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RBI for Offshore Pipelines
Technology
Technology
I
n the pipeline industry much effort has been taken
to ensure safety. Therefore, in-depth research has
been carried out with respect to allowable failure
probabilities. Since also the consequences of fail-
ure play a more important role, risk based approaches
are becoming more common. They can be used during
design as well as during operation. The focus is here on
the operational phase regarding risk based inspection.
The implementation of a
risk based inspection (RBI)
procedure starts with the de-
termination of the relevant
failure modes that should be
regarded (Figure 1).
After identification of the
relevant failure modes, the
corresponding probability
and consequence have to be
estimated. The probability of
failure can be estimated by us-
ing different methods, such as
Qualitative methods
S e mi - q u a n t i t a t i v e
methods
Quantitative methods.
Qualitative methods are based on few essential data
and lead to a rough estimation of the failure probabil-
ity. Semi-quantitative methods use more information
and some calculations are carried out, which results
into a more accurate failure probability. The quantita-
tive methods consider fully probabilistic approaches
and lead to an accurate determination of the existing
failure probability. However, in engineering praxis
the data required for the fully
quantitative approach is typi-
cally not available.
Therefore, in the follow-
ing the semi-quantitative ap-
proach is used. This approach
gives a more detailed failure
probabi l i t y t han t he pure
qualitative approach and is
normally applicable. Details
of the complete risk assess-
ment, i.e. by also taking into
account the consequences,
are given below.
As the risk is not constant
along the pipeline route, a
segmentation of the pipeline
Risk based inspection (RBI) has become quite popular since the inspection budget can be used much
more effciently compared to conventional inspection procedures. The RBI normally starts with the
determination of all relevant risk driving effects for the specifc pipeline, the defnition of acceptance
criteria and the assessment of the residual lifetime for the pipeline. These tasks require a close
co-operation between the pipeline operator and the RBI-experts. This paper describes some of the
major aspects of the methodology developed to estimate the risk of 60 offshore pipelines. Based on
this risk assessment an optimised inspection strategy is developed. Each pipeline investigated
is divided in specifc segments taking into account the differences in essential parameters over the
pipeline length, such as wall thickness, environmental loads, or corrosion condition. Although
only basic data has been available this was suffcient to work out reliable results within a
semi-quantitative risk approach. In a fnal step the results of the risk assessment are used for the
optimisation of the inspection intervals within the proposed risk based inspection framework.
oct-dec 2013 31
is carried out. After estimating the risk related to each
segment, an appropriate inspection strategy has to be
developed. The inspection effort and interval should
be determined taking into account the current and the
future risk of the segment regarded.
Modelling the Risk
The combination of probability of failure (PoF) and
consequence of failure (CoF) yields the risk. Several
qualitative and quantitative risk assessments exist (e.g.
code based [1], [2] or from the literature [8]). The risk
can be represented in a matrix with the columns and
rows as probability and consequence respectively.
This matrix can be of any dimension, however often
a square matrix as e.g. 5x5 is used (as shown in Fig-
ure 2). In Figure 2 the probability of failure and the
consequence of failure are categorised from negligible
to serious. Negligible (Neg.) probability of failure and
negligible consequence correspond to the lowest risk.

Risk acceptance criteria are the limits above which
the operator will not tolerate risk for the pipeline. The
highest risk is presented by the red areas with an ex-
treme consequence and a high or serious failure prob-
ability. Such areas are unacceptable and should be
avoided. The orange areas present a high risk level and
indicate that measures should be taken very soon. The
yellow areas indicate a medium risk where action is
required by a certain due date. The acceptable risk is
presented by the green areas.
The risk increases with the operation time due to
time-dependant failure modes. Time-dependant ef-
fects are e.g. growth of corrosion flaws or cyclic
loads during the operation. After inspection, correc-
tive measures can be considered, e.g.
Reassessment of the faws,
Rechecking and replacement or strengthening of
critical parts.
This may lead to a reduction of the risk predicted
before the inspection.
When the inspection scheduling is based on risk
evaluation, the current risk matrix is required. This
approach allows the focus on high risk areas for the
inspection instead of time-based inspection of the
entire system.
