The Tactics, Goals, and Outcomes of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam By: Evan Kalikow

For decades, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (commonly known as the Tamil Tigers and henceforth referred to as the LTTE) have been a fascinating organization to study. Social scientists and policy-makers alike can draw valuable lessons from the LTTEs activity in Sri Lanka since the mid 1970s. Throughout the following examination of the LTTE, the organizations separatist and nationalist goals and its violent tactics embracing strategies of both attrition and intimidation will inform its successes and failures in achieving its long-term goal of autonomy. Moreover, this essay will analyze potential strategies that would have proven fruitful for the LTTE and provided for a more lasting and permanent solution to the issue of an independent Tamil state. The LTTE was formed with one explicit purposethe creation of an autonomous state for Tamil nationals north of Sri Lanka. As examined by Gamini Samaranayake in his 2007 article Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the group consists almost entirely of Sri Lankan Tamils, with inconsequential support from other associated groups, including Muslims, Indian Tamils, and Tamil Christians (Samaranayake 2007: 174). The LTTE now has approximately 8000 members, according to the University of Marylands National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism And Responses to Terrorism (START). Although the LTTE is primarily a nationalist and separatist organization, there are strong ethnic and religious ties; the majority of Sri Lankan Tamils are Hindu, as compared to the predominantly Buddhist Sinhalese ethnic group which comprises almost three quarters of the Sri Lankan population (Nadarajah and Vimalarajah 2008: 22). It is important to understand the historical context of the Tamils in Sri Lanka in order to analyze the LTTE. The Sinhalese, as previously mentioned, encompass 74.5 percent of the Sri Lankan population, compared to the Tamils 12.5 percent (Samaranayake 2007: 172). Tensions between the two groups escalated during British colonial rule in the mid 1900s, in particular over the issue of representationthe Tamils favored a 50:50 balance of

representation, of which the majority Sinhalese disapproved. This schism reached a turning point in 1948 when a notable portion of Tamil elites, fearing discrimination and persecution, attempted to form an independent state, which was summarily rejected by the Sinhalese (Samaranayake 2007: 173). The issues of autonomy and representation were far from resolved, however, and the seeds for a separatist group like the LTTE to form were sown. The organization evolved from its formation in 1976 as a youth-powered guerilla organization competing amongst several dozen similar groups to the unchallengedvoice of Sri Lankas Tamil minority that it remained for several years (Samaranayake 2007: 173174). The LTTE was notable in that it engaged in violent tactics against not only the Sri Lankan government and Sinhalese civilians, but against other Tamils and rival Tamil revolutionary groups as well. These counter-Tamil acts of violence primarily occurred in the mid-1980s when support of Tamil nationals was still dispersed over a handful of insurgent groups, namely the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), the Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS), and the LTTE (Samaranayake 2007: 174). Because these groups were less formidable and less organized than the LTTE, let alone the Sri Lankan government, the LTTE was able to overpower the competing groups through sheer force and were the most widely supported Tamil nationalist group by the late 1980s (Wilson 2000: 127-131). In these early stages of conflict, it would appear that the LTTE engaged in intimidation tactics to persuade the Tamil population to lend their support and allegiance to the LTTE over all other groups. The LTTE was dissatisfied with many aspects of the aforementioned groups; for instance, they took issue with the EPRLFs funding and support from India and Colombo (Wilson 2000: 129), the recognition given to the TELO over the LTTE (2000: 127), and the Marxist political focus of the other groups, particularly the PLOTE (2000: 127). By eliminating the competing groups, the LTTE was able to

