CONTEMPT CASES

1. P.N. Duda v. Shiv Shankar & Ors

In the case of P.N. Dadu v. P. Shiv Shanker & Others, (1988) 3 SCC 167, the then Minister of
Law, Justice and Company Affairs P. Shiv Shankar had made a speech making fierce
allegations to the effect, that the Supreme Court was composed of elements from the elite
class, that because they had their ‘unconcealed sympathy for the haves’ they interpreted the
expression compensation’ in the matter they did. He submitted, that the Supreme Court held,
that the said was an expression of opinion about an institutional pattern. It was submitted, that
even in spite such serious allegations made, the Court found that the case of proceeding for
contempt was not made out.

2. Rama Dayal Markarha v. State of M.P.

It was decided that fair and reasonable criticism of a judgement that is a public document or a
public act of a judge involved in the administration of justice is not considered contempt.
Such reasonable and honest criticism should be encouraged because no one, including judges,
can claim infallibility. Such criticism could reasonably claim that the judgement was
erroneous or that an error was made, both in terms of law and known facts.

3. Re: S. Mulgaokar
The SC has maintained that the judiciary cannot be immune from fair criticism.
The contempt action is to be used only when an obvious mis-statement with
malicious intent seeks to bring down public confidence in the courts or seeks to
influence the courts. J. Beg’s remark in the case is of particular importance. It
was opined that at times, the judiciary may adopt a magnanimously charitable
attitude even when blatantly disparaging and unfair criticism of its operations is
made out of a genuine concern of improvement. The assertion essentially
underlines the need for a liberal interpretation of constructive criticisms on the
judiciary.
The Supreme Court in In Re: S. Mulgaokar vs Unknown was examining whether suggesting
that judges of the Supreme Court were working at the executive’s behest attracts contempt.
The Court showed restraint and tried to demarcate the line between freedom of speech and
administration of justice by laying down six principles. Unfortunately, in the latter
judgements courts used these principles during the trials of important persons and hence these
principles were not adhered to in its spirit.

4. E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T.N. Nambiar

In E.M. Sankaran Namboodiripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar , this Court had to deal with this
jurisdiction in respect Of Mr. Namboodiripad who at the relevant time was the Chief Minister
of Kerala. He had held a press conference in November, 1976 and made various critical
remarks relating to the judiciary which inter alia was described by him as "an instrument of
oppression" and the Judges as "dominated by class hatred, class prejudices", "instinctively"
favouring the rich against the poor. He also stated that as part of the ruling classes the
judiciary "works against workers, peasants and other sections of the working classes" and
"the law and the system of Judiciary essentially served the exploiting classes" (emphasis
supplied) It was found that these remarks were reported in the newspapers and thereafter
proceedings commenced in the High Court of Kerala. The appellant Shri Namboodiripad was
called upon to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt. In his affidavit the
appellant stated that the reports were "substantially correct", though incomplete in some
respects. The appellant further claimed that his observations did no more than give expression
to the Marxist Philosophy and what was contained in the programme of the Communist Party
of India. By a majority judgment of the High Court the appellant was convicted for contempt
of court and fined Rs. 1000 or simple imprisonment for one month. He moved this Court by
an appeal. He contended that the law of contempt must be read without encroaching upon the
guarantee of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and
that the intention of the appellant in making his remarks at the press conference should be
examined in the light of his political views which he was at liberty to put before the people.
He sought to justify the remarks as an exposition of his ideology which he claimed was based
on the teachings of Marx and Engels and on this ground claimed protection of the first clause
of Article 19(1) of the Constitution. The conviction of the appellant was upheld by this Court.
It was observed by Hidayatullah, C.J speaking for the Court that the law punishes not only
acts which do not in fact interfere with the courts and administration of justice but also those
which have that tendency, that is to say, are likely to produce a particular result. Judged from
the angle of courts and administration of justice, there was no doubt that the appellant was
guilty of contempt of court. The Chief Justice observed whether the appellant misunderstood
the teachings of Marx and Engels or deliberately distorted them was not to mush purpose.
The likely effect of his words must be seen and they clearly had the effect of lowering the
prestige of judges and courts in the eyes of the people. (emphasis supplied) That he did not
intend any such result may be a matter for consideration in the sentence to be imposed on him
but could not serve as a justification. this Court further held that the appellant had misguided
himself about the true teachings of Marx, Engles and Lenin. According to the Chief Justice he
had misunderstood the attack by them on State and the laws as involving an attack on the
Judiciary. No doubt the courts, while upholding the laws and enforcing them, do give support
to the State but they do not do so out of any impure motives. To charge the Judiciary as an
instrument of oppression, the Judges as guided and dominated by class hatred, class interests
and class prejudices, instinctively favouring the rich against the poor is to draw a very
distorted and poor picture of the Judiciary. It was clear that the appellant bore an attack
upon judges which was calculated to raise in the minds of the people a general
dissatisfaction with and distrust of all judicial decisions. According to the Chief Justice it
weakened the authority of law and law courts (emphasis supplied). It was further held that
while the spirit underlying Article 19(1)(a), must have due play, the Court could not overlook
the provisions of the second clause of that Article. Its provisions are to be read with Articles
129 and 215 which specially confer on this Court and the High Courts the power to punish
for contempt of themselves. Although Article 19(1)(a) guaranteed complete freedom of
speech and expression, it also made an exception in respect of contempt of court. While the
right is essential to a free society, the Constitution had itself imposed restrictions in relation to
contempt of court and it could not therefore be said that the right abolished the law of
contempt or that attack upon judges and courts would be condoned. We are not concerned
here whether the appellant in that case properly understood the communist manifesto or the
views of the Marx, Engles and Lenin.

5. Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa, HC

In the case of Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Registrar of Orissa and Another (1973), the
Supreme Court of India ruled that the main word is “justice” and not “judge”, the main
concern revolves around justice and not the judges. The Contempt of Courts Act respects the
right of free speech and expression and the right to justice. The contempt laws should be
practiced only when there is mala fide intention to violate the dignity of the court and not fair
or trivial comments made on the judiciary and the judicial officers.

6. Conscientious Group v. Mohammad Yunus & Ors

Mr. Mohd. Yunus, Chairman of the Trade Fair Authority of India had criticised a judgment
delivered by a Supreme Court Judge in a case, holding that the singing of the National
Anthem for a particular sect. of Christians was not compulsory, Mr. Yunus said this
judge(justice Chinnappa Reddy) has no right to be called either an Indian or a judge.

An Association of individuals called the Conscientious Group filed a petition seeking a

direction that Mr. Yunus should be hauled up for contempt.

The court passed detailed judgment but didn’t order any action against Yunus.

7. M.R. Parashar & Ors v. Dr. Farooq Abdullah & Ors

Contempt petition was filed against then Chief Minister of J&K for making certain
contemptuous statements against the judiciary and the Editor and the correspondent of a
newspaper in which those statements were published correspondent. The CM denied to have
made the statements, as the Editor asserted that the reports of the speeches published in his
newspaper are true. The court held that in absence of any preponderant circumstances which,
objectively, compel the acceptance of the word of one in preference to the word of the other,
it was unable to record a positive finding that the CM made the particular statements is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The court ruled that “ the liberty of free expression is not compounded with a licence to make
unfounded allegations of corruption against judiciary.”

8. Utpal Kumar Das v. Court of Munsif, Kamrup

This is the case of non-rendering of assistance, although the court has ordered to render
assistance. Decree executed by the court to deliver immovable property but because of certain
obstruction, the defendant failed to do so. Hence, he was held liable for constituting
disobedience to the orders of the competent Civil Court.

9. Jaswant Singh v. Virendra Singh

In this case an advocate caste derogatory and scandalous attack on the judge of the High
Court. An application was filed an election petitioner in the High Court, who was an
advocate. He wanted to seek to stay for further arguments in an election petition and also the
transfer of election petitions. These things cause an attack on the judicial proceeding of the
High Court and had the tendency to scandalize the Court. It was held in this case that it was
an attempt to intimidate the judge of the High Court and cause an interface in the conduct of a
fair trial.

