Learning from the past

Failures during and after construction

Both design and construction errors are identified
BY DOV KAMINETZKY PARTNER FELD, KAMINETZKY AND COHEN, P.C.

Large-scale structural failure is a nightmare that haunts the construction industry. The financial devastation, the demolished reputations and the loss of life that could re sult from a collapse have troubled the sleep of probably e ve ry architect, engineer, contractor or owner at some time. This frightening quality of failures almost guarantees that they will continue to happen. Fear, embarrassment and the gag of interminable lawsuits have kept informa tion on failure from traveling quickly enough, what little of it ever gets into general circulation at all. The way to dispel a nightmare is to attack it with hard fact, with eyes open wide and the mind alert. . . . avail ability of complete and accurate information could be the first step towards shaking the dread of collapse.
Engineering News-Record, June 4, 1981

These timely remarks underscore some of the problems confronting our firm during more than five decades of investigating both major and minor construction failures. A few cases are presented here in the hope of furthering the understanding and awareness needed to prevent such disasters. The term failure indicates not only structural collapse but a wide range of nonconformity with design expectations or requirementssuch as unwanted settlements, deformations, cracks, bulges and misalignments. If one takes time to measure the shape, position, and condition of completed stru c t u re s, many failures to comply with good design and construction practice could be found. Many recent failures can be traced to: errors in reading drawings design errors sloppy construction practices poor communication between designer and contractor inadequate construction supervision

Accordingly, failures can be reduced by more competence in design, construction, and construction supervision. The possibility of a major error in design actually getting through the construction phase is indeed remote, considering all of the stages of checks and controls in design, estimating, detailing, field supervision, and construction through which a job must go. In concrete construction, fortunately, there is a certain amount of informal load testing inherent in the construction process itself and collapses are much more common during construction than after completion and full occupancy. It is natural, when forms and slabs collapse during concreting, to assume that the formwork was at fault. This is not always true; the collapse of one 4-story concrete structure was thought at first to be caused by form failure, but later investigation showed that some of the exterior wall columns were not on the solid rock assumed in the design plans. A column settled, became ino p e ra t i ve, and the slabs collapsed. Other cases have been reported in which slabs collapsed due to weakness caused by duct openings at high-stress points. When lower floor slabs collapse they carry upper floor forms with them, and the situation sometimes looks like a formwork failure until a closer study is made.

Torsional cracking in slabs

Unstiffened edge slabs of flat plate floors require top reinforcement at exterior edges to prevent torsional cracking at the stiff connection to the column. Columns should be so located as to avoid reentrant corners at exterior edges of flat plates that have shallow beams or no beams at all. The load transfer will induce high torsional stress in the slab edge or the face of the shallow spandrel and split it near the column. In a 16-story apartment where this recommendation was disregarded, bearing piers were later added to provide direct support at the reentrant corners and neutralize the torsional moment. In a 40-story apartment of similar layout, flat slabs

exhibited cracking at the columns. The use of bearing walls as a remedy was out of the question, and structural steel brackets were bolted to the column face to provide similar support for the corner. One floor slab with

cracked area rebuilt was subjected to a load test and it failed after 22 hours with a full load. Another load test made after adding the brackets was quite successful. This added support detail was provided at eight columns on each of the upper levels (Figure 1). Self-anchoring bolts were set into drilled holes 10 inches deep, and each bolt was tested for pullout resistance to twice the design requirement. The proof tests were all satisfactory.

Shear failure caused by construction error

A thre e - ye a r-old concrete plaza deck, serving as the roof of a garage, collapsed in New York without warning, crashing down on parked cars. The roof consisted of a 16-inch-deep waffle slab with 3 feet of earth cover. About half of a symmetrical entrance plaza, an area 45 x 50 feet, failed. The other half remained in place, apparently in sound condition. Failure was a clean punching shear, with little effect beyond the shear cut. In spite of the builders long experience with this type of construction, the 12-inch-deep concrete caps that should have extended 10 inches beyond the column faces had been omitted at all of the columns in the failure area (Figure 2). They had also been omitted at all of the nine columns in the symmetrical area that did not fail. The only difference in conditions between these two areas was a stopped-up drain in the failed area. This resulted in a frozen earth cover on the deck that failed; the other half of the deck was well drained. The factor of safety for three years had been 1.05. The failed slab was reconstructed with column heads and new columns; the other half of the deck was considerably strengthened by new girders, capitals, and column jackets.

Figure 1. Torsional shear failure at column near reentrant slab edges. Solution shown here involved repair followed by installation of supplementary support brackets attached to column to resist the twisting action.

Shear failure: design or construction error?

At first glance, the tragic failure described next resembled a formwork collapse. Howe ve r, it was determined that it resulted from excessive punching shear in the flat

BASIC RULES FOR PREVENTING CONSTRUCTION FAILURES

1. Gravity always worksif you dont provide permanent support, something will fall. 2. Chain reaction will make a small fall into a large failure, unless you can afford a fail-safe design, where sufficient reserve support is available when one component fails. 3. It requires only a small error or oversight, in design, in detail, in material strength, in assembly, or in protective measures, to cause a large failure. 4. Eternal vigilance is necessary to avoid small errors. If there are no capable foremen on the job and in the design office, then supervision must take over the chore of local control. Inspection service and construction management cannot be relied upon as a secure substitute.

