NACE Paper No.

MECCOCT18-12521

Managing Operational Risk of Subsea Pipeline through Risk Based Inspection Approach

Mohamed A. Attia MSc CEng, PE

Saudi Aramco
Dhahran, 31311
Saudi Arabia
Email: mohamed.attia.1@aramco.com

Yasser A. Hammas MSc

Saudi Aramco
Dhahran, 31311
Saudi Arabia
Email: yasser.hammas@aramco.com

ABSTRACT

Pipeline integrity management system should be built around the concept of risk-based decision
processes in order to enhance plant integrity and reliability while, optimizing the inspection plan. This is
by focusing resources on high risk equipment and performing more effective inspection plan on low risk
equipment. The overall objective of risk-based inspection (RBI) is to provide an inspection regime that
is suitable and sufficient in controlling the operational risks over the lifetime of the pipeline. The key
parts of a RBI program are the determination of all relevant Risk Drivers, the definition of risk tolerance
and the assessment of the remaining lifetime. Several methodologies are available for the purpose of
risk assessment. Depending on the quality and availability of the existing pipeline data, an adequate
methodology should be used. In case of insufficient data, a simple qualitative assessment with an index
procedure becomes the only option to conduct RBI assessment. Therefore, a qualitative RBI
methodology has been developed for subsea pipelines.

This paper describes the major aspects of the qualitative RBI methodology developed to manage the
adherent operational risk of subsea pipelines. The methodology covers all relevant aspects with respect
to the Probability of Failure (PoF) and Consequence of Failure (CoF). The determination of PoF is
carried out by assessing the remaining life time and using the index procedure. Whereas, the index
value deemed four pipeline aspects: i.e., design, corrosion, third party effects and operation. The CoF
is determined based on the safety and environmental impact. For the safety consequences assessment
the location of the pipeline, the medium transported, internal pressure and possible spill volume are
evaluated. The environmental impact is assessed by evaluating location, the medium transported and
the spill volume only. Accordingly the adherent risk for each investigated section of a pipeline / riser,
can be computed. The risk tolerance criteria must be defined for each type of risk to be assessed.
These risk targets are used to identify the optimum inspection plan for each subsea pipeline. This
paper presents the results of the RBI assessment conducted on 81 subsea pipelines, using the newly
developed RBI methodology. The assessment revealed different governing threats and failure modes
for subsea pipelines and risers such as aging, free span or corrosion. Moreover, an optimum inspection
plan was developed for each subsea pipeline.

Key words: RBI, risk based inspection, operating and historical data, inspection interval, risk
assessment, risk target, risk tolerance, subsea, offshore, pipelines, risk management.

INTRODUCTION
Pipelines are an integral parts of oil and gas companies, it works as veins to transfer hydrocarbon
products across thousands of kilometers. Thus, the integrity of pipelines network is high priority.
Pipelines need to be inspected and tested to ensure the mechanical integrity. Many plants follow time-
based inspection approach, without considering the associated risk of each pipeline. Now a days the
general industry practice is that a risk based integrity management approach should be applied.

The intention of using a risk-based approach is that the inspection activities are selected and
scheduled on the basis of their ability to explicitly measure and manage threats to the pipeline system
and ensure that associated risks are managed to be within acceptable limits.

OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
RBI methodology should take into account:

 Identification of threats and failure modes

 Estimation of probabilities of failure (PoF)
 Estimation of consequences of failure (CoF)
 Estimation of risk level (CoF × PoF).

I. Probability of Failure

The PoF should consider failure modes of operation, design, corrosion and 3rd party impacts. The CoF
covers the environmental impact and the human safety. The failure defined as failure modes of
operation, design, corrosion and 3rd party impacts. The consequence of failure covers the
environmental impact and the human safety. A risk matrix has been used to illustrate the resulted risk.

The determination of the PoF is carried out by assessing the remaining life time and by using the index
procedure, see Figure 1. The minimum value of both is taken as probability of failure.

Figure 1: Determination of the probability of failure

I.1 probability of failure Index procedure (PoF index)
The index value of the PoF will be determined by using the following main topics, see Figure 2.

Figure 2: Determination of the probability of failure for the index procedure

The scale of PoF is as shown in Table 1, qualitative ranking scale assigned to the quantitative PoF values
and the Index used. The index estimates the availability of the installation and is defined between 0 and 100,
where a high value (80–100) represents a negligible probability of failure. A low index value (0–20) indicates
that the probability of failure is serious, which means that a failure is expected. In other words, as the
calculated index increases, the PoF’s rank will be higher accordingly.

Table 1: Probability of failure categorization

Remaining
PoF Index Quantitative Pf Description
Life Time
Negligible (1) >15 years 80 – 100 < 10-5 Failure not expected
In a typical pipeline system, one or more
Low (2) <15 years 60 – 80 10-5 – 10-4 failures can be expected over the lifetime
of the installation
In a small pipeline system, one or more
Medium (3) <10 years 40 – 60 10-4 – 10-3 failures can be expected over the lifetime
of the installation
In a typical pipeline system, one or more
High (4) <5 years 20 – 40 10-3 – 10-2
failures can be expected annually
;In a small pipeline system, one or more
Serious (5) <1 year 0 – 20 > 10-2
failures can be expected annually

Description:

Beside the index procedure, the remaining life time of both the pipeline and riser is calculated, see
Figure 3. The following main topics are considered: design life time, corrosion growth, fatigue loads,
free span growth and fatigue loads at free span locations.

