A Brief Guide For Teaching Proof

Authors: Elena Nardi, Paola annone
Address: UEA-EDU, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK

Telephone: +44 1603 592631 (Nardi), +44 1603 591007 (annone)
Fax: +44 1603 593446
E-Mail: e.nardi@uea.ac.uk, p.iannone@uea.ac.uk
Website: http://www.uea.ac.uk/~m011/
http://www.uea.ac.uk/edu/mathsed.html

ISBN 978-0-9539983-8-8

Cover: The diagram on the cover is used in the proof of Cantor's theorem that
it is impossible to enumerate the real numbers (namely that they are
uncountable). Cantor's proof is based on what became known as his
diagonal method: showing that for every given infinite sequence of
real numbers x
1
, x
2
, x
3
, . it is possible to construct a real number x
that is not on that list. remember vividly how seeing this diagram as a
Year 1 undergraduate made the construction of that x come to life so
very naturally. believe that amongst the objectives of mathematics
education research is to unearth such telling representations (whether
verbal, diagrammatic, symbolic or other) and help make them part of a
newcomer's landscape of university mathematics. Elena Nardi

Title: .with apologies to George Plya whose How To Solve It (Penguin
Science, 1990/1957) has been a seminal starting point for many
educators' and mathematicians' inquiries into the teaching and
learning of mathematics. and whose title here we are paraphrasing.
As we are not the first ones to have thought of this paraphrasing
Daniel J Velleman's How To Prove It: A Structured Approach (2006) is
at least one more case we may have to take comfort in the
possibility that the guide's originality does not start and end with our
choice of title!

Printed by the UEA Print Services

How to Prove It:
A brief guide
for teaching Proof
to Year 1 mathematics undergraduates

Elena Nardi and Paola Iannone

School of Education and Lifelong Learning
University of East Anglia
Norwich, UK

Contents

ntroduction

1
Acknowledgements

4
1. Conceptualising formal mathematical reasoning and the
necessity for Proof

5
2. 'Proof' by example: Syndrome or starting point?

17
3. Proof by Counterexample: s one as good as many?

23
4. Proof by Mathematical nduction: Conveying a sense of the
domino effect

32
5. Proof by Contradiction: Spotting the.contradiction

42
Epilogue

51
Bibliography

52
Appendix 53

How To Prove It Nardi & annone 1
Introduction

The booklet you hold in your hands is the outcome of a small project we
conducted with the financial support of the Higher Education Academy
(Mathematics, Statistics and Operational Research branch) between April
and September 2006. n response to HEA-MSOR's interest in 'commissioning
a project that provides support to those teaching 'Proof' to Pure
Mathematicians'. We proposed to produce a Guide, available as a booklet
and electronically, that will provide such support based on

Findings from our previous studies in the area (particularly given that
Mathematical Reasoning, specifically Proof, has been an essential
theme running across the data collection and analyses in these studies)
Relevant literature
nterim evaluation of the Guide's draft by groups of mathematicians and
researchers in mathematics education based at UEA and other
institutions that participated in the previous studies.

n the Appendix to this booklet we provide the project's Final Report to HEA-
MSOR where we describe the process through which we produced the guide
as well as the theoretical underpinnings of this work.

With regard to its structure the guide consists of five sections, each
highlighting an aspect of teaching and learning Proof that we propose as
significant:

conceptualising formal mathematical reasoning and the necessity for
Proof
the role of examples in Proof: the tension between the general and the
particular and 'proof'-by-example
the role of examples in Proof: Proof by Counterexample
Proof by Mathematical nduction: the step from n to n+1
Proof by Contradiction: spotting the contradiction

Each section is split in three sub-sections as follows:

Data sample: Examples from the data that we have collected in the
course of our previous studies and that illustrates the theme. This
usually starts with examples of student written responses to a
mathematical problem that required the use of a particular aspect of
Proof that the theme of the section aims to explore. t continues with a
brief reference to the comments made on the student responses by the
mathematicians interviewed in that study and concludes with a listing of

issues that the reader is invited to consider in the light of these
examples.
Some mathematics education research findings: how does the relevant
mathematics education research literature approaches the theme the
section aims to explore, particularly with regard to the difficulties
students face.
Transforming theory into pedagogical practice: recommended
pedagogical practices

The Data Samples have been collated from material in Amongst
Mathematicians: Teaching and Learning Mathematics At University Level
(Nardi, 2007 in press). n this the perspectives of mathematicians (who had
participated in group interviews in the course of our previous studies) are
presented in the slightly unconventional but not unusual format of a fictional
yet data-grounded dialogue between two characters, M and RME, a
mathematician and a researcher in mathematics education. Typically the
discussion between M and RME starts out from commenting on samples of
Year 1 mathematics students' written responses to questions that had been
handed out as 'homework' in the context of Calculus, Linear Algebra and
Group Theory courses.

Some mathematics education research findings is typically structured so that
it represents the work on students' learning and understanding of Proof, a
particularly vibrant area of mathematics education research. Findings in the
area have revolved around the following questions:

How do students conceptualise Proof? What are the difficulties
students have when implementing some Proof techniques? What do
students consider to be an acceptable proof? How does this
compare to what mathematicians perceive as an acceptable proof?
(Cognitive issues)
How does confidence in mathematics affect students' engagement
with and success in constructing proofs? (Affective issues)
How does lecture theatre / seminar room / classroom culture affect
students' perception of Proof? (Socio-cultural issues)

We would like to suggest a certain way of approaching the reading of this
booklet. You may wish to read it in a linear fashion from start to finish. This is
fine. You may however also wish to consider (re)visiting each section
separately and independently of the others.

Within each section we would like to suggest that

you first engage briefly with the mathematical problem that becomes the
trigger for the discussion between M and RME in the Data Samples
you read and reflect briefly on the examples of student responses to the
problem
you read and reflect briefly on the small excerpt of conversation
between characters M and RME
you attempt the more overall research perspective on the issue that is
on offer in the section that follows. You may need to engage with some
educational research terms in this section but we have tried to keep
these to a minimal
you consider the recommended practices in the final section.

Throughout we recommend that you read while considering the following
questions:

Regarding the particuIar issue in each section:

s this an issue that you believe your students face?
f yes, to what extent? And how do you as their teacher usually help
them towards a more comprehensive tackling of this issue?
Do you find that the research findings presented here offer an
accurate / meaningful description of student / difficulty?
Do you find the recommended pedagogical practices as potentially
useful?
Do you already use some of these, or similar, practices in your
teaching? Can you think of other occasions where drawing on these
recommendations could be helpful?
What modifications (systemic, practical, attitudinal etc.) of standard
practice would the endorsement and use of the recommendations
made here imply? Are these feasible? Etc.

Regarding the guide overaII:

What other issues regarding the teaching of Proof would you like to see
addressed by mathematics education research or future similar
publications that aim to support those who teach Proof to mathematics
undergraduates? What have we left out? Given the minute scale of this
project we had to be austerely selective.

Note on [x]: Across the text numbers 1-5 in square brackets refer to sections
1-5. The sections are meant to stand alone but this cross-referencing may
help the reader revisit parts of the guide where a reference to a similar issue
is made.

AcknowIedgements

Apart from our funders, the Higher Education Academy (Mathematics,
Statistics and Operational Research branch), we would like to acknowledge
the support of the participants to the two Interim Evaluation Events (one with
UEA faculty and one with colleagues from elsewhere) that took place in June
2006. Their encouraging and incisive comments contributed greatly to the
finalising of the guide. We thank them warmly and we sincerely hope that this
booklet fulfils its promise to be of help to those who teach proof to
mathematics undergraduates either directly, through its recommendations
or, perhaps more potently, as a trigger for reflection on the issues of
pedagogy it raises.

1
ConceptuaIising FormaI MathematicaI Reasoning
and the Necessity for Proof

ConceptuaIising Proof and Its Necessity: a sampIe of data
1

Students often wonder why anyone would bother with arguing about let
alone proving the truth of an obviously true statement. f this is a substantial
element of the economy of the human brain then perhaps asking students to
unpack the thinking behind their endorsement of obviously true statements is
an act that veers against their natural tendencies. And if so, it is then an act
doomed to fail. Here we will discuss why this unpacking is such a
fundamental element of mathematical thinking and hence internalising it is
non-negotiable . and hugely instructive. The following problem was set to
Year 1 students in the first weeks of an Analysis course:

Write down a careful proof that 2 Q.
(do this by contradiction: assume that 2 = m/n with n, m having no
common factors and see where you get after squaring and clearing
fractions).

One of the students handed in the following response:

1
Sample collated from episodes in Chapters 3 and 4 (Nardi, 2007 in press)


The part of the student's response we would like to focus on here is her
sentence 'if the square of a number is even then the number is even' which is
stated, yet left unproven. This is a small but significant, step of this proof. s
assuming the truth of this statement acceptable? Are the students at this
stage expected to provide the proof for every step in a proof, even the
apparently obvious?

M discusses the above with RME as follows:

M: . this lack of explicitness is dubious. Students have a problem in
deciding what level of sophistication they need to present in their
writing. Writing out a proof for every single claim can result in a long
script, something students are not used to. Since their school days they
have been expected to do small things in response to small chunks of
the syllabus. would be happy with such a leap if it followed other
occasions where similar simple arguments had been proved. But there
is a firmer approach: in a first course such as this would expect a
complete proof of this. n itself it is a small but substantial proof .at this
stage this leap of faith is not completely satisfactory. am aware of
course that distinguishing what knowledge can be assumed,
compressed, omitted from a script is a difficulty in itself. often like brief
student responses but am not sure they are always very revealing.

RME: Yes, students often imitate the expert's style and in this case they
do not seem to learn much about the necessity to prove even claims
that are intuitively almost obvious.

M: Obviousness creates problems and potential misunderstandings about
what level of detail is expected. A proof of this sort is that the product of
two even numbers is an even number. And there are other examples of
a simple proof students can learn a lot from. And perhaps in the writing
you can let them get away without all of those within an argument but, if
asked, the expectation would be that they can do them, right? n public,
on the board .!

RME: So simplicity obstructs a more accurate perception of what is
necessary? Do the students see proof as a tool for convincing
themselves and others?

M: Students are accustomed to being told in school about the truth or
falsity of statements, not to deciding themselves and this is a step they
need to take at this stage: the desire to know why something is true.
The focus in school is on algebraic manipulation, not proof. Which may
foster a misleading image of mathematics as all being about

manipulation only, missing thus what is at the heart of mathematics,
namely proof. This unbalanced stock of experience explains why they
find proof so difficult.

So, not only students are unclear about what can be taken for granted, stated
and left unproven, but the tendency to do so may be exacerbated by the
simplicity of the proposition in question: a syndrome of the obvious then
emerges and avoidance of explanation or proof becomes the greatest
casualty of this obviousness.

ConceptuaIising Proof and Its Necessity: some Mathematics Education
research findings

The above sample focuses on a tendency observed in students to make use
of, yet leave unproven, statements (often unaware they are expected to prove
them). There are several studies that focus on this common student tendency
(including Almeida, 2000; Dreyfus, 1999; Healy & Hoyles, 2000; Recio &
Godino, 2001 etc.) and they largely fall within a wider area of investigation in
mathematics education research that examines questions such as.Do
students see the necessity for proof? Do students see proof as a tool for
convincing themselves and others (whether friends or foes, Mason et al
1985)? Etc.

Given that questions such as the above have been debated within the field for
a while below we list some major issues that surround this debate. We note
that this is just a cursory glimpse into a quite substantial body of work that
has been taking place within mathematics education research for about 30
years. n [2]-[5] the focus is much tighter (e.g. on issues related to particular
proving techniques).

Students' perceptions of what constitutes proof. Recio & Godino (2001)
offer a distinction on students' perceptions as having different institutional and
personal meanings. Healy & Hoyles (2000) also reported on students' rich
and divergent perceptions of what constitutes proof. Proof has many facets in
society (evidence), in science (induction) and in mathematics (deduction).
Building on work that highlights the tension between personal and more
formal understanding of conviction they examined students' conceptions of
proof in the curricular context of high attaining 14/15 year old students in the
UK. Their findings showed that:

there is a substantial difference between the students' personal
preferences and the ones they would make in order to improve their
chances for a better grade. (and there was evidence that teachers were
not always aware of this).

