The Future of International

Education in Tanzania
Based on a Transformative Scenario Planning Project (TSP)
Scenarios are stories about the
future. They tell a series of
plausible but challenging stories
about what might happen. Not
what we think should happen, but
possibilities to consider, if we
open our eyes wide enough, and
to be ready for. The particular set
of scenarios developed here are
Transformative Scenarios, which
by deni t i on i nvol ve mul t i -
stakeholder groups to help open
our eyes to thoughts and ideas
which are otherwise peripheral to
our vi si on. Tr ansf or mat i ve
Scenari os enabl e countri es,
communities or organisations to
consider the strategic choices
they could make now, to either
adapt to anticipated challenges or
to shape with other stakeholders
the kind of future they desire.
This particular set of scenarios
is about the future of International
Education in Tanzania, between
2014 and 2030. Commissioned by
International School Moshi (ISM),
this scenarios exercise brought
ISM students, parents, sta"
member s, gover ni ng board
members and shareholders into
conversation with representatives
of the Department of Education,
principals of other international
schools, the former chair of the
national selection committee of
United World Colleges (UWC) in
Tanzania and business people.
These scenarios are designed to
not only inform ISMs future
strategic directions, but also to
stimulate conversation across the
education sector in Tanzania.
What might lie ahead and what
could be done together and
separately to face these possible
futures in a clear-eyed, visionary
way? What kind of leadership,
collaborations and actions will
best serve the diverse needs of
children growing up in Tanzania?
Four storylines emerged from
this exercise, shaped by two
factors deemed most inuential
and most uncertain in considering
t he f ut ur e of i nt er nat i onal
education. The rst factor is the
conduciveness of the business
environment in Tanzania. The
s econd i s how appeal i ng
international education is to
parents and families, linked to
questions of quality, a"ordability,
aspirations and opportunity.
Scenarios About the Scenarios
2
Scenarios About the Scenarios
3
Acuvlsm A sLory abouL an unsLable envlronmenL for buslness,
ln whlch youLh-led uprlslngs pressure Lhe sLaLe Lo
lncrease Lhe quallLy of educauon. 1he comblnauon of
soclal lnsLablllLy and lmproved nauonal educauon
renders lnLernauonal educauon less appeallng Lo
forelgn nauonal and local famllles respecuvely.
Lllusm uescrlbes a fuLure ln whlch a serles of domesuc crlses
resLrlcLs buslness opporLunlues and prompLs Lhe few
who can aord lL Lo send Lhelr chlldren Lo
lnLernauonal schools ouLslde of 1anzanla.
Lxpanslonlsm 1hls scenarlo descrlbes a fuLure 1anzanla wlLh a
burgeonlng economy and opporLunlLy for a wlder
cross-secuon of socleLy, a slgnlcanL proporuon of
whom nd lnLernauonal educauon an appeallng
cholce for Lhelr chlldren.
nauonallsm A sLory of a wealLhler 1anzanla whlch embraces a
proud and pro-buslness nauonallsL ldenuLy,
conservauve values and a paLh of self-deLermlnauon
free of lnLernauonal lnuence.
About International School Moshi (ISM)
4
The International School Moshi was
established in 1969 to serve the needs of
the expatriate and local communities and
has grown to provide a fully accredited
international education for children from age
3 to age 19, o"ering the International
Baccalaureate (IB) Diploma (DP), Middle
Years (MYP) and Primary Years (PYP)
programmes. With about 500 students
(including about 150 boarders) divided
between two campuses and from 40
di"erent nationalities, the school provides a
broad range of educational o"erings whilst
maintaining a high standard of individual
care.
The Arusha Campus is a day school for
students aged 3 to 16 years, o"ering a full
primary and middle years education through
the IB PYP and IB MYP. In an exciting new
development, the IB Diploma Programme
will begin to be taught at the Arusha
Campus as from August 2014.
The Moshi Campus is both a day and
boarding school for students aged 3 to 19
years, with primary (PYP) and middle years
(MYP) education as well as the pre-
university Diploma Programme (DP).














ISM is proud of its historical legacy. It
was the rst International Baccalaureate (IB)
School in Africa when it started o"ering the
IB Diploma in 1973. The school was also
i nst r ument al i n t he cr eat i on and
development of what the world now knows
as the IB Middle Years Programme in the
early 1980s, a programme which builds on
t he phi l osophy of t he I B Di pl oma
Programme.
The I nt er nat i onal Baccal aur eat e
programmes educate the whole person and
aim to develop inquiring, knowledgeable
and caring young people. ISM encourages
students to become active, compassionate
and lifelong learners with the aim of
ensuring they are successful in this modern
and ever-changing world.
Reos is a social enterprise that helps
businesses, governments, and civil society
organisations address complex social
challenges.
We convene, design and facilitate multi-
stakeholder partnerships and initiatives on
issues such as employment, health, food,
energy, the environment, security, and
peace.
Our approach is systemic, creative, and
participative.
About Reos
There are two main sections in
this document: a setting the
scene perspective on Tanzania
today, followed by a presentation
of four scenarios about Tanzania
towards 2030. This is the most
comprehensive presentation of
ScenariosISM, intended primarily
for those involved in setting ISMs
strategic directions, and as a
regular reference point for ISMs
continued internal use. Two briefer
presentations of the scenarios
have been produced for a larger
audience, to engage others in the
education sector in conversation
about the future.
You are invited to read the full
document, or to dip in and out of
the statistics and stories. Please
bear in mind that none of these
stories are about what ISM and
the scenarios team WANT to
happen or think SHOULD happen.
They are simply stories about
what COULD happen. All four
stories contain some ambiguity, in
acknowledgement of the fact that
life is never all good or all bad. We
h o p e t h e y s t r e t c h y o u r
imagination, perspectives and the
creative range of choices you face
as you move into the future.