Figure 3: Determination of the probability of failure for the remaining life time
1. Pipeline Design Index
The pipeline design index is used to describe the influence of the design parameters to the operation
condition of the offshore pipeline system including riser, whereas design failure can cause damages. On the
other hand, the design safety factor can affect maintenance intervals. Therefore, the design has a great stake
in the current state of the pipeline system. The design index is composed of Ultimate limit state part and
Fatigue limit state part.
The ultimate Limit State describes the resistance of the offshore pipeline system to static (extreme) loads.
Possible failure modes due to static loads are bursting, rupture, local or global buckling, and plastic collapse.
The Fatigue Limit State considers the effects of cyclic loading, such as that induced by waves, currents,
pressure changes, etc.
A. Assessment of the Ultimate Limit State (ULS)
The assessment of the Ultimate Limit State (ULS) describes the influence of the resistance of the design
against the ULS-criteria. Figure 4 shows the relevant aspects of the ultimate limit state part.

Figure 4: Structure of the ultimate limit state factor

 Pressure (internal, external),

 Manufacturing quality,
 Global checks (operation condition),
 Soil effects,
 Local checks (stress concentrations at bends and crossings),
 Fittings,
 Free span, and
 On-bottom stability.

A.1 Pressure
The pressure index includes the effects of internal pressure effect, external pressure effects and
overpressure. The composition used is shown in Figure 4.
 Figure 4: Structure of pressure index

A.1.1 Internal Pressure Effect

This aspect describes the utilization due to the maximum operation pressure. Typical input parameters
are: maximum operating pressure, nominal outer steel diameter, nominal wall thickness, yield stress and
tensile stress.
Note: If pipelines with a small wall thickness are used, an additional reduction is considered, in
accordance with DIN 24706.

A.1.2 Overpressure Effect

During operation, overpressure can be occurred. The major reasons are: Overpressure due to incorrect
operation and Overpressure due to pressure surge. Overpressure due to incorrect operation will be
considered as follows. Three different qualitative stages are possible:
Stage 1: Significant probability of occurrence
Stage 2: Low probability of occurrence
Stage 3: Zero probability of occurrence
Pressure surges can occur due to fast fitting closure. The following stages are possible:
Stage 1: High probability of occurrence
Stage 2: Low probability of occurrence
Stage 3: Impossible

A.1.3 External Pressure Effect

The external pressure due to the water depth may lead to failure of the pipeline by collapse. Buckle
propagation is also possible. Therefore, the resistance to collapse and the possibility of buckle
propagation are evaluated here.
The resistance to collapse and the possibility of buckle propagation can be determined with the additional
input parameter as follows: maximum water depth of the tag, density of water, ovality, yield stress and
fabrication type.
If buckle arrestors are used, the buckle arrestor length and the buckle arrestor thickness as additional
input parameters are needed.
A.2 Estimation of the Manufacturing Quality
One main index influencing factor, as described above, is used to assess the general stress level.
However, experience shows that system failure frequently does not occur solely with the global stress
level, but in combination with a stress concentration. The sensitivity of the corresponding pipeline with
regard to the excessive stress increases caused in the production process is classified as being relatively
high. The assessment is performed separately for circumferential and longitudinal welds, with both
influences being incorporated additively into the index.
Manufacturing Quality of the girth Weld
For the girth welds, several dependencies are used, such as: percentage of tested girth welds,
percentage of flawed welds, quality of the girth welding requirements and additional influences caused by
geometric stress concentrations (misalignment, peaking, and ovality). The following three levels were
used:
HIGH = The applicable demands exceed the current specifications of the codes to a
considerable degree
MEDIUM = The applicable demands comply with the currently valid codes
LOW = The quality is unknown, or the applicable demands lie considerably below the currently
valid codes.

Manufacturing Quality of the longitudinal Weld

Pipes with longitudinal welds or spirally welded pipes are assessed by means of different influencing
factors, such as seamless pipeline, measured Crack Tip Opening Displacement (CTOD) value [3],
maximum operation pressure / test pressure and fabrication type.

A.3 Global Stress Checks

The stress state of an offshore pipeline system is mainly influenced by the permanent acting loads such
as pressure, temperature, wave and current, etc. With regard to damage assessment the type of
additional stresses has to be taken into consideration for the failure cause. Tension leads to faster crack
growth while, compression does not increase crack growth. Compression does not increase crack
growth, but the buckle tendency increases under compression loads especially in combination with
bending. This is the reason why the compression and tension are considered during this index
determination. Additional permanent acting forces may be added.
The influence of the axial stress is obtained by using the most awkward combination of temperature and
pressure which can occur during operation. The index is determined by comparing the stress with the
yield stress of the material. The required additional input parameters are as follows:
- Maximum and Minimum installation temperature,
- Maximum and Minimum operation temperature,
- Additional bending moment taken from the design analyses,
- Additional axial force taken from the design analyses.

A.4 Soil Effects

The index concerning the soil effects comprises three different parts as shown in Figure 5:
- General soil condition, such as on-bottom roughness results
 - Infrequent events, such as seismic events
- Special frequent events, such as slopes, liquefaction, erosion

Figure 5: Flowchart for the soil effects

A.4.1 General Soil Condition

The results of an on-bottom roughness (OBR) analysis are evaluated here. The required input
parameters and questions are:
- OBR Measurement carried out?
- OBR Analysis carried out?
- Analysis approved
A.4.2 Infrequent Soil Events
Infrequent soil events, such as seismic events, have to be taken into consideration. The seismic condition
depends on the location of the tag. The evaluation of the seismic effects can be estimated with the required
input parameters, considering the location and the design against seismic hazards.
A.5 Local Stress Checks
The local check part of the design index considers the bend effects and crossing effects. Also, the effects of
the pieces, the upheaval buckling and the end expansion are considered, see Figure 6.

