TRUST FORMATION IN NEW ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

D. HARRISON MCKNIGHT LARRY L. CUMMINGS NORMAN L. CHERVANY University of Minnesota--Curtis L. Carlson School of Management 395 Hubert H. Humphrey Center 271-19th Avenue South Minneapolis, MN 55455 Direct all correspondence to D. Harrison McKnight hmcknight@csom.umn.edu

Acknowledgements: The authors wish to express appreciation to Shawn Curley, Fred Davis, Gerald Smith and Aks Zaheer for their helpful reviews and comments on earlier versions of this paper.

ABSTRACT: Trust is a key enabler of cooperative human actions. Three main deficiencies about our current knowledge of trust are addressed by this paper. First, due to widely divergent conceptual definitions of trust, the literature on trust is in a state of construct confusion. Second, too little is understood about how trust forms and on what trust is based. Third, little has been discussed about the role of emotion in trust formation. To address the first deficiency, this paper develops a typology of trust. The rest of the paper addresses the second and third deficiencies by proposing a model of how trust is initially formed, including the role of emotion. Dispositional, interpersonal, and impersonal (system) trust are integrated in the model. The paper also clarifies the cognitive and emotional bases on which interpersonal trust is formed in early relationships. The implications of the model are drawn for future research.

NOTE: This paper was presented by the first author in October, 1995 at the Information & Decision Sciences workshop, University of Minnesota.

TRUST FORMATION IN NEW ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

INTRODUCTION Trust is widely acknowledged as an important concept to study because it enables many cooperative human endeavors (e.g. Dunn, 1988; Gambetta, 1988). It is a key to interpersonal relationships in various settings (e.g. Arrow, 1974; Fox, 1974; Lewis & Weigert, 1985a). Yet trust received relatively little research attention until the 1970s (Luhmann, 1991). The literature on trust in various disciplines has displayed inadequacies that fall into three categories that relate to: trust definition, trust creation dynamics, and emotion. First, due to widely differing conceptual definitions of trust, the literature on trust presents a confusing picture of what trust is. Second, too little is understood about how trust forms and on what trust is based. Third, little has been explained about the role of emotion in trust formation. Each of the three deficiencies is discussed. Finally, a model is developed that addresses these problems.

PROBLEM 1--CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION Definitions of trust have become a "confusing potpourri," (Shapiro, 1987a: 625), a "conceptual confusion" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985a: 975). They have proliferated in divergent ways, and yet, in any given paper, are usually quite narrow (Kee & Knox, 1970). This problem, termed homonymy, means that one label encompasses more than one concept. (Smith, 1990). The concept of trust fits this definition of homonymy. Trust has been defined as: a behavior (e.g., Zand, 1972); an attitude (Kegan & Rubenstein, 1973); a confidence (Cohen, 1966); an expectancy (Rotter, 1980; Scanzoni, 1979); a belief or set of beliefs (Barber, 1983; Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Rotter, 1967); a dispositional variable (Rosenberg, 1957; Rotter, 1967, 1980); a situational variable (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982); a structural variable (Fox, 1974; Lewis & Weigert, 1985a,b): a social agency relationship variable (Shapiro, 1987a); and, an interpersonal variable (Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985). Some have discussed and described trust and its effects without specifically defining it (Granovetter, 1985). Only a few researchers have attempted to display more than one

of the dimensions of trust and how those relate to one another (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Dobing, 1993; Lewis & Weigert, 1985a,b; Luhmann, 1991; Zucker, 1986). This raises the question: If one researcher defines trust in a widely different way from another researcher, how can the theoretical formulations and the empirical results of researchers build on each other?

One specific aspect of this problem is that studying a single narrow type of trust does not adequately capture the breadth of meaning assigned to the word trust in everyday usage. To be effective, scientists should start with, or be grounded in, common terms (such as "trust"). Then they should strive "to extract from [common-sense psychology] the essence of everyday terms that lend themselves to [scientific psychology] uses." (Kelley, 1992:11) Finally, the scientific terms should then be compared back to common terms to see whether they reflect the breadth of meaning the common terms connote in everyday usage. The interplay between common terms and scientific terms improves the practical applicability of the scientific and makes researchable the common. When scientific usages of the same common term diverge widely, researchers should re-evaluate the way the term has been used. Such dissatisfaction is manifest in the trust literature (Barber, 1983). For example, rather than using existing trust conceptualizations, Mishra (1993) felt compelled to distill four specific dimensions of trust from the literature. Similarly, those studying trust within the Prisoner's Dilemma arena have recognized that "some of the everyday meanings of trust and trusting behavior are, no doubt, not captured by [the Prisoner's Dilemma] framework." (Orbell, Dawes, and Schwartz-Shea, 1994:112). But what can be done about this problem? Van de Ven (1989: 487) warned that when theories on a topic widely diverge, the advocates "for each theory engage in activities to make their theory better by increasing its internal consistency, often at the expense of limiting its scope...such impeccable micro logic is creating macro nonsense!" There is evidence that this is happening in the trust literature.1 To counter such tendencies, Van de Ven

For example, the various attempts in the psychology literature to divide and operationalize dispositional and situational trust are catalogued in
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recommended that scholars should "deal with the tensions, debates, and forced choices between overly narrow competing theories" by utilizing these "inconsistencies and contradictions between theories...to develop better and more encompassing theories." (1989: 488)

We believe that this advice applies to the trust literature. The divergence of narrow trust definitions provides motivation for improving the theoretical basis of the study of trust. If there are really several types of trust, what are they, and how do they fit together? The primary challenge, then, is to synthesize and define carefully the various types of trust and to demonstrate how they both differ from, and relate to, each other.

PROBLEM 2--TRUST CREATION DYNAMICS Trust has usually been studied as a static, rather than a dynamic, variable (exceptions: Lewis & Weigert, 1985a,b; Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985; Zucker, 1986). This may have occurred because of the preponderant use of experimental or cross-sectional research methods (e.g. Bonoma, 1976; Solomon, 1960). But the method should not drive the research stream. Rather, the methods should fit the phenomenon, and the trust phenomenon appears to be very dynamic. Here are some examples. The literature is full of statements to the effect that trust is "fragile" or easily destroyed (Baier, 1986; Dasgupta, 1988; Luhmann, 1991; McGregor, 1967). Some say trust takes a great deal of time to form (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Others have found that it may form very quickly (McKnight, 1994). These arguments indicate that trust should be viewed and studied as a dynamic construct. Adding the time dimension should improve theory on trust (Poole & Van de Ven, 1989).

Wrightsman (1991). At the same time, sociologists have been further refining their own specific conceptualizations of trust (e.g., Barber, 1983; Luhmann, 1991; Shapiro, 1987a). Further evidence that the psychological and sociological views are diverging is found in one major sociological work on trust, which assails the psychological conceptualization of trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985b).
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Further, discussions about trust should not only answer the question of "what" results from trust, but should answer the question of "how" trust forms. Static approaches provide answers to the "what" questions, but do not adequately address "how" or "why" something develops. The "what" questions have been researched for some time in the trust literature. It seems time to address the "how" questions. In addition to increasing our theoretical understanding, this is important for a practical reason. Addressing the question of how trust develops will increase the ability for researchers to derive practical prescriptions. Hence, this paper addresses the question: How does trust develop at the onset of a relationship, and on what is it based?

