Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia, China and the South China Sea

Carlyle A. Thayer International Studies Association San Francisco, April 5, 2013

Main Argument
ASEAN members seek to accommodate Chinas rise South China Sea disputes have exposed differences among ASEAN Threat perceptions vary U.S. rebalancing welcomed but not alignment

ASEAN-China
Chinas rise challenge and opportunity All ASEAN members seek accommodation with China through ASEAN-centric multilateral institutions
Economic benefits Moderate great power rivalry

Bilateral Long-Term Cooperative Framework Agreements

Threat Perceptions
ASEAN divided on South China Sea Claimant States
Philippines and Vietnam/Malaysia and Brunei

Maritime Non-claimant States

Indonesia and Singapore

Mainland States
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar

Claimant States Threat Perceptions

Geographical proximity Legacy of historical interaction Estimations of Chinas intentions Direct threat to vital national interests
Philippines and Vietnam

No direct threat to vital national interests

Malaysia and Brunei

Threat to National Interests

Philippines
Mischief Reef Malampaya Field: 40-45% Luzon power Loss of Scarborough Shoal Revitalize U.S. alliance/territorial defence Internationalize dispute
ASEAN Take action to United Nations

Threat to National Interests

Vietnam
Western Paracels (1994), Johnston South (1988) Maritime Strategy to 2020: 55% GDP Cable cutting incidents 2011 Harassment of fishermen Domestic anti-China nationalism Struggle and Cooperate Compartmentalize South China Sea dispute

Other Claimant States

Malaysia and Brunei
Chinas u-shaped line cuts into Bruneis and Malaysias EEZs Minor incidents of harassment Capable armed forces and allies No perception of direct threat Longer-term concerns to balance China

Maritime Non-Claimant States Threat Perceptions

Indonesia and Singapore
No direct territorial disputes but overlap of maritime boundaries Concern with SLOC security/regional stability Favour central role for ASEAN Occasional critical stance on Chinas actions Hedge by encouraging U.S. engagement

Mainland States Threat Perceptions

Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand
No direct interest in South China Sea Accommodate Chinas rise through ASEAN and bilaterally But resist dependency on China Cambodia outlier as ASEAN Chair Thailand U.S. ally

Managing South China Sea Disputes

1992 and 1995 ASEAN Statements 1995-99 ASEAN Code of Conduct 2000-02 ASEAN-China discussions on COC 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties (DOC) 2002-05 Terms of Reference 2005-11 Guidelines to Implement DOC 2011-13 no project implemented

Code of Conduct
Philippine Draft COC (2012) ASEAN Summit April 2012
Chinas participation

Proposed Elements of a Regional COC 45th AMM and Retreat debacle Six Point Principles on the South China Sea A Regional COC for South China Sea

U.S. Rebalancing
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defence Rebalance to Asia-Pacific Economic, Diplomatic , Political, Military PACOMs Four Pillars
Partners, presence, power projection, principles New platforms, better capabilities Increased rotational presence

Conclusion
Accommodate Chinas rise through ASEANcentric multilateral institutions Chinese assertiveness has led to differing threat perceptions ASEAN divided into three groupings
Claimant, maritime, and mainland states

General support for rebalancing

Hedging, balancing but no taking of sides

Deference/Defiance: Southeast Asia, China and the South China Sea

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