Figure 6: Flowchart for the local stress checks

A.5.1 Crossings
Pipelines often cross other pipelines and cables etc. The crossings of riser can be present in the spool piece
area only. This crossing may cause an additional load in the pipeline due to the additional bending and the
crossing supports lead also to additional free spans, which have to be taken into consideration.
A.5.2 End Expansion
Due to temperature and pressure variations, sections of a pipeline may expand if the pipeline changes its
direction. These displacements have to be taken into account near platforms, risers, etc. Therefore, the end
expansion of the pipeline will be determined and used as an input for the stress analysis of expansion loops,
risers, etc.
A.5.3 Stress Peaks due to Bends and Elbows
In bends, the stresses are often higher than in a straight pipeline section. Typical effects include:
- Pressure induced stress amplification in the bend,
- Soil effects, which result into a restraint condition,
- End-cap effects.
A.6 Fittings
Within the scope of the qualitative evaluation of a pipeline system, a detailed examination of line fittings with
due consideration of the design constraints is not possible. The presence of a fitting in itself leads to an
increase in the possibility of leakage. Further causes of failure are to be found in a rise in stresses resulting
from the support system, stiffness discontinuities etc. For this reason, an index factor is included if there are
any fittings in the pipeline segment under consideration:
• Pipeline segment without fitting
• Pipeline segment with fitting.

A.7 Free Spans

This index value considers the distance between the estimated (or measured) and acceptable free span
length. For an un-trenched pipeline, a free span design investigation is required. If design data are not
available a red flag will be placed. The confirmation based on an independent analysis is considered.
For the TAG types “riser – splash zone” and “riser – submerged” the index value of free span considers the
distance between the clamps installed and the acceptable free span length. The measurement results will be
assessed as well as the date of the measurement. The standard measurement interval is an input value. If
the date of the last measurement is older than the standard measurement interval, a red flag will indicate that
a new measurement is required. The measured free span length will be compared with the acceptable free
span length according to the design report. Depending on the result the free span utilization factor will be
determined. Beside the free span length, the free span growth estimated by the last two measurement
results will be assessed.
The inspection factor considers the inspection results for the clamps. The inspection results will be assessed
as well as the date of the inspection. The standard inspection interval is an input value. If the date of the last
inspection is older than twice of the standard inspection interval a red flag will indicate that a new inspection
is required immediately.
The existing free span length will be compared with the allowable free span length according to the design
report. Depending on the result the free span utilization factor will be determined.
A.8 On-Bottom Stability
The design index for the on-bottom stability covers the lateral stability of the pipeline TAG. In order to ensure
an acceptable lateral movement of the pipeline tag, the design factor has to be determined.
B. Assessment of the Fatigue Limit State
Beside the ultimate limit state failure, it is possible that pipelines – especially older ones – may fail because
they have exceeded their fatigue life. The index for the fatigue limit state can be determined according to
Figure 7.
 Figure 7: Flowchart for fatigue limit state

The probability of failure due to fatigue is influenced by:

• Age of the pipeline and riser,
• Material of construction,
• Cyclic loads (wave, current, pressure fluctuations… etc.),
• Stress concentration (welds, manufacturing failure, corrosion, impact),
• Geometric parameters, such as e.g. outer diameter, wall thickness, and
• Additional loads, such as temperature, bends etc.
The following effects create cyclic stress values for risers which are essential for this failure mode:
• Wave induced cyclic loads (riser - splash zone, riser – submerged),
• Vortex induced Vibration (riser - splash zone, riser – submerged) and
• Internal pressure fluctuations (all riser TAG).
B.1 Cyclic Operation Load
For considering cyclic loads due to operation, the corresponding stress amplitudes should be considered.
The load cycles corresponding to the pressure deviation have to be determined. This can be carried out on
the basis of measurement results (pressure / time diagram) or in consultation with the operator.

B.2 Material and Manufacturing Effects

The materials and manufacturing effects are considered by three stages, which represent different
probabilities of fatigue damage:
Stage 1: Significant probability of fatigue damage, e.g. due to ageing or weld defects
Stage 2: Low probability of fatigue damage, e.g., normal weld quality)
Stage 3: Negligible probability of fatigue damage (e.g. steel material and manufacturing in accordance with
current practice, high weld quality)

B.3 Stress Concentration

The index for general pressure containment, manufacturing quality and global checks are combined with the
time factor.
2. Pipeline Corrosion Index
Corrosion can lead to a leak as well as to fracture. Besides the corrosion flaw itself (with its dimensions), the
stresses at the defect (axial and circumferential stress), the material toughness and the position are of
significance (inside or outside of the seam area of longitudinal and girth welds). The corrosion index is
formed from the internal corrosion and external corrosion as shown below in Figure 8.
 Figure 8: Flowchart for corrosion index

