confidentiality of
foreign currency deposits:

xxx xxx xxx

Under R.A. No. 6426 there is only a single exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits,
that is, disclosure is allowed only upon the written permission of the depositor. In Intengan v.
Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the accounts in question are U.S. dollar deposits, the
applicable law is not Republic Act No. 1405 but RA 6426. Similarly, in the recent case of
Government Service Insurance System v. 15th Division of the Court of Appeals, the Court also
held that RA 6426 is the applicable law for foreign currency deposits and not Republic Act No.
1405. xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

The written consent under RA 6426 constitutes a waiver of the depositor’s right to privacy in
relation to such deposit. In the present case, neither the prosecution nor the Impeachment Court
has presented any such written waiver by the alleged depositor, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
Also, while impeachment may be an exception to the secrecy of bank deposits under RA 1405, it
is not an exemption to the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under RA 6426.

Article 3, Sec. 1 (Right to Life, Liberty and Security; Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas
Data)

15) Burgos v. PGMA et al

FACTS:
 In 2007, Jonas Burgos was abducted at about 1:30 pm by 4 armed men and a woman in
civilian clothes while having lunch at the HapagKainan Restaurant in Ever Gotesco Mall,
Quezon City.
 On the same year, Jonas’s family files a complaint at the Commission on Human Rights
alleging military involvement in the abduction of Jonas after tracing the license plate
number of the vehicle used in the abduction to a vehicle impounded in the 56th Infantry
Battalion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Burgos family also filed a
complaint with the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and Task
Force-USIG – National Capital Region.
 The Burgos family files a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Philippine Court of
Appeals asking that the government produce Jonas to the court which was denied,
however, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
 Almost five years since the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, the Burgos family concluded
their presentation of witnesses and evidences for the Habeas Corpus Petition. The defense
shall start presenting their witnesses in May 2012.
 In light of the latest developments on the abduction case of Jonas Burgos, the Supreme
Court reviews the Court of Appeal’s decision on the consolidated petitions of Edita
Burgos for Habeas Corpus, Contempt and Writ of Amparo.
 The assailed CA decision dismissed the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus; denied the petitioner's motion to declare the respondents in Contempt; and
partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
 Last 2010, the Supreme Court issued a resolution ordering the Commission on Human
Rights to continue the investigation regarding the abduction of Jonas Burgos. The Court
tasked the CHR to conduct further investigations because of the lapses by the PNP-CIDG
 In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA's dismissal of the petitions for
Contempt and for the issuance of a Writ of Amparowith respect to President Macapagal-
Arroyo, as she is entitled as President to immunity from suit.
 March 15, 2011 – The Commission on Human Rights submits its report to the Supreme
Court
 The Commission Submitted the following findings:
a. Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds
that the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his
constitutional rights to life liberty and security were violated by the Government have
been fully determined.

b. In his SinumpaangSalaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of

HARRY AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart from the
faces of the two abductors in the cartographic sketches that he described to the police,
after he was shown by the Team the pictures in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya
2000 and group pictures of men taken some years thereafter. The same group of pictures
were shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper Edmond M. Dag-uman (Dag-
uman), who also positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr.
Daguman'sSinumpaangSalaysaystates that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a Company
Commander in the 56th IB while he was still in the military service (with Serial No.
800693, from 1997 to 2002) also with the 56th IB but under 1Lt. UsmalikTayaban, the
Commander of Bravo Company

c. Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been
for what is otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some police
and military elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the
requested documents does not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso
facto created a disputable presumption that AFP personnel were responsible for the
abduction and that their superiors would be found accountable, if not responsible, for the
 crime committed. This observation finds support in the disputable presumption "That
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced." (Paragraph (e), Section 3,
Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Revised Rules on Evidence of the Rules
of Court of the Philippines).
d. As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB officer Lt.
HARRY A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has effectively crushed the
theory of the CIDG witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliaga's true identity and
affiliation with the military have been established by overwhelming evidence corroborated by
detained former Army trooper Dag-uman.

e. Interview with VirgilioEustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy

and Justice (UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the
cartographic sketch was among the raiders who abducted him and four others, identified
as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona otherwise known as
ERAP FIVE.

