S E C R E T // NOFORN//2O3OO8O8 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA APO AE 09360

JTFGTMO-CG

08 Aus 2005

MEMORANDUMFORCommander, UnitedStates Avenue, Southern Command, 3511NW 91st Miami, FL33172.

SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendation for ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) for (S) Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000536DP

JTF GTMODetainee Assessment

1. (FOUO) Personal Information:
o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: Mohammed Abdullah Ahmed o Aliases and Current/TrueName: Mohammed Abdullah alHarbi. Mohammed Abdullah Ahmed. Abu Ahmed. Muhammad 'Abdallah Saqral-'Alawi al-Harbi o Placeof Birth: Riyadh/Saudi Arabia (SA) o Date of Birth: 1977 o Citizenship: SaudiArabia o InternmentSerialNumber (ISN): US9SA-000536DP 2. (FOUO) Health: Detaineeis in good health. He refusedtreatmentfor latent TB and has G6PD deficiency that makes it unsafefor him to have certain types of medications. Detaineehas no known drug allergies or travel restrictions.

3. (S//NF) JTF GTMOAssessment: a. (S) Recommendation:JTFGTMOrecommends thisdetainee beheldfor Continued

DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD). b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previouslyassessed detainee as Retainin DoD Control (DoD) on 28 May 2004. For this updaterecommendation, is assessed detainee as a probable memberof Al-Qaida. Detaineewas recruitedby four eldersof the Al-Ruwel mosquein Riyadh, SA to attendjihadist training in Afghanistan. With assistance from individuals CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES REASON: E.O.12958 SECTION 1.5(C) DECLASSIFY ON:20300808

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S E C R E T // NOFORN // 2O3OO8O8 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendation for ContinuedDetentionUnder DoD Control(CD) for Detainee,I SN: US9SA-00005 Guantanamo 36DP (S) assessed to be Al-Qaida facilitators,detainee traveledto Afghanistanvia lran. While in Kabul, AF, he residedin a known Al-Qaida safehouse and was ultimately capturedin the presence of a known Al-Qaida operative. He spentelevenweeksin a Toufan prison prior to being transferred to US custody. It is assessed this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threatto the US, its interests and allies. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlessotherwise noted,the following paragraphs are basedsolely on the detainee'sstatements. a. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travet: Detaineeclaimed Sheik Abdel, Abu Hamaz, Abu Nasir, and Khalid convinced him to travel to Afghanistan. Detaineewas instructedto travel to Meshed,Iran (IR), where "Saeed"would facilitatethe border crossing. Detainee traveled from Riyadh, SA, to Damman,SA, and purchased a planeticket to Meshed,IR. Saeed met detaineeand arrangedtravel to the Afghanistan-Iran border. Detaineewas driven to Herat, Afghanistan (AF) and stayedthe night in Abu Naeef s safe house. The next day detainee flew to Kabul, AF using a plane ticket purchasedby Abu Naeef, and was taken to an Arab safehouserun by Abu Salem. (Analyst Note: This safehousewas the Arab House aka Azzam Guesthouse.).Detaineeclaimed when informed that training was unavailable,he decidedto return to Saudi Arabia. He statedthat he was turned away at the Afghan-Iranian border, and ultimately returnedto Azzam Guesthouse.Detaineesoon met Mahmood. (Analyst Note: Mahmood is Mohmood Salim al-Mohammed,ISN US9SY-000537DP served as a Taliban fighter and Al-Qaida aspirant.) b. (S) Training and Activities: Detaineestayedat AzzarnGuesthouse approximately one and a half months waiting for training. He left when he was informed there were no training opportunities available. c. (S//NF) Capture Information: Unidentified armedAfghan's took detainee into custody. He was then turned him over to local Afghan Warlord Tofan. He remainedin custody at a Tofan-run prison for approximately eleven weeks until he was turned over to US forces. (Analyst Note: Exact date of transfer to US forces is unknown, however detainee entereddetention facility at Kandaharon, or, about 10 Februarv 2002.)

d. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 08June 2002 e. (S/NF) Reasonsfor Transferto JTF GTMO: To provide information onthe
following: o o Personalitieswho recruited detaineefor jihad Information on mosquesdetaineeattendedin Saudi Arabia

a L

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S E C R E T // NOFORN/ / 2O3OO8O8 JTFGTMO-CG Recommendation for Continued SUBJECT:Update Detention UnderDoD Control(CD) for Detainee, ISN: US95,4.-00005 Guantanamo 36DP(S)
o o o Detaineeroute of travel into Afghanistan Guesthouse/transient house in Kabul Treatmentof prisonerswhile in custody of Afghani officials

5. (S//NF) Detainee Threat: poses a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed thedetainee a HIGHrisk,asheis likelyto pose a
threat to the US, its interestsand allies.