A. External Corrosion
The outer surface of the pipeline TAG in question can have contact to the soil, water, air or a combination of
them. The formation and the development of corrosion vary depending on whether it takes place in water, air
splash zone, soil, etc. For this reason, a separate assessment is carried out for each of these environments.
The external corrosion index is composed of an environmental index describing the corrosiveness of the
environment (water, air or soil) and the flaw measurement result (e.g. intelligent pig result) or postulated flaw
assessment.
Especially, the environmental index for riser TAGs depends on the outside environment, e.g.
• Riser – Air: Air
• Riser – splash zone: Splash zone
• Riser – submerged: Water
• Spool: Water
Environmental Condition: Water
The environmental index for pipeline and riser TAGs in water and splash zone are considered. The
evaluation depends on water depth, salinity of the water, water temperature and -1-Year current velocity.
Environmental Condition: Air
The environmental index for pipeline TAGs in air (e.g. the TAG Type “riser – air”) will be assessed and the
required input parameters are Sulphur dioxide deposition rate, Chloride deposition rate and Time of wetness.
Pipeline with measurement results, e.g. intelligent pig run
The assessment of the pigging measurement is composed of the evaluation of the pigging result and the
factor, which assesses the density of the corrosion flaws. The required input data are the number of defects
in the TAG and the length of the TAG.
If no corrosion flaw was detected, it is assumed that a corrosion flaw originated at the time of the pig run and
starts to develop from then. By using the annual growth rate and the today date, the relative depth and the
length of the flaw can be estimated. Like a measured flaw, this can also be assessed.
For the measured flaws the growth since the last measurement is also taken into consideration. Based on
the so estimated current dimension a flaw assessment is performed.
For the assessment longitudinal as well as circumferential flaws are considered. The axial defects are
assessed with the RSTRENG procedure and for the circumferential flaws the Kastner approach is used. For
the evaluation of the pigging result the estimated repair factor (ERF) is determined and an assessment with
respect to the depth to wall thickness ratio (a/t) is carried out.
Pipeline without measurement results
If no pigging result is available for a pipeline, a fictitious corrosion flaw, an environmental influence factor and
a postulated corrosion flaw will be considered by using the growth rates for the length and the depth. Typical
required input parameters are defect growth rate (depth), defect growth rate (axial length), and defect growth
rate (circumferential length). For the external corrosion assessment the depth growth rate, axial length
growth rate and circumferential growth rates are used. The depth growth rate of 0.1 mm/year is chosen
based on 2 for the material sub-group FE4 (unalloyed steels and low-alloy steel) for the environment air and
0.2 mm/year for the splash zone. The length growth rates are estimated with 5 times of the depth growth
rates based on experience. Based on this input data current postulated flaw dimensions can be determined
and assessed.
For the submerged parts the corrosivity of the sea water is assessed by using salinity, oxygen content of the
water, water temperature and current velocity.
Assumptions for sea water as shown in Table 2:
Salinity Oxygen content Water temperature 1-year current velocity
40 g/kg 7 ppm 26.5 °C 1.2 m/s

B. Internal Corrosion
A distinction is made between pigged pipelines and un-pigged pipelines for the internal corrosion index.
Pigged Pipelines
If the pipeline has been pigged, the index is determined from the individual assessment and the
environmental assessment (internal fluid). Typical input parameters are Number of internal features per TAG,
TAG length and Environmental index describing the corrosiveness of the medium transported. For the
evaluation of the pigging result the estimated repair factor (ERF) is used as described for the external
corrosion. To consider the time dependence in the determination of the corrosion index, the growth rate is
estimated, and an allowance to the measured flaw depth is calculated considering the time since the last pig
run. With only one pig run, the annual growth rate is estimated for the deepest existing defect in the pipeline
and its operating period. If results are available for more than one pig run, the mean growth rate and the
standard deviation of two pig runs is used.
Un-pigged Pipeline
The assessment for the case of internal corrosion in an un-pigged pipeline was developed. On the basis of
the coating and medium data, an “internal environmental influence” is determined. The unavailable pigging
result is replaced by a flaw postulated for each system. Typical required input parameters are as: years of
operation, defect growth rate (depth), defect growth rate (axial length), defect growth rate (circumferential
length) and environmental index describing the corrosiveness of the medium transported.
An overview to the different internal corrosion growth rates used is shown in the below Table3
Table 3: Internal corrosion growth rates
Type Growth rate
[mm/year]
Sour crude, flare 0.127 (5 mpy)
Sweet crude 0.03 (1.2 mpy)
Sour Gas 0.27 (10.7 mpy)
Sweet Gas 0.052 (2 mpy)

Pipeline Operation Index

Disturbances of pipeline operations are mainly caused by incorrect operation, but also by improper design,
construction and maintenance. Here, the human error is the most important factor. The assessed measures
for the prevention of incorrect operation as:
 Procedures and safety philosophies,
 Regular training of operators,
 Mechanical devices and safety systems,
 Safety programs,
 Maintenance
 Technical monitoring and surveys in order to check for correct pipeline operation.
Note: Routine maintenance should include check procedures and intervals, among other things for valves,
instruments, safety systems and equipment for cathodic corrosion protection.
Procedures
The procedures covered in instruction manuals must consider all aspects of pipeline operation. These
procedures should be reviewed and revised regularly. Following procedures should be documented.
Technical Monitoring
The scope of monitoring of the pipeline operation will be considered here. The pipeline and riser surveys
includes training, safety programs, and safety critical elements.
Training
Training for operators shall prevent failures that endanger the operators themselves or the pipeline operation.
Thus, the pipeline operation risk may be reduced.
Note: First aid, injury prevention, and even emergency response are not included in these training programs.
Furthermore, different training programs are also necessary for the various jobs. Effective training for
operators in pipeline operations covers several main aspects
Safety Programs
Safety programs include the following reviewable aspects:
 Safety philosophy existing?
 Documented evidence of safety trainings for operators and other employees existing?
 Safety requirements strictly performed
 Organization and housekeeping are given
Mechanical Devices and Safety Systems
The technical safety devices include the following aspects:
 Number of and distance between block valves and pressure relief valves,
 safety instrumented function (SIF)
Block valves are installed between instrumentation and the pipeline section in order to isolate this pipeline
section for maintenance. Consequently, it is not necessary to shut off the whole pipeline section. For the
failure prevention in operation sequences, mechanical or computer-assisted devices must be installed.
These devices are used to safeguard a defined sequence of operation procedures. The installed safety
systems are necessary to protect the pipeline operations against human error and overstepping the
maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP). The possibility of exceeding the MAOP will be assessed by
the installed safety system.
The assessment of safety systems is classified into the following categories:
 No safety systems
 Safety system level 1 – no redundancy
 Safety system level 2 – several independent safety systems
 Pipeline section / safety devices are remotely monitored, but intervention has to be done manually
 Pipeline section / safety devices remotely monitored and remotely controlled
 Pipeline section / safety devices non-owned
Maintenance
The maintenance procedure includes procedures and schedules for operating valves, inspection of cathodic
protection equipment, testing / calibrating of instrumentation and safety devices, corrosion inspection,
lubrication of all moving parts, and engine / pump / compressor maintenance.
3. Third Party Index
Potential damage to offshore pipelines system including riser can occur as a result of insufficient sea bottom
burial depth and third party activities that are too close. In addition, the pipeline and riser diameter, the wall
thickness, the right-of-way (ROW) conditions and the patrol frequency will be considered as shown in Figure
9