Students were rather poor at constructing proofs. They often relied on
empirical arguments and their narrative often had little algebra or
formalism.
Students preferred empirical arguments but acknowledged more was
expected of them.
f students believed the conjecture in the first place, then they tended to
rely more heavily on and be convinced by empirical argument. (see
also [2])
Algebraic arguments were highly valued by students but also found
them difficult to produce or understand.
Narrative arguments were popular for their explanatory power and the
students' own narrative constructions were often characterized by
higher incidence of deductive reasoning. Their pattern was more or
less: empirical evidence to convince, then words or pictures to
complete the argument. Not algebra though.
Dominant views of proof were: truth, explanation, (some, few)
discovery.
Use of examples was seen as important so, often, a valid proof would
be seen as not general and examples would be used to 'complete' it.
Finally students' views of what constitutes proof - their views on what
constitutes an acceptable, sufficient argument - influenced their ability
to construct (and complete) a proof.

The transition from the experimental and intuitive habits of school
mathematical reasoning to the formal requirements of advanced
mathematical thinking. (e.g. Bell, 1976 and 1979; Moore, 1994). Most work in
this area suggests that students find proof difficult, unnecessary and
meaningless. They view empirical evidence as proof and use more empirical
arguments than deductive arguments (Martin & Harel, 1989; Porteous, 1990;
Williams, 1980; Yerushalmy et al, 1990; Almeida, 2000; Dreyfus, 1999;
Selden & Selden, 2003; Raman, 2003).

Even when introduced to deductive proof students do not seem to appreciate
its 'generic' aspect, namely, according to Balacheff (1990), one that is relying
on an object that is 'not there in its own right, but as a characteristic
representative of its class' (see also [2]). As Fischbein (1982) notes, students
are possibly not aware of the distinction between empirical and deductive
arguments.

Students either see empirical evidence as proof or deductive proof
simply as evidence Chazan (1993). Elaborating on the above distinction,
Chazan notes that students seem to recognise, especially when their
attention is drawn to it, that empirical arguments rely on examples which are
special, measurements are not exact and there may be counterexamples.

nstead of becoming sceptical about empirical arguments they prefer to
modify their empirical strategies in order to accommodate some of the
limitations and counterexamples do not disturb their notion of mathematical
truth which is not characterised by universality (see also [3]).

Dealing with the logic behind formal proof. Students are overwhelmed by
the content of the mathematical statements in a proof and are not able to
move beyond content and into the realm of logical manipulation of the
statements (Selden & Selden, 1995). Anderson (1994) characteristically
refers to persistent inconsistencies in the students' proving behaviour when
they fail to 'disentangle the logical elements from the analytic concepts'. A
similar interference on the students' clarity and competence in logical
manipulation was observed by Barnard (1995) in relation to the students'
considerable inability to negate logical statements: the perceived 'meaning' of
the statement, Barnard explains, interfered with the action of negation and
prevented the students from acting on a logical statement regardless of its
content. Not at ease with reading formal mathematical language as
something more than a meaningless citation of symbols, students often find it
difficult to engage with a logical manipulation of the statements (Barnard,
1995; Almeida, 2000; Keith, 2000).

Furthermore there is a set of works (e.g. Duval, 1991 and O'Brien, 1972;
1973) that attributes the learners' difficulties with mathematical proof to their
confusion of deductive thinking with ordinary argumentation.

The sociocultural dimension of proof. Axiomatic deduction is the norm in
the mathematical community. However a careful look at the mechanisms of
acceptance of a proof reveals that, similar to the outcomes of all human
activities, a mathematical proof is submitted to a context-dependent scrutiny.
n other words acceptance of a proof is a sociocultural process (Hanna,
1991).

Degrees of persuasion vary given that, depending on where the proof comes
from and how it is presented, learners may feel obliged to accept a proof
which they do not necessarily believe. This reflects the reality in the
mathematical community where acceptance of a proof is often a result of a
variety of sociocultural factors other than its sheer formality. Sekiguchi (1992)
in his thesis points at the social dimension of proof presentation as a
communication process and Hanna (1989a and b) enumerates a variety of
dimensions in the social process of accepting a proof.

Above all, proving is convincing and the rhetoric of conviction is subject to a
large number of communicational conventions. Moreover at the forefront of
mathematical creativity, new mathematical proofs are often presented in
elliptic, condensed forms that require a certain amount of suspense of

disbelief from the reader. n that sense formal proof is the driving force and
the aim of official mathematical communication but it is materialised on the
basis of a number of conventions; these conventions are characteristic of the
formal mathematical culture and their adoption is synonymous to a learner's
advanced mathematical enculturation.

ConceptuaIising Proof and Its Necessity: transforming theory into
pedagogicaI practice

Given the expansive work on Proof in mathematics education research we
offer here a mere glimpse into the recommendations made by the various
authors on how to approach the teaching of Proof. n [2] [5] we focus, e.g.,
on certain proving techniques; here we have selected some of the issues
raised in the literature and sample some recommendations on how teaching
can address those.

Gila Hanna, a prolific writer on the matter (particularly with regard to the
pedagogical role of proof), collates in a 2000 review the functions of proof and
proving as follows (p8): verification, explanation, systematisation, discovery,
communication, construction, exploration and incorporation. The first two,
verification and explanation, she proposes, are the functions teaching,
particularly at the early stages of students' encounter with proof, ought to
concentrate on. Further explanation (insight into why a statement is true) is
the function of proof that, she claims, has the most important pedagogical
role. An explanatory proof achieves a certain type of insight, she describes: it
uses a characterising property of an object mentioned in the theorem and
highlights the dependence of the result on this property; it calls upon the
meaning of the terms employed, not merely on the abstract relations between
these terms (Hanna's distinction relates closely to another distinction made
recently by Keith Weber and Lara Alcock (2004) between syntactic and
semantic proofs: the former rely on manipulating these relations and the latter
on proceeding through steps that involve an understanding of what things
mean at each step).

Take for example the statement

The three angle bisectors of a triangle meet at a single point (the incentre of
the triangle).

A standard proof of this involves 'the use of the characterising property that
an angle bisector is the locus of all points equidistant from the edges of the
angle' (p9). t is a proof that is 'both convincing and illuminating' (p9) and thus
represents the type of proof that needs to be given priority at this early stage
of students' encounter with proof. Hanna demonstrates the difference
between proofs that merely prove and proofs that explain in a 1990 paper that

discusses some pedagogical aspects of proof. She uses several proofs of the
following statement to make her point:

Prove that the sum of the first n positive integers, S(n), is equal to n(n+1)/2.

A proof by mathematical induction, though certainly acceptable, typically
lacks explanatory power; it hardly says anything about why the sum is what
we claim it is. Consider however a proof of this statement proposed by
Gauss:

S can be written as
1+2+.+(n-1)+n
and
n+(n-1) +.+2+1
Then: 2S is
[1+n]+[2+(n-1)]+.+[(n-1)+2]+[n+1]
which is equal to taking n times the factor n+1. 2S = n(n+1).
Therefore S= n(n+1)/2.

This proof provides a very convincing account of why the sum is n(n+1)/2.
Hanna then introduces two illustrations that can be used for two further
explanatory proofs:

An isosceles triangle of dots:

And a staircase-shaped area:

Frank Uhlig's proposition (2002) for a different sequencing in proof
presentation originates in concerns similar to those of Hanna. Uhlig starts
from recognising that students experience few, if any, proofs in school. He

also offers an observation from the evolutionary history of mathematics:
formal proof, in its rigorous definition - lemma - proof - theorem - proof
corollary (DLPTPC) form, does not become the usual way of presenting
mathematical results until around 1870. t is thus quite sensible to work on
introducing students to proof in a much smoother, transitory kind of way. Take
Linear Algebra, he proposes. Typically in Year 1 it is taught more or less as a
DLPTPC course, often at the expense of conceptual understanding. Uhlig
proposes a teaching method that gently moves from an intuitive WWHWT
(What happens if? Why does it happen? How do different cases occur? What
is true there?) approach to the more formal DLPTPC one. He offers several
examples in his paper and the underlying argument is that this is the way
mathematics is researched anyway (he himself is primarily a research
mathematician). For example:

A good start for introducing 'proofs' by using salient point type arguments is
to discuss the solvability of linear equations before actually teaching how to
solve them (p339).

He then travels through the usual Linear Algebra material on this topic
highlighting at several points where replacing formal introductions with
exploratory ones (e.g. with reference to the definition of linear independence)
and where unpacking processes usually presented in one compressed step is
apt. He concludes:

With our early WWHWT and later DLPTPC approach combined, we have
been able to transit in one semester from almost 'no proofs' through 'salient
point proofs' to 'formal rigorous proofs'. (p344).

Uhlig's proposition received lively commentary when it appeared in
Educational Studies in Mathematics. Amongst the comments the following
two stand out:

Jean-Luc Dorier, Aline Robert and Marc Rogalski (2002) largely agree
with his approach but distance themselves from his claim that it is lack
of experience with proof that is to blame for students' typical difficulties
in introductory Linear Algebra courses of the DLPTPC kind. French
students also have problems with traditional approaches even though
they have more experience with proof than the Anglosaxon students
Uhlig has worked with. Therefore, they infer, the difficulty must contain
context-specific elements. n particular, it seems to revolve around the
idea that most concepts in Linear Algebra are unifying - generalizing
concepts which, for the students to understand, a step back and
reflection is necessary. The authors list their experience of teaching
when this student need is considered, their preferences, their links with
history, their proclivity towards proofs that highlight conceptual

significance (but can be, unlike Uhlig's, more computationally difficult).
They thus propose an enrichment of his method.
Robert Burn (2002) also responded to Uhlig with a enriching
proposition: he highlighted the potential of studying R
2
and R
3
as a
sound basis for generalizing properties of vector spaces and for
highlighting the links between Algebra and Geometry.

Finally we would like to offer Leron's (1983) proposition for a different
approach to structuring proofs. Leron highlights what is perceived as a
conflict between mathematics aesthetics and what students find easier to
relate to (we return to this in [5]). His key idea for re-structuring mathematical
proofs is as follows: arrange a proof not as a linear sequence of facts, but in
levels, proceeding from top down. The levels themselves consist of short,
autonomous "modules, each embodying the major idea of the proof (p175).

Leron offers a range of examples and, significantly, from across mathematical
topics. n that paper alone he tackles proofs from Number Theory, Euclidean
Geometry, Calculus and Linear Algebra. We conclude this section with citing
a structured proof of

If lim
xa
f(x) = L and lim
xa
g(x) = M, then lim
xa
f(x)g(x) = LM.