PROBLEM 3--ROLE OF EMOTION The role of emotion in trust formation has not been fully addressed (Lewis & Weigert, 1985a). Scholars have long recognized the important role of emotional security for trust (Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985). For example, Luhmann (1991) has pointed out that the role of emotion is critical in explaining how, and under what circumstances trust turns to distrust (Luhmann, 1991). Still, a large gap remains. Although scholars like Lewis & Weigert (1985b) have asserted that emotion is important to trust, they have not explained emotion's role in trust formation in the earliest stages of a relationship. Instead, they have assumed that initial relationship trust "is mainly cognitive and assumptive" (Lewis & Weigert, 1985b: 466). The question addressed here is: What is the role of emotion in the formation of trust in new relationships?

SECTION 1: A TYPOLOGY OF TRUST-RELATED CONCEPTS A typology of types of trust concepts is defined, in order to provide an overview of how to distinguish one type from another. In Section 2, each type of trust will be discussed in terms of a model proposing how several of these types form a foundation for other types. Collectively, Sections 1 and 2 address Problem 1 above by

synthesizing the divergent definitions of trust into a comprehensive set of cognitive/emotional constructs that fit together and yet can be distinguished from one another. The typology is not fully comprehensive; it does not cover every type of trust in the literature. The types of trust this paper addresses have been selected to cover what the authors consider the more important forms of trust, such that a broad, but parsimonious group of constructs emerges.

Trust as a behavior is excluded because of the difficulty of distinguishing it from other concepts such as cooperation and information sharing openness, which have sometimes been called trust (e.g., Mishra, 1993). In game theory research, for example, the act of not defecting may be called a "trusting behavior;" but it may also be called "cooperation'"or "cooperative behavior." Calling it "trusting behavior" makes clear the assumption that the act of not defecting is based on some set of trustrelated cognitions/emotions; but this does not clearly distinguish the act from cooperation. The question that can be asked is, "wouldn't it be more accurate to call this behavior a consequent of trust, rather than trust itself?" Because the act of reliance or dependence on another seems to be the essence of trusting, some have equated trust with dependence or reliance (e.g., Giffin, 1967). The weakness of this definition is that reliance is only one of a number of behaviors that demonstrate cognitive/emotional trust. It would be very difficult to agree on a list of all the types of behaviors that are manifestations of trust. Even if scholars could agree on the list, the task of distinguishing these trusting behaviors from their common usage terms (e.g., cooperation, helpfulness, openness) would be daunting. Therefore, we do not here deal with behavioral trust. We distinguish such behaviors from (cognitive/emotional) trust by treating them as behavioral manifestations of what we call trust. Five trust-related constructs are defined in this section: interpersonal trust, trusting beliefs, system trust, dispositional trust and decision to trust. These concepts will be defined and distinguished from each other largely based on the dimensions shown in Table 1.

-------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here --------------------------------

INTERPERSONAL TRUST We define interpersonal trust as one party's willingness to depend on the other party with a feeling of relative security even though negative consequences are possible. Interpersonal trust is a person-specific concept; one person is ready to depend on a specific other person. It is a situation-specific concept; it applies in a specific situation. Interpersonal trust is an intentional state; the person is willing (or ready or planning) to depend on the other in the situation. For simplicity, the following discussion will refer to only one side of the interpersonal dyad. Further, we will use the unmodified term "trust" to mean interpersonal trust.Our definition of trust embodies three essential elements found in the trust literature: (a) potential negative consequences, (b) dependence, and (c) feelings of security: (a) The prospect of negative consequences (Bonoma, 1976; Gambetta, 1988; Good, 1988; Luhmann, 1988; Mishra, 1993; Zand, 1972) is what makes trust important but problematic. Some researchers refer to the possibility of negative consequences as risk (Coleman, 1990; Giffin, 1967; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Luhmann, 1991; Riker, 1971; Scanzoni, 1979; Shapiro, 1987a; Swinth, 1967), while others describe it as uncertainty (Deutsch, 1973; Gambetta, 1988; Schlenker, Helm & Tedeschi, 1973) . In each case, scholars believe that when negative results are possible, successful interaction requires trust. (b) Trust involves dependence on another party. A number of researchers refer to trust as a dependence (Atwater, 1988; Dobing, 1993; Lewis & Weigert, 1985b; Scanzoni, 1979) or reliance (Giffin, 1967; Good, 1988; McGregor, 1967; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994) upon others. If one is not required to depend on the other, one does not need to trust the other. The word "depend" is also important because it links trust to the power literature. Astley & Zajac (1991: 399) point out that Emerson defined dependence as the "obverse of power." That is, one who becomes dependent on another party places the other party in a

position of power over her/him. Since trust means a willingness to depend, one who trusts is willing to place the other person in a situational position of power over him/her. The trust literature has already noted the interplay between trust and power (Solomon, 1960; Bonoma, 1976). However, trust and power have not previously been linked definitionally. (c) To trust, the person facing negative consequences must be willing to depend on the other person with feelings of security (Lewis & Weigert, 1985b; Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985), comfort (Eayrs, 1993), confidence (Deutsch, 1973; Dunn, 1988; Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985; Luhmann, 1991; McGregor, 1976; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Scanzoni, 1979), or lack of fear (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). These feelings distinguish trust from a less secure willingness to depend, which would be characterized by feelings of anxiety or fear. This aspect of trust is an emotional component, whereas the intentional aspect of trust is a cognitive component. The emotional aspect and the cognitive intention are intertwined; a person feels secure with respect to her/his willingness to depend.

Trust is distinguished from willingness to depend on another based upon control of the other. Riker (1971:66) said, "If one has power over other people,...then one can by definition control events, bringing them to a desired conclusion. In this sense the man of power need not trust others to do what he wants because he can coerce them instead."2 This distinction rests on the idea that the person who trusts another must "trust trust" (Gambetta, 1988: 213, 228) or "rely on trust" (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994:93) and not solely depend on control mechanisms. For example, a supervisor who monitors an

This does not mean that control mechanisms are irrelevant. Indeed, such mechanisms may facilitate trust (Dasgupta, 1988). However, one party cannot fully control the other. This distinction has also been drawn in definitions of cooperation (Williams, 1988).
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employee by video camera depends on the camera for assurance of the employee's good behavior. Hence, the supervisor is not willing to depend on the employee to behave properly. Therefore, based on our definition, the supervisor does not really trust the employee.

