Contours of Climate Justice

critical
currents
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
Occasional Paper Series
Contours of
Climate Justice
Ideas for shaping new
climate and energy politics
no.6
October 2009 Beyond Diplomacy – Perspectives on Dag Hammarskjöld 5
critical currents no.6
October 2009
Contours of Climate Justice

Ideas for shaping new climate
and energy politics
Edited by
Ulrich Brand Edgardo Lander
Nicola Bullard Tadzio Mueller
With contributions by
Kolya Abramsky Eduardo Gudynas
Alberto Acosta Mike Hodson
Walden Bello Enrique Leff
Achim Brunnengräber Simone Lovera
Ewa Charkiewicz Simon Marvin
Anne Laure Constantin Alexis Passadakis
Gopal Dayaneni Wolfgang Sachs
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

Uppsala 2009
critical currents 6 book_b.indd 1 09-11-05 11.17.56

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
pays tribute to the memory of the second
Secretary General of the UN by searching
for and examining workable alternatives
for a socially and economically just,
ecologically sustainable, peaceful and
secure world.
In the spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld’s Critical Currents is an

integrity, his readiness to challenge the Occasional Paper Series
dominant powers and his passionate plea published by the
for the sovereignty of small nations and Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation.
their right to shape their own destiny, the It is also available online at
Foundation seeks to examine mainstream www.dhf.uu.se.
understanding of development and bring to
the debate alternative perspectives of often Statements of fact or opinion
unheard voices. are those of the authors and
do not imply endorsement
By making possible the meeting of minds, by the Foundation.
experiences and perspectives through the Manuscripts for review
organising of seminars and dialogues, should be sent to
the Foundation plays a catalysing role secretariat@dhf.uu.se.
in the identification of new issues and
the formulation of new concepts, policy Series editor: Henning Melber
proposals, strategies and work plans towards Language editor: Peter Colenbrander
solutions. The Foundation seeks to be at the Layout: Karim Kerrou
cutting edge of the debates on development, Design: Mattias Lasson
security and environment, thereby Printed by X-O Graf Tryckeri AB
continuously embarking on new themes ISSN 1654-4250
in close collaboration with a wide and Copyright on the text is with the
constantly expanding international network. authors and the Foundation.

Contents
Preface ............................................................................................................................... 5
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 9
Ulrich Brand, Nicola Bullard, Edgardo Lander and Tadzio Mueller

Radical climate change politics in Copenhagen and beyond: From criticism to action?........9
part 1: How did we get here in the first place? ............................................................... 17
Ewa Charkiewicz
A feminist critique of the climate change discourse. From biopolitics to necropolitics? ........ 18
Achim Brunnengräber
Kyoto´s ‘flexible mechanisms’ and the right to pollute the air .................................... 26
Eduardo Gudynas
Climate change and capitalism’s ecological fi x in Latin America ............................... 36
Walden Bello
The deadly triad: Climate change, free trade and capitalism ...................................... 42
part 2 : Wrong turns, dead-ends and cross-roads ............................................................ 45
Simone Lovera
REDD realities .......................................................................................................... 46
Tadzio Mueller and Alexis Passadakis
Green capitalism and the climate: It’s economic growth, stupid!................................ 54
Anne Laure Constantin
Fixing the world’s climate ‘foodprint’........................................................................ 62
Mike Hodson and Simon Marvin
The right to the city – energy and climate change..................................................... 70
part 3 : Mapping (and walking) the terrain of climate justice .......................................... 79
Gopal Dayaneni
Climate justice in the US ........................................................................................... 80
Wolfgang Sachs
Climate change and human rights ............................................................................. 85
Kolya Abramsky
Energy, crisis and world-wide production relations ................................................... 92
Enrique Leff
Degrowth, or deconstruction of the economy: Towards a sustainable world ..................101
Alberto Acosta
The rights of nature, new forms of citizenship and the Good Life
– Echoes of the Constitución de Montecristi in Ecuador ......................................... 108

Preface
‘Man has lost the capacity to foresee and to

forestall. He will end by destroying the earth.’
Albert Schweitzer
More than 75 years ago, in a letter to Rut- he kept from the mid-1920s onwards. For
ger Moll (probably in 1933), Dag Ham- Hammarskjöld, nature amounted almost to a
marskjöld wrote about his emotions while sacred frontier. Some of the notes from 1951
spending the summer hiking in northern show with particular clarity his deep bonds
Sweden. For him, this experience evoked ‘a with the wilderness, which for him was the:
feeling of solidarity with nature’ as ‘almost
the most important thing’.1 Hammarskjöld …extrahuman in the experience of the
had a profound, intimate relationship with greatness of Nature. This does not allow
the world of the sea and even more so that itself to be reduced to an expression of
of the mountains.2 He had a deep-rooted our human reactions, nor can we share
and conscious personal interaction with na- in it by expressing them. Unless we each
ture, which was evidenced by, among other fi nd a way to chime in as one note in
things, his admiration for the work of Carl the organic whole, we shall only observe
von Linnaeus as well as his affinity for the ourselves observing the interplay of its
fiction of Joseph Conrad and his belief in thousand components in a harmony out-
the ethical philosophy of Albert Schweitzer, side our experience of it as harmony.4
to mention only the obvious instances. His
posthumously published childhood memo- Hammarskjöld’s photos, which he took with
ries of his upbringing on Uppsala’s Castle a passion during his explorations, pictured
Hill provide further striking insight into his mostly landscape and were a visual expression
almost spiritual relationship with the natural of this respect for nature. As he commented
environment and habitat.3 in an essay entitled ‘The camera has taught
me to see’, he was seeking to illustrate ‘the
Not the least testament of this relationship balance of strength and nervous sensitivity so
can be found in his entries in the notebook often displayed by nature’s own creations’.5
1 Quoted in Thelin, B. (2001), ‘Dag Hammarskjöld

– Nature, Landscape, Literature’, Development
Dialogue, Vol. 1, p.88.
2 See on the latter the magnificent pictorial tribute by 4 Hammarskjöld, D. (1993, 16th printing), Markings.
Grundsten, C. (2007), Swedish Wilderness. The Mountain New York: Random House, p.66.
World of Dag Hammarskjöld. Stockholm: Max Ström. 5 Quoted from ‘Landmarks. Photographs by Dag
3 Hammarskjöld, D. (2000), Castle Hill. Uppsala: Dag Hammarskjöld’, in Development Dialogue, Vol. 1,
Photo: Dag Hammarskjöld
Hammarskjöld Foundation. 1987, p.28.
Contours of Climate Justice. Ideas for shaping new climate and energy politics 5

The second secretary general of the United much beyond square one. Despite more than
Nations most likely did not have climate 300 multilateral agreements negotiated and
change in his mind. However, his notion entered into since 1972, the world’s climate
of ‘solidarity with nature’ calls for further as we know it faces ultimate collapse. Politi-
and fuller contemplation. Suffice it to con- cal and institutional constraints have stood
clude within the confi nes of this preface that in the way of a solution:
throughout his varied career he clearly had
an awareness of natural beauty and serenity Many of the problems related to sustaina-
and appreciated them as a treasure to be pro- ble development would have been solved
tected in the post-Second World War era, easily, or would not have evolved if the
with its belief in progress and modernity agreements reached early on actually had
based on technological advancement and a been implemented. However, by the end
Fordist conception of the industrialisation of the process, a huge implementation
and commodification of consumer societies. and accountability gap had accumulated
– a failure that lies at the core of the chal-
Soon after his untimely death in the early lenges today.6
hours of 18 September 1961 on a mission to
the Congo to seek a peaceful resolution of The tendency of governments to place nar-
the conflicts arising from its decolonisation, row state interests above global survival
humankind’s disastrous effects on nature, and comes at a life-threatening price. It is there-
responsibility for them, became a topical is- fore not surprising that many concerned per-
sue in global governance initiatives. In 1967, sons have few if any expectations or illusions
Sweden proposed that the UN General As- that those participating in the Copenhagen
sembly convene a conference on the environ- event will actually demonstrate the required
ment. The UN Conference on the Human problem-solving capacity. Despite all the
Environment in Stockholm (1972), the UN declarations, declamations and lip service,
Conference on Environment and Develop- even the scariest climate-change scenarios
ment in Rio de Janeiro (1992) and the World are proving to be understatements of what
Summit on Sustainable Development in Jo- might come. Policy responses and adapta-
hannesburg (2002) were subsequent markers tions fall short of addressing the challenges.
in a series of top-level global meetings, which The logic of the era of the Enlightenment,
were continued in other forums all over the in which human beings utilise nature for
world. They created normative reference short-term gain without concern for long-
points and political institutions such as the term survival, approaches bankruptcy.
Convention on Biological Diversity and the
Framework Convention on Climate Change Securing a future for human beings and the
in order to meet the challenges. many other endangered species on this plan-
et requires instead a change of mindset. The
More than four decades after the Swed-
ish initiative in 1967, with governments of 6 Engfeldt, L-G. (2009), From Stockholm to Johannesburg
the world due to meet in Copenhagen in and Beyond. The Evolution of the International System for
December 2009 to seek a follow up to the Sustainable Development Governance and its Implications.
Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden/Minis-
Kyoto Protocol, progress has not advanced try for Foreign Aff airs, June, p.15.
6 Critical Currents no. 6

quote above by Albert Schweitzer has been farmer, and she is a woman and she is des-
used as a motto for a ‘Provocation’ published perate’.
by the Swedish Tällberg Foundation. In its
postscript, the authors conclude, that ‘we That date, 24 October 2009, also marked the
have to rethink the principles upon which we International Day of Climate Action (350
base the development of our economy, tech- Day) when people in 181 countries came to-
nology and governance. Nature is what it is. gether for the most widespread day of envi-
We cannot negotiate with nature to change ronmental action in the planet’s history. At
its nature, its processes, and its chemical and over 5,200 events around the world, people
physiological characteristics’.7 gathered to call for strong action and bold
leadership on the climate crisis. Copenha-
The urgency of the situation has in the gen could be an important marker in cur-
meantime also been expressed in official rent efforts to face the challenges responsi-
arenas and discourses. On 24 October, the bly on a global level and at the level national
fourth European Development Days, organ- governance, through state institutions and
ised in Stockholm by the Swedish govern- governments. But the solution lies beyond
ment during its presidency of the EU, closed Copenhagen.
with a plenary session on climate change
and development. Edward Natapei, prime The contributions to this volume seek to
minister of the small Pacific island state of strengthen awareness of the key issues and
Vanuatu, made this appeal: ‘Urgent action is the urgent need for initiatives and commit-
needed to avoid a genocidal impact on small ments beyond one place at one specific mo-
island states’. Ahmed Shaheed, minister of ment in time. They testify to the need for
foreign affairs of the Maldives, warned that a mind change and the implementation of
at current rates of sea-level rise, the island subsequent new paradigms, a commitment
soon risks losing its international airport. most politicians as representatives of their
‘We must fi nd ways to adapt to rising seas, governments and states still seem to lack –
coral bleaching, flooding and disease.’ particularly on the level of global govern-
ance. Dag Hammarskjöld, from what we
Mary Robinson, president of the Ethical know of him, would have been on the side
Globalization Initiative and vice president of the deeply concerned voices advocating a
of the Club of Madrid, called on Europe to fundamental shift in mindset.8
take the lead in climate change negotiations:
‘The time has come for decision taking. It is Henning Melber
time for leadership’. She added: ‘The image
of climate change is the polar bear. I like
polar bears, too, but that is the wrong im-
age. The image of climate change is a poor 8 This suggestion is strengthened by the noteworthy
fact that Sverker Åström, one of Hammarskjöld’s
closest colleagues and friends since the 1940s, as the
Swedish permanent representative to the UNs in the
7 Ekman, B., Rockström, J., and Wijkman A. (n.d., mid-1960s initiated and with much foresight and de-
2008/09), Grasping the Climate Crisis. A Provocation termination oversaw the implementation of the pro-
from the Tällberg Foundation. Stockholm: Tällberg cess leading to the Stockholm Conference of 1972. See
Foundation, p.38. Engfeldt, From Stockholm to Johannesburg, pp.32 ff.