Figure 9: Determination of third party damage index

A distinction between attributes of pipeline / riser and environment and preventive measures will be made in
the index calculation.
A. Depth of Cover and Protective Measures
Cover, as a means of reducing third party damages, has two components in most offshore cases water
depth and cover height.
Either can provide a measure of protection from third party damage, since the increasing water depth usually
limits the number of activities that could be harmful to the pipeline. Additional cover (soil, rock, etc.) provides
a physical barrier against damage. These preventive measures are necessary in order to protect the pipeline
against anchor and trawl impact etc.
The depth of cover for pipelines includes the coating in addition to the water depth, cover height and / or
preventive measures.
Especially, the assessment of the protective measures for risers has to be carried out for each part of the
riser separately such as riser part above the splash zone, Splash zone and submerged area and spool area.
The determination for the preventive measures for the riser part in the spool area differentiates between the
cover type, the wall thickness of the coating and the water depth. Other than that mentioned parameter for
the preventive measures, the maximum anchor depth is required.
B. Threats from Third Party Activities
Potential damage on pipelines could be caused by several threats from third party activities such as, Vessel
traffic, shore approaches, dredging areas, anchoring areas, fishing areas, construction activities (e.g. on sea
cables, data cables), presence of other offshore structures (platforms, offshore wind farms etc.) and seismic
activities.
C. The Influence of Diameter and Wall Thickness
The influence of pipeline diameter and the wall thickness are further criteria assessed with the “third party
index”.
The cross-sectional area and the section modulus rise with increasing pipeline diameter at constant wall
thickness. Accordingly, anchors and dropped objects, for example, must exhibit higher strengths in order to
damage pipelines. This means that third party activities affect larger pipelines less frequently or that the
probability of pipeline damage decreases with increasing diameter.
D. Right-of-Way (ROW) Condition
The criteria named previously were aspects which characterize the attributes of pipeline and its environment,
whereas the ROW condition and the patrol frequency are preventive measures. The visibility of signs and
markers which indicate the presence of the pipeline are considered for a qualitative scoring.
The qualitative scoring scale of the ROW condition assessment is classified in three levels: Excellent | Fair |
Poor
E. Patrol Frequency
Pipeline patrol is used to spot evidence of a pipeline leak and can be also used as a proactive method to
prevent third party intrusions. A potential threat does not have to be in the direct vicinity of the pipeline. For
example, dredgers that are working miles away or the activity of fishing vessels may already have caused
damage or could possibly cause damage in the near future. The patrol might also note changes in the
waterway or shoreline that may indicate a pipeline exposure due to shifting bottom conditions.
The following categories are used in Table 4:
Category Patrol frequency
1 Once per week
2 Once per month
3 Once per year
4 Every two years

I.2 Probability of Failure Remaining Life Time Remaining Procedure (PoF remaining life time)
The probability of failure can further be determined by the remaining life time of the pipeline system. The
minimum remaining life time of all assessments from the following subsections must be considered. The
remaining life time of the pipeline / riser can be calculated with respect to: design life time, corrosion growth,
free span growth, cyclic external loads, and fatigue load due to pressure variations.
Remaining Life due to Design
The remaining life time due to design can be calculated by the following typical input values: today (or
defined evaluation date), design life time and installation date
Remaining Life Time Due to Corrosion
The remaining life time due to corrosion has to be determined based on the maximum depth and based on
the maximum length of the flaw. For the length both variants, circumferential as well as longitudinal flaws,
have to be considered. The input data is taken from the corrosion index. Remaining life time due to fatigue
Remaining Life Due to Fatigue
It will be determined for the straight pipeline system including riser and for the free span location separately.
The remaining life time due to cyclic operation load fatigue and the remaining life time due to fatigue at free
span location can be determined with the span specific input parameters. The remaining life time due to
cyclic operation load fatigue is estimated for the following condition:
 Estimated fatigue (cyclic hoop stress).
 Estimated fatigue (cyclic end cap stress).
Remaining Life Time Due to Free Span Growth
The remaining life time due to free span growth can be calculated for pipeline and for the spool section of the
riser. If only the as-built survey data exists, the free span measurement has to be carried out after one year. If
experience of the operator with similar pipelines in the same area exists this inspection interval can be
increased (or reduced). If no experience exists and no second measurement is carried out after one year a
red flag has to be placed. If more than one free span exists within the current TAG all free spans shall be
evaluated and the minimum remaining life time of all spans must be considered.
The resulted PoF remaining life time is the combination of these four categories that are calculated / determined
using a qualitative index procedure. The scale of PoF remaining life time is as shown in Table 5. The table also
gives the recommended qualitative ranking scale assigned to the quantitative probability of failure values and
the Index used. The index estimates the availability of the installation and is defined between 0 and 100,
where a high value (80–100) represents a negligible probability of failure. A low index value (0–20) indicates
that the probability of failure is serious, which means that a failure is expected.