TRUSTING BELIEFS Trust, as is typical of intentions (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), is based upon the person's cognitive beliefs about the other person (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Gabarro, 1978) and the person's emotional security about those beliefs. Together, these cognitive beliefs and the related emotional security form a construct we call trusting beliefs. Beliefs about the other person means that one person believes that the other person is trustworthy in the situation. Therefore, this construct is shown as personand situation-specific in Table 1. Beliefs about the other person's trustworthiness, based on the trust literature,3 include beliefs that the other person possesses such attributes as benevolence,4 honesty,5 competence,6 and predictability.7 In other research, these beliefs are often referred to as

A review of the trust literature reveals that the most common belief components in trust definitions can be informally clustered as follows. The word "cite" refers to the number of articles or books on trust, of a possible 79 reviewed, that include this type of trust in their description of what trust is. (a) Benevolence (caring, goodwill, not opportunistic/self-interested, favorable motives/intentions, fiduciary responsibility) --35 cites (b) Honesty (honesty, integrity, credibility, reliability, dependability)--27 cites (c) Competence (competent, skilled expert, efficacious)--15 cites (d) Predictability --12 cites 4 Benevolence is perhaps best captured by Gambetta's definition: "...trusting a person means believing that when offered the chance, he or she is not likely to behave in a way that is damaging to us..." (1988:219). Others mentioning forms of benevolence include: Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Deutsch, 1958; Dunn, 1988; Larzelere & Huston, 1980; Pellegrino, 1991; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994. 5 For example: Barber, 1983; Blakeney, 1986; Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Cooprider & Victor, 1993; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Larzelere & Huston, 1980; Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Worchel, 1979. 6 For example: Barber, 1983; Blakeney, 1986; Dobing, 1993; Giffin, 1967;
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trust itself. We propose that such beliefs form the core cognitive concept that is manifest in intentions to trust, which in turn are manifest in trusting behaviors.

Trusting beliefs also encompass belief-related emotional security. This refers to the level of security one possesses in one's beliefs about the other person. The term "emotion" is used primarily in the sense of feelings, based on cognitive evaluation and assignment of positive or negative values (Berscheid, 1983: 123) to the object of those feelings.

SYSTEM TRUST System trust is the belief that proper impersonal structures are in place to enable one to anticipate a successful future endeavor. Impersonal structures include such safeguards as regulations, guarantees, or contracts. System trust may also refer to belief in the proper structure of one's own role and others' roles in the situation. But, it is not specific to a person. System trust does, however, relate to a specific situation and its context. System trust is based on the effectiveness of social structures in reducing uncertainty and providing foundations for secure feelings about the future (Luhmann, 1991; Lewis & Weigert, 1985a; Shapiro, 1987b). For example, Zucker (1986) points out that much of the personal-based trust of the 1700s and early 1800s in the United States was displaced in the late 1800s because the populace became much more heterogeneous through immigration. Hence, it became necessary for system trust--trust in institutions (e.g., banks, courts, regulations, professional associations) --to fill in for the absence of personal trust.

DISPOSITIONAL TRUST

Mishra, 1993; Pellegrino, 1991; Sitkin & Roth, 1993. 7 For example: Deutsch, 1958; Giffin, 1967; Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985.
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To this point, we have treated trust as a situational variable. But it can also be viewed as a cross-situational, cross-personal variable (e.g. Deutsch, 1973; Harnett & Cummings, 1980; Wrightsman, 1991). Definitionally, a person has dispositional trust if s/he has a consistent tendency to trust across a broad spectrum of situations and persons. There are two types of reasoning that underly dispositional trust. The first is that one assumes that others are generally trustworthy people--hence, one should usually trust others. The second is that one assumes that irrespective of whether people are good or not, one will obtain better outcomes by trusting them--hence, one should trust them.

DECISION TO TRUST Decision to trust differs from dispositional trust in that it is an intentional construct and relates to specific situations. It means that one has formed an intention to trust every time a particular situation arises, irrespective of beliefs about the attributes of the other party in the situation. Like the second type of dispositional trust, it means that a person has decided to trust because the benefits of trusting in this situation outweigh the risks associated with trusting. The difference between decision to trust and dispositional trust is that decision to trust is limited to a situation, whereas dispositional trust goes across many situations. Decision to trust is different from system trust in that it is an intention, not a set of beliefs.

DISTRUST CONSTRUCTS Although this paper focuses on the positive side of trust, we do occasionally discuss the negative side. Distrust will be discussed in relation to one of the mechanisms that creates it and in terms of trust's fragility. Each of the above trust constructs has its distrust opposite. These are probably separate constructs rather than just lying at the far end of the same scale as trust (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995). They are defined here briefly such that, for simplicity, their definitions mirror those of the trust constructs. Interpersonal distrust means that one is not willing to depend on the other party with a feeling of relative security in a situation in which negative consequences

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are possible. Distrusting beliefs means that one believes that the other person is not trustworthy in the situation--not benevolent, honest, competent and/or predictable. System distrust means one believes that impersonal structures that will enable one to be successful are not in place. Dispositional distrust means one has a tendency to distrust across a broad spectrum of situations and persons. Decision not to trust means that one has made a decision to distrust in a particular situation, irrespective of beliefs about the attributes of the other.

SECTION 1 CONCLUSION Lewis & Weigert (1985a) called trust a highly complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon. Harrison White (1992: 174) said, "Trust is itself a term for a clustering of perceptions." The above set of definitions help address Problem 1 by representing trust as a set of constructs instead of limiting it to one narrow type. This trust typology is appropriate in terms of coverage; it extends to both personal and impersonal, and to situational and across-situational contexts. It represents both trait and state (intentions, beliefs) aspects of trust. It includes several core beliefs, which comprise the central motivator of trusting behaviors. But, because these beliefs may be somewhat distal from trusting behaviors, we have also included an intentional state, which should relate closely to trusting behaviors. Hence, we have defined a manageable set of constructs that capture a wide and appropriate range of the overall concept we know as trust.

SCOPE OF THE REST OF THE PAPER The remainder of the paper applies the trust constructs to the earliest portion of a relationship.8 The discussion addresses the question posed by Orbell, Dawes, & Schwartz-Shea (1994:113): "Absent [an interaction] history, on what do we base our trust?" In particular, we will: (a) analyze the formation of trust by identifying the types of trust and cognitive mechanisms by which it is created, and
8

The term "relationship" will be defined at the beginning of Section 2.

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(b) explain the role of emotion in trust formation.

Early relationship trust is extremely important. It helps create an initial direction for the relationship. Most scholars agree that trust usually progresses unidirectionally, either in upward spirals or in downward spirals (e.g., Golembiewski & McConkie, 1975; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Zand, 1972). On the positive side, people tend to confirm their early positive beliefs and hopes, strengthening trust over time. Such confirmation occurs through attribution processes (Kramer, 1994; Holmes, 1991). People evaluate the other's actions and attribute them to the positive attributes of the other person. Similarly, on the negative side, peoples' attributions tend to confirm their early beliefs that the other person is not trustworthy. Because trust often moves in such self-confirming cycles, understanding of the formation of early trust is critical.