Introduction »

Radical climate change politics in Copenhagen
and beyond: From criticism to action?
Ulrich Brand, Nicola Bullard, Ulrich Brand is a professor of

Edgardo Lander and Tadzio Mueller international politics at the Institute of
Political Science at Vienna University,
member of the Scientific Council of
Attac Germany and of the working
There is something uncanny about the politics group on social ecology of the Federal
of climate change. An issue at the same time Coordination of Internationalism
old and new; omnipresent, yet easily forgot- (www.buko.info). Among his recent publications is
ten; threatening the destruction of billions of ‘Postneoliberalism. A Beginning Debate’ (Uppsala: Dag
lives, yet somehow relegated to a relatively ob- Hammarskjöld Foundation, 2009), a special issue of
scure corner of the global political system, the Development Dialogue (co-edited with Nicola Sekler).
United Nations Framework Convention on
Nicola Bullard has worked with
Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty organ-
trade unions, women’s organisations,
isation far less powerful than, say, the World human rights groups and development
Trade Organization (WTO). But whence the agencies in Australia, Thailand and
relatively sudden prominence of the issue, af- Cambodia for more than 20 years. Since
ter languishing in the environmentalist dol- 1997, Nicola has been with Focus on
drums for nearly two decades – is it ‘really’ the Global South, the international policy research and
because of the climate crisis, or are there other advocacy organisation based in Bangkok, Thailand, and
interests, other structures at work? And what is currently coordinating its climate justice programme.
can ‘we’, the global movements, global civil
society, whatever name we give to ourselves, Edgardo Lander is a social scientist
what can we do about the issue? These ques- and works at the Venezuelan Central
tions might not be resolved here, but we feel University in Caracas, and is a member
that it is important to start asking them. of the secretariat of the Social Forum of
the Americas. He researches and writes
Since public discussion of the issue began in on Venezuelan society; environment and
earnest in the 1980s, climate change and its the limits of planet Earth; development; alter-globalisation
potential and real impacts have become more movements; epistemology and the critique of Eurocentrism;
the colonial character of hegemonic modern knowledge
and more obvious. Not only the develop-
and science and technology as political issues.
ments in scientific research, but also the ac-
tivities of environmental movements,media,
critical intellectuals, progressive state offi- Tadzio Mueller lives in Berlin, where
cials and alternative energy producers have he is active in the emerging climate
focused social and political attention on the justice movement. Having escaped the
implications of the problem. With the UN- clutches of (academic) wage labour, he
FCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, an interna- is currently writing a report on ‘green
tional political mechanism to manage the capitalism’ for the Rosa Luxemburg
Foundation. He is also an editor of
issue was developed in the 1990s.
Turbulence-Ideas for Movement (www.turbulence.org.uk).

In the last two years especially, climate an informal gathering of the governments of
change has climbed to the top of the political the main emitting countries, known amongst
agenda. There are, of course, a multiplicity NGOs as the ‘Major Emitters Forum’ – has
of reasons for this resurgence of an issue that been meeting every month since March 2009.
has gone through alternating cycles of low A number of preparatory meetings have tak-
and high public attention, but central among en place, and in Copenhagen itself we will
them are, no doubt, the publication of the no doubt be treated to the best that the thea-
Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental tre of international diplomacy can offer: the
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); of the negotiations will be extended in a dramatic
Stern Report – whose message, crucial from lock-in of the delegates, and at the very end,
the perspective of enlightened capital, is that we will be served a ‘result’ of sorts, because in
it is cheaper to take action on climate change spite of recent official attempts to downplay
now than in the future, and that a ‘green the relevance of the summit, ‘total failure’
capitalism’ might be possible; sky-high en- would just be too embarrassing an option to
ergy prices (recall that in 2007 and 2008, oil contemplate. And yet, it is unlikely that there
prices were touching the US$ 150 mark); and will be a significant ‘deal’ of any kind, that
the argument that peak oil, that is, a peak in the next phase of the Kyoto Protocol will be
global oil discovery relative to demand, had signed there. More likely, we will get a type
been reached, after which prices would have of roadmap for further negotiations (with a
to rise drastically. In the comparative politi- protocol being finalised in Mexico in 2010).
cal frenzy that followed, the IPCC and Al Still, there will be a dramatic showdown.
Gore were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize,
while G-8 summits in 2007 in Germany, in Alas, with all the attention, all the drama,
2008 in Japan and in 2009 in Italy had the not much has changed in the last 20 years,
linked issues of energy and climate change at least not for the better. Oil and gas con-
high on their agendas. The UNFCCC sum- sumption have increased enormously, and so
mit in Bali in December 2007 was widely has the rate of increase – and, of course, glo-
covered in the global mass media. bal greenhouse gas emissions show the same
trend. Production and consumption patterns
The climate summit in December 2009 in are still the same and, moreover, have rap-
Copenhagen, the ‘COP 15’ (15th Confer- idly been globalised through transnational
ence of the Parties to the UNFCCC), will capital, state policies and the lifestyle of a
no doubt be a decisive moment – one way ‘global middle class’.
or the other – and everybody is gearing up
for it. Global attention is guaranteed, and as The main reason for this lack of change is this:
a publicity stunt, UN Secretary General Ban Environmental policies in general and climate
Ki-moon initiated a ‘global count-down to change policies in particular are formulated
Copenhagen’ on 24 September. The meeting in line with dominant political and economic
will also be important for the fact that US structures and interests. Today, in spite of the
President Barack Obama and his administra- economic and political crises that are rocking
tion are, for the first time, going to engage in the globe, these dominant politics remain neo-
the process. The Major Economies Forum – liberal and neo-imperial, oriented towards

competitiveness and maintaining and enhanc- not only by globalised capitalism, but more
ing the power of Northern governments, cor- specifically by a top-down kind of climate
porations and elites. To be sure, this is not just politics. The build-up of pressure within the
a North-South issue: the lifestyles of Southern agricultural sector to produce crops for agro-
elites are as ‘unsustainable’, if the somewhat fuels for the world market is merely the most
tainted word be allowed, as those dominant visible example of this trend. Over the last 20
in the global North. Policies formulated at the years, a type of global resource management
global level reinforce the position of owners of has emerged wherein government officials,
assets, and of the global middle classes – includ- business, scientists, some NGOs as well as
ing the middle classes of economically ‘emerg- media act in concert to control and manage
ing’ countries such as China, India or Brazil. the destruction of the environment and to
The ‘Western lifestyle’ is still being promoted profit from it both politically and economi-
around the world, its destructive insanity not- cally. Over the same period, the content of
withstanding. Human wellbeing and social these policies has been criticised. However,
security are still seen as closely tied to eco- there has not been a critique of their form;
nomic growth, which implies resource-inten- this intergovernmental politics, this kind of
sive growth of car production, of airports, of diplomacy that occurs under the pressure of
industrialised farming, etc. lobby groups searching for consensus, while
systematically leading to weak compromises.
The role of global crisis dis- Most importantly, however, the question of
courses and the UNFCCC form is one of the economic ‘overcoding’
In spite of its obviously political nature, the of apparently environmental concerns sur-
issue of climate change is often perceived as a rounding climate change: the line of thought
question of science rather than politics. This in goes from scientific knowledge to global
turn leads to a situation in which the problem problem, and from global problem to eco-
of climate change is exclusively or predomi- nomic opportunity, while questions of power
nantly framed as a problem that has to be dealt (between genders, classes, North and South,
with globally, that is, from above, with West- of corporations…), lifestyle, production and
ern knowledge and through the techniques consumption are pushed aside. Following the
of scientific and economic management rath- zeitgeist of the 1990s, the instruments of glo-
er than through social and political transfor- bal environmental politics are largely market-
mation. Such an approach obscures the many based because powerful actors consider the
local conflicts over scarce resources and land market to be the superior means of dealing
use that are as constitutive of ‘climate change’ with fundamental problems such as climate
as any abstract figure expressing the amount change. Not by chance, the main instrument
of CO2 in the atmosphere. The many local, of the UNFCCC is therefore emissions trad-
practical alternatives – more precisely, existing. This in turn justifies weak policies ‘at
ing low-carbon lifestyles – to be found are home’. The current division of labour (along
downplayed. Moreover, a number of eco- lines of class, gender, race, age and power in
logically sustainable forms of producing and the international system) is hardly problema-
living have actually been put under pressure tised. Environmental policies have thus be-

come a moral and efficiency-based strategy To counter the development of a top-down
aimed at the middle classes. The generalisa- system of global resource management, we
tion of the Western lifestyle (a generalisation need a broad public debate about as well as
that remains valid for most people in spite practical steps towards the necessary transfor-
of the significant differences in power and mation of production and consumption pat-
wealth within Western societies) is cynical terns, society’s relationship with nature and
because billions of people are poor and lack the power of states and capital. Of course, the
access to even basic means of subsistence. UNFCCC is not responsible for the contin-
Besides this managerial framing, a catastrophic ued growth of CO2 emissions or for our fos-
discourse about climate change and its effects silistic mode of development, that is, for fur-
has been established. In 2007, the head of the ther climate change. This is a much broader
IPCC, Rajendra Pachauri, stated that ‘we’ process involving many more powerful eco-
must bring about a complete turnaround by nomic and political actors and structures, for
2012 in order to avoid ‘disaster’ and that the example, the lifestyles of the global upper
two or three years from 2007 onward would and middle classes. At the institutional level,
be decisive. This kind of invocation of ur- the WTO, the International Monetary Fund
gency, its basis in scientific discourses not- (IMF) and the World Bank, all of which
withstanding, narrows the room for a critique promote trade liberalisation and structural
of existing global climate change policies and adjustment policies, are far more significant
politics; goes hand in hand with a ‘technoc- in terms of climate change (their policies ac-
ratisation’, that is, depoliticisation, of climate celerate it, for example, through expansion
change politics; and places our hopes in the of industrialised agriculture and global trans-
discovery of some as yet unknown silver bul- port, two major greenhouse gas emitters).
let-technological solution that would simply The UNFCCC, however, maintains that it
‘fix’ the anthropogenic greenhouse effect. is the most central and appropriate institu-
Such technologies – if any – are likely to be tion to stop climate change. But in the last 15
large-scale and delivered by powerful play- years, it has become evident that technocratic
ers such as the DeserTec Consortium that approaches and their catastrophic framing
is planning to build large-scale, centralised change very little with respect to the prob-
solar-power generating systems in the Sahara lem: on the contrary, current lifestyles and
to supply Europe’s energy needs. dominant (and so far ecologically pointless)
policy orientations are being re-legitimised.
Geographer Erik Swyngedouw has else-
where shown how this catastrophic framing To be sure, the UNFCCC embodies the
of climate change fits in neatly with pow- fact that there is today a politicised aware-
erful political discourses on post-democra- ness of climate change. Within the institu-
cy and post-politics. It seems that there is tion, however, this awareness is then framed
virtually no alternative to existing forms in specific ways and in line with dominant
of politics and to the socioeconomic condi- interests and social forces. This spells daily
tions that give rise to them. Quoting Fre- disaster for billions of people – in fact, some
dric Jameson, he reminds us that today ‘it is movements from the global South argue
easier to imagine the end of the world than that the policies driven or encouraged by
to imagine the end of capitalism’.

