PRINCIPLES FOR INCREASING

AMERICAN SECURITY AFTER 9/11

Newt Gingrich
May 11,2004

SUMMARY

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also
known as the 9/11 Commission) has an opportunity to describe the system,
culture, structures, budgets, metrics, and goals that America needs to be safe
in an increasingly dangerous world.

The greatest contribution the 9/11 Commission can make is to tell the
country the truth about the scale of change that is needed and then let the
elected and appointed officials make the compromises.

To achieve these goals the following steps would be helpful:

1. Focus on the future security needs of America using 9/11 as a case

study from which to learn. It is not nearly as important to discover
what's wrong with the current system of intelligence as it is to design
the values, the structure, the metrics, systems architecture and the
culture of the new system. The current system is a hybrid product of
the Cold War competing with the KGB and being changed from the
outside by the Congress. It began with the FBI, OSS and military
intelligence competition of the Second World War and was then first
changed by the National Security Act of 1947. Trying to reform the
current system is exactly the wrong strategy, what we need to do is
design the transforming 21st century system and then build bridges
from the current reality to the desired end state.

2. Future security needs are vastly greater, more urgent, and more
challenging than people think:

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a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD, mostly nuclear) and
Weapons of Mass Murder (WMM, mostly biological but with
some chemical weapons) are more real and much more deadly
than either the American people or their political-governmental
system think. Despite all of the rhetoric since 9/11, America is
much more like Britain in 1935 than Britain in 1940. We are
vastly underestimating the threat and the urgency;

b. The Islamic Civil War between the irreconcilables (largely

Wahhabi and Deobandi) and the modernizing wing (very small
and mostly in Europe, the US and outside the Arab world) and
the traditionalists is likely to last until 2070 or later. Today the
irreconcilables have the energy, the moral force, and the
momentum. There may be 39 to 52 million potential recruits for
violence and the number is growing (source: CIA Counter
Terrorism Center senior analysts);

c. Centers of danger beyond the Islamic Civil War continue to

grow with Pakistan (possibly the most precarious and
dangerous nuclear-capable country in the world in 2004) and
Saudi Arabia. North Korea and their state-controlled WMD
enormously complicates the intelligence challenges of trying to
focus on both non-state and state at the same time. The China-
Taiwan relationship, Russia and Iran are additional examples of
concerns America must have beyond the Islamic terrorist threat;

d. There is an enormous amount of ungoverned territory on the

planet (see attached map Possible Remote Havens for Terrorist
and Other Illicit Activity) and there is no practical way to
implement a no sanctuary policy for terrorists without an
enormous expansion of governed areas (the map illustrates
largely rural ungoverned areas but most third world large cities
have huge ungoverned zones in which police are powerless);

e. There is a Gray World of people smuggling (including 800,000

slaves a year), illegal arms trade, illegal international narcotics,
illegal transportation and illegal crime of traditional sorts. This
Gray World (the term is George Tenet's) provides a gray

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 underside to the emerging global economic system and is a
force multiplier for any terrorist group with money.

3. Our opponents are intelligent, determined, and adaptive. They

increasingly study us and practice denial and deception. We should
find it very sobering that they could carry off bombings in Madrid,
Chechnya and Iraq virtually with impunity. We should have no
illusions about how little we have accomplished in trying to penetrate
and defeat our terrorist opponents. Furthermore, their use of public
communications to convey their messages has been vastly superior to
our efforts to do the same. We should be very humbled by the results
of the first three years of the direct war between America and
irreconcilable Islamists.

4. Intelligence in a 21st century highly-complex world which includes

real time information systems and weapons of mass murder and mass
destruction has to be:

a. Comprehensive;

b. Real time;

c. Demand pulled across all institutional boundaries;

d. Centered on human intelligence;

e. Analyzed by people with sophisticated understanding of

cultures and personalities we are opposing; and

f. All of the above should be reflected in a completely new form

of daily presentation to the President, the senior National
Security and Homeland Security officials and the leaders of
Congress to ensure they are staying informed about a very
complex real time world.