Before proceeding, we must bound the level of analysis. The discussion explores trust as an interpersonal variable. We recognize that intergroup or interorganizational trust may use different, or, at least additional, formational processes than will interpersonal trust. The discussion, however, does not address those differences. Rather, it focuses on the interpersonal level of analysis, because this level is more conducive to a close look at the cognitive and emotional mechanisms that form trust. We believe that a thorough grasp of these mechanisms is essential to understand relationships more fully (Robins, 1990:80) and at more macro levels. Also, the discussion is limited to the above-defined trust constructs themselves. It recognizes, but does not address, the potential of other variables (e.g., communication, equity, power--see Loomis, 1959; Organ, 1990; Solomon, 1960) to impact trust significantly. The reason for this scope limitation will become apparent: trust by itself is complex enough in the several manifestations treated in this paper. The paper proceeds as follows: The dynamics of initial relationship trust formation are explained (Section 2), addressing Problem 2 above. This section also addresses the remaining portion of Problem 1 by explaining how the types of trust relate to each other. In addition, Section 2 addresses Problem

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3 by explaining the role of emotion in trust formation. The implications for both research and practice are discussed in Section 3.

SECTION 2:

TRUST FORMATION

DEFINITION OF THE INITIAL RELATIONSHIP Two parties are said to have a relationship when they are behaviorally interdependent. This means that each is dependent on the other (Brehm, 1992; Berscheid, 1985), and each recognizes that dependence (Berscheid & Graziano, 1979). Interdependence means that one party is not able to fulfill its function or achieve its objectives without action by the other party (Mishra, 1993; Thompson, 1967). In this situation, each party desires assurance that the other's actions will enable their interdependent objectives to be met. Such assurance can come either through control mechanisms or through trust (Barber, 1983). Relationships differ in strength along a continuum that has close family ties at the strong end and impersonal market relationships at the weak end. In market relationships, two parties may do no more than exchange money for already-priced goods. At the other end of the spectrum, family relationships may be extremely strong -- characterized by high levels of influence and interaction frequency between parties (Berscheid, Snyder & Omoto, 1989). Since they are more or less socially embedded (Granovetter, 1985; Shapiro, 1987a), most organizational relationships lie somewhere between these two extremes (Bradach & Eccles, 1989).

The remainder of this paper addresses trust in the context of what is called the "initial" relationship, which is distinguished by time and interdependence dimensions. In terms of the time dimension, the initial relationship begins when the parties first become aware of each other. In terms of the interdependence dimension, the parties both become aware that they are dependent on the other to accomplish some objective. The "initial relationship" ends after the first few interactions in their interdependent roles. Therefore, the initial relationship period is very brief. The end of the initial relationship is marked by a change in the manner in which one's views about the other are formed. As will be explained in Section 2, initial relationship views of the other

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are based on cognitive mechanisms. The period after the initial one is called the continuing relationship. As the parties interact during the continuing relationship, their judgments about each other become more a function of the interactions themselves. Recalling that our construct of interpersonal trust means a willingness to depend, our overall argument proceeds as follows: (a) In spite of the newness of the relationship, initial period interpersonal trust may be relatively high because of some combination of five supports: dispositional trust, a situational decision to trust, categorization mechanisms, illusionary mechanisms, and system trust. (b) System trust and a decision to trust directly affect interpersonal trust itself, while the effects of categorization and illusion on trust are mediated by trusting beliefs. Dispositional trust works on trust both directly and through the mediation of trusting beliefs. These arguments are justified as each of the five supports is individually discussed below. Pictorially (shown as Figure 1), these supports of trust might be thought of as the bases that underly trust.

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-------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here --------------------------------

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Interpersonal trust is like a platform that rests on one or more of the five bases. Trust is more firm when several bases undergird it. Section 2 discusses how: (2.1) dispositional trust underlies both trusting beliefs and trust itself; a decision to trust also underlies trust; (2.2) categorization and illusion underly trust through their effects on trusting beliefs; (2.3) system trust underlies trust; (2.4) the trusting beliefs construct underlies trust. Section 2.5 discusses why initial trust is properly characterized as fragile. Section 2.6 explains the extent to which one may assign necessary and sufficient conditions to the formation of trust.

2.1 DISPOSITIONAL TRUST AND A SITUATIONAL DECISION TO TRUST Table 1 shows that dispositional trust and decision to trust are both cross-personal phenomena. As apparent from their Section 1 definitions, these concepts are closely related. Therefore, they will be discussed together in Section 2.1.

2.1.1 DISPOSITIONAL TRUST As defined earlier, a person has dispositional trust if s/he has a consistent tendency to trust across a broad spectrum of situations and persons. The question that needs to be raised is: "Is dispositional trust important, and if so, under what conditions?" Based on a literature search (e.g., Schlenker, Helm & Tedeschi, 1973), Dobing (1993) felt dispositional trust would not be as salient as situation-based trust. Johnson-George & Swap (1982) argue that one's willingness to depend on another "in any given situation will be determined by a variety of more specific factors [besides dispositional trust]" (p. 1306). They cite evidence that dispositional trust predicts trusting behavior only when parties are new to each other in "highly ambiguous, novel, or unstructured situations, where one's generalized expectancy is all one can rely on." (p. 1307) More recently, Holmes (1991: 63) says that although researchers assume dispositional trust is a contributor to

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the development of relationship-specific trust, this link has not been proven. In light of our framework, this link may have been difficult to prove because dispositional trust is only one of several structures upon which trust may be based. If all of the bases of trust are taken into account, the dispositional trust to interpersonal trust linkage may be tested in a controlled manner.

We propose that relationship newness itself is important in predicting the effects of dispositional trust. In new relationships, it is likely that dispositional trust will have some impact on some people's trust in others. Already-developed patterns of thinking (schemas) about relationships should transfer, to some degree, to an initial relationship. This is particularly true if the person cannot draw on other bases (e.g., trusting beliefs or system trust) because the situation, the type of relationship, and the type of other person are new. In other words, if no more specific information is available, one would rely on one's basic beliefs about human nature, as reflected in dispositional trust (Wrightsman, 1991). This is similar to the argument presented by Mullins & Cummings (1994: 6) that "weak situations" display ambiguity in terms of the meaning of the situation. In weak situations, the person's disposition will be more salient than the situation. Therefore, we propose:

Proposition 1: To the extent that situational factors (e.g., system trust) are not salient, dispositional trust will have a significant effect on trust and on trusting beliefs during an initial relationship .

We distinguish between two types of dispositional trust, each with different effects on interpersonal trust: Type A and Type B. Type A dispositional trust means that one believes that others are generally good people, typically trustworthy, and therefore should be treated as such. Type B dispositional trust means that one believes that

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irrespective of whether people are good or not, one will obtain better interpersonal outcomes by treating people as though they are good and trustworthy people. Both Type A and Type B dispositional trust would apply across most situations. Dispositional trust Type A affects one's beliefs about the other's trustworthiness (Kramer, 1994). Hence, this general belief may easily be translated into a belief that the specific other in the relationship is trustworthy. Type B influences one to trust the other without respect to beliefs in the other person. It means one believes that things turn out best when one trusts others, even though others may not be trustworthy. Thus, this type of dispositional trust does not lead to beliefs about the other person, but still supports one's willingness to depend on that person.