(in the paper it is juxtaposed to the much shorter yet far less explanatory one
appearing in standard Calculus texts)


REFERENCES

Almeida, D. (2000) The student experience of mathematical proof at
university level. International Journal of Mathematics Education in Science
and Technology, 31(6), 871 890
Anderson, J. A. (1994) The answer is not the solution: inequalities and proof
in undergraduate mathematics. International Journal of Mathematics
Education in Science and Technology, 25, 655-663
Balacheff, N. (1990) Beyond a psychological approach: the psychology of
mathematics education. For the Learning of Mathematics, 10, 2-8

Barnard, T. (1995) The impact of 'meaning' on students' ability to negate
statements. Proceedings of the 19
th
Annual Meeting of the International
Group for Psychology in Mathematics Education, 2, 3-10
Bell, A. W. (1976) A study of pupils' proof explanations in mathematical
situations. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 7, 23-40
Bell, A. W. (1979) The learning of process aspects of mathematics.
Educational Studies in Mathematics. 10, 361-385
Burn, B. (2002) Some comments on 'The role of proof in comprehending and
teaching elementary linear algebra' by F. Uhlig. Educational Studies in
Mathematics, 51, 183184
Chazan, D. (1993) High School Geometry students' justification for their
views of empirical evidence and mathematical proof. Educational Studies in
Mathematics, 24, 359-387
Dorier, J. L., Robert, A., & Rogalski, M. (2002) Some comments on 'The role
of proof in comprehending and teaching elementary Linear Algebra' by
F.Uhlig. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 51, 185 191
Dreyfus, T. (1999) Why Johnny can't prove. Educational Studies in
Mathematics, 38, 85 109
Duval, R. (1991) Structure du raisonnement deductif et apprentissage de la
demonstration. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 22, 233-261
Fischbein, E. (1982) ntuition and proof. For the Learning of Mathematics, 3,
9-18
Hanna, G. (2000) Proof, explanation and exploration: an overview.
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 44, 5-23
Hanna, G. (1990) Some pedagogical aspects of proof. Interchange, 21(1), 6-
13
Hanna, G. (1991) Mathematical Proof. n D. Tall (ed.), Advanced
Mathematical Thinking (pp. 54-61). Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer
Academic Publishers
Hanna, G. (1989a) 'More than formal proof', For the Learning of Mathematics,
9(1), 20-23
Hanna, G. (1989b) Proofs that prove and proofs that explain. PME13, Paris,
Vol.2, 45-51
Healy, L., & Hoyles, C. (2000) A study of proof conceptions in Algebra.
Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 31(4), 396 428
Keith, J.(2000) The student experience of mathematical proof at university
level, International Journal of Mathematical Education in Science and
Technology, 31, 53-60

Leron, U. (1983) Structuring mathematical proofs, The American
Mathematical Monthly, 3, 174-185
Martin, W. G. & Harel, G. (1989) The role of the figure in students' concepts of
geometric proof. Proceedings of the 13
th
Annual Meeting of the International
Group for Psychology in Mathematics Education, 2, 266-273
Mason, J. H., Burton, L & Stacey, K. (1985) Thinking Mathematically, London:
Prentice Hall
Moore, R. C. (1994) Making the transition to formal proof. Educational
Studies in Mathematics, 27, 249-266
O'Brien, T. (1972) 'Logical thinking in adolescents.', Educational Studies in
O'Brien, T. (1973) Logical thinking in college students, Educational Studies in
Porteous, K. (1990) What Do Children Really Believe? Educational Studies in
Raman, M. (2003) Key ideas: what are they and how can they help us
understand how people view proof? Educational Studies in Mathematics, 52,
319 325
Recio, A. M., & Godino, J. D. (2001) nstitutional and personal meanings of
mathematical proof. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 48, 83 99
Sekiguchi, Y. (1991) Social dimensions of proof in presentation: from an
ethnographic in a high school geometry classroom. PME16, Durham NH,
Vol.2, 314-321
Selden J. & Selden A. (1995) Unpacking the logic of mathematical
statements, Educational Studies in Mathematics, 29, 123-151
Selden, A., & Selden, J. (2003) Validation of proofs considered as texts: can
undergraduates tell whether an argument proves a theorem? Journal for
Research in Mathematics Education, 34(1), 4 - 36
Uhlig, F. (2002) The role of proof in comprehending and teaching elementary
Linear Algebra. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 50, 335 - 346
Weber, K. & Alcock, L. (2004) Semantic and syntactic proof productions.
Educational Studies in Mathematics 56, 209 234
Williams, A. (1980) Brief reports: High School students' understanding of
proof. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 11, 239-241
Yerushalmy, M., Gordon, M. & Chazan, D. (1990) Mathematical Problem
Posing: implications for facilitating student inquiry in the classroom.
Instructional Science, 19, 219-245

2
'Proof'-by-example: Syndrome or Starting Point?

'Proof'-by-exampIe: a sampIe of data
2

The following problem was set to first year undergraduate students during
their course in basic analysis and linear algebra:

Let A be a non-zero nxn matrix such that AA=A
2
=0 (the zero matrix).
Show that A is not invertible. Give an example of a matrix A such that
AA=A
2
=0.

One of the students handed in this response:

M comments on the above as follows:

M: am often asked by students who recognize that doing the 2x2 case only
might not be enough in the end but then again they often behave as if it
is. it was enough for Cayley and Hamilton by the way. You know, they
did the case 2x2 and then in the appendix they offered the 3x3 case.
That's it. That's their proof! And students are often happy to live in
Flatland! But there is a slightly different issue here as well: in this
question wouldn't be surprised if they resisted the invitation to construct
an example. They often resist hard our efforts to get them to give
examples. They don't like doing examples. They want somehow the
characters in their solutions to be in the question already. They don't
want to be required to construct any new characters! Let alone explain
how these characters came to be.

2
Sample from Chapter 3 in (Nardi, 2007 in press)

M's comments raise what we label here as the 'Proof'-by-example
Syndrome (in the particularly severe case of the student response
discussed above)
M highlights two cases from the history of mathematics in which
mathematicians made a constructive use of this type of proof albeit
via the construction of a generic example, namely an example that
encapsulates all the characteristics of the general case
M observes that, even though students often rely on examples to shape
their mathematical arguments, they typically resent constructing
examples as illustrations of their understanding of the general theory

'Proof'-by-exampIe: some Mathematics Education research findings

The 'Proof'-by-example Syndrome this chapter focuses on is well
documented in the literature as a student tendency that can be traced back to
the students' experience of school mathematics. For example Healy & Hoyles
(2000) found that the 14/15 year old students in their study often relied on
empirical arguments and that if they believed the conjecture in the first place,
then they tended to rely more heavily on and be convinced by empirical
arguments. Algebraic arguments were highly valued by students but students
also found these proofs difficult to produce or understand. Narrative
arguments were popular for their explanatory power and the students' own
narrative constructions were often characterized by higher incidence of
deductive reasoning. Their pattern was more or less: empirical evidence to
convince, then words or pictures to complete the argument.

n order to describe the various strategies that students employ in order to
produce a mathematical argument, Harel & Sowder (1998) have introduced
the notion of Proof Scheme. A Proof Scheme is the collection of arguments
that a student (or a mathematician) employs to convince herself or others of
the validity of a mathematical statement. They suggest that there are seven
types of Proof Schemes grouped in three categories as follows:

ExternaI conviction These can be: a ritual proof scheme (where
convincing comes from the form of the proof rather than from the
content), an authoritarian proof scheme (or convincing by authority of
the book or the lecturer) and a symbolic proof scheme (where
convincing comes from manipulation of symbols behind which there
might or might not be meaning)
EmpiricaI conviction These can be: procedural (where students hold
as convincing rudimentary images of the mathematical concepts
involved and ones not fully supported by deduction) and inductive
(where one or more examples are judged to be convincing of the
validity of the general statement)

AnaIyticaI conviction These can be: transformational (where students
convince others of the validity of a statement by a deductive process in
which they consider generality issues and goal-oriented operations and
transform mental images) and axiomatic (where the students also
recognise that mathematics also relies on statements that have no
proof)

This classification, Harel & Sowder stress, is not meant to be hierarchical:
different proof schemes can be displayed by students (and professional
mathematicians) at the same time in different contexts. Moreover, taxonomies
like the one illustrated above are not intended to be exhaustive: Harel &
Sowder do not classify all different types of proof that can occur in students'
(and indeed mathematicians') work. However only some of the above
schemes would be recognised by the mathematical community as acceptable
proofs. For example in the data sample we offer here, and in Harel &
Sowder's terms, the student's proof scheme could be classified as Empirical
Conviction/nductive in two senses: 2x2 matrix rather than nxn and a specific
2x2 matrix instead of a general one. And it can hardly be accepted as proof.

n what follows we offer a glimpse into how this student tendency can be
gradually transformed into an appreciation of the role of examples
particularly generic examples can play in constructing mathematical
arguments. Examples are important. However they are largely so as starting
points only and students often need to be helped to move beyond a 'be-all
and end-all' reliance on them.

'Proof'-by-exampIe: transforming theory into pedagogicaI practice

So, how can this transformation begin to happen? Let's consider, for
example, what we referred to above as a generic example, an example that
encapsulates the generality of a statement

Euclidean Geometry is a context in which use of generic examples is
abundant. Consider, for example, the statement

Theorem: The diagonals of a parallelogram bisect each other.

t probably makes a lot more sense to start a proof of this statement by
drawing a 'generic' parallelogram rather than a square!

A square may in itself be a parallelogram. However, if we proceed this way,
we not only find that the diagonals bisect, but also that they cross at a 90
angle! n this case we would need to discuss that this is not the case for most
other parallelograms (and perhaps for which other parallelograms the angle is
also 90). And we would definitely need to generalise the proof beyond
squares.

Let us now consider another simple case, this time in an algebraic context.
Consider the statement

Theorem: Show that the sum of an even number and an odd number is
an odd number.

One proof of this statement is as follows:

Let p be an even number and k be an odd number, therefore p can be
expressed as p=2p' and k can be expressed as k=2k'+1 with p',k'N.
Then: p+k=2p'+(2k'+1)=2p'+2k'+1=2(p'+k')+1 which is odd for any p'
and k'.

Students however often come up with responses such as the ones below.
What would you make of these responses?

'Because for example 17=10+7'.
This answer reveals a problem with understanding the statement.
The statement of the theorem is not that every odd number is given
by the sum of an even number plus an odd number, but that the sum
of an even number plus an odd number is odd.
'Because for example 10, which is 2x5 plus 5 is 15'.
Examples like that are not ideal as the two numbers (10 and 5 in our
case) have a common factor (5) and this is not a generic example (a
bit like the square-vs.-parallelogram comment in the example
above).
'Because for example 10+7=17'.
This answer could reveal understanding of the statement (it is the
right way around), but does not give a lot of insight on why this is so
and relies entirely on trusting the truth of the statement.
'Because for example 10, which is 2x5 plus 7 is 17'.
This begins to tease out the essence of 10 being even, but says
nothing about 7.
Because for example 10, which is 2x5, plus 7, which is 3x2+1, is
2x5+(3x2+1)=2(5+3)+1 which is odd.
This is what Movshovitz-Hadar (2000) calls a transparent pseudo
proof. t encapsulates all the steps involved in the proof, teases out

the defining features of odd and even, but it is, after all, a numerical
example.

The students responses proposed above, unlike the written excerpt at the
beginning of this section, are fictional. These are included only as examples
of the different nuances a 'proof' by example has and of the different types of
appearance it may make in students' writing. And let us stress here that the
last response is rather unlikely to appear in a piece of student writing: the
step from the last response to a proper proof is very small, and we can argue
that a student who has produced the last response would also very quickly be
able to produce a formal proof of the statement. However, despite a certain
degree of contrivance, this last response still serves as an indication of the
role generic examples can play in constructing arguments.

n constructing, and conveying the significance of, a generic example it is
crucial to constantly tease out what it is exactly that makes the example
generic, representative of its genre (Mason 2002). Mason offers some
practical suggestions about this teasing out:

Use two different sides of the blackboard to develop the general proof
and the generic example. This might help students recognise genericity
as well as link the abstraction of the former to the specificity of the latter
When describing an example stress what are the features that make
this example generic, as well as what features you can alter but yet still
have the example remain generic.

Other practical suggestions that can be incorporated into teaching and refer
to the issue of 'proof' by example are:

Try to always state the theorem to be proved in the most general form.
After having given a formal proof (perhaps with the help of the
blackboard suggestion above) try to specialise the statement in different
directions and see what happens to the property that was to be proved.
n the example of the parallelogram we discussed before, this could
translate in proving the theorem with a parallelogram and then
investigate what happens to the case of a rhombus or a square. n the
case of the algebraic statement regarding odd and even numbers, this
could translate in considering the case of both numbers being even and
both numbers being odd.
Try also to the reverse process: take a specific case (in the
parallelogram example take for instance a square) and investigate
which properties of the square can be taken away to preserve the fact
that the diagonals bisect. n this way the students could gain some
further insight into generic example construction as well as theorem
formation.


REFERENCES

Harel, G. and Sowder, L. (1998) Students' proof schemes: Results from
exploratory studies, in E. Dubinsky, A. Schoenfeld and J. Kaput (eds.),
Research in Collegiate Mathematics Education, III, American Mathematical
Society, Providence, R, 234283.

Healy, L., & Hoyles, C. (2000) A study of proof conceptions in Algebra.
Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 31(4), 396 - 428.

Mason, J. H. (2002) Mathematics teaching practice. A guide for university and
College lecturers, Horwood Publishing Series in Mathematics and
Applications.

Movshovitz-Hadar N. (1998) Transparent pseudo-proofs abridge to formal
proofs. Proceedings of the nternational Conference on the Teaching of
Mathematics, University of Aegean, Samos, Greece, July 3-6, 1998. New
York: John Wiley and Sons.

3
Proof by Counterexample: is one as good as many?

Proof by CounterexampIe: a sampIe of data
3

The following problem was set to Year 1 students in the context of discussing
properties of sets and of the supremum, infimum, maximum and minimum of
a set in their introductory Analysis course.