demonstrate to the Tamil population that it was the only militant group willing and able to combat the Sri Lankan government and scared them from supporting or starting any other organizations. There are two cases that one could make to argue that the LTTE did not engage in intimidation in this instance. It can be argued that, because the various militant groups were competing against each other for support from the population, it would be more accurate to describe the LTTEs actions as outbidding rather than intimidation. This, however, cannot be true. The strategy of outbidding is chiefly concerned with proving to the population that one particular organization is better suited to be more violent or extremist than the othersthat is, the violence demonstrated by these groups is directed not among each other, but at a common target (the official government). By engaging in conflict against the other organizations to the point of destruction, the LTTE proved to be operating under the principles of the intimidation strategy rather than outbidding. One could also posit that intimidation is used when an extremist organization is competing for the populations support against the government rather than other non-state groups. While this is generally true, the structure of governance in Sri Lanka in the 1980s was such that the majority of Tamils resided in the north and eastern parts of the state, which was described by Suthaharan Nadarajah and Luxshi Vimalarajah (2008: 17) as almost qualifying as a failed state, featuring repression characterized by indiscriminate violence, human rights abuses, and non-state groups claiming and displaying legitimacy. Therefore, in these early stages of LTTE separatism, it can be argued with credibility that the LTTE acted as if the competing organizations were the government figure in the scheme of the intimidation strategy. The actions carried out by the LTTE against the other groups (as well as the LTTEs motivations and goals) thus fall into line with the tactic of intimidation. After competing groups were marginalized and the majority of Tamil support backed the LTTE, the organizations tactics and targets markedly changed. From 1987 until 2000, the

group was principally characterized by its frequent use of suicide terrorism, engaging in almost 200 attacks and killing or wounding thousands of innocents (Schweitzer 200: 3). In her 2005 article Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Ccile Van de Voorde described the staggering impact of these statistics: Overall, as far as implementation, frequency, and total of attacks are concerned, the LTTEs highly effective and extremely brutal suicide terrorism campaign surpasses the more publicized ones waged by Hizballah or Hamas. Today the Tamil Tigers are the most thriving and fiercest terrorist group to have ever resorted to suicide terrorism. (Van de Voorde 2005: 187). The LTTEs suicide attacks were indiscriminatory, as the organization was ready and willing to target buildings, infrastructure, symbolic targets, members of the government, and civilians (Van de Voorde 2005: 187). A strategy consisting of suicide attacks cannot work or be effective, though, unless the population carrying out the attacks has members ready and willing to sacrifice themselves for a cause larger than their individual lives. Fortunately for the LTTE, the Tamil culture in Sri Lanka was able to provide for conditions promoting suicide attacks. In his chapter of the book Making Sense of Suicide Missions entitled Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002, Stephen Hopgood discusses the issue of suicide terrorism within the LTTE. Hopgood examines the origin of the Black Tigers, the suicide attack wing of the LTTE, making a particular point to mention the adulation and martyr status received by Black Tigers who sacrifice themselves for the LTTE cause (the LTTE even recognizes Black Tigers Day on the anniversary of the death of Captain Miller, the first Black Tiger) (Hopgood 2005: 50). Perhaps more important than the LTTEs efforts to label suicide attackers as heroes was the culture of the Tamils as a whole. Many Tamils, especially those who would join or be enlisted by an extremist group such as the LTTE, were quite passionate about the cause of Tamil autonomy and would rather sacrifice their lives for the cause than be captured or jailed by the Sri Lankan government. Moreover, a significant portion of the Tamil population consisted of