b. (S/NF)Reasonsfor ContinuedDetention:
o (S/AIF) Detaineeis assessed as a memberof Al-Qaida and may havetrained as a pilot. Detaineeresidedin a safehousefrequented by Al-Qaida membersand operatives. Detaineewas recruited to travel to Afghanistan to train and participate in jihad. o (S/AIF) Detaineeand ISN 537 were takeninto custodytogether. Detainee

lnitiu'r.'rffi 111ff"il$Hi'l'K";5;ili:ills'lfiilJ?:il11ifs
Taliban fighter at the time of his detention. ISN 537 claimedhe traveledto Afghanistan to attend training at Al-Farouq. It is probable that detainee initially utilized charitableorganization (lt{FI) cover story to hide his true

:""lf",KTiA11fiJ#') n.porting indicates that roran asaudi captured

Al-Qaida memberwho claimedto be a fundraiserfor the Taliban in group. Given the cover Afghanistan. This singleindividual was in detainee's story provided by detaineeupon capture,it is probable the report refers to him.) o (S/ {F) Documentation indicatesan individual with a similar nameand dateof birth as detainee,received,participated in, or attemptedto gain accessto various flight programs. (Analyst Note: If detainee was trainedas a pilot, it is possiblethat

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individual who identified himself as Mohamad al-Harbi contactedthe 43 Air Schoollocatedin Port Elizabeth,SouthAfrica in hopesof obtaininga private pilot's license. o (S/AIF) Detaineespent at least a month and a half at the Azzam Guesthouse in (Analyst Kabul, AF. Note: Azzan Guesthouse was run by Abu Faraj al-Libi and was locatedin the former SaudiArabian Ambassador's home. SeniorAl-Qaida Operative (ISN Riyadh the Facilitator 1457) believed the safe housewas referred to as Azzarrt House. According to MohammedBasardah, US9YM-000252DP(ISN 252), a mid-

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S E C R E T // NOFORN / / 2O3OO8O8 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control(CD) for Guantanamo Detainee,I SN: US9SA-00005 36DP (S) high level Al-Qaida operative, Harnzaal-Ghamdi also ran the Azzarn Guesthouse. Ghamdi was a high-level Al-Qaida operative.The SaudiAmbassador's housewas well known as a havenfor Al-Qaida personnel.) providedthree different versionsof how he o (S/ {F) Analyst Note: Detainee enteredAfghanistan and what he did when he got there. It is unclear whether detainee actuallyreceivedtraining, sinceit is inexplicablethat he would not be provided an opportunity to attend one of the camps given his connections,his travel

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claimed heand AbuAdeltraveled fromRiyadh, SA,to

Meshed,IR, via Damascus, Syria (SY), and Bahrain. Detaineeclaimedthat Abu Adel contactedSaeed beforethey left Bahrain. Saeed allegedlymet them in Meshed, IR where they stayedfor three days. Detaineeand Abu Adel then traveled to the Afghanistan-Iran border where their passportswere checked, reviewed, and stampedwith no questionsasked. They traveled to Herat, AF, and met with Abu Naeef and two unidentified men. Then they flew to Kabul, AF. (Analyst Note: Except where noted, no further information other than

Meshed,IR, via Damman,SA, and Bahrain. Once in Meshed,detainee contactedSaeedand spent one night with him. Detaineethen met up with Abu Adel and they traveled to the Afghanistan-Iran border where they crossed legally into Afghanistan. Once in Afghanistan, the pair traveled overland to Herat and stayedone night at Abu Hamza's guesthouse.Then they traveled by plane to Kabul. o (S/A{F) Detaineehasbeenplacedis on a U.S. Government watch list. He is listed as a threat if allowed to enter the United States. (Analyst Note: The placementof this individual on the list was a result of an Intelligence Community assessment that an individual is a memberof a UBL group.) c. (FOUO) Detainee's Gonduct: Detaineeis assessed as a LOW threatfrom a detention perspective.Detainee'soverall behaviorhas beencompliantand non-hostile.

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6. (S/NF)Detainee Intelligence ValueAssessment: is of LOWintelligence value. a. (S) Assessment: JTFGTMOdetermined thisdetainee

o (S/A{F) Detaineehas knowledge about recruiters and the recruitment processat alRuwel Mosque in Riyadh, SA. Detaineemay have information about facilitators in Iran. Detaineehas information about the Azzam Guesthouse as a result of his extendedtime at

s E c R E T // NOFORN / / 20300808

S E C R E T // NOFORN / / 2O3OO8O8 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: Update Recommendationfor Continued Detention Under DoD Control(CD) for Detainee,I SN: US9SA-00005 36DP (S) Guantanamo that residence. Detaineemay possess knowledge aboutjihad training. Detaineemay be able to provide information on aviation training accessibility outside the United States.

b. (S//NF) Areasof PotentialExploitation:

o o Detainee'sknowledgeof recruiters Detainee'sknowledgeof recruitmentprocess o Al-Ruwel Mosque involvement o Additional individuals who may have been recruited by above named individuals Detainee'sknowledgeof facilitation network in Iran Detainee'sknowledgeof Azzam Guesthouse Detainee'sknowledgeof the aviation industryto include: o Training outside the United States gaining access o Al-Qaida emphasis on low level operatives to pilot training plots Al-Qaida o utilizing the aviation industry

o o o

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswas reassessed on 07 December2004, and he remains an enemv combatant.

Commandins

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