(i) If S and T have suprema, prove sup(ST) = max {supS, supT}.
(ii) Is it true that if S and T have suprema then sup(ST) = min {supS,
supT}? Justify your answer.

The excerpt that follows is from a transcribed conversation between a Year 1
student (Alan) and his tutor and is taken from (Nardi 1996).

.The tutor and Alan then agree that (ii) is not true. Alan cannot recall the
counterexample he used. The tutor offers a counterexample (S={1,2}, T={1,3})
and asks Alan to think where exactly he realised that (ii) was not true.
A1: t's true that supS is an upper bound for the intersection but it's just saying
that... it breaks down when prove that it is the least upper bound...
because if there is an element in between...
T1: t would look awfully like this again! [refers to student's response to
another part of this question]
A2: Oh, it's the same... probably... so supS is 2...
T2: Hmm... so alpha could go one and a half from there...[Alan nods] t's the
problem about that you are considering two alternatives for all x as
opposed to it holding for a particular x... 'm not certain...
A3: 'm saying... that x here... think it's this... it's quite difficult to say...
The tutor says there is a 'shakier' counterexample which requires a bit of
'trickery': choosing S and T such that ST= then ST has no supremum. He
however suggested the one given above because he thought of it as 'slightly
more convincing'.

Below M and RME consider the issue of 'more' or 'less convincing'
counterexamples.

M: Choosing a couple of sets which are disjoint seems to be taking the toys
away. feel there is not even an opportunity here to start toying with this
idea. think that from the student's point of view would be dissatisfied.
After all not all counterexamples are the same: they are if their use is to
disclaim a statement but they are not as they highlight different things.
For example the minimal counterexample, the least number that violates
something is often a good indicator of a property or a phenomenon. A

3
Sample collated from Episodes in Chapter 3 in (Nardi, 2007 in press)

reasonable counterexample that shows up in how many cases, not
simply one extreme one, the statement does not apply is far more
acceptable. But is this a personal, psychological thing or something to do
with the mathematics? wonder. think can offer another example:
convergence/divergence of a series when the absolute value of its
sequence tends to zero. There are more and less instructive
counterexamples you can use to illustrate the difference between a
convergent and a divergent sequence or series. A counterexample may
suggest to you how you can reformulate a statement to include fewer or
more cases. So, if the condition about the intersection was that the two
sets do not intersect, then the students' search for a counterexample
would have been more productive as they would have been steered
away from the less convincing one, think.

RME: Do you get occasions where students say: well. ok, we have found
one or two counterexamples but actually for most of the cases the
statement applies, therefore the statement is true? Because if that were
the case then the students would not easily accept Proof by
Counterexample.

M: Yes, students often think that to prove falsity of a statement they have to
prove it is always false. Take matrix multiplication is not commutative, for
example. They cannot always see that finding just one pair of matrices
that do not commute is enough. Other interesting problems in this
respect are: the probability of randomly picking two matrices that
commute or a rational number off the real line. n fact it is a real problem
to convey to the students how one goes from a state of doubt to a state
of persuasion via examples or what not. think there is potency in the
idea of providing the opportunity to the students to explore the
reasonable, meaningful cases.

RME: We often talk about a type of proof that helps us modify an argument, a
technique and so on. Can we revisit this in the context of the above
excerpt?

M: Yes, but need to know what definition of supremum the students had
been given and whether this included an equal emphasis on upper
boundedness and non emptiness of the set. Knowing this would tell us
more about why the students respond to the counterexamples in these
ways. The interest in the non-emptiness is limited, it is just something
that makes the definition more precise when you write things down. The
essence lies in the bounded-aboveness, would suggest. Therefore
there is no surprise in the students' preference for counterexamples that
refer to the latter. And would agree with them. Moreover think the
empty intersection counterexample is pathological, an unproductive

resolution of the question that does not illuminate us any further about
the assertion. The other one is good. f the second part of the question
put the non-empty intersection as a requirement then attention would
have been steered away from this unproductiveness. But beyond the
pedagogical and psychological parts of the argument there is the issue of
the role of a counterexample: well, would say it is its illuminating
powers.

Proof by CounterexampIe: some Mathematics Education research
findings

'The status of a counterexample is so powerful compared to the status of other
examples. While one counterexample is enough to draw very definite
conclusions, several supporting and verifying examples do not suffice. No
wonder often students feel that a counterexample is an exception that does not
really refute the statement in question.' (Zaslavsky & Ron 1998, p231).

Students' relationship with counterexamples (understanding the role
counterexamples play in rejecting conjectures; generating and using
counterexamples) is a relatively under-researched area of mathematics
education. These issues are usually discussed in the more general frame of
how students relate with proof, how they understand its universality and how
they use examples in proving. For example, researchers (e.g. Balacheff,
1991) have approached students' treatment of counterexamples from the
wider angle of how they treat refutation. Or, to give another example, as we
saw in [2], counterexamples can be discussed in the context of empirical
proof schemes (Harel & Sowder, 1998). n these more general studies
students often appear unconvinced by a counterexample and they view it as
'an exception that does not contradict the statement in question' (Zaslavsky &
Ron 1998, p225).

Zaslavsky & Ron (1998) explored students'

understanding of the role of counterexamples in refuting statements
use of counterexamples by their own initiative to refute a statement
success in generating correct counterexamples
overall difficulty with refutation

For this purpose they employed five sources of evidence:

question sheets that contained several statements (some true and
some false). They asked students to identify the false statements and
prove their falsity.
a problem sheet that contained three fictional student responses to a
proving task. They asked students to evaluate the three responses (one

claimed truth based on a few examples; another claimed falsity based
on a counterexample; and the third claimed falsity, did not accept the
sufficiency of a counterexample and pursued a different argument).
a problem sheet that contained a false statement with four attempts to
falsify it. They asked students to determine the validity of each attempt.
Attitudinal questionnaires recording students' attitudes towards the role
of counterexamples.
A problem sheet with four false statements the students were asked to
generate counterexamples for.

A particularly interesting finding of the study is that students' behaviour varied
very widely in accordance with context (a view more generally identified by
other studies such as Perkins & Salomon's (1989)). The tasks the students
were asked to engage with were both algebraic and geometric and

for geometric statements much more reference was made to counterexamples
than for the [.] algebraic statements. (p228)

Also:

students were much more persistent in their view that a counterexample is
sufficient for refuting a geometric statement than for an algebraic one. (p228).

(As in several places in this guide, Geometry emerges as an area of
mathematics brimming with potential for a fruitful discussion of Proof...).

Students were also found not very proficient in identifying false statements
and also were reluctant to use counterexamples. The study suggests that this
reluctance

impeded their ability to correctly determine the validity of the given statements
(p228)

and records the worrying result that the vast majority of students (about two
thirds)

either did not find it appropriate to use counterexamples or were not able to
correctly use counterexamples for any statement. (p230)

Even students who accepted a counterexample as sufficient evidence for
refuting a statement

were not able to distinguish between an example that satisfies the conditions
of a counterexample and one that does not. (p230)

Students also had difficulty with generating counterexamples. For example,

they were trying to force many conditions upon an example [and as a
consequence] came up with 'examples' that do not exist, and were not aware
of it. (p231)

The above findings resonate with similar studies that Zaslavsky and Peled
(1996, 1997) conducted with mathematics student teachers. n (Zaslavsky &
Peled 1996) they discuss the pedagogical role of counterexamples in terms of
a distinction between counterexamples that (only) prove and
counterexamples that (also) explain and in (Peled & Zaslavsky 1997) they
locate students' difficulty with this type of proof in the wider arena of their
difficulty to construct examples (often due to limited content space).

From a pedagogical perspective we agree with Peled & Zaslavsky (1997) that

different counterexamples may have a different 'pedagogical status', that is
some may be more powerful than others in terms of providing insight into the
claim and ways to refute it. (p49)

They distinguish three types of counterexamples in terms of their explanatory
power (p53):

Specific: a counterexample that contradicts the claim yet does not give
a clue to the underlying mechanism for constructing other or similar
counterexamples
Semi-general: a counterexample that give some clue to the underlying
mechanism for constructing other or similar counterexamples but does
not 'tell the whole story' and does not cover the whole space of
counterexamples.
General: a counterexample that provides a 'behind the scenes' story
and suggests a way to generate the entire counterexample space.

Peled & Zaslavsky's (1997) triad above falls neatly into our discussion
(annone & Nardi, 2005) of the variable effect of different types of
counterexample. We distinguished three, at times conflicting, roles that
counterexamples play in learning and doing mathematics.

The first role is an affective role. The counterexample has to be
emotionally convincing for the students (strengthen their certainty). f it
is based on what the student perceives as some minor technicality (as
is the case non-emptiness in the example in the previous section) then
the counterexample may not convince the student that the proposition
is false.

The cognitive role consists in conveying to the students that all
counterexamples are the same, as far as mathematical logic is
concerned; that a single counterexample can refute a proposition; that a
proposition does not need to be always false in order to be false; and,
that one occasion of falsity suffices.
The epistemological-cum-pedagogical role has to do with what can be
learned from a good counterexample for example in mathematics we
use counterexamples to identify which elements of a false statement
would need to be amended in order to transform this statement into a
theorem.

Peled & Zaslavsky's (1997) triad is of particular value when discussing mostly
the last two of the three roles we distinguish above.

Proof by CounterexampIe: transforming theory into pedagogicaI
practice

Peled & Zaslavsky (1997) exemplify their triad (specific, semi-general,
general) in the context of student teachers' responses to the task of refuting
the following two statements:

Task 1. Two rectangles with congruent diagonals are congruent
Task 2. Two parallelograms having one congruent side and one
congruent diagonal are congruent.

The three sets of counterexamples they cite are as follows:

Specific counterexamples (p54)

Semi-general counterexamples (p54)

General counterexamples (p56)

Zaslavsky and Ron's (1998) question sheets have generated rich evidence
on students' fluency with and attitudes towards counterexamples. We
therefore cite below some of the false statements they asked their students to
engage with.:

If in two quadrilaterals all sides are respectively congruent, then the
quadrilaterals are congruent.
If the diagonals of a quadrilateral are equal in length, the quadrilateral is
a rectangle.
The function f(x) = x
2
+2x-2 is odd.
The function f(x) = -x
2
-2x decreases in its domain.

. and invite you to consider analogous tables as well as counterexamples
that address the third dimension (affective) that we discussed in (annone &
Nardi 2005)!

Furthermore in case you would like to move this discussion beyond the
context of Algebra, Geometry and Analysis here is the task Zaslavsky &
Peled (1996) have used in the context of Group Theory to explore students'
attitudes towards and proficiency with generating counterexamples:

Any commutative operation is also associative.

REFERENCES

Balacheff, N.: (1991) Treatment of refutations: Aspects of the complexities of
a constructivist approach to mathematics learning. n V E.Glasersfeld (Ed)
Radical Constructivism in Mathematics Education, 89-110, Netherlands
Kluwer Academic Press

Harel, G. and Sowder, L.: (1998) 'Students' proof schemes: Results from
exploratory studies', in E. Dubinsky, A. Schoenfeld and J. Kaput (eds.),
Research in Collegiate Mathematics Education, III, American Mathematical
Society, Providence, R, 234283.

annone, P. & Nardi E. (2005) Counterexamples: is one as good as many?
Proceedings of the 4
th
Mediterranean Conference in Mathematics Education,
Palermo, taly. Volume , 379-388

Nardi, E. (1996) The novice mathematician's encounter with mathematical
abstraction: tensions in concept-image construction and formalisation.
Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Oxford.

Peled, . & Zaslavsky, O. (1996) Counterexamples that (only) prove and
counterexamples that (also) explain. Focus on Learning Problems of
Mathematics, 19 (3), 49 61

Perkins, D.N. & Salomon, G. (1989) Are cognitive skills content bound?
Educational Researcher, 18(1), 16-25

Zaslavsky, O. & Peled, . (1996) nhibiting factors in generating examples by
mathematics teachers and student teachers: the case of binary operation.
Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 27 (1), 67 78

Zaslavsky, O. & Ron, G. (1998) Students' understanding of the role of
counter-examples, Proceedings of the 22
nd
Annual Conference of the
International Group for Research in Psychology of Mathematics Education,
Vol 4, 225-232

4
Proof by MathematicaI Induction:
conveying a sense of the domino effect
4

(or: don't worry, you are not assuming
what you are supposed to be proving.)

