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Canadian Foreign Policy Journal

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The future of Canadian airpower and the F-35

Rob Huebert
a a

Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada Available online: 02 Feb 2012

To cite this article: Rob Huebert (2011): The future of Canadian airpower and the F-35, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 17:3, 228-238 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2011.638196

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Canadian Foreign Policy Journal Vol. 17, No. 3, September 2011, 228238

The future of Canadian airpower and the F-35

Rob Huebert
Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada Keywords: Canadian Airpower; F-35; Military Strategy; Canadian Defence Policy

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Introduction The Harper governments announcement in July 2010 that it would be purchasing 65 F-35 aircraft unleashed a storm of controversy (CBC, 16 July 2010). Much of it focused on the anticipated cost of purchasing the aircraft. As the aircraft is still in development the nal cost is uncertain. The real debate is whether in the future Canada needs the airpower that is provided by the F35s. As a medium power, does Canada need the capability provided by ghter aircraft as it moves into the twenty-rst century? Will Canada require the ability to engage in future hostile aerospace environments? Will Canada need to have airpower to defend its borders and to defend future foreign deployments? These are the real questions that need to be asked. Once these questions have been addressed, then the issue of costs may be examined. In assessing Canadas future airpower requirements, the literature on the subject is quite limited. Apart from Joseph Jockel, Andrew Godefroy, Scott Robertson and James Fergusson, academics have made little effort to understand Canadian airpower. Canadas allies have powerful air forces. Since the Americans have tended to do most of the thinking on the subject,1 few Canadians have given serious thought to what airpower means for Canada. Most Canadians are probably unaware that Canadian airpower has played a vital role in Canadian security in terms of war ghting, deterrence, and other overseas deployments for peace-keeping, peace-making and so forth. In order to address whether Canada needs its own airpower, this analysis will look at two key issues: will Canada need to have ghter-based airpower for the next 30 to 40 years? If yes, what type of aircraft is necessary and what is available? Canada will operate the replacement for the CF-18s (also labeled as CF-188s) for 30 to 40 years. Every aircraft has its own shelf-life, that is, how long it can be operated. Both the Russian and American Air Forces still maintain and operate bombers that were built in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Tu-95 and B-52) (FAS 2000, 2010a). Likewise Canada still operates the CC-138 Twin-Otters that were built in the early 1970s in its northern region (Canadian Army, 10 March 2011). However, due to high speeds and other demands placed on them, the

Rob Huebert is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and the associate director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary. He was a senior research fellow of the Canadian International Council; a fellow with Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute and in November 2010 was appointed as a commissioner to the Canadian Polar Commission. Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, Calgary Alberta, T2N 1N4. Email: Rhuebert@ucalgary.ca
ISSN 1192-6422 print/ISSN 2157-0817 online # 2011 NPSIA http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2011.638196 http://www.tandfonline.com