ISSUE:

 WON the CHR report on the disappearance of Jonas Burgos is sufficient enough for the
SC to issue a final ruling and to:
1) Issue a writ of Habeas corpus— YES
2) Declare respondents in contempt— NO
3) Issue a writ of Amparo— NO

Court’s Ruling AMPARO

1. After reviewing the evidence in the present case, the CA findings and our findings in our June
22, 2010 Resolution heretofore mentioned, including the recent CHR findings that Lt. Harry A.
Baliaga, Jr., (Lt. Baliaga) of the 56th Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army is
one of the abductors of Jonas, we resolve to hold in abeyance our ruling on the merits in the
Amparoaspect of the present case and refer this case back to the CA in order to allow Lt. Baliaga
and the present Amparo respondents to file their respective Comments on the CHR Report within
a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution.
2. The Court of Appeals shall continue hearing on the Amparo petition.
3. On the non-compliance of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (TJAG) to provide the
CHR with copies of documents relevant to the case of Jonas, and thereby disobeyed our June 22,
2010 Resolution.
4. Acting on the CHR's recommendation and based on the above considerations, we resolve to
require General Roa of TJAG, AFP, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the
time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution, and then incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, to show cause and
explain, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why
they should not be held in contempt of this Court for defying our June 22, 2010 Resolution.

Habeas Corpus
1. In light of the new evidence, the Court hereby dismisses the Court of Appeal’s decision to
dismiss the habeas corpus petition.
2. For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the habeas corpus
petition and require him - together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; the incumbent
Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB at the time
of the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Feliciano - to produce the person of Jonas and to show
cause why he should not be released from detention
Petition of Contempt
1. Two types of Contempt: Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority and
dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of
justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil
contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of
the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the
violated order was made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to
compensate, then it is civil.
2. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on
the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence can
be overcome only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which means proof to the
satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence that precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that for which it is given. It is not sufficient for the proof to
establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely true than the
contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable certainty and moral certainty - a
certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
3. For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the respondents in contempt for filing
false returns in the habeas corpus proceedings before the CA, she has the burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the respondents had custody of Jonas.
4. In light of the dismissal of the petitions against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo who is no
the longer the President of the Republic of the Philippines, she should now be dropped as a party-
respondent in these petitions.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Court of Appeals: Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of

Habeas Corpus

FACTS:
At around 1:00 in the afternoon of April 28, 2007, Jonas Joseph T. Burgos – a farmer advocate
and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan was forcibly taken and abducted by a group
of four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at
the ground floor of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
On April 30, 2007, the petitioner, Edita Burgos, held a press conference and announced that her
son Jonas was missing. That same day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the
person abducted was her son Jonas. In a subsequent police investigation and Land Transportation
Office (LTO) verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 was registered to a 1991
Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. The said vehicle was seized and
impounded on June 24, 2006 for transporting timber without permit. However, in May 2007,
right after Jonas’ abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of
this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare parts were
“cannibalized.” The police was likewise able to generate cartographic sketches of two of the
abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses.
On August 29, 2007, the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(PNP-CIDG) presented Emerito Lipio a.k.a. Ka Tibo/Ka Cris, Marlon D. Manuel a.k.a. Ka Carlo,
and Melissa Concepcion Reyes a.k.a. Ka Lisa/Ramil to support the theory that elements of the
New People’s Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas.
In its July 17, 2008 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for the Issuance of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus, denied the petitioner’s motion to declare the respondents in contempt;
and partially granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner. Essentially,
the CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct
connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military. It also found that the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) and the PNP did not fully exert their effort in the conduct of
investigation. The CA ruled that the AFP has the burden of connecting certain loose ends
regarding the identity of Ka Ramon and the allegation that Ka Ramon is indeed Jonas in the
“Order of Battle.” As for the PNP-CIDG, the CA branded its investigation as “rather shallow”
and “conducted haphazardly.”

PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive
and meaningful investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their
duties is a fatal to the grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
ANSWER: Yes.
SUPREME COURT RULINGS:
ON PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO
Effect of the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful
investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties
– Considering the findings of the CA and our review of the records of the present case, we
conclude that the PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful
investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence
(in the performance of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of
these investigative shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful
investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
DISPOSITIVE:
In disposing of the case, the Supreme Court issued the following directives:
1. DIRECTED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative
proceedings, including field investigations – acting as the Court’s directly commissioned
agency for purposes of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
2. REQUIRE the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to make available and to provide copies, to the Commission on Human
Rights, of all documents and records in their possession and as the Commission on Human
Rights may require, relevant to the case of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, subject to reasonable
regulations consistent with the Constitution and existing laws;
3. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG and its incumbent Chief to submit to the Commission on Human
Rights the records and results of the investigation the PNP-CIDG claimed to have forwarded
to the Department of Justice, which were not included in their previous submissions to the
Commission on Human Rights, including such records as the Commission on Human Rights
may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution;
4. DIRECTED the PNP-CIDG to provide direct investigative assistance to the Commission on
Human Rights as it may require, pursuant to the authority granted under this Resolution;
5. AUTHORIZED the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and
exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific
directives as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and
6. REQUIRED the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court a Report with its
recommendations, copy furnished the petitioner, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP
and the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents, within ninety (90) days from receipt of the
Resolution.
In light of the retirement of Lt. General Alexander Yano and the reassignment of the other
respondents who have all been impleaded in their official capacities, all subsequent resolutions
and actions from the Supreme Court were served on, and directly enforceable by, the incumbents
of the impleaded offices/units whose official action is necessary. The present respondents shall
continue to be personally impleaded for purposes of the responsibilities and accountabilities they
may have incurred during their incumbencies.
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo.

16) Boac v. Cadapan

FACTS: June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn), Karen Empeño
(Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) (abductees) from a house in San Miguel, Hagonoy,
Bulacan. The three were herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an
undisclosed location.Spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed a
petition for habeas corpus before the Court, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and
Jovito Palparan (Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt.
Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. The Court issued a writ of habeas
corpus, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals. By Return of the Writ, the
respondents in the habeas corpus petition denied that abductees are in the custody of the military.
Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas corpus
petition. The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on Human
Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for separate
investigations and appropriate actions as may be warranted by their findings and to furnish the
Court with their separate reports on the outcome of their investigations and the actions taken
thereon. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision. Erlinda
Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a Petition for Writ of Amparo With
Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of Documents The petition impleaded the same
respondents in the habeas corpus petition, with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, then Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then Phil.
National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col.
Anotado) and Donald Caigas. Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in
light of her immunity from suit while in office. By Resolution the Court issued a writ of amparo
returnable to the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate court, and ordered the
consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending habeas corpus petition. By Decision of the
appellate court granted the Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the immediate release of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible;
2. Whether the chief of the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, as well as the
heads of the concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and detention of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino;
3. Whether there is a need to file a motion for execution to cause the release of the aggrieved
parties; and
4. Whether Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party
respondent in this case.

RULING:

