Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict

in Sri Lanka
Author(s): Neil DeVotta
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Spring, 2000), pp. 55-76
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
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 Control Democracy,Institutional
Decay, and the Quest forEelam:
Explaining Ethnic Conflict
in Sri Lanka
Neil DeVotta*

O n 25 January1998,just ten daysbeforeSri Lanka celebratedfifty

yearsof independence, three LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) rebelscrashedan explosives-filled
truckthroughthegates
ofthecountry's mostreveredBuddhisttemple,damagingitsroofand facade.
Had the inner sanctum,which Buddhistsbelieve holds a tooth of Lord
Buddha,been destroyed, theislandwouldmostlikelyhaveundergoneethnic
riotingon a scale greaterthan thatexperienced duringthe 1983 pogrom.
The Temple of the Tooth's significance to the island's Buddhists was
communicatedbyone bystander killus, eat us,
who pleaded, "Youterrorists,
but don't attackour shrineswhereBuddha lives."'The bombingultimately
killedsixteenpeople, injuredover twenty-fiveothers,provokedthe deputy
defenseministerto tenderhis resignationand forcedthe governmentto
moveitsvauntedfestivities fromthe templepremisesin Kandyto Colombo.
At the ensuingindependence dayparade, Sri Lanka's presidentreferredto
the ethnicconflictbetweenthe country'smajoritySinhalese and minority
Tamilsand noted,"Wehave failedin the essentialtaskof nationbuilding."2
Indeed, Sri Lanka standsas a classicexample of how statebuildingcan fail
whenone ethnonationalgroup (in thiscase theSinhalese) attemptsto build
a religio,juridicoand politico-economicsocietybyexcludingitsminorities.
In tryingto account forSinhalese nationalismand the ensuingconflict,
some scholarspoint to Buddhism'stwomillenniainfluenceand itsimpact
in shapingan indelibleSinhaleseconsciousness,whileothersemphasizethe
colonial presencewithitsattendantculturaland economic influencesand

Versions of this paper were presented at the 27th Annual Conference on South Asia, Madison,
Wisconsin, and the 57th Annual Meeting of the MidwestPolitical Science Association, Chicago. The
author especially acknowledges the comments made on previous draftsby Robert L. Hardgrave,Jr.,
Sumit Ganguly and an anonymous reviewer.
'Quoted in "11 Killed in Truck Bombing at Sri Lanka Buddhist Site," New YorkTimes,26January
1988, p. 3(A).
2Quoted in Sugeeswara Senadhira, "Ethnic StrifeOvershadows Freedom Jubilee," India Abroad,
13 February1998, p. 24. The quote was repeated when the President addressed the UN's 53rd Annual
General Assembly.See Observet; "Examining Our Failures," 23 September 1998.

55
 PacificAffairs

policiesofstratification along racial,classand religiouslines.Manyalso hold

thatSinhalese nationalismand the subsequent ethnic conflictis more or
less the creationof politicalelites.Similarly, Tamil nationalismis cast as a
constructof high-casteand middle-classnorthernTamilswhose designwas
to subsumeintraethniccleavagesespeciallyemanatingfromthedisgruntled
Tamillowerclasses.3
While these theoreticalpositions enhance our understandingof the
ongoingconflict, bythemselvestheyremainpartialexplanations.None fully
explainsthecivilwaritselfin thatnone accountsforthemobilizationsuccesses
oftheTamilswhowereonce stereotyped as career-oriented,intellectualand
passivebut are now responsiblefor creatingwhat is arguablythe world's
most deadly secessionistconflict.Any attemptto analyze Sri Lanka's civil
warshould thusattemptto answerwhyTamilmobilization,in fighting fora
separatestate,generatedsuch enthusiasmamongsttheirfellowswho,in the
main,had relied on democraticinstitutions to tackletheirgrievances.And
doing so mustinevitablydrawon structural, politicaland economic forces
as wellas on elitepolicies and politics,especiallyifa bettertheoryof ethnic
conflictis to be constructed.4
In theattemptto achievethis,thisarticleadoptsa framework thatanalyzes
the two phases of Tamil mobilization- political and military- and the
eventualpush towardsEelam(a Tamilstate)as a consequence ofinstitutional
decay.In hisanalysisoftheKashmircrisis,SumitGangulyemployeda similar
framework focusingon institutional decayand mobilization.He arguedthat
the "Kashmiriinsurgencyarose out of a process of political mobilization
thatwasjuxtaposedwithsteadyinstitutional decay."5SriLanka's Tamilsshare
some of the circumstancesfacingthe Kashmiris- claimsto territory thatis
militarilyoccupied, a distinctiveethnicconsciousness,and a religiousand
ethnicaffiliation thatallowsfora majority regionalidentityamidsta minority
nationalidentity- thoughthe obviousmajor differencebetweenthe twois
thattheKashmirisare caughtamidsta complicatedand protractedregional
conflictwhile the Tamil rebels are directlyengaged againstthe Sri Lankan
government. The framework is also consistentwiththetheoreticalliterature
on social movementsand institutions, whichgenerallyholds thatwhile an

'For an articulationof these positions,see Bardwell L. Smith,ed., Religionand LegitimationofPower

in SriLanka (Chambersburg: Anima Books, 1978); Nira Wickramasinghe,EthnicPoliticsofColonialSri
Lanka, 192 7-47 (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1995);Jane Russell, CommunalPolitics
UndertheDonoughmoreConstitution, 1931-47 (Dehiwala: Tisara Prakasakayo Ltd., 1982); Christopher
G. Ellison, "Elites,Competition, and Ethnic Mobilization: Tamil Politicsin Sri Lanka, 1947-77,"Journal
ofPoliticaland MilitarySociology,
vol. 15, no. 2 (Fall 1987), pp. 213-28.
4Donald Horowitz,EthnicGroupsin Conflict (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1985), p. 140.
Sumit Ganguly, "Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and Institutional
Decay," InternationalSecurity,
vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 91.

56
 in SriLanka
ExplainingEthnicConflict

open politicalopportunity structurepromotescollaboration,a closed system

encouragesdissensionand challengesto stateauthority.6
For definitionalpurposes,I referto "institutions" as the officialestab-
lishmentsthatstructureconductto create"thestate"- i.e., thebureaucracy,
police and defenseforces,the public education system,and judicial system
- as well as those privateestablishmentsgaininglegitimacyfromand/or
providinglegitimacyto political elites representingthe state.Institutions
facilitatenetworksfor individualsand groups to negotiatetheirrelations
withthe stategivencommon interests, laws,rightsand aspirations.While it
is to be expected thatindividualsand groupswould attemptto maximize
accruablebenefits,thevigilantand competitive natureofpolyethnicsocieties
require theirinstitutionsto promoteand provideimpartialinteractionsso
as to preclude ethnic dissension.Thus if impartialinteractionslegitimize
interactionsdelegitimizeinstitutions.
particularistic
institutions, The more
interactionspermeate institutionsemblematizingthe state,
particularistic
the more likelythose marginalizedwould mobilize in opposition. This is
especially so for polyethnic polities where those dispossessed and
discriminatedagainstmayprotestbymobilizingalong ethnonationallines.
This has indeed been the case in Sri Lanka.
The firstsection focuseson fifty yearsof Sinhalese-dominatedpolitics
and the marginalizationand scapegoatingof the Tamilswithinthe context
ofa "controldemocracy"7-a democracyinwhichthemajority groupeschews
ethniccompromisewitha state'sminoritiesand insteadsolelycontrolsthe
leversof power - in the attemptto create a Sinhalese ethnocracy.It also
juxtaposes the concomitantinstitutionaldecay as it applied to the Tamils.
The second sectionfocuseson Tamilmobilization,elaborateson themassive
breakdownofinstitutions duringthe1983riots,whichmarkedan utterchasm
betweenSinhaleseand Tamils,and therebyprovidesan explanationforboth
of the country'scivilwar.The thirdsection
the durabilityand intractability
evaluateshow Sri Lanka's controldemocracycontinuesto preclude ethnic
compromiseand a restructuring It arguesin favorof
ofpoliticalinstitutions.
a devolutionarystructure decayand claimsthat
and thereversalofinstitutional
devoidofsuchaccommodation, theisland'sdeadlyconflict willlikelycontinue.