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life expectancy of ghter aircraft tends to be shorter than that of bombers or other slower aircraft. Nevertheless, the Canadian Air Force has been successful in extending the life of most of its aircraft, particularly its current eet of CF-18s. The eet rst entered service in 1982 and the nal aircraft was procured in 1988 (Canada, 3 March 2007). It continues to deliver front line service (as illustrated by its current deployment in the Libyan conict in 2011), with 79 operational aircraft currently (CBC, 21 March 2011). Already in service from 23 to 29 years, the modernization program could extend the CF-18s service for another six years until 2017 (Roberds 2006). The aircraft could be operating for over 30 years. Although Canada is expected to take delivery of the F-35s in 2017, Canada has seldom taken possession of a major weapon system on time, due to delays in the procurement program. It is likely that the CF-18s will need to be maintained past 2017. Nevertheless, the Canadian Air Force hopes to commence procurement on schedule in 2016 and then continue for several years. If these new aircraft prove to be as durable as the current CF18s, it stands to reason that the F-35 aircraft will be in use for the next 25 to 30 years. Assuming that Canada takes possession of these new aircraft from 2016 to 2020, they will be in use until approximately 2050. This is the time period that must be considered for the purpose of answering the question about Canadian airpower. Canadian airpower As mentioned earlier, discussions about Canadian airpower have been limited to a small number of academics and members of the Canadian Forces. As such, there is considerable ambiguity regarding the term. An examination of recent Canadian Air Force documents such as Vectors 2020: An air force strategic assessment or Canadian Forces aerospace doctrine does not directly dene Canadian airpower. Even many of the best academic writings on the term sidestep the issue (Ferguson 2009). Most of these make reference to the classical theorists of the eld such as Douhet, Mitchell, Trenchard, Seversky, and Slessor, as well as those that are considered to be more modern theorists such as Boyd and Warden (Meilinger 2003). But there is a frustrating lack of precision as to what is actually meant by the term Canadian airpower. Perhaps the best explanation of Canadian airpower has been provided by the former Chief of Air Staff (i.e., head of the Air Force) Ken Pennie. He wrote that the mission of the Canadian Air Force is: To control and exploit the aerospace environment for military purposes that contribute to Canadians security and national objectives (2004 2005). Thus the aerospace environment anything that starts at the ground and continues into space is the unique element in which the assets of the Canadian Air Force are utilized to provide for Canadian security. The difference of airpower from other types of power has been summarized by Mueller (2010). In an excellent review of airpower he identies four main attributes of modern airpower that makes it a unique form of coercive force. First, given the speed, range and exibility of modern aircraft, modern air forces can bypass both the land and naval forces of an enemy. Secondly, these same forces can be massed very quickly. Unlike naval or land forces, an air force can be concentrated in a matter of hours, giving it the ability to act almost immediately. Third, these rst two attributes mean that from a political perspective, leaders of countries who have strong air forces tend to use the air force as their rst deployed military response. The net effect is that a state with airpower supremacy is in a position to dominate any location of its choosing by suppressing the naval and land forces of the opposing side. Mueller also points out that there had been a growing belief in the 1990s that airpower alone could also achieve military and political victory. This was based on the increasing precision of weapons systems combined with the accuracy provided by space-based communication and

