RJN Objections Plaintiff has apologized to this court about his dealing with his short term memory

and would explain that his objections for Judicial Notice were confused because Exhibit B for Quality is the same as Exhibit 2 for FNMA . Plaintiff requests the court to point out on the assignment of DOT to FNMA (Defendant FNMA Exhibit 2 either Plaintiffs name or loan number or any indication the Subject Property was assigned, and for that matter, on QLS RJN Exhibit B. Surely it is a question of relevance whether a recorded Assignment relates to the Subject Property or Subject Loan. I may be wrong but I believe the court cannot take notice of obviously false or forged documents or to the information on such documents if an objection is raised. According to the law at the time, the execution date of the assignment fell past the expiration date of the notary. The Court did not address Objection #5 in light of the question whether an agent of an unnamed beneficiary can perform the duties of a Trustee in a deed of trust loan per Stockwell which holds that only the trustee holds the power of sale. Nor was the point addressed of which of the two beneficiaries at the time had their agent file the NOD. I request the Court state who exactly was the beneficiary and how much they paid for the Subject Loan when the NOD was filed, and where those facts are found. The Court did not address Objection #6 in light of the reference to Herrera v. Deutsche for objections 2 6 with facts of independent proof that the party assigning the interest had authority to do so and so the legal effect cannot have judicial notice taken of it. For the reasons above Objections 7 9 are not moot, as the declarant did not have personal knowledge of the business records underlying the Assignment and therefore cannot add weight to uncertain facts. Objection #10. Plaintiff is not aware of any examination of declarant to determine his competence or extent of knowledge of business records, because Plaintiff would love to examine declarant as a witness because of the additional bonuses paid to lenders for enrolling homeowner into programs for which they did not apply and do not offset loan payments for those bonuses. Oh wait, the court denied Plaintiffs notice of those bonuses because it is not a fact, nor will it likely lead to admissible facts when a federally provided website was cited regarding the bonuses. Objection #11. Nothing was paid for the loan, the business records show no note existed at the time, yet the Court determines that declarants statement is well founded on non-existent business records. As a result declarant is competent to interpret that a default by one or two or both beneficiaries at the time occurred because Plaintiff stopped making payments to prevent acknowledging an illegitimate loan. The Courts ruling only stands on the presumption a loan still exists, and whether his loan belongs to some other lender is outside the jurisdiction of this court; The only question is whether defendants were beneficiaries at the time. As it stands, both were, simultaneously. Objection #13. The court does not address the assignment that occurred as indicated by the special endorsement on the Note to Federal Home Loan Bank, and any number of additional assignments to establish it into a pool for a mortgage back security, and possibly back out, as the pool # reference on the illegible assignment to FNMA the Court judicially notices would imply. Nor are these considerations likely to lead to admissible facts, apparently. Objection #15. A lay opinion is not a fact, and no foundation of authentication of any piece of paper has determined there is a factual original note, nor are there any business documents such as a bailee letter attesting to such document. The only business records show The Promissory Note was not available in paper
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format. Furthermore, Plaintiff pointed out that another attorney claims the document presented at the deposition were only copies, which is also a lay opinion. Papers introduced as one thing were presented to Plaintiff at his deposition by professional liars later as something else. Objection #16. The Promissory Note refers to the original promissory note; yet only a document introduced as a variable rate note was produced. The Promissory Note is a note, but a note is not necessarily The Promissory Note. Claiming something generically at one point in time, then claiming it has specific properties at a later point in time is a lie. Objection #17. Court does not address statements taken out of context and packaged as facts as a falsity. Objection #18. Court does not address irrelevance of statement made about a hypothetical topic and has nothing to do with incompetence of a lay opinion. Objection Section E Clerks office for filing pleadings closes at one. Plaintiffs mail is normally delivered mid to late afternoon. After running errands on way home from filing, mail contained envelope post marked April 30 from the Court that contained the ruling. Causes of Action The Court misconstrues Plaintiffs pleadings on his causes of action. (1) Whether anyone holds a piece of paper alleging to be a promissory after alleged possession occurs after the