Proposition 2a: In the initial relationship, Type A dispositional trust will be positively related to trusting beliefs, and its effect on interpersonal trust will be mediated by those beliefs.

Proposition 2b: In the initial relationship, Type B dispositional trust will be positively related to trust, but not to trusting beliefs.

2.1.2 A DECISION-TO-TRUST Kee & Knox (1970) proposed that people may manifest trust even when they believe the other party will likely be untrustworthy. Kee & Knox said this may occur "when there is much to gain from trusting..., but little attendant risk." (1970: 360) We are suggesting that such trust may be based on a situation-based decision to trust. This is very similar to Riker's (1971) conceptualization of trust as a situation-based decision to depend on another. In Section 1, we differentiated such a decision to trust from interpersonal trust itself, and from our other trust-related constructs. We posit that such a decision may be a basis for trust.

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A decision-to-trust intention is formed when situational characteristics cause one to choose to trust in this situation irrespective of beliefs about the attributes of the other party. This is similar to Type B dispositional trust, except that it only applies to particular settings. For example, a person may decide that the benefits of trusting the other person in this situation outweigh the downside risk of trusting. The situational nature of the decision distinguishes decision-to-trust from dispositional trust. In a given situation, other, and without forming beliefs about the other's trustworthiness. The situation (with which one is familiar) is more salient than the people involved.9 A personal intention is thus formed to trust the other "tentatively and conditionally" (Gambetta, 1988: 228) until the other proves unworthy of the trust. A person may fear the other's ability to defect and cause harm, but at the same time realize that the outcome of the relationship may be endangered if an initial stage decision to trust is not made. For example, a person dependent on a specific project team may decide that s/he will trust the team leader with which s/he interacts because s/he hopes that this decision to trust will improve the chances for project success. However, if the intention is applied to all, or nearly all, situations, (Gambetta, 1988: 228) then it becomes Type B dispositional trust.

Proposition 3: In the initial relationship, a decision-to-trust intention will be positively related to trust, but not to trusting beliefs.

2.2 TWO MECHANISMS ENABLING TRUST: CATEGORIZATION AND ILLUSION Categorization and illusion are two mechanisms that play an important role in the formation of trust. By mechanism we mean cognitive processes that can affect a person's beliefs. These mechanisms help form trust by their impact on trusting beliefs.

2.2.1 CATEGORIZATION MECHANISMS

9

This strategy may extend to cover a category of situations, as well.

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People try to simplify a complex, uncertain world by organizing information into categories so they can use an "equivalent response to all instances of a category" (Shetzer, 1993). In a new relationship, a person may initiate three types of trust-

related categorization mechanisms: (a) unit grouping, (b) reputation categorization, and (c) stereotyping. Each of these mechanisms supports trusting beliefs.

Unit grouping--Unit grouping means that one person, because of the new relationship, now perceives the other person in a new grouping that places the pair into a natural cohesive partnership. That is, the other person is categorized as part of a grouping that includes oneself. It is believed that those grouped together share common goals and/or beliefs, values, and assumptions. For example, one of the authors was studying a large corporate division in which (due in part to functional specialization) there were significant communication and cooperation barriers between manager groups. One of the division's managers asked the author why it was that, in spite of these barriers, people who were formed into cross-functional task forces seem to drop immediately all their prior parochial feelings and act as a cohesive team. One possible answer could be that people tend to alter some of their beliefs about the other party when they become part of the same team.

Evidence for this phenomenon is found in social psychology. In studying prospective dating couples, Darley & Berscheid (1967) found experimentally that the knowledge that one will be paired with the other often changes (positively) one's beliefs about the other's characteristics. Borden & Levinger (1991: 35) describe how a couple's being identified as a unit is "more than merely a label. It reflects a transformation from selforiented to jointly-oriented criteria for formulating goals and evaluating experiences--a transformation from an 'I'-- to a 'we'--orientation." We posit that the same can happen in other interdependent relations, resulting in what Culbert and McDonough (1985: 128) call alignment. "Alignments give an individual a frame of reference for instantly recognizing the opportunities and threats inherent in each situation and the importance or dismissability of various interpersonal relationships." Hence, unit grouping can

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enable one to call up learned cognitive relationship schemas and scripts (Baldwin, 1992) to facilitate cooperation in joint endeavors. Lewis & Weigert (1985b: 464) posit that emotional trust will be high in "primary group relations," the group of which the person considers him/herself and the other person to be closely interacting members. Having both parties in the "in-group" would lead to belief-related feelings of security because one's schema of in-group membership would portray the other favorably. The schema would include images that future interactions with the other person will not be "uncertain, complex, and...threatening." (Lewis & Weigert, 1985b: 462) If the categorization mechanism places the dyad into a clan-like or family-like relationship, emotional security will be high. On the other hand, if the categorization mechanism places the other person in an out-group category, emotional trust of that person may be low.

Unit grouping will also produce in one party positive affect for the other. In most organizational contexts, these feelings will not reflect the "hot" emotion experienced in an intimate relationship. They will, however, produce feelings of liking and respect. Just as important for trust formation, unit grouping is also likely to produce feelings of security that one's beliefs about the other's trustworthiness are valid. This feeling of security, combined with the cognitive beliefs, forms a basis for interpersonal trust.

Reputation categorization--A second kind of categorization is based on one party's reputation, as known by the other party. Reputation may reflect professional competence (Barber, 1983; Dobing, 1993). It may also extend to issues of integrity. (Dasgupta, 1988). Reputation may reflect either what is known about the person or what is known about the person's group. The person may be perceived as a competent person because of her/his own actions, or because s/he is a member of a competent group. As an example of this latter type of categorization, Dasgupta (1988) says that the Gurkhas have a reputation for bravery in battle. While individual Gurkhas may vary in levels of bravery, we would still judge a Gurkha about whom we know nothing according to our opinion of the Gurkha group. We would "impute a high probability

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to his being brave, not necessarily because he has done anything--he may have gone untested so far--but because he is a Gurkha, he is one of them." (Dasgupta, 1988: 63) Hence, through group or individual reputation, one puts the other in a category of those on whom one may depend.

Stereotyping--The third type of categorization has to do with more general biases (stereotypes) about the other person. Stereotyping may be done at the broadest level, such as gender (e.g., Orbell, Dawes, and Schwartz-Shea, 1994), or at more specific levels, such as prejudices against specific small groups. These prejudices may cause immediate distrust between majority and minority groups (Johnson & Johnson, 1989: 108). Johnson & Johnson point out that such stigmatization "takes place even before direct contact begins" (Johnson & Johnson, 1989: 109). Stereotypes may be formed on the basis of the first bit of second-hand knowledge one obtains regarding the other party. Or, they may be formed at the first meeting between the parties, based on the other's voice (e.g. male/female, domestic/foreign) (Baldwin, 1992, p. 462) or physical appearance (Lewis & Weigert, 1985b:468; Riker, 1971: 78). In social psychology experiments, for example, subjects more often placed the physically attractive person into the "good" person category than they did one who was not physically attractive. Researchers called this the "what is beautiful is good" stereotype (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1982). As another example, in an evening MBA course in which students were randomly assigned to interdependent work groups, one foreign student reported that conflict and low trust levels existed in his group because one of the other students, on seeing his obviously foreign name on his business card, was infected by previously acquired prejudices against "his type" (McKnight, 1994).