5. To create the kind of large scale strategic achievements Alfred Sloan

developed at General Motors in the 1920s and General George C
Marshall managed in the Second World War you must:

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 a. Insist on coming to the right solution and only then begin to
compromise. If policy makers only see the compromised
versions, they will never know what their advisers thought
should really be done. Let the elected officials make the tough
compromises but insist on giving them the real options to
choose from;

b. Create a systemic planning process to ensure that all echelons

thoroughly understand what they are supposed to accomplish
(see attached Planning & Leadership Model);

c. Make sure you have the right theory of the problem and the
solution (see John Nagl's Counterinsurgency Lessons from
Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife for a
classic example of learning by the British and rejecting learning
by the Americans);

d. Plan back from victory (this was the key to successfully

fighting the Second World War in such a short time). The key
measurement is not how far you have come but how far you
have to go.

e. Plan everything in a deep-mid-near model where deep is ten

years out, mid is four to five years our and one is the next year.
The absence of disciplined focus on deep first and then mid is
why so many daily decisions in Washington have no profound
impact over time. Decisions without context are simply
energetic activity.

f. Establish the right metrics to measure achievement so you

know every day if you are doing the right things in the right
way. Establishing measurable metrics is a key to effective
implementation.

6. Insist on including Congress in your analysis. Under our Constitution,

Congress has co-equal responsibilities for establishing the institutions
of national security. Congressional budgeting, congressional

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 oversight, congressional limitations on activities have all had a
dramatic impact on our intelligence and national security institutions.
To try to explain the absence of adequate human intelligence
capabilities on 9/11 without reference to the Church Committee and a
quarter of century of congressional hostility to dealing in hostile
environments is simply historically false. To try to develop the future
national security system by focusing only on the Executive Branch is
a profound misreading of the American Constitution. It is time for
some group to tell the truth about the need for Congressional reform
in national security.

7. Without getting into partisan scape-goating it is important to put the

intelligence and policing functions in their historic context. The
people who were leading the FBI on 9/11 were operating in a culture
that had been profoundly aloof at least since the early days of the
Second World War some 60 years earlier. The people who were trying
to get the intelligence community to work had been battered and
shaped by attacks on the community going back at least 30 years to
the attacks on Director Helms and others. Fixing these two sets of
institutions and cultures will require profound and not merely shallow
changes.

8. When we have everything right, everything fixed, with even the best
intelligence system in the world and the wisest leaders willing to
listen, we will still run a high risk of being surprised because we have
active opponents who study us and practice denial and deception.
Therefore, we need to have a surprise-surviving defense and
Homeland Security system.

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Planning & Leadership Model
VISION

STRATEGIES
All
("A project is a definable communication
I delegatable achievement and the occurs in the
PROJECTS I key to entrepreneurial rather than mind of the
L bureaucratic behavior. listener

TASKS Listen > Learn > Help > Lead

Appreciative understanding
(active listening between the sentences)
TRUE PRAGMATISM
(Listen for new facts and perceptions)
2004 All Rights Reserved The Gingrich Group, LLC
www.newt.org (202) 862-5948 Leadership Model
 The Nature of the Real War
Pool of Potential Recruits
Islamic Civil War
9/11 (39 - 52 million and growing)
(1.3 billion people)
Osama
Al Qaeda (3-5K)
• Modernizers bin Laden's
Symbolic Victory" Potentially
• Traditionalists Violent Additional
.... / groups...
• Non-violent Irreconcilables /-—-—
Irreconcilables
The Gray World
Iraq
Afghanistan
and the Warrior-Recruiters
(from Iraqi cross-border
Saudi Arabia Ungoverned Areas insurgency experience)
Indonesia
Libya - Illegal narcotics and drug-dealing,
Syria
Iran - Illegal transportation,
Egypt - International arms dealers, 3/10/2004
Pakistan (most dangerous
potentially) - International crime, and DRAFT © 2004 All Rights Reserved