1. Yes, Raymond’s affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent
Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino,
and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate
respondents’ accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond
Manalo’s familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the “DTU,” as shown in his
testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the “Division Training Unit,” firms up
respondents’ story that they were detained for some time in said military facility. The
corroborative testimonies, in the same case, of Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a forensic
specialist, as well as Manalo’s graphic description of the detention area. There is thus no
compelling reason for the Court to disturb its appreciation in Manalo’s testimony. The outright
denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles.
2. No, The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. Command responsibility in its simplest terms, means the
“responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed
forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict.” In this
sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions
of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept
of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is “an
omission mode of individual criminal liability,” whereby the superior is made responsible for
crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed
to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied). It
bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a
substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative liability. An amparo proceeding is not
criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved.
Neither does it partake of a civil or administrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed
to direct specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right
to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals. An amparo proceeding does nor determine
guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance or threats thereof or extrajudicial
killings; it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance…
for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance…
3. No, Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for execution
for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty and security of a person is
at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and execution of any decision thereon must be
expedited as soon as possible since any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very
rights that these writs seek to immediately protect. The Solicitor General’s argument that the
Rules of Court supplement the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only
find suppletory application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than weaken,
the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with dilatory motions in view of
 the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a
motion for execution is inconsistent with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered
by an amparo proceeding. In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to
immediately release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would
defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings in amparo petitions. Summary
proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without prejudice to further appeals
that may be taken therefrom.
4. No, the Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions against then President Arroyo
well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions
were filed. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it
in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head
of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is
important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to
fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and
judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. Parenthetically, the petitions
are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted, condoned or performed any
wrongdoing against the three missing persons.

17) Mison v. Hon Gallegos

FACTS: On 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of

Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the location
and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve
fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Hence, asked Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an
undesirable alien.

Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public
interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711. BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police
District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku
was detained
On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport. Ku filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies. Judge Gallegos, in an Order dated 22
January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo. Also, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order
granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine National Red
Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine National Police-
Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku and his immediate family

ISSUE: WON Writ of Amparo should prosper

RULING: Writ of Amparo not proper.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)39 provides: SECTION 1. Petition. –
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to
promulgate rules to protect our people’ s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance
in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of
Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the writ
of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to
threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico
enumerated the elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined
in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time

Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of the BI, that he was
not read his rights under the constitution and was not informed of the reason for hi s arrest, nor
provided a copy of any document leading to his arrest and detention,46 the arresting officers are
all consistent in testifying that, upon Ku’s arrest, they introduced themselves as agents of the BI,
presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his constitutional rights as well
as the expiration of his visa. More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to
conceal Ku or his whereabouts.
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should contain, among which
is the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits.
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained for a long period
of time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him
to hold him under detention. The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the
Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by substantial evidence. t is to be
additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of
Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku’s proper recourse is with the BI and,
thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP.

18) Hon Zarate et al v. H.E. Aquino III

FACTS: Petitioners aver that they are members of various progressive party-lists that have been
wrongfully tagged by the military and the police as "communist front organizations. As alleged in
the petition, sometime in March 2014, the Government commenced intensified military
offensives in Talaingod, Davao del Norte under the rubric of counterinsurgency. About 1,300
Manobos allegedly evacuated to Davao City to escape the effects of said military operations
evacuees.

Beginning January 2015, however, some of the Manobos started going back to Davao City. By
July 2015, approximately 700 Manobos were at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
(UCCP) Haran. Petitioners claimed that these Manobos sought refuge at UCCP Haran due to the
persisting militarization of their communities and their forcible recruitment to the paramilitary
group, Alamara
Certain Manobos claimed, on the other hand, that they were deceived into going to Davao City;
that, upon reaching UCCP Haran, they were deprived of their freedom of locomotion and were
held there against their will from 3 February 2015 to 25 February 2015; that during said period
they were forced to listen to lectures and join rallies; until a fellow tribe member was found dead,
hanging lifeless on a tree, inside the UCCP Haran compound; and that it was only then that they
were allowed to go home with the body of the deceased. Filed a complaint for (Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention), and Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003).

To determine who would be charged in the complaint, the complainants were shown "lists" from
which they purportedly identified the defendants. Petitioners now aver that the inclusion of their
names and photographs in the "lists" indicates that they are and have been the subject of State
surveillance. incriminate them in fabricated criminal charges, and insinuations of their links with
the New People's Army. petitioners argue that their inclusion in the "lists" are threats to their life,
liberty, and security warranting the protection of the writ of amparo. Additionally, petitioners
claim that as there is absolutely no basis for the inclusion of their names and photographs in the
"lists," then respondents should be compelled via the writ of habeas data to disclose and to
provide petitioners with copies of all information and evidence pertaining to them which
respondents have in their files or records, and for such information to be destroyed.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner`s complaint should prosper