The above three categorization processes enable one to place a person one hardly knows into a grouping from which generalizations may be made. These generalizations, in turn, enable one to form beliefs about the other person's honesty,

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competence, benevolence, and/or predictability. Categorization also supports emotional security with respect to trusting beliefs. Together, these beliefs and accompanying emotional security provide a foundation for trust.

Proposition 4: In spite of the newness of a relationship, categorization mechanisms will enable initial relationship interpersonal trust to be high. The effects of categorization mechanisms on interpersonal trust will be mediated by trusting beliefs.

2.2.2 ILLUSIONARY MECHANISMS THAT DEVELOP TRUST Trust is not developed solely on rational mechanisms, but also on illusionary mechanisms. Sometimes one does not even know enough about a person to enable categorization to operate. Categorization requires that one use logic. That is, one places the person in a category, attributes good characteristics to a group, and, through logic, concludes that the person has the same attributes as found generally in the group. On the other hand, illusionary processes operate without such information and logic. That is, a high level of illusionary overconfidence about the other person's attributes may exist in initial relationship trust. By overconfidence, we mean greater confidence than one's available data about the other person can reasonably justify. In this time frame, known facts about the other are sketchy at best. Therefore, Lewis & Weigert (1985b: 466) say that early trust is "assumptive." Luhmann (1991: 68) says that "[trust entails] reliance upon fictions which work...trust is not concerned with knowing the essential truth about a matter but with the success of the reduction of [mental] complexity." The mind economizes effort by drawing a consistent picture of the other, even if the drawing must extend "beyond the available evidence" (Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985: 97). Holmes (1991: 64) says that a person's early feelings about the interdependent other create "a sense of optimism that belies a lack of hard evidence." The future possibilities "feed their hopes and fantasies about the potential of the relationship." (Holmes & Rempel, 1989:

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192) This is especially true when one perceives that the other person has the characteristics needed to enable one to complete plans or goals important to one's future. Holmes' analysis of how trust initially forms is consistent with the research in cognitive psychology, which says that people use inferential shortcuts to allow them to make up their minds "quickly, easily, and with excessive confidence in the correctness of their decisions." (Tetlock, 1985: 302) A pair of people in an initial relationship are also likely to use illusionary processes because they do not know from experience whether the other has the attributes needed to be considered trustworthy.

The cognitive processes that build this illusion-based trust may be similar to those related to judgment overconfidence in the behavioral decision theory literature. In particular, (a) one forms a tentative opinion; (b) one then seeks confirming evidence; and, (c) even a slight effort to find out more about the other person may overinflate one's confidence that a high level of trust in the other is warranted (e.g. Davis & Kottemann, 1994; Langer, 1975; Paese & Sniezek, 1991). Kramer (1994) found, for example, that ruminating for a few minutes about the others' motives and intentions increased a person's confidence in the the accuracy of their judgments of the others. People tend to fill in confidently the missing pieces of the most sketchy information presented to them about the other (e.g. Abelson et al., 1968; Jagacinski, 1991). Hence, illusion can support a person's beliefs in the other's trustworthiness.

Illusion can also help support emotional security in one's beliefs about the other. It does this by filling in missing facts that would make one feel secure in one's beliefs about the other. For example, one would feel secure about the other if one believes that the other shares one's basic values and goals. Even without evidence, one may feel relatively confident that the other has such values and goals. Hence, one will feel more secure in one's beliefs about the other.

Proposition 5: In spite of the newness of a relationship, illusionary

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mechanisms enable initial relationship trust to be high. The effects of illusionary mechanisms on trust will be mediated by trusting beliefs.

Illusion applies to trust in another way. In the initial relationship, the person may not yet have a total comprehension of the risks involved in trusting the other. Baier (1986: 236) says that the consciousness of trust progresses from "initially unselfconscious trust to awareness of risk along with confidence that it is a good risk, on to some realization of why we are taking this particular risk,..." Holmes (1991: 57) described this progression as a "dialectic between people's hopes and fears." The illusionary processes underlying trust fill in the gaps left by simple lack of total consciousness of the risk issues pertinent to a well-reasoned decision to trust. Since they are based on hopes for the future, illusionary mechanisms will probably be most salient when future relationship prospects provide outcomes that one or more party greatly desires. But, since it is essentially a mechanism that fills gaps, illusion will be salient only to the extent that facts about the other are absent or inadequate. Illusion would fill in, for example, when one does not have enough information about the other to use categorization mechanisms.

Proposition 6: In the initial relationship, illusionary processes will be most salient when: (a) prospects for outcomes of the relationship have high value to persons in the dyad, and (b) few facts are known about the other person or the categories in which the other would be placed.

2.3 SYSTEM TRUST Initial relationship trust may also be high because it is founded on system trust. One's system trust was defined as the belief that proper impersonal structures are in place to enable one to act in anticipation of a successful future endeavor. The personal characteristics of the other are not at issue with this kind of trust. Hence, system trust does not support beliefs about the other person (see Figure 1); however, it does

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support willingness to depend on the other. System trust may be based on the appearance that things are normal (Garfinkel, 1963: 188) or "customary," (Baier, 1986: 245) or that "everything seems in proper order," (Lewis & Wiegert, 1985a: 974). System trust may also rest on what Shapiro (1987b: 204) calls structural safeguards, or institutional "side bets,"10 such as regulations, guarantors and litigations. For example, a company subcontracting the construction of metric-sized engine parts trusts that the other party will use the same measures the company uses, since they are specified by well-accepted metric standards makers.

In addition to institutional structures, system trust may be based on the situation itself. System trust can include both the proper setting and one's comfort with one's own roles and other persons' roles in that setting. Baier says, "We take it for granted that people will perform their role-related duties, and trust any individual worker to look after whatever her job requires her to." (1986: 245) Baier also argues: "Social artifices such as property, which allocate rights and duties as a standard job does... generally also create a climate of trust, a presumption of a sort of trustworthiness." (1986:245-6) That is, roles and duties often inhere from social structures. These socially constructed roles and duties create a shared understanding among members of the social system that facilitates trust among them. System trust provides assurances that, given the current conducive setting, the other party is likely to act in a way that can be depended on, hence enabling trust.

System trust can be distinguished from illusionary processes. First, illusionary processes are mental mechanisms, while system trust is a belief construct. Second, illusionary processes are based largely on hope and desire, while system trust is based on the specific institutions that provide safeguards against personal damages.

