Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000 CIRILO R.

VALLES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents. DECISION PURISIMA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus: "A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding. On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship".1 In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54. The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336. On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:

"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present petition follows as a matter of course. xxx xxx xxx

"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition. SO ORDERED."2 Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999. Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No. 9254 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor. Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that: a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988; b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988. Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office. As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that

the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded. Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,3 that: "xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. xxx" The petition is unmeritorious. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as: SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours) The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides: SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United

States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours) Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 19734 and 19875 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondents application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship: (1) By naturalization in a foreign country; (2) By express renunciation of citizenship; (3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more; (4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country; (5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; (6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and (7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality. In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC6 and in the more recent case ofMercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.7

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.8 As held by this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well. Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water. Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states: "SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: xxx xxx Again, petitioners contention is untenable. In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.9Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced: "xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification." Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect xxx xxx xxx xxx

Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.10 The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.11 This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship. Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water. Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.12 He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew. Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,13 an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court. Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler.14 Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED. Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999 ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows: Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853 Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894 Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1 The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said: What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship. The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected? Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position. WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City. On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner. On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent. The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read: As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727). WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of candidacy. We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections. ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City. Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati. This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that [T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he: 1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and, 2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;

Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered. The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship. This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City. II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati. We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted. I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention: Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding. xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment." The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in several cases, 7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8 Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office." To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) soli; Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows: 10 . . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all. What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council. When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources. Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest. And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW. In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11 . . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these

naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship? Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12 By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13 SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship. On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position? SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships. SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world. SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen. SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship." SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic. SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification. This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held: [W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic. III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR. 11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17 It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship." On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government. These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse. There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age. Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar: . . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national. Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority. In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath: 6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN xxx xxx xxx

renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied." To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [B.M. No. 914. October 1, 1999] RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR VICENTE D. CHING, applicant. RESOLUTION KAPUNAN, J.: Jksm Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching. The facts of this case are as follows: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents: 1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant; 2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao, La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and 3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth E. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections. On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship. The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship"1 [Citing Cu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 89 Phil. 473, 476 (1951)] in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that (w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority."2 [Citing CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1991 Ed. p 359.] In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made 'upon reaching the age of majority."3 [Citing Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 5 SCRA 108, 110 (1962)] The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:" Chiefx

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time. In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states: 1.......I have always considered myself as a Filipino; 2.......I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and other official document; 3.......I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens; 4.......I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote; 5.......I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995; 6.......I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625; 7.......My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public; 8.......I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines; 9.......I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and 10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps 10.00) as filing fees. Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination. When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.4 [Sec. 1. Art IV of the 1935 Constitution reads: Esm Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office; (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippine; (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines, and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship; (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.] This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines.5 [Sec. 1(1), Article III, 1973 Constitution.] Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.6 [Sec 1(3), Article IV, 1987 Constitution.] It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution.7 [BERNAS The constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, First Ed. (1987), p. 502.] If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.8 [Ibid., citing Convention Session of November 27,1972 and noting that it is also applicable to the 1987 constitution.] C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." Esmsc However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.9 [Art. 402. Civil Code.] In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority.10 [Lim Teco vs. Collector of Customs, 24 SCRA 84, 88 (1912)] The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.11 [Muoz vs. Collector of Customs, 20 SCRA 494, 498 (1911); Lorenzo vs. Collector of Customs, 15 SCRA 559 592 (1910)] However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,12 [5 SCRA 108 (1962)] that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said: It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.13 [Id., at 110.] However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite: Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16,1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over

seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority."14 [Id.] In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare,15 [59 SCRA 45 (1974)] the pertinent portion of which reads: And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he cane of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship.16 [Id., at 52.] Esmmis Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated: Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.17 [Id.] The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,18 [199 SCRA 692 (1991)] where we held: We have jurisprudence that defines 'election' as both a formal and an informal process. In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court we held: "Esteban s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship" (p. 52: emphasis supplied)" The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule. Esmso xxx The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons. An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21). We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have bean superfluous but would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?19 [Id at 707-709 (Underscoring Supplied)] The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines, all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.20 [Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA 364, 379 (1989)] One who privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar. Msesm SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001] ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents. DECISION KAPUNAN, J.: The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen."[1] Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2] On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads: Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: xxx (4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present: (a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or (b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x. Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House

of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.[4] On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.[6] Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds: 1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part. 2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship. 3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.[7] The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship. Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen. The petition is without merit. The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; (3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8] There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.[9] As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."[10]