The scenarios team and the
participants at the scenarios
workshop are named at the end of
this document. Our warm thanks
to them f or thei r energeti c
contributions to this process.
Scenarios About this document
3
Introduction
The scenarios workshop identied
several driving forces understood to be
important shapers of international
education in a future Tanzania. Amongst
these were levels of political and social
stability, foreign investment, and the
quality of infrastructure alongside more
proximate drivers such as a"ordability
and perceptions of international educ-
ation in relation to both state education
and that o"ered by local competitors.
The scenarios grew out of these drivers,
each telling a series of di"erent twists
and turns in the road in relation to these
and related factors.
But what is the situation imme- diately
prior to these scenarios? The next
several pages tell the story of Tanzania
today, starting with landmarks that have
helped to create the current situation
and continuing with a broad overview of
the political, economic, educational
landscape. It concludes with some
trends which o"er insight into current
directions of change and hint at how
these trajectories might develop in our
scenarios.
This contextual description is far from
comprehensive, seeking instead to
describe some of the conditions of the
soil out of which the scenarios grow.






Landmarks
It is May 2014. 53 years have passed
since gaining independence, 50 since
the formation of the United Republic of
Tanzania and 22 years since the intro-
duction of multi-party democracy. Other
landmarks from the more recent past
that could, perhaps, throw light on the
future include:
2001: Rekindling of the East Africa
Community with Kenya and Uganda
2001: Abolition of fees at government
primary schools
2005: President Kikwete takes o#ce
after CCM wins the third democratic
elections
2006: $4.2 billion in debt written o"
under the Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative, approximating 30% of GDP
2010: The rst in a new series of
discoveries of major reserves of natural
gas o"shore
2012: Formation of Tanzania Constitu-
tional Review Commission (CRC) which
released its second draft Constitution in
March 2014 before being dissolved at
the end of its term.
2013: CCM admitted as full member of
Socialist International, a global group of
socialist parties.
October 2013: President Kikwete pro-
mises a freedom of information act
In 2015, Tanzanians will go to the
polls for the fth time since multi-party
democracy was introduced.
Setting the Scene: Tanzania in 2014
6
A few statistics
The 2012 Population and Housing Census results show that Tanzania has a
population of 44,928,923 of whom 43,625,354 are on the Mainland and 1,303,569 live
in Zanzibar
i
. 87.9% of this population live on less than $2 a day. The vast majority of
the population lives in rural Tanzania. The average Tanzanian has an expected lifespan
of 60 years.
Other measures of the socio-economic wellbeing of Tanzanians include:
Setting the Scene: Tanzania in 2014
7
Table 1: Indicators of socio-economic status and wellbeing of Tanzanians. Source: Bertelsmann Stiftungs
Transformation Index (BTI) 2014, covering the period January 2011 to January 2013 and drawing on World Bank,
UNDP and related gures.
These statistics o"er a smoothed-out story of the average Tanzanian. The following
paragraphs attempt a more complex picture of Tanzania today, providing a glimpse
into political, economic and educational dynamics currently shaping the country. This
is followed by a very brief consideration of issues a"ecting Tanzanias key neighbours
- Kenya and Uganda. These portrayals will simply seek to set the scene for the
scenarios that follow, rather than o"ering a comprehensive overview. In this way, each
scenario can unfold from a common starting point.
Political context
The CCM has won at least 60% of votes
cast in each election since the dawn of
multi-party democracy. In 2005, CCM won
70% of seats in the Union Parliament and
Jakaya Ki kwet e won 80% of t he
presidential votes. In the most recent
elections of 2010, CCM won by a slightly
smaller majority of 60% of all votes cast on
mainland Tanzania. Chadema won 25% of
the vote in the rst show of strength of an
opposition party, garnering 48 of a total of
349 parliamentary seats (up from 11 in the
2005 elections)
ii
. Most signicantly, only
40% of all registered voters cast their ballot.
This may be due, in part, to perceptions
of the CCM president, Jakaya Kikwete. His
job approval rating had decreased from 90
to 71 points between 2008 and 2012. Seven
out of every ten people who participated in
a survey associated the Presidents O#ce
with corruption, an upward trend compared
to 5 out of 10 people in 2008
iii
.
According to an Afrobarometer survey in
2008
iv
, only 38% of those polled agreed
with the statement democracy is preferable
to any other kind of government, down
from 85% ve years previously. However,
71% expressed satisfaction with the
functionality of democracy in 2008.
On the whole, there is relative political
freedom in the country. One of the
questi ons asked by Afro-barometer
surveyors in 2012 and reported in 2013 is:
in this country, how free are you to say
what you think? 76% of the respondents
said they felt completely free This is the
second highest rating in Africa after Malawi,
and compares well to the 49% average on
the continent. Despite this general indicator
of freedom of speech, there have been
some recent incidents of repression. In
2012, the leader of a protracted doctors
stri ke was beaten and tortured. A
newspaper which reported his ordeal was
closed down. In a separate incident, a
journalist critical of the government was
killed. In Freedom Houses Freedom in the
World 2014 report, Tanzania was awarded
the status of being partly free and given a
rating of 3 on a scale of 1 (complete
freedom) to 7 (complete repression) on all
three dimensions: freedom, political rights
and civil liberties.
The most recent political initiative is the
development of a new Constitution. The
Tanzania Constitutional Review Commission
(CRC), formed in 2012, delivered its second
draft of a new Constitution at the end of its
term in March 2014. President Kikwete then
inaugurated a Constituent Assembly to
oversee the process of nalising and
enacting the Constitution. The draft
indicates support for freedom of
the press, right to information, access to
education for all, gender equality in
parliament and transformation to a three-
government federal republic from the
prevailing two-tier union.
Despite this freedom of speech and
political activity, Tanzania is characterised
by a relatively weak civil society, with civil
society organisations (CSOs) prohibited by
law to engage in politics. The Teachers
Trade Unions (TTU) are reportedly better
organised than most other trade unions.