the UNFCCC are today a greater threat to G-8 or the UNFCCC. But in fact, the current
their livelihoods than climate change itself. forms of environmental and resource politics
The political mode of crisis management are the result of, and in turn reproduce, exist-
that exists on this terrain is diplomacy, and ing relationships of domination. Irresponsible
behind this is the pursuit of ‘national inter- policies like the development of nuclear power
ests’ under conditions of globalised capital- plants are formulated in other forums such as
ism and the race for competitiveness. Once the G-8 and will no doubt be picked up by the
governments come back from major confer- UNFCCC.
ences at which, yet again, the notion of ‘be-
ing at a crossroads’ has been evoked (as they
are now doing around the climate summit
Beyond global resource management
in Copenhagen), they continue to obey Of course, a simple breakdown of the UN-
powerful actors such as the car industry, FCCC would probably not be the best pos-
seed companies, industrial farming, meat sible outcome for the movements for global
producers, etc. Additionally, environmental (climate and environmental) justice. We al-
ministries tend to be relatively weak within most certainly need internationally formu-
governments, as energy issues are usually lated, binding and enforceable rules in order
dealt with by other, stronger apparatuses. to promote the profound transformations
necessary to deal with not only the climate
Take agro-fuels as an example. When it comes crisis, but also the wider biocrisis, and to
to energy security and profits, critical questions transform the idea of ‘development’. From
and disastrous experiences are simply brushed an emancipatory perspective, stopping cli-
aside. The issue of agro-fuels is presented by mate change is of the utmost importance,
Southern governments such as Brazil or In- which means stopping fossil-fuel-based pat-
donesia as an ‘opportunity for growth and de- terns of production and consumption.
velopment’. But for whom, and at what price?
In these countries, agricultural restructuring But radical social movements and criti-
is determined by the huge demand from the cal NGOs as well as critical intellectuals
EU, where specific norms have recently been and some media are increasingly recognis-
implemented that call for a higher percentage ing that the UNFCCC in its current form
of ethanol to be mixed with gasoline. The is not an adequate mechanism to deal with
global middle class consumers support these this enormous task. Like other international
policy developments because they fear high institutions, the UNFCCC is part of a capi-
energy prices. Alternatives are left aside or talist, Western, white and masculine regime
are reduced to a sideshow in the wider ‘en- of global resource management. It should no
ergy mix’. Finally, what we see in the field of longer be legitimised through the participa-
environmental politics is an attempt to resta- tion of NGOs, social movements and other
bilise the neo-liberal, neo-imperial globalisa- critical actors. We do not need ‘sustainable
tion project by presenting a progressive image globalisation’, basically another expression for
in the field of environmental policy-making. neo-liberalism and neo-imperialism – or, put
‘World leaders have understood the problem’, another way, maybe neo-liberalism’s Plan B.
is the message we hear from summits of the

Fifteen years after the UNFCCC’s first meet- tal issues. Of course we need to consume
ing in 1994, we can clearly see that what is less meat, cars/auto-mobility and electrical
needed are fundamentally different political gadgets. But this cannot amount to a sim-
and social responses. In this process, states ple moral claim that ignores social struc-
will still be important, but they and their of- tures and the power relations on which they
ficials will not be the forces driving it. On are based. Alternative and attractive forms
the contrary, today they are mainly an obsta- of living, producing and exchanging; new
cle to serious action against climate change. social divisions of labour; and alternative
Changing production and consumption pat- identities are necessary, as well as possible,
terns, lifestyles or the meaning of the ‘good and in many cases revolve around concrete
life’, and attacking corporate power and the struggles for the protection of the natu-
politics of resource management are complex ral commons (water, biodiversity, air, etc.)
and long-term processes. Several elements against their commodification. The public
need to be considered. One major element sector and its accompanying infrastructures,
has to be a practically rooted critique of the more energy efficiency and sustainable
dogma of competitiveness linked to techno- goods are not only linked to learning proc-
logical developments. There are few gov- esses, but might also call into question the
ernments and social actors who have really power of certain producers and the speed of
understood the dangers of existing trends. globalisation. What we need is the ecologi-
What is needed is a repoliticisation of the cal conversion of existing industries, while
‘market’. It is not just the efficient mechanism taking advantage of the enormous knowl-
for allocating resources that it is often taken edge of the producers that lies within them.
to be, but a highly effective instrument for Environmental issues are profoundly linked
the production of domination of some peo- to questions of social power. For example,
ple over others – and for hiding precisely this over-exploitation of labour, especially of il-
relationship. Markets imply and in turn ob- legalised migrants and many workers in the
scure power and exploitation along the lines global South, obeys the same logic of profit
of class, gender, race and North-South divi- and accumulation that is at work in the de-
sions. And at the same time as we need to struction of nature. It is necessary to politi-
criticise the structure of market relations, it cise the immediate desires of workers for
is equally crucial to restrict the power of in- cheap food, energy and other goods, which
dustrial and financial corporations that thrive are produced under unsustainable and unso-
within them. cial conditions. But there is also a problem
here that needs to be solved: the short-term
Of course, if such an endeavour were suc- interests of many people are linked to un-
cessful, it would mean less economic sustainable patterns of production and con-
growth, with all that this implies for profits, sumption. Emancipatory socio-ecological
the power of private capital, the tax basis of orientations and practices therefore need to
the state and employment in the traditional be linked to all aspects of life, as well as to a
sectors. An emancipatory politics has to take redistribution of social wealth.
care not to be moralistic about environmen-

Emancipatory demands and conflicts About this publication
Many alternatives are thinkable, possible We met in January 2009 in Belem at the
and already exist. It is possible that socio- World Social Forum for the fi rst time to
ecological confl icts can show that much discuss compiling a dossier as a contribu-
more is at stake than symbolically tackling tion to ongoing debates about the politics
climate change through global resource of climate change. It is this inspiring envi-
management: questions of democracy and ronment that motivated us, an environment
decision-making, power over social knowl- where the practical critique of globalised
edge and the means of production, the nec- capitalism in its many facets is condensed,
essary reduction of working-hours, the val- where the frustrating and productive expe-
orising of reproductive activities concerning riences of struggles against exploitation and
caring, health, food, etc. For that, we need patriarchy and for justice and real democ-
to develop radical demands and propos- racy come together. For a long time, climate
als through debates and the exchange of change issues had not been at the top of the
views and experiences. With our critique of agenda of the global justice movement, but
dominant climate change and environmen- a few years ago, this changed. And still it is
tal policies we are not cynical about climate not at all clear what a radical or emancipa-
change and we do not intend to strengthen tory climate politics will look like.
the lobby that defends the fossil-fuel path of
development. However, we do not see the Our goal is to contribute to a more sophis-
solution to the problem in Western scien- ticated understanding of the emerging cli-
tific knowledge, in intergovernmental proc- mate justice movement and to create reso-
esses and in ecological modernisation for nances between different perspectives and
the Western middle classes at the expense spheres of engagement. We want to render
of many others, especially the poor, and the more explicit a multiplicity of experiences
material living conditions on earth. Politics and proposals and put them into context, re-
in times of deep socio-ecological crises have ferring to real or supposed tensions and con-
to change; to become a democratic and in- tradictions – such as that between ‘develop-
formed transformative process, taking into ment’ and ‘climate justice’ – and showing
consideration the many ambiguities that ex- the existing wide array of alternatives. The
ist, but with a view to a more just world activities around the COP 15 in Copenhagen
based on solidarity beyond the dogma of are a starting point in the creation of such a
competitiveness and profitability. We want broad movement – or in Naomi Klein’s in-
to reorientate debates and policies towards spired words used to describe the anti-WTO
fundamental socio-ecological and emanci- protests in Seattle exactly 10 years before the
patory transformations in conjunction with publication of this dossier, they can be the
an acknowledgement of alternative practices movement’s ‘coming-out party’. A ‘move-
and processes. ment’ goes beyond the activities of activists,
their importance notwithstanding. It in-
cludes convincing many people to engage in
different everyday practices and convincing

journalists to refer to voices from outside Nuss at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in
the conference halls and official science. It Berlin, as well as the Institute of Political
implies politicians who are willing to break Science at Vienna University. Special thanks
with the dogma of competitiveness and pol- go to the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation
itics as a power game among elites and it and its director, Henning Melber, for giving
takes seriously changes in institutions such us the prestigious intellectual and political
as private and public fi rms, schools and uni- space of Critical Currents and for sharing our
versities. This ‘movement’ is a broad proc- political concerns over dominant develop-
ess of social transformation and its core and ments and our desires to change the world.
catalyst is the collective thinking and action Our thanks also go to the good people as-
that is currently taking place within the cli- sociated with the Foundation who did such
mate justice movement. a wonderful job on language editing, layout
and other essential tasks: Peter Colenbrand-
This issue of Critical Currents was a collec- er, Mattias Lasson and Karim Kerrou. As
tive undertaking. First of all, we would like usual, all remaining flaws are entirely our
to thank the authors contributing to the responsibility.
dossier. We are grateful for the many con-
tributions we received from activists and We hope that this publication can contrib-
scholars from different continents and social ute to shaping a future climate and energy
contexts, with knowledge of varying fields politics that will prove capable of solving the
of international climate and energy politics, multiple crises that climate change is part of,
and with very diverse perspectives. The and which humanity is facing in the second
common ground is that we are all preoc- decade of the 21st century.
cupied with, and critical of, the direction in
which international climate politics are and
have been heading for a long time.
Three of the editors want to warmly thank

the fourth, Tadzio Mueller, who had by far
the heaviest workload and who is in many
ways responsible for getting this issue done.
We are grateful for the generous fi nancial
support for his and other work that came
from Focus on the Global South, Sabine

A feminist critique of the climate change
discourse. From biopolitics to necropolitics?
Ewa Charkiewicz
Global ecology and global markets interact

in a number of ways, to the point that now- Ewa Charkiewicz is an activist and
adays the two are mutually indistinguish- researcher with an interest in critical
able. On the one hand, the global expansion globalisation studies, as well as feminism
of markets increases demand for resources and ecology as new social critiques. She
and puts more pressure on the integrity of lives in the Netherlands and is currently
ecosystems, one result being global climate involved with Feminist Think Tank, Poland.
change. On the other hand, measures to ad-
dress climate change rely on market instru-
ments for environmental policy. Cap-and- cial security systems and other public forms
trade measures contribute to the creation of of social provisioning, for instance, educa-
new virtual fi nancial markets. Today, the tion or healthcare, as well as public admin-
neoclassical model of the market is also of- istration (the state itself ) are reorganised in
fered as a compelling conceptual model for terms of economic rationality. The fi rm be-
thinking about solutions to the problems of comes a regulatory ideal, a beauty queen,
environmental degradation. for state, school or hospital. Environmental
policy, too, has been subsumed under this
Close to half a century ago, French phi- economic rationality.
losopher Michel Foucault coined the con-
cept of ‘biopolitics’ to point to the problem The way interactions between markets and
of how human life is managed or adminis- the environment are governed has far-reach-
tered. Foucault understood biopolitics as a ing consequences for human and non-human
historically contingent mode of the mutual life. The combination of environmental and
implication of power and knowledge that human resources has been neatly captured by
enabled the differential adjustment of hu- Teresa Brennan (2000) as ‘living nature’. Her
man bodies to new forms of capital accu- work exemplifies a new feminist social cri-
mulation (Foucault 1990). Later, neo-liberal tique, which has developed some interesting
biopolitics would expand the notion of the arguments about the relationships between
economic to include the social (Foucault people, nature and capital. These relation-
2004). Domains of government such as so- ships, as in all social institutions, are funda-