Table 5: Probability of failure categorization

Qualitative
Likelihood Category Index Life Time Assessment
assessment
5 – Serious Failure probable 0 – 20 < 1year
4- High High 20 – 40 1- 5 years
3- Medium Medium 40 – 60 5 – 10 years
2- Low Low 60 – 80 10-15 years
1- Negligible Negligible 80 – 100 > 15 years

II. Consequence of Failure

The definition of consequence of failure (CoF) is based on the safety and environmental impact. For the
human safety assessment the location of the pipeline, the medium transported, internal pressure and
possible spill volume are evaluated. The environmental impact is assessed by evaluating location, the
medium transported and the spill volume only. The scale of CoF is as shown in Table 6

Environmental
impact

Consequence
Location of failure
Class

Operation Human safety

Pressure

Contents
type Spill volume

Figure 10 Consequence of Failure

 Table 6: Consequence of failure categorization
Likelihood Category Human Safety Environmental impact
Multiple fatalities, or single 3rd
E- Serious Persistent damage (> 100bbl)
party fatality
Single fatality or multiple Severe damage to be extensively re-stalled
D- High
severe injuries with no significant lasting (<100 bbl)
Limited damage, spontaneous recovery
C- Medium Multiple or severe injuries
(<50bbl)
Only First aid, not affecting Minor effect, very local contamination (<5bbl),
B- Low
work no permanent effect to the environment
A- Negligible None Slight damage within a system – no spill

The following subsections specify the implemented estimation of consequences. Within these
subsections, a value for each type of consequence will be determined and further combined to obtain the
total consequence.

Safety
Human safety depends mainly on: Location (i.e., far from shore, shipping lanes, manned installations,),
Contents, Water depth, Pressure regime, Spill volume

Figure 11: Safety Consequence

Besides the water depth and the location, the consequence for human safety also depends on the kind of
internal contents and pressure regime. The effect for safety in shallow water is in most cases higher than for
the deeper water. A distinction is drawn between the different types of fluids (according to ISO 167088):
 Typically non-flammable water-based fluids
 Non-flammable fluids which are non-toxic gases at ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure
 Flammable and /or toxic fluids which are liquids at ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure
 Non-toxic, single-phase natural gas
 Flammable and/or toxic fluids which are gases at ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure and
are conveyed as gases and/or liquids.
Beside the contents type, the location class and the pressure regime, the spill volume has to be considered
as well. It depends on the outer diameter, the wall thickness and the length of the pipeline available for
spillage.
The following different location classes are used:

Location Description
More than 500 m from normally unmanned installations, beaches etc.
1 No shipping routes within a radius of 2 m2
Few fishing activities
More than 500 m from normally unmanned installations, beaches etc.
2 No shipping routes within a radius of 2 m2
Regular fishing activities
More than 500 m from normally unmanned installations, beaches etc.
3 Shipping routes
Regular fishing activities
More than 500 m from normally manned installations, beaches etc.
Less than 500 m from normally unmanned installations
4
Shipping routes
Regular fishing activities
5 Less than 500m from normally manned installations
6 Less than 50 m from beaches

Environmental Impact

The environmental impact depends on several parameters, such as the location, the contents and the spill
volume.
The considered location aspects are: distance to shore, water depth, sea bottom conditions, high priority
areas, nature reserve areas, etc. The following different location classes are used:
Location Description
1 More than 10, 000 m to shore, water depth >10m
2 Between 10, 000 m and 2,000 m to shore, water depth >10m
3 Between 2, 000 m and 500 m to shore, water depth >10 m
4 Protective areas like coral reefs etc.
5 Water depth less than 10 m or less than 500 m to shore
6 High priority areas, nature reserve areas, etc.

Assets (Economic Effect)

This business interruption cost includes production loss and damage costs (i.e., replacement costs or repair
costs). The production loss will be assessed in terms of barrels. This asset can be determined by taking the
daily amount and the days on which the pipeline / riser is out of service. This time includes also the repair or
replacement phases. These input data shall be confirmed by the operator to take account of the on-site
conditions. The damage costs can be either replacement costs or repair costs. The costs vary for different
areas (e.g. above splash zone, splash zone and under water) etc. Therefore, the operator should give an
input for his site specific costs. The repair and the replacement case have to be calculated. The lower value
is used to determine the consequence of failure for the assets.
The consequence of failure for the pipeline system can be determined as the maximum value of the single
events.
III. Inspection Planning
The risk associated is defined as the product of the probability of failure (PoF) and the consequence of failure
(CoF).
Risk = PoF x CoF
For each investigated section of a pipeline / riser, the risk will be evaluated on the basis of the input
data for the system, as shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11: Development of the risk matrix

Risk is most conveniently presented as a matrix, see Figure 12. This allows the relative contribution of
both factors CoF and PoF to be seen more clearly and presented in a 5x5 risk matrix.

Likelihood Category
Consequence
Category 1 2 3 4 5

A
B
C
D
E
Figure 12: Risk matrix
The highest risk is obtained when the probability of a failure is serious and the consequence of the
failure is serious. By reducing the consequences or the probability of a failure, the risk can be reduced.
The green areas in Figure 12Error! Reference source not found. represent low risk. The yellow areas
show a medium risk. The orange areas indicate a medium high risk. Red areas represent a high risk.

