APPENDIX C: FORENSIC ENGINEERING ANALYSES OF THE LOWER 9TH WARD

BREACHES

Summary

Forensic engineering analyses of the two breaches that resulted in the catastrophic

flooding of the Lower 9th Ward and adjacent areas shows that failure of the flood protection

structure (levee, floodwall, supporting sheet piles) was due primarily to multiple flaws and

defects embedded in this flood protection structure during its life-cycle. These flaws and defects

included those developed during the concept development (e.g. failure to recognize I-wall

tension gap), design (e.g. failure to properly evaluate soil conditions and characteristics),

construction (e.g. failure to drive sheet piling to depths sufficient to prevent excessive water

intrusion), operation (e.g. failure to provide adequate safe-guards to adjacent flood protection

structure during IHNC lock expansion activities), and maintenance (e.g. failure to respond to

early warnings of potential for excessive seepage). Hurricane Katrina provided a test of this

flood protection structure and it performed miserably.

The available information indicates a high degree of correlation of the site clearing work

for the USACE Lock Expansion Project at the East Bank Industrial Area (EBIA) sites and the

two breach locations in the flood protection structure adjacent to the Lower 9th Ward. This

remediation work (removal of soils, formation of cavities, vibrations) very probably had

important effects on the soils relied upon to provide stability and protection for the flood

protection structure. Removal and disturbance of the surface soils overlying the permeable sub-

soils (marsh layers) would have facilitated the under seepage discussed in this Appendix. In

addition, removal of the soils on the canal side of the floodwall would have reduced the lateral

stability of the flood protection structure.

C.1
History of IHNC and East Bank Industrial Area

Since the founding of New Orleans by the French in 1718, a navigation channel between

the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain had been proposed. This would allow intercoastal

commerce to connect with river and seaborne commerce (Figure C.1). The Port Authority of

New Orleans (established 1896) recognized that the problem with establishing a water link was

the fluctuating flow of the river and the difference in the elevations of the river and Lake

Pontchatrain. Thus, locks would be needed to control the flow between the river and the lake.

Figure C.1: Map of the City of New Orleans (1829, Historic New Orleans Collection)

C.2
 In 1914 the Port Authority received authorization from the state legislature to locate and

construct a deep-water canal. The proposed canal would be 5.3 miles long and up to 1,600 feet

wide, located just downstream of the Army’s riverfront supply center (about 2 miles downriver

and parallel to Elysian Fields Avenue).

Construction of the IHNC was started in 1918 with the excavation necessarily proceeding

from the lake toward the river. Excavation work started with construction of parallel dikes on

either side of the canal so hydraulic fill could be placed behind the dikes. Hydraulic excavation

was used wherever possible to excavate the channel, when the materials were easily loosed.

Draglines were employed to scoop out the more resistant soils dragging it up onto the dikes

which were gradually built up to become permanent protective levees. Buried cypress stumps

slowed progress by jamming the suction dredges and stalling the dragline buckets. From the

outset, contractors battled the problems with stability of the canal slopes, as water and the soft

soils constantly slid back into the excavation.

The canal excavation was completed in 1919 and work then shifted to the lock structure

located 2,000 feet from the Mississippi River at the south end of the canal (Figure C.2). Very

severe problems were encountered during construction of the IHNC locks due to slumping soils

and running sands (indicating high water conductivity and flow). Soil borings (Figure C.3)

disclosed the presence of extensive buried layers of “humus.” These layers existed to

penetrations exceeding 30 feet. These layers represented the layers of swamp (hard growth) and

marsh (soft growth) that had been buried with dredge spoil and fill imported to raise the ground

elevation.

C.3
Figure C.2: IHNC channel dimensions (USACE 1971)

Figure C.3: Soil borings performed in vicinity of IHNC lock disclose the presence of extensive
layers of buried “humus” underlying the east bank (present area of the Lower 9th Ward) (USACE
1971)

Upon completion, the Port Authority set about developing piers, docks and quays along

the INHC to increase cargo handling. The Port Authority also made available adjacent lands for

use by industries. Much of the area on the west side of the IHNC was built during World War II.

The eastern side was developed after the early 1950s (Figure C.4).

C.4
Figure C.4: IHNC 1964 (USACE photograph)

The gulf coast portion of the GIWW (Gulf Intracoastal Water Way) is a protected

shipping channel between Port Isabel, Texas and Apalachee Bay Florida. In 1944, under the

USACE authorization, the GIWW was rerouted to pass thorough the southern part of the IHNC

and tie in with the Mississippi River. The MR-GO and its tie-in with the GIWW were completed

in the 1960s. Thus, the IHNC became intimately connected with the Gulf of Mexico through the

GIWW and MR-GO.

The effectiveness of this navigable waterways connection was demonstrated during

hurricane Betsy in September 1965 when both sides of the IHNC in the vicinity of the Lower 9th

Ward experienced breaks (Figure C.5). Some 6,560 homes and 40 businesses were flooded in

water up to 7 feet deep on the west side of the IHNC. The east side of the IHNC also failed,

flooding the present Lower 9th Ward in water up to 9 feet deep (Figure C.6).