A traffc-light system, derived from the risk matrix,
is used with the following meanings for the inspection
planning / maintenance:
Since a lot of data has to be evaluated for the risk
assessment and inspection scheduling it is advanta-
geous to use software. A suitable software tool is GA-
LIOM which has been developed at the Germanischer
Lloyd (GL), cf. [11], [12] for more details about GA-
LIOM software. The risk-based traffic light colours
from Figure 3 are also used for the components in
the Overview tree of GALIOM, as shown on the
left of Figure 4.
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In GALIOM the
parent compo-
nent has the worst
colour of its chil-
dren. So it is easy
to identify which
component / part
of the pipeline has
the highest risk and
thus requires the
most attention.
Failure Probability
The probability of
failure can be esti-
mated by different methods.
The approach used most often
is the evaluation of historical
damage data. This approach
can be used to identify the
major threats and their con-
tribution to pipeline failure.
Different sources such as
e.g. Parloc [9] and [10], US
department of transportation
[13] are available.
An evaluation of different
data bases shows regional dif-
ferences between the failure
distributions, see e.g. Figure 5.
As the failure modes have
time dependent as well as
time independent aspects,
they have to be considered
both. The approach proposed
here covers both effects in dif-
ferent ways:
Index procedure,
Remaining life time.
The index procedure de-
scribes the general condition
of the pipeline and the remain-
ing life time considers directly
the time dependent
effects. The total
failure probability
will be obtained by
the highest failure
probability of both
assessments.
Index Procedure
In Figure 6 it is
shown the structure
for estimating the
failure probabil-
ity when using the
index procedure.
Each index part (e.g. design,
corrosion, operation) will be
assigned a value between 0
and 100, where 100 is the
best result and 0 the worst
case. These values will be
scaled with suitable weight-
ing factors. The sum of all
weighting factors is equal
to one. Thus, the sum of the
weighted index part values is
also a result between 0 and
100 and can then be used
for the assessment. Each in-
dex value is either derived by
equations or by qualitative as-
sessments.
The design index is used
to describe the infuence of
the design parameters to the
condition of the pipeline. De-
sign failure can cause serious
damages and a conservative
design leads to a reduction of
the failure probability.
As corrosion is an important
failure mode the corrosion in-
dex is introduced. Corrosion
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can lead to a leak as well as to fracture of a pipeline.
Third party damage occurs for offshore as well as for
onshore pipelines. Regarding e.g. offshore pipelines
an anchor impact or interaction with fshing equip-
ment can lead to failure. These failure modes are as-
sessed in the third party index.
The operation conditions of the pipeline also infu-
ence the failure probability. If e.g. the pipeline is op-
erated close or above the design pressure it will fail
more likely than a pipeline operated at 50% of the
design pressure. These types of dependencies are cov-
ered in the operation index.
The combination of all four index values by con-
sidering weighting factors leads to the result of the
index procedure.
Remaining Life Time Approach
The remaining life time approach is an alternative
approach for estimating the probability of failure. The
remaining life time of the pipeline can be calculated
taking into account different issues, see Figure 7.
The remaining life time with respect to corro-
sion can be estimated based on e.g. measured faw
dimensions and growth rate. Also the design life
should be considered. If the design life is reached
a detailed assessment of the pipeline as proposed in
[14] should be carried out before further operation.
Fatigue due to operational loads and especially free
spans are time dependent issues for pipeline failures
and should therefore be considered.
Consequences of Failure
Different types of consequences are regarded:
(Human) safety,
Environmental impact,
Assets (economical consequence) and
Reputation / political consequence.
The frst three items are of similar importance for the
total consequence. The consequence with respect to
reputation or political aspects has to be determined
and weighted in agreement with the operator, see Ta-
ble 1. Typical acceptance criteria for the consequenc-
es can also be found in [4].
Safety (of persons) is the most important issue.
Here, the location, specifying the population den-
sity close to the pipeline, type of content, pres-
sure and spill volume have to be considered.
The environmental impact is mainly influenced
by the medium transported, the potential release
(spill) volume, and the location (protective areas
oct-dec 2013 35
like the Wadden Sea).
The financial aspect is
very client specific and
therefore not included
in this paper.