The criteria must be defined for each type of risk to be assessed. The risk acceptance criteria are used
to derive the timing of inspections, such that an inspection is carried out prior to the acceptance limit
being breached. This would allow either the reassessment of the risk level based upon better
information, detailed evaluation of any damage, or the timely repair or replacement of the degraded
component. Summarizing, the procedure described has the following requirements:
 Divide the considered pipelines into different sections (TAG´s),
 Calculation of the probability and consequence of failure in each tag to get the risk matrix,
 Combination of the “tag-specific” risk matrices to a complete pipeline risk matrix and
 Update of the risk matrices in accordance with changed conditions, such as
 Input of measured flaw data, which replaces the estimated theoretical corrosion flaw data and
 Exceeding time limit of required inspection.

The Inspection Frequency Factor is calculated based on the PoF & CoF categories
Table 7: Inspection Frequency Factor
PoF
IFF Negligible Low Medium High Serious
negligible 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.8
low 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.7
CoF

medium 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6

high 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
serious 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.25

Pipeline splitting into TAGs and TAG types

A typical pipeline system has several different conditions along the length. A pipeline section which has
a nearly uniform condition will be treated as one TAG. Error! Reference source not found.13 gives an
impression about this splitting into TAGs. Each vertical line shows the boundary of a TAG.

Figure 13: Pipeline from Platform to Landfall split into TAGs with uniform conditions
In this project the segmentation is done for pipelines with changing outer diameter and / or wall
thickness. Risers are also segmented based on their environment in: air, splash zone or sea water.

Each riser is dived in different sections (TAGs) for the assessment, because the probability of failure
and the consequence are different for riser parts in air, splash zone and in sea water. For the offshore
pipelines segmentation is carried out, if main risk influencing parameter like outer diameter or wall
thickness changed along the route. For each segment the risk is assessed. Based on this risk result the
inspection planning is carried out.

CASE STUDY

This proof of concept assessment included eighty one (81) offshore subsea pipelines and fourteen (14)
risers. These pipelines have different dimeters varying between 4 inches and 36 inches as well as different
lengths from 560 meters to 95742 meters. Also, the (14) risers had different dimeters between 24 inches and
36 inches.
Both of the subsea pipelines and risers are using to transport sour crude oil and sour gas from the
offshore platform. The water’s depth has been assumed to be between 30 meters as minimum depth
and 52 meters maximum.
The fluid process composition are:
The crude containing 1,244 mol% H2S, 1.3706%mol CO2 and 2.8024% mol H2O, 38 oC and, 3206 kPa.
The Wet sour gas 1.5205% mol H2S, 2.0707% mol CO2 and 0.0193% mol H20, 38 oC and, 1724 kPa

Assessment Findings
The findings cover the following: General findings, Inspection history review and Risk analysis/
projection results.

General Findings:

 Out of eighty one (81) offshore pipelines included in this assessment, fifty (50) of the pipelines (62%) are
exceeded the design life.
 The documentation of the allowable free span length shows sometimes different values for the same
pipeline & location.
 Intelligent scrapping data was available for one pipeline only (36in).
 The free span inspection was carried out based on inconsistent intervals. Sometimes the last inspection
was carried out more than 12 years ago. For fifty-two (52) pipelines (64%) no free span inspection is
performed.
 Corrosion seems not to be the main failure mode. Seven, 3rd party failures have been reported and only
five corrosion related leakages (affecting however only two pipelines) have been reported.

Risk Analysis
The risk profile for all offshore pipelines is shown in Figure 14 and Table 8
 Current Risk
Distribution
Consequence Likelihood Category
Category 1 2 3 4 5
A 0
B 1 2 3
C 2 3 23 28
D 2 1 34 37
E 1 12 13
0 0 6 6 69 81
Figure 14: Current Risk Matrix for offshore pipelines
Table 8: Risk driver
No. of pipelines concerned
Risk driver
(%)
Combination of free span,
50 (62%)
fatigue at welds, coating, …
Free Span –only 25 (31%)

The main observations to note from the above figure and table are as follows:
 The risk distribution shows forty-seven (47 or 58%) HIGH RISK pipelines, twenty-nine (29 or 36%)
MEDIUM HIGH RISK, four (4 or 5%) MEDIUM RISK and one (1 or 1%) in the LOW RISK category.

 The main risk drivers for the likelihood of failure for the offshore pipelines are free span fatigue resp.
ultimate strength and uncertainty about corrosion damage (metal loss), combined with high
consequences due to the nature and large volume of the product handled by these pipelines.

The risk matrix for all offshore risers is shown in Figure 1.

Current Risk
Distribution
Consequence Likelihood Category
Category 1 2 3 4 5
A 0
B 0
C 0
D 12 12
E 2 2
0 0 0 0 14 14
Figure 15: Current Risk Matrix for offshore risers

The main risk driver is the age combined with unknown condition especially with respect to fatigue for all 14
risers. The main observations to note from the above figure are as follows:
 The risk distribution for the riser shows fourteen (14 or 100%) HIGH RISK risers.
 The main risk driver for the likelihood of failure for the offshore riser is the unknown fatigue damage due
to the age of the risers, combined with high consequences due to the nature and large volume of the
product handled by these components.

Conclusions & Observations

 RBI assessment was completed for pipelines and risers of offshore platform Complex and included
identifying the risk levels and recommendations for optimizing future inspections.
 The risk distribution for Offshore platform shows:

 Forty-seven (47 or 58%) HIGH RISK pipelines,

 Twenty-nine (29 or 36%) MEDIUM HIGH RISK pipelines,
 Four (4 or 5%) MEDIUM RISK pipelines and
 One (1 or 1%) LOW RISK pipelines.