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command systems. However, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have resulted in a rethinking of these assessments. Nonetheless, airpower is still essential for Western forces to achieve both military and political victory in conicts in the current period. There has been no specic Canadian airpower theory developed per se. As mentioned previously, part of the problem is that the academic community has always very small. But a more signicant challenge has been the types of roles that the Canadian Air Force has played. It has continually worked with allies and friends in almost all of its deployments both abroad and at home. As a result it is virtually impossible to isolate Canadas use of airpower from that of its allies. Thus there has not been a uniquely Canadian use of airpower, but rather one that is normally used to support a larger allied need. How then has Canada used airpower? Canadian use of airpower Canada has used airpower almost since the time that aircraft were rst invented. The Silver Dart, which was one of the rst aircraft built in the world, gave four demonstration ights for the Canadian forces in Petawawa, Ontario in 1909. The rst Canadian Aviation Corp was created in October 1914, and marked the rst step of the Canadian use of airpower (Department of National Defence, 3 April 2009). Throughout the period from World War I to the end of World War II, the Canadian Air Force eventually evolved into the fourth largest air force in the world. As the Cold War developed, the Canadian Air Force emerged as one of the most important elements in NATOs response to the Soviet Union. In the 1950s the Canadian contribution of ghter aircraft for deterrence against Soviet aggression was one of the largest in the entire alliance. Only as the Cold War progressed and the European nations rebuilt their armed forces including their air forces, did the Canadian contribution recede both in relative and absolute terms Overall Canadian contribution to the training of its own and Allied personnel has been very signicant, as has the establishment of its own squadrons of aircraft deployed to Europe. Even more importantly, Canadian airpower was almost always conducted in cooperation with its allies. In particular, the Canadian Air Force has always operated closely with the British Air Force and the American Air Force. In many ways close cooperation has been very important in achieving military and political victory. Germany was defeated in World War I and was defeated again alongside the Japanese and Italians in World War II. The Soviet Union was deterred during the Cold War and ultimately eliminated as a security threat by 1989. It is important to note that during the Cold War there were several debates over airpower that did emerge. The most signicant developed in the 1960s when Canadian leaders were required to make several key decisions in regards to the re-equipping the Canadian Air Force. There were three specic issues that arose. One was over the nature of the weapons carried by Canadian ghters should they be nuclear or conventionally armed? Second, should Canada retain ghter aircraft? And third, if ghters were to be retained should these aircraft be built and designed in Canada or should they be bought from the Americans? It is of course beyond the scope of this article to be able to offer a detailed assessment of these questions. But ultimately they forced Canadian political leaders and defence planners to address three larger issu. The rst was the question pertaining to the core security of Canada. In responding to the Soviet Union, how could Canada best stop that country from launching a nuclear strike on Canadian soil? In the 1950s the Canadian answer was to work closely with the United States to provide a robust surveillance and interceptor system against a possible Soviet bomber threat. As the USSR moved from bombers to Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Canadian leaders were required to work with the Americans from a posture of defence to one of deterrence. The role of the Canadian Air Force remained central but less focused at this point (Jockel 2007).
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The need to defend and then deter the USSR also cemented the Canadian American defence relationship that emerged from the Second World War. Canadian ofcials realized very early in the Cold War that any defence against the USSR needed the power of the United States. At the same time, it was also realized that Canada needed to be seen by the United States as pulling its own weight. Any move to take a free ride was seen as having economic impacts as well pushing the Americans to take a more active role defending North America within the sovereign territory of Canada (Barry and Bratt 2008). Thus Canada airpower was needed not only to defend against the Soviet threat; it was also needed to ensure good economic and political relations with the United States. Thus Canadian airpower became not only strategic but also political and economic. However, the fact that Canadian security was ultimately achieved in the context of the Allied cooperation has made it difcult to isolate the precise contribution of Canadian airpower. Furthermore, Canadian political and military leaders were not involved in the strategic use of airpower since the creation of the Canadian Air Force. Although Canadians were consulted and their opinions valued, they were expected to follow the decisions made by British and American leaders. Canada focused on maintaining an ability to defend the homeland and to deploy aircraft overseas in all three of these conicts. Canada has a long tradition of operating its airpower both for the home game and the away game. However, for a midsize country like Canada, this has placed tremendous pressure on its resource capabilities. And yet Canada has consistently chosen to develop airpower capabilities that have met both of these requirements. The end of the Cold War created new demands and opportunities for the employment of Canadian airpower. On the one hand, many expected that the need for and requirements of Canadian airpower could be substantially reduced and even eliminated. This so-called peace dividend was based on the assumption that the end of the Soviet Union threat meant that Canadian airpower was no longer required. The desire to reduce the size of the Canadian Air Force was further enforced by successive Canadian governments in order to reduce the debt and decit. The Canadian Forces budget was one of the most politically expedient areas that could be targeted in the 1990s. By 1995, the Canadian Air Force was being substantially reduced. However, as the Canadian Forces in general were being reduced in the 1990s, Canada began to deploy its air force at an increasing rate. The 1990s began with the deployment of a number of its CF-18s to support the war against Iraq in the liberation of Kuwait. This was followed by the use of the CF-18s in the war against Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999. In 2001, Canadian assets were mobilized following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. As an aside, a Canadian general was in charge at NORAD headquarters when the attack occurred. Canadian air assets were also utilized in the campaigns against the Indonesians in East Timor, and throughout the conict in the former Yugoslavia as that state collapsed into anarchy. Canadian air transports played a critical role in the Afghanistan campaign. While Canadian CF-18s were not deployed, the Canadian Forces involved in the conict operated under the umbrella of its allied partners. Most recently, Canada has deployed its CF-18s in the Libyan campaign. Several major themes emerge after looking at the Canadian record of utilizing airpower. First, Canada has shown an interest in the development and utilization of airpower almost from the time the airplane was invented. While it is impossible to determine with precision Canadas role in the victories of WWI, WWII and the Cold War, there is no doubt that Canadian ofcials understood the importance of airpower and were willing to utilize it. Second, Canadian airpower has been used both for the protection of Canadian territory and for utilization in overseas deployment. Third, Canadian airpower has almost continually made use of ghter capabilities. While this point may not be widely appreciated, it is clear that Canadian political and military leaders have seen a high utility for the development of Canadian ghter capabilities.