mentally gendered. In other words the pro- with the rationality of the market, and have
duction of knowledge, access to resources, become one of the avenues through which
division of labour, responsibilities and en- the neo-liberal revolution has affected more
titlements are founded, signified and legiti- and more areas of human life. The changes
mised by way of the concepts of gender and in environmental policy were effected in
gender relations. While for decades concerns two steps: fi rst, techno-managerial and fis-
have been raised about the ecological and so- cal instruments gained ground, and second,
cial limits to growth, with the latter focused a shift from material to virtual took place.
on poverty, feminist political thinkers have
pointed to the effects that neo-liberal mar- Thirty years ago, after the failure of attempts
ketisation has had on social reproduction or at measures to ‘control and prevent’, pro-
the economy of care, where people’s lives posed solutions for the global environmen-
are sustained, maintained and reproduced at tal crisis were framed using the concept of
the level of everyday life (Bakker 2004, El- ‘sustainable development’. The high point of
son 1994). Neoclassical economic models are these debates was the formulation at the UN
blind to the maintenance of life in the house- Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 of
holds, or see households as firms, as single the global programme of action known as
units that maximise their utility. The con- Agenda 21 (Agenda for the 21st century).
cept of the ‘care economy’ shows how mar- Agenda 21 was a multilayered document
kets and states depend on the reproduction that accommodated different vocabularies,
of the lives of subjects (configured as taxpay- including changing consumption patterns,
ers, workers, soldiers, consumers) that takes linking poverty eradication with environ-
place in the household economy. According mental improvements, as well as clean tech-
to global studies, the vast majority of care and nologies and economic instruments. While
reproductive work is done by women. The the strategy of suggesting that women were
expansion of the concept of the care econo- better environmental managers was debat-
my to include relationships with nature opens able, nevertheless the governmental Agenda
up new possibilities for linking feminist and 21 gave unprecedented visibility to women.
environmental agendas. In this short piece, I At the time, the political space created by
will show how the relationships between na- the UN’s global conferences enabled the ar-
ture and human reproduction have been cap- ticulation of dissent in the form of alterna-
tured by a neo-liberal biopolitics and discuss tive treaties from Rio, such as the ‘Women’s
the possibilities for strategic interventions in Agenda 21’, which represented an alterna-
the current global conjuncture. tive vision of social and ecological justice
and participatory democracy.
From managerialism to marketisation Over the next 10 years, former critics of Rio
In the period since the signing of the United who in 1992 had rejected the summit’s com-
Nations Framework Convention on Cli- promise between ‘the environment’ and
mate Change (UNFCCC) at the Rio Sum- ‘development’, by 2002 had become defend-
mit in 1992, global environmental politics ers of Agenda 21. The turning point was the
have been fundamentally reframed in line Rio+10 conference on sustainable develop-

ment in Johannesburg (WSSD), where the sified pressures on the environment. Ironi-
battle for a North-South deal on environ- cally, in light of man-made climate change,
ment and development, and for keeping the persuasive neo-liberal metaphor of lift-
Agenda 21 intact, was lost. In Johannesburg, ing all boats literally comes true.
the question of the ecological and social lim-
its of economic growth was displaced from Crucial in the move towards a neo-liberal
the summit agenda. In the fi nal documents biopolitics was the relocation of environ-
of Rio+10, poverty was no longer an issue mental policy to the domain of virtual fi-
pertaining to access (or the lack thereof ) to nancial markets. This move was consolidat-
sustainable livelihoods. Women simply dis- ed on a global scale with the Kyoto Protocol.
appeared from fi nal document (with two Pollution was no longer something that pol-
minor exceptions). Sustainable development icy-making sought to avert, and its materi-
morphed into global environmental man- ality was banished to the subtext. Instead,
agement, the threads of which were already environmental policy itself became a means
to be found in Agenda 21. To quote former of creating virtual markets, such as local
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2001) markets for pollution permits or global cap-
during the preparations for the Rio+10 con- and-trade measures. What Rio+10 did to
ference in 2002, ‘we have to make globalisa- sustainable development, the Kyoto Proto-
tion work for sustainable development’.1 In col did to climate change discourse, in effect
fact, it was the other way round: sustainable harnessing global ecology in the service of
development was retooled to work for neo- the expansion of virtual fi nancial markets.
liberal global governance.
From the perspective of the materialities of
Now the solution to interlinked global cri- everyday life, reducing ‘environmental pol-
ses no longer lay in fundamentally chang- icy’ to mere techno-managerial fi xes makes
ing consumption and production patterns, it far more difficult to avert global ecologi-
but in liberalising global trade and invest- cal and climate crises, as the politically and
ment flows. Trade as the new saint and the technologically mediated growth in the vol-
new saviour of development was supposed ume, scale and speed-up of production and
to raise all boats. According to the script consumption has far outpaced environmen-
of free market ideology, the liberalisation tal efficiency gains (Sonntag 2001). The shift
of investment flows was meant to generate to market-based instruments either transfers
funds for environmental improvements and some of the environmental costs of produc-
to reduce poverty. With the help of fi scal tion and consumption to the end user, that
policy incentives, environmental manage- is, the consumer (with poorer households
ment and new technologies, the environ- paying the largest share of cost relative to
mental mess would somehow be cleaned up. their income), or creates new virtual money
Of course, these policies designed to speed markets for pollution permits through glo-
up capital flows and turnover further inten- bal cap-and-trade systems, with no effect on
the real economy in terms of reducing global
1 Annan, K. (2001), Implementing Agenda 21. Report emissions. As pointed out in a UN Depart-
from the Secretary General to the ECOSOC, www. ment of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)
johannesburgsummit.org

policy note of 2009, the policy focus on fiscal world…nature, and the unruly masses,
incentives for green technologies and cap- particularly women of color in the north
and-trade measures will offload the costs of and south, are monitored and managed
dealing with climate change on to develop- as never before.
ing countries. Just like earlier end-of-pipe
policies, these new techno-financial strate- Current mainstream wisdom on climate
gies do not decouple economic growth from change is that new technologies and fi nan-
environmental pressures and continue to cial instruments will mitigate the conse-
transfer the risks and costs of ecological cri- quences, or fi x the problem. To be sure, glo-
ses on to households. Given historical gender bal feminist discourse has also been affected
divisions of labour and responsibility as well by the neo-liberal revolution and become an
as the exigencies of biological reproduction, avenue for the marketisation of social im-
women who provide caring work in formal aginaries and human interactions. Recently,
or informal markets or in their households free-market feminism, alpha-girls feminism
bear the greatest burden in making up for the or the feminist managerialism so visible in
environmental and social costs of neo-liberal the reorientation of gender mainstreaming
governance. The loss of existential security, from women’s rights agendas towards for-
and specifically the loss of means of liveli- mal equity – and technical anti-discrimi-
hood, food security and health as acutely ex- nation – politics have gained prominence.
perienced by poorer households and popula- Analogous with the dubious effects free
tions, as well as the intensification of work market environmentalism has had in reduc-
and claims on time and physical energy, exert ing the impacts of economic growth on the
enormous pressures on people’s capacities to environment, feminist managerialism has
live, and on the care economy or reproduc- not improved the quality of women’s lives,
tive economy, in particular in households nor has it slowed the intensification of new
in the global South. Not surprisingly Ter- forms of exploitation of bodies, which are
esa Brennan (2003) analysed globalisation in bombarded with toxins, forced to work
terms of the ‘terrors of everyday life’. long hours in flexible and insecure labour
markets, while all the costs of reproducing
people are reprivatised to households.
Environmentalism, feminism
and neo-liberal revolution In both cases, neither environmentalists nor
In her critique of global environmental feminists have abandoned the ideas of sus-
management, Ynestra King (1997) wrote tainability, justice and rights, but for both
that the end of 20th century involved: groups it has been increasingly difficult to
bring this language into global policy are-
...a massive renegotiation of power, nas. The old strategies of working from both
knowledge, and the ownership of life inside and outside were preempted when
from the molecular to the planetary. Fer- the discourse, for instance on poverty, shift-
tility, labor, ‘natural resources’ can all be ed from meeting basic needs towards the
rationalized and controlled…all part of technical Millennium Development Goals
the managed and manageable brave new (MDGs) in the late 1990s. One possibility

for strategic intervention is, therefore, to re- leged men and subsequently determined
cover old language and the memory of shifts by anonymous capital pursuing its own
in conceptual frameworks to challenge the reproduction. When the industrial revolu-
contemporary enclosure of feminist and en- tions relocated part of traditional women’s
vironmental discourse within the rational- housework to the market (making clothes,
ity of the market. There are various feminist cooking, healthcare, childcare, etc.), it was
and environmental stakes in challenging this always valued less monetarily than work
rationality not only in relation to economic signified as ‘male’. With the modernisa-
activities, but also to the extent that markets tion of patriarchy (Pateman 1987), women
have captured the politics of states, which now have access to markets on terms of be-
enforce neo-liberal policies and increasingly ing equally exploited with men, while their
operate according to the economic logic of responsibilities for care are intensified un-
the enterprise, where budgetary/macroeco- less they can afford to ’outsource’ it to other
nomic politics is ‘the last argument of the women in global care work-chains.
king’, the ultima ratio regum.2
This massive renegotiation of power and
The fi nancialisation of politics, including knowledge, while maintaining modernised
the politics of everyday life, entails the re- patriarchal structures intact in the domain of
production of patriarchal, gender, class and global economic, environmental and social
race relations in new guise. All human in- policy, coincided with political changes in
teractions and institutions are gendered – the status of human subjects. When markets
including markets. As Joan Scott (1987) puts become the key source of political rationality
it, gender is a primary signifier of power, (as Foucault argued in his 1979 lectures on
and gender relations are constitutive of all the birth of biopolitics), not only nature but
power relations. The first economics text- also human beings are remade and re-cate-
book in history, Xenophon’s (427-355 BC) gorised, no longer being subjects or citizens.
Oeconomicus (‘The Economist’), describes the From the perspective of markets and states,
good manager of the oikos (household and we become revenue-generating resources,
estate) as one who knows nature in order to disposable sources of discretionary income to
make the best use of it in order to enhance be cultivated and optimised for the market,
the value of all his possessions. The good or transformed into human waste. The state
manager arranges workers like soldiers in a no longer legitimises itself by taking care of
battle to plough the fields, and takes care of its citizens. Responsibilities for social repro-
commerce while the nameless wife attends duction are not shared, as they were in social-
to duties under the household roof, includ- ist or liberal welfare states, but are relocated
ing the management of slaves. What today to the households. The assumption is that
is seen as economic activity is based on the women’s time is infinitely elastic in provid-
same historically established gender divi- ing paid and unpaid work, turning women
sion of labour, time and money, with access into a buffer zone for rises in productivity,
to wealth and money controlled by privi- declining quality of jobs and for everything
else that is required in the speeded-up time of
the reproduction of capital.
2 This was the inscription on the guns of King Louis XIV.