C.5
Figure C5: Hurricane Betsy flood inundation map (USACE 1965)

Figure C.6: Flooding east of IHNC – Lower 9th Ward following hurricane Betsy (USACE
photograph)

C.6
 The USACE report on hurricane Betsy (1965) states that both internal levee failures and

overtopping along the IHNC occurred on both the west and east sides. No details concerning the

mechanisms of failure were provided. Following hurricane Betsy, the IHNC levees were

heightened using steel sheet piles and concrete I-walls in the 1980s and 90s.

By the late 1990s work was underway to expand the IHNC locks to relieve shipping

congestion and allow further expansion of the Port of New Orleans. Congress authorized the

study for the lock enlargement / replacement in 1956. The proposed new locks would require a

bypass channel that would be constructed at the East Bank Industrial Area (EBIA). The EBIA is

located in the Lower 9th Ward, west of the floodwall and east of the IHNC, between Florida

Avenue and Claiborne Avenue (Figure C.7).

Figure C.7: IHNC and EBIA (left side) (USACE photograph)

Available documentation indicates that the USACE purchased the EBIA site from the

Port of New Orleans in order to proceed with the bypass channel construction (Washington

Group International - WGI, “Project Work Plan, Project Site Development and Remedial Action

of East Bank Industrial Area, Inner Harbor Navigation Canal Lock Replacement Project,” report

to USACE, New Orleans District, 2000). WGI began working at the job site in January 2001.

C.7
 The EBIA consists of 32 acres of former industrial sites previously leased from the Port

of New Orleans to private owners. The EBIA consisted of six facilities named for their former

occupants. These included (starting at the south) the International Tank Terminal, Saucer

Marine, Mayer Yacht – Distributors Oil, Indian Towing, McDonough Marine, and Boland

Marine.

At one time, underground storage tanks were located at both the Boland property and the

Saucer property. These tanks were reported to have been removed. The State of Louisiana listed

Boland Marine as an unspecified hazardous waste generator. In 1991, an anonymous employee

contacted the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and reported that the company

had buried drums containing hazardous waste onsite.

The EBIA had a long history spanning more than 4 decades of industrial use by marine

service and petroleum distribution companies. Purportedly, tenants contaminated the property as

a result of their industrial operations. Also of particular significance at the EBIA was the active

placement of construction materials (concrete rubble) and solid wastes (barges, metal turnings,

concrete blocks) to protect the properties from the effects of ship wakes. These two activities had

two primary impacts derived from the existence of hazardous constituents that could negatively

affect: 1) the environment at the time of construction, and 2) construction of the bypass channel.

To ameliorate these potential negative effects, the USACE New Orleans district

contracted with WGI to characterize and remediate the EBIA’s environmental contamination and

identify and remove construction materials likely to interfere with bypass channel construction.

For remediation, the specifications required the canal bank be excavated to a depth four

feet below the existing grade and fifteen feet from the edge of the water onto land. When

possible, the work was done during low tide to facilitate visual observation of the work. When

C.8
work was completed, the landside of these excavations became the ‘new’ shoreline. It is reported

by WGI (“Technical Completion Report,” 2005) that in the majority of cases the canal bank was

excavated as required to a depth of four feet, additional observations of contamination prompted

excavations to a deep as nine feet. The records provided by WGI indicate that a total of 12,259

tons of contaminated soils were removed from the Boland site and 35,636 tons of contaminated

soils were removed from the Saucer site.

In addition to removal of canal-side soils that had previously provided stability and

protection to the flood protection structure, numerous underground storage tanks and debris were

removed. At the Saucer site, large underground storage tanks had to be removed. In addition, a

buried railroad tank car required construction of a cofferdam so that the tank car could be filled

with air, floated free, lifted and transported from the site. At the northern Boland site, a wharf

extended along most of the IHNC. Following removal of the wharf materials, the piles

comprising the foundation were pulled and transported from the site.

Twelve abandoned barges were located on the EBIA site. Conditions of the barges ranged

from beached to completely sunken (embedded into the bottom). Ten of the barges were

removed from the southern Saucer site and two barges from the northern Boland site. WGI

completed its work, removed its equipment, and demobilized from the job site in May 2005.

Development of the Breaches during Hurricane Katrina

The IHNC sits at the heart of the three main populated regions of New Orleans. As

shown in Figure C.8, a number of breaches developed along the IHNC during Hurricane Katrina,

contributing to the flooding of all three of the most heavily populated protected areas in this

event. This Appendix addresses the two breach locations on the east side of the IHNC adjacent to

the Lower 9th Ward.

C.9
Figure C.8: Map showing principal features of the protected areas in the New Orleans area (ILIT
2006)

These two breaches will be identified as the “North Breach” (approximately 100 feet

wide, south of Florida Avenue) and “South Breach” (approximately 1,000 feet wide, north of

North Clairborne Avenue). Figure C.6 shows the locations of the North and South Breaches – the

photograph was taken on 6 September 2005 (National Oceanic and Space Administration 2005).

