ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO et al., vs. JUSTO LUKBAN et al.

(G.R. No. L-14639; 39 Phil 778, March 25, 1919)

Ponente: Malcolm, J.
Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Habeas Corpus.
Facts:
1. Manila Mayor, Justo Lukban, wanting to exterminate vice, ordered the closing of the citys red light district. The
brothels were closed & the workers (170 women) were rounded up & kept confined to their houses in the district
by the police for a little more than a week.
2. On the night of Oct.25, 1918, the women were forcibly hustled aboard the steamers Corregidor & Negros & sent
off to Davao to work as laborers w/o their consent, w/o opportunity to collect their belongings, & apparently were
under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation.
3. The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed & receipted for as
laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, & by Feliciano Yigo & Rafael Castillo. The governor &
hacendero had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of
Manila.
4. The attorney for the relatives & friends of the deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member
of the SC, alleging that Justo Lukban, along w/ Anton Hohmann (the police chief), & others illegally restrained the
women of their liberty.
5. The court awarded the writ of habeas corpus in an order of November 4 that directed Lukban, Hohmann, Sales,
Yigo to bring before the court the persons alleged to be deprived of their liberty on December 2, 1918. On the
day named in the order, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the
respondents.
6. The court issued a second order directing that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the Court by
respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, Yigo on January 13, 1919 unless the women should, in written statements
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce that right, or
unless respondents demonstrate other legal motives that made compliance impossible.
7. On January 13, 1919, respondents had succeeded in bringing from Davao 8 women. They allege that 81 women
were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation free,
renounced the right through sworn statements; 59 had already returned to Manila by other means, and despite all
efforts 26 could not be located.
8. The counsel for petitioners asked the Court to find the respondents in contempt of court. The respondents
challenged the contempt proceeding and the issuance of the writ.
Issues:
1. Whether
2. Whether
3. Whether
4. Whether

the
the
the
the

petitioners had standing to file the petition for habeas corpus

Supreme Court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus
women were illegally restrained of their liberty
respondents were guilty of contempt

Held/ Ratio:
1. Yes. When it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, another person may
submit it in his/her behalf. In the case at bar, the way the expulsion was conducted by the officials made it
impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. They were first isolated from society and then
shipped. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf, in this case, the
petitioners who were relatives and friends of the deportees.
2.

No. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the SC or any judge thereof enforceable anywhere in the Phils.
Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the SC or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the
SC & is dependent on the particular circumstances. In the case at bar, it was not shown that the CFI of Davao was
in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other
hand, the petitioners and their attorneys were in Manila and it was shown that the case involved parties situated
in different parts of the Islands. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the
writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefit of the writ.

3.

Yes. The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties,
who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of their liberty & their freedom of locomotion just
as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. In this case, there was no law, order, or regulation which justified
the action of the respondents in restraining the petitioners of their liberty. There was no showing of any law or
order which authorized or conferred upon the Mayor of the city or the Chief of Police the right to force the women
to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Phil. penal law during that time
specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any
person to change his residence.

4.

No. Only Mayor Lukban is guilty of contempt. He was primarily responsible for setting forth this whole chain of
events and had under his power as head of the city government to facilitate the return of the women to Manila
but failed. The rest of the respondents are not guilty of contempt. Some were merely following the orders of their
superiors or merely fulfilling a duty. Another was merely drawn into the case through miscommunication.

An officers failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus, when he has power to
do so, is contempt committed in the face of the court.
Dispositive: In resume- as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary . The respondents
Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are not found to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is
found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one
hundred pesos.