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Ultimately Canada has come to accept that a modern ghter aircraft provides the best protection against foreign threats to its own territory, and also plays a critical role in overseas deployments. Both Liberal and Conservative governments in Canada have accepted the necessity of spending signicant amounts of resources to maintain this capability. Furthermore, no Canadian government has been willing to rely on other nations, in particular the United Kingdom and the United States, to provide for this need. Canada remains committed to defending Canadian and North American territory. Airpower is the critical element for protection of the territory. While the end of the Cold War eliminated ve to the most serious threat to Canadian security, the events of 9/11 demonstrated that it is na think that future threats will not continue to exist. Fighter aircraft are the most efcient means of countering any threat to North America due to their speed and endurance. Canadian decision makers also see an important utility in the deployment of ghter capabilities overseas. During World War II and the rst part of the Cold War, only Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States had the capability to deploy ghter aircraft to Europe to ght Germany and to deter the USSR. In the post-Cold War era Canada has deployed its ghters in at least three conicts Iraq, Kosovo and Libya. There is obviously an acceptance of both the military and political value of the security provided by ghters. In short, it is obvious that airpower has been a central element of Canadian security both at home and abroad. Future trends But what of the future? This article established that the F-35s will likely operate until 2050. Are there any trends in this time period that will affect the Canadian need for ghter capabilities? Predicting the future is indeed perilous. It is very difcult to predict the security environment that will be facing Canada in the next 30 to 40 years. The shock of the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 has resulted in a growing effort by both Western governments and researchers to develop means of better understanding the future. As stated by Martin Van Creveld, while no one can see the future, it is at least possible to indicate a few of the directions that change is likely to take (1991, p. 198). Thus the focus of most analysis has been on the identications of the core trends that are most likely to inuence future Canadian defence needs (DND 2008; CSIS 2009; Gizewki 2007). As such, several trends that are now developing will impact future Canadian needs. First, it is becoming clear that in the immediate future many of the most powerful Western nations will increasingly face economic threats to their long-term prosperity and ability to maintain their current levels of national security (Miller 2009). For example, the United States is increasingly facing a debt load that many consider too heavy to be maintained without substantial economic changes (Quinn 2010). Whether this comes in the form of drastic cuts to the American governments spending or signicant tax increases, it is increasingly apparent that the United States will face dramatic challenges to its economic security and, hence, its national security. At the same time, the United Kingdom has already been forced to slash government spending, including dramatic cuts to its defense expenditures (Chalmers 2010). Japan has also increasingly been facing issues regarding its aging population and its long-term prosperity. These concerns have been heightened following the disastrous earthquake and tsunami. The resulting death toll and destruction including the nuclear crisis have raised even more concerns about the long-term viability of the Japanese economy (OECD 2011). These countries may be able to resolve their economic difculties, but it is becoming evident that it will require a substantial reduction in their military capabilities. The Americans have already slashed the number of F-22 ghters that they had originally intended to build from 750 to 187 due to their very high cost and the growing economic difculties they face