North Korea - People smuggling (800K slaves a American Enterprise Institute

Colombia year and millions of others) (202) 862-5948

The 9/11 event proved you can focus the irreconcilables and kill Americans.
 Memo on Previous Statements Relating to Terrorism
by
Former Speaker Newt Gingrich

Excerpts from Window of Opportunity by Newt Gingrich with David Drake and
Marianne Gingrich - Chapter 10: The Dilemmas of American Foreign and Military
Policy (1984)

• "Any terrorist group which systemically exploited the vulnerabilities of our

economy would discover that there was remarkably little planning for
backup systems in case the normal routes and structures were destroyed. In
effect, we have made ourselves vulnerable to any serious group terrorists
who want to paralyze large portions of our economy and society." (p. 230)
• "Terrorism must be confronted because it is far more likely to have an
impact on our lives than is nuclear war. Terrorism is more likely to kill
Americans and to challenge our policies than is any other kind of force." (p.
231)
• "We must develop a doctrine which states clearly American policy toward
violence aimed at the destruction of our society. We must take the steps
necessary to prove that no terrorist organization can kill Americans with
impunity." (p. 232)
• "The long-term struggle against terrorism will be a dark and bloody one,
involving years of vigilant counterterrorism...and a willingness to strike
back with substantial force at the originators of the action rather the foot
soldiers of the terrorist action.. .We must develop a doctrine which so
severely and directly threatens the leaders of terrorist movements that
they refrain from attacking the United States because they fear personal
consequences. Any other policy is an invitation to a blood bath in which
we will certainly be the losers." (p. 232)
• "At a minimum, we will need closer relationships between the intelligence
agencies, the diplomatic agencies, the economic agencies, the military
agencies, the news media, and the political structure. There has to be a
synergism in which our assessment of what is happening relates to our
policies as they are developed and implemented. Both analyses and
implementation must be related to the news media and political system

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 because all basic policies must have public support if they are to succeed."
(P- 239)

Gingrich Comment made 8/3/85

• "We are a nation that has a nagging toothache called terrorism. We have
gotten through the last terrorist assault with almost no casualties, few lessons
and no medicine."
The National Journal
August 3, 1985
"Reagan Gets Mixed Reviews for His Loud Speech But Small Stick on Terrorism"
By Christopher Madison

Gingrich Comment made 12/20/86

• "What I'm trying to do is start an argument on how we live in the first third
of the 21st century. My centerpiece is that we are now a country whose
problems are 100 or 1,000 times bigger than its solutions. Our three biggest
problems are that government costs more than society will pay, we are not
competitive in the world market and there is a requirement that we lead the
free world through the [Western] alliance and in the fight against terrorism."

The National Journal

December 20, 1986
"Eye of Newt"
By Richard Cohen

Gingrich Comment made a day after February 26, 1993 World Trade Center
bombing

Then minority whip, Gingrich said that Clinton needed to be "cautious" in cutting
the defense budget. "There's a very real requirement for human intelligence and
military strength. Every time we have any display of weakness, any display of
timidity.. .here are people eager on the planet to take advantage of us."

www. opinionjournel. com (2/2 7/93)

"An Unheeded Warning" - 9/30/03,
By Richard Miniter

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Comment made by Dr. Roy Godson 4/6/95

• "It is entirely proper for Congress, if necessary, to take the lead in calling for
this type of comprehensive assessment of terrorism In the early 1980s,
Congress, at the prodding of a then relatively little-known Congressman
from Georgia, Newt Gingrich, forced the Executive Branch to issue annual
public reports on Soviet efforts to influence Western public opinion, and in
so doing performed a great service. If not for Congressional urging, today
we would probably be without a national narcotics assessment as a weapon
against international organized crime. As the national interest demanded it,
Congress pushed the Executive Branch; today, a comprehensive
opportunity-oriented assessment of terrorism is very much in that same
national interest."
Testimony April 06, 1995
President National Strategy Information Center House Judiciary International
Terrorism
By Dr. Roy Godson