Tamil Grievances,and thePath to EthnicConflict

SinhaleseParticularism,
SriLanka'sSinhaleseand Tamilsare ofIndianprovenance.Given
Historically,
the plethoraof mythsand folklorethatmesh withboth groups' histories,
thismaybe theonlycertainhistoricalfact.Allotherclaims,whilecontributing

6SeeJoe Foweracker, Theorizing Social Movements(Boulder: Pluto Press, 1995); Sidney G. Tarrow,
Powerin Movement:Social Movements,Collective Actionand Politics(New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1994).
7The termis influenced by Ian Lustick's "Stabilityin Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism
Versus Control," WorldPolitics,vol. 31, no. 3 (April 1979), pp. 325-44.

57
 PacificAffairs

towardgroupidentity, are disputable.The Sinhalese,supposedlycomprising

of Aryanstock,settledin Sri Lanka around the fifthor sixthcenturyB.C.
Depending on thesource,theDravidianTamilswereeitheralreadypresent
or followedthe Sinhalese soon thereafter.
Sinhalese chroniclesrecord wars between the two groups,though the
historyappearsto be an extensionoffolklore;and currentethnicdistinctions
seem based on themythicalhistorycreatedbynineteenth-century Buddhist
eliteswho effectivelyweaved folkloreand religionto claim a NorthIndian
heritageand fashiona nationalistideology.8Whateverthe case, bythe time
the Portugueselanded in 1505, the Tamilswere concentratedin the north
and northeastand the Sinhalese occupied the restof the country.This was
united the countryin 1832.
so untilthe Britishadministratively

ThePoliticsofLanguageand Religion
In keepingwithBritain'sdivide-and-rule in SriLanka
policies,herauthorities
baldly favoured minoritycommunities at the expense of the majority
community'sreligion,language and culture.Independence was therefore
seen as a mechanismby which Buddhism, the Sinhala language and its
intertwinedculturecould be restoredto its rightfulplace of prominence
and dominance. The rhetoricjustifying such an outcome inevitablyrelied
on the racializationof ethnicidentities.Whilereligionwas utilizedearlyon
foridentitypurposes as well as a mobilizingmechanism,especiallyagainst
the British,it was the "Sinhala only" language movement that created
Sinhalese-Tamil ethnicanimosity in thepostindependenceera.The Sinhalese
quest to make Sinhala the country'sonly officiallanguage consequently
markedthe genesisof postindependenceethnicpolarizationin Sri Lanka.
As one SinhalesememberopposingtheSinhala OnlyBill presciently noted:
"Twotornlittlebleedingstatesmayyetariseout ofone littlestate(ifthebill
is passed) . .. One language, two countries; two languages, one country."9The
Bill's passage was one of the firstindicationsthatSri Lanka had embarked
towardsa controldemocracy.
Tamil opposition to the Sinhala Only Bill and the subsequentviolence
led to the 1956 "race riots."In the belated attemptto accommodateTamil
concerns,Sri Lanka's PrimeMinister,S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike,met with
Tamil Federal Partyleader S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and agreed to the
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 (B-C Pact). This pact provided
for regional councils withlimitedpower and also recognized Tamil as a

8See Gananath Obeysekere, "Sinhalese-Buddhist Identityin Ceylon," George Devos and Lola
and Change(Palo-Alto: MayfieldPublishing,
Romanucc-Ross, eds., EthnicIdentity:CulturalContinuities
1975), pp. 231-58; R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, "The People of the Lion: The Sinhala Identityand
Ideology in History and Historiography,"Jonathan Spencer, ed., Sri Lanka: Historyand theRootsof
Conflict(London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 45-86.
'The statement from the Communist Party leader, Colvin R. de Silva, is quoted in M. R.
NarayanSwamy,TigersofLanka: FromBoys toGuerrillas(Delhi: Konark PublishersPvt.Ltd., 1994), p. 10.

58
 ExplainingEthnicConflict
in SriLanka

minority language.WiththeTamilsdroppingtheirdemand forTamilas an

equal languagewithSinhala and the Sinhaleseagreeingto recognizeTamil
as a minority language,the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact "embodied
one of the fewstatesmanlikecompromisesbetweentwoextremepositions
evertobe attemptedin SriLanka."'0 Sadly,thedevicewasvirulently contested
by the ubiquitoussangha(Buddhistclergy),Sinhalese nationalistsand the
UnitedNationalParty(UNP). Claimingthe Sinhalesewerebeing betrayed,
futureUNP presidentJ. R. Jayewardeneattempteda protestmarch from
Colombo to Kandy.Then UNP leader Dudley Senanayakeproclaimed: "I
am prepared to sacrificemylifeto preventthe implementationof the BC
Agreement,which is a racial division of Ceylon under the guise of the
RegionalCouncils Systemand is an act of treachery.""Such oppositionled
to the B-C Pact being abrogated and greatlycontributed to the 1958
communalriots.12 WhileSenanayakelatersoughtto establisha devolutionary
scheme throughthe 1969 DistrictCouncil Bill and therebyappease Tamil
concerns,thistoo wasscuttledbythesanghaand Sinhalesenationalists.This
timearound,theywere ablyassistedbysectionsof the Muslimpopulation,
the Marxistsand the SLFP. Such contradictory ethnic positioningby the
major political parties when in and out of power to seek the majority
community'ssupportat the minorities'expense soon became a standard
operatingprocedurein Sri Lanka's controldemocracy.
Withno meaningfulchecksto muzzletheinfluential sanghaand Sinhalese
nationalists,Buddhismwas providedspecial statusand statepatronagein
the 1972 constitution. WithBuddhismand Sinhala both affordedsuperior
status,Sri Lanka was now nearerto being an ethnocracythana full-fledged
secular democracy. Such ethnic particularismalso eroded the state's
autonomy.This ensued because a vibrantSinhalese communitylearned to
utilizeelectoralpoliticsdeftlyto demand and dictatestatepoliciesthatwere
sometimescontradictory to the preferencesof the governingauthorities,
leading to outcomes that clearly discriminated and marginalized the
minorities.The resultantparticularism obliviousto minority needs coupled
withtheviolentethnicskirmishes thatperiodicallyensued underminednon-
Sinhalese confidencein the state'sinstitutions, forcingthese minoritiesto
see themselves as subjectto thetyrannyofthemajority. In termsofdemocracy
itself,the ironywas thatSri Lanka's controldemocracywas gettingbeyond
thecontrolofitsgoverningelitesand leading to seriousinstitutional cracks.

10Walter Schwarz, The Tamils of Sri Lanka, 4th rev. ed., MinorityRights Group Report No. 25
(London: MinorityRightsGroup, 1988), p. 7.
11Quoted in CeylonDaily News,12 AuguLst1957 and cited in Ketheswaran Loganathan, Sri Lanka:
LostOpportunities,Studies in ConflictFormation and Resolution (Colombo: Center forPolicyResearch
and Analysis,1996), p. 24.
12 Bandaranaike indisputablysignalled the Pact's abrogation when he "tore up a copy of the pact

in frontof the assembled monks who clapped in joy." Quoted in Swamy,TigersofLanka, p. 12.