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications[12] and none of the disqualifications[13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.[14] Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15] Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications[17] and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18] Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;[20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23] As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held: xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original.][25] Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides: Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to

have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows: Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship. Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship. The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 132244 September 14, 1999 GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. VITUG, J.: The instant petition for review under Rule 45 assails the orders, dated 22 September 1997 and 29 December 1997, issued by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Marikina City in Case No. N-96-03-MK, entitled "in the Matter of the Petition of Gerardo Angat y Legaspi to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, and Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 965 and 263[0]." Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by naturalization in the United States of America. Now residing at No. 69 New York Street, Provident Village, Marikina City, Angat filed on 11 March 1996 before the RTC of Marikina City, Branch 272, a petition to regain his Status as a citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, Republic Act No. 965 and Republic Act No. 2630 (docketed as N-96-03-MK). In his petition, "applying for naturalization," he averred that FIRST. His full name is GERARDO LEGASPI ANGAT. Copy of his latest picture is hereto attached and made an integral part of this petition. SECOND. His present place of residence is #69 New York St., Provident Village, Marikina, Metro Manila and his former residence was in Las Vegas, U.S.1wphi1.nt THIRD. His trade or profession is in buy and sell and managing the properties of his parents which he has been engaged since his arrival here in the Philippines. FOURTH. He was born on the 22nd day of June 1954 at Tondo, Manila. He was formerly a citizen of the Philippines. He lost his Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. He is at present a citizen or subject of the United States of America. Copy of his birth certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A." FIFTH. He is newly married to Zenaida Lim who was born in Tondo, Manila and now resides at petitioner's residence at Marikina, Metro Manila. Copy of their marriage contract is hereto attached as Annex "B." SIXTH. He returned to the Philippines from the United States of America in 1991. Copy of his alien registration is hereto attached as Annex "C." SEVENTH. He has the qualifications required by Commonwealth Act No. 63 as amended, and Republic Act Nos. 965 and 2639 to reacquire Philippine citizenship, and possesses none of the disqualification prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 473. He has resided in the Philippines at least six months immediately preceding the date of this petition, to wit: since 1991. He has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. EIGHT. He is not opposed to an organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government. He is not defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance of men's ideas. He is not a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy. He has not been convicted of any crime

involving moral turpitude. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. The nation of which he is a citizen or subject is not at war with the Philippines. NINTH. It is his intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, and particularly to the United State of America to which at this time he is a citizen. 1 On 30 April 1996, the trial court, through the branch clerk of court, issued a notice setting the case for initial hearing on 27 January 1997 2 which, along with the petition and its annexes, was received by the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG") on 10 May 1996. On 13 June 1996, petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171. The motion was denied by the trial judge in his order of 12 July 1996. Another motion filed by petitioner on 13 August 1996 to have the denial reconsidered was found to be meritorious by the court a quo in an order, dated 20 September 1996, which stated, among other things, that A close scrutiny of R.A. 8171 shows that petitioner is entitled to the benefits of the said law considering that herein petitioner is a natural born Filipino citizen who lost his citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. The petition and motion of the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines likewise show that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under R.A. 8171. 3 Concluding, the court ruled: WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Order of the Court dated July 12, 1996 is hereby set aside. The petitioner is ordered to take his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. 8171 before the undersigned on October 03, 1996 at 11:00 in the morning. SO ORDERED. 4 After taking his Oath of Allegiance on 03 October 1996, another order was issued by the trial judge on 04 October 1996 to the following effect; viz: After the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines had been taken by the petitioner, Gerardo Angat y Legaspi before the undersigned, the petitioner is hereby repatriated and declared as citizen of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. The Bureau of Immigration is ordered to cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the petitioner upon the finality of this order. Likewise, let a copy of this Order be registered in the Local Civil Registry of the Municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila and the General Civil Registrar, Sta. Mesa, Manila, after its finality. SO ORDERED. 5 On 19 March 1997, a Manifestation and Motion (virtually a motion for reconsideration) filed by the OSG asserted that the petition itself should have been dismissed by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on Naturalization consistently with Administrative Order No. 285 ("AO 285"), dated 22 August 1996, issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. AO 285 had tasked the Special Committee on Naturalization to be the implementing agency of R.A 8171. The motion was found to be well taken by the trial court; thus, in an order, dated 22 September 1997, it adjudged: This resolves the Manifestation and Motion filed by the Office of the Solicitor General on March 19, 1997.