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(ORourke 2009). The F-22 represents Americas most modern ghter. It incorporates such advanced technologies that an act of Congress forbids it from being sold to any ally or friendly nation for the fear that its technology could be compromised. The British have also been making substantial cuts to their ghter eets. In particular, they have recently announced that they will be eliminating their existing maritime ghter capabilities until they are able to purchase the American built F-35s. But even this future procurement will be reduced. This means that Canada can expect to see its main allies substantially reducing their ghter capabilities in terms of numbers. The technological capabilities of the remaining ghters will remain high, but the overall quantity will be reduced. Canada cannot assume that the predominance of allied airpower will remain as it has been for the last 20 years. Canada will need to assume more of the burden for the protection of Canadian and North American territory as well as for the protection of the airspace over any of its future overseas deployment. It is reasonable to assume that the Americans will expect Canada to provide more protection of the North American continent. Thus for the home game, there will likely be continued American pressure on Canada to contribute to the protection of North America. The question arises as to what air threats will continue into the future. There are two possible responses. First, the Russians resumed their long-range bomber patrols near North American airspace in 2007 (CNN 2007), and have continued to maintain them since. While they have not ventured into Canadian or American airspace, they have not been willing to provide prior notication of their patrols. Furthermore, Prime Minister Putin recently announced that the Russians will be building a new long-range stealth bomber by 2025 (Isachenkov 2010). Given the uncertain relationship that has developed between the Russians and the Western powers, their patrols will remain a concern into the future. Terrorism remains a threat to North America (NIC 2008). Few, if any, had suspected that domestic commercial aircraft could be turned into cruise missiles and bring down two of the tallest buildings in North America and attack the Pentagon. What new terrorist threats will emerge in the next 30 years? Fighter aircraft may not be able to respond to all of the new threats but they will be the best platform for defence for the foreseeable future. Another issue that Canada may face in the near future goes beyond these possible threats to North America. Canada has an abundance of natural resources that will increasingly be the envy of other nations. To a very large degree, Canadas connection to the United States, both in terms of geography and economics, has provided a level of military and economic security that does not exist elsewhere. Canadian supplies of oil, natural gas, uranium, and freshwater will increasingly be in demand from an international perspective. What this means in terms of future security is very difcult to determine. It may be that the Canadian American relationship, in which Canada ships most of its resources to the United States in return for an American security umbrella, will remain intact into the future. But it is also possible that the United States could become more aggressive in regards to Canadian resources and less willing to provide for Canadian security. And while it is unlikely that Canadian natural resources would create a national security threat to Canada, the possibility still exists. If Saudi Arabia was to implode due to the Arab Spring, the natural resources of Canada would attract more international attention. This could be a problem in the future. At the same time it is highly unlikely that Canada will turn inward and abandon the policy of overseas deployments that developed at the time of the Boer war. Since World War II there has been a bipartisan consensus that Canadian security is best provided for by meeting threats as far away as possible from Canadian shores. In the most recent Parliamentary debate on the extension of the Canadian commitment to the Libyan mission (and the continued utilization of Canadian CF-18s), the NDP supported the extension. In all probability the Canadian commitment to

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overseas deployments, either in the name of alliances, peace-making, peace-keeping or any other term, will continue into the future. Canada will continue to deploy its military forces. The complete air superiority that has been guaranteed by Canadas allies and friends will change. In the last 20 years, Canada has deployed its forces knowing that it will be operating with allies and friends, which guarantees that the skies will be controlled by Western powers. As Canada moves into the future, this guarantee will become increasingly questionable. It is probable that Canada will increasingly need to deploy its own ghter capabilities to ensure the protection of both its land and naval assets. Furthermore, it may nd itself engaged in conicts in which the opposing side will have increasingly sophisticated air assets. As difcult as the deployment in Afghanistan was for the Canadian Forces, it is easy to understand just how much more difcult it would have been had the Taliban had its own airpower capabilities. This would have meant a very different type of conict for Canada. Thus, Canada will either have to reduce or eliminate its overseas deployments and risk higher casualties, or take on an increasing ability to provide for its own protection. In Canada, the debate over the F-35s has also raised the issue of its stealth capabilities. Critics have suggested that Canada does not need stealth capabilities for their next ghter aircraft (Staples 2010). Their argument hinges on the suggestion that stealth is primarily utilized for offensive purposes. Stealth does give the ability to launch a strike without an enemy detecting the strike until it is too late to respond. But more importantly, stealth will be necessary as two technologies become increasingly available to all states and even non-state actors. The proliferation of missile technology and, specically, surface-to-air missiles (SAM) has grave ramications for Western air forces. As this technology proliferates and becomes more accessible it will be easier to use it against Western air forces. The power of these weapons systems was rst demonstrated even before the Cold War ended. The Americans transferred stinger missiles to the irregular forces ghting against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1970s. While these missiles had a limited range, they proved very effective against the Soviet helicopters and played a role in the Russian decision to withdraw (Kuperman 1999). At that time, missiles such as the stinger seldom found their way onto the open market. The American government deliberately sent the missiles through intermediaries in Pakistan as a deliberate policy to undermine the Soviet position in that conict. These missiles worked against slow ying helicopters but were incapable of hitting a ghter. Now much more advanced weapons systems are becoming available on the open market. This trend is expected to continue. Furthermore, just as the United States found it politically expedient to provide stingers to the Afghans ghting the Soviets, states such as Iran are developing their own missile technologies and will no doubt be willing to provide these to states and non-state actors that are opposed to Western interests. Canada will be operating overseas alongside its allies and friends in an environment proliferated by surface-to-air missiles. Such an environment will require the use of stealth aircraft. With fewer American and British aircraft, combined with the proliferation of surface-to-air missiles, Canada will need to assume a greater role of force protection for any future overseas deployments. This ultimately means aircraft that can provide protection over the skies will be essential. In the future, Canada will need to increase its airpower if it intends to continue to deploy military force overseas. It will face an increasingly dangerous environment and it will not be able to depend on its allies to the degree that it has in the past. Thus the choice will be increasingly stark: to not deploy, or to increase its indigenous ability to protect any ground or naval assets that it may wish to deploy.