Contextual Scan
8
Economic context
Despite being designated a least
developed nation by the United Nations,
Tanzanias economy has been steadily
growing over the past decade according to
the World Bank. This has been driven by a
rapid growth of mining, as well as a degree
of expansion in construction, trade and
tourism, and manufacturing industries.
Tanzanias export performance has also
improved with exports increasing from
about 15.5% of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in 2009 to 27.5% of GDP in 2011. It
is worth noting that imports to Tanzania also
increased dramatically in 2011 (see table at
the end of this chapter).
In 2013, discoveries of natural gas ranked
sixth (in volume) amongst all gas and oil
discoveries that year. However, it is not yet
clear that continued discoveries of o"-shore
gas reserves will have a signicant knock-
on e"ect on the Tanzanian economy.
Growth in the economy should be read in
the context of continued high dependence
on foreign aid. Tanzania has steadily
privatised state enterprises as part of
structural adjustment strategies since the
early 1990s. This process has slowed in
r ecent year s, wi t h sever al l ar ge
i nf r ast r uct ur e oper at or s such as
telecommunications, ports, railways and
electricity remaining state-controlled.
Despite objective increases in the
performance of the economy, the Afro-
barometer reports that 52% of Tanzanian
respondents rated the economic conditions
worse or much worse than 12 months
ago (conducted in 2012) against 26% who
rated economic conditions better or much
better. There are three major areas of
common concern about the economy that
might be inuencing this perception: access
to and stability of electricity supply,
corruption, and taxation. These should be
read in relation to broader economic issues
of poverty, widespread lack of access to
services, and a very small middle class.
The Investment Climate Assessment
(ICA, 2008) for Tanzania looks at the
obstacles that a"ect rm competitiveness
and incentives to grow and invest. The ICA
is based on results from the World Bank
Enterprise Survey, a survey of 419 small,
medium and large enterprises (SMLEs) and
65 microenterprises conducted in late 2006.
Small business owners cite regular power
outages, corrupti on and over-pri ced
el ectri ci ty as the factors that most
undermine business development.
The Tanzania Electricity Supply Company
(Tanesco) is state-owned and not always
able to maintain supply to those areas
connected to the grid. In 2005 growing
demand and a steep drop in hydroelectric
generation capacity led to load shedding
and almost daily outages for many rms.
Losses from electricity outages were
estimated to be about 10% of output in that
year for example. According to the 2012
Household Survey
v
conducted by the
National Bureau of Statistics, only 17% of
households had access to electricity in
Tanzania, and only 18% have access to the
electricity grid. Levels of access are
signicantly higher in Zanzibar than on the
mainland. The average price of power in
Tanzania is $0.17 per kilowatt hour. That
compares with an average of $0.14 per
kilowatt hour for the African continent and
$0.07 in East Asia, according to African
Development Bank data.

Contextual Scan
9
There are attempts to improve the
electricity supply, and the energy regulator
has reported expressions of interest by two
companies to each build a 200-megawatt
gas-red power plant that will help reduce
an energy decit
vi
. The regulator plans to
more than double electricity production over
the next four years by building at least four
power plants including the 600-megawatt,
coal-red Mchuchuma facility.
Transparency International
vii
rates various
dimensions of corruption. The Corruption
Percept i ons I ndex r anks count r i es
according to how corrupt the public sector
is perceived to be by businesses and
experts. Scores range from 0 (highly
corrupt) to 100 (very clean). According to
the 2013 survey, Tanzania had a score of
33, and was ranked 111 out of 117
countries. A second measure produced by
Transparency International is the Control of
Corrupt i on Percept i on i ndex whi ch
measures perceptions about the extent to
which public power is exercised for private
gain. This is scored from -2.5 to +2.5 with
higher scores reecting better governance.
Tanzania received a score of -0.49, in the
37th percentile of countries. These two
indexes reect perceptions of public
corruption, and do not engage the equally
important question of corruption within
business and investment. Despite this, the
Afrobarometer in 2013 reported that 59% of
surveyed adult Tanzanians think that most
revenues from gas should be managed by
government
Taxation is an expressed concern for
employees and business owners. Tax rates
are relatively high and climbing, especially
i n t he t ouri sm sect or, creat i ng an
increasingly inhospitable environment for
businesses in this sector.
In 2011, the estimated unemployment
rate was 10.7% (BTI, 2014: 22) Though this
gure presents a fairly optimistic view, it is
clear that most Tanzanians live through
informal activities, using their resources,
wits, and connections to grow, make and
trade whatever they can
viii
. According to a
recent report Finscape Tanzania 2013:
Access to Financial Services
ix
, only 4.5% of
adult Tanzanians are nanced by salaries or
wages from the formal sector, and 2.7%
receive wages from the informal sector. In
addition, some 22.% are nanced by their
own presumably small businesses. The rest
receive their incomes from subsistence
farming (20.6%) or agribusiness (15.8%).
Nearly a quarter of the adult population in
Tanzania is dependent on others for income
(22.9%). In e"ect the middle class in
Tanzania i.e. those who are likely to be
able to a"ord private schooling - is very
small.
The lack of nancial resources is
matched by a lack of basic services. One
survey conducted in 2012, revealed that in
the previous 12 months, 62% of the
population went without clean water
(compared with 42% across Africa), 71%
went without medicine or medical care
(versus 53% continent-wide) and 55% went
without enough food (in contrast to a total
gure for Africa of 50%). Between 1995 and
2005 foreign aid of 57 dollars per person to
improve rural water supply yielded 1%
decrease in water coverage. Neighbouring
st at es had a f ar hi gher ret ur n on
investments.
Contextual Scan
10
Educational context
The literacy rate in Tanzania is estimated
to be 73%. Education is compulsory for
seven years, until children reach age 15, but
most children do not attend school this
long, and some do not attend at all.