RULING: Dismissed. Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires substantial evidence. "only actual
threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the case, can qualify as a
violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Mere membership in
organizations or sectors historically involved in EJKs cannot equate to an actual threat that would
warrant the issuance of a writ of amparo. We note, however, that the matter of petitioner Zarate's
supposed inclusion in the military's OB has already been addressed by the Court in the
consolidated cases of In re: Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in favor of Lilibeth 0.
Ladaga, et al. As for the pending cases against petitioner Zarate, suffice it to say that the
complaints were duly supported by affidavits,20 police blotters,21 medical records,22 and reports
of social workers.

Petitioners Mariano and Casino, on the other hand, cite their previous charge of rebellion,24 and
their earlier implication in a kidnapping with murder case. The filing of cases, however, cannot
be characterized as an unlawful act or omission in the context of the Amparo Rule. Of all the
petitioners, it is only petitioner Balabapersonalwhoalleged circumstances claiming threatened
violations of her right to life, liberty and security. However, The instances cited by petitioner
Balaba fail to demonstrate an actual threat to her life, liberty, and security.

The writ of habeas data is a "remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. The extraordinary writ of habeas data "provides a judicial remedy to protect a person's right
to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances where such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data) provides that the petition should aver "the manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party." The
Habeas Data Rule likewise requires substantial evidence. In the present petition, petitioners fail to
show how their right to privacy is violated given that the information contained in the "lists" are
only their names, their positions in their respective organizations, and their photographs. All these
data are of public knowledge and are readily accessible even to civilians.

Although the petition for a writ of habeas data may be filed by family member, or even relatives,
on behalf of the aggrieved party,35 the Habeas Data Rule presupposes that the aggrieved party is
still alive.

Article 3, Sec 1 (Substantive Due Process)

19) Valentino L. Legaspi v. City of Cebu et al

FACTS: On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted
Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor
vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu
City.

On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke
Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, then represented by
Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding
Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic
Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as
unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages.

Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying
parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office
and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car
was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to
pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car but such
imposition the fine was without any court hearing and without due process of law. He was also
compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the violation)
without any court hearing and final judgment;

That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there was no sign
prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative and that he was
compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and
a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu,
demanded the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of theTraffic Code of Cebu
City, and damages.

He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the
sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of
theanayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by the group even if it was not
obstructing the flow of traffic.

The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as
null and void. The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the
decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid. Upon the denial of their respective
motions for reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi came to the Court via separate petitions for
review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.

ISSUES
1. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 was enacted within the ambit of the legislative powers of
the City of Cebu - YES

2. Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity and
constitutionality, particularly the limitations set by the Constitution and the relevant
statutes - YES

RULING:
Tests for a valid ordinance (formal: 1 and 2; substantive: 3)
1. must be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
2. must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
3. must also conform to the following substantive requirements
1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal requirements

- Was the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664 within the corporate powers of the LGU of the City
of Cebu? Yes
- no issues were raised against the formalities of the enactment of the ordinance, so compliance is
presumed
- Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of
the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power
of taxation, but with parameters and limitations
- police power cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units.

LGC Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Composition. – (a) The sangguniang
panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under
Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(5) Approve ordinances, which shall ensure the efficient and effective delivery of the basic
services and facilities as provided for under Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said
services and facilities, shall:
(v) Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places
and approve the construction, improvement repair and maintenance of the same; establish bus and
vehicle stops and terminals or regulate the use of the same by privately-owned vehicles which
serve the public; regulate garages and operation of conveyances for hire; designate stands to be
occupied by public vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of signs, signposts, awnings
and awning posts on the streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and sprinkling of streets
and public places;
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and,
when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and
illegal constructions in public places;

- the LGUs would be in the best position to craft their traffic codes because of their familiarity
with the conditions peculiar to their communities.

Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664with the substantive requirements

- the first substantive requirement for a valid ordinance is the adherence to the
constitutional guaranty of due process of law.
-
- 2 kinds of due process
1. procedural due process - procedures that the government must follow before it deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property  notices and hearings
2. substantive due process - adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty, or
property. In other words, substantive due process looks to whether there is sufficient
justification for the government’s action.
- Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity
with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of
fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy.
- terms encroachment and obstacles used in Section 458 of the LGC, supra, were broad enough to
include illegally parked vehicles or whatever else obstructed the streets, alleys and sidewalks

- Petitioners say that they were not accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing, and
impounding of the vehicles, or even to be heard and to explain their side prior to the
immobilization of their vehicles; and that the ordinance was oppressive and arbitrary for that
reason.
- any vehicle owner may protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the
ordinance. – the ordinance permits the release of a vehicle upon a protest directly made to the
Chairman of CITOM; or to the Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the
City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña, even without payment of the fine
- none of the petitioners resorted to this - did not diminish the fairness and reasonableness of the
escape clause written in the ordinance.
- the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the
driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the apprehension. In that situation, the enforcer
would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation
- the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but
designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was
enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the
conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as
with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

InMetropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc., G.R. No.

135962, March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President
and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are
conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu.

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative
power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC,
and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription
of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the
contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance
No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the
streets in the City of Cebu at all times".

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to
enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability
by simply driving away. DENIED.

20) Bienvenido P. Jaban Sr. et al v. CA et al

FACTS: An ordinance authorizing the traffic enforcers to immobilize any motor vehicle
violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City was
enacted to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the streets in the City of Cebu at all
times".

The Jaban’s brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, City Traffic Operations
Management (CITOM), et al., seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional
for being violative of due process and for being contrary to law., and for damages. Atty. Legaspi
likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, demanded the delivery of personal property,
declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages.

In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co-defendants, the City Attorney of Cebu
presented similar defenses, essentially stating that the traffic enforcers had only upheld the law by
clamping the vehicles of the plaintiffs; and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the presumption of
constitutionality and validity. The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision
declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void. The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed
to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid.
Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi came to
the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.

HELD: The Court of Appeal’s decision is sustained.

A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general
and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu. The
CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative power to
enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC, and also
generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the
contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance
No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to
enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability
by simply driving away.

DENIED.

Article 3 Sec 1 (Substantive Due Process; Equal Protection; Police Power) in Relation to
Article 6 Sec 26 (Riders in Bills)

21) Remman Enterprises Inc v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service

FACTS: This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the Real Estate
Service Act of the Philippines. R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was
passed. Its purpose is to professionalize the real estate service sector under regulatory scheme of
licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners. The supervision was
likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC). The law
required that companies providing real estate services must transact with the employ of duly
licensed real estate brokers. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law, alleging that it
violates the due process clause and infringes the ownership rights of real estate developers
enshrined in Art. 428 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, they claim that it violates the equal
protection clause as owners of private properties are allowed to sell their properties without the
need of a licensed real estate broker.
The provisions in question are –o Section 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of
Real Estate Service. o Section 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. The RTC denied
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. ISSUES AND HOLDING

ISSUE: Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause, particularly
substantive due process. No.

RULING: The requirements for substantive due process are – Lawful government purpose; and
Reasonable means necessary for the accomplishment of the lawful purpose. The lawful purpose
of R.A. 9646 is to professionalize the real estate service and increase its standards. § The law
recognizes the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in
boosting investor confidence, and in promoting national progress.

The requirement of employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is reasonable as
it merely regulates the conduct of business, and does not curtail the exercise of petitioners’
ownership rights.

[YAP, K.] C2020 | 1

Lastly, there is a substantial distinction between real estate developers and owners of private who
want to sell their private property.

Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate
developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business
which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. RTC decision AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

22) Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council

FACTS: Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a
Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief[1] under Rules 65 and
63 of the Rules of Court,... respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC), requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as
applicant to... second-level courts, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with
grave abuse of discretion.