Figure 16: Distribution of the risk

 The main risk drivers for the likelihood of failure for the offshore pipelines are free span fatigue resp.
ultimate strength and uncertainty about corrosion damage, combined with high consequences due
to the nature and large volume of the product handled by these pipelines.
 The risk distribution for the risers shows all fourteen (14 or 100%) in HIGH RISK The main risk
driver for the likelihood of failure are fatigue resp. ultimate strength, uncertainty about corrosion
damage, crack growth in welds (due to exceeding the design life time), combined with high
consequences due to the connection to manned platforms.

Conclusion
1. Carry out Free Span analysis for the missing pipelines.
2. For twenty five (25) pipelines an additional free span analysis and / or inspection may reduce the
risk.
3. For fifty (50) pipelines aged 25 or more years, it is recommends a life time extension e.g. in
accordance with the ISO TS 12747 5]. This includes e.g.:
a. As old concrete may become decomposed (perform an external coating survey for the
pipelines)
b. For the pipelines going to shore the welds should be analyzed using an ECA (Engineering
 Critical Assessment) in order to prevent leakages based on fatigue cracks.
Alternatively to the life time extension, a replacement of the pipelines exceeding the age of 25
years may be considered.
4. Perform an RBI assessment for the risers connected to the pipelines assessed here.
5. Perform a fatigue assessment of the risers and based on the result the risk may be re-assessed.
6. Check the assumption for the risers especially with respect to the corrosion and allowable clamp
distance and update if required.
7. Consider installing corrosion monitoring devices (Coupons or probes).
8. Example of Inspection Plans:

Table 9: Inspection plan for pipelines

Pipeline Current Next external inspection date regarding,
risk stability, coating condition & free spans
Line 3 8 to Line TP-07 10IN 5C 16.07.1986
LINE 3 8 to LINE TP-07 16IN 5C 23.06.2005
LINE 9 14 to LINE TP-07 10IN 5C 16.07.1986
LINE 9 14 to LINE TP-07 16IN 5C 06.07.2005
LINE 15 20 to LINE TP-07 12IN 5C 02.09.1994
LINE 15 20 to LINE TP-07 8IN 4B 02.09.1994
LINE 23 28 to LINE TP-07 12IN 4C 30.07.1994
LINE 23 28 to LINE TP-07 8IN 4B 30.07.1994
LINE 29 34 to LINE TP-07 12IN 4C 26.07.1994
LINE 29 34 to LINE TP-07 8IN 5C 26.07.1994

Table 10: Inspection plan for risers

Significant
Current Next inspection
Location of riser Connected pipeline fatigue
Risk due date
probable
PLANT A PLATFORM 8 PA-8 to PLANT B-3 5D 11.04.2010 yes
PLANT A PLATFORM-4 PA-4 to PLANT B-2 5D 29.09.2009 yes
PLANT A PLATFORM-5 PA-5 to PLANT B-2 5D 14.03.2010 yes
PLANT A PLATFORM-6 PA-6 to PLANT B-3 5D 29.04.2010 yes
PLANT A PLATFORM-7 PA-7 to PLANT B-3 5D 06.10.2014 yes
PLANT B-2 (RISER C4) PA-4 to PLANT B-2 5D 19.12.2012 yes
PLANT B-2 (RISER C5) PA-5 to PLANT B-2 5D 19.12.2012 yes
PLANT B-2 (RISER G3) PLANT B-3 to PLANT B-2 5E 20.09.2011 yes
PLANT B-3 (RISER G4) PLANT B-3 to PLANT B-2 5E 06.11.2010 yes
PLANT B-3 (RISER C38) PA-8 to PLANT B-3 5D 05.02.2012 yes
PLANT B-3 (RISER C40) PA-7 to PLANT B-3 5D 05.02.2012 yes
PLANT B-3 (RISER C41) PA-6 to PLANT B-3 5D 05.02.2012 yes
PLANT B-3 (RISER C43) PLANT B-3 to PLANT B-2 5D 05.02.2012 yes
PLANT B-3 (RISER C44) PLANT B-3 to PLANT C 5D 05.02.2012 yes
 References
1. DIN 81249, November 1997, Corrosion of metals in sea water and sea atmosphere, part 2: Free
corrosion in sea water
2. DIN 81249, November 1997, Corrosion of metals in sea water and sea atmosphere, part 4:
Corrosion in sea atmosphere
3. DNVGL-OS-C401, Fabrication and testing of offshore structures, July 2017
4. DIN EN ISO 8044, Corrosion of metals and alloys - Basic terms and definitions, 1999.
5. ISO 12747, Petroleum and natural gas industries -- Pipeline transportation systems --
Recommended practice for pipeline life time extension, 2011
6. ISO 16708, Petroleum and natural gas industries -- Pipeline transportation systems -- Reliability-
based limit state methods, 2010
7. API 579, Fitness for Service, 2009
8. API 580, Risk-Based Inspection, 2009
9. API 581 Risk-Based Inspection Technology, 2008
10. API 1160, Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid Pipelines, 2001
11. DNV-RP-F116, Integrity Management of Submarine Pipeline Systems, 2009
12. DNV-RP-F206, Riser Integrity Management , 2008
13. DNVGL-RP-F101, Corroded pipelines, 2017
14. DNVGL-RP-F113, Pipeline subsea repair, 2016
15. DNVGL-RP-F105, Free spanning pipelines, 2017
16. The European Federation of Corrosion Publications (1994): Predicting CO2 Corrosion in the Oil and
Gas Industry, II. Series, The Institute of Materials, Great Britain