Net primary school enrolment has grown
signicantly, from 49% in 1991 to 94% in
2010. Free tuition has led to a massive
increase in the number of children enrolled
in primary schools, from 4,839,361 in 2001
to 7,959,884 in 2006 to 8,410,000 in 2008.
However there is widespread criticism of
the quality of education, with the average
classroom size growing to 66 learners in
2011 and the average student to teacher
ratio in schools standing at 49:1 (BTI,
2014:22).
Currently, learners at government schools
(with a small number of exceptions) are
taught in Kiswahili. By law, all secondary
education must be taught in English (except
Kiswahili class). For many students, English
is their third language. In 2009, only 35.4%
of students sitting for the National Standard
VII Exam received passing marks in English.
Students who do not pass this exam in
English could still attend school where
Engl i sh i s the pri mary l anguage of
instruction, making the use of English in
secondary school teaching controversial.
Those in favour of English-instruction
secondary schools argue that the ability to
speak English prepares students to work in
the global economy. Those opposed argue
that English-language instruction leaves
students out and detracts from students
concentrating on the subject matter.
Gover nment school s are rel at i vel y
i nexpensi ve. Government secondary
schools charge anything between 120 to
about 200,000 Tanzanian shillings (TSH) per
year (around US$120). Several fees are
charged in addition to tuition, including
testing fees, caution fees, watchman
contri buti on, academi c contri buti on,
furniture contribution, identity fee, emblem
fee, and fee for lunches.
A number of private primary schools, with
substantial attendance fees, teach in
English, the medium of instruction in 539 of
the 551 registered private primary schools.
Private secondary school annual tuitions
vary from approximately TSH 200,000
(around US$150) to TSH 32 million (around
US$20,000). Typical private school tuition is
around TSH 700,000 ($525 USD) per
annum.
Enrolment at public primary schools
increased from 1,303,000 in 2006 to
1,364,000 in 2012. In contrast, enrolment
and private primary schools increased from
13,399 in 2006 to 40,578 in 2012.
Despite higher enrolment gures, public
facilities have not increased in proportion.
What has seen a dramatic rise is the
number of non-government or private
school institutions. According to the
National Bureau of Statistics, over a period
of 6 years the number of private primary
schools increased from 260 to 806. This is
91 new primary schools per year, or more
than 7 new schools per month. Although
less dramatic, there has also been a
signicant increase in private high schools
over the same period, from 600 in 2006 to a
little over 1000 in 2012. That is 70 new
private high schools per year. There has
been recent criticism of the levels of fees
charged by private educational institutions.

Contextual Scan
11
In 2011, President Kikwete spoke against
high fees at private schools
x
. He stressed
that education is a service rather than a
commodity to be overpriced as some
privately operated schools are doing. And
he also spoke against some schools that
o"er foreign education to Tanzanian
students; a process that he said makes
them foreigners in their own country. I
urge the private sector to review structures
of schools fees to enable more parents to
educate their children, he said. The
president was also unhappy that some
private schools have chosen to subscribe to
foreign-based education.
There is considerable support for gender
equity, at least in public opinion. In an
Afrobarometer survey in 2012, Tanzanian
adults were asked to respond to the
statement: in our country, women should
have equal rights and receive the same
treatment men do. 84% agreed, 63 agreed
very strongly. This view is reected in
decisions about schooling for boys and
girls. The same survey put the following
proposition to respondents: if funds for
schooling are limited, a boy should always
receive an education in school before a girl
only 16% agreed. In contrast, 78% agreed
with statement: the child with greatest
abilities to learn should receive priority
when funds are limited
xi
.
Contextual Scan
12
Table 2: number of schools in Tanzania. Source: National Bureau of Statistics
Trends
There are si gnal s that CCM has
continued to lose popularity since the 2010
elections. By-election results underscore
the swing away from CCM and towards
CHADEMA while the Afrobarometer 2012
survey indicates that nine out of 10
Tanzanians say government has performed
poorly to keep commodity prices down,
and eight out of 10 disapprove of e"orts to
narrow gaps between rich and poor,
improve living standards and create
employment. (BTI, 2014:13). While CCM is
expected to win the 2015 elections,
di vi si ons wi thi n the party are al so
anticipated to make it a considerably closer
race.
The Afrobarometer 2013 report states
that l i ved poverty (dened as the
experience of people having to go without
basic essentials) is on the rise in Tanzania.
73% of Tanzanians polled in 2012 said their
country was going in the wrong direction
contrasted with 25% said it was going in
the right direction.
Economic trends (cited by the BTI 2014
report) over the period 2009 to 2012 are
also worth noting when thinking about
future possible developments:
Contextual Scan
13
Table 3: Economic Trends 2009 2012. Sources: The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2013 |
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook 2013 | Stockholm International Pease Research
Institute (SIPRI), Military Expenditure Database 2013
References
14
I. Tanzania in Figures 2012, National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Finance, Tanzania. Available from
http://www.nbs.go.tz/
II. Ibid.
III. http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/-/2558/1626674/-/lemudwz/-/index.html
IV. http://www.afrobarometer.org/les/documents/summary_results/tan_r4_sor.pdf
V. Ibid.
VI. Tanzanian Energy Regulator Considering Two Bids for Power Plantsby Alawi Masare March 04, 2014
(source: Bloomberg BusinessWeek: www.businessweek.com. Accessed 03.04.2014)
VII. http://www.transparency.org/country accessed 9 April 2014.
VIII. www.scenarios.ws/tutaka
IX. Available at http://www.nscope.co.za/pages/default.aspx
X. http://archives.in2eastafrica.net/kikwete-decries-exorbitant-school-fees/ Accessed 9 April 2014.
XI. http://www.afrobarometer.org/results/results-by-country-n-z/tanzania. Accessed 9 April 2014.
Scenarios
Four
Scenarios
A story i n whi ch the busi ness
environment is less conducive and
international education is less attractive.