Neo-liberal biopolitics optimises human sub- the market is not good for business. Now we
jects as economic units sufficient unto them- need to argue that this kind of business is not
selves, idealising those who can afford the good for people.
bill for all their needs, including healthcare,
children’s education and pensions; who have Last but not least, one of the salient features
sufficient disposable income to afford savings; of neo-liberalism is the so-called pragmatic
and who do not need systems of mutual social shift from discussing causes of social and
insurance. Neo-liberal biopolitics has its dark environmental misery and predicaments to
underside, the politics of death or necropoli- focusing instead on dealing with their ef-
tics, as Achille Mbembe (2003) put it, where fects (preempting the option of dealing with
the poor are left to die or are exploited to the causes). An example of this is the aban-
the verge of bare existence in this new slave donment of any debate on changes in con-
economy. As the expansion of credit markets sumption and production patterns that was
to the ‘sub-prime’ sector (with all its eugenic perceived as central to addressing the causes
connotations) shows, the poor are continu- of the global environmental crisis back in
ously accessed and processed for profit. As the days of Rio (chapter 4 of Agenda 21).
indeed is nature, a quest that includes new All the talk of emission volumes, emission
appetites for extraterrestrial resources, dan- reduction scenarios, estimates of mitigation
gerously coupled with new techno-political costs, focuses the climate change discourse
capacities for planetary enclosure. It is not on effects, while the in-depth causes of cli-
unlikely that these trends will be amplified mate change are removed from the agenda.
in the future. From the standpoint of criti- Analogous to earlier end-of-pipe policies,
cal social movements, this calls for strategic new techno-fiscal strategies do not decou-
interventions in the name of human agency ple economic growth from environmental
and universal indivisible human rights. The pressures and continue to transfer the risks
‘right to a healthy environment’ has now be- and costs of ecological crises to households,
come the right to live. To prevent the slip while the benefits of economic growth and
into necropolitics, the future of the present income from markets increasingly accrue to
– with its differential life chances for useful a small privileged group with economic and
neo-liberal subjects and for human waste, political resources.
and new scenarios of the future where the
spaceship earth is abandoned to rot – needs When looking at the climate crisis from
to be inserted into the social imaginary. En- the perspective of environmental integrity
vironmentalists and feminists have to take up and social reproduction, the major source
the role of Cassandras who challenge neo- of misery is revealed to be the unrelenting
liberal politics of truth, free market Muzak growth of pressures on both nature and hu-
and nihilism, with clear accounts of where man bodies. People need nature and nurture
this course is threatening to take us as hu- to live, and to live they have to produce and
man communities. For too long, while pur- to consume. In a capitalist society, the inter-
suing the strategies of change from inside, actions between nature and people are me-
NGOs have patiently argued that destroying diated by money. The currently ruling form
the environment or excluding women from of money (fi nancial capital) is driven by the

compulsion to reproduce itself. As Teresa From this perspective, and taking climate
Brennan (2000) points out in her theory of change seriously, what is at stake is to
energetics, the time of reproduction of liv- shift the language of the debate from ef-
ing nature (human and non-human) is on a fects (emissions) to causes (the way virtual
collision course with the time of reproduc- and productive economies are functioning
tion of capital. Following and reworking the now), and to reorganise markets, in particu-
arguments of Karl Marx, she argues that the lar to slow down the flow of money through
accumulation of capital requires the input the economy. With the transaction time of
of living nature (human and non-human) global money markets now reduced to mil-
into products and services. As ‘raw materi- liseconds, market growth dependent on its
als’, nature and human labour are sources of further speed-up and expansion has disas-
energy and sources of surplus value. Both la- trous consequences, as the recent fi nancial
bour and nature give more than they cost. Capital crisis shows. To challenge these powerful
does not pay the costs of the reproduction trends, we need to socialise and ‘green’ mar-
of people, but transfers these costs to house- kets. Markets have always existed as a form
holds (to the care economy, as some femi- of exchange. The problem is how markets
nists would say). Nor does capital pay for the are constructed and regulated, in particu-
reproduction of nature (under substitution lar in the current lethal regulatory form of
laws), unless forced to do so. neo-liberal governance where all social and
ecological costs are externalised to house-
The real costs of nature are always de- holds, with disastrous effects for the weakest
ferred...Speed of acquisition and spatial social groups. Socialising markets implies
expansion increase pressures on living recapturing the notion of the market as a
nature...In the event that natural proc- form of exchange, where costs of human
esses of reproduction cannot be speeded and environmental reproduction are shared.
up, the cost of natural reproduction has This is where feminist agendas of securing
to be reduced to make up for the drag on the integrity of social reproduction and en-
exchange-value. (Brennan 2003: 128) vironmental agendas of environmental sus-
tainability coalesce.

Literature
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nity. Ground for a New Economy. London: tract’, in Patemen, C., Disorder of Women.
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Kyoto’s ‘flexible mechanisms’ and
the right to pollute the air 1
Achim Brunnengräber
The current fi nancial and economic crises
are generating pressures towards the regula-
tion of the global capitalist economy, but the
much-heralded strategies for reform remain
mere piecework and seem to have reached
their limits long before the crisis has run its
course. After all, their primary focus is on
the revitalisation of the banking and trade
sectors, not on global environmental issues.
The relapse suffered by Angela Merkel –
once hailed as the ‘climate chancellor’, now
considered once again a run-of-the-mill car
and industry chancellor – shows that during
a crisis, the environment has no lobby. To
be sure, environmental organisations, green Achim Brunnengräber is at the
(wings of ) parties, engaged scientists and Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science,
international environmental and develop- Free University, Berlin. His research
ment NGOs issue regular reminders about areas are environmental governance,
the United Nations Framework Convention energy policy, climate change policy and
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the politics, vulnerability and adaptation.
Kyoto Protocol. But that, too, is symptom-
atic of the problem: the crisis has not led to
a critique of market-based instruments, but
rather to an ever more desperate attempt to
cling to them, in spite of all their weakness-
es, for beyond them there seems to be noth-
ing but political wilderness. This makes a
critique of the political economy of climate
change all the more important.1
1 For a more detailed exposition of this argument cf.,

Brunnengräber (2009), Die politische Ökonomie des
Klimawandels.

The Kyoto Protocol is a set of political rules get the incentives right.2 We are witnessing
for the economic management of a capitalist the emergence of a climate neo-liberalism,
crisis phenomenon, which had already been which may very well energise some national
on the agenda long before the fi nancial crisis economies, but will certainly not protect
– at least since the UN Conference on En- the climate.
vironment and Development in Rio de Ja-
neiro in 1992. The third Conference of the
Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in Kyoto in
Climate change and
1997 agreed on a path towards the regula- global constitutionalism
tion of the crisis. Ecological necessities such At the international level, governments have
as reducing the use of fossil fuels, the expan- waived such options as taxes, imposing bans
sion of renewable energies, as well as new on certain substances or reducing ecologi-
concepts of mobility and new lifestyles were cally damaging subsidies. Dominant actors
largely ignored. Powerful economic interests within these governments, as well as private
were pushing for market-based instruments businesses and international NGOs (partici-
and insisted that these should not interfere pating in the process in a kind of conflict-
with growth targets or economic competi- ual cooperation) have largely enforced the
tiveness. As a result, the mechanisms con- use of economic instruments in the interna-
tained in the Kyoto Protocol will not make tional governance of climate change. When
it possible ‘to reduce emissions more quickly governments guarantee rights to pollute by
than the rhythm of economic growth would emitting CO2, they develop a specific steer-
allow’, argues Enrique Leff (2002: 102). ing mechanism by means of which they cre-
ate the framework for economic actors to
At the same time, the Kyoto Protocol was regulate themselves. By doing so, they abdi-
also the starting point for the emergence of cate their responsibility for the general good
an international regime of resource man- and, in this case, for the environment. Gov-
agement that would soon open up new ernments only point the self-regulating mar-
business opportunities. Within the context kets in one particular direction, primarily
of international climate governance, eco- in order to secure the later surveillance and
nomic processes have taken on a life of their control of newly institutionalised property
own and now reach far beyond the protocol rights, thereby reducing transaction costs. In
as such. The crisis is seen not as a systemic the context of ‘global constitutionalism’ (Gill
crisis of capitalism, but as an opportunity: 2000), the contractual international regula-
a ‘Green New Deal’ or a ‘Global Green tion of ‘rights to pollute’ is thus the precondi-
Recovery’ (Edenhofer/Stern 2009; cf., also tion for the creation of new markets.
Friedman 2008) is meant to create jobs, For companies, this implies the emergence of
reenergise the global economic system and
protect the climate. A ‘green capitalism’ is 2 According to Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber of the Pots-
seen as a significant source of potential tech- damer Institut für Klimafolgenforschung, protecting
the climate will lead to a ‘third industrial revolution’
nological innovations, if only governments
due to the technological innovations it will induce
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 8 November 2005).

new criteria of competitiveness, which affect fundamentally the contradictions cannot be
the conditions for the valorisation of capital, excised, the governance of climate change
their investment and innovation strategies remains a fragile construct (Brunnengräber
and their choice of location and technol- 2007).
ogy. The precondition for this is the ability
to render the natural environment in mon-
etary values. Nature the way that we perceive
Carbon trading, or the
it does not exist per se, but is subordinated valorisation of nature
to the dominant socioeconomic rationality. The creation of a market for tradable CO2
This rationality also shapes the politics of cli- emissions is seen as a significant step towards
mate change: rather than ethical questions, it the solution of the global climate crisis. By
is questions about the costs of climate change virtue of being tradable, CO2 certificates
and of instruments for companies, states and are meant to contribute to the reduction
societies that determine the dominant dis- of greenhouse gas emissions in the places
course. ‘If we do not take any steps to pro- where such reductions are cheapest. The
tect the climate’, says Claudia Kemfert of the cap that limits the amount of certificates is
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik, ‘by intended to contribute to the realisation of
2100 we will be faced with global climate greenhouse gas reduction targets. This trade
change-related damages of up to 20 trillion in emission rights follows an economic logic
US$’ (2005: 1). Nicholas Stern, former chief that is fundamentally and widely accepted.
economist at the World Bank, has calcu- However, so far experiences with this in-
lated that a further increase in greenhouse strument, both in Germany and the wider
gas (GHG) emissions could lead to up to 20 EU, have been rather sobering, even if the
per cent being lopped off the global GDP by impacts of carbon trading have not been
2050. These kinds of calculations are prima- only negative for German industry. Al-
rily intended to make environmental prob- though emission rights were given away for
lems fit into economic discourses. free in the fi rst trading period, energy com-
panies simply added their theoretical costs to
At the same time, the instruments in the the price of energy (windfall profits). Accord-
Kyoto Protocol cement the separation of ing to the German ministry of the environ-
international climate change politics from ment, in 2005 this practice resulted in the
other international institutions and organi- companies raking in profits of between € 6
sations. In many ways, the treaties aiming for and € 8 billion at the expense of their cus-
economic growth and the liberalisation of tomers (Tagesspiegel, 16 May 2006).
trade in goods and services contained within
the World Trade Organization (WTO) con- In the EU, some 9,400 energy producers and
tradict the goal of the Kyoto Protocol. The industrial facilities require a certificate for
discursive-ideological as well as institutional each ton of CO2 emitted. However, given
separation of a global climate problem and fos- that the EU’s member states were rather
sil fuel (in-)security enacts a (temporary) rap- generous in their distribution of about 1,829
prochement between the economy and the million tons of emission rights, industry’s
environment (Altvater 2008). But because real requirements were exceeded by 44 mil-