Hindu extremists who strongly believed in the virtues of reincarnation, contrasting starkly with the primarily non-extreme and nonviolent Sinhalese Buddhist majority in Sri Lanka (Van de Voorde 2005: 188). Thus, the motivations of the Tamil population made suicide terrorism a plausible and effective strategy for the LTTE. In addition to their reliance on suicide terrorism, the LTTE was also characterized by its successful assassinations of world leaders, most notably Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993, and former Sri Lankan Prime Minister and presidential hopeful Gamini Dissanayake in 1994. (Van de Voorde 2005: 187-188). The LTTEs assassination strategy was not reserved exclusively for heads of state, however; the group carried out (or were alleged of carrying out) assassinations of a diverse array of targets, including local authorities, religious figures, and leaders of competing Tamil groups (Hopgood 2005: 56). It is important to note, however, that the LTTE did not generally take credit for or deny assassinations and assassination attempts, making it nigh impossible to quantify the extent of this form of violence (Hopgood 2005: 54). The strategies of suicide attacks and assassinations each exemplify the attrition tactic of terrorism. This would seem to make sense, as the situation in Sri Lanka regarding the issue of an autonomous Tamil state satisfies many conditions that are conducive to a successful attrition tactic. Possible responses to the LTTE by the democratic Sri Lankan government were restrained both legally and politically, as those who could potentially be targeted by the government (i.e. members of the LTTE) were also citizens of Sri Lanka. Moreover, the Sri Lankan government did not have a high tolerance for violence. As discussed earlier, the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka is primarily Buddhist and decidedly nonviolent (Van de Voorde 2005: 188). It is clear to see, given those crucial details, how tactics of attrition would have been seen by the LTTE as conducive to their goals of an autonomous Tamil state. It is difficult to categorize the actions of the LTTE as purely successful or unsuccessful, as the groups history and the status of an independent Tamil state have been in flux ever

since the groups formation, in particular in the past decade. However, one can quite easily assess the LTTEs goal of gaining relevance and influence relative to other Tamil nationalist groups as a success. By the time their initial suicide campaign had started in 1987, the LTTE had, through more conventional military means, overpowered each competing revolutionary Tamil group to the point of irrelevancy or disbandment (Samaranayake 2007: 174). Perhaps those other groupsincluding TELO, PLOTE, EPRLF, and EROScould have survived or combatted marginalization by focusing on their common ground with the LTTE; this seems unlikely, though, as the other groups had motives and goals beyond the creation of a Tamil state (such as the Marxism espoused by TELO, PLOTE, and EPRLF), and the LTTE was uncompromising in its purely separatist aims (Wilson 2000: 127-131). Ultimately, the consolidation of power to the LTTE may have been beneficial as a whole to Tamil nationalists and extremists, as it allowed a unitary non-state actor to work as their advocates in support of a Tamil state without additional infighting. The LTTE was able to make significant gains toward the formation of an autonomous Tamil state through its campaign of attrition. Perhaps the groups most significant success came during the groups 2002 Ceasefire Agreement with the Sri Lankan government, which brought an end to the third Eelam War. The Ceasefire Agreement had two important effects for the LTTE: it solidified the large territorial stronghold it had in the north and eastern parts of Sri Lanka, allowing those areas to act as a de facto state, and it allowed the LTTE to shift its focus from acts of violence to solidifying its autonomous control over its territory (Stokke 2006: 1022). By most accounts, this can be seen as a victory for the LTTE. The group was formed with the explicit goal to create an independent Tamil state in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, and the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement was a major step forward toward that goal becoming a reality. While status as a de facto state may not have been preferable to an officially recognized new state, it nevertheless granted the LTTE autonomy over a region populated primarily by Tamils.

If this ceasefire and period of peace had lasted, it would be easier to deem the LTTEs campaign as a success; as it stands, however, the degradation of the Ceasefire Agreement by 2006 and the LTTEs decline in the years following provide ample evidence for the LTTEs strategy of terrorism to provide fleeting success at best and long-term failure at worst. The ceasefires cracks began to show in October and November of 2003 when the Sri Lankan government declared a state of emergency and suspended parliament in response to an LTTE proposal for self-governance, which the President of Sri Lanka rejected outright (Smith 2007: 70). After that incident, according to Chris Smith in his article The Eelam Endgame?, the political framework that underpinned the concept of self-government for Sri Lankan Tamils became history and the peace process never recovered. (Smith 2007: 70). The period following that did nothing to bolster the peace process and was notable for frequent political skirmishes, a newly-elected Sri Lankan government that was less amicable toward negotiating with the LTTE, and, eventually, a breaking of the ceasefire and build-up to war spurred by the LTTEs assassination of Laxman Kadirgamar, a Sri Lankan foreign minister who was adamant about ascribing the terrorist label to the LTTE (Smith 2007: 70-72). By early 2009, the LTTE had become severely weakened to the point of irrelevancy, having lost control of the majority of the northern regions of Sri Lanka to the official government (Reddy 2009). There are two ways in which the leaders of the LTTE could have changed their strategy to ensure a more permanent solution to the issue of an independent Tamil state. The first method would have involved abandoning the suicide attack component of their strategy or, failing that, gearing the suicide attacks more toward political and nonliving targets and away from civilians. Attacking civilians through suicide attacks may have been an effective strategy for establishing credibility as a dangerous organization and for getting the Sri Lankan government to listen to the LTTEs demands, but it is a double-edged swordas mentioned earlier, the people of Sri Lanka elected a government that was less willing to work