Synopsis
A period of social instability and violence
follows the indecisive 2015 elections,
producing a major shift in the political
landscape. Growing civic action - and
militancy among the youth - fuels a return to
a more socialist agenda to address the
needs of poor Tanzani ans, ami dst
scapegoating of foreign inuences on the
youth. After the 2020 elections, the
government makes good on its election
promises to invest in national education,
acknowledging the impact of inadequate
educat i on and l i mi t ed empl oyment
opportunities on the growing demographic
of young Tanzanians. In the mid-2020s,
t here are maj or new o"shore gas
discoveries, but growing greed by those
with both political and economic power, and
a low level of local skills, result in minimal
visible benet to the average citizen. Most
Tanzanians are relatively poorer in 2030
than they were in 2014, but benet
nonetheless from an improved and free
government school i ng system. Most
foreigners drawn into the mining and gas
industries elect to leave their families at
home rather than bringing them to a socially
conservative and unstable context.
Narrative
Following the popularity trends of the
ruling party and opposition party over the
previous decade, neither achieves an
outright majority in the 2015 elections and
they reluctantly agree to a coalition
government. The instability of the new
coalition hampers attempts to develop or
implement new policy. Opinion polls show
that condence levels in this coalition start
from a low base and continue to fall during
its rst few months in o#ce.
Despite its expressed concerns for the
poor, the coalition government adopts a
mo r e s o c i a l l y c o n s e r v a t i v e a n d
economically neo-liberal agenda. The
announcement of a decision to privatise key
state-owned entities coincides with a
decision to reduce taxes levied on multi-
national companies.
In early 2016 the drought plaguing the
country deepens, l eadi ng to severe
increases in food prices. The rural areas are
hardest hit, with food ination reaching 30%
in some areas.
Higher international oil prices and a
devaluation of Tanzanian currency deepen
this trend. 2016 sees a spike in urban
migration and a growth in informal dwelling
and trade on the margins of Tanzanias
cities.
At the end of this year, headlines about
the Presidents newly purchased eet of
vehicles receive considerable attention.
Only a couple of months later, a 15 year old
youth throws a rock at the presidential
cavalcade. Police respond by shooting him,
and this incident ignites social protest
amongst the poor who are al ready
struggling to a"ord basic necessities. The
youth are at the forefront of a growing
populist movement against the coalition
government. Their militancy grows and they
are rumoured to be supported by extremist
groups from neighbouring countries.
Several youth movements seem to be
adopting a more socially conservative
agenda which excludes women and ethnic
Scenarios: Activism
16
minorities. Their strategies are anything but
conservative however, and social media is
their most potent weapon used to expose
both hypocrisy and vulnerability in the
coalition government, and to animate
unprecedented numbers of youth to join
their struggle.
Alongside a more organised level of
politically motivated violence, random crime
and insecurity grows during this period.
Unemployment continues to rise.
The t wo coal i t i on par t ner s nd
themselves politically deadlocked, one
neutralizing the others anti-corruption
stance and, in turn, being blocked from
fullling their commitment to the poor. In a
bid to capture the powerful youth vote, one
of the coalition parties woos a very popular,
and less militant, young leader who, through
a clandestine set of meetings, negotiates to
stand as their presidential candidate for the
2020 elections. This partys election
manifesto centres on promises to address
demands for decent education and decent
j obs. They wi n the 2020 el ecti ons
convincingly enough to be able to shed
their coalition partner. They start to reverse
some of the pro-business moves made over
the past ve years, striking the balance of
appeasi ng the l arger mul ti -nati onal
compani es whi l e acti ng agai nst the
interests of smaller and medium sized
businesses. The tourism industry is hard hit.
Around this time, conservation policies are
de-prioritised, poaching levels rise and
national parks deteriorate and tourism
levels decline.
Having consolidated power, the police
and military are strengthened to deal with
increasing domestic opposition as well as
o"-shore piracy around the gas elds.
Military spending increases.
Despi te some chal l enges, Chi nas
investment in Tanzania grows over this
period, most notably in manufacturing,
agribusiness on the Serengeti Plain and the
extraction of recently discovered shale gas
reserves. Complaining about inadequate
skilled and semi-skilled local labour, China
puts pressure on the Tanzanian government
to improve levels of education and training.
A period of major investment in national
educati on fol l ows. The gover nment
develops a detailed plan to overhaul and
modernise the education system which, in
2022, gains signicant support from both
China and the World Bank.
GDP continues to grow, vacillating
between 7 and 8%, but inequality deepens.
Free trade zones are allowed, though they
dont benet Tanzanians.
In 2023, it is announced that state high
school fees will be waived. In the same
year, a new policy requires that 60% of all
teachers in international schools must be
Tanzanian.
The ruling party is returned to power in
the 2025 elections, largely on the strength
of devel opments i n educati on. The
Education Minister is awarded a mansion in
a new coastal development in Dar es
Salaam in acknowledgement of his e"orts.
The process of privatizing which started in
the 1990, received a boost in 2015 and then
stalled in the dying days of the coalition
government is dramatically reversed when
t he gover nment unvei l s a det ai l ed
nationalisation plan. Business leaders speak
out more loudly than usual about their
dissatisfaction with Tenesco which has
become increasingly unreliable over recent
Scenarios: Activism
17
years. There is much grumbling around the
dinner tables of the middle classes about
the state of infrastructure. European donors,
already concerned about growing needs
within the European Union, reduce aid and
divert it closer to home.
In 2027, amid insecurity concerns of oil
producers in the Middle East and Nigeria,
social unrest in Russia places unforeseen
limits on Gazproms supply of natural gas.
Tanzania, where discoveries of o"-shore
natural gas reserves have continued in a
steady if modest fashion since 2010,
becomes more strategic as a fuel source
and attracts both l egal and i l l egal
investment. Taxation on foreign-owned
businesses is increased to expand the
public scus and fund an increasingly
bloated and ine#cient public service.