59
 PacificAffairs

Discriminationin Education and Employment

The paucityofindustry and agriculturein thenorthernregions,theprestige
and securityof statesectoremployment,and the opportunitytherebyfor
upwardsocial mobilityin a rigidlycastistTamil societyhad spurredmany
northernTamils into seeking governmentalcareers, though significant
numbersalso migratedto themorepopulous Sinhaleseareasas professionals
and traders.Since manysoughtuniversity placement as a steppingstone
into the governmentalapparatus,the Tamils came to be proportionately
overrepresentedin the universities and civilservice.For example,in 1946,
just twoyears prior to independence, the Tamils comprised thirty-three
percentof the elite Ceylon CivilService and fortypercentof theJudicial
Servicedespitebeingonlyelevenpercentofthepopulation.In theuniversity
arena, thirty-one percentof the studentswereTamil."3
GiventhatBritishfavoritism partlycontributed toTamilgains,theforemost
effortsof Sri Lanka's postindependentSinhalese-led governmentswere
geared towardseliminatingsuch disparities.As the governmentalstructure
was devoid of any patron-clientties to the Tamils and the continued
governanceof the Sinhalese eliteswas dependent on the extentto which
statepolicies satisfiedtheirfellowSinhalese,itwaswithinthe interestof Sri
Lanka's politiciansto maximizetheirabilityto deliveron the educational,
economic and other demands of the majoritycommunity'scoalitional
interests.And thiswas partlyachieved by systematically eliminatingTamil
recruitsfromgovernmentalservice.
Sri Lanka's almostninetypercentliteracyrateis testamentto the serious
pursuitof education since independence in 1948. And education being so
significantto the social mobilityof each community, educational decisions
soon concerned the highest authoritiesin the governmentand ethnic
communities. While Sinhalese politicians ensured that educational
opportunities,togetherwithlimitedindustrialresourcesand governmental
positions,were distributedforemostwithintheircommunity,these gains
relativelydeprivedthehithertooverrepresented Tamilsand led thelatterto
suspecta Sinhaleseconspiracyat workto erode theirfuturepossibilitiesfor
upwardmobility.
In theimmediate,postindependenteducationarena,university entrance
was based solelyon merit.Andjust as itwas in the employmentsphere,the
university systemplayed up to the Tamil's advantage.For example, in the
medical and engineeringfieldsTamil representationnumericallyequalled
that of the Sinhalese. When such parityremained unchanged despite
subsequent governmental policies, a weightage systemthat explicitly

13See Chandra Richard de Silva, "Sinhala-Tamil Ethnic Rivalry:The Background," Robert B.

Goldmann and A. JeyaratnamWilson, eds., FromIndependence toStatehood:Managing EthnicConflictin
Five Africanand Asian States(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 116; Schwarz, The TamilsofSri
Lanka, pp. 9-10.

60
 ExplainingEthnicConflict
in SriLanka

discriminatedagainstTamil entrantswas instituted,furthersignifying

Sri
Lanka's controldemocracyto be in highgear.

ResourceAllocationand Colonization
Resource allocation and government-sponsored Sinhalese resettlementin
areas Tamilsconsideredpartof theirtraditionalhomeland were twoother
issues that contributedtowardTamil distrust.In the formercase, state
resourceswere disproportionately allocated in favorof the Sinhalese and
Sinhalese-dominatedareas, withthe governmentat timesgoing out of its
wayto shelveinternationally sponsoreddevelopmentprojectsin Tamilareas.
And the few occasions on which the governmentseriouslyconsidered
irrigationprojectsaffecting theTamil-dominated northand northeastwere
whentheinvestment stood to benefitSinhalesesettlers.14The government's
selectivity,
however,could be viewedas highlyrational,forto develop the
Tamil areas would bring them closer to self-sufficiency and perhaps
inadvertently promotefuturedesignstowardsecession.On the otherhand,
such policies clearlysmacked of discriminationand the Tamilsjustifiably
construeditas yetanothergovernmentalattemptto keep themdependent
on theirethnicnemesis.
In the case of colonization,another major source of grievancefor the
Tamils,largenumbersofSinhalesewereresettledbythegovernment in areas
theTamilssawas theirhistorichomeland.Whileindependentland clearances
by peripateticswiddenfarmerswere once common in these regions,the
clearance and land developmentprojects advocated by Sinhalese elites,
beginningaround themid 1930sbut intensifying afterindependence,were
undoubtedlywell calibratedforfutureLebensraum.Thus as faras Tamils
wereconcerned,theresettlement policieshad twofundamentalaims:First,
to dilute the region's ethnic concentration so that Tamil electoral
representationwas curtailed,and second, to delegitimizeTamil claims
regarding a distinctivegeographical entity.Colonization in disputed
territoriessucceeded so well thatbythe 1960s the governmentcould create
an entirenewdistrict in theeastcomprisingnearlyeightyper centSinhalese.
This Amparaidistrictwas carvedout of the BatticaloadistrictwhereTamils
were a majorityeven at independence.
The resettlement policiesinevitablybecame a politicalthornforsuccessive
Tamilparties.For theSinhalese,however,theappeal ofpeasantresettlement
was engendered by pangs of primordialism,a sense of necessity,their
Buddhist religion,and territorialinsecurities.In the firstinstance, the
Sinhalese pointed towardtheirancient civilizationin the Anuradhapura

"4See Neelan Tiruchelvam, "Ethnicityand Resource Allocation," in FromIndependence toStatehood,

pp. 185-95; Bruce Matthews,"Radical Conflict and the Rationalization of Violence in Sri Lanka,"
vol. 59, no. 2 (Spring 1986), p. 33; Greg Alling,"Economic Liberalization and Separatist
PacoficAffairs,
Nationalism: The Cases of Sri Lanka and Tibet,"JournalofInternational vol. 51, no. 1 (Summer
Affairs,
1997), pp. 127-28.

61
 PacificAffairs

region, in the North Central Province,and claimed ancestral rightsof

occupation,thoughat thebureaucraticlevels,officialsalso referredto high
population densityin the westand south tojustifyDryZone resettlement.
The widespreadbeliefthatSriLankawasSihadipaandDhammadipa, theisland
oftheSinhalesewhowereennobled to preserveand protectBuddhism,also
contributedtowardthe resettlement zeal. Related to all thesejustifications
was-and is-thesecurityconcernentailingthe nearlysixtymillionTamilsin
India's Tamil Nadu statewho act as a potent socioculturalbastionforSri
Lanka's Tamils.This has led to the beliefthat"We [Sinhalese] are carrying
on a strugglefornationalexistenceagainstthe Dravidianmajority" and the
fearthat"If the Tamilsget hold of the country,the Sinhalese willhave to
jump into the sea."15Such a self-imposedminority complex in thismajority
community enabled invidiousnationalistelitesto pushdeftly throughoppor-
tunisticagendasthatvitiatedimpartialinstitutionalism to thecountry's Tamils.
Withno bill of rightsin the Sri Lankan constitutionto alleviateTamil
concerns, with the minorityrightsincorporated into the constitution
guaranteeingnondiscriminatory legislationundermined,and withminority
electoral representation stayingbelow that envisioned at the time of
independence,'6SriLanka nowbecame a veritablecontroldemocracy.This
wasespeciallyevidentin thepost-1970erawhenboththeSriLanka Freedom
Partyand itsallies and the United National Partywere able to garnerlarge
parliamentarymajoritiessufficientto run roughshod over the respective
oppositionwhilefurthermarginalizingthe minority Tamils.That the large
parliamentary majoritiesallowed the SLFP in 1972 and the UNP in 1978 to
ratifytwo constitutions and that they both did so without input or
participationbythe elected Tamilrepresentatives highlightedthe extentto
whichthe Tamilsweremarginalizedin Sri Lanka's controldemocracy.And
though the 1978 constitutionrecognizedTamil as an officiallanguage, it
was seen as too littletoo late bythosealienatedTamilswho had lostfaithin
the country'sinstitutions and begun to mobilize.

Tamil Mobilizationin Reactionto Institutional

Breakdown
thatsmackedof
The politicizationofethnicidentities,a Buddhistrevivalism
Sinhalesechauvinism,and a heightenedTamilconsciousnesshad gradually
mobilizedtheTamilsto clamorthroughoutthe1950sand 1960sfora federal
constitution.InitialTamil mobilizationwas pursued throughreinvigorated
regionalparties,therebyallowingforintracasteand intraclasscleavagesto
be effectivelysubsumed. However, the lack of opportunities at the

15 Michael Roberts, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Sinhalese Perspectives: Barriers to

Accommodation," ModernAsian Studies,vol. 12, no. 3 (July1978), p. 367.

'6AmitaShastri,"Government Policy and the Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka," Michael E. Brown and
Sumit Ganguly,eds., GovernmentPoliciesand EthnicRelationsin Asia and thePacific(Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1997), pp. 137, 139.