lion tons in 2005. In May 2006, the price of tion whose material (physical-chemical) ef-
these emission rights accordingly collapsed fect on the atmosphere becomes obscured.
from € 30 per ton to less than € 10, ‘an em-
barrassing success for the environment’, a Protecting the climate thus becomes ‘a
German newspaper commented (die taz, 16 matter for speculators’ who strive for
May 2006). From 2008 to 2009, the price rents and profits from fi nancial transac-
of certificates that the KFW Bankengruppe tions, while not being at all interested in
could sell for the German government had climate change (Altvater 2008: 154).
crashed by 60 per cent. At EXX, the energy
exchange in Leipzig, they were temporar- Another problem is the participation of the
ily available for less than € 8 (cf., www.exx. Central and Eastern European (CEE) coun-
com for an evaluation of the fi rst trading pe- tries in the emissions trading system. The
riod cf., DEHSt 2009). In the second trad- agreement in Kyoto was that Russia and
ing period (2008-12), the number of CO2 Ukraine would, by 2012, merely have to sta-
certificates that were distributed was some- bilise their emissions as measured against the
what reduced as a result of pressure from the baseline of 1990. But the breakdown of their
European Commission. Now, however, the economies generated massive real reductions
economic crisis and the ensuing reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, such that today
in the CO2 emissions of many companies both countries can sell their surplus emission
are leading to a drop in demand for the cer- rights on the future market for certificates.
tificates, which in turn reduces their price. Even in the absence of any further measures
to achieve reductions, Russia’s emissions in
But the mechanism at the heart of the Kyoto 2020 would most likely still be some 20 per
Protocol can only work efficiently if certifi- cent lower than those of 1990. The CEE
cates are scarce and therefore expensive. If countries will thus be able to sell significant
they are too cheap, they do not generate amounts of ‘excess’ emission rights on the
pressure towards reducing emissions and market, although these certificates will not
their steering effect remains limited (cf., be based on any real emission reductions.
Brouns/Witt 2008). In addition, prices for Many describe the possibility that govern-
certificates have been extremely volatile, ments and companies will use these cer-
highly dependent on the ups and downs of tificates to effectively buy themselves out of
the business cycle and the vagaries of specu- their responsibility to reduce emissions as the
lation. So far, the erratic movements of the production of ‘hot air’. The problem might
price of certificates have more or less negat- only deepen once the developing and new-
ed the hoped-for regulatory effects (Hollain ly industrialised countries participate in the
2009). Carbon trading is thus an instrument global carbon-trading market. For reasons of
of dubious value that cannot guarantee a re- justice, these countries are granted the right
duction in greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, to increase emissions in order to close gaps in
it is even doubtful whether the certificates economic development and progress (cf., the
that are being traded on the exchanges actu- article in this journal by Eduardo Gudynas).
ally still represent real emissions, or whether The quandary is that the emission allowances
they have become mere objects of specula- they are granted can be unrealistically high.

A reduction of absolute emissions in the in- credited towards the investing government
dustrialised countries, as formulated in the or company and deducted from their re-
Kyoto Protocol, seems hardly realistic against spective emission reduction targets. The ar-
this backdrop since additional emission cer- gument is that, from a global point of view,
tificates are so easy to come by. Even the it is irrelevant where exactly greenhouse gas
German Bundesverband Emissionshandel emissions are reduced. Thus, protecting the
und Klimaschutz has to admit that the trade climate is made possible not only cheaply
in CO2 certificates has so far ‘inhibited rather and efficiently but also profitably.
than strengthened the transformation of the
energy sector towards structures that are less Growth prospects for CDM projects are sig-
dependent on emissions’. Renewable energies nificant. In June 2006, 190 projects were reg-
have not benefited from the emissions trade istered and 860 were in preparation. By early
either. It is not merely teething problems that 2009, 1,400 projects had been registered and
are preventing an anti-fossilistic transforma- 4,600 projects were in preparation (see http://
tion, but political and economic constraints, cd4cdm.org for current numbers). The fre-
interests and power relations. The emissions quently high expectations for CDM projects
trade functions as a creative form of CO2 ac- were often disappointed, however. In or-
counting that simply allows business as usual der for investments in emission reductions
to continue. This might explain the ‘unprec- to qualify as CDM projects, they have not
edented lack of critique vis-à-vis the funda- only to make a contribution to sustainable
mental flaws of emissions trade’, as Valentin development but also fulfi l the criterion of
Hollain puts it (2009: 25). additionality. In order to qualify for the CDM,
projects have to prove that they would indeed
generate additional emissions reductions in
Flexibility through loopholes: The their host country. Measures that would also
Clean Development Mechanism have been taken in the absence of the CDM
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (such as the construction of a hydroelectric
opens yet another way for the governments power station that was planned before the
and companies of industrialised countries existence of the CDM) are not eligible under
to meet their emission reduction targets by the Kyoto agreement. One particular goal of
reducing emissions not in their own but in CDM is also to support ‘host countries’ on
developing and newly industrialised coun- their path to more sustainable (cleaner) devel-
tries. The CDM effectively allows CO2 opment by way of technology transfer.
reductions to be ‘exported’ to the global
South, while emissions in the industrialised Primarily, however, CDM helps industrial-
nations remain constant or even increase, ised nations and their companies to avoid
depending on how many CERs (Certified having to really reduce their emissions at
Emissions Reductions) are fed into domestic home. The actual point of the instrument is
systems. Common examples include refor- to reduce the costs of protecting the climate
estation projects or the construction of wind by implementing measures where expenses
turbines and power plants. The emissions are low and profits high (Witt/Moritz 2008).
saved or captured by such projects are then The additionality and actual contribution to

sustainable development that many CDM demand support from industrialised na-
projects make is also in question. One study tions. The latter should carry the ‘new and
reveals that 40 per cent of the CDM projects additional’ costs3. Three global financial
registered before summer 2007 did not meet funds have been established to meet these
the criterion of additionality (Schneider demands: 1) The so-called Special Climate
2007). This means that ‘false certificates’ Change Fund (SCCF) with the goal of
reach the EU, eventually leading to a glo- promoting development in the energy and
bal increase in CO2 emissions. A particularly transport sectors. By March 2008, the fund
strong critique is directed towards projects had received about US$ 90 million in volun-
to eliminate or dispose of partly halogen- tary contributions (GEF 2008); 2) the Least
ated hydrocarbons (HFCs) and laughing Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) pro-
gas (N2O) in China, India and Brazil. More vides fi nancial aid for the implementation
than one-third of the tradable certificates of the most important adjustment measures
derive from these so-called ‘end-of-pipe’ and serves only LDCs. Altogether, US$ 170
technologies. The gas that forms as a residue million had been paid voluntarily into the
in the production of coolants has very high fund by March 2008; and 3) the Adaptation
global warming potential and is an extreme Fund (AF), whose aim it is to strengthen
climate killer. By burning it, emission cer- concrete adjustment measures and projects.
tificates can be earned fast and at low cost. This fund is fi nanced by a mandatory 2 per
cent tariff on each CER generated by CDM
The CDM is biased in favour of large projects. Measured against current stimulus
projects and tends to ignore smaller ones packages, these sums are hardly more than
with relatively higher costs. Over 90 per ‘peanuts’. Furthermore, the projects most
cent of the CERs come from India, China, likely to be funded are those that open up
South Korea and Brazil. However, espe- new market opportunities for the technolo-
cially Least Developed Countries (LDCs) gies produced by industrialised countries.
often lack the institutional infrastructure
for CDM projects. Likewise, few CDM The countries most affected by climate change
investments reach rural areas. The lasting are those of the global South – countries that
transformation of energy systems and the are extremely poor by socioeconomic stand-
extension of decentralised renewable supply ards. The consequences of climate change
systems are goals of the CDM only on pa- will spawn and intensify conflicts over access
per. Market-based mechanisms invest where to resources such as water or arable land (Un-
it is cheapest. Costlier efforts to protect the müßig/Cramer 2008, WBGU 2007). Con-
climate – efforts that demand strong invest- sidering the adjustment measures and financ-
ment in sustainable technologies – are ne- ing programmes employed so far, there exists
glected (CDMWatch 2004). reasonable concern that these are not based
on the needs of the most vulnerable popula-
tions, but rather determined by other inter-
Peanuts for adjustment measures
When it comes to climate protection and
adjustment measures, the LDCs commonly 3 Art. 4.3. and 4.4., UNFCCC, United Nations
(1992).

ests. This would seem to be confirmed by the concerns were damages to objects or serv-
exclusion of local actors from the planning ices already insured. The key question was
stages of national adjustment strategies and risk assessment. The costs likely to be caused
by the apparent economic and technological by climate change were factored into prog-
prioritisations (Dietz/Scholz 2008). noses of estimated future damages. The re-
insurance companies were among the very
few players in the private sector to demand
Hot investment climate far-reaching reductions in greenhouse gas
In industrialised countries, climate change emissions and adaptation measures as soon
has long been of economic importance. In- as climate change politics became an inter-
ternational regulations create a booming national issue. They have also added their
market of unforeseen possibilities. Consult- own studies to relevant discussions.
ing firms are founded that advise the industry
in its approach to emissions trading, while Recently, the market opportunities created
banks and brokerage houses create their own by the climate change debate have become
boards to manage the trade. On the stock ever more obvious. Insurers offer compre-
market, new types of financial instrument hensive policies, from covering your own
are developed that take into account compa- home against storm floods to covering entire
nies’ efforts to reduce their climate footprint. tourist regions against potential income loss
Meanwhile, companies develop programmes as a consequence of climate change. Take,
that allow offsetting emissions caused by in- for example, the case of coral reef bleaching.
ternational travel by way of special taxes. The Ernst Rauch writes:
purchase of emission certificates for individu-
als is managed by initiatives like MyClimate As concentrations of climate gases soar, so
or climepartner (www.myclimate.org, www. do the demands upon the insurance indus-
climatepartner.com). Evaluation services as- try: without adequate primary insurance
sess companies’ CO2 emissions and counsel rates, stable reinsurance capacity will no
on reduction possibilities. International agen- longer be possible. The solution lies in risky
cies direct climate protection programmes joint ventures between primary and sec-
towards developing countries, and internet ondary insurance companies and the capital
firms offer emission-free communication market. (www.munichre.com, downloaded
platforms. In addition, there are the reports 15 September 2006)
and surveys from the field of economics that
supplement and rationalise the process.4
Climate change has been on the agenda
Conclusion: multiple crises?
of reinsurance companies such as Munich Destructive modes of production as well
Re and Swiss Re since the 1970s. They are as resource-intensive consumer habits and
mainly affected by the increasing costs of mobility needs are being defended. Neo-
natural catastrophes. Early on, their main liberal policies would not be successful if
they were not able to transform the climate
4 Cf. ‘Zum Geschäft mit der Erwärmung’, Der Spiegel change debate into new market opportuni-
32/2005, and ‘Das Portal zum Emissionshandel und ties. The ‘flexible mechanisms’ are neither
Klimaschutz’, www.co2-handel.de.

aimed at reducing growth nor towards en- ialised, developing. We can hardly expect
ergy or development policies. No measures upcoming negotiations and conferences on
are introduced that increase the production climate change to change this.
of renewable energies, or contribute to the
decentralisation of energy structures. The The concept of a Green New Deal does to
focus lies instead on the societal use and val- some degree respond to criticism of the cli-
orisation of nature, as well as on the enor- mate policies we have seen to date, but it
mous innovation potential of the climate remains very vague as far as future meas-
change label for the economy. The regula- ures are concerned. So far, no response to
tion of climate governance by the market is the ever-increasing destructive consump-
the result of special interest lobbyism, con- tion of resources has been found. The idea
tributing to the stabilisation of hegemonic of sustainability, celebrated in 1992, has
capitalist structures and exploiting climate failed (Park et al. 2008). Technological ap-
protection for profits made in newly created proaches, insurance policies and adjustment
(fi nancial) markets. The empirically evident measures fit smoothly into the ambitions for
difficulties of administering the mechanisms growth and market efficiency. They follow
of the Kyoto Protocol thus form a veil be- the same logic that has been responsible for
hind which the consolidation of a political the destructive ecological effects of indus-
economy of climate change and the economisation trialisation. In the end, it is always easier to
of nature proceed apace. approve economic stimulus packages that
cosmetically modify existing structures
This raises the question of whether the in- than strive for fundamental transformations
ternational climate regime is in fact the right that challenge a paradigm of growth which
institution to combat climate change is both ecologically unsustainable and so-
Twelve years after signing the Kyoto agree- cially unjust.
ment (1997) and 17 years after signing the
Framework Convention on Climate Change Translated from German
(1992), it should be obvious that the effects by Gabriel Kuhn.
of these policies are not only incredibly
slow, but also that they have not achieved
their desired outcomes. Presently, the fi nan-
cial crisis and economic recession make low
energy prices, the preservation of jobs and
national competitiveness more important
than the reduction of emissions caused by
production and consumption. This goes for
all countries: industrialised, newly industr-