The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region
XI, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch
13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur. In a letter[2] dated December 18,
2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he
was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner
sent a letter, through... electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of
considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the
prejudicature examination.

The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter dated February 3,
2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its
decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was... upheld due to the JBC's long-
standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others,
incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the
petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he... was excluded from the list.

This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court. In his petition, he argued that: (1) the
Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no
more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year... requirement violates the constitutional provision
on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also
asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 10[4] of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8557[5] should not be merely directory and should be fully
implemented. He further alleged that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by
the Constitution and by Congress, since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years
of... practice of law. In compliance with the Court's Resolution[6] dated April 22, 2014, the
JBC[7] and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)[8] separately submitted their Comments.

Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG,... they essentially stated that the petition is
procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due
process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to
prevent the JBC from performing its... principal function under the Constitution to recommend
appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner
has no clear legal right... that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated
because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who
have served less than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is
no... violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.

Issues: The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is
constitutional.

Ruling: Ruling of the Court Procedural Issues: Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court
considers it necessary to first determine whether or not the action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, and declaratory relief commenced by the petitioner was proper. One. The remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions
for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for... certiorari and prohibition, and both are
governed by Rule 65."[9] As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v.
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al.,[10] this Court explained that: Two. The remedy of
mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy.

The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not
included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that... his non-
inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury. Three. The
petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or... an ordinance. The relief sought under
this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument
and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."[16] "[T]he purpose of the
action is to... secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a
statute, deed, contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle
issues arising from its alleged breach." In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not
involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition specifically sought a judicial declaration that the
petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although he failed to meet JBC's
five-year requirement... policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal right
under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The
opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable
right... that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of candidates, which
is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim
any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy. Furthermore, the instant petition
must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.[18] The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under... the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 19[19] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691.[20] Therefore, by
virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial
power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the
Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should... still be dismissed.

Substantive Issues As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to
the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is...
burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it determines the men
and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has provided the
qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its... own
set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate. The functions
of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal function
of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the
President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms... the process that the JBC
shall follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC
has the authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the
judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications... required by the Constitution and law for
every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility
in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not
unbridled license to act in performing... its duties. JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees
and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient
administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of uniform
criteria in order to ascertain whether an... applicant meets the minimum constitutional
qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the
five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and incidental to
the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.

23) Ferrer,Jr. v. Mayor Bautista et al

FERRER V. CITY MAYOR BAUTISTA

FACTS: Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, or the Socialized

Housing Tax of Quezon City, Section 3 of which provides:

SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the

assessed value of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be
collected by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the
Quezon City Government.
“Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) shall be utilized by the Quezon
City Government for the following projects: (a) land purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of
current/existing socialized housing facilities; (c) land development; (d) construction of core
houses, sanitary cores, medium-rise buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of
public-private partnership agreement of the Quezon City Government and National Housing
Authority (NHA) with the private sector. “

On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on December 16, 2013 and took
effect ten days after when it was approved by respondent City Mayor. 6 The proceeds collected
from the garbage fees on residential properties shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an
earmarked special account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections. 7 Section
1 of the Ordinance set forth the schedule and manner for the collection of garbage fees:
The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and shall be paid
simultaneously with the payment of the real property tax, but not later than the first quarter
installment.8 In case a household owner refuses to pay, a penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due,
plus an interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof, shall be charged. ChanRoblesVi
Petitioner Ferrer claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a percentage of the
assessed value of the property, which is subject to revision every three (3) years in order to reflect
an increase in the market value of the property. The SHT and the garbage fee are actually
increases in the property tax which are not based on the assessed value of the property or its
reassessment every three years; hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the LGC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax ordinances are valid

RULING: Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011, the Socialized Housing Tax is valid.
Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an annual garbage fee on all domestic
households in Quezon City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL

RATIO:
1. The 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of property bears a social
function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good. Property has
not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but
also a social function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of
society. The principle is this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be
injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their
property, no r injurious to the right of the community.
Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the government in the exercise of police power.  In this jurisdiction, it is well-
entrenched that taxation may be made the implement of the state’s police power.
The SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to impose.
Cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of
the basic services and facilities which include, among others, programs and projects for low-cost
housing and other mass dwellings. The collections made accrue to its socialized housing
programs and projects.
The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a
regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power for the general
welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest. Removing slum areas in
Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless constituents but
advantageous to the real property owners as well. The situation will improve the value of the their
property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe community,
and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and better
consumers of business products.