Gingrich Comment made 5/10/95

• "But the objective fact of the future is that the primary dangers of terrorism
on the planet are essentially those of Islamic extremism and particularly
those financed and abetted by the Iranian government."
The Record
May 10, 1995
"Gingrich: Main Terrorist Threat Still From Iran"

Gingrich Comment made 3/7/96

• "We are, in fact, entering the age of terrorism," Gingrich said. "We've had
this fantasy since the fall of the Berlin Wall that the age of freedom has
arrived." Terrorism means more than bombs set off by shadowy groups,
Gingrich said, but can extend to states threatening neighbors.

Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, IA)

March?, 1996

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Gingrich Comment made 7/29/96

• "I'm just saying I think you've got really look at what is your overall
systematic plan for dealing with terrorism, where do you get the best punch
for the dollar? I'm just suggesting to you that we want to be very helpful but
we want to be helpful in a way that is effective and that actually gets the job
done to save lives; it doesn't just make people feel good spending money,
lots of activity, and then you discover, oh, here's this huge loophole that
somebody over here was able to walk right through and pull off their act of
terrorism."

The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer

July 29, 1996

Gingrich remarks made during the Keeper of the Flame Award Dinner, Center for
Security Policy (9/18/96)

• ".. .There should be a thorough investigation of the current Central

Intelligence Agency" [note: Deutch was in charge at the time]
• "We should insist on the establishment of a professional Central Intelligence
Agency with a professional director dedicated to the defense of the United
States rather than to the defense of left-wing politicians."
• "I believe there are three levels of dangers that we should deal with using
three different strategies...The first is terrorism; the second is adventurous
or outlaw states; and the third is great powers."
• "We should insist on the re-establishment of human intelligence and the
capacity of the intelligence agency to.. .have spies."
• "This [Clinton] administration is stretching our military, frankly, [to] the
verge of the breaking point."
• "We have to talk honestly about modernization.. .at the core of the survival
of our children's country, we need to reestablish a seriousness of purpose
and an honesty of intellect and a willingness to have clarity, to have
coherence, and to have consistency. Or we are going to once again face a
crisis of enormous proportions, and we will pay in blood what we are giving
up today in time and preparation."

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Gingrich Response to U.S. intelligence failures to anticipate Pakistani underground
nuclear tests

• ".. .We have too little funding for intelligence, too few assets, too few
analysts. I hope lawmakers will consider this when they adopt the
intelligence budget."

The Washington Post

May 14, 1998

Gingrich Response to Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania

• "We need much better human intelligence, much more sophisticated efforts
to go after terrorists and others."

The Baltimore Sun

August 8, 1998

Gingrich Response to U.S. air strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan after Embassy
bombings

• "We cannot allow a terrorist group to attack American embassies and do

nothing. And I think we have to recognize that we are now committed to
engaging this organization and breaking it apart and doing whatever we have
to suppress it, because we cannot afford to have people who think that they
can kill Americans without any consequence."
• "I think it's very important that we send a signal to countries like Sudan and
Afghanistan that if you house a terrorist, you become a target. And if you
want to get rid of the target, you've got to get rid of the terrorist."

Gingrich response to US Strikes against Osama bin Laden's network

CNN BREAKING NEWS 13:45 pm ET
August 20, 1998; Thursday 1:45 pm Eastern Time

Gingrich Discussing the $1.5 billion emergency supplemental funds approved for
U.S. intelligence agencies for FY99

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 • Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-Fla.) chairman of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, credited Gingrich as the main architect of the
spending package, saying he had been pushing for an additional $1 billion
for intelligence for several months. $200 million of the package was added
to intelligence for anti-terrorism efforts involving the FBI along with the
CIA and the Pentagon.
• "Past cuts in intelligence have hurt key programs, including innovation of
advanced technological collection techniques as well espionage operations
and analysis. The new programs are specifically tailored to provide
protection to both U.S. citizens and our country's interests in the new
millennium."