The motion alleges that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 dated August 22, 1996 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos, any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization, which is composed of the Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, which shall process the application; that if their applications are approved they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, affect which they shall be deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship and the Commission of Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. The motion prays that the herein petition be dismissed on the ground that the same should be filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The records show that on September 20, 1996, the Court granted the herein petition and as a consequence thereof, the petitioner Gerardo Angat y Legaspi took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Presiding Judge of this Court on October 03, 1996 and on October 04, 1996, the petitioner was ordered repatriated and declared as citizen of the Philippines. On February 21, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance as counsel of the State in the subject petition and on March 19, 1997 filed the herein manifestation and motion. The allegations in the manifestation and motion of the Office of the Solicitor General clearly shows that this Court has no jurisdiction over the herein petition as the same falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Committee on Naturalization. Considering that this court has no jurisdiction over this case, the order granting the same is therefore null and void. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is hereby granted. The orders of this Court dated September 20, 1996 and October 04, 1996 are hereby set aside and the herein petition is ordered DISMISSED on the ground of lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its re-filing before the Special Committee on Naturalization. SO ORDERED. 6 A motion for reconsideration, filed by petitioner on 13 October 1997, questioned the aforequoted order asservating that since his petition was filed on 14 March 1996, or months before the Special Committee on Naturalization was constituted by the President under AO 285 on 22 August 1996, the court a quo had the authority to take cognizance of the case. In the Order, dated 29 December 1997, the trial judge denied the motion for reconsideration. The instant appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure submits the lone assignment of error that The Regional Trial Court (has) seriously erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive effect to Administrative Order No. 285, absent a provision on Retroactive Application. Petitioner would insist that the trial court had jurisdiction over his petition for naturalization 7 filed on 11 March 1996, and that he had acquired a vested right as a repatriated citizen of the Philippines when the court declared him repatriated following the order, dated 20 September 1996, allowing him to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which was, in fact, administered to him on 03 October 1996. The contention is not meritorious.

R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account or political or economic necessity. The pertinent provisions of the law read: Sec. 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 631, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a: (1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government; (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for the predominance of their ideas; (3) (4) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude: or Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.

Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, 8 dated 05 June 1975, amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship, with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as the other members, was created pursuant to Letter of Instruction ("LOI") No. 270, dated 11 April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No. 491 issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on 29 December 1976. Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquino's Memorandum of 27 March 1987, it was not however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 9 the Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of President Aquino had merely directed the Special Committee on Naturalization "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings . . . under Letter of Instruction ("LOI") 270." 10 The Court elaborated: This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum-based on the copy furnished us by Lee-did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clear repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist." The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not-repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress once created to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to

Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well. 11 Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995; 12 hence, when petitioner filed his petition on 11 March 1996, the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No. 725 was in place. Administrative Order 285, 13 promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in effect, was merely then a confirmatory issuance. The Office of the Solicitor General was right in maintaining that Angat's petition should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The court's order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and void, and it did not acquire finality 14 nor could be a source of right on the part of petitioner. 15 It should also be noteworthy that the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was thus incorrect for petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 16 and R.A. No. 2630 17 since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States of America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition, Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, and the Order, dated 22 September 1996, issued by the court a quo, dismissing the petition of petitioner in Civil Case No. N-96-03-MK for want of jurisdiction, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino. In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet been organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has decided to resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We cannot permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the vital principles of public office to be here applied. It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our discretion to interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the present petition as having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC. The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary to this basic question. The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. OFFICE OF THE CLERK UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA September 23, 1988 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents. CRUZ, J.: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could not sue under the said section. Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from the respondents. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the

Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on October 20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on January 20, 1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178. Petition No. 280225. Alien Registration No. A23 079 270. Very truly yours, WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER Clerk by:(Sgd.) ARACELI V. BAREN Deputy Clerk This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the United States. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime. The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many members of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein. That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States