C.7 shows a similar photograph taken about the same time from a different perspective showing

the breach sites at the Lower 9th Ward relative to the intersection of the MR-GO – GIWW and

IHNC.

C.10
Figure C.9: Aerial photograph of North Breach and South Breach sites taken 6 September 2005 (NOAA 2005). Postulated breach
initiation sites indicated. Note the USACE lock expansion site clearing ‘holes’ left immediately outside the floodwall protecting the
Lower 9th Ward (to top of photograph)

C.11
Figure C.10: Two Lower 9th Ward breach locations relative to ‘T’ intersection of IHNC with
MR-GO – GIWW (USACE IPET 2007)

Early the morning of 29 August 2005, the water level in the IHNC began to rise as a

result of the effects of the hurricane Katrina surge developed in Lake Borgne and its hydraulic

connectivity with the MR-GO - ICWW (Figure C.11). The main peak of this storm surge was

relatively short-lived, rising quickly over a period of several hours to a maximum elevation of

approximately +14 feet (MSL, Mean Sea Level) at approximately 8:30 a.m. (Central Daylight

12
Time), and then subsiding quickly thereafter. The hydrographs in figure C.11 are bsed on actual

measurements of the water levels versus time near the west bank corssing of the CSX rail line

across the IHNC channel. The ‘dip’ in the rising hydrograph at one of the stations wa caused by

a localized temporary drawdown due to development of a breach in that vicinity at

approximately 5:00 a.m.

Figure C.11: Katrina hydrograph for IHNC (USACE IPET 2007)

As the water level in the INHC increased during hurricane Katrina, the water reached the

top of the earth levee on the east side and rose up the concrete floodwall (Figure C.12). The top

of the earthen berm had an elevation on the east side outside the I-wall alignment higher than the

land behind the levee, having been built-up with materials dredged from the IHNC to form the

EBIA. This bench extends 100 to 200 feet west of the I-wall alignment at an elevation of zero to

about 2 feet. Due to the USACE decision regarding the reference elevation for construction of

the I-walls, everything was built 2 to 3 feet too low (top of wall elevations 12 to 13 feet).

13
Figure C.12: As-built drawings for I-wall installation on the east bank of the IHNC adjacent to
the Lower 9th Ward.

North Breach

Available evidence indicates that the first of the two breaches to occur was the North

breach (USACE IPET 2007, Team Louisiana 2007). Based on timing established by ‘stopped

clocks,’ this breach appears to have fully developed by approximately 5:45 a.m., as floodwater

began to halt clocks in homes in the adjacent neighborhood shortly after that time (Team

Louisiana 2007). Eyewitness reports indicate that water was entering this area as early as 5:00

a.m. (USACE IPET 2007). It is likely that this early report of flooding is associated with the

onset of development of the breach (movement of the earth berm and concrete I-wall, Figure

C.4) and opening the vertical ‘expansion joints’ in the concrete I-walls. This behavior was

observed and photographed during the evolution of the breach at the 17th Street Canal.

Figure C.13 shows an aerial view of this feature. This was a relatively narrow feature,

less than 100 feet in width, and unlike the more massive second failure that occurred several

hundred yards to the south, there was no evidence of sustained overtopping adjacent to this

14
feature. The hydrographs indicate that the water level would have been at approximately +4.5

feet MSL at the onset of the failure and at approximately +9.0 feet MSL at the time of the full

development of the breach. This meant that the wall failed before the water reached the top of the

wall at approximately + 12 feet MSL.

Identified in Figure C.13 and Figure C.14 (taken while water is flowing into the Lower

9th Ward) are ‘holes’ located immediately outside (IHNC side) the flood wall. This feature can

be seen more clearly in Figure C.15. This feature is in the immediate vicinity of one of the

underground excavations reported by WGI in the EBIA lock expansion site clearing report (WGI

2005).

Figure C.13: Photograph of the North Breach at Lower 9th Ward taken 29 August 2005 (USACE
IPET 2007). Note the water filled ‘hole’ immediately outside the flood wall on the IHNC side.

15
Figure C.14: Photograph of the North Breach taken while water is still flowing into the Lower 9th
Ward. Note the deep water filled ‘hole’ immediately outside the flood wall on the IHNC side.
Turbulent water indicates shallow inward flows taking place

Figure C.15: Photograph of North Breach taken shortly after passage of hurricane Katrina
showing breach repair operations underway. Deep hole located outside the wall is indicated.