10. Attorney General v. Times Newspaper Ltd.

Fact: In 1996 the defendant newspaper had given an undertaking to the Attorney General
not to publish information about the British intelligence service disclosed to it by T, a former
employee of the service. The defendant applied to vary the undertaking so as to permit it to
publish extracts of a book written by T and published in Russia once the book had entered the
public domain. The book contained matters disclosed in beach of confidence and matters
which might be damaging to the national interest. The judge varied the undertaking to permit
the defendant to republish information which had previously been published or made
generally accessible to the public at large. The Attorney General appealed on the grounds that
the phrase “generally accessible to the public at large” was too wide and that, to avoid
damage to the national interest, publication should only be allowed when the defendant could
demonstrate that the book had come to the widespread attention of the public at large.

Issue: Whether a publisher should be required to obtain prior approval from the Attorney
General before publishing material which might be damaging to national security.

Held: Although it was desirable that there should be consultation between a newspaper and
the intelligence services before publication of information that might include matters capable
of damaging the national interest, it was not right having regard to article 10 ECHR and s 12
HRA, to subject the defendant to a fetter on its right to freedom of expression beyond that
which applied to other publishers who had not given the undertaking.

ITAT through President v. V.K. Agarwal

Brief fact
A letter was sent by the Law Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice to the President of the
Tribunal stating that he was in receipt of a written complaint that in a particular case two
conflicting orders were passed by the same Bench.

It was stated therein that the Judicial Member passed the ‘first draft order’ in favour of the
assessee and signed the same.

Subsequently, the Accountant Member passed an order in favour of the Revenue, which was
signed by both the members.
The President was asked to send a report on the same within ten days.

The President asked the two members to give their comments on the same.

The members clarified that the first draft of the order was only signed by the Judicial Member
and was not an order of the Tribunal for the purposes of the Act.

It was clarified that pursuant to passing of the draft order, the members discussed the case
among themselves and decided that the view taken therein was incorrect.

Accordingly, the order deciding the issue in favour of the Department was passed by the
Accountant Member and signed by both members.

Before these comments could be communicated to the Law Secretary, he wrote another letter
to the President stating therein that if no justification was given to him, adverse inferences
will be drawn against the President as well.

The Tribunal viewed these letters as interference with its judicial functioning and filed an
application before the Supreme Court requesting it to issue a show cause notice of contempt
against the Law Secretary.

SC's Observation

The Law Secretary argued that since his responsibilities extended to supervision over the
functioning of the Tribunal, he was within his rights to ask for a report from the President.

The Tribunal, on the other hand, argued that the Law Secretary’s supervision over the
Tribunal was limited to matters of administrative nature and he could not be permitted to
influence the judicial decisions of the members.
The first draft prepared by the Judicial Member was not an ‘order’ since it was not signed by
both the members.

There was nothing wrong in the members discussing the matter and finally passing an order
contrary to the first draft prepared by the Judicial Member.

The supervision and control of the Law Secretary over the Tribunal was merely
administrative in nature.

The letters written by the Law Secretary in the present case sought to interfere with the
judicial power of the members of the Tribunal, which was not permitted in law.

The conduct of the Law Secretary in the present case, interfering with the judicial functioning
of the Tribunal amounted to a gross contempt of Court.

It was a deliberate attempt on his part to question the judicial functioning of the Tribunal
coming as it did from a person of his rank.

It was rightly perceived by the President as well as the two concerned Members of the
Tribunal as a threat to their independent functioning in the course of deciding appeals coming
up before them.

His apology before the Court was not accepted and a fine of Rs. 2000 was imposed for this
contempt.

In simple words, power of Law Secretary is confined to administrative supervision. Law

Secretary has no jurisdiction to interfere with the judicial functioning of the Tribunal.

Vinay Chandra Mishra v. Supreme Court Bar Association

In Vinay Chandra case supreme court suspended the contemnor-Vinay Chandra from
practising as an advocate for 3 years in addition to imprisonment and such imprisonment will
remain suspended and will be activated if the contemnor is convicted for contempt of court
once again. In Vinay Chandra case Court had held that power of Supreme Court to take
cognizance of contempt and to award punishment for it under article 129 and 142(2) is
independent of any statute. According to court the power to punish under article 129 and
142(2) is independent and cannot be controlled by any statute, because such power is “sui
generis”.

Thus in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India the decision of the court to
suspend the advocate was challenged. The main contention of the petitioner was that the
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to suspend an advocate from practising, because this was
the exclusive domain of the State Bar Council or the Bar Council of India, under the
advocates act, 1971.