62
 ExplainingEthnicConflict
in SriLanka

bureaucratic,commercialand educationalspheresforthehighercasteand
once upper and middle class Tamils soon gave wayto a ratherlarge and
disenchantedlumpen bourgeoisie,makingsecessionseem a necessity.The
dominantand politicallymoderateTamilUnited LiberationFront(TULF)
party'scall in 1976foran independentTamilstateofEelamthus"represented
a shiftfromthe struggleforequalityto an assertionof freedom,fromthe
demand forfundamentalrightsto theassertionofself-determination, from
the acceptance of the pluralisticexperimentto the surfacingof a new
corporateidentity."'17
Eelamgalvanizedmanyextremists and youngTamils,and bytheearly1980s,
numerous groups emerged to fightthe governmentfor secession. The
eventual outcome was that the moderate TULF was superseded by the
LiberationTigersofTamilEelam. But the significanceof thisdevelopment
mustalso be gauged byitstiming.For whileTamilmilitancyhad itsgenesis
in themid 1970sand appeared relatedto unemploymentand thedwindling
numberofTamil studentsin the universities, itwas not untilthe late 1970s
and early1980s thatvariousTamilrebel groupsmobilizedmilitarily against
the government.A contributingfactorto this mobilizationwas the 1979
Preventionof TerrorismAct that allowed the securityforces to arrest,
imprison,and leave incommunicado for eighteen monthswithouttrial
anyone suspectedof unlawfulactivity. the Act led to
Applied retroactively,
thewidespreadtortureand humanrightsabuse ofmanyyoungTamils.That
such abuse occurredat a timewhenthemilitary wasviewedas an occupation
forcein the northonlyexacerbatedthe Tamils' sense of alienation.More
importantand an immediatefactorin Tamil militarymobilizationwas the
1983 riots,whichhighlightedthe breakdownof the country'sinstitutions,
drove thousandsof young Tamils into becoming insurgents,and thereby
galvanizedthe movementthreateningSri Lanka's sovereignty.

The1983 Pogrom
The 1983 riots,spurredby Tamil rebels killingthirteensoldiers,were a
watershedin Sinhalese-Tamilrelations.While the riots correlated to a
extentwiththe economic changes thatensued fromSri Lanka's
significant
post-1977structuraladjustmentreforms,theywere more intensethan the
anti-Tamilriotsof 1977 and 1981. The open marketreformsalloweda large
numberofTamilstoutilizetheirethnicand businessconnectionswithIndians
and become upwardlymobile.Thus ifthe pre-1977era sawSinhalese heavy
and smallindustrialists,shopkeepersand tradersutilizetheirethnicidentity
to procurequotas,licensesand generalaccess to scarceresources,thenthe
open marketreformsallowed the Tamilsto become successfultradersand
industrialistsin their own right.The subsequent prosperitycatapulted

7 Neelan Tiruchelvam,"The Politics of Decentralisation and Devolution: Competing Conceptions

of DistrictDevelopment Councils in Sri Lanka," in FromIndependencetoStatehood, p. 198.

63
 PacificAffairs

previously lumpenTamilgroupsintothemiddleand upper classstratawhile

theirSinhalesecounterparts, unable to competewiththecheap and superior
importsinundatingthe marketplace,became strippedof theirstatusas
"captainsof the industry."'8
Economictransitions createuncertainty, and ethniccohesionis mostlikely
strengthenedamidstsuch uncertainty. This is especiallytrueifone group
articulatesitsgrievancesand relativedeprivationas resultingfromtheaffairs
ofa rivalgroup.Such grievancesthenlead to chauvinismand theracialization
of politics,which is what occurred duringthe 1983 riots.Marx mayhave
rightly claimed thatthe lumpen proletariatlacked class consciousness,but
thatis not to saythe lumpen proletariatcannotbe galvanizedalong ethnic
linesbyusingsuch emotiveissuesas language,religionand culture.Ethnic
rhetoricallowsfordoingjustthis,and itis notcoincidentalthattherelatively
deprivedSinhalesebourgeoisiewas able to utilizethedestabilizingenergies
of the Sinhalese lumpen proletariat in ensuring that the Tamil
entrepreneurialclassesweremore or lesswiped out in the 1983 riots.Thus,
soon afterthe riots,theEconomist could reportthat"Twoweeksago Tamils
owned 60 percentof thewholesaletradeand 80 percentof the retailtrade
in the capital.Today thattradeis gone."19
IfSriLanka'spost-independence policieson language,religion,education,
employment, colonization and resource allocation contributed to
institutionaldecadence, the 1983 riotsmarked the climacticmoment in
institutionalbreakdown. Indeed, the systematicand virulentviolence
unleashed duringthe 1983 riotsmade ita veritablepogrom.IftheSinhalese
lumpen proletariatriotedto loot, then othersled the riotersto ensure the
destructionofTamilgoods and property. In at leastone instancetherioters
wereled bya cabinetministerwhoseonce prosperouspoliticalclientelewas
now marginalized. The political organization against the Tamil
entrepreneurialclasses was especially evident when rioterswere baldly
transportedin government vehiclesand providedwithelectoralregistration
formsto pick theirtargets.In some instancestherioterswereaccompanied
by the supposedly tolerant and nonviolent sangha.20President J. R.
Jayewardenedid not impose an immediatecurfewnor address the nation

18
Newton Gunasinghe, "The Open Market and Its Impact On Ethnic Relations in Sri Lanka," in
SriLanka: TheEthnicConflict: Myths,Realities,and Perspectives,
byCommittee forRational Development
(New Delhi: Navrang, 1984), p. 199.
19"Sri Lanka Puts a Torch to its Future," TheEconomist, 6 August 1983, p. 26.
20S. J. Tambiah, BuddhismBetrayed? Religion,Politics,and Violencein Sri Lanka (Chicago:University
of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 75. Most Sinhalese Buddhists understandablyprotestwhenever the sangha
is portrayedas intolerantand violent,yetsuch a portrayalhardlycontradictsSri Lanka's historiography.
As Jayadeva Uyangoda notes, "Sinhalese Buddhism has made no significantcontribution to the
evolution of a non-violentsocial ideology. On the contrary,the Sinhalese Buddhist historiographical
traditionand ideology inherent in it supports ethnic political violence." See "Militarization,Violent
State, Violent Society: Sri Lanka," Kumar Rupesinghe and Khawar Mumtaz, eds., InternalConflicts in
SouthAsia (London: Sage Publications, 1996), p. 129 (n. 5). See also editorial "Buddhism and Peace"
in Daily News,11 November 1998.

64
 EthnicConflict
Explaining in SriLanka

overradio and televisionuntilthreedaysaftertheriots.When thepresident

foundthecourageto addressthecountry,
finally he spokeagainstseparatism
but evinced"nota syllableof sympathy forthe Tamilpeople or anyexplicit
rejectionof the spiritofvengeance."2And "Aftertwodaysofviolence,and
themurderof35 Tamilsin a maximum-securityjail, theonlyeditorialin the
government-run newspaperwas on 'savingour forestcover'."22About two
weekspriortotheriots,Jayewardene toldtheDailyTelegraph: "I am notworried
abouttheopinionoftheJaffna [Tamil]people....Nowwecan'tthinkofthem.
Not about theirlivesor theiropinions of us."23While it is debatable ifsuch
presidentialinsouciance emboldened the anti-Tamilelementsresponsible
forthe riots,theseindelicatecommentscertainlysignifiedthe institutional
erosion facing the Tamils. Ultimately,the riots exemplified the utter
breakdownof Sri Lanka's institutions.

MajorSourcesofInstitutional Breakdown
While Sri Lanka's politicalelites heavilycontributedtowardsinstitutional
breakdown,the Buddhistclergy,variousSinhalese Buddhistorganizations,
and Sinhalese Buddhistnationalistsmustbear major responsibility forthe
course of events. The sangha and nationalist scholars, for example,
misconstruedand reinventedSinhalese history,folkloreand mythology,
therebypromotingbothSinhalesegrievancesand nationalism.Furthermore,
by positioningthe Buddhistclergyas protectorsof Buddhism (especially
that of the original Therevada sect) and the island of Sri Lanka as the
designatedsanctuary forBuddhismundertheSinhalese,thesegroupscreated
a milieu that demanded Sinhalese ascendancy and dominance. For a
Sinhalese government to eschew these demands was tantamount to
committingpoliticalsuicide.
If "ideas" are incorporatedas an institutionalist
construct,as is common
within the institutionalistresearch paradigm, then such ideational
institutions, as articulated by the Buddhist clergy and nationalist
organizations, werepartofthestandardoperatingproceduresofSriLanka's
postindependent sociopolitical landscape leading to powerfulpolitical
slogans such as "BuddhismBetrayed"and "Sri Lanka for the Sinhalese."
The institutionalbreakdownwas thus legitimated,if not orchestrated,by
utilizingthe resourcesand ideational constructs/influences of Sinhalese
Buddhistorganizations. Embeddedoverdecades, theseinfluencespermeated
to bothstateand privateinstitutions, so muchso thateventheonce impartial
judiciary, the armed forces and private organizations from business
establishments to sportsclubsweresoon enculturatedinto a pro-Sinhalese,
pro-Buddhistmentality.