Pipeline Segmentation
As the risk is not con-
stant along a pipeline
route, it is beneficial to
divide the pipeline in
different segments. The
idea is that every single
pipeline segment has
approximately a con-
stant probability of failure and a constant conse-
quence of failure. Figure 8 shows a pipeline di-
vided into different parts, so called TAGs.
The pipeline shown in Figure 8 starts at an off-
shore platform with a riser, which normally has
a higher wall thickness than the pipeline. The
consequence of a failure is also higher in the vi-
cinity of the platform, because personnel could
be directly affected. Along the pipeline route
the probability and consequence of failure may
change due to different wall thickness, environ-
mental conditions, water depth, locations like
crossings, etc.
For each segment the PoF and CoF should be
nearly constant and have to be assessed.
Risk Based Inspection and Maintenance
Based on the results of the risk approach suit-
able inspection / preventive maintenance frequen-
cies have to be determined. They depend on the
considered TAG and on the operator requirements;
i.e. they have to be agreed and adapted with the
operator. Different approaches can be used for the
determination of the suitable maintenance fre-
quency, cf. [5], [7].
One possibility is the determination of a so-called
inspection frequency factor (IFF). Based on the ob-
tained risk the inspection frequency factor can be
determined. An example is given in Table 2. Note
that the inspection frequency factor is also related
to the risk color according to Figure 3.
Based on the normal inspection interval, provided
by the operator, the new interval can be determined
risk based, by considering the corresponding frequen-
cy factor from Table 2.
Application of RBI to Offshore Pipelines
Data gathering was performed for 60 aged off-
shore pipelines. Some of the data was available
in electronic format, some in paper format. For
some pipelines only basic data was available,
like outer diameter, wall thickness, operating
pressure and transported medium. The pipeline
diameters range from 4 inch to 42inch. The me-
dia transported are gas, water, glycol and oil.
The regarded pipelines were installed between
the 1973 and 2003.
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Identifcation of Failure Modes
An identification of the failure modes has been
carried out by evaluating the historical data pro-
vided by the operator and a FMEA workshop with
the operators staff.
The following major threats have been identifed:
Corrosion,
Impact,
Fatigue, especially at free spans,
Static over loads, especially at free spans.
Segmentation
Based on the data collected and the identified
failure modes the pipelines have been divided into
several TAGs. As most of the regarded pipelines
have a length smaller than 10km, they are treated
as one TAG. The major transport pipelines with
several km length and changing wall thickness
and consequences have been divided into several
TAGs. In total 68 pipeline segments are regarded
in the following.
Risk Assessment
For the risk assessment the probability of failure
and the consequence are evaluated. The probabil-
ity of failure is determined by two different ap-
proaches: remaining life time and index proce-
dure, as described above.
The remaining life time is assessed for corro-
sion, free spans and with respect to the design
life. The design life is expired for 51% of the pipe-
line segments. Therefore, the remaining life time
due to design is expired until a life time extension
analysis has been performed. For the remaining
33 pipeline segments (49%) twenty-four show a
remaining design life time smaller than 10 years,
seven have a design life time between 10 years
and 15 years and the rest have a remaining life
time due to design greater or equal 15 years.
Only for some of the pipelines the allowable free
span lengths could be determined clearly and not
for all pipelines the inspection data with respect
to free spans was available. Therefore, for 32% of
the pipeline segments the remaining life time due
to free spans has been expired. For these pipelines
a re-assessment of the measured free span or the
measurement itself is required.
For fourteen of the 68 pipeline segments an in-
telligent scrapper run was performed in the past
in order to determine the corrosion condition of
the pipeline. Using this limited data the corrosion
growth rate was calculated based on theoretical
models. By considering the growth rate and the
installation date resp. the operation start date, the
remaining life time based on the criteria of ASME
B 31G [3] and Kastner [6] has been determined.
For all assessed pipeline segments the remaining
life time due to corrosion is greater than 0 years.
Based on the remaining life time analysis (RL) in to-
tal the following results are obtained:
Additionally to the remaining life time assessment
the index procedure (IP) is used. This approach allows
a more general view on the pipeline.