16
South Breach

Several hundred yards to the south of the North Breach, a massive second breach

developed. Figure C.16 shows an oblique aerial view of the South Breach which ws

approximately 1000 feet in length. The large barge washed in through this very long feature is

visible in this photograph. The sheetpile wall is also clearly visible. The sheetpiles remained

interlocked throughout the severe inflow and scour caused by the breach. The concrete floodwall

atop the sheetpiles could not withstand the deformations developed by the sheetpiles as they

were stretched and much of the concrete I-wall panels spalled off of the top of the sheetpile

curtain. The large excavation ‘hole’ on the former EBIA site immediately outside the breach and

adjacent to the former alignment of the floodwall is indicated on Figure 16. This feature is in the

immediate vicinity of one of the underground excavations reported by WGI in the EBIA lock

expansion site clearing report (WGI 2005).

Figure C.16: Oblique aerial photograph of South Breach showing barge and excavation ‘hole’
outside the floodwall alignment at the former EBIA site (FEMA 2005)

17
 A similar but earlier photograph is shown in Figure C.17. This photograph was taken

during the water outflow the afternoon of 29 August 2005. The deep ‘holes’ immediately outside

the floodwall alignment at the north and south ends of the South Breach are indicated on the

photograph. The aerial photograph taken about the same time shown in Figure C.18 shows the

excavation holes at the north and south ends of the South Breach.

Figure C.17: Oblique photograph showing the South Breach with levee alignment and EBIA lock
expansion site clearing ‘holes’ immediately outside the north and south ends of the breach are
indicated (USACE IPET 2007)

18
Figure C.18: Aerial photograph shown the South Breach with EBIA lock expansion site clearing
‘holes’ immediately outside the north and south ends of the breach are indicated (NOAA 2005)

Geology and Soil Conditions

The near surface geology at this location is dominated by sediments deposited by past

distributaries of the Mississippi River with the exception of the area near Lake Pontchartrain.

Conditions near the lake (Figure C.19). The area at the IHNC - Lower 9th Ward is underlain by

swamp and marsh deposits that vary between 10 and 20 feet in thickness. Interdistributary

materials consist largely of fat clays below the marsh and swamp deposits. This layer, which also

contains zones of lean clays and slit, is approximately 30 to 35 feet thick. A complex estuarine

deposit exists below the interdistributary layer and is comprised of a complex mixture of clays,

silts, sands, and broken shell material. This deposit is about 30 feet thick and is underlain by

Pleistocene deposits which are commonly a stiff clay.

19
Figure C.19: Near-surface geology of area between 17th Street Canal and IHNC Lower 9th Ward area

20
 South Breach North Breach

Figure C.20: East bank of IHNC geologic section through South Breach and North Breach sites (USACE IPEt 2007)

21
 A centerline geologic section of the east bank of the IHNC (Figure C.20) shows the North

Breach and South Breach to be underlain by primarily gray clays with occasional plastic silt

strata. There are two significant marsh (swamp) deposits in the upper foundation soils.

Figure C.21 shows a cross-section through the South Breach. The top of the concrete

floodwall at this location is at approximately +12.7 feet (MSL). The clayey levee embankment

sits atop primarily gray clays (CH) with occasional plastic silt strata. There are two significant

“marsh” layers in the upper foundation as well. The sheet pile curtain supporting the concrete

floodwall is very short with its base at –8 feet MSL. This ‘short-sheet’ design fails to cut off flow

through the second primary marsh layer. The “marsh” layer is a variably interbedded layer of

organic silts, clays and peats. Lateral permeability of this ensemble is variable. There is a well

established history of underseepage problems along this and nearby levee frontages (ILIT 2006,

Team Louisiana 2007).

Figure C.21. Geologic cross section through the South Breach (CH – high plasticity clays, ML –
silts, CL – low plasticity clays)\

Geologists have determined that this location is crossed by a growth fault zone; the Lake

Borgne growth fault. Such growth faults are endemic to the southern coastal states (due to

22
compaction of soft underlying sediments, ground water withdrawal, petroleum production, and

other similar activities). These zones develop features like silt dikes such as was found at this

location (Gagliano 2005). Such features have been mapped in the center of the south breach that

developed in the Lower 9th Ward during hurricane Katrina (Figure C.22). These zones extend to

significant depths (well in excess of 100 feet). Earthquakes have occurred along these zones (one

reported in this area in 1964, Gagliano 2005). These growth fault zones could provide

weaknesses and high water conductivity (permeability) conduits in the soil column.

Figure C.22: Mapped growth fault (Lake Borgne fault zone) through center of South Breach
(Gagliano, Effects of Geological Faults on Levee Failures in South Louisiana, Testimony to U.S.
Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works, November 17, 2005)

23
 Additional evidence for the nature of the under seepage potential at these two sites was

provided by an impressive “crevasse splay” (local term for fan shaped under seepage erosion

features, ILIT 2006). This crevasse splay developed at the outboard side of the interim repair

section at the south breach (Figure C.23). This crevasse splay occurred at the relatively low

reverse-flow gradients as the inboard area continued to drain after it had already been largely

unwatered by pumping after initial drainage through open breaches. This crevasse splay

undermined the otherwise continuous outboard side toe fill blanket along this frontage. The

location of this crevasse splay, coincident with the location of the south breach failure provides

strong support for the presence of a foundation stratum of very high lateral permeability at this

location.