21 "SriLanka Puts a Torch to its Future" TheEconomist,p. 25.

22Ibd
23Quoted in AlanJ.Bullion, India, S? Lanka and theTamilCrisis1976-1994:An InternationalPerspective
(London: Pinter,1995), p. 31.

65
 PacificAffairs

The institutional breakdownwas moststarkly highlightedbythe security

forces'actionsin the face of the 1983 riots.While the securitypersonnel
had to be encouraged to act duringthe 1977 riotsand were openlyslowto
intervenein the1981riots,theyeitheraided and abettedtheriotersor turned
out to be mere observersin 1983. This was in contrastto the general
discipline,impartiality and professionalism imputedto the forcesand was
particularlyantitheticalto theirconductin the 1950s,whentheywerehighly
regarded amongsteven northernTamils. This high regard extended to
Sinhalese policemen as well. Indeed, "quite often they [the Sinhalese
policemen] were regarded,bysectionsof the Tamils...as impartialarbiters
in conflictswheneverand wherevercaste was a factor."24 Such perceptions
of impartialityand professionalism had disappearedbythe 1960swhen the
police and armycame tobe viewedas partoftheSinhalesevanguarddesigned
to subjugate the Tamils. This perceptionwas tied to the political,social,
economic and religiouscurrentsadverselyimpactingthe Tamilsand was in
turnrootedin thecollectivebreakdownofinstitutions in thefaceofSinhalese
attemptsto maintaina controldemocracy.
As alreadynoted,thedivisivepoliciesalong ethnic,religiousand linguistic
lineswereinitiallypropagatedbypro-Sinhaleseand pro-Buddhist institutions.
While the respectivegovernmentsthemselvesadopted these policies, the
mechanismforcingthemto do so was the governmentalstructureitself.In
an electoratewhere more than eightypercentof parliamentary seatswere
determinedbySinhaleseconstituencies and Sinhalesepoliticiansweredevoid
of patron-clientties to the Tamils,successivegovernmentswere able to
convenientlydisregardlegitimateTamil grievances;on the otherhand, by
being dependent on Sinhalese electoratesforcontinued governance,the
governmentsconcerned had no choice but to pander to the majority
community'sdemands and perpetuateSri Lanka's controldemocracy.In
firstmanipulatingSinhaleseproclivities and thereafteraccommodatingthe
electorate'sdictates,therespectivegovernments achievedspectacularsuccess,
culminatingin a large number of Sinhalese achievingupward social and
economic mobility. But ifthe successof thisSinhalese upwardmobilitywas
effectivelygeneratedthroughthe manipulationof stateinstitutions, then
therelativedeprivationeffectively imposedon theTamilswasin turna gross
failureoftheseveryinstitutions designedtopromoteequalityand impartiality.
Ensuringthe implementationof divisivepolicies in a democraticsociety
also meantcontrollingand emasculatingthejudiciary. The 1972 constitution
grantedthelegislaturepoweroverthejudiciaryand thisled thegovernment
to coerce or dismiss certainjustices and promote those supportiveof
governmentalpolicies. Such controland coercionwere especiallyrampant
during the post-1977UNP era whenjustices ruling against government

24K M. de Silva,"The Police and Armed Services,"K. M. de Silva,ed., SriLanka: Problems

ofGovernance
(New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1993), p. 362.

66
 ExplainingEthnicConflict
in SriLanka

preferences,ethnicand otherwise,had to fend offstate-sponsoredunion

membersinveighing threatsoutsidetheirofficesand homes.Ifsuchpractices
were undemocratic,theywere neverthelessconsidered essential for the
government'slegitimacyin the eyesof the majority. But theveryrationality
justifyingsuch actions encouraged a milieu that in turn promoted an
institutional
culturenegatingminority a hostofinstitutions,
rights.Ultimately,
bothgovernmental and private,acted in unisonto dismantletheadvantages
accrued to the Tamils. If the pre-1977 era saw the governmentand its
patronagenetworksresortto thisdismantlingsystematically, thenthe post-
1977 era saw the relatively
deprivedSinhalese lumpen classesconnivewith
governmentalforcesto strikeat the Tamils.The upshot of all thiswas the
Tamilinsurgencyseekingsecession.

Restructuring A Last Hope?

Institutions:
The ethnicscapegoatingand ethnicparticularism unleashed bySriLanka's
control democracy and the resultantinstitutionaldecay that radically
marginalizedthe Tamil communityare responsiblefor the currentbleak
impasse. The troubling continuation of ethnic scapegoating, ethnic
particularism and institutional decay coupled with the increasingly
prosperous Tamil diaspora's support forEelam,the LTTE's tenacityand
extremistSinhalesepoliticsguaranteesa drawn-outconflict.Yet,anylasting
solution to the ethnic conflict will need to be preceded by a major
restructuringof the country'sinstitutions.

Devolution:A ViableAlternative
The governingPeople's Alliance party'sattemptsat devolutionmarksthe
mostseriouseffortmade so farto accommodateminority grievancesin Sri
Lanka. The devolution process, should it succeed, would grant more
autonomyto theregionson mattersrangingfrompolicingto development,
thusinstitutinga cleardivisionofpowersbetweentheregionsand theCenter.
Regionalinstitutions, byemployingpredominantly regionalpersonnel,will
limit,ifnot end, Tamilcomplaintsthattheyare dominatedand subjugated
in theirown homeland bytransplantedSinhalese governmentofficials.
Devolutionwould,mostimportantly, transform a politicalstructurethat
has thus fareffectively marginalizedthe Tamils both constitutionally and
Tamilsin thepostindependenceera havevotedalmostexclusively
electorally.
forethnicand regionalparties,makingTamilparliamentary representation
in a first-past-the-post
electoralsystemrarelysignificantenough to garner
politicalclout or impactthe electoralverdict.Otherwisenoted, it was the
Sinhalese electoratesthat determinedwhich partygoverned. The 1978
constitution,however,introducedproportionalrepresentationallowingfor
thepossibility
ofincreasedTamilrepresentation in parliament.It also reduced
the chances of landslidevictoriesby the twomajor partiesand eradicated

67
 PacificAffairs

disparitiesbetweenthe percentageofvotesa partypolled and the number

ofparliamentary seatswon.Furthermore, theelectionforpresidentallowed
votersto pick candidatesas theirsecond or thirdpreference,whichis then
consideredifno candidatereceivedmore than50 percentof thevote.The
latterespeciallymakes Tamil votes as importantas Sinhalese ones. While
such constitutionaland electoralengineeringwas partlygeared to increase
minority influence,therebels' separatistchallengecoupled withthealmost
dictatorialpresidentialpowersenshrinedin the new constitutionhave thus
far led to more anomie than equalityfor the Tamils.25A reversalof this
outcome mayyetbe possiblewithina federaliststructurethatmaintained
the currentelectoralsystem.26
Those againstfederalismor a similarformofdevolutionare ideologically,
the same forcesthatopposed ethnicaccommodation
ifnot institutionally,
in the 1950sand 1960s.A tactfulapproachon theirpartmighthaveachieved
a credible power-sharing arrangementbetweenthe Sinhalese and Tamils,
therebycaulkingtheinstitutional cracksthathave nowexpanded intoa gulf
of grievances.The ironyis thattheseforcescontinueto clamoragainstthe
verymechanismsthatprovidetheonlyviablealternative to maintainingtheir
cherishedgoal-a unitedSriLanka.Britain'sdevolutionprogramforScotland,
Walesand NorthernIrelandand Spain's autonomypackage fortheBasques
signify how rupturedethnicrelationsand institutions maybe mended. It is
significantthat with the Basque countryallowingjurisdiction over its
language,taxes,police and parliament,the influenceof Basque separatists
isnowon thewane.The institutional breakdownand thesubsequentsuffering
unleashed on the Tamils,however,is more severethanthatexperiencedin
the Basque countryand Britain.That is all the more reason forSri Lanka's
present politicians to work seriously towards restructuringthe state's
governingmechanisms.
Increasedautonomyviadevolution,whilenota panacea, maynevertheless
affordthe necessary political and psychological palliative to reinstate
confidencein the currently discreditedinstitutional
structureand thereby
erode the Tamil quest forEelam.The case of India, withitsethnolinguistic