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Climate change and capitalism’s
ecological fix in Latin America
Eduardo Gudynas
The issue of climate change has recently ac-

quired great prominence in South America.
It has received considerable coverage in the
mainstream media, been the object of many
citizen-led campaigns and has at least been
discursively acknowledged by governments
and some companies. Yet despite this grow-
ing presence in public debate, the question
is whether the proposals that have been cir-
culated so far are really aimed at devising
effective measures to tackle climate change.
The analysis in the present text shows that

the discourses of all South American gov-
ernments today, while not denying the
challenge of climate change, present it in a Eduardo Gudynas is director of the
distorted way. Climate change is thus ren- Latin American Center on Social Ecology
dered as functional for a process of com- (CLAES), a think tank on sustainable
modification of nature and a reorientation development based in Uruguay.
of environmental policy. Even under left-
wing governments, South America is wit-
nessing the redeployment of variations on
the theme of faith in progress through the varied, and range from possible losses in
appropriation of nature, thus preventing the agricultural production, the disappearance
substantive agreements that would be neces- of the Andean ice fields, coastline changes,
sary to confront climate change. declines in tourism or the effects of an in-
crease in natural disasters. Their emphases,
too, are very diverse, from enraged speechi-
A distorted perspective on climate change fying to the establishment of scientific com-
All the governments of South America are mittees and the promotion of campaigns.
worried about climate change. The reasons are Concomitantly, the conventional media

recycle reports on the subject, almost all of the official reports by various South Ameri-
which, however, originate in industrialised can countries), or relativised according to
countries: the ones that are more regularly evaluations in proportion to surface or popu-
cited come from the Northern hemisphere, lation. Despite their global responsibility,
and thus obviously express the problems and many Southern countries oppose accept-
priorities of richer countries. ing any substantive commitments to reduce
emissions on the grounds that they do not
It is thus that, step by step, a certain idea want to be tied to reduction goals that might
of climate change has spread across South hinder their development. But they also, by
America, wherein the following elements are emphasising their condition of victimhood,
central: emphasis on the responsibility of in- insist that the fight against climate change
dustrialised nations as a way of deferring and must be financed and supported with tech-
avoiding commitment; identification of emis- nology transfers from industrialised nations.
sions by sectors such as industry and trans- Their own responsibilities – which, however
port as the main culprits; and the view that ‘differentiated’, are global nonetheless – dis-
South American countries would be, above appear. Their own initiatives remain limited,
all, ‘victims’. However much truth there is in and South American countries contribute to
each of these elements, the whole set leads to the eternal horse-trading and bargaining in
distorted positions, allowing South Ameri- international negotiations concerning the
can countries to engage in media campaigns money that is expected in order to initiate
while avoiding both debate and concrete ac- national measures against climate change.
tion to tackle the roots of the problem.
Correspondingly, the way in which these
To be sure, a much greater responsibility falls governments have begun to take action on
on industrialised countries, particularly if the climate change accentuates other deforma-
question is considered from a historical per- tions. While recognising problems of vul-
spective. However, we must also admit that nerability, which are serious and urgent, their
several Southern countries have become huge mitigation campaigns are focused on reduc-
greenhouse gas emitters, sometimes at levels ing emissions in sectors such as transport, in-
higher than developed nations. For instance, dustry and electricity generation. On these
if we consider total emissions (excluding land- fronts, their actions are generally modest and
use changes), Brazil ranks 7th, ahead of coun- narrow, and usually exhaust themselves in
tries such as Germany and Canada; Mexico is programmes to foster the use of energy-sav-
11th (ahead of Italy and France) and Argen- ing light bulbs, fi lters in some factory chim-
tina, 25th (ahead of The Netherlands).1 neys and praising hybrid cars. Whatever their
true efficacy, in the end these programmes
The volume of current emissions is some- matter because of the support they garner in
times minimised, sometimes hidden (this the form of public opinion. Besides, this kind
partly explains the delayed presentation of of initiative is in line with the dominant mes-
sage in the media, where the stress is always
1 Emission figures for 2005, based on the Climate on industrial or transport emissions.
Analysis Indicators Tool – CAIT database, World
Resources Institute.

The problem is that this does not corre- marketing campaigns around themes such as
spond to South American reality. A greater light bulbs. In this way, the most urgent and
proportion of emissions in the energy sec- politically most costly themes, such as agri-
tor is typical of rich countries. For instance, cultural policy, go undiscussed. This stance
transport and industry generate about 90 per is, nevertheless, instrumental in strengthen-
cent of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU. ing their international bargaining positions
It is for this reason that these are the sectors while carrying on with the present models
targeted by such countries. of development.
The situation in South America, however, is

very different: the most substantial portion
The commodification of nature
of greenhouse gas emissions (75.2 per cent) The persistence of conventional develop-
comes from agriculture and land-use chang- ment strategies is one of the main causes of
es. Industry, transport and the like represent the resistance to a climate change agenda in
23.6 per cent of emissions of CO2 equiva- South America. The dominant model is still
lents.2 Agriculture, land-use change and one based on the appropriation of nature and
forestry represent 83 per cent of total emis- on export-led growth. Even the so-called
sions in Brazil, almost 86 per cent in Peru progressive governments (Argentina, Bo-
and 91 per cent in Bolivia. It is obvious that livia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uru-
this situation is different from what many as- guay and Venezuela) have been resurrecting
sume. This situation exposes the contradic- a particular version of an ideology of progress
tions of, for example, Brazil, which has be- – according to which, these countries possess
come a great global emitter, but resists taking enormous natural resources and ample poten-
substantial measures, demands compensation tial for ecological buffering, and so the gov-
and transfers while at the same time present- ernments take it as their mandate to make the
ing itself as a new global power. most of this wealth. The high price of com-
The gravest and most urgent problems for modities in recent years has amplified this
climate change in South America relate to tendency, and many governments thought it
agricultural policy, land use and exports of essential to take advantage of these opportu-
agrifoods. The agenda of political debate and nities in the global economy to further their
the most urgent measures must turn to these foreign trade. To that end, they refused, and
questions, and in particular to urgent issues are still refusing, any idea of environmental
such as deforestation, land reform and the ex- conditions or restrictions, although now the
pansion of export monocultures such as soy. justification is the global crisis that has nega-
Yet this nexus does not receive the attention tively impacted economic expansion.
it deserves from the South American public:
on the contrary, it is repeatedly avoided by The distortion of the climate-change agen-
governments whose mitigation plans are in- da enables governments to evade a deeper
adequate and whose goals are vague. What is debate on the central ideas of this style of
more, they take advantage of this distortion development, which are central in the for-
in the debate on climate change by organising mulation of land-use and agriculture poli-
cies. But this same distortion means that
2 Data for the year 2000. CAIT database, World Re- some conventional actions can be present-
sources Institute.

ed as having an environmental purpose. A cates of the incorporation of environmental
typical case is the agro-fuel programme in goods and services into the WTO regime.
Brazil, greenwashed as a fight against an
oil-based civilisation, when in fact it con- Other actors operate in the same way. Among
stitutes a deepening of the expansion of soy the so-called conservation BINGOs (big in-
and sugarcane monocultures in support of ternational NGOs), for example, market-
exporting agribusiness, with serious social based mechanisms such as carbon trading are
and environmental impacts. seen as key in responding to the challenge of
climate change – extending all the way to
Thus nature is turned into a basket of com- extreme cases such as Conservation Inter-
modities: environmental goods and serv- national’s proposal regarding the Amazon,
ices replace ecosystems, and natural capital whereby protected areas should self-finance
comes to express the environment’s mon- themselves by way of the sale of environmen-
etary value. This kind of approach is func- tal services and goods, or carbon capture, in
tional to the trade in natural resources, and global markets (Killeen 2007). This is an ex-
so does not contradict the present version of tremely pessimistic position, which assumes
the ideology of progress. incapable states and the forsaking of any idea
of transforming global capitalism, and ac-
This emphasis is not new, and is part of the cepts the destruction of the greater part of
heritage of the neo-liberal years, but it has the rainforest, while all that is hoped for is to
also been promoted by South American gov- salvage the odd protected area by including it
ernments. One should remember the Rio+10 in the very commercial networks that cause
summit in South Africa in 2002 where vari- environmental destruction.
ous Latin American countries, led by Brazil,
insisted on the idea of promoting the com- Along the same lines, the recent ECLAC
mercialisation of their own biodiversity and (Economic Commission for Latin America
ecosystemic functions as if they were but one and the Caribbean) report on international
commodity among others. This explains the trade, insofar as it even acknowledges the
present insistence on the part of various pro- importance of climate change, also calls for
gressive governments on arriving at agree- resistance to green forms of trade protec-
ments on environmental goods and services tionism. More importantly, this proposal
at the World Trade Organization (WTO). demonstrates other aspects of this distor-
tion, since national or local environmental
In the framework of the commodification of problems vanish from the agenda. Environ-
nature, the environment is broken up into mental impacts that range from the loss of
commodities to be inserted into productive biodiversity to urban contamination are not
processes. As a consequence, the components adequately considered; the actions to con-
of ecosystems – its fauna and flora, or even their front them are emptied of meaning; envi-
genes, ecological cycles, etc. – are converted ronmental institutions are even more frag-
into commodities that are subject to trade laws ile; and there are multiple problems with
and can have owners and an economic value. enforcement. Much is said about environ-
Countries like Brazil and Argentina, for ex- mental questions, but from a distorted per-
ample, are among the most energetic advo- spective, while a parallel weakening of na-

tional and local environmental governance livian president, Evo Morales, has recently
in South America takes place. challenged environmental organisations and
even local communities that oppose oil ex-
ploration thus: ‘What are we to live off ?’ he
The ecological fix for capitalism asks. Along the same lines, support for a tra-
This distorted perspective on climate change, ditional style of material development can
and the advancing commodification of na- be found in old social movements, such as
ture even in times of global crisis, are due trade unions with an industrial, urban base.
to the fact that we are witnessing a sort of
‘ecological fix’ for capitalism. This new ver- In this context, the social policies charac-
sion is different from the programme pushed teristic of progressive governments remain
in the framework of the neo-liberal reforms targeted at specific social groups and com-
of the 1980 and 1990s, since today there is pensate for the negative effects of this very
acknowledgment of the problems with those developmentalist strategy of the commodi-
positions, a greater role for the state is envi- fication of nature. Environmental questions
sioned and social programmes are to remain are engaged at a surface level, usually taking
in place. the form of marketing campaigns, but the in-
sistence is still that environmental regulation
Yet there has been no progress in develop- would slow economic growth and represent
ing a substantive critique of the economic a risk to development itself. As a result, only a
order, of the excessive emphasis on the ap- superficial environmental agenda is accepted,
propriation of nature or the logic of progress or one that effectively incorporates actions
and economic growth. The progressive or that are functional to economic growth and a
left-wing governments of South America relationship to the global economy that relies
have rectified some of the extremes of the on the export of primary commodities. This
old politics, especially in the social arena, explains the distortions of the debate on cli-
and this is no small matter. But they have, mate change and the resistance to discussing,
nevertheless maintained the same style of for instance, the role of emissions originating
development as natural resource-exporting from agriculture and land use.
countries. What is more, in some of these
governments the state acts to facilitate the Since this style of development now has a
intensified use of natural resources, the ex- social and environmental face, it generates
port of primary commodities and the attrac- the illusion of a ‘benign capitalism’. The
tion of foreign investment: directly, through fundamentals of its functioning go unques-
state enterprises, such as national oil compa- tioned, as do those of the commodification
nies, as in the case of Bolivia or Venezuela, of nature or the supporting role of social
or indirectly, as in the plans to attract large- programmes. Instead, there are measures of
scale mining investment in Ecuador. reparation and compensation, and even the
acceptance of another kind of globalisation,
For the said governments, the importance of with greater state regulation (a good exam-
the state as a new promoter of the appropria- ple would be the ‘capitalism 3.0’ proposal of
tion of nature is clear. For example, the Bo- economist Dani Rodrik).