5. Just as a ship cannot be run by two captains, a construction job must be run by one individualnot by a committee. That individual must have full authority to plan, direct, hire and fire; and full responsibility for production and safety. 6. Good craftsmanship is needed on the part of the designer, the vendor, and the constructor teams. 7. Some designs are unbuildable. Attempts to produce architectural gems may stretch the limit of safe buildability even with our most sophisticated equipment and techniques. 8. There is no foolproof design, there is no foolproof construction methodwithout careful control. 9. The best way to generate a failure on your job is to d i s re g a rd the lessons to be learned from failures of others.

Figure 3. Columns remained standing following collapse of flat plate floors in this office building. Probable failure cause was excessive punching shear in the flat plates where reinforcement continuity was interrupted at some of the columns. Figure 2. The roof of this parking garage in New York City collapsed suddenly three years after construction. Immediate cause of failure: a plugged drain in the earth cover above. With water unable to drain from the soil, the weight on the garage roof increased, precipitating the collapse. Key reason for failure: the contractor failed to construct the called-for concrete cap at the top of each column. In looking at a plan view of the engineering drawings, the contractor mistook the lines representing the concrete cap for the outline of the spread footing. Had there been better field inspection of this job, or had the drawings been clearer, this failure might have been prevented. or columns, which of course prevented slab steel from running through the columns. The design called for a complex reinforcement assembly around each interior column within the slab thickness, but how these assemblies could be placed within the zone of high shear and still permit the duct openings was not clear.

Inadequate mudsills under shoring

Workmen were placing concrete for the second floor of a building addition when steel shoring supporting the area collapsed and eight workmen fell 20 feet to the basement level. The foundations for the shoring were 16-inch-wide pieces of plywood cut at random lengths. Because of the flexibility of the wood, soil pressure under the shoring towers was approximately 5 tons per square foot, or 5 times what the ground could adequately support. The soil in the construction area was muddy due to heavy rains prior to the accident. This produced differential settlement of adjacent legs of shoring towers (Fig-

plates at the columns. Reinforced concrete flat plate floors (no column capitals or drop panels) were 10 inches thick, supported on square columns spaced 24 feet on centers in both directions. Columns rested on concrete-filled pipe piles driven to bedrock. Typical columns were 25 inches square at the basement level, decreasing to 20 inches square between the second and fourth floors. First and second floors were several weeks old at the time of the accident, and forms and shores had been removed. The third floor concrete was at least 20 days old; forms had been removed. The slab was reshored to the second floor, and was carrying the formwork for the fourth floor. Concrete had been placed in the fourth floor forms only a short while when most of the east wing, an area about 72 x 144 feet, dropped all the way to the cellar. The other three wings were little damaged except where they adjoined the collapsed section. Significantly, almost all of the columns remained standing full height after the collapse (Figure 3). Top-story column forms remained in place and very little reinforcement projected from the free-standing columns at any floor level. Plans indicated 10 x 14-inch duct openings in the slab along two adjacent faces of some interi-

Figure 4. Wet soil conditions, inadequate mudsills and shore loads five times what the ground could adequately support led to shoring collapse.

Figure 5. Spall at bearing surface on precast beam supporting hollow core slab.

Figure 7. Parapet section, weakened by cracking, blew off in high wind.

Figure 6. Precast parapet sections cracked because of restraint at welded connections.

Figure 8. Cracking in stem of tee beam where weld to supporting steel girder restrained movement. ure 4). When settling occurred, it caused stress changes in the entire framework and led to collapse, the investigation concluded.

Cracking and failures of precast concrete elements

The first instance of cracking and distress of precast and/or prestressed concrete structures due to end restraint appeared on the U.S. scene some 30 years ago. The same type of failure has occurred repeatedly in many forms and shapes, but with one consistent result: serious damage to concrete stru c t u re s, often causing millions in financial losses. There have also been several cases of total collapse where the seriousness of the initial distress was not recognized in time. Here, the cracking developed further and increased in such magnitude to cause total loss of the shear resistance at the supporting ends. Why this constant recurrence and the failure to heed repeated warnings? Partly because of legal restrictions imposed by some clients to bury the facts in case of embarrassing circumstances of loss of taxpayers money, but more important is the fact that insufficient publicity has been

Figure 9. Laboratory test of full-scale notched beam resulted in failure at load much below that anticipated by designer. given to alert the construction industry to the serious dangers inherent in providing end restraint to precast elements. The damage is often magnified when this restraint is coupled with the introduction of notches and brackets. A few case histories will be presented to fill the existing void of knowledge on this subject.