Proof by MathematicaI Induction: a sampIe of data
5

The following problem was set to Year 1 students in the first weeks of an
Analysis course:

One of the students handed in this response to part (ii):

Student E

As this student response exemplifies and as we discuss briefly in the
following section difficulties with the algebraic manipulations required in a
Proof by Mathematical nduction form a large part of the students' overall
difficulty with this type of Proof (in the case of part (ii) with handling
inequalities). However here we wish to focus on students' difficulty with the
mechanism of Mathematical nduction itself.

M: One difficulty with Mathematical nduction is that somehow one proves a
statement for n by assuming it in the second step. And this somehow
contrasts with everything else that we have said to the students often in

4
'Googling' the term yielded numerous uses of the term, for example in lecture notes and
so on, for the purpose of describing the mechanism of Proof by Mathematical nduction.
5

the same week, maybe even in the same lecture, that there is something
special about Proof by nduction that students have little understanding
of. How can you possibly prove something in this way by saying it is true
in the first place? t is hard work to get by this notion. And also think
another difficulty is beginning to appreciate that one needs to replace n
with n+1, a difficulty also seen in the context of f(x) and f(x+3). This is
always proving surprisingly hard work. often think it would be easier to
use n and k instead. Already that means that substituting k+1 to n is
easier than substituting n+1 to n. But see the main difficulty with
Mathematical nduction as being able to see the transition from the n to
the n+1 case, this idea that you need to prove your right to the claim that
the statement is true for k+1, assuming the truth for k.

RME: Do the students understand why the Mathematical nduction
mechanism is a proof?

M: Well, to start with, some of them come to university already familiar with it
and it is an easy-to-follow recipe. am thinking of places we use it
commonly in Linear Algebra, for example.

RME: A kind of domino effect, guess.

M: Yes! Which they accept easily. Especially in the context of proving
equalities, like in part (iv), to which they are used to.

RME: There are plenty of examples in Geometry where the mechanism turns
out to be useful.

M: Sure but they are much more accustomed to seeing this in the context of
Algebra. And as a recipe that is easy to apply. But why is it a proof? am
not sure how far into thinking about this they go but it is easier for them
than for us, in a sense. The less mathematics you know the more
convincing nduction is. t is pretty obvious: P(1) is true and, if you can
prove that P(n) implies P(n+1), P(2) is true implies P(3) is true. and so
on for all n. f you know lots of mathematics it is not. pretty obvious at
all!

RME: Student H seems to play around a bit with what P(n) is in her script.


Student H

M: Well, as usual there is a problem with the idea that P(n) is a statement,
not a number. Or an equation. think there is an interesting interplay in
this otherwise fantastic script the student knows exactly what she is
doing between P(n) being a statement and an algebra expression. P(n)
is followed after a couple of lines by P(n+1) = . . To me it is very crucial
that they see P(n) as a statement evaluated at n and not as a number or
an expression. The whole logic of Mathematical nduction depends on
that. know P(n) makes it look a bit like a function but in a sense there is
a correspondence between statements and values of n so this symbolism
is not off at all. But of course, given the dominant understanding of
function as an algebraic expression that arranges the assignment of
values of a quantity for various values of x, this symbolism may invite
misunderstandings. And don't want to go into thinking that yes, there is
a function but it is the one that assigns true or false to P(n).

Proof by MathematicaI Induction: some Mathematics Education
research findings

'Proof by Mathematical Induction is especially annoying to students.
The topic [.] is typically presented as a technique for establishing
closed-form formulas for summation [e.g. 'prove that the sum of the first
n numbers of the form 4k-3 is 2n
2
-n]. To do this students go through the
stylized steps [true for n=1; assume true for n, prove true for n+1]. Now,
most students find the first task so trivial that they can't imagine what
needs to be done. What's worse is that they look at the second task
and wonder why in the world they should assume precisely what it is
that they are trying to prove. Annoying indeed.' Cuoco & Goldenberg
(1992, p183)

To counteract the potential 'annoyance' lying in the above kind of introductory
experience to the mechanism of Mathematical nduction Cuoco and
Goldenberg look at an alternative approach: what might someone use to
'develop this formula for the sum', they ask and suggest that we invite
students to start with going through some of the first calculations themselves
(to add the first 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . such numbers and see what they get). f you
do so, they claim, 'you'll probably find that you don't re-compute each sum
from scratch'. For example to get 1+5+9+13 it is very likely that you will use
the sum for 1+5+9 you had already calculated and just add 13.

'A pattern emerges from the calculations, and the pattern comes from
the insight (gained by carrying out several concrete calculations) that
there is an alternative method for looking at each sum that makes use
of the structure (and value) of the previous sum. n other words there is
a self-similarity in the stream of calculations that allows you to apply the
same technique for evaluating a term in the stream regardless of where
in the stream it occurs.' Cuoco & Goldenberg (1992, p183)

n other words what you do to go from the 12
th
to the 13
th
sum is exactly the
same thing you do to go from the 43
rd
to the 44
th
:

't is this pattern [.] that leads to the insights about what a closed form
for the general sum should be and why it should be what it is. What we
discover here is that there is an invariant construction (or function) that,
when applied to one 'level' of our stream of calculations, produces the
next one' Cuoco & Goldenberg (1992, p183)

Cuoco & Goldenberg then introduce activities that facilitate students'
understanding of this pattern, this self-similarity. n the Algebra task described
above they base their activities on the software Logo. n Geometry they
employ a micro-world called Fractal Explorer to ask with the students
questions such as 'after n steps how much area remains and, in particular,
how does the remaining area change as n increases?' in the case of the
triangles figured below (p184):

The students participating in their activities, particularly in the Geometry-
related ones, appeared to have 'little difficulty with using mathematical
induction as both a method of discovery and for argument' (p202). What their
work brings to the fore is the need to help students acquire a sense of what is
at the heart of the Mathematical nduction mechanism by teasing out the
pattern and the constructive process that underlies P(n).

n fact what Cuoco & Goldenberg touch in the quotation that opens this
section is the tip of a rather formidable iceberg of misconceptions around
Proof by Mathematical nduction. Paul Ernest (1984) lists seven of these as
follows (interestingly he quotes sources that go back as far as 1908, an
indication that the cognitive and pedagogical issues around Proof by
Mathematical nduction have been known for quite some time!):

The ambiguity in the word 'induction' (also meaning 'a heuristic method
for arriving at a conjectured generality describing a finite sequence of
examples', p181).
ts reputation amongst students as 'the method in which you assume
what you have to prove and then prove it!'.
Apart from the apparent circularity above difficulty with other aspects of
the method's logical form such as its use of quantifiers and its use of
implication.
The misleading impression that 'one of the components of an inductive
proof is not really essential' (p182), namely the verification of P(1) or
P(n
0
) for a particular n
0
.
The misleading impression that it is of 'exclusive use in summing finite
series'.
A sense of disconnectedness in the introduction of the method to the
students in ways that make the method appear as unrelated to anything
the students have seen before (Ernest elaborates the need to connect
the introduction of the method to the notion of ordering of the natural
numbers).
The 'conceptual/technical difficulty of handling the vital step
P(n)P(n+1)' (p188). Unlike other encounters with P(n+1) that usually
require a substitution of n+1 for some variable in a known expression,
here the student is required to 'handle almost the inverse of this', to
work from P(n) towards a new expression which s/he then needs to
show is P(n+1).

Most items in this list, but particularly the last one, resonate with the
discussion between M and RME in the previous section, as well as the
available literature on student difficulties with Mathematical nduction (Ron &
Dreyfus, 2004; Fischbein & Engel, 1989; Avital & Liebeskind, 1978;
Movshovitz-Hadar, 1993a; Segal, 1998; Lowenthal & Eisenberg, 1992). We

have also touched on this in (Nardi & annone, 2003) where we mostly focus
on elaborating some of these technical difficulties (algebraic manipulation,
handling of certain symbols etc) involved in the four mathematical induction
problems mentioned in the previous section.

n our analysis the students' writing of proofs by Mathematical nduction,
mathematical content knowledge (in the case of the problem discussed here
this included manipulation of inequalities, use of etc.) plays an inextricable
and significant part.

For example in part (ii) the students' problems often lie with dealing with
inequalities. n our data when P(n) was an inequality, a significant number of
students simply gave up. The remaining students demonstrated intense
uncertainty about their claims and a range of difficulties with completing the
proof such as starting from the inequality one is supposed to arrive at. A
number of students also presented answers where the manipulation of the
inequalities involved was particularly convoluted. A conjecture that emerged
in our analysis was that the students' proofs by Mathematical nduction often
seem to follow the pattern: 'if A = B, to prove A = C, start from C = B and
end up with an identity'. We propose that this is an approach that the students
appear to be at ease with when P(n) is in the form of an equality but not in the
cases that it is in the form of an inequality:

Often the students construct a deduction of P(n+1) from P(n) as follows:
That is, their proof seems to follow the pattern: 'if A = B, to prove A = C,
start from C = B and end up with an identity'. This is an approach that
the students appear to be at ease with when P(n) is in the form of an
equality but not in the cases that it is in the form of an inequality (see
examples above). (p626)

Another difficulty we reported was the trouble students had with transferring
sums in the language of in part(iv):

n the latter case (P(n) as a sum of n-related quantities), we identified
difficulty with the translation of the verbal statement of P(n) into a
sum. n particular, in constructing the expression of the sum, the
students appeared to use symbols ambiguously, namely as both an
index and a fixed number (we observed ambiguity of this kind in the
students' proofs by Mathematical nduction in general where n is both
the general natural number in P(n) and the specific n within Steps 2 and
3 of the standard procedure). The repercussions of that were not as
grave in this case as, early in the proof of P(n+1), the sum is replaced
by an equivalent quantity from P(n). Still the issues arising from the co-
habitation of these two conflicting meanings are crucial. (p627)


n sum there appear to be two sets of issues the literature addresses with
regard to induction:

1. Difficulties with understanding the mechanism of Proof by Mathematical
nduction (e.g. why it constitutes a proof and how all its steps are
related to each other and are all necessary components of the
argument).
2. Technical difficulties with regard to algebraic manipulations (e.g.
inequalities) and the use of mathematical / logical symbolism (e.g.
quantifiers, etc.).

Proof by MathematicaI Induction: transforming theory into pedagogicaI
practice

Most of the above quoted authors accompany their analysis of the aspects of
Proof by Mathematical nduction that students find problematic with ideas
about how to facilitate students' encounter with the method. For example in
the paper we quoted above (Nardi & annone 2003) we recommended that
teaching needs to stress the role of n in the statement of P(n): n is an index
that varies in the natural numbers; and, of k in the induction step: k is a fixed
natural number and k+1 is its successor.

Most authors also start from acknowledging the problems students encounter
with Mathematical nduction and proceed with proposing an instructional
programme that aims to avert these problems. For example, Allen (2001) set
up a five day classroom experiment that started from discussing functions,
patterns and rules, moved towards recursive definitions and introduced the
definition and processes of Mathematical nduction through demonstrating it
in the context of applications (echoing the Cuoco and Goldenberg
constructive processes we outlined earlier).

Also echoing their focus on constructing an understanding of Mathematical
nduction step by step are Pavlekovic's (1998) several activities: these focus
on developing students' skill in determining regularities through examinining,
for example, the sum of the first n natural numbers (or even or odd)
numerically and visually). Crucially some of the activities provide an
opportunity to highlight that 'inductive reasoning sometimes yields false
conjectures' (p139) and thus that 'every conjecture needs to be proved'
(p140). Similar awareness of the potential pitfalls of relying too soon on the
apparent truths of inductive reasoning underlies the ten classroom exercises
proposed by Nitsa Movshovitz-Hadar (1993b).

Ron & Dreyfus (2004) employ the domino model to convey the steps involved
in understanding mathematical induction. They list these steps as follows:


the two conditions in the induction proof (induction basis and inductive
step) are independent of each other and both are necessary;
how these conditions are integrated to create a formal proof;
understanding the induction basis (checking the first step is an integral
part of the proof and not something done to convince yourself that the
statement is likely to be true)
understanding the stage of the induction step (that this is a statement of
a proof nested in the overall proof, different from the overall statement,
k can be any natural number).