By 2030, Tanzania is characterised by a
socially conservative state that pursues a
largely socialist agenda and a smaller
Tanzanian middle class and by greed. When
people stop to greet each other in the
streets and marketplaces, they are heard to
complain that community-oriented values
are being displaced by self-interest.
However, there are high hopes that
investments in state education will start to
pay dividends in the next decade. Ex-pat
workers appear to be increasingly isolated
and, on the whole, come to Tanzania for
short contract periods and without their
families.
Scenarios: Activism
18
A story i n whi ch the busi ness
environment is less conducive and
international education is more attractive
Synopsis
In this scenario, the gap grows between
the rich (comprising the political elite, big
business and a small but growing middle
class) and the majority of Tanzanians. The
ruling party continues to enjoy political
power but in the context of growing apathy
and growing resentment amongst voters.
When the ruling party once again wins the
2020 elections, poor and hungry Tanzanians
embark on a long, slow road of protest and
unrest, fuelled by social media. Among
these, the most organised are teachers
whose protracted strikes have a devastating
e"ect on the education system. Tanzanias
growing domestic crisis (exacerbated by
corrupti on and fai l ure to appl y the
freedoms, rights and equalities enshrined in
the 2014 Constitution) makes the country
less attractive to tourists and foreign
investors, except extractive industries. The
government closes ranks and places severe
restrictions on foreign work permits, with
exemptions for the mining and gas
industries. The economy grows in the
southern and industrialised areas of the
country, but stagnates in the north and
farming areas. Due to Tanzanias failure to
make progress on regional agreements, the
EAC rethinks Tanzanias membership.
Narrative
The Constitution is nalized in late 2014
after some delay. The proposal to move to a
three-government union proves contentious
and is ultimately over-turned by the ruling
party majority in the Constituent Assembly.
This development fuels public apathy and
passivity in the face of democratic process.
Although the ruling party wins the 2015
polls by a narrow margin, attracting 52% of
the vote, less than 40% of registered voters
show up at the polls in what is widely
considered to be a vote of no-condence in
all the parties contesting the elections.
In the aftermath of the elections, there are
signals of political repression. Ad-hoc and
poorly organised protests in reaction to the
election results are dealt with heavy-
handedly by police. A small number of
newspaper editorials comments on this
disproportionate response, speculating that
trouble may lie ahead.
Over the next two years, very little
progress is made in realising rights
enshrined in the new Constitution such as
freedom of the press and gender equality in
parliament and it becomes evident that
these rights will remain on paper only.
GDP continues to rise, reaching almost
9% in 2018, but there is signicant state
capture by small Tanzanian elite with
nancing from BRICS countries.
Some left wing politicians, supported by
civil society organisations and social media,
attempt to introduce increased social
security using the gas and mineral wealth,
but this motion is defeated in parliament.
Foreign investors throw a lavish party for
the current ruling party to launch its
manifesto for the upcoming 2020 elections.
Photographs of and commentary about this
event, spread far and wide on Facebook
and Twitter, spur anger amongst the poor
and middle class alike. Foreign investors
and entrepreneurs who pride themselves on
their ethics start to pack their bags and look
Scenarios: Elitism
19
for greener pastures. Those with fewer
ethics recognise the opportunities of
growing political patronage and stay.
There is increased movement towards
towns country-wide as people look for jobs.
Infrastructure and services especially
electricity and telecommunications -
become less reliable and more expensive.
The ruling partys 2020 election campaign
recycles pro-poor and nationalist slogans
reminiscent of the Nyerere era. Few seem
convi nced, and when they wi n the
elections, fraud is widely alleged.
Shortl y thereafter, protests begi n
amongst those most disenfranchised,
disillusioned and desperate, fuelled by
social media. This spreads to several trade
unions, including the Teachers Unions,
which is more organised than most. Rolling
strikes by teachers throughout the country
in turn send children and youth, including
university students, onto the streets and
after several months of stalling, the
government makes concessions to ensure
that schools start to function again. But
condence in the national education system
is very low and parents actively seek
alternatives.
2020 to 2025 sees a signicant increase
i n sponsor shi p o"ered by f orei gn
universities to high achieving Tanzanian
school-leavers. Over the previous decade, a
noticeable trend has developed in the
number of Tanzanian-born but foreign-
educated graduates electing to work in their
newl y adopt ed count ri es. There i s
speculation that this brain drain will ow
faster and deeper in the future, to the
detriment of intellectual capital, leadership
and entrepreneurship within Tanzania. The
older generation of leaders in business and
academia is worried about succession.
Meanwhile, the outlook of the ruling class
(comprising political elites and their equally
ambitious business allies) is optimistic.
International mining and gas companies
continue to prosper. The number of luxury
vehicles gridlocked on city streets rises.
Their investment in their childrens
education increases too. An interesting
divide starts to form between those sending
their children to independent boarding
schools aligned to religious institutions
(mostly aspirant middle class Tanzanians),
those choosi ng more secul ar l ocal
al t er nat i ves, many of whi ch o"er
international qualications (mostly ex-pat
business people) and those choosing to
send their children overseas (often, the
ruling class). Around this time, fuelled by
these kinds of debates, widely published
research demonstrates that those who enter
u n i v e r s i t y wi t h a n I n t e r n a t i on a l
Baccalaureate (IB) qualication are better
equipped for the global job market upon
graduation.
Those engaged in social protests are
gradually worn down by police violence and
the disinterest of those with political power
and material wealth. In the absence of a
sympathetic ear, or any meaningful form of
leverage, their disruption is reduced to low-
level noise. By the time parties start
campaigning for the 2025 elections, there is
little evident political engagement either in
favour of, or against, their election
platforms. These elections pass by, with
most seeming to accept the result as a
foregone conclusion.