According to the petitioner, the act of Vinay Chandra amounts to Professional misconduct
which is different from contempt of court and punishment for misconduct can be given only
under advocates act, 1961.

It was also contended that under Article 142(2) court can punish for contempt only in a cause
which is pending before it and that professional misconduct is not a subject matter which is
expressly pending before the court while dealing with a case of contempt.

Petitioner also contended that court cannot suspend the licence to practice of an advocate and
doing so under article 142 would amount to “assuming a jurisdiction”. It said that the court
cannot create a jurisdiction or punishment which has not been expressly provided by a law.

Court thus went on to discuss the nature and scope of power to punish for contempt under
article 129.

The court holds that suspending an advocate from practice can be given only for
“Professional misconduct” and it (supreme court) cannot take over such jurisdiction, which is
exclusively given to a Disciplinary committee under Advocates Act. It said that article 142
cannot be used to deprive a professional lawyer of the due process contained under advocates
act. i.e., It cannot deprive an advocate of being heard and adjudicated by a disciplinary
committee for professional misconduct under section 35 of the Advocates Act. By this court
overruled its decision in Vinay Chandra case in which while suspending the licence of an
advocate it said that there is no limitation on the power of Supreme Court to punish for
contempt.

There is no restriction or limitation on the nature of punishment that this Court may award
while exercising its contempt jurisdiction and the said punishments can be the punishments
that the Court may impose while exercising the said jurisdiction

Further, it said that although its power to punish for contempt is independent of any statute, it
cannot ignore the express statutory provision dealing with a subject. Thus it said that in
dealing with contempt of court case, suspending the licence to practice is a power statutorily
available only to the Bar Council of India or State Bar Council and, therefore, the court
cannot in the exercise of the jurisdiction under article 142 suspend that licence. It expressly
stated that the power of State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India to take action for
professional misconduct is different from the jurisdiction of the courts to take action against
the advocates for the contempt of court.

T.R.Dhananjay v/s. J. Vasudevan

 In this case the petitioner’s claim for promotion as the Chief Engineer was accepted by the
High Court in contradistinction with that of the then incumbent and the decision of the High
Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The fact that the Petitioner was not eligible under
relevant rules for promotion as the Chief Engineer was not brought to the notice of the Court.
When the claim inter se had been adjudicated and the claim of the petitioner had become
final, the Government did not promote the petitioner in accordance with the Court’s order on
the ground that he could but be promoted under the relevant rules. The Court held that the
refusal amounted to contempt of Court. When the order has been passed by the Court the
Government or authority or person to whom the order has been made has no option but to
give effect to the order as passed by the Court. If there is any doubt, he should ask for
clarification. The respondent was held liable for contempt of Court.

In the case of MOHD ASLAM VS UNION OF INDIA

the petitioner (MOHD ASLAM) filed a contempt petition against the respondent (Shri Kalyan
Singh), then Chief Minister that he wilfully disobeyed the court’s order. There was a prior
case in which the constitutional validity of land acquisition of Ayodhya under Sec-4 of Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 by the government was challenged. Here court ruled in accordance
with the resolutions passed in the National Integration Council on basis of statements given
by Shri Kalyan Singh. Now, the petitioner approached the court alleging that the respondent
is acting against the order passed by the hon’ble court and not fulfilling his own
commitments. The court convicted the respondent and sentenced imprisonment of 1 day and
a fine of Rs 2000.

In the matter of Re Ajay Kumar Pandey

It was observed that “ fair comments, even if, out-spoken, but made without any malic and
without attempting to impair the administration of justice and made in good faith in proper
language do not attract any punishment for contempt of court. However, when from the
criticism a deliberate, motivated and calculated attempt is discernible to bring down the
image of judiciary in the estimation of the public or to impair the administration of justice or
trend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute the courts must bitter themselves to
uphold their dignity and the majesty of law.’ In this case The Supreme Court held that
advocate using intemperate language against various judicial officers and attributing motives
to them while discharging there judicial function would be held guilty of contempt of Court.
In this case such advocate was sentenced or punished to 4 months simple imprisonment and
fine of Rs. 1000/-.