They describe the potential contribution of the Domino Model as follows
(p116):

THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF
THE DOMINO MODEL TO
UNDERSTANDING PROOF BY
MATHEMATICAL INDUCTION
ELEMENTS OF PROOF BY MATHEMATICAL
INDUCTION AND KNOWLEDGE RELATED TO
PROOF BY MATHEMATICAL INDUCTION
The pushing of the first domino tile so that
its fall represents the basis stage.
The representation of the induction
basis.
n order to stress the necessity of this
stage the teacher can demonstrate that
no tile falls if the first one doesn't, even
though the tiles are arranged in a row
such that every tile would knock down the
next one, if it were to fall.
The necessity of the induction basis.
The
induction
basis
Any falling tile knocks down the next one. The representation of the induction
step.
f a tile falls then it knocks down the next
one.
What do we prove in the induction
step?
Any one of the domino tiles fall. The representation of the induction
hypothesis.
Questions about the legitimacy of the
induction hypothesis, or about the
similarity between the statement to be
proved and the induction hypothesis, can
be dealt with by reference to the model,
and specifically to the local scope of the
hypothesis. The teacher can say, for
example: "On the basis of the hypothesis
we only prove that the statement is true
for k+1. t is like saying that if the tile k
falls, then the tile k+1 also falls. We don't
talk about all the tiles but only about one
tiIe and its successor.
The induction hypothesis is a part of
the induction step.

What is the roIe of the induction
hypothesis?

Why is it Iegitimate to use the
hypothesis?

What is the difference between the
hypothesis and the original
statement?
Every tile knocks down the next one. The generaIity of the variable k that
is used in the induction hypothesis.
A domino row with a sufficiently big
distance somewhere.
Situations where the induction step
cannot be applied at some place.
The
induction
step


Paul Ernest (1984) also endorses the domino model (p184) and also
recommends drawing on the following conceptual analysis of Mathematical
nduction:

REFERENCES

Allen, L. (2001) Teaching Mathematical nduction: An alternative approach,
Mathematics Teacher, 94(6), 500-504

Avital, S. & Libeskind, S. (1978) Mathematical induction in the classroom:
Didactical and mathematical issues, Educational Studies in Mathematics, 9,
429-438

Cuoco, A.A. & Goldenberg, E.P. (1992) Mathematical nduction in a visual
context, Interactive Learning Environments, 2(3&4), 181-204 p183)

Ernest, P. (1984) Mathematical nduction: A pedagogical discussion.
Educational Studies in Mathematics, 15, 173-189

Fischbein, E. & Engel, . (1989) Psychological Difficulties in Understanding
the Principle of Mathematical nduction', Proceedings of the 13th Annual

Conference of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics
Education, Paris, France, July 9-13, Volume 1.

Lowenthal, F. & Eisenberg, T. (1992) Mathematics nduction in School; An
llusion of Rigor, School Science & Mathematics, 92(5), 233-38

Movshovitz-Hadar, N. (1993a) The False Coin Problem, Mathematical
nduction and Knowledge Fragility, Journal of Mathematical Behaviour, 12(3),
253-268

Movshovitz-Hadar, N. (1993b) Mathematical nduction: A focus on the
conceptual framework, School Science and Mathematics, 93(8), 408-417

Nardi, E. & annone, P. (2003) The Rough Journey Towards a Consistent
Mathematical Proof: the P(n) P(n+1) Step in Mathematical nduction.
Proceedings of the 3rd Mediterranean Conference on Mathematics
Education, 621-628. 3-5 January 2003, Athens, Greece.

Pavlekovic (1998) An approach to mathematical induction starting from the
early stages of teaching mathematics, Mathematical Communications, 3, 135-
142

Ron, G. & Dreyfus, T. (2004) The use of models in teaching proof by
mathematical induction, Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the
International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Vol 4, 123-
130

Segal, J. (1998) 'Learners' Difficulties with nduction Proofs', International
Journal of Mathematical Education in Science & Technology, 29(2), 159-77

5
Proof by Contradiction: Spotting the .Contradiction

Proof By Contradiction: a sampIe of data
6

The discussion here refers to the same question we mentioned in [1]:

Write down a careful proof that 2 Q.
(do this by contradiction: assume that 2 = m/n with n, m having no
common factors and see where you get after squaring and clearing
fractions).

n addition to the example of student responses cited there (Student L) the
following one (Student JWT) is also mentioned in M and RME's discussion of
the problems students have with executing a Proof by Contradiction:

M: Students here are missing where the proving point id. f attempted to
explain where the principal difficulty with Proof by Contradiction lies
would have a go as follows: students are used to a linear proving
argument where they start from one point and arrive at another in a
sequence of logical steps. n Proof by Contradiction this linearity does not
apply. Then again in my experience another issue is also the interim
technical details. On top of which is writing the first line correctly and
knowing the assumption you are starting from. Then once you read the
last line you must be able to see what this is actually saying and why it
contradicts what you assumed.

RME: Students appear to have a problem with spotting where the
contradiction lies in the sequence of claims they write out. Look at

6

Student JWT's response: the difference of squares, the algebra, the
logical error. see the last as possibly an outcome of a desperate desire,
an urgency to complete the process of contradiction by spotting one.

M: f you also look at Student L's response there is a lot of knowing grinding
leading her into not knowing where to end up, how to wrap the argument
up and close it. As said if you do not state at the top of your argument
the non-existence of common factors then you find yourself in the middle
of a joggling act ending up with the final sentences which are a muddled
and desperate attempt to complete the argument with something that
more or less makes sense. n this sense find Student L's fractions
cannot be simplified forever rather reasonable. am reasonably happy
assuming the student had not seen any proof like this before. Am right
to make this assumption? wonder. Or, maybe am being a bit too
generous.There is some sense but not enough, and clear,
demonstration of understanding. The problem with her response is that
she hasn't put at the beginning of the sheet that m and n have no
common factors. As a result she cannot get to the contradiction emerging
from the fact that they end up appearing to have common factors.
nstead she finds a different contradiction. Her argument has the scent of
Analysis in it, this idea of simplifying for ever and ever! appreciate that
underlying aspect of infinity being introduced into the discussion. am
more concerned about her not proving that if m squared is even then m
must be even [1]. would still like to stress though the originality of her
thought.! So, yes, it seems that students have a problem with spotting
where the contradiction lies. And the contradiction often lies in the leap to
conclusion [1] they perform.

RME: Most students reached a certain point in the proof and that point was
up to where the instructions in the hint could take them but stopped
where the creative part started.

M: So you can teach algebraic manipulation but not this creative part, right?!

Proof By Contradiction: some Mathematics Education research findings

' had experienced the phenomenon many times before, that this proof [there
are infinitely many prime numbers], despite its apparent simplicity, leaves most
students [.] mystified the first time they see it. (This is even more pronounced
in an oral presentation because of its linearity and uni-directedness.) So took
great care to present it slowly and clearly, involving the students with
intermediate steps and carefully explaining all terms used, etc. However, when
finished the proof with the triumphant announcement of the contradiction,
could clearly see that the students were not feeling triumphant at all. n fact
their faces showed the same glazed look of bewilderment and blankness.

Once more was left wondering about the nature of this proof and its
processing by the students. What is it in the proof that makes it so simple to
me, yet so perplexing to the students?' Leron (1985, p321-2).

The difficulties around proving the irrationality of 2 have provided a fertile
ground for exploring students' difficulties with proof by contradiction for
several mathematics educators. For example Tall (1979) and Alibert &
Thomas (1991, p217) compare three types of proof of the irrationality of 2: a
generic proof, a standard proof and a proof by contradiction.

n their study generic proofs seemed to generate less confusion and be more
welcome by the students at this early stage of their encounter with proof than
proofs by contradiction. This resonates with our experience from the study we
quote in the data sample above: students had several opportunities to employ
proof by contradiction (If A is an nxn matrix such that A
2
=0 then the matrix is
singular, the statement in [2], is one of those) and generally fared poorly in
taking up the opportunity and carrying such proofs through.

For example in the case of proving the irrationality of 2 it is of particular
concern that the students reach the point 2m
2
=n
2
and then they are uncertain
of the next step. The proof that there is an unlimited number of primes is
similar in the sense that it contains the potential for a similar mental barrier.
Here there is a real step between 2m
2
=n
2
and knowing that this implies that m
and n are even therefore they must share a common factor and that therein
lies the desired contradiction. Not picking up that real step is of concern.

Proof By Contradiction: transforming theory into pedagogicaI practice

Having explored the difficulties Year 1 and A level students had with proving
the irrationality of 2 and also starting from their own mathematical
experiences Barnard and Tall (1997) de-composed the proof to its
elementary items as follows:



Not too distantly from the above decomposition Uri Leron (1985) argues that
it is the way that proofs by contradiction are presented that confuses the
students. For example the proof he refers to in the quote that opens the
previous sub-section is highly regarded for its concision and beauty. However
students are more at ease with introducing first the construction of the
number M as a product of s primes +1. At this point they can play with it,
understand how it works, and 'own it'. Once they become familiar with this
construction engaging with and generating a proof by contradiction is nearly
trivial. This may be in conflict with the aesthetic norms of mathematics but it
does seem to work better for the students. Leron also argues that, while most
proofs centre around an 'act of construction', proof by contradiction is centred
on an 'act of destruction' which is likely to be psychologically less easily
acceptable by the students.

Tied with Leron's thoughts on this below are four suggestions by David Tall
(1979) for proving the irrationality of 2:

Proof C We show that the assumption that a rational p/q exists such that
p
2
/q
2
= 2 leads to a contradiction. Suppose that p
2
/q
2
= 2 where p and q are
integers with no factor in common, then p
2
= 2q
2
. Thus p
2
is even. But if p
were odd, then p
2
would be odd. So this means that p must be even, p = 2r
where r is an integer. Substituting in p
2
= 2q
2
, we obtain 4r
2
= 2q
2
, so 2r
2
=
q
2
. The same argument shows that q must also be even. So p and q have
a common factor, 2, contradicting the fact that they have no common
factor.

(This is what the aesthetic norms of mathematics considers as a pleasing
proof by contradiction).

Proof D We will show that if we start with any rational p/q and square it,
then the resulting square cannot be 2. On squaring an integer n, the
number of times any prime factor appears in the factorization of n is
doubled in the prime factorization of n
2
, so that each prime factor occurs
an even number of times in n
2
. n the fraction p
2
/q
2
we factorize the
numerator p
2
and denominator q
2
, canceling common factors where
possible. Then each factor either cancels exactly, or we are left with an
even number of appearances of that factor in the numerator or the
denominator. The fraction p
2
/q
2
cannot be simplified to give 2/1 because
the latter has an odd number of 2s in the numerator. So the square of a
rational p/q is never equal to 2.

Proof C* We will show that the assumption that a rational p/q exists such
that p
2
/q
2
= 5/8 leads to a contradiction. Suppose that p
2
/q
2
= 5/8 where p

and q are integers with no factor in common. Then 8p
2
= 5q
2
. Thus 5 is a
factor of 8p
2
. f 5 did not divide p then it could not divide 8p^2, hence we
deduce that 5r = p where r is an integer. Substituting in the original
equation we get 8(5r)
2
= 5q
2
. This simplifies to 40r
2
= q
2
. From this we see
that 5 must divide q
2
and, by the same argument as before, it divides q,
contradicting the fact that p and q have no common factor.

Proof D* We will show that if we start with any rational p/q and square it,
then the result p
2
/q
2
cannot be 5/8. On squaring any integer n the number
of times that any prime factor appears in the factorization of n is doubled in
the prime factorization of n
2
, so each prime factor occurs an even number
of times in n
2
. (For instance if n = 12 = 2x2x3, then n
2
= 12x12 = 144 =
2x2x3x2x2x3 and 3 occurs twice and 2 occurs four times, both even
number of times) n the fraction p
2
/q
2
, factorize p
2
and q
2
into primes and
cancel common factors where possible. Each factor will either cancel
exactly or we are left with an even number of appearances of that factor in
the numerator or denominator of the fraction. The fraction p
2
/q
2
can never
be simplified to give 5/8, for the latter is 5/2
3
, which has an odd number of
5s in the numerator (and an odd number of 2s in the denominator). So the
square of a rational p/q can never equal 5/8.