The Washington
Post
October 23,1998

Recommendations from the Hart-Rudman Commission (The United States

Commission on National Security/21st Century) Recommendations, Phase I
(9/15/99) - New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Phase II
(4/15/00)- Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and
Promoting Freedom, and Phase III (3/15/01) - Building For Peace

• Phase I, commission's view of the future believes in part that, (11): "We
should expect conflicts in which adversaries, because of cultural affinities
different from our own, will resort to forms and levels of violence shocking
to our sensibilities."
• Conclusions to draw, Phase I, in part, (1): "America will become
increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military
superiority will not entirely protect us.. .States, terrorists, and other
disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass
disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American
soil, possibly in large numbers."
• First key objective stated in Phase II: "To Defend The United States And
Ensure That It Is Safe From The Dangers Of A New Era."
• First section of executive summary in Phase III, Securing the National
Homeland: "The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with
the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability

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 of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against
American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century."
• Among the 50 recommendations in Phase III that the commission pushed
for: 1) "The President should develop a comprehensive strategy to heighten
America's ability to prevent and protect against all forms of attack on the
homeland, and to respond to such attacks if prevention and protection fail."

Gingrich Testimony: House Committee on Armed Services

• .. ."Terrorism is a much more profound threat than we have responded to. It

should trouble every American that we've been trying to get bin Laden
since 1993. You just mentioned the cost of repairing an American warship
damaged by terrorists. We should all be concerned that we don't have the
intelligence to know where they are, the ability to preempt, or the capacity to
punish. And in fact, we have people who routinely go around the world
holding press conferences explaining they're at war with the United States.
This is a serious strategic challenge to us."
• In response to question during Q&A period: "We felt that a Homeland
Security Agency was a more appropriate response.. .we felt that in terms of
having a better grip on what happens around our coasts and around our
borders, that the Coast Guard and the enforcement parts of the Customs
Service and the Border Patrol are logically a coherent part of this kind of a
Homeland Security Agency, far more so than they are in the current agencies
where they're embedded.
• But I strongly commend what you've introduced. I do hope that all of your
colleagues in both parties will look at it carefully. And I do think we need
some kind of systematic effort to develop a capacity to respond to an event
of mass destruction or mass disruption in one of our major cities."
• .. ."The customs and the Border Patrol ought to be integrated, in our
judgment, into a Homeland Security Agency. It is absurd when one
computer can't talk to the other and they're sitting right on the border
together, or when one union work rule blocks somebody from being
practical. We ought to have the most efficient possible border, because we
want the maximum flow of trade, and that cannot happen if there's great
inefficiency."
House Committee on Armed Services
March 21, 2001

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Senator Rudman's Senate Testimony (9/21/01) praising Newt Gingrich as the
"Father" of the Homeland Security concept

• "Let me tell you, interestingly enough, you know, Newt Gingrich, who was
the father of this idea, on the theory that no good deed goes unpunished,
when he left the House, was put on this commission. And he is a historian
who brought a lot of insight."

Senator Warren Rudman

Senate Testimony
September 21,2001

CIA Director George Tenet's comment at Joint House and Senate Select
Intelligence Committee on pre-9/11 intelligence failures that Newt Gingrich was
the only person to obtain an intelligence funding increase in the 1990s (10/17/02)

• "Counterterrorism funding and manpower needs were number one in every

list I provided to Congress and the administration. Indeed it was at the top of
the funding list approved by Speaker Gingrich in 1999, the first year in
which we received a significant infusion of new money for intelligence. That
supplemental and those that follow it that you supplied were essential to our
efforts and they helped save American lives."

CIA Director George Tenet

Joint House and Senate Select Intelligence Committee
October 17, 2002

###

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