2. In the subject ordinance imposing garbag collection fee, the rates of the imposable fee
depend on land or floor area and whether the payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium,
social housing project or apartment. For easy reference, the relevant provision is again
quoted below:
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m.
unit in a condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident
of a lot similar in size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and
less have to pay a fixed rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed
regardless of whether the resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of
"promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in
over-consuming the present resources and in generating waste." Instead of simplistically
categorizing the payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized
housing project or apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could
truly measure the amount of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors
include, among others, household age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population
density of the barangay or district, capacity to pay, and actual occupancy of the property. R.A.
No. 9003 may also be looked into for guidance. Under said law, WM service fees may be
computed based on minimum factors such as types of solid waste to include special waste,
amount/volume of waste, distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility,
capacity or type of LGU constituency, cost of construction, cost of management, and type of
technology. With respect to utility rates set by municipalities, a municipality has the right to
classify consumers under reasonable classifications based upon factors such as the cost of service,
the purpose for which the service or the product is received, the quantity or the amount received,
the different character of the service furnished, the time of its use or any other matter which
presents a substantial difference as a ground of distinction.

24) 1-UTAK v. COMELEC

Article 3, Sec. 1 (Right to Property) in Relation to Article 3, Sec. 2 (Search and Seizure),
Article 3, Sec. 3; Article 3, Sec. 4, Article 3, Sec. 21 and Article 3, Sec. 22, and Article 6, Sec.
1

25) Disini v. Secretary of Justice

Article 3, Sec. 1 (Procedural Due Process; Trial by Publicity) in Relation to Article 3, Sec. 4
(Freedom of the Press) and Article 3, Sec 14 (Rights of the accused; Public Trial)

26) Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the multiple Murder Cases Against
Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan et al

Article 3, Sec. 2 (Search and Seizure) in Relation to Article 3, Sec. 3 (Right to Privacy)
Article, 2 Sec. 28 (Full Public Disclosure)

27) Pollo v. Chairperson Constantino – David (Civil Service Commission)

Article 3, Sec. 2 (search and Seizure; Standards Applied to Buses)

28) Saluday v. People

Article 3, Sec. 3 (Right to Privacy)

29) Spouses Bill and Victoria Hing v. Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy

Article 3. Sec. 3 (Right to privacy; writ of amparo; writ of habeas data)

30) Rhoda Ave. S. Vivares v. St. Theresas`s College

31) Dr. Joy Margate Lee v. P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan

Article 3, Sec. 4 (Expression)

32) GMA Network Inc v. COMELEC et al

33) Diocese of Bacolod et al v. COMELEC
34) SWS and Pulse Asia v. COMELEC
35) Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez, et al

Article 3, Sec. 5 (Freedom of Religion)

36) Perfecto v. Esidera

37) Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice
Building in Quezon City

Article 3, Sec. 6 (liberty of abode and Freedom to travel) in relation to article 3, Sec 1 (due
process), Article 3, Sec. 4 (Speech, Expression and Assembly), Article, 3 Sec, 5 (Religion)
and Article 2, Sec. 12 (Primary Right of Parents to Rear their Children)
38) SPARK et al v. Quezon City

Article 3, Sec. 6 (Right to Travel and HDO)

39) Genuino v. De Lima

Article 3, Sec 7 (Right to Information) in relation to Article 2, Sec. 28 (Public Disclosure)

40) Sereno v. Committee

41) DFA v. BCA International

Article 3, Sec. 10 (Non-impairment Clause)

42) Goldenway v. Equitable Bank