Figure C.23: Crevasse splay induced by reverse flow beneath the interim repair embankment

24
 A contractor was given the job by USACE to construct a cofferdam associated with

construction of a drainage culvert located north of this area during the period 1999 to 2003. As

shown in Figure C 24, the contractor experienced significant difficulties with water flooding and

soil heaving at depths between about –15 feet and –30 feet (McElwee personal communications

2005, 2006). Only after the sheetpiling were driven to penetrations of –60 feet were the water

flooding and soil heaving problems arrested. The excavated soils were highly organic silts and

clays.

Figure C.24: Soil heaving problems and seepage experienced during excavation of coffer dam

Soil sampling and testing results indicate marsh deposits in the upper layers – extending

to depths of –30 feet MSL. Based on knowledge of the geology of the area and the results from

25
soil exploration testing and sampling, the depths are highly variable (as would be expected for

the bottom of a swamp / marsh). The following quotations are from the soil boring logs that

sampled the soils in these layers: "Very soft, gray clay, saturated, with large amount of word

fragments and roots. High moisture content with trace organic matter, wood and significant

amount of roots. Grading to firmer with depth. Unable to perform vane due to large amount of

roots and wood in sample". "Very soft gray organic clay with humus and wood (Much wood at

19.5' - 20.0').” “ Very soft dark gray organic clay with humus and much wood".

Results from the USACE IPET and ILIT soil borings and in situ tests performed in this

area indicate the presence of “marsh” layers to a depth of –20+ feet (NAVD88). During the ILIT

sampling program, very high conductivity through the marsh layers was observed during drilling

through these layers at each of the sites in this area (Figure C.25). As the hole was drilled at one

location, the drilling fluids quickly communicated through the marsh layers to the nearby

adjacent holes which had been previously drilled. Examination of the samples indicated

distinctive preferential layering of the organic material indicating much higher horizontal water

conductivity compared with the vertical water conductivity.

26
Figure C.25: Observations of very high hydraulic conductivity associated with buried “marsh”
layers made during soil boring drilling operations at the Lower 9th Ward breach sites (Rogers
2007)

27
North Breach Analyses

Figure C.26 shows a cross-section through this breach site as employed in both finite

element analyses, limit equilibrium analyses, and finite difference analyses. The embankment

crest is at an elevation of approximately + 7.5 feet MSL and the upper portion of the

embankment consists of moderately compacted clay fill. The lower embankment section is older

historic fill and consists of locally available clays of relatively high plasticity. These are

underlain by a stratum of variable “marsh” deposits approximately 10 feet in thickness. The

marsh stratum is underlain by a relatively deep layer of soft, lacurstrine (lake) clays of relatively

high plasticity. This figure also shows the relatively extensive dredged sandy fill placed at the

outboard side of the floodwall to create additional land for the EBIA.

Note that the navigation channel lock expansion site clearing underground obstruction

removal excavation ‘holes’ are not included in this model. Currently, the author is performing

analyses to determine the effects of these holes on the performance of the levee – floodwall –

sheetpile system.

Figure C.26: Cross-section for analysis of the North Breach (Seed et al 2007)

28
 Figure C.27 shows the USACE IPET investigation’s interpretation of the statigraphy and

shear strengths in the foundation soils beneath the inboard side levee toe at the North Breach.

The solid symbols are shear strength test data and the irregular line is IPET’s interpreted

undrained shear strengths from cone penetrometer testing (cone tip factor of NK = 15). The IPET

investigation concluded that the soils at this site were normally consolidated over their full

depths and the linear red lines int his figure are then the linearly increasing shear strength

profiles used in the IPET analyses.

The ILIT investigation (2006) and the later analyses summarized here (Seed et al 2007)

used more elaborate methods for interpretation of the shear strength data. For the soft clays at

this site, making use of the pore pressure measurements from the in situ piezocone data, the ILIT

investigation re-interpreted the shear strength data using site-specific and material-specific cone

tip factor value of NK = 12 as shown by the irregular fine blue line in Figure C.27. For the marsh

deposits, following the same procedures, the IPET interpretation used a site-specific and material

specific cone tip factor of NK = 15. Additional evaluation of the geology and depositional history

indicated that the entire profile could not be treated as normally consolidated and the assessment

of shear strength versus depth is shown in Figure C.27 by the heavy dashed red lines.

Figure C.28 shows results from a transient flow seepage analysis that determines the

calculated seepage exit gradients as they would have existed with the canal water at a level of

+14 feet MSL. These transient flow analyses modeled the progressive rise in storm surge levels

over the 24 hours before the failure at between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. The analyses in Figure

C.27 were performed with a coefficient of horizontal permeability of Kh,marsh = 10-4 centimeters

per second (cm/s). Exit gradients had become unsafe with regard to initiation of erosion at an

earlier stage of this analysis, with exiting toe gradients reaching values of grater than 0.8 as early

29
as 5:00 a.m. The pore pressures under the inboard levee toe became potential unsafe with regard

to hydrostatic uplift (heave or “blowout” at approximately the same point in time.