10

Blau (1964: 98) points out that "commitment has been conceptualized as a side bet that promotes trust by making it disproportionately disadvantageous for a person to violate an agreement."
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System trust may also operate through promises or contracts. Baier speaks of a promise, in Hume's words, as "a bond or security" and "the sanction of the interested commerce of mankind." (1986: 246) When one relies on a promise for the basis of trust in the other, two conditions apply. First, the truster feels comfortable that the promise has the type of significance in the particular setting such that the trusted person will make every effort to fulfill it, or reap certain sanctions. This can apply even where interpersonal trust is low: "...the only trust Hobbist man shows is trust in promises, provided there is assurance of punishment for promise breakers..." (Baier, 1986: 252). Second, the truster feels comfortable that the trusted person, out of either integrity or fear of sanctions, will act according to the norms surrounding promise in the social setting. The first condition is a function of system trust, while the second condition reflects beliefs about the other person's probable actions in that social setting.

Proposition 7: In the initial relationship, system trust will be positively related to interpersonal trust. Its effects on interpersonal trust will not be mediated by trusting beliefs.

2.4 TRUSTING BELIEFS AS A FOUNDATION OF TRUST Trusting beliefs includes both cognitive and emotional components, both of which are discussed in this section.

2.4.1 COGNITIVE BELIEFS Cognitive beliefs in the other person's trustworthiness will likely provide a foundation for cognitive willingness to depend on the other person in an initial relationship. If one believes that the other party is trustworthy, one is likely to be willing to depend on that person. Dobing (1993) found evidence of this linkage in his questionnaire study.

Proposition 8: In an initial relationship, one's cognitive willingness to

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depend on another person will be positively related to one's cognitive beliefs in the other person's trustworthiness.

2.4.2 EMOTIONAL SECURITY In Section 1, we defined both interpersonal trust and trusting beliefs to have an emotional component of feelings of security. A number of researchers have said that trust has an emotional component or is based on feelings of security (e.g. Lewis & Weigert, 1985ab; Luhmann, 1991; Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985). Others refer to confidence or confident beliefs in the other (e.g., Deutsch, 1973; Dunn, 1988; Scanzoni, 1979). By separating trusting beliefs from attitudes/intentions to trust (willingness to depend), our conception of trust is able to view the emotional aspect of trust at both levels. Emotions are separated into two levels because each level's emotions has a different referent. At the trust level, the emotional aspect refers to feelings of security about one's willingness to depend on the other party. At the belief level, the emotional aspect means one has feelings of security about one's beliefs regarding the other party's trustworthiness. Emotions, like cognitions, tend toward internal consistency. That is, one is likely to feel secure both in one's willingness to depend and in one's trusting beliefs about the other party. The person who feels secure in her beliefs about the other's trustworthiness will tend to feel assured in her willingness to depend. Hence, the emotional security related to trusting beliefs will underly the emotional security aspects of willingness to depend.

Proposition 9: Emotional security in one's trusting belief will be positively related to emotional security in one's initial willingness to depend.

2.5 THE FRAGILE NATURE OF INITIAL RELATIONSHIP TRUST The term "fragile," when applied to trust, refers to a trust level that is subject to the likelihood of large downward changes during a given timeframe. Why is trust fragile in the initial relationship? We argue that initial trust is fragile largely because of the relatively tenuous nature of its underlying support. The support is tenuous because it is

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based on assumptions and tentative decisions about the other person and the situation, which can easily be replaced by experience-based judgments of the other party. Hence, experience with the other party that contradicts one's early beliefs may cause a rapid decrease in one's level of trust.

We do not argue that early trust will always be fragile. A combination of bases may allow it to be strong. However, we argue that initial relationship trust is likely to be more fragile than experience-based trust.Intuitively, the more diverse trust's supports, the less fragile trust will be. The inverse would also be true. The fewer its underlying supports, the more trust is subject to abrupt changes toward distrust. For example, trust may rely almost exclusively for support on system trust. In the case of agreements or contracts, Dasgupta (1988) says that the trust one person has in another to fulfill a contract depends on the power of the agencies that are able to enforce contracts: "If your trust in the enforcement agency falters, you will not trust persons to fulfil their terms of an agreement and thus will not enter into that agreement...It is this interconnectedness which makes trust such a fragile commodity." (1988: 50) Similarly, the sole belief in the other's honesty is a basis for trust that can crumble quickly (Dasgupta, 1988) if experience indicates that the belief is mistaken. Riker (1971: 78) points out that categorization as a basis for trust is fragile because "only rarely do they effectively discriminate between the trustworthy and the untrustworthy." We have previously discussed how dispositional trust may be a weak trust base in the presence of a strong situation. Situational or personal bases for trust may become strong quickly as experience is gained.

Trust will be fragile in the initial relationship because of the assumptional nature of its foundation. Intuitively, the illusion-based trust seems most assumptional and therefore fragile. Decisions-to-trust are also tentative; they are normally decisions to "trust until" one obtains further information (Dobing, 1993). Decisions to trust may reflect

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some level of underlying suspicion of the other. Kee & Knox (1970: 359) propose that in some circumstances, people will continue trusting even when they still have "some mild doubts about O's integrity or competence." But when "some critical level of uncertainty is reached, P will begin to withhold full manifest trust in order to protect himself..."

As facts about the other person displace illusions and presuppositions, the person's trust may quickly erode. Fazio & Zanna (1981) pointed out two reasons why experience replaces assumptions: (a) people consider behavioral experience information to be more reliable than indirectly obtained information; and, (b) people's direct experience in forming an attitude or judgment makes that attitude more readily accessible in memory. Riker (1971:78) agreed with Fazio & Zanna's first reason, saying that people won't long be satisfied with trust based on non-experiential data. Rather, they will seek data that brings them greater assurance that their initial conceptions are valid.

Added to Fazio & Zannas two reasons is a third reason: emotion. People are likely to have emotional experiences through interaction early in a relationship (Berscheid, 1983). During the initial relationship, people are more likely to be surprised or to have their expectations interrupted by the other's actions or words. Surprising or interrupting events are likely to have emotional effects (Berscheid, 1983). Within the range of emotional intensity expected in most interactions, emotional events are likely to be remembered better than are non-emotional events (Baddeley, 1990). Hence, emotion-causing interactions will be more likely to be recalled later as input to one's trust judgments of the other. Emotional events are also likely to impact trust because they often arouse the person's autonomic nervous system (Berscheid, 1983), which heightens the person's attention to the other party when placed in a similar situation with her/him. Heightened attention combined with a negative emotional feeling make it more likely that the person will find evidence counter to her/his current trust and

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trusting beliefs. Any evidence found will lead to further suspicion. Hence, a selffulfilling prophecy spiral will result. Based on emotion theory, we suggest that for interdependent parties, emotion-laden interruptions may raise such questions as: "Will the other party obstruct my higher-order plans the next time a similar opportunity arises?" If the answer is "yes," or even "maybe," then the person's willingness to depend on the other would decrease.