25
Despite being institutedin 1978, the constitution'selectoral provisionswere not tried out until
the October 1982 presidential election. And rather than hold new parliamentaryelections, which
would have compromised the ruling party'sover two-thirdmajority,the United National Partyheld a
referendum and thereby extended parliament's duration for another term. Thus, parliamentary
elections under the 1978 constitutionwere not conducted until February 1989. By then, Sri Lanka
had regressed into one of the most politicallyunstable countries in the world.
26 One may argue as to whether all regions should enjoy similarpowers or if the Tamils should be

provided with preferentialpowers due to their ethnoregional status. It may be that asymmetrical
devolution, as would be the case among the Scots, Northern Irish and Welsh after the May 1999
elections, would generate Sinhalese opposition and hostility.Symmetricaldevolution, on the other
hand, would not only provide equal power to the regions but furtherallow Sinhalese nationalists a
face-savingexit.The firststep,however,would be forall partiesto agree on the necessityfordevolution.
Devoid of such political consensus, it is premature to engage the issue of symmetricalvs. asymmetrical
devolution.

68
 Explaining Ethnic Conflictin Sri Lanka

demarcations, provides a salient example of such a structure.Robert

Hardgravehas arguedthatsuchethnolinguistic "Federalismprovidesa venue,
howeverflawed,forexpressionsofculturaldistinctiveness, but italso serves
to compartmentalize friction."27
Though hardlyas ethnicallyheterogeneous
as India,SriLanka mayfindthatsuchan arrangement betweentheSinhalese
and Tamilscould providetheonlychance forpeacefulcoexistence.Indeed,
there is some evidence to suggestthat federalism,despite perpetuating
minoritygroups' statusas minoritiesat the federallevel,maybe the only
solutionwhenevera stateharborsregionallyconcentratedethnic groups.
This is partlybecause "federalism deflects hostilityfrom the central
governmentbycreatingnew politicalinstitutions and politicalcompetition
at the local level."28In Sri Lanka's case, the onlyalternativesto federalism
maybe military occupation and the attendantsubjugationof Tamilsin the
northand east,or continuingthecurrentdestructive warfarewithnumerous
innocentcivilians-especially Tamilcivilians-facing thebruntofthecarnage.29
Neither,however,affordsa solutionto the currentethnicimbroglio.
This also means a militarysolution has limitedutility, as was painfully
evident during Operation Jayasikuru (VictoryAssured). The Jayasikuru
campaign,initiatedin May 1997,was designed to open a land route to the
Jaffnapeninsula. Originallyset to be completedwithinabout six months,
theoperationwascalled offaftereighteenmonthsofcostlyfighting. Besides
politicallyweakeningthe governmentand embarrassingthe military, the
conflictclearlyproved the LTTE's militarycapabilitiesand whya political
settlementis a sine qua non. But apart fromrestructuring and rebuilding
confidencein the country'sinstitutions, it is possible an ultimatepolitical
settlementmayalso require thirdpartyintervention.Given the degree of
distrustbetween Sinhalese and Tamils,it is indeed hard to envisionany
settlementwithouta significant thirdpartyactingas a guarantor.

The PlausibilityofThirdPartyIntervention
BarbaraWalterclaims thatthe record of civilwarsbetween1940-90shows
that,shortof complete militaryvictory, both robustinstitutions
and third
partyinvolvement werevitalforthesuccessfulresolutionofconflict.
AsWalter
notes,askingcombatantsto "demobilize,disarm,and disengagetheirmilitary
forces...[when] civilwar adversariescannot crediblypromise to abide by
such dangerousterms"is bound to reach a dead end. On the otherhand,
"only when an outside enforcer steps in to guarantee the terms do

27RobertL. HardgraveJr.,"India: The Dilemmas ofDiversity," LarryDiamond and Marc F. Plattner,

eds., Nationalism,
EthnicConflict, and Democracy(Baltimore:JohnHopkins UniversityPress, 1994), p. 72.
28AliciaLevine, "Political Accommodation and the Prevention of Secessionist Violence," Michael
E. Brown, ed., TheInternational DimensionsofInternalConflict(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 331.
29 For a disturbing account along these lines, see Daya Somasundaram, ScarredMinds: The
PsychologicalImpactofWaron SriLankan Tamils(New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998).

69
 PacificAffairs

commitments to disarmand sharepoliticalpowerbecome believable."30 The

significanceof thirdpartiesis furtherevidentgiventhatbetween1945-1993
only fourteenout of fifty-seven internal conflictswere settled through
negotiation.
Accordingto Walter,thirdpartycredibilitycan be maintainedand the
resolutionof conflictencouraged providedthreeconditionsare fulfilled:

(i) The respective hasa self-interest

thirdparty in theconflict.
(ii) It possessessufficient capabilities
military and iswilling
toresortto
forceifnecessary.
(iii) The thirdparty
can signalresolve.32

India's geographicalproximity, itsconcernforstability in the region,its

militarycapabilities,its disinclinationto see a separate Tamil state in Sri
Lanka (as thatcould potentiallylead to calls fora Dravida Desam-a Tamil
state-insouthIndia) butitsinterestnevertheless in ensuringthatSriLankan
Tamil discontentdoes not spill over to Tamil Nadu all make it an ideal,
albeitunrealistic,thirdpartycandidate.Anythirdpartyinvolvement would
firstrequirethecombatants'consentand be preceded bya cease-fire.Given
the factthatLTTE leader VelupillaiPrabhakaranis among thosesoughtby
the Indian governmentforplanningRajivGandhi's murder,the rebelsare
unlikelyto agree to Indian involvement-unless perhapsthe Indians do the
unthinkableand drop the charges againstPrabhakaranand other LTTE
cadresaccused ofGandhi'smurder.On theotherhand,giventhatSinhalese
nationalistsview fightingthe known LTTE devil more attractivethan
collaboratingwitha lesserknownIndian guardianangel, consentfromthe
SriLankan government forIndian involvement isunlikelyto be forthcoming
as well.Indeed, ifthe oppositionto the Indian PeacekeepingForce (IPKF)
followingthe 1987 Indo-LankaPeace Accordswas a valid gauge, then the
majorityof Sinhalese are unlikely to tolerate another Indian military
deployment.Memories of IPKF atrocitiesagainst the Tamilswould likely

30Barbara F. Walter,"The Critical Barrier to CivilWar Settlement,"InternationalOrganization, vol.

51, no.3 (Summer 1997), p. 336. Also see BarryR. Posen, "The SecurityDilemma and Ethnic Conflict,"
Michael E. Brown,ed., EthnicConflict and InternationalSecurity(Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress,
1993), pp. 103-24; David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and
Management of Ethic Conflict,"InternationalSecurity, vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 70-74.
Roy Licklider,"The Consequences of Negotiated Settlementsin CivilWars,1945-1993,"American
PoliticalScienceReview,vol. 89, no. 3 (September 1995), p. 684. The evidence does suggest that a
recrudescence of conflict is less likelywhen conflict resolution is determined by one partybeing
militarilyvictorious rather than by a negotiated settlement.But Sri Lanka's inabilityto defeat the
LTTE over nearly two decades of fightingand the latter's dedication to the separatist cause, amply
exemplifiedbyitscyanide capsule-carryingsuicide cadre, question the likelihood of a militarysolution
being in the offingand therebyjustifya negotiated settlement.See ibid., pp. 681-90. See also R.
Harrison Wagner, "The Causes of Peace," Roy Licklider,ed.,StoppingtheKilling(New York: New York
UniversityPress, 1993), pp. 235-68.
32Walter,"The Critical Barrier,"pp. 340-41.