alleged purchaser has notice that a default has been declared, takes the loan subject to all defenses to such claims as the homeowner may prosecute. The appellation of holder in due course does not apply. The judicially noticed and illegible Deed of Trust provides the homeowner can sue if there is a question of the beneficiary interest. There are two prongs to the rights of the beneficiary chain of beneficial interest, evidenced by The Promissory Note (not a copy) and equitable interest from negotiation of the loan. The Promissory Note is necessary, especially in post-Calvo landscape because, as in this case, special endorsements are found only on The Promissory Note and control the beneficiary interest and the resulting chain. No explanation is forthcoming from Defendants regarding the special endorsement to Federal Home Loan Bank. The Courts theory that the foreclosing party is not required to have physical possession of the promissory note is based solely on case law for uncontested and underwater loans where no surplus funds result from an trustee sale. The all-inclusive statutes for non-judicial foreclosure have provision for the trustee to use the promissory note to determine beneficial share of the excess funds after sale. As in this action. The Court postulates The factual problem with plaintiffs theory is that defendants have offered substantial evidence that JP Morgan does in fact have physical possession of the original promissory note In actuality, the Noticed assignment from FNMA states the note came from them, but the factual business records show FNMA didnt have it in their vault, and there are no vault records of where it came from to transfer to JP Morgan. Curious the Court would deny the compelling of documents that might shed light on how, exactly, JP Morgan produced the (unauthenticated) note. A copy of the note is available from the Title company to any lender who will pay for it. (2) Plaintiff offers multiple lines of argument regarding why the Notice of Default is void. The Court seems unfazed that discovery uncovered simultaneous beneficiaries claiming interest at the time the NOD was filed. Yet the Court denies further discovery to allow investigation of how that is possible, and finds no trialable issue of fact given this legal impossibility. It must be more of that sloppy paperwork that recently resulted in a multi-billion dollar settlement. Defendants facts do not support their agent of the beneficiary
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gimmick, which is so shoddy even the Defendants cant explain with names and business records who acted as agent for whom at any point in time. Maybe Federal Home Loan Bank sold it to another party? Another line of argument the Court makes no mention of is that an agent of the beneficiary cannot perform trustee duties for deed of trust loans because only the Trustee holds the power of sale, and its been convoluted mis-interpretations of the Appellate Courts that mix the language that accommodate mortgages and deed of trust loans since the Stockwell decision in 1909 that Defendants whole case rests upon. Calvo, by stating deed of trust loans are not other encumberancers reinforced the title theory of Stockwell, where title passes to the Trustee and only they hold the power of sale. The Court incorrectly states QLS executed the notice of default, not in its capacity as the trustee of record, but rather in its capacity as an agent of the beneficiary. The facts show McCarthy & Holthus are agents of FNMA, and JP Morgan is an agent of FNMA, and QLS states LSI (subsidiary to LPS) is an agent of QLS, but has no business records memorializing any agency relationships. The Court prevented Plaintiff from compelling discovery from QLS that would lead to facts that LPS is both database software and communications software that all of the above use to communicate among each other. So if you cant tell the agents without a scorecard, why does the Court deny discovery of those agency relationships and documents requesting their interactions among each other? In other words, a missing fact is the business document reflecting any beneficiary selected QLS to act as an agent of anyone to do anything. Plaintiff asked that question, and was denied its discovery by direct action of this Court. And how does the Court ignore, again, Stockwell, and the concept of separation of the Trustee from the beneficiary for deed of trust loans, by condoning an employee of QLS signing Substitutions of Trustee to QLS as an AVP of an agent of a beneficiary? The Court gets it wrong again with the fact that the assignment was recorded after the notice of default is not of consequence. . There was legal remedy available to all defendants who elected to ignore it and not lose referral bonuses for filing necessary documents by a prescribed time. It appears the Court is now advocating felony false filing in this decision. Furthermore, an execution date is found on Assignments, and memorialize the operative date of the assignment, which is used as the legal basis for determining whether an assignee is holder in due course with warranty, or is subject to defenses of the homeowner in a legal action and must prove its interest, as in this action. This