Scenarios: Elitism
20
In 2026, reaction to the brain drain, the
government tightens restrictions on work
permits for international workers, making an
exception in the mining and gas industries.
In 2027, the tourism sector and related
enterprise, weakened over the last years of
civil disturbance, and negatively a"ected by
these restrictions, take a body blow when
tourism levy increases are announced. The
economy of northern Tanzania is negatively
a"ected and the Tanzanian Shilling further
devaluates.
Tanzanias relationships within the East
African Community deteriorate. For some
time, it has felt shouldered aside by more
power f ul regi onal pl ayer s, and i t s
commitment to regional agreements has
waned accordingly. Citing Tanzanias
domestic woes and its failure to make
progress towards regional trade and
common currency arrangements, EAC
l eaders tabl e a proposal to revoke
Tanzanias membership at the 2029 EAC
Summit. No decision is taken, but a select
committee of regional parliamentarians is
appointed to investigate further.
By 2030, Tanzania is characterised by a
small but powerful elite comprising both
local Tanzanians and foreigners, a politically
disinterested middle-class aspirant for a
better standard of living and quality
education for their children, and a vast
majority of people for whom hunger is a
daily worry. Morale is low amongst
Tanzanians as is its reputation deteriorates
internationally.
Scenarios: Elitism
21
A story i n whi ch the busi ness
environment is more conducive and
international education is more attractive
Synopsis
In a scenario of expansionism, the
business environment is vibrant and
i nternati onal educati on hol ds strong
appeal. . As the ruling partys popularity
wanes, the opposition gains more support.
The opposition emerges from the 2020
elections a clear winner and embarks on its
plans to privatise, ght corruption, reduce
tax, invest in infrastructure and protect
property rights. Both the education and
business sectors (including tourism) benet.
The Tanzanian middle class grows, and
more ex-pats choose to make a long-term
home in Tanzania. Despite improvements in
national education, more people can a"ord
an alternative, have ambitions for their
children beyond Tanzania and elect to enrol
their children in international schools in
Tanzania. All looks rosy in the late 2020s,
but is this situation sustainable? As the gini-
coe#cient grows, there are signals of civil
unrest increasing.
Narrative
In the 2015 elections, the ruling party
wins by a slim majority. The oppositions
support base continues to grow. During the
period between this election and the next,
there is a strong focus on civic education,
f unded by conser vat i ve par t i es i n
Scandinavia, with attempts to increase the
numbers of people who register to vote and
who exercise their vote in 2020.
I n l at e 2016, af t er pr ot r act ed
negotiations, the new Constitution is
approved. A modied version of the
proposed three tier system of government is
agreed, bringing the temperature of
antagonism between Zanzibar and the
Mainland down by several degrees.
In 2017 the new port, funded and built by
the Chinese, opens just north of Dar es
Salaam, increasing regional trade. A railway
is constructed from Dar es Salaam to
Kigoma with a connection to landlocked
Rwanda.
A framework for a common (higher)
education for the EAC is agreed in 2018.
Attempts are made to streamline education
systems within the EAC.
As demand for natural gas continues to
grow with the depletion and instability of
international oil reserves, Tanzanias GDP
rises to nearly 10% in 2020. While rural
Tanzanians remain poor, the cities are
ourishing with new housing developments,
infrastructure and health facilities - some
private and some public.
The 2020 elections arrive. On the back of
middle class prosperity and optimism, the
neo-liberal policies of the opposition party
garner support. They win the elections with
a narrow majority. The new government
immediately enters into negotiations with
the World Bank and the IMF to support its
strategies and indicates to its EAC partners
an interest to kick-start the stalled process
towards a common market. The new
President shows strong leadership and
communicates a clear vision for the future
of Tanzania. Among the key areas are EAC
integration investment in national education
and national infrastructure and creating an
enabling environment for the gas and oil
sector to expand.
Scenarios: Expansionism
22
Tanesco is the rst state-held entity to be
privatised (with funding from the World
Ba n k ) , c l o s e l y f o l l o we d b y t h e
telecommunications infrastructure. On the
back of strategies to boost a free market
economy, foreign direct investment to
Tanzania increases and more multi-national
companies set up o#ces, especially in Dar
es Salaam. Dual citizenship is allowed. This
attracts forei gners and al l ows hi gh
educated Tanzanians in the diaspora to
return and contribute to the positive
developments.
During its rst term of o#ce, the
gover nment i ntroduces a seri es of
conservation strategies based on best
international practices, which boosts
tourism by both middle class Tanzanians
and international visitors. It is hailed by the
IUCN and WWF for i ts progressi ve
strategies in response to both poaching and
climate change.
The EAC Monetary Union (EAMU) is
i mpl emented i n 2023. As wi th the
introduction of the Euro in the EU, it
encounters many i ni ti al hi ccups I n
recognition of this, the EU provides a team
of advisors to support the transition,
contributing to a stronger relationship
between the two regions.
Tanzani a becomes an i ncreasi ngl y
serious player in providing transport to and
from landlocked countries, benetting in
particular from rapid industrial growth in
Rwanda.
In 2025, the ruling party wins the
elections again and the rst woman
president of Tanzania is inaugurated.
Tanzanias economic growth and its
increasing dominance in regional a"airs and
political stability make it an attractive home
for regional headquarters. Multinational
corporations, international NGOs, and the
UN move to the beautiful areas around the
Serengeti and Mount Kilimanjaro, thankful
to avoid the spiralling costs and instability
of Nairobi. A new airport is built in Arusha to
provide a gateway to high-end tourism in
t he r egi on and l ar ge r es i dent i al
developments. The Tanzanian government
grants incentive schemes to develop these
areas.
In the late 2020s, in the midst of visible
consumption and economic growth, some
cracks begin to show. Policies pursued by
the government and foreign investment
ows have not beneted all Tanzanians,
resulting in a widening gap between the
haves and the have-nots. The signals of
dis-satisfaction are small but, for those who
are listening, worrying. A bomb blast at the
ruling partys headquarters in Dar es Salaam
is dismissed by some, but not all.