70
 ExplainingEthnic Conflictin Sri Lanka

cause thatcommunityto oppose a similarIndian presence too. And given

the soul-searchingthe Indian militarywas forcedto undergosubsequentto
the IPKF debacle, now referredto as "India's Vietnam,"it is debatable if
even the Indian governmentwill favorredeployment.Indian regional
sensitivities
further precludeanyotherSouthAsianforceactingas guarantor.
Should thirdpartyinvolvementbecome necessary,a United Nations
peacekeeping force may prove to be the most noncontroversial. An
interestingstudyfindsthatwhile UN peacekeepers are more likelyto be
deployed when internal conflicts spread across sovereign borders,
peacekeepingmissionsare more successfulwhen deployedwithina state.33
This finding,combined with the fact that the UN prefers to deploy
peacekeepers afterconsultingwithstates,that it operates by recognizing
extant demarcations,and that thirdparties militarilyand economically
"weighingin" on the side of governmentsrather than the respective
opposition-and the UN may sometimesqualifyin thisregard as well-are
three timesmore likelyto intervenesuccessfully,34 togethersuggeststhat
UN involvementin Sri Lanka's conflictshould not be precluded.Yet,such
interventionbytheUN or anyothergroupmustbe precededbyrestructured
and reinvigorated at themilitary,
institutions political,social and economic
levelsso thatSri Lanka's Tamilsfeel confidenttheycould coexistin a new
milieu as primusinterparesratherthan in a control structurewhere the
Sinhalesecontinueto be primussolus.The jingoisticrhetoricaccompanying
the debate on devolutionunfortunately suggeststhatpowerfulsegments
withinthe Sinhalese communityare determinedto perpetuatethe latter.

Overcoming
Major Difculties
To saythe majorityof Sri Lankans now favorsome formof devolutionmay
notbe farfromthetruth. Yet,anydevolutionproposalfacesheavyopposition
fromsome withinthe sanghaand Sinhalese/Buddhistinstitutions such as
the National Sangha Council, All Ceylon Buddhist Congress, National
MovementAgainstTerrorismand theSinhala Commission.justas the 1950s
BuddhistCommissionwas influentialin highlightingSinhalese/Buddhist
grievancesandjustifyingtheSinhala OnlyBill,it appears theseinstitutions,
withtheiragitpropreiteratingcolonial grievances,seek tojustify
a Sinhalese
ethnocracy.
Though Buddhism'suniversalistic message historically discouragedthe
sanghafrompoliticalactivism,SriLanka's twentieth-century bhikkus(monks)
33Chantal dejonge Oudraat, "The United Nations and Internal Conflict,"Michael E. Brown,ed.,
TlheInternationalDimensionsofInternalConflict(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), p. 525.The deployment
of any outside force will most likely generate stiffopposition from Sinhalese nationalists, though
currently,despite nearly a dozen offersfrom friendlycountries and organizations, the Sri Lankan
governmentis also against any formof thirdpartyintervention.
34Withregard to thissuccess rate forthirdparties,see PatrickM. Regan, "Conditions of Successful
Third-PartyIntervention in Intrastate Conflicts,"Journalof ConflictResolution,vol. 40, no. 2 (June
1996), p. 353.

71
 PacificAffairs

provedto be consummatenationalists. And whileone mayjustify organized

Buddhism fighting against immorality, injustice, corruption and
unrighteousness, thesangha'srecentperpetuationofa Sinhaleseethnocracy
is perhaps the biggestobstacle facingthe government'sdevolutionplans.
Withthe sanghadividedboth withinand betweentheirrespectivenikayas
(sects), it is plausible that a significantnumber of bhikkus favorethnic
compromise.But the sulphurousvoices dominatingthe devolutiondebate
currently belong to thenationalistfactions,whoseleadershavevowednever
to supportdevolution.Indeed, some leadingmonkshave threateneda door-
to-doorcampaignagainstanyformofdevolution.Yet,SriLanka's politicians
continueto genuflectslavishly beforethemas theseBuddhistleaderswield
enormousinfluence.The militantsectionsof the sanghaand the Sinhalese
nationaliststhus pose a powerfulobstacle to a futuresystemof ethnic
impartiality, and marginalizingtheir egregious influencewill inevitably
require the major politicalpartiesto adopt a common platformof ideas,
ideals and actions.
At the currentstage,however,the United National Partycontributesto
the devolution logjam by continuingwith the opposition's traditional,
scapegoatingrole. It vilifiedthe People Alliance government'sdevolution
proposalsonlyto table itsownplans thatpartlycall forcentralgovernment
capacity to dissolve Regional Councils with merely 50 percent of
parliamentary votes.As anypartyneeds a majority(at least one vote more
than 50 percent) to govern,the UNP proposal would allow any Sinhalese
centralgovernmentto dissolvethe regional apparatusat will.The UNP is
perhapsinfluencedin itsdesignsbyIndia'sPresident'sRule provision(Article
356 in the Indian Constitution),which allows the centralgovernmentto
invokea constitutional emergencyand therebydismissanystategovernment.
ButArticle356 is also one of themostabused powers.Employednearly110
times,it has caused seriousstrainbetweenthe Indian Centralgovernment
and the constituentstates comprisingthe Indian Union.35Any similar
mechanism applied to Sri Lanka would only add fodder to the already
pervasiveTamil distrustof the Sinhalese.
The UNP positionwouldallowforan inquirypriorto dissolvinga Regional
Counciland also enable sucha decisiontobe challengedthroughthecourts.
But the intimidationand manipulationof the courtsbyrecentSri Lankan
leadersmakesuchchecksmeaningless.A betterarrangement wouldperhaps
be to increasethe parliamentary thresholdnecessaryto dismissa Regional
Council whilealso guaranteeingthatsuch a course could onlybe pursued
throughmultiparty involvement.This would at least preventa singleparty
fromrunningroughshod over minorityRegional Councils. At its best, it
may allow astutepoliticiansto cooperate withina federalstructurewhile
marginalizingthe Sinhalese and Tamilextremists.
35K, Gopalakrishnan, "Federal Rule in States Considered Violation of Constitution,"India Abroad,
9 October 1998, pp. 2-3.

72
 in SriLanka
ExplainingEthnicConflict

Ultimately,whatever the form of devolution achieved, it should

incorporatetwo fundamentalfeatures:(i) It should make it structurally
impossibleforanypoliticalpartysingularly and summarily todismissregional
governmentswithoutsupportfromopposition parties,thus ensuringany
such drasticactionmayonlybe initiatedifthe country'snationalsecurityis
threatened.(ii) It should guarantee the self-determination of the Tamils,
providingautonomyin the areas of development,taxation,policing and
local government.While the fearsthatdevolutionand self-determination
mayeventually lead to theisland'sdismemberment are understandable,they
are mostlyexaggerated.Indeed, there is no causal relationshipbetween
devolutionand secession.On thecontrary, whatthecausalarrowdoes suggest
is that whenever majority groups in polyethnic societies eschewed
conciliation,accommodationand compromise,then states,immaterialof
constitutionalstructuresand electoral systems,were likelyto experience
separatistmovements.Dismembermentis thus likelyto occur only if the
devolutionary agreementis not"honestly applied."Consequently, "autonomy
and federationare bettersolutions than usually considered, if theyare
honestlyapplied and carefullytended."36
Presently,all leading Tamil parties,withthe exceptionof the LTTE, are
moderateand are committedtowardscoexistingwiththe Sinhalese. Their
positionis partlydictatedby the factthata vastnumber of Tamils earn a
livelihoodin Sinhaleseareas and therealizationthatthedismemberment of
an island the size ofWestVirginiawould provemilitarily and economically
untenable.A new constitutionalorder providingrestructuredinstitutions
withcredibleimpartiality autonomyat
at the nationallevel and significant
the provinciallevel should thereforesufficeto satisfythe vastmajorityof
Tamilsand maintaina unitedSri Lanka.
The UNP's currentposition,however,is symptomatic offourdecades of
oppositiongrandstandingthroughwhichSri Lanka's leaders fromS. W. R.
D. Bandaranaike to J. R. Jayewardene(and everyonein-between)have
stooped to ethnic legerdemainin tryingto attainpower.In a real sense,
theseleadersfailedwhereitmatteredmostas theirpatriotismevanescedin
the face of political opportunism.And the control democracy and its
attendantinstitutionalbreakdown theybrought about in the process is
responsibleforthe casusbelliand itssubsequentinsensateviolence.Michael
Brownhas noted that"Althoughmanyinternalconflictsare triggeredby
internal,mass-levelfactors,thevastmajorityare triggeredbyinternalelite-
level factors.In short,bad leaders are the biggestproblem."37 Indeed, one
would be hard-pressedto come up withas bad a crop ofleaders,as signified

36 . William Zartman, "Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again," David Lake and Donald

Rothchild, eds., The InternationalSpread ofEthnic Conflict:Fear,Diffusion,and Escalation (Princeton:

Princeton UniversityPress, 1998), p. 324.
37 Michael E. Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions," in The International Dimensionsof
InternalConflict,p. 575.