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So what options are open to Canada? Canada faces six choices regarding its future airpower: (1) Canada can choose to not buy a new aircraft replacement for the CF-18; (2) Canada can postpone the decision and attempt to extend the life span of the CF-18s beyond 2017; (3) Canada can introduce new technologies such as drones and UAVs as a replacement for manned ghters; (4) Canada can buy an older generation ghter that is now available on the market; (5) Canada can look for an alternative fth generation ghter rather than the F-35s; and (6) Canada can stay with the decision to buy the F-35. If Canada were to select the rst option and simply eliminate ghter aircraft from its air force, this would end a policy of maintaining indigenous ghter capabilities that goes back to World War II. Successive Canadian governments have always seen a utility in spending the necessary resources to ensure that Canada had its own ghter aircraft. If Canada were to abandon this policy, it would face American displeasure. The United States would undoubtedly take steps to provide for the protection of all North American airspace. What this would look like would depend on how seriously the Americans view the threats to North America. At a minimum, the Americans would probably demand the right to overy Canadian airspace on a regular basis. In the long term such action would pose a serious threat to Canadian sovereignty. A second problem would be that Canada would expose any troops deployed overseas to a much higher risk than before. As has been argued throughout this article, the international environment is going to become one in which Western air superiority can no longer be taken for granted. The future of deployments, whether for peace-keeping, peace-making or any other types of mission, will become more dangerous. Canadian decision makers will face the choice of either deploying their troops with a higher risk to their safety, or not deploying them at all. Canada can also choose to postpone the decision on the F-35s, but this choice will carry signicant nancial ramications (Department of National Defence, 2007b). It will become increasingly expensive to keep the CF-18s airworthy. The stresses on a modern ghter aircraft are substantial and take a toll on both the engine and airframe. As an aircraft ages the stresses often require the replacement of wings, tail assemblies and other components of the aircraft (Caron and Richard 1998). This is expensive. In addition, the older the aircraft becomes, the more dangerous it will be to its pilots. Canadas experience with older equipment demonstrates a superb mechanical capability, but old equipment still breaks down. When a ghter aircraft suffers any form of mechanical malfunction the results are often disastrous. It is also likely that if Canada pulls out of its current contract, any effort to subsequently reengage the Americans will cost more. The Americans want partners now and are more willing to cut a deal on the price of the aircraft than they would be in the future. While it might be that the Americans would welcome Canada back with a contract that is equal or even better than what is the current case, it seems unlikely. The third option of looking beyond current manned ghter technology is something that all modern states will do at one point in time. It is reasonable to assume that in the future the manned ghter will be replaced by some form of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (FAS 2010b). The Americans rst developed an operational form of such an aircraft when they placed a missile on one of their predator drones. They successfully used this platform to destroy a car carrying Afghan insurgents/terrorists. Until then, the Americans had used the drones only for surveillance purposes. However, signicant technological challenges must be overcome before all manned ghters can be replaced by some unmanned variant. Whether that will occur in the next 30 to 40 years is uncertain. However, Canada still needs to wait