T. DEEN Dayal v. H.C. of Andhra Pradesh

The issue which was raised in the aforesaid case is "Does the High Court have jurisdiction to
take action for contempt of court?"

Addressing this issue, the Supreme Court in T. Deen Dayal v. High Court of A.P.11 held that
the High Court has jurisdiction to take action for contempt of court as a court of record under
Article 215 of the Constitution while trying an election petition. The reason for such a
conclusion was that Section 80-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides that
"the court having jurisdiction to try an election petition shall be the High Court". The
jurisdiction to try an election petition is thus given to a court i.e., the High Court. The
authority designated being the High Court, it therefore has the jurisdiction to take action for
contempt of court as a court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution while trying an
election petition.

Rajiv Daiya v. state of Rajasthan

In the present case, the petitioner, Mr. Rajiv Daiya has challenged various provisions of the
law, including Section 301 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and various provisions of the
Judges (Inquiry) Act. Furthermore, the Division Bench dealing with the writ petitions filed by
Suraz India Trust had framed ten questions on the appointment of judges under Article 124
(2) of the Indian Constitution. Based on the complexity of the questions, the Division Bench
referred the matter to a larger bench on April 04, 2011. On November 09, 2012, a three-judge
bench heard the issue and directed that the case files be referred to the Chief Justice for
proper measures. The petitioner, Mr. Daiya, made submissions before the Chief Justice,
asking for the matter to be placed before a bench of eleven judges. However, the Chief
Justice again deemed it appropriate to place the matter before a three-judge bench. During a
hearing on November 7, 2013, the three-judge bench stated they were not inclined to
entertain the writ petition and hence dismissed the case.

The petitioner viewed this ruling as a clear breach of laws and regulations. Moreover, the
judgement was a disrespect of the order passed by the Division Bench. The petitioner filed a
contempt petition against the Chief Justice, three other Supreme Court judges, and the
Secretary-General. However, the petitions were dismissed because they were lodged unfairly
and were not presented before the court for deliberation. The trust also claimed that none of
the cases brought before the Court was decided on merits, and the court was unwilling to
entertain the case and thus dismissed it. Following this, Suraz India Trust had to approach the
Supreme Court

The Supreme Court stated that the presentation made by the trust was indeed disturbing due
to the allegations made by the petitioner against three Supreme Court judges and six
Rajasthan High Court judges. The Court expressed dissatisfaction with the petitioner’s
aspersions against the judges and stated that respect for the Courts and the decisions rendered
by them must always be maintained to ensure public respect for the judges.

The Court determined that important matters are discussed before the Courts daily. They lack
behind sometimes as a result of instances like these. Filing contempt petitions one after the
other on issues with no justification clearly shows the trust’s lack of understanding and
illegitimacy. Therefore, such actions were and should be taken seriously by the Court.

On May 01, 2017, the Court directed a sum of 25 Lakhs to be deposited by the petitioner for
wasting the judges’ time. Additionally, the Court permanently banned Mr. Rajiv Daiya from
filing any public interest litigation either by himself or any other individual due to
misconceived petitions filed before the Court.

Mrityunjay Das v. Sayed Hasibur Rahman

Court held that, " Exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts Act shall have to be
rather cautious and use of it rather sparingly after addressing itself to the true effect of the
contemptuous conduct,”

Om Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal, AIR 2000 SC 1136

It was held that availability of an independent judiciary and an atmosphere wherein Judges
may act independently and fearlessly in the source of existence of civilization in society the
writ issued by the court must be obeyed. It is the binding efficacy attaching with the
commands of the court and the respect for the orders of the court which deter the aggrieved
persons from taking the law in their own hands because they are assured of an efficacious
civilized method of settlement of dispute.
The following cases are related to Professional Misconduct:
Samantha v. State of Andhra Pradesh
Emporer v. Jodh Singh
Prahlad Sharan Gupta v. BCI
V.P. Kumaravelu v. BCI
Hikimat Ali Khan v. Ishwar Prasad
John D’Souza v. Edwand Anni
Mrs. Roma Banerjee v. Ushapati Banerjee
D.S. Dalal v. SBI
Rajendra Pal v. Ramkrishna Gupta
Girendra Kishore Jha case
D.P. Chaddha v. Triyogi Narain
Rama Talkies v. Govt of Andhra Pradesh