leads to Plaintiffs point that any number of assignments could have been made, and any of the assignees (or even a few of them) may have written off the face value of the loan as a loss for tax purposes, and turned around and re-assigned the loan for consideration, e.g. tax writeoff. Defendants provide insufficient facts that this did not happen with them as no business records exist to show dates the Subject went on the books, and off the books among them, and the Promissory Note is endorsed in blank, without recourse. The Court gets it wrong again with it is a reasonable inference from the fact of recordation itself that defendant QLS acted with the authority of the beneficiary, because the facts show there were at least 2 beneficiaries, and not the beneficiary-without-a-name, and a questionable chain of beneficiary interest since FNMA couldnt provide even a copy of the Note, and an unexplained special endorsement on the Note. Furthermore, Summary Judgment allows all assumptions and presumptions to the opposing party, and there are no business records to support the Courts inappropriate speculation, especially when Plaintiff was denied discovery by actions of the court of the records memorializing QLS was asked to do anything by anyone regarding the foreclosure. The Court gets something right with Plaintiff has not alleged any defect in the statutorily prescribed contents of the notice of default, or in the manner of service of the notice of default. However, Plaintiff did point out in his Opposition that the NOD violated the terms of the Deed of Trust. Its found in that illegible
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document the Court judicially noticed. As for prejudice, NONE of the entities on the notice of default were parties to the original loan documents, nor were they known by any business relationship to Plaintiff when it was filed and served. If the Court believes that a prudent man would just accept such a document and pay a small fortune to perfect strangers, well, I have a bridge I might sell you Fourth Cause of Action Plaintiff agrees with the Court regarding subject matter jurisdiction after receiving the Reply Memorandum Tuesday afternoon. However, neither Lopez or Jelsing are on point. Lopez dealt with additional payoff statement fees for faxes, and clearly came under the definition of federal law at the time. Jelsing was essentially unopposed and not argued. The law has changed since then. Plaintiff would point out this is a hearing about facts, or lack thereof, and the sandbagging tactics of Defendants introducing this issue in discovery in order to take advantage of federal case law about an insurance topic that came out in discovery immediately before an already scheduled MSJ allowed the judge to bring the issue up then. The law and topic were available to Defendants at the time of their FAA, and was not a result of discovering that Plaintiff had anything that would affect how his loan would be serviced. So again, were back to unfair surprise and elder abuse. Whether the Court finds Plaintiffs argument unpersuasive or not comes after considering the facts which Plaintiff presented, and that Summary Judgment is a determination if any facts remain in contention. Since Lopez was about fees, and this case is about a copy of the note denoting beneficiary interest, and federal law does not intrude into states dominion of real estate title, and the definition of servicing for federal purposes being about dealing with the flow of money from the borrower and related reports, can this Court honestly state there is no question of preemption? Especially in light of the change in law in the past couple of years that is not reflected in Defendants pleadings? Furthermore, Plaintiff should have the chance to request a Second Amended Complaint to accommodate the issues found in discovery and this issue of preemption. Preemption was first brought up by Defendants in their Opposition to Plaintiffs discovery motions, and not even as a fact for an affirmative defense. The courts decision on that motion / opposition was available when he got home from filing his opposition to this motion. So here it is, oral arguments on a tentative ruling on a motion for summary judgment, as the first time Plaintiff has a chance to plead Defendants amended preemptive issue. Clearly the tactics being employed demonstrate the importance of a fair presentation by both parties, especially if it heads to the Appellate courts. Plaintiff was hoping this Court would be able to distinguish between states rights for real estate title, and payment processing by lenders. (3) The Court remains derelict to determine standing of Defendants to equitable relief. This is a question of legal jurisdiction, and has been raised in several of Plaintiffs pleadings. Plaintiff maintains the possibility that no amount is owed, no money was passed as consideration from JP Morgan to Fannie Mae, and the only business records that can prove otherwise are possessed by Defendants. Defendants refuse to proffer any business records supporting a claim of equitable relief, and the Court recently ruled against Plaintiffs discovery efforts to compel such records.

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