Tall adds to the above a proof proposed by Hardy:

Proof H There is no rational number whose square is m/n, where m/n is a
positive fraction in lowest terms, unless m and n are perfect squares. For
suppose, if possible, that p
2
/q
2
= m/n, p having no factor in common with q
and m no factor in common with n. Then np
2
= mq
2
. Every factor of q
2
must
divide np
2
and, as p and q have no common factor, every factor of q
2
must
divide n. Hence n=r q
2
where r is an integer. But this involves m = rp
2
; and
as m and n have no common factor, r must be unity. Thus m = p
2
, n = q
2
,
as was to be proved. n particular, it follows by taking m = 2, n = l that 2
cannot be the square of a rational number.

And concludes:

We have seen in a group of 20 able students the significant preference in
understanding of the proof D* over the proof C* when they have had no
experience of either type of proof. The standard contradiction proof C, though
mathematically elegant, lacks explanatory power and generalizes with difficulty
because of linguistic considerations. The Hardy proof does not have greater
explanatory power for students, despite its greater generality. Meanwhile the
generic family of proofs including D and D*, though more verbal and less easy
to write in symbols, has the elusive quality of explanation which enhances
understanding. The evidence suggests therefore that we should seek the
explanatory power of generic proofs for beginners, rather than the aesthetic

elegance or generality of general proofs. The latter can (and should) come at a
stage when they are more likely to be appreciated.

These conclusions agree with those of Uri Leron quoted above.

Antonini (2004) suggests that there are situations where students produce
arguments that are close to the spirit of Proof by Contradiction
spontaneously; particularly he refers to the cases where students support
their train of thought by generating non-examples. These situations, he
proposes, can be a potent stepping stone for introducing Proof by
Contradiction. Below is an example of such a situation (V and C are
students):

Two lines r and s on a plane have the following property: each line t
intersecting r, intersect s too. Is there anything you can say about the
reciprocal position of r and s? Why?

Response 1:

19. V: Oh, they [r and s] cannot be perpendicular.
20. C: No, that's not possible.
21. V: They cannot be perpendicular because otherwise it [the line t]
could be parallel one of the two and do not intersect the other one
(he makes a drawing, see figure above).

Response 2:


31. V: Well, [the line t] cannot be parallel to any of the two lines because,
if we have two crossing lines, even if they are not perpendicular
(he makes a drawing, see figure above), if [t] is parallel to one of
the two, it intersects just one of them.
32. C: Yes, it's the same situation of the two perpendicular lines.

n the above the students start building a case for the reciprocal position of
lines s and r through producing non-examples (i.e. examples which do not
verify the given hypothesis). Antonini's work suggests that they are already
taking a significant step towards producing a proof by contradiction.

Movshovitz-Hadar & Hadass (1990) link production of proof by contradiction
to the use of paradoxes in teaching mathematics. n their paper there is a
telling example of a 'proof' that shows that .4 is irrational.

Proving that 4 = 2 is. irrational
By definition, we call a number r irrational, if and only if there are no two
integers a, b for which r = a/b. To show that 2 is irrational, we apply an
indirect proof and assume that 2 = 4 is rational. We'll show that this
assumption leads logically to a contradiction. The proof is analogous to the
one that shows that 2 and 3 are irrational. According to our assumption,
there exist two integers p, q, relatively prime (i.e. having no common factor
other than 1) such that p/q = 4.
p/q = 4 p
2
/q
2
= 4 4q
2
=p
2
4|p
2
4|p
there exists an integer n such that p = 4n
hence 4q
2
= 16n
2
q
2
= 4n
2

4|q
2
4|q
and therefore p and q have a common divisor greater than 1, which
contradicts the initial assumption that they are relatively prime. t follows that
our assumption was false and therefore 4, that is 2, is not a rational number.
Q.E.D

The above parallels the proof for the irrationality of 2 but contains a mistake.
We note that the step where the above proof fails is the same step that most
of the students in the study quoted in the opening part of this section
stumbled upon: that 2|q
2
implies 2|q. This is only true for prime numbers
(such as 2 in the proof of irrationality of 2) and for composite numbers
whose prime decomposition is in prime numbers that appear only once. n the
proof of the irrationality of 4 there is the step 4|p
2
implies 4|p which is not
true (for example 4|6
2
but 4 does not divide 6). The authors have invited
students' views on this flawed proof and there is suggestion in their findings
that such exploration can become a forum for a potent discussion of this type
of proof.

REFERENCES

Alibert, D. & Thomas, M. O. J. (1991) Research on mathematical proof. n D.
O. Tall (Ed.) Advanced Mathematical Thinking, (pp. 215230). Dordrecht:
Kluwer.

Antonini, S. (2003) Non-examples and proof by contradiction, Proceedings of
the 27th Annual Conference of the International Group for the Psychology of
Mathematics Education, Honolulu, US, 2, 49 - 55.

Barnard, T. & Tall, D. (1997) Cognitive Units, Connections and Mathematical
Proof, Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the International Group
for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Finland, 2, 4 - 48.

Leron, U.(1985) A direct approach to indirect proofs. Educational Studies in
Mathematics, 16, 321-325.

Movshovitz-Hadar, N. & Haddas, R. (1990) Pre-service education of math
teachers using paradoxes, Educational Studies in Mathematics, 21, 265-287.

Tall, D. (1979) Cognitive aspects of proof, with special reference to the
irrationality of 2, Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Conference of the
International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Warwick,
200207.

EpiIogue

The recommendations in [1]-[5] offer little more than a glimpse into the
mathematics education research in this area. We have deliberately chosen
the 'scale' of our recommendations to be relatively small because we intend
this guide to be of immediate use. We have thus emphatically not
attempted to introduce in this guide larger-scale innovations. Beyond
individuals' commitment these always require institutional / systemic /
curricular changes that would not perhaps be immediately feasible (even
desirable?) by the immediate readership this guide targets to reach all
lecturers of Year 1 students, but particularly the newcomers to the task!

As a concluding remark let us however mention two areas both lively for
quite a while where some of these larger-scale developments are now
beginning to be on offer:

the role of History of Mathematics and Cultural Studies.

Example: A recent proposition (Rowlands & Carson, 2006) is for rethinking the
value of Geometry in the school curriculum and approaching its teaching
through a sequence of seventeen or so 'primary events' and as a transition from
trusting what concrete experience and senses suggest to learning how to
demonstrate universal truths about statements.

the role of new technologies.

Example. A recent special issue of Educational Studies in Mathematics focused
on the use of Dynamic Geometry software in the teaching of Proof (Jones et al,
2000). The significance of this and other works in this area is that they are
becoming more and more pedagogically and mathematically driven.

With this guide we aim to raise awareness rather than directly prescribe what
we perceive as good practice. Our work in this area continues and we look
forward to carrying on the conversation this booklet aims to launch.

REFERENCES

Jones, K.; Gutirrez, . & Mariotti, M.A. (eds) (2000) Proof in Dynamic
Geometry Environments: A PME Special ssue, Educational Studies in
Mathematics 44 (1-3)

Rowlands, S. and Carson, R. (2006) Proof, reason, abstraction and leaps: a
cultural-historical approach to teaching Geometry. Hewitt, D. (eds)
Proceedings of the British Society for Research into the Learning of
Mathematics, Warwick, 71-76

BibIiography

Each of sections 1-5 has its own set of references and starts with an excerpt
from

Nardi, E. (in press 2007) Amongst Mathematicians: Teaching and Learning
Mathematics at University Level. Due by Springer in the Spring/Summer
2007.

However we would also like to acknowledge the following works as the
substantial influences on the theoretical underpinnings of the work towards
the guide.

Dawson, S. (1999) The Enactive perspective on teacher development: "A
Path Laid While Walking. n B. Jaworski, T. Wood, & S. Dawson (Eds.),
Mathematics teacher education: International critical perspectives (pp. 148
162). London: Falmer.

Holton, D. A. (Ed.) (2001) The teaching and learning of mathematics at
university level: An CM study. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

annone, P. & Nardi E. (2005) On the Pedagogical nsight of Mathematicians:
'nteraction' and 'Transition from the Concrete to the Abstract', Journal of
Mathematical Behaviour, 24(2), 191-215

Mason, J. (2002) Mathematics teaching practice: A guide for university and
college lecturers. Chichester, UK: Horwood Publishing.

Nardi, E., Jaworski, B. & Hegedus, S. (2005) A spectrum of pedagogical
awareness for undergraduate mathematics: from 'tricks' to 'techniques',
Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 36(4), 284-316

von Glasersfeld, E. (1995) Radical constructivism: A way of knowing and
learning. London: The Falmer Press.

Wagner, J. (1997) The Unavoidable ntervention of Educational Research: A
Framework for Reconsidering Researcher-Practitioner Cooperation.
Educational Researcher. Vol. 26, No. 7. p. 13-21

Wenger, E. (1998) Communities of practice: Learning, meaning and identity.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

HEA-MSOR Project Final Report Nardi & annone 1
Appendix

Project title:
Transforming theory into practice:
A guide for teaching Proof to mathematics undergraduates
grounded on the co-ordinated perspectives and recommendations of
mathematicians and researchers in mathematics education

FinaI Report

Elena Nardi & Paola Iannone

School of Education and Lifelong Learning
University of East Anglia
Norwich, UK

Address: UEA-EDU, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK
Telephone: +44 1603 592631 (Nardi), +44 1603 591007 (annone)
Fax: +44 1603 593446
E-Mail: e.nardi@uea.ac.uk, p.iannone@uea.ac.uk
Website: http://www.uea.ac.uk/~m011/, http://www.uea.ac.uk/edu/mathsed.html

On March 20
th
2006 we were commissioned by the HEA-MSOR Network to
produce a guide that will provide 'support to those teaching Proof to Pure
Mathematicians'. The production of the Guide would be based on: findings
from our previous studies in the area; relevant literature; and, an interim
evaluation of a draft sample by groups of mathematicians and researchers in
mathematics education based at UEA and other institutions. The project was
expected to last from April 1
st
to September 30
th
. In what follows we report on
the Guide's production process and outline the dissemination plan regarding
the promotion of the Guide that is currently in progress.

Elena Nardi and Paola Iannone, September 30
th
2006

1. Production of the Guide

Production of the Guide was carried out in three phases

Work towards the selection of the themes the Guide touches on and preparation of
a draft sample of the Guide to be used as the basis of the discussion in an nterim
Evaluation Event
nterim Evaluation Event
Work towards finalising the structure and content of the Guide in the light of
recommendations made at the nterim Evaluation Event and further reading and
scrutiny of our previous data.

Below we describe each of the above phases.

Phase I: Towards a draft structure and sample of the Guide (April - May)

Work towards the selection of the themes the Guide touches on consisted largely of
drawing on relevant literature and on our previous studies in this area.

With regard to the former we searched the mathematics education research literature in
order to identify tried-and-tested recommendations regarding the teaching of Proof to
mathematics undergraduates.

With regard to the latter these include the recently completed study 'Engaging
mathematicians as educational co-researchers' funded by the Learning and Teaching
Support Network as well as five other studies that Nardi has been involved with since 1992
(funded by: ESRC (2), Wingate Foundation, Nuffield Foundation (2 - annone also
involved)). Mathematical Reasoning, and in particular Proof, has been an essential theme
running across the data collection and analyses in these studies. We mostly revisited the
material from the LTSN-funded study in which we had conducted a series of themed
Focus Group interviews with mathematicians from six UK universities. n these interviews
pre-distributed samples of mathematical problems, typical written student responses,
observation protocols, interview transcripts and outlines of relevant bibliography had been
used to trigger an exploration of issues on the teaching and learning of university
mathematics. Two of the six themes explored had been: Students' perceptions of Proof
and its necessity and Students' enactment of proving techniques and construction of
mathematical arguments. Eleven half-day interviews had generated about 250,000 words
of transcript sharply focused on:

how the participating mathematicians perceive their students' difficulties; and,
the pedagogical practices they employ or wish they could employ more
extensively and more systematically to support their students' overcoming of
these difficulties.

An additional resource has been our own teaching experience, in particular annone's five-
year experience as an undergraduate mathematics tutor at UEA.

Overall the work was underpinned by the principles and theoretical perspectives on the
teaching and learning of mathematics that have been underlying our previous work. n the
following table we outline these principles and demonstrate how they have helped shape
the contents of the Guide.