For the design index one third of the pipelines
is evaluated within the category low and negligi-
ble and two thirds within the category medium
resp. high. For the corrosion index the values are
shifted to a higher category. The third party index
is evaluated with negligible to high for the pipe-
line segments. This reflects that some pipelines
are infield lines with similar risk and restricted
shipping traffic. The transport pipelines are partly
buried and therefore have a different probability
of failure with respect to third party damages. The
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operational index is negligible. The combination
of the four index values uses a weighting based
on the evaluation results of historic pipeline data
presented in Figure 5. This leads to six pipelines in
the category high and 51 in the medium category
and 11 in the low category.
Additionally to the failure probability the con-
sequence assessment is carried out. The finan-
cial aspect of the consequence is not taken into
account here. For the environmental and safety
aspect the medium transported and the location
are considered.
The total consequence is determined by the worst
value of safety and environment for each pipeline seg-
ment. 12% of the segments are evaluated with the
highest category serious. 40% of the pipeline seg-
ments show a high consequence and the remaining
49% are medium, low or negligible.
The risk results are presented in the risk matrix in
Figure 9. For the probability of failure the worst re-
sult from the remaining life time approach and the
index procedure is taken. The color code is chosen
based on GL standard as presented in Figure 2 and
Figure 3.
Based on the risk color and the specific failure
modes which are the main risk drivers the next in-
spection is proposed. For the investigated pipelines
free spanning and life time extension are the most
important issues.
The free span inspection interval is adjusted
based on the risk result. The following intervals
are proposed:
Alternatively to the free span inspection of the
pipelines a re-analysis of the allowable free span
length is proposed based on the current valid
codes. For some pipelines intelligent pigging was
not intended to be used on a regular basis, there-
fore no inspection intervals for intelligent pigging
are proposed. For the others the following inter-
vals are suggested:
oct-dec 2013 39
Conclusions
It can be concluded that the combination of re-
maining life time and index procedure is able to
cover all relevant failure modes. When only us-
ing the remaining life time approach threats like
impact damage, which is the reason for 30% of
all pipeline damages, are not covered. The pro-
posed procedure fits well within the framework
suggested in current codes like DNV RP F116
[4] and has been successfully applied to differ-
ent offshore pipelines.
Acknowledgments
Special thanks to Dr. Thomas Plonski, who devel-
oped the procedure together with the authors.
References
[1] API Standard 1160, Managing System Integri-
ty for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, November
2001
[2] API Recommended Practice 580, Risk-based
Inspection, May 2002
[3] ASME B31G, Manual for determining the
remaining strength of corroded pipelines.
American Society of Mechanical Engineer-
ing, 1991
[4] DNV DNV-RP-F116, Integrity Management of
Submarine Pipeline Systems, October 2009
[5] DNV RP G101, Risk Based Inspection of off-
shore topsides static mechanical equipment,
January 2002
[6] Kastner, W., et al., Critical crack sizes in duc-
tile piping, Int. J. Pres. Ves. & Piping Vol. 9,
187, page 197-219, 1981
[7] Khan, F.I., et al., Risk-based Integrity and In-
spection Modelling (RBIIM) of Process Com-
ponents/systems, Risk Analysis, Vol. 26 No. 1,
2006
[8] Muhlbauer, W., Pipeline Risk Management
Manual, 3rd Edition, Elsevier, 2004
[9] PARLOC 96, The update of loss of contain-
ment data for offshore pipelines, OTH 551.
Health and Safety Executive
[10] PARLOC 2001, The update of loss of contain-
ment data for offshore pipelines, Health and
Safety Executive, July 2003
[11] Plonski, T. and Stadie-Frohbs, G., Risk Man-
agement of Ageing Pipeline Networks using
GALIOM, 9 Congreso y Expo Internacional
de Ductos, 2008
[12] Stadie-Frohbs, G. and Wiese, F., RBI for Off-
shore Pipelines Challenges in Theory and
Practice, Subsea Pipelines Integrity Manage-
ment Conference, 2011
[13] U. S. Department of Transportations Re-
search and Special Programs Administra-
tion, Office of Pipeline Safety(RSPA/OPS)
http://primis.rspa.dot.gov/pipelineInfo/stat_
causes.htm
[14] ISO TS 12747:2011 Petroleum and natural
gas industries Pipeline transportation sys-
tems Recommended practice for pipeline
life extension
This publication thanks Dr. Gundula Stadie-
Frohbs and Jrg Lampe, from Germanischer
Lloyd SE for providing this paper.
PP
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