C.27: Alternative intgerpretations of soil stratigraphy and shear strengths beneath the inboard
side levee toe at the North Breach site (Seed et al 2007)

30
Figure C.28: Hydraulic exit gradients for the North Breach. Horizontal permeability of 10-4 cm/s.
Storm surge at +14 feet MSL. (Seed et al 2007)

Even though a range of permeabilities and soil shear strengths were studied, they do not

explain the occurrence of failure at this site as early as between 5:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. The

conclusions drawn from the analyses were that under seepage and piping exacerbated by uplift or

‘blowout’ at the inboard toe of the levee was the principal cause of this failure. It is postulated

that the substantially shortened seepage paths caused by the water filled gap and the unfilled

excavations left immediately outside the floodwall and sheetpiling will show that ‘blowout’

conditions could have existed as early as 5:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m., thus explaining the water

observed coming from the breach area.

Analyses of this breach performed by the USACE IPET did not include permeability –

seepage effects based on ‘professional judgment’. Their analyses of lateral stability indicated a

deep sliding mode of failure (USACE IPET 2007).

31
 Both sets of these analyses have not addressed the potential effects of the ‘holes’ that

existed on the IHNC side of the flood wall. As noted earlier, I am performing analyses to

determine the effects of these excavations. The analyses will include a broad range of parameters

to assist in development of additional insights into the reasons for the premature failure at the

North Breach.

South Breach Analyses

Figure C.21 has presented a geologic cross section through the South Breach site. As for

the North Breach site, transient flow analyses were performed for this site. The analyses showed

that the rising storm surge in the canal was likely able to be partially effectively transmitted to

foundation soils beneath the inboard side levee toe. The storm surge rose slowly at first, raising

water levels in the IHNC from approximately +2 feet MSL to +5 feet MSL over a 22 hour

period, and then the rate of water level rise increased as the eye of the storm approached, raising

the water levels form + 5 feet to their full peak at approximately +14 feet MSL over an 11-hour

period, and overtopping the concrete flood wall height by a bit more than a foot.

As for the North Breach, these analyses do not include the effects of the navigation

channel lock expansion site clearing unfilled excavations left immediately outside two locations

along this stretch of the floodwall and sheetpiling. These effects will be addressed by future

analyses.

It is important to note that if these flood walls were designed, constructed, and

maintained at their authorized elevations, and if breaching had not developed, there would have

been minor overtopping and flooding of the Lower 9th Ward and adjacent areas.

Figure C.22 shows equipotential water pressure (contoured in 1 foot increments of water

head) contours and seepage vectors for transient flow analyses of conditions as the canal water

32
levels reached + 14 feet MSL. The equipotential contours are those calculated based on a lateral

coefficient of permeability for the “marsh” layer of Kh,marsh = 10-4 cm/s. A range of permeability

coefficients were analyzed (Kh,marsh = 10-4 cm/s to Kh,marsh = 10-6 cm/s).

As shown in Figure C.23, the fraction of the steady state pore pressure that accrues at this

location is strongly affected by the lateral permeability of the marsh layer. For values of Kh,marsh

= 10-4 cm/s to Kh,marsh = 10-6 cm/s, the fractionof the full steady state pore pressure (1,080 pounds

per cubic foot) would be on the order of 85% to 77% of the steady state pore pressures . The

pore pressures correspond to the ‘gapped’ wall – sheetpiling cases wherein it is assumed tat a gap

opens between the sheetpiles and the levee embankment soils on the waterside as the canal water

reaches an elevation of approximately +11 to +12 feet MSL. Such gapping was noted in the

finite element analyses performed to model the behavior of this section. The effect of this gap is

to permit direct entry of high water pressures at the base of the sheetpile curtain during the later

states of the storm surge rise and this also adds to the pore pressure rise beneath the inboard side

of the levee embankment.

Exit gradients at the toe were calculated to be marginally unstable with respect to

initiation of erosion and piping at this stage by approximately 8:30 a.m. for conditions

corresponding to Kh,marsh = 10-4 cm/s or greater. Hydrostatic forces on the upper clay layer

overlying the main marsh layer at the toe region were also marginally stable with regard to

potential hydrostatic uplift for those conditions.

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Figure C.22: Equipotential contours when canal water levels reached +14 feet MSL. Contours
are at 1-foot intervals of water head (63 pounds per square foot). Horizontal permeability is
Kh,marsh = 10-4 cm/s (Seed et al 2007)

Figure C.23: Pore water pressure versus time at the top of the marsh layer at the toe of the levee
(location D Figure C.22) as a function of permeability of the marsh layer (Seed et al 2007)

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 Figure C.24 shows results from the finite element analyses fir conditions at a canal water

elevation of +13.5 feet MSL. Both the evolving outboard side ‘gap’ and the eroded inboard side

trench are present at this stage. As shown in Figure C.24, two distinct failure mechanisms are

approaching a failure state: an upper failure controlled by the relatively thin upper “marsh” layer,

and a deeper mechanism along the top of the main lower “marsh” layer.