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 PacificAffairs

by theirstand on ethnic issues,than has been foistedon Sri Lanka.38Sri

Lanka's President,ChandrikaKumaratunga,is thuscorrectto note that"It
is the powercrazypoliticiansthathas [sic] put the countryin the present
turmoil."39Butwiththeiroppositionto anydevolutionproposal,thesangha,
Sinhalese nationalistsand the nouveau"powercrazypoliticians,"including
some in Kumaratunga'sown government, onlyperpetuatethe institutional
decaybegun bytheirilkfourdecades ago.
The civilwarhas onlyexacerbatedinstitutional decadence. This is most
starklyevidentin the armed forces' gross human rightsabuses and the
government'slack of politicalwillto investigatesuch abuses (i.e., the mass
gravesin Chemmani,whereover400 Tamilsare believedto be buried,and
thealleged rape and tortureofcivilians).The indiscriminateharassmentof
Tamils,especiallyin the northand east,stemmingfromthe securityforces'
frequentinabilityto differentiatebetween rebels, rebel supportersand
innocentcivilians,further vitiateTamilconfidencein thestate'sinstitutions.
CombinedwiththeheightenedracismfacingTamils,due mainlyto thealmost
palpable cultureofsuspicionand distrust stemmingfromtheLTTE's deadly
suicide bombings,the good willand politicalcapital necessaryto recreate
thatwould guaranteea unitedSri
the requisitecivilsocietyand institutions
Lanka continueto be eroded.

Conclusion
Despite theirutilitywithinspecificcontexts,theoriescenteredon religion,
colonialism, and class and caste cleavages are limited in providing an
overarchingexplanationforSriLanka's ethnicconflict.On theotherhand,
theframework consideredhere notonlyaccountsforthegradualerosionof
ethnicrelationsbetweenthe Sinhalese and Tamilsbut also providescauses
for the conflict'sintractablenature, and furthercalls attentionto the
institutionalrestructuringnecessaryforplausible conflictresolution.The
difficultyin reachinga settlement,however,signifiesthatinstitutionsare
easierto breakdownthanbuild up, thatpromotingethnicaccommodation
may thereforebe a better long-termalternativeto employing control
mechanisms, and that restoringethnic peace can often be costlyand
frustratinglyevanescent.Especiallyin lightof Sri Lanka's currentfriendly
relationswithIndia, whichwas vilifiedduringthe IPKF's presence in the
latter1980s,the seventeen-year old civilwar also supportsthe notion that
interstateconflictsare more easilyresolvedthanintrastateconflicts.
The LTTE, despite alienating the veryTamil populace it claims to

38The paeans, panegyrics and hagiographies manufactured in the Sri Lankan media when
celebrating these leaders' birthand death anniversaries,however,blatantlybelie this.
39 Quoted in Shanika Sriyananda,"PresidentHopes PA-UNP AgreementWillAchieve the Beautiful
Dream," Sunday Observer, 13 April 1997.

74
 ExplainingEthnicConflict
in SriLanka

represent,continuesto battlethe Sri Lankan securityforces.While itsloss

ofJaffnato governmentforces in December 1995 initiatedsome major
territorialsetbacks,the LTTE neverthelessremainsa dedicated and potent
guerrillaforcethatwillcontinueto inflictsteadyand demoralizingcasualties
on the Sri Lankan masses and securityforces.Its successfulassaulton the
Mullaitivuarmycamp,killingovertwelvehundredsoldiersinJuly1996,and
the similarassaulton Killinochchiin September1998, killingoveranother
seventeenhundredsoldiers,40 is testamentto itsfighting prowess.
The LTTE was proscribedby the governmentsoon afterthe Temple
bombing.Yet,anypermanentsettlementto Sri Lanka's costlyconflictwill
require its imprimatur. Through intimidationand assassinationof public
theLTTE signalsitsstrongoppositionto anyentity-moderate
officials, Tamil
politicalpartiesand/orSriLankan forces-legitimating in
politicalauthority
the northand north-east.The assassinationof twoJaffnamayorswithina
span of fourmonthsin 1998 markthe starkestrecentexamples. Even the
Tamil United LiberationFrontand other moderate and pro-government
Tamilparties,despitetheirinterparty divisions,have called fortalkswiththe
rebels,thoughit is possible an ultimatesettlementmaymake the LTTE a
majorregionalplayerat theexpense oftheseTamilmoderates.Ifso, itis the
price thesemoderateswould need to be readyto payforthe largergoal of
attainingpeacefulcoexistence.
In the main, however,peaceful coexistencewill be determinedby Sri
Lanka's majoritycommunityand itspoliticalrepresentatives. In thatsense,
thegreatestconfidence-building measurewouldbe a devolutionary structure
thatguaranteesand promotesall Tamilaspirationswithina unitedSriLanka.
The government'sobduracyin promotingand expandingthewarin Tamil
areas thusnot onlysends a negativesignalbut also highlightsa worrisome
disregardtowardtheplightofTamilcivilians. Warrequiresatleasttwoparties,
and the LTTE is indisputablycomplicitin perpetuatingSri Lanka's agony.
Yet, despite being portrayedas an organizationbrainwashedinto blindly
itsleader'sdictates,itmaybe hardtofaulttheLTTE's determination
fulfilling
to fighton, giventhatevenmoderateTamilsfeelfrustrated and betrayedby
successiveSri Lankan governments'numerous broken promisesand the
inabilityof the country'sdominantpoliticalpartiesto reach a consensuson
a credibledevolutionproposal. Such a proposal supportedbythe majority
ofSriLankansand all majorpoliticalpartieswillnot onlygain international
supportbut also endear the governmentto thewar-weary northernTamils.
A proposalthatalso accommodatedtheLTTE mayforcethegroupseriously
to moderate its views or face becoming utter pariahs within its own
community.But Sri Lanka's politicians,especiallythose belonging to the
majorparties,firstneed unitedlyto eradicatethe extantcontroldemocracy

40The number killed in the Killinochchi battlevaries.The figureadopted here is fromSugeeswara

Senadhira, "SecurityCouncil ReviewsWar Stalemate," India Abroad,6 November 1998, p. 20.

75
 Paci'icAffairs

and instead commit towardsan equal opportunitystructureforall communal

groups, thereby signalling the requisite resolve to follow through in
rebuilding the country's institutions. The commitment should never be
consigned to rhetoric but translated into concrete political, economic and
social results.Doing so, however,would demand of today'spoliticians a caliber
of leadership that eluded their bright but unprincipled political forebears.
The failure to muster such courage would only exacerbate the country's
agony and perhaps destroythe last viable chance of maintaining a united Sri
Lanka in which all communal groups voluntarilycoalesced.

ofTexas,Austin,U.S.A.,March1999
University

Sri Lankan
Tamil Nationalism
ItsOriginsand Developmentin
theNineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries
A.Jeyaratnam
Wilson
- l Thisbook offersa concisehistoryoftheSriLankan
Tamilnation,itsculture,socialmake-up,and poli-
ticalevolution.The author'sanalysisis based on
raw> m Kr > > $knowledge
first-hand E E , I and personalcontactwith
I manyoftheindividualsinvolved.In a finalchapter,
tAJ.V.Chandrakanthan describeslifeand attitudes
outsidetheembattledTamilareastoday.

osi Intyour orfrom

bookstore Raincoast
Books
Tel:1-800-561-8583;
Fax:1-800-565-3770
204pp,hc$75.00 E-mail:
custserv@raincoast.com
pb$27.95(May2000) wwwubcpress.ubc.ca

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