amicably with the LTTE. Generally, if noncombatant citizens believe that a group may target them in suicide attacks, they will be less likely to support or have empathy with that group. Had the LTTE not engaged in suicide attacks or made an effort to avoid civilian fatalities, perhaps the voting non-Tamil Sri Lankan public would have been more open to electing a government that would negotiate with the group. A second tactic that would have benefitted the LTTE would have been to switch to a provocation strategy following the establishment of the Ceasefire Agreement. By ending the ceasefire through the assassination of Kadirgamar, the LTTE could not garner any international sympathy. This, coupled with the fact that the Sri Lankan governments strategy to combat the LTTE involved both using the governments superior military strength and convincing the international community that the LTTE deserved no sympathy, doomed the group to failure (Aryasinha 2001: 36). Instead, the LTTE could have gained support and sympathy by attacking the Sri Lankan government through small, inconsequential attacks, provoking the government to issue a non-proportional response. This strategy would have cast the Tamils and the LTTE as persecuted actors and could have prompted the international world to intervene in hopes of a more permanent, less deadly solution to the problem. The LTTEs campaign to form an autonomous Tamil state in the north and east of Sri Lanka was characterized by the groups propensity to violence, its intimidation and destruction of rival groups with similar goals, its wanton destruction through suicide attacks and assassinations, its effectiveness at becoming a de facto state, and its ultimate failure in maintaining or advancing that de facto status. Had the LTTEs campaign succeeded and an official Tamil state been recognized, this case, as well as the resulting relations between the Tamil state, Sri Lanka, and other states, would have been fascinating. As it stands, the LTTE remains an interesting and important case study in the effectiveness, deadliness, and failures of suicide terrorism and attrition strategies.

References Aryasinha, R (2001) Terrorism, the LTTE and the conflict in Sri Lanka, Conflict, Security & Development 1 (2), pp. 25-50 Hopgood, Stephen (2005) Tamil Tigers, 1987-2002. Making Sense of Suicide Missions. (Oxford: Oxford UP) pp. 43-76 Nadarajah S, and Vimalarajah L (2008) The Politics of Transformation: The LTTE and the 2002-2006 peace process in Sri Lanka, Berghof Transitions Series No. 4, pp. 1-60 Reddy, M (2009) Killinochchi captured in devastating blow to LTTE, The Hindu. Newspaper. < http://www.hindu.com/2009/01/03/stories/2009010357740100.htm> Samaranayake, G (2007) Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 30 (1), pp. 171-183 Schweitzer, Y (2000) "Suicide Terrorism Development and Characteristics." International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism. Herzeliya, Israel. Lecture. Smith, C (2007) The Eelam endgame?, International Affairs 83 (1), pp. 69-86 START - National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism.", U.S. Department of Homeland Security through the University of Maryland, <http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp? id=3623> Stokke, K (2006) Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and Forms of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka, Third World Quarterly 27 (6) pp. 1021-1040 Van de Voorde, C (2007) Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Police Practice and Research: An International Journal 6 (2), pp. 181-199 Wilson, A. J. (2000) Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. (University of British Columbia Press)