Figure C.25 shows the calculated evolution of the Factor of Safety (water driving forces

divided by soil resisting forces) as canal water levels rose. At a water level of approximately +10

to +12 feet, a water-filled ‘gap’ began to open on the outboard side of the sheetpile curtain, and

the analytical case began to transition form the ‘un-gapped case’ to the ‘water –filled gap’ case.

Based on both conventional limit equilibrium analyses coupled with transient flow seepage

analyses, and finite element analyses which internally incorporated the seepage analyses, the best

analytical estimate was that failure would occur at a canal water elevation of about +12.5 to

+14.5 feet MSL. This is in very good agreement with the observed field performance at this

section which suggests that the failure occurred at a canal water level of approximately +12.5 to

+ 14 feet MSL.

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C.24:Relative shear strain levels at a canal water elevation of +13.5 feet MSL at the South
Breach (Seed et al 2007)

C.25: Evolution of the Factor of Safety as canal water levels rose at South Breach (Seed et al
2007)

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Summary and Conclusions

At the site of both breaches, as the water level continued to rise the concrete floodwall

and supporting sheet pilling leaned toward the protected side. Due to the levee crown (top)

elevation (below water level at this time) and levee cross-section, water intruded into a gap that

developed between the sheet piling and supporting soils on the canal side. This allowed

substantial increases in the water lateral pressures acting on the floodwall – sheet piling – soil

levee system. In addition, the leaning floodwall and sheet piling effectively cut the supporting

levee in half substantially reducing its lateral capacity.

At the same time, the current (Seed et al 2007) transient flow analyses show that the

rising storm surge in the IHNC was effectively transmitted to the inboard side levee toe area.

Based on the analyses summarized here, by about 8:00 a.m., approximately 75% to 90% of the

steady state flow surge-induced pore pressures reached the foundation soils beneath the inboard

toe of the levee. It is important to note that these flow analyses did not include the dramatically

shortened flow paths caused by the gaps formed behind the floodwall nor of the site clearing

unfilled excavation holes. Abundant evidence of flood side cracking and sinkhole formation on

the protected side was found in the surviving I-wall segment between the north and south

breaches. These under seepage effects would have had extremely important effects on the soil

strengths and resistance to lateral and vertical forces.

The IPET study did not analyze the potential effects of under seepage: “Piping and

erosion from under seepage is unlikely because the I-walls were founded in a clay levee fill, a

marsh layer made up of organics, clay and silt, and a clay layer. Because of the thickness, the

low permeability of these materials, and the relatively short duration of the storm, this failure

mode was considered not likely and was eliminated as a possible mode of failure” (IPET, 2007).

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Both the NAE/NRC and ASCE IPET oversight and review committees criticized the IPET lack

of recognition and treatment of under base seepage effects in their analyses of the breaches that

developed in the flood protection system during hurricane Katrina.

As noted earlier, (due to their lower than authorized elevation and the surge water

conducted into the IHNC by the ICWW and MRGO) from about 7 a.m. to 10 a.m., the

floodwalls would have been overtopped. Because no protection (armoring) had been provided

for the levee behind the floodwalls (e.g. splash pads), as the water overtopped the floodwalls,

trenches were eroded behind the floodwalls. This led to removal of substantial portions of the

levee and consequently reduced the lateral capacity of the flood protection structure (Figure

C.26).

Figure C.26: Surge overtopping scour trench developed behind I-wall at south breach (USACE
IPET 2007)

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 Analyses performed by the author indicate that sections of the I-wall could have failed

due to removal of the lateral support caused by erosion of the deep trenches (5 to 6 feet) formed

behind the supporting sheet piles. These analyses and conclusions have been corroborated by

Gordon Boutwell (Flooding Evaluation Tank T-250-2, Murphy Oil Facility, Meraux, LA, Expert

Report, August 2006) and NIST (2006). This possibility needs to be further analyzed to

determine if it could have been a controlling mode of failure for some sections.

As the water continued to rise in the INHC, under the increased lateral pressures, the soil

levee supporting the floodwall and sheet piling deformed laterally and differentially. The

floodwall had vertical ‘water stops’ that separated the individual panels that comprised the

concrete floodwall (expansion – settlement joints). Significant wall movement was found in the

wall sections adjacent to the north breach. However, no such movement was evident adjacent to

the south breach. As the flood protection structure deformed laterally under the water pressure, it

is likely in the breach sections that the vertical water stops separating adjacent sections of the

concrete flood wall opened sufficiently to all water to jet through the openings and erode the

soils on the protected side of the levee. This behavior was photographed as the breach at the 17th

Street Canal developed (Kardon, Bea, Williamson, “Validity and Reliability of Forensic

Engineering Methods and Processes,” Proceedings 4th Forensic Congress, ASCE, 2006; IPET

Report 2006). This could help explain the report given by IPET that eyewitnesses indicated that

water in the 9th Ward near Florida Avenue was accumulating as early as 5 AM when the water

level in the IHNC was still well below the top of the floodwall.