TheoreticaI Framework

ReIevant Dimension

SeIection Criterion

Constructivism Learning as an individual
sense-making process,
teaching as facilitating this
process
Select activities that foster student
participation, learning from peers and
student teacher interaction (e.g. project
work, group-work, student presentations
etc.)

Socio-cultural theory Enculturation into the
language and practices of
university mathematics
Select activities that foster an
understanding of the language and
practices of university mathematics (e.g.
student / lecturer led Scientific Debates on
acceptable forms of argumentation and
Proof; Mathematical Writing Workshops on
acceptable forms of mathematical writing,
etc.)

Enactivism Teaching and learning as
processes of constant mutual
specification and
codetermination, as "paths
laid while walking; embrace
and draw on the power in
concreteness and in
specificity of context

Present selected activities through lively
and illustrative examples from the data (e.g.
short stories and vignettes from teaching
events recorded in the previous studies)

Participatory / Partnership
Research
ntegration of innovation is
manageable, and sustainable,
if driven and owned by the
mathematicians who are
expected to implement it
Select activities that, either in our data or in
the literature, have been highlighted as
potent by mathematicians themselves,
respond to specific student and curricular
needs and are manageable within the
systemic constraints of university courses

By early June the preliminary structure and content of the Guide was as follows:

ntroduction
Five sections each on a theme regarding the teaching of Proof to first-year
undergraduates. These themes were:
conceptualising formal mathematical reasoning and the necessity for Proof
the role of examples in Proof: the tension between the general and the
particular and 'proof'-by-example
the role of examples in Proof: Proof by Counterexample
Proof by Mathematical nduction
Proof by Contradiction
Epilogue
References

Each of the five sections was envisaged as follows:

Example from the data collected in the course of the above mentioned LTSN study
that illustrates the theme. This usually starts with examples of student written
responses to a mathematical problem that required the use of a particular aspect of
Proof that the theme of the section aims to explore. t continues with a brief
reference to the comments made on the student responses by the mathematicians
interviewed in that study and concludes with a listing of issues that the reader is
invited to consider in the light of these examples.

Brief review of some relevant literature with regard to the theme the section aims to
explore. Throughout amongst our priorities has been that this scrutiny of the
relevant literature is presented in a language that is accessible to users with a
limited background in the prose and terminology of educational research.
Exposition on recommended practices as found in the literature and the interviews
with the mathematicians with a particular emphasis on strengths and cautionary
points.

A sample of the Guide entitled 'Proof'-by-example: Syndrome or Starting Point?' was
prepared for use in an nterim Evaluation Event which aimed to collect the comments and
recommendations of practitioners (teachers of mathematics at the undergraduate level)
whose teaching the Guide ultimately purports to support.

Phase II: Evaluation of the draft sample (June)

The event took place in the course of two two-hour lunchtime meetings on June 22
nd
and
23
rd
one with colleagues from UEA and the other with colleagues from elsewhere in the
UK and abroad (taly and Brazil). The structure of the meetings replicated that of the
numerous focused group interviews we have conducted in the context of the above
mentioned LTSN study. The meetings were audio recorded.

Overall the reception of the sample was very positive and its presence became the starting
point of fervent discussion both about the theme it touched on and the potential uses of the
Guide in general. More or less the discussion followed the structure we proposed in the
concluding page of the sample:

'n the discussion of this sample from the Guide we would like you to consider the following
questions:
Regarding the particuIar issue we raise in the sampIe ('Proof'-by-exampIe):
s this an issue that you believe your students face?
f yes, to what extent? And how do you as their teacher usually help them towards a
more comprehensive understanding of the role of examples can play in constructing
mathematical arguments?
Do you find the discussion of generic examples as a means to facilitate such
understanding useful?
Do you use generic examples in your teaching? Could you suggest other occasions,
perhaps more in tune with university-level mathematics than the ones we offer in this
sample, where resorting to a generic example and transparent pseudo-proofs can be
helpful?
Do you find John Mason's tactics relevant to what you do, or could do, in your own
teaching? Would you like to add any more suggestions to those?
Regarding the production of the Guide in generaI:
Content: what other issues regarding the teaching of Proof would you like to see addressed
in the Guide?
Format:
do you find the format of the sample . Appropriate? Clear? Engaging?
do you find the length of discussion devoted to each part of the sample (data,
literature, pedagogical suggestions) appropriate? Would you like to see the balance
altered in any particular direction?
Please remember that the Guide is currently in its infancy. t is our serious intention that your
comments as thoughtful and frank as we can get them to be! shape subsequent versions of the
Guide as much as possible.'

n sum the points raised in the interviews were as follows:

Regarding the sample:


Example from the data there is value in starting each section with an example
from the written work of the students and the reactions from the mathematicians.
The example however needs to be chosen carefully. As it is impossible to find an
example that exemplifies only the particular issue treated in the particular section,
the attention of the reader needs to be directed to which aspect of the example we
want them to concentrate upon. One suggestion was to use one example of student
data to highlight more than one issue, pointing the reader each time to which issue
we want them to concentrate upon.
Literature review introduce examples for each of the phenomena described in the
educational literature section (for example, in the case of the phenomena described
in the sample, introduce examples for each one of the Proof Schemas). Pay
attention to the language in which the literature review is written. t must be
accurate but also avoid excessive use of jargon. For example: in the literature
review of the sample precede the terms 'affective', 'cognitive' etc. with the questions
that raise the corresponding issues (affective, cognitive etc.). Unpack the
educational jargon even further: for example, stress the difference between what
constitutes a taxonomy in mathematics and a taxonomy in mathematics education.
Transforming theory into practice the level of the discussion in the sample was
accepted as suitable and the mathematics in there as fine, even if it treats
apparently elementary statements.
The practical suggestions to the lecturer these might be better placed at the end
of the "Transforming theory into practice bit rather than at the beginning, and there
should be plenty of those. There was little consensus amongst interviewees on this
however: some suggested that these might be redundant altogether. One
suggestion was to include some direction on how to use a blackboard in a lecture
(seen to be important).

Regarding the Guide generally:

The title of the Guide must be a shorter and snappier version of the title project.
The five themes / headings for the Guide's sections are appropriate and relevant.
The length of the sample is only not-too-long but, according to some, even affording
a bit more detail. As the Guide is not intended for reading from cover to cover in one
go, we need not shy away from making our point elaborately even if this implies a
longer text for each section.
Avoid jargon.
Do not be afraid of using (mathematically easy) examples. They can be very
illustrative of the issues in question.
nclude an introduction to explain how the Guide works.
Some participants expressed a preference for presenting the Guide in LaTex
7
.

t is our intention that the final version of the Guide complies with as many of the above
recommendations as possible. Please note that we have not taken all the
recommendations on board: for example, we have not taken up the suggestion to use just
one example of student data that highlights several aspects of the issues touched upon in
the various sections and revisit it in each section from a different perspective. One reason
is a concern for variety: we believe more, and more diverse, examples make the Guide
more engaging. Another reason is that the diversity of examples we draw on reflects the

7
At the time of writing this Report we were at the final stages of writing/formatting and had
not decided yet on whether we will comply with this preference.

diversity of data we collected in our previous studies as well as the breadth and wealth of
pedagogical discourse the participating mathematicians engaged in during the interviews
for these previous studies.

Another suggestion we have not taken up is to include more generalist pedagogical advice
(e.g. on using blackboards). Even though we recognise that there are mathematics-
specific aspects to learning how, for example, to use a blackboard, given the limitations of
this very small-scale project, we have chosen to stay focused on the issues strictly related
to the teaching of Proof. We do however consider this request for more general, yet
mathematics-related, pedagogical advice as one that merits further and systematic work
and we would be happy to consider it for future projects.

Phase III: Towards the final version of the Guide (July - September)

n the light of the above evaluation we finalised the Guide which will be available in the
coming weeks in hard copy (as a booklet) and electronically (as a PDF file available for
downloading from our site a link to the HEA-MSOR can also be easily established). The
Guide is approximately 12,000 words long and consists of the sections we described in the
Phase I section. Below we outline the plan for the promotion of the Guide.

2. Promotion of the Guide

At present activities towards the promotion of the Guide are planned as follows:

We have referred to the work towards the Guide in a presentation at the Third
nternational Conference on the Teaching of Mathematics at the Undergraduate Level
(stanbul, June 2006) entitled 'You look at these students, you look at their faces, you
know they are lost.': the pedagogical role of the mathematician as de-mystifier and
en-culturator.
We have obtained an SBN number for the Guide so that it becomes accessible
through bibliographical and library databases
We are making the Guide available at our site (and HEA-MSOR's site if requested) as
well as other relevant sites such as http://www.lettredelapreuve.it The nternational
Newsletter on the Teaching and Learning of Mathematical Proof.
We have been invited to offer a presentation, or working session, at a mathematics
education conference in which the mathematical community is known to participate.
This is the Undergraduate Mathematics Teaching Symposium in Galway reland
(December 15
th
-16
th
, 2006). Another relevant conference we will try to present at is the
annual UMTC (Undergraduate Mathematics Education Conference) held in
Birmingham annually (UMTC 2006 is planned for December 18
th
-19
th
2006) or the
annual conference of the Mathematical Association (April 2007).
As promised to the colleagues from UEA and elsewhere who participated in the nterim
Evaluation Event we will present and discuss the final version of the Guide in a
seminar/event within the current academic year.
We will be announcing the completion of the Guide in a short article in a professional
journal. n this we will outline the contents of the Guide and invite readers to access it
in full. Potential venues of publication are The Mathematical Gazette, The MSOR
Newsletter and The Bulletin of the London Mathematical Society.

3. Note on the budget

At the moment of completing this Report hitherto expenses comply more or less with the
planned budget. The outstanding balance will be spent of the production and replication of
the Guide in print and (in the unlikely case there is a remainder) towards expenses for
further dissemination (for some of the activity outlined above). UEA's Print Group have
given us an indicative price of about 2 per copy for the Guide.

4. Further work

At the time of completing this report the Leverhulme Trust, following our submission of an
outline proposal in July 2006, has invited a full application of our proposal entitled
'Transforming theory into pedagogical practice for university mathematics'. We will submit
this by December 1
st
2006 and will be notified of the results by end of April 2007. The
proposed work employs the Guide as a starting point for a Programme of nnovation, a
programme of innovative practices that will be implemented and evaluated in the context
of a Year 1 course in Pure Mathematics at UEA and elsewhere. Moreover, and given the
exact match between our research plans and the objectives set by the HEA National
Teaching Fellow Scheme, we are also inquiring our eligibility for this scheme and may
submit an outline proposal by the end of October 2006.

5. References

The Guide includes with a complete set of references to the works mentioned in each
section for example each section starts with an excerpt from

Nardi, E. (in press 2007) Amongst Mathematicians: Teaching and Learning Mathematics
at University Level. Due by Springer in the Spring/Summer 2007.

However we would also like to acknowledge the following works for their substantial
influence on the theoretical underpinnings of the work towards the Guide.

Dawson, S. (1999). The Enactive perspective on teacher development: "A Path Laid While
Walking. n B. Jaworski, T. Wood, & S. Dawson (Eds.), Mathematics teacher
education: International critical perspectives (pp. 148162). London: Falmer.
Holton, D. A. (Ed.). (2001). The teaching and learning of mathematics at university level:
An CM study. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.
annone, P. & Nardi E. (2005) On the Pedagogical nsight of Mathematicians: 'nteraction'
and 'Transition from the Concrete to the Abstract', Journal of Mathematical
Behaviour, 24(2), 191-215
Mason, J. (2002). Mathematics teaching practice: A guide for university and college
lecturers. Chichester, UK: Horwood Publishing.
Nardi, E., Jaworski, B. & Hegedus, S. (2005) A spectrum of pedagogical awareness for
undergraduate mathematics: from 'tricks' to 'techniques', Journal for Research in
Mathematics Education, 36(4), 284-316
von Glasersfeld, E. (1995). Radical constructivism: A way of knowing and learning.
London: The Falmer Press.
Wagner, J. (1997) The Unavoidable ntervention of Educational Research: A Framework
for Reconsidering Researcher-Practitioner Cooperation. Educational Researcher.
Vol. 26, No. 7. p. 13-21
Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: Learning, meaning and identity. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.

A Brief Guide For Teaching Proof

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Brief Guide For Teaching Proof

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Authors: Elena Nardi, Paola annone

Address: UEA-EDU, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK

You might also like