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until someone else such as the Americans develops the necessary technology. Canada will need to explore this option, but that will be in the future. Many critics of the F-35 have suggested adopting the fourth option. Some are concerned that the technology associated with the F-35 is simply too untested. Therefore they suggest that it will both be cheaper and more effective to buy an existing aircraft such as the Super Hornet (Webb and Byers 2010). If Canada were to pursue this option, it could realistically consider four aircraft. Canada will not buy advanced ghter aircraft from the Russians (e.g., Sukhoi SU-30MKI or Mikoyan MiG 29M/35) or from the Chinese. The existing choices would be the EuroFighter Typhoon, the French Dassault Rafale, the Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen NG, and the Boeing F/ A 18E/F Super Hornet. The Swedish jet may be problematic in that its parent company, Saab, is experiencing signicant economic difculties and an expected sale to the Norwegians did not transpire. Both the EuroFighter and the Rafale are receiving their rst exposure to combat in the Libyan campaign. Initial reports suggest that they have been performing well (Keaten 2010), but these reports are very preliminary. The price of the EuroFighter was substantially over the original budget (Evans 2003), but there is no way to know how much cheaper it would be than the F-35. The other issue is that it probably is not as technologically advanced as the F-35. But even in this context how the two aircraft would compare in unknown. This can only be understood once the F-35 is operational. The French Rae and the American Super Hornet are both very good aircraft but their core design was established in the 1970s. Both aircraft have modernized avionics and communication equipment; both also have updated engines, but their radar signature still renders them less stealthy than the F-35 and therefore more exposed to the new SAM technologies. The fth choice open to Canada is to withdraw from the existing F-35 contract and to hold a competition. If Canada wants to purchase a fth generation ghter aircraft, it is difcult to know who would be invited to the competition and, more importantly, who would come. The Americans have enacted a law that forbids the sale of the F-22 to foreign nations. This includes Canada. As mentioned earlier, Canada has a longstanding policy of not buying military equipment from Russia or China. This means that the two fth generation ghters currently being developed by both nations, PAX-FA T-50 and J-XX respectively, would not be eligible and both aircraft are not as advanced in their development as is the F-35. Japan may be developing a fth generation ghter, but it is only in the planning stages. For the competition option, Canada would consider both the sole fth generation possibility, i.e., the F-35, and the three older aircraft discussed previously. Such a competition could indeed be held but whether the various companies would be willing to enter it is questionable. The nal choice open to Canada is to keep its decision to buy the F-35s. It should be clear from the problems associated with the ve alternative choices that this decision is the most logical for Canadas future airpower needs. There is no alternative to the F-35. This is not to suggest that the aircraft may prove to be very expensive and have technological issues, but if Canada decides to retain a ghter capability to 2050, the F-35 is really the only choice.

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Conclusion In conclusion it should be apparent that Canada will continue to require ghter capabilities to ensure the continuation of Canadian airpower. Canada will need to protect its aerospace territory in North America. It is unlikely that any future government will reverse the Canadian orientation to deploy military force abroad. Given that Canadas allies will probably be cutting back on their ghter capabilities there will be increasing pressure on Canada to ensure it has its own ghter capability.

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Not only is Canada going to face a future where there will be increased demands on it to provide its own ghter capabilities, but it is likely to engage in environments where surfaceto-air missile technology will advance and become much more widely available. Aircraft with stealth capabilities will be necessary. Canadas options are limited. In a perfect world Canada would not need to worry about the security of its borders, nor would it have to worry about deploying its forces overseas and placing its men and women in the Canadian Forces at risk. But Canadian history demonstrates the of hoping for such a world. In a perfect world Canada would also have the ability to naivete compare and contrast various ghter aircraft options and make a long-term decision based on that comparison. Once again, that world does not exist. The available options point only to the F-35 as Canadas next ghter.

Note
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1. Of the many Americans who examine the modern concept of air power, RAND is one of the foremost think tanks examining issues relating to the subject (http://www.rand.org/topics/national-security. html). Within Canada there is now the Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre. But among non-military research institutes only the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba has a focus on Canadian air power.

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