Lateral translational instability was apparently involved at both north and south breaches.

Inspections of the flood protection structure north and south of the North Breach indicated

39
significant movements had occurred in the adjacent sections of the flood protection structure.

There was no such indication south of the southern breach.

However, the IPET analyses (2006, 2007) reached somewhat different conclusions for

both the North Breach and the South Breach. IPET attributed the North Breach to a deep, semi-

rotational failure through the soft gray clays of the foundation, and at an early time (well before

6:00 a.m. with water level at about 11 feet – well below the top of the floodwall) in order to

explain the eyewitness observations cited earlier. This would indicate an ‘unexpected’ failure.

The early eyewitness reports of water accumulation at the levee toe could be explained as

resulting from water flowing through the water stops that could have been opened by differential

deformations developed in the supporting soils. IPET stability analyses of the South Breach

resulted in computer factors of safety larger than unity with the water level at the top of the wall

and a crack behind the wall, indicating that the walls at those locations would have remained

stable if none of the soil supporting the wall had been removed by erosion. As noted, IPET

choose not to investigate the effects of under seepage and hence the effects were not included in

their analyses.

Additional evidence for the nature of the under seepage potential at these two sites was

provided by an impressive “crevasse splay” (local term for fan shaped under seepage erosion

features, ILIT 2006). This crevasse splay developed at the outboard side of the interim repair

section at the south breach (Figure C.23). This crevasse splay occurred at the relatively low

reverse-flow gradients as the inboard area continued to drain after it had already been largely

unwatered by pumping after initial drainage through open breaches. This crevasse splay

undermined the otherwise continuous outboard side toe fill blanket along this frontage. The

location of this crevasse splay, coincident with the location of the south breach failure provides

40
strong support for the presence of a foundation stratum of very high lateral permeability at this

location. This zone or stratum of very high lateral permeability could be associated with the

growth fault that has been mapped through the area of the South Breach (C.22).

Most egregious were oversimplified assumptions and analyses performed by the USACE

IPET concerning mechanisms of seepage and hydraulic uplift effects. Such mechanisms have

been well known for decades. Seepage beneath levees is discussed in depth in the USACE

Engineer Manual EM 1110-2-1913, Design and Construction of Levees, Chapter 5 “Seepage

Control.” This chapter begins as follows: “Without control, under seepage in pervious

foundations beneath levees may result in (a) excessive hydrostatic pressures beneath an

impervious stratum on the landside, (b) sand boils, and (c) piping beneath the levee itself. Under

seepage problems are most acute where a pervious substratum underlies a levee and extends

both landward and riverward of the levee and where a relatively thin top stratum exists on the

landside of a levee.” Inappropriate evaluation and analyses of the hydraulic and strength –

deformation characteristics of the highly pervious organic marsh (swamp) layers underlying

most of the greater New Orleans area has been a historic and pervasive ‘blind spot’. Forensic

engineering investigations subsequent to hurricane Katrina clearly have identified its potential

effects at the 17th Street Canal breach, the London Canal breaches, many of the important

breaches along the MR-GO protective structures, and at the two breaches at the Lower 9th Ward.

The conclusions reached by the engineering forensic analyses are in substantial

agreement; the flood protection structure adjacent to the Lower 9th Ward did not perform

acceptably or as intended in the original design. If the flood protection structure had been built

and maintained to the intended elevation, then no significant overtopping would have occurred.

With no overtopping, there would not have been any erosion of the supporting soils behind the

41
floodwall. If the potential for formation of a water filled gap between the flood wall and its

supporting sheet piling and the adjacent soils had been recognized, then the lateral stability

performance would have not been compromised. Similarly, if the potential for under seepage had

been recognized and the seepage prevented, then the lateral stability performance would not been

further compromised.

There is substantial evidence to indicate that the USACE lock expansion EBIA site

clearing and underground storage tank removal operations played important roles in initiation of

the North Breach and South Breach. The information reviewed by the author provided by the

USACE and Washington Group International has been limited. Time has not permitted review of

the large number of documents provided by USACE and Washington Group International.

The information that is available clearly indicates a high degree of correlation with the

site remediation work conducted by WGI in behalf of the USACE at the EBIA sites and the

breach locations in the flood protection structure adjacent to the Lower 9th Ward. This

remediation work (removal of soils, formation of cavities, vibrations) very probably had

important effects on the soils relied upon to provide stability and protection for the flood

protection structure. Removal and disturbance of the surface soils overlying the permeable

subsoils (marsh layers) would have facilitated the under seepage discussed earlier in this

Appendix. In addition, removal of the soils on the canal side of the floodwall would have

reduced the lateral stability of the flood protection structure.

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