The Supreme Court annulled certificates of title over shorelands along Taal Lake. While a lower court had previously registered the lands, the registration court lacked jurisdiction as shorelands are public domain. The lands in question were shown to have always been part of Taal Lake and washed by its waters, not acquired through accretion. As public domain lands, they could not be subject to private ownership or registration, so res judicata did not apply. The Court affirmed the lands were property of the State.
The Supreme Court annulled certificates of title over shorelands along Taal Lake. While a lower court had previously registered the lands, the registration court lacked jurisdiction as shorelands are public domain. The lands in question were shown to have always been part of Taal Lake and washed by its waters, not acquired through accretion. As public domain lands, they could not be subject to private ownership or registration, so res judicata did not apply. The Court affirmed the lands were property of the State.
The Supreme Court annulled certificates of title over shorelands along Taal Lake. While a lower court had previously registered the lands, the registration court lacked jurisdiction as shorelands are public domain. The lands in question were shown to have always been part of Taal Lake and washed by its waters, not acquired through accretion. As public domain lands, they could not be subject to private ownership or registration, so res judicata did not apply. The Court affirmed the lands were property of the State.
Mindanao Bus Company vs City Assessor 116 PHIL 501 GR No. L-17870 September 29, 1962 FACTS The City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed a realty tax on several equipment and machineries of Mindanao Bus Co. These equipment were placed on wooden or cement platforms and can be moved around in the bus companys repair shop. The bus company appealed the assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax Appeals of the City, however, sustained the city assessor. Thus, the bus company appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, which likewise sustained the city assessor. HELD Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property: xxx (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner pf the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works; Note that the stipulation expressly states that the equipment are placed on wooden or cement platforms. They can be moved around and about in petitioner's repair shop. Before movables may be deemed immobilized in contemplation of Article 415 (5), it is necessary that they must first be essential and principal elements of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. In this case, the tools and equipment in question are by their nature, not essential and principal elements of Mindanao Bus Co.s business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on. Aside from the element of essentiality the Art.415 (5) also requires that the industry or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. A sawmill would also be installed in a building on land more or less permanently, and the sawing is conducted in the land/building. However, in the instant case, the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by law. The equipments in question are not absolutely essential to the petitioner's transportation business, and petitioner's business is not carried on in a building, tenement or on a specified land. As such, the equipments in question are not deemed real property because the transportation business is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by law. The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop, if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another. Therefore, the imposition of realty tax on the maintenance and repair equipment was not proper because the properties involved were not real property under Article 415 (5). RP v. Lat Vda de Castillo, et. al. Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
G.R. No. L-69002 June 30, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AMANDA LAT VDA. DE CASTILLO, FLORENCIO T. CASTILLO, SOLEDAD LOTA CASTILLO, CARLOS L. CASTILLO, NIEVES KATIGBAK CASTILLO, MARIANO L. CASTILLO, HIPOLITA DYTIAPCO CASTILLO, AIDA CASTILLO HERRERA, HERMITO HERRERA, JOSE L. CASTILLO, LILIA MACEDA CASTILLO, TERESITA L. CASTILLO, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BATANGAS and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
EN BANC
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the April 26, 1984 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court reversing the February 6, 1976 Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Batangas.
Facts:
In 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, located in Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas, as the true and absolute owner of the land with the improvements thereon, which was issued to him by the Register of Deeds of Batangas. He was married to Amanda Lat.
By virtue of an instrument dated in March 1960, the two parcels of land with Original Certificate of Title (OCT) were consolidated and divided into Lots 1 to 9 which was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). After the death of Modesto Castillo on August 31, 1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of mortgage in favor of Florencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which Original Certificate of Title was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title (TCT) were issued to the following appellants- defendants.
The Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. 2044 with the lower court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered thereby (Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State.
It was alleged that said lands had always formed part of the Taal Lake and being of public ownership, it could not be the subject of registration as private property. They alleged in their answer that the Government's action was already barred by the decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed; and that the government was estopped from questioning the ownership and possession of appellants.
The then Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, decided that the Register of Deeds of Batangas to order the cancellation of the OCT in the name of Modesto Castillo and the subsequent TCT issued over the property in the names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-19166 are hereby declared public lands belonging to the state. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Defendants appealed their case. The Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on April 26,1984, reversed and set aside the appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint.
Issue:
The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.
Held:
There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter (Ramos v. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986]; that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil Code) and, therefore, not registrable.
Thus, it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant (Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 14 SCRA, 259 [1965], citing the cases of Dizon, et al. v. Bayona, et al., 98 Phil. 943; and Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., 13 SCRA 704).
But an important bone of contention is the nature of the lands involved in this case.
Petitioner contends "that "Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof. Consequently, the same were not subject to registration, being outside the commerce of men; and that since the lots in litigation are of public domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code) the registration court (of 1951) did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as private property, hence, res judicata does not apply. (Rollo, pp. 37-38).
The Government presented both oral and documentary evidence.
Lakeshore land or lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be differentiated from foreshore land or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides (Castillo, Law on Natural Resources, Fifth Edition, 1954, p. 67).
Such distinction draws importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added (Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423) while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for private ownership until formally declared by the government to be no longer needed for public use (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).
But said distinction will not help private respondents because there is no accretion shown to exist in the case at bar. On the contrary, it was established that the occupants of the lots who were engaged in duck raising filled up the area with shells and sand to make it habitable.
The defense of long possession is likewise not available in this case because, as already ruled by this Court, mere possession of land does not by itself automatically divest the land of its public character (Cuevas v. Pineda, 143 SCRA 674 [1968]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the April 26,1984 Decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and the February 6,1976 Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Batangas is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
Maneclang vs IAC Posted on June 21, 2013 GR 66575 September 30, 1986 144 SCRA 553 FACTS ISSUE HELD A CREEK is a recess/arm extending from a river and participating in the eb and flow of the sea. It is a property belonging to the public domain. It is not susceptible to appropriation & acquisitive prescription because such is As a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual. Its nature as property of the public domain cannot be modified by the construction of irrigatoon dikes by the National Irrigation Authority, or by its conversion into a fishpond. Hence, a compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of such property in favor of an individual is null and void. The compromise agreement has no legal effect since it is contrary to law and public policy.
Report of the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations on the Petition of the Honourable Thomas Walpole, Benjamin Franklin, John Sargent, and Samuel Wharton, Esquires, and their Associates
1772