The fragility of trust is also affected by the strength of the combination of beliefs one party holds about the other. As mentioned earlier, four core beliefs about the other emerge from the trust literature: benevolence, honesty, competence, and predictability. If only one of these beliefs is held, the relationship may be very unstable. But even with more than one belief, particularly in their under-informed initial state, they may be fragile. In fact, if one is missing only one of the four foundational beliefs, trust may still be fragile. Why? First, belief in the other's competence, which we define as efficacy--"capacity for producing a desired result or effect" (Stein, 1971: 455)--is critical to trust. Unless the other has the power and ability to accomplish what is needed, the dependent party has no reason to trust that it will be done.

But even a competent partner may make promises that are not kept. Second, then, a person needs to believe that the other is honest--defined as making honest efforts (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995) to accomplish the thing implicitly promised in the interdependent relationship. Third, even if one believes that the other is competent and honest, one needs to feel assured that more than the letter of the agreement will be kept. This requires that the person believe the other is benevolent, not self-serving or opportunistic. Finally, non-fragile trust requires that the level of predictability of the other's behavior become evident. Predictability means the ability of one to forecast the other's actions. Without this belief, the person may still fear that an unpredictably honest, competent and benevolent partner may not perform on the next occasion when an interdependent action is required.

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For all of the above reasons, we propose:

Proposition 10: Initial relationship trust is likely to be very fragile.

2.6 CONSIDERING THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR TRUST FORMATION It is difficult to apply necessary and sufficient conditions to initial relationship trust formation. As we have discussed, initial trust is complex both in its composition and in terms of the number of bases on which it rests. Little empirical research has been done that sheds light on our propositions about the formation of trust. However, Dobing (1993) found that trusting beliefs are highly correlated with willingness to depend. Goldsteen, Schorr & Goldsteen (1989) found that dispositional trust had a significant effect on what they call mistrust. However, they do not report on the validity of their unique trust operationalizations. Zucker (1986) discusses how institutional-based trust substituted for process-based trust from 1840-1920 in the United States, but does not explore the effects one type of trust has on another. Orbell, Dawes & Schwarz-Shea (1994) studied the effects of gender categorization on trusting expectations, but found it had very little predictive power. To our knowledge, no one has studied the effects of illusion on trust. More critically, no one has simultaneously studied the effects of several of the trust bases on trust. Due to lack of research on how the bases of trust impact trust, our discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions for trust rests on logical arguments rather than on empirical evidence.

From prior discussion, it seems reasonable that with several possible mechanisms/bases for trust, none of them is likely to be solely necessary for trust. The various mechanism(s) can act as substitutes for one another. For example, Zucker showed that system trust can replace more personal types of trust. Similarly, it seems logical that beliefs about the other person can substitute for dispositional trust.

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We do not preclude the possibility that a single basis may be sufficient for the development of a high level of trust. In a weak situation, where no other basis is available, dispositional trust may be sufficient. A decision-to-trust intention may be strong enough to warrant trust in a given situation. Categorization alone may be sufficient if the category places the two parties in a clan-like, emotionally secure position with each other. System trust would be sufficient alone if it is strong enough to provide one a secure enough feeling to overcome the uncertainties presented by the new interpersonal situation. Illusion would probably not be sufficient alone, since it normally works in conjunction with system or dispositional trust.

It seems reasonable that the presence of two or more of the five bases would normally provide a stronger reason for high trust than would one alone. For example, Kramer found a fairly high trust level among MBA's, attributing the high level to ingroup bias, which is like our unit grouping categorization. However, their level of trust may have also been higher due to: (a) higher-than-average dispositional trust; (b) illusionary processes (since Kramer had them ruminate about their judgments of the others); (c) a decision-to-trust intention; or/and (d) some form of system trust. However, we caution that the number of bases alone is the only factor. Rather, the strength of each base will also affect the level of trust.

Proposition 11: Typically, initial relationship trust will be based upon a multiplex of bases. The more diverse and strong the bases, the higher the level of trust.

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SECTION 3: CONCLUSION

The trust concept is difficult to conceptualize and operationalize in ways that are theoretically sound, empirically testable, and applicable to common usage and practice. A major intent of this paper is to differentiate the various types of trust in a way that allows each part to be used on its own, but still relate to the other types. Employing the interplay between interpersonal trust and its bases will shed light on such unexpected research results as high trust in new relationships and situations (e.g., Kramer, 1994).

In addition, this research highlights additional possible explanations for results in game theory research. This is important because of the historical prevalence of game theory approaches in trust-related research. For example, dispositional trust, system trust, and categorization mechanisms need to be eliminated as possible reasons for observed experimental outcomes--or used to explain the outcomes. The result will be a more thorough explanation of trust-related phenomena, not merely an ability to predict trust-related outcomes. Twenty-five years ago, Kee & Knox (1970: 365) recommended that Prisoner's Dilemma research should include "continuous" measures of the individuals' subjective state (e.g., beliefs) in addition to the behavioral choices they make. Our model's rich set of constructs provides a theoretical basis for doing so.

To build a proper foundation for continuing research in trust, operationalizations should correspond as closely as possible to the conceptualizations provided above. The following reflects some of the key research steps that need to be taken in this area: (a) Reliable and valid instruments reflecting the constructs in this paper should be developed (Cummings & Bromiley, 1995, in press).

(b) The instruments should be tested against what people mean when they use the term "trust" in everyday life.

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(c) The initial relationship trust propositions should be tested both in laboratory and organizational settings. (d) Since trust has been defined to be juxtaposed against other social control mechanisms, additional work should be done to examine the interplay between the types of trust discussed here and social control mechanisms.

Several researchers have suggested that the trust concept needs considerable integrative effort (Barber, 1983; Kramer, 1994; Lewis & Weigert, 1985a; Sitkin & Roth, 1993), both definitionally and in ways that link the micro (psychological) level with the macro (organizational or social) level. This paper contributes as follows: (a) It synthesizes several views of trust into a coherent set of constructs, representing a typology of trust in its respective components: beliefs, attitudes/intentions, emotions, dispositions and impersonal beliefs. (b) It postulates ways in which the bases of trust support trust. (c) It portrays the cognitive and emotional mechanisms that allow initial relationship trust to form. (d) By focusing on the mechanism level, it provides a way to explain and understand the dynamics of trust formation.

Several implications for practice can also be drawn from this model: (a) We need to be realistic about the nature of early levels of trust. Early trust may be more fragile and ephemeral than people in various relationships assume (and for different reasons). (b) By understanding the nature of early trust's fragility, we can try to strengthen the bases that support trust. The more bases of trust that one can set up or positively influence, the better. (c) One should work to be trustworthy and have a trustworthy reputation in order to ensure trust lasts past the initial phase of the relationship.

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(d) Because trust tends to be reciprocally influenced (Golembiewski & McConkie, 1975), a personal strategy to "trust until" would be appropriate for many new situations.

However, a caution is in order. Because early trust is based more on fiction than fact, we must be careful how it is extended (Granovetter, 1985). Otherwise, we may unwittingly expose ourselves to opportunism. "After all, at the very heart of the

dilemma ... is not simply whether to trust or distrust, but rather how much trust and distrust are appropriate in a given situation" (Kramer, 1994: 226).

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