is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are its nationals." It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States. If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual. Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance to the Philippines. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected ViceGovernor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 163256 November 10, 2004 CICERON P. ALTAREJOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA, respondents. DECISION AZCUNA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of prohibitory and mandatory injunction, to set aside the Resolution promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), First Division, on March 22, 2004 disqualifying petitioner Ciceron P. Altarejos from running as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate, and another resolution of the COMELEC en banc promulgated on May 7, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The factual antecedents are as follows: Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country." Private respondents alleged that based on a letter1 from the Bureau of Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846 issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.2 On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer3 stating, among others, that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus, petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the petition. On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum, while petitioner did not file one within the required period.4 Petitioner, however, filed a Reply Memorandum5 subsequently. Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections. He found, thus: xxx The provisions of law governing the qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials are found in Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provide as follows:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. xxx. (c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component cities or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. [SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective position:] xxx. (d) Those with dual citizenship. xxx. (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; xxx Under the terms of the above quoted statutory provisions, it is required that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not have acquired the right to reside abroad. In the present case, it has been established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent is a citizen of the United States of America. Such fact is proven by his Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. E139507 issued on 3 November 1997 and Immigration Certificate of Residence (ICR) with No. 320846 issued on 3 November 1997 by the Alien Registration Division, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. This was further confirmed in a letter dated 25 June 2001 of then Commissioner ANDREA D. DOMINGO of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. Although respondent had petitioned for his repatriation as a Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. 8171 on 17 December 1997, this did not restore to respondent his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited Republic Act No. 8171 specifically provides that "repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." It appears from the records of this case that respondent failed to prove that he has fully complied with requirements of the above-quoted Section 2 of Republic Act 8171 to perfect his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino citizenship. Respondent has not submitted any document to prove that he has taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and that he has registered his fact of repatriation in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. In fact, in a letter date 25 June 2001, Commissioner ANDREA DOMINGO stated that RESPONDENT is still a holder of visa under Section 13 (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, with an indefinite authorized stay in the Philippines, implying that respondent did not register his supposed Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration otherwise his Alien Visa would have already been cancelled. The rule is that in case of doubt concerning the grant of citizenship, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the State and against the applicant (Cheng vs. Republic, L16999, 22 June 1965). xxx Not having been able to prove that he has fully reacquired his Filipino citizenship after being naturalized as a citizen of the United States, it is clear that respondent is not qualified to be candidate for the position of Mayor

of San Jacinto, Masbate, in the 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections, pursuant to the aforequoted Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991. As a further consequence of his not being a Filipino citizen, respondent has also committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy by stating therein that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen, when in fact, he has not yet even perfected the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate for public office, which could be a valid ground for the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code x x x. 6 In its Resolution promulgated on March 22, 2004, the COMELEC, First Division, adopted the findings and recommendation of Director Zaragoza. The dispositive portion of said Resolution stated, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent CICERON PEREZ ALTAREJOS is hereby disqualified to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Accordingly, his certificate of candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate is denied due course and cancelled and his name deleted from the certified list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections.7 On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and attached the following documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office, viz: (1) Oath of Allegiance dated December 17, 1997; (2) Identification Certificate No. 116543 issued by the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004; (3) Certification from the City Civil Registration Office, Makati City, that the Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance of petitioner was received by said office and registered, with the corresponding fee paid, on February 18, 2004; (4) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Bureau on Immigration and Deportation that it was furnishing said office with the Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation of petitioner for the cancellation of petitioner's registration in said office as an alien, and the issuance to him of the corresponding Identification Card as Filipino citizen; (5) A letter dated December 17, 1997 from the Special Committee on Naturalization to the Local Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate that it was sending petitioner's Oath of Allegiance and Certificate of Repatriation for registration in their records and for petitioner's reacquisition of his former Philippine citizenship. On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVED as it hereby RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for UTTER LACK OF MERIT and AFFIRMS the Resolution of the First Division.8 The Comelec en banc held, thus: The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.