By 2030, Tanzania is characterised by a
l arge and opt i mi st i c mi ddl e cl ass.
Infrastructure is modern and e#cient, and
the cities are full of construction sites.
Relationships with EAC countries are good,
and stability in Tanzania has had positive
knock-on benets on several of i ts
neighbours. Investments in state education
are paying o", while international education
is also embraced. Partnerships have been
bui l t between state educati on and
international education and elements of
i nt er nat i onal educat i on have been
integrated in the state education. TISA plays
an important role in the development of
national and international education in
Tanzania. The partnerships seem to pay o".
But the patience of the poor, rendered
invisible by the good times of those with
more privilege, is wearing thin. Can these
good times last?
Scenarios: Expansionism
23
A story i n whi ch the busi ness
environment is more conducive and
international education is less attractive
Synopsis
This scenario starts with much the same
trajectory as the expansionism scenario.
The leading opposition party steadily gains
support and wins the elections in 2020.
Alongside the free-market policies they
implement over the ensuing years and the
windfall from o"shore gas production, the
Tanzanian economy grow stronger. There is
a strong emphasis on family as the
cornerstone of society which catches the
avour of social conservatism of some of
Ta n z a n i a s n e i g h b o u r s a n d t h e
governments rhetoric, policies and actions
increasingly marginalise women, ethnic
minorities, Muslims and homosexuals.
Tensions increase between Zanzibar and
the mainland, and these take on a religious
dimension as Christians and Muslims
contest the national space. Right wing
Christian preachers who have enjoyed
political inuence elsewhere in the region
move into mainland Tanzania too, alienating
the Muslim majority on Zanzibar and stirring
up tensions between neighbours who have
lived together peacefully for decades.
Narrative
The new Constitution is approved in
2014, enshrining a new generation of rights.
The ruling party wins the 2015 elections,
albeit by a small majority. The results are
contested, creating some unrest, but
stability is resumed after a few months.
With important discoveries of natural gas
at regular intervals throughout the period
from 2010, Tanzania becomes a major
international player in the fuel industry and
attracts signicant foreign investment. GDP
accelerates to 10% per annum by late
2016. However there is growing concern
over income inequalities as the prots are
distributed unequally.
In 2017, in anticipation of the 2020
elections, the leading opposition party
embarks on a campaign on the basis of the
policies they will put in place to sustain
economic growth and to stimulate sectors
of the economy not yet beneting from
foreign direct investment. It also articulates
a stronger nati onal i st agenda than
previously, which wins approval in the face
of fears that foreign investors are beneting
at the expense of Tanzanians and will
moreover yield political inuence. The
number of Tanzanians who think that
revenues from gas should be managed by
the state rises from 59% in 2013 to nearly
80% by 2018, according to opinion polls.
Their nationalist policies are particularly
inuential in the growing middle class in the
urban areas.
At the same time, the region becomes
more volatile and an increase in violence in
Somalia contributes to a growing stream of
refugees and migrants through Dar es
Sal aam, put t i ng pressure on l ocal
resources. The rst major xenophobic
incidents begin in 2018, and continued
tensions break into violence with increasing
regularity. A survey shows that most
Tanzanians want prosperity only for their
kin.
The leading opposition party wins the
2020 elections, unseating the ruling party
for the rst time. A period of liberalisation
and investment in infrastructure follows. The
Scenarios: Nationalism
24
government decides to double the salaries
of state school teachers, funding this
increase through VAT levied on school fees
above $2000 per year. NSSF contributions
are applied to all employees, both foreign
nationals and Tanzanian.
By 2025, electrication rises from 17% of
households to 45% and two thirds of
households have access to clean water. At
the same time, the government campaigns
against certain equality provisions in the
2014 Constitution, arguing that these are
not African and not in Tanzanias best
interests. Facebook and Twitter are banned.
During the early 2020s, it becomes
apparent that the liberal philosophy of
international schools is being viewed with
suspicion by the government and its
followers. State-sponsored newspapers
criticise international schools for being
unTanzani an. Pri nci pal s of several
international schools are summoned to the
Ministry of Education and advised that
things will have to change. Parents at local
international schools start to think about
placing their children in international
schools abroad.
With money to spend and swelling
national pride, more Tanzanian teachers and
educators are setting up private and semi-
private schools o"ering high quality
education based on the Tanzanian national
curri cul um and produci ng excel l ent
graduates. On the mainland, these schools
tend to favour Christian education over the
more liberal or secular education o"ered by
the international schools. Parents look for
schools with good morals and strict
discipline.
Tanzania qualies for the Africa Cup of
Nations in both 2022 and 2024. In 2024, it
reaches the quarter nals. A feel-good
factor pervades Tanzania.
In 2025, the leading opposition party is
re-elected by a landslide with a mandate to
revise the 2014 Constitution. Later the same
year, the cost of foreign work permits is
doubled.
In 2026, free schools o"ering an elite
secondary education are introduced by the
government. Expatriate families decide to
send their children home for schooling.
The national curriculum goes online in
2028. The governments investment in
national education has become a source of
national pride. Within weeks of this
development, access to international
education is restricted to foreign nationals
only.
By 2030, Tanzania is prosperous, with a
growing middle class that has high hopes
for the next generation on the basis of the
oppor t uni t i es t hey f ace. However,
nationalism is casting an ever-larger
shadow over those who are not seen to be
model Tanzanians and who are mostly
excl uded f rom these opportuni ti es.
Fundamentalism is on the rise, with
regressive policies that favour a more
patriarchal and Christian state over one that
welcomes diversity. With success of the
government free schools following an elite
educat i on, s t udent enr ol ment i n
international schools throughout Tanzania
declines.
Scenarios: Nationalism
23