Case 1: A complex in the New York area was built in the late 1970s of hollow-core precast prestressed slabs bearing on precast concrete walls and beams. At the typical floors, spans at the bearing surfaces appeared as edge loading occurred (Figure 5). At the lowe r- g a rage level precast girders cracked as a result of restraint provided by end welding plates. Tensile stresses developed at the nonconfined edges. Edge spalling occurred here, too. On the roof, precast parapet sections were welded at their ends thereby causing restraint, limiting their movement, and generating tensile stresses as a result of contractions due to shrinkage and temperature. These tensile stresses exceeded the strength of the panels, which cracked at their ends (Figure 6). One parapet unit was so weakened that a heavy wind totally blew it off the roof (Figure 7). Case 2: A school structure in the East was constructed in the late 1970s of precast double tee panels supported on a structural steel frame. The tees were supported on either the top or bottom flanges of the steel girders. Alternate stems of the tees were welded at their ends to the supporting girders. For economic reasons the construction stopped and the partially completed structure was exposed to environmental effects for a great length of time. As a result, many of the welded stems cracked, with predominant cracking at the stems having reduced sections resulting from bottom notches or top flange blocking (Figure 8). Here again the welding at the ends restrained the panels from movement and rotation, resulting in serious damage that had to be corrected by p re s s u re-injected epoxy supplemented by steel shear plates. Case 3: A hospital structure constructed in the early 1960s of precast concrete elements had beams notched at each end, bearing on concrete brackets cast as part of the precast columns. Shortly after construction serious cracks developed in both the notched beams and the column brackets. The cracks were so severe that a fullscale notched beam was tested in a laboratory and failed at rather a lower load than expected by the design (Figure 9). The structure was repaired by adding steel cradle plates at a very high cost. Case 4: Cracks developed in the stems of a precast roof structure of a school built in the West in the late 1950s. In 1980, a section of the roof of the auditorium consisting of approximately 18 prestressed concrete double tee joists, (approximately 38 x 70 feet in area) fell from the center of the roof to the floor below (Figure 10). The collapsed portion of the roof framing consisted of factory fabricated pretensioned prestressed lightweight concrete double tee joists spanning 40 feet between prestressed concrete girders. The joists were notched to fit on girder ledges with tops of both elements at roughly the same elevation. To meet seismic requirements for a roof diaphragm, flange shear connectors were welded, typically every 6 feet. Similar connections were provided from tee flanges to side walls.

Figure 10. Collapse of part of a school roof structure in which precast prestressed joists were too tightly restrained to allow for the long-term shortening which occurs in such members. Also shown is a typical crack observed in double tee joists in adjacent spans.

The design also required that each stem of each double tee be welded at both ends at the steel-to-steel seat level, and a plate in the center of each end of the flange was welded to an insert plate in the support beams. Thus, the double tees were tightly restrained at each end. Hardly any supplementary reinforcement was provided in the notched ends, and neither the amount nor location would conform to current recommendations on connection design. A state of California Advisory Bulletin (March 16, 1981) describes the problem: A potentially hazardous condition may exist in certain buildings which were constructed using precast pretensioned prestressed concrete framing members. This condition may exist where inadequate provision was made to allow for the effects of long-term shortening which occurs in such members. The result of this hazardous condition can be structural failure and collapse. Summary: After more than 30 years of misuse and misunderstanding of the behavior of precast prestressed concrete elements, we believe the following should now be clear: Brackets and notched beams could be designed and constructed properly and eventually perform well in s e rv i c e. These elements may be reinforced by either post-tensioning and inducing compression in the direction of the expected tensile stresses or by placing mild reinforcement to close tolerances at all surfaces

and reentrant corners. In any event, in order to avoid the damage described above, the concrete elements should be allowed to move sufficiently to reduce the possibility of the development of tensile stresses and the resulting cracks. Most important, horizontal precast concrete elements should not be welded at both ends, but rather allowed to move and rotate, so as to avoid considerable damage by cracking. Rigidity for lateral loads such as wind and earthquake may be provided by reinforcing bars grouted or cast in concrete. Elastomeric bearing pads should permit hori zo n t a l and vertical movement and rotations and should not be placed directly at the edges of the bearing surfaces. To simplify the message: (1) Avoid brackets and notches where possible; (2) Do not weld both ends of precast elements; and (3) Avoid bearing on unconfined edges.

in this article represent only the tip of a dangerous icebergone that is all too often concealed as litigation to assign liability proceeds. Facts that would be beneficial may be mothballed for years, while the same errors are repeated. Although this learning process may be delayed, it must not be stopped. All members of the construction teamdesigners, builders, and materials suppliersmust become involved in learning from these experiences.

Acknowledgement The basic rules for preventing construction failures and the case of shear failure due to construction error were adapted from Dov Kaminetzkys article, Structural Failures and How to Prevent Them, in the August 1976 issue of Civil Engineering. These basic rules were originally formulated by the late Jacob Feld, founder of Feld, Kaminetzky & Cohen.

Conclusions
Some of the general conclusions we have reached through many first-hand failure investigations are presented here in the basic rules. The few examples given PUBLICATION #C810641
Copyright 1981, The Aberdeen Group All rights reserved