When the entire records of the case was forwarded to the Commission (First Division) the respondent's only evidence was his Certificate of Repatriation dated 17 December 1977 and marked as Annex 1 of his answer. This piece of evidence was not enough to controvert the evidence of the petitioners which consist of the letter of the then Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Andrea Domingo dated 25 June 2001 which stated that as of the even date respondent is a holder of permanent resident visa (page 15 of the records) and the certification of Josephine C. Camata dated 28 January 2004 certifying, that the name of the respondent could not be found in the records of repatriation. (page 42 of the records) The questioned resolution, is therefore, in order as the evidence submitted by the respondent were insufficient to rebut the evidence of the petitioner. Now, the respondent, in his Motion for Reconsideration, attempted to introduce to the record new pieces of evidence, which introduction is not anymore allowed in a Motion for Reconsideration. These are the following a) Annex "2" Oath of Allegiance; b) Annex "3" Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate; c) Annex "4" Certification of the City Civil Registrar of Makati City; d) Annex "5" Letter addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Jacinto, Masbate by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization; and e) Annex "6" Letter addressed to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation by Aurora P. Cortes of Special Committee on Naturalization. Assuming that the new evidence of the respondent are admitted, with more reason should we cancel his certificate of candidacy for his act of [misrepresenting] himself as a Filipino citizen when at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, he has not yet perfected the process of repatriation. He failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2 of [Republic Act No.] 8171 which provides that repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The certification was issued by the same Ms. Josephine C. Camata, City Civil Registrar, dated February 18, 2004. This time, she certifies that Ciceron Perez Altarejos was registered under Registry No. 1, Page 19, Book No. 1, Series of 2004 and paid under OR nos. 88325/8833256 dated February 18, 2004. (page 65 of the records). Obviously, he was able to register in the proper civil registry only on February 18, 2004. The respondent was able to register with the Bureau of Immigration only on March 1, 2004 as evidenced by the Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate attached to the Motion as Annex "3." This fact confirms the finding of the Commission (First Division) that at the time respondent filed his certificate of candidacy he is yet to complete the requirement under section two (2) of RA 8171. As a consequence of not being a Filipino citizen, he has committed false representation in his certificate of candidacy. Such false representation constitutes a material misrepresentation as it relates to his qualification as a candidate. As such the certificate of candidacy may be cancelled on such ground. (Ycain vs. Caneja, 18 Phil. 778)9 On May 10, 2004, the election day itself, petitioner filed this petition praying that: (1) The petition be given due course and a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex parte restraining the respondents and all persons acting on their behalf, from fully implementing the questioned COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004; (2) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering the COMELEC and all persons acting on its behalf to allow petitioner to run as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 elections, and to count and canvass the votes cast in his favor and to proclaim him as the winning mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate; and (3) after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered declaring null and void and setting aside the COMELEC Resolutions promulgated on March 22, 2004 and May 7, 2004 and other related Orders of the COMELEC or its representatives which have the effect of illegally preventing petitioner from running as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. In its Comment,10 the Office of the Solicitor General stated that, based on the information relayed to it by the COMELEC, petitioner's name, as a mayoralty candidate in San Jacinto, Masbate, was retained in the list of candidates voted upon by the electorate in the said municipality. Hence, the cancellation of petitioner's certificate

of candidacy was never implemented. The COMELEC also informed the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioner's opponent, Dr. Emilio Aris V. Espinosa, was already proclaimed duly elected Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. The Office of the Solicitor General contends that said supervening event has rendered the instant petition moot and academic, and it prayed for the dismissal of the petition. In his Reply,11 petitioner opposed the dismissal of his petition. He claims that the COMELEC resolutions disqualifying him from running as a mayoralty candidate adversely affected his candidacy, since his supporters were made to believe that his votes would not be counted. Moreover, he stated that said COMELEC resolutions cast a doubt on his Philippine citizenship. Petitioner points out that he took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 17, 1997. In view thereof, he ran and was even elected as Mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate during the 1998 elections. He argues that if there was delay in the registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the proper civil registry, the same was brought about by the inaction on the part of said offices since the records of the Special Committee on Naturalization show that his Certificate of Repatriation and Oath of Allegiance have long been transmitted to said offices. Petitioner also asserts that the subsequent registration of his Certificate of Repatriation with the Bureau of Immigration and with the Civil Registry of Makati City prior to the May 10, 2004 elections has the effect of curing the defect, if any, in the reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship as his repatriation retroacted to the date of his application for repatriation as held in Frivaldo v. Comelec. The pertinent issues raised are the following: (1) Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation; and (2) whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division. As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.12 Nonetheless, courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.13 First Issue: Is the registration of petitioner's repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation? The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171,14 thus: SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.

When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office apply? In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,15 the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be construed as "applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term." The Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus: Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be: * a citizen of the Philippines; * a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected; * a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; * able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect." * In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day." From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.16 (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that "the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application." In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldo's repatriation to the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court, thus: xxx The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past eventsi.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to

Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty. xxx Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenshipwas, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.17 Republic Act No. 817118 has impliedly repealed Presidential `Decree No. 725. They cover the same subject matter: Providing for the repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos. The Court's ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of one's application for repatriation subsists for the same reasons quoted above. Accordingly, petitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997. Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate. Second Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion in affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division? The Court cannot fault the COMELEC en banc for affirming the decision of the COMELEC, First Division, considering that petitioner failed to prove before the COMELEC that he had complied with the requirements of repatriation. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration, when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence. As the COMELEC en banc correctly stated: The Comelec Rules of Procedure provides that insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision is a ground for a motion for reconsideration (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence referred to in the above provision and to be considered in the Motion for Reconsideration are those which were submitted during the hearing and attached to the respective Memoranda of the parties which are already part of the records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of the respondent were not able to overcome the evidence of the petitioners.19 It is, therefore, incumbent upon candidates for an elective office, who are repatriated citizens, to be ready with sufficient evidence of their repatriation in case their Filipino citizenship is questioned to prevent a repetition of this case. WHEREFORE, the petition seeking the nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc of May 7, 2004, affirming the Resolution of its First Division dated March 22, 2004, is hereby DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.