Targeted poverty-alleviation programmes are itself at the centre of the debate, and particu-
very important in emergency situations, but larly its goal of achieving economic growth
when they become permanent they dampen through the export of primary commodi-
the most acute effects of this capitalism and ties. The ‘solutions’ that beckon with the
pacify social unrest. Governments find polit- commodification of nature are not enough
ical legitimacy and so prevent the discussion to tackle national environmental problems,
of their mode of appropriation of nature and let alone global ones. Measures such as the
their international insertion based on natu- creation of international carbon markets are
ral resources. The examples above show how mere illusions of supposedly effective alter-
governments, several big NGOs and signifi- natives, when in fact they do nothing but
cant sectors of academia are complicit in this. exacerbate the problems. If there is no radi-
The degradation of the environment is hid- cal change in this kind of relationship, eve-
den, made invisible. However much recogni- rything points to the persistence of sluggish
tion of ecological effects there may be, the ar- international negotiations that will repeat-
gument is that they are the inevitable costs of edly avoid real commitments to tackle the
leaving underdevelopment behind. Not only root causes of climate change.
that, but the intensification of the commodi-
fication of nature is presented as a solution to Translated from Spanish
the existing problems. by Rodrigo Nunes.
Climate change and post-

material development Literature
A radical shift in international negotiations Acosta, A., E. Gudynas, E. Martínez, and
on climate change requires another kind of J.H. Vogel (2009), Leaving the Oil in the
leadership from South American countries. Ground: A Political, Economic, and Eco-
It is necessary to break with the ideology of logical Initiative in the Ecuadorian Ama-
progress and to move towards post-material zon. Americas Program Policy Report.
development. To the extent that political de- Washington, DC: Center for International
bate in South America is today richer and Policy, 13 August.
more diversified, it is possible to move for-
ward with this agenda. For example, the ECLAC (2009), Panorama de la inserción
proposal for post-oil development in Ecua- internacional de América Latina y el Caribe
dor, including a moratorium on oil drilling 2008-2009. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL.
in the Yasuní region (Acosta et al., 2009), is
a very important intervention. In the same Killeen, T.J. (2007), ‘Una Tormenta Per-
way, we need to discuss urgently policies fecta en la Amazonia. Desarrollo y conser-
regarding agriculture, cattle farming and vación en el contexto de la Iniciativa para la
forestry, and generally come up with a new Integración de la Infraestructura Regional
design for rural development. Sudamericana (IIRSA)’, Advances in Applied
Biodiversity Science, No. 7, Conservation In-
In this task, it is necessary to put the essence ternational.
of contemporary Latin American capitalism

The deadly triad:
Climate change, free trade and capitalism
Walden Bello
The way out of the global recession, it is al-

leged by figures ranging from Gordon Brown
to Pascal Lamy, is by expanding global trade,
and the key to this is concluding the stalled
Doha Round of trade negotiations under
the World Trade Organization (WTO). But
there is something surreal about this argu-
ment. Faced with the looming spectre of cli-
mate change, the trade negotiations in Ge-
neva amount to little more than arguing over Walden Bello is a member of the House of
the arrangement of deck chairs while the Ti- Representatives of the Philippines, president of
tanic is sinking. Indeed, one of the most im- the Freedom from Debt Coalition and senior
portant steps in the struggle to come up with analyst at the Bangkok-based research and
a viable strategy to deal with climate change advocacy institute, Focus on the Global South.
would be to derail the Doha Round. He is the author of 25 books, the latest of which
is The Food Wars (London: Verso, 2009).
Global trade: deeply dysfunctional
Global trade functions by virtue of a trans- From the point of view of environmental
port system that is heavily dependent on fos- sustainability, global trade has become ever
sil fuels. It is estimated that about 60 per cent more dysfunctional. Take agricultural trade.
of the world’s use of oil goes to transporta- As Daniel Imhoff has pointed out, ‘the aver-
tion activities, which are more than 95 per age food item journeys 1,300 miles before
cent dependent on fossil fuels. A study by the becoming part of a meal’.2 Long-distance
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and travel contributes to the absurd situation
Development (OECD) estimated that the wherein ‘ten calories of energy are required
global transport sector accounts for 20-25 per to create just one calorie of food energy’.3
cent of carbon emissions, with some 66 per
cent of this figure accounted for by emissions The WTO has been a central factor in in-
in the industrialised countries.1 creasing carbon emissions from transport. A
2 Imhoff, pp.425-6.
1 new economics foundation, p.9. 3 Ibid.

study done by the OECD in the mid-1990s Again Mander and Retallack: ‘Each ton of
estimated that by 2004, the year marking the freight moved by plane uses forty nine times
full implementation of free-trade commit- as much energy per kilometer as when it’s
ments under the WTO’s Uruguay Round, moved by ship…A two minute takeoff by
there would have been an increase in the a [Boeing] 747 is equal to 2.4 million lawn
transport of internationally traded goods mowers running for twenty minutes’.8 In
of 70 per cent over 1992 levels. This figure, support of trade expansion and global eco-
notes the progressive British think tank new nomic growth, authorities have by and large
economics foundation (nef ), ‘would make taxed neither aviation fuel nor marine bun-
a mockery’ of the Kyoto Protocol’s manda- ker fuel, which now account for 20 per cent
tory emissions reduction targets for industr- of all emissions in the transport sector.
ialised countries.4 Since then, with the ex-
ception of the dip in global trade caused by Along with fossil-fuel-intensive air trans-
the world economic crisis, things have been port, fossil-fuel-intensive road transport
getting progressively worse. has also been favoured by the expansion
of world trade, instead of less emission-in-
tensive modes of transportation such as rail
Transportation: More fossil- traffic. In the EU, for instance, the focus on
intensive than ever building up a road transport network led an
Ocean shipping accounts for nearly 80 per OECD study to comment that ‘the way in
cent of the world’s international trade in which the EU liberalisation policy has been
goods. The fuel commonly used by ships implemented has favoured the less environ-
is a mixture of diesel and low-quality oil ment-friendly modes and accelerated the
known as ‘Bunker C’, which contains high decline of rail and inland waterways’.9
levels of carbon and sulphur. As Jerry Man-
der and Simon Retallack point out, ‘if not
consumed by ships, it would otherwise be
Decoupling growth and
considered a waste product’.5 energy: a panacea
Aviation, which has the highest growth There has been talk about decoupling trade
rate as a mode of transport, is also the fast- and growth from energy use, or shifting
est growing source of greenhouse gas emis- from fossil fuels to other, less carbon-in-
sions, with its consumption of fuel expected tensive energy sources. This is the position
to rise by 65 per cent from 1990 levels by held by the G-8. The assumption is that af-
2010, according to one study cited by nef.6 fluent societies can take on commitments to
Other estimates are more pessimistic, with reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, but
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate still grow and enjoy their high standards of
Change (IPCC) suggesting that fuel con- living if they shift to non-fossil fuel sources
sumption by civil aviation is increasing at of energy. Moreover, the domestic imple-
a rate of 3 per cent a year and could rise by mentation of the mandatory cuts agreed on
nearly 350 per cent from 1992 levels by 2050.7 multilaterally by governments must occur
by way of market-based mechanisms, that
4 new economics foundation, p.10.
5 Mander and Retallack, pp.28-9. 8 Mander and Retallack, pp.28-9.
6 Cited in new economics foundation, p.11. 9 OECD, quoted in new economics foundation, p.11.
7 Ibid.

is, through the creation and trading of emis- inevitable if the world is to address serious-
sion permits. The subtext is: techno-fi xes ly the challenge of climate change and the
and the carbon market will make the tran- broader environmental crisis. In the short
sition relatively painless and – why not? – term, however, a sharp U-turn in consump-
profitable too. tion and growth in the developed countries
and a significant decrease in global trade
The reality is that other energy sources and are unavoidable if we are to have the space
technologies are either dangerous, like nu- to mount this more strategic enterprise of
clear power; have deleterious side-effects, moving away from capitalism towards a
like agrofuels’ negative impact on food pro- more ecologically sustainable form of eco-
duction; or are simply science fiction at this nomic organisation.
stage, like carbon sequestration and storage
technology. Moreover, market mechanisms The outcome of the Doha negotiations will
such as carbon trading are simply a way for determine whether free trade will intensify
states to avoid forcing their corporate sectors or lose momentum. A successful conclusion
to make the hard decision to significantly to Doha will bring us closer to uncontrolla-
cut emissions now. ble climate change. It will continue what nef
describes as ‘free trade’s free ride on the glo-
It is also rapidly becoming clear that the bal climate’. A derailment of Doha will not
dominant paradigm of economic growth be a sufficient condition to formulate a strat-
is one of the most significant obstacles to egy to contain climate change, but given the
a serious global effort to deal with climate likely negative ecological consequences of a
change. But this destabilising, fundamental- successful deal, it is a necessary condition.
ist growth-consumption paradigm is itself
more effect than cause. The central prob-
lem, it is becoming increasingly evident, is a
Literature
mode of production whose main dynamic is Imhoff, D. (1996), ‘Community-supported
the transformation of living nature into dead Agriculture’ in Mander J., and E. Goldsmith
commodities, creating tremendous waste (eds), The Case Against the Global Economy.
in the process. The driver of this process is San Francisco: Sierra Club.
consumption – or more appropriately over-
consumption – and the motivation is profit Mander, J., and S. Retallack (2002), ‘Intrin-
or capital accumulation. sic Environmental Consequences of Trade-
related Transport’, in International Forum on
Global trade has been a central mechanism Globalization, Alternatives to Economic Global-
of this capitalist dynamic of accumulation, ization. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.
consumption and expansion. And for the
foreseeable future, trade expansion and glo- New economics foundation (2003), Free
bal growth will fall in line with their his- Trade’s Free Ride on the Global Climate. Lon-
torical trajectory of being correlated with don: new economics foundation.
increased greenhouse gas emissions.
OECD (1997), Freight and Environment: Ef-
Ultimately, a fundamental transformation at fects of Trade Liberalisation and Transport Sector
the level of the mode of production seems Reforms. Paris: OECD.

part ii »
Wrong turns, dead-ends
and cross-roads

REDD realities
Simone Lovera
Some six years ago, Kevin Conrad, a close

friend and advisor to Michael Somare, prime
minister of Papua New Guinea (PNG), had
a great idea. The prime minister was com-
plaining to him that the World Bank had
forced him to comply with a number of
strict conditions on a loan to the PNG for-
estry sector. The conditions were aimed at
conserving the forests in this remote coun-
try. As the biodiversity and carbon stored in
these forests were of global importance, Mr
Conrad advised his prime minister to ask for
compensation from the world community
for the ‘environmental service’ of reducing
deforestation. Thus the concept of payments Simone Lovera is managing coordinator of
for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation the Global Forest Coalition, an international
and forest Degradation in Developing coun- coalition of NGOs and IPOs campaigning
tries (REDD) was born. for rights-based, socially just forest
policies. She also works as a volunteer for
This anecdote is often told by Mr Conrad Sobrevivencia/Friends of the Earth-Paraguay.
himself at international meetings. However,
Mr Conrad seldom specifies what the con-
ditions of the World Bank exactly entailed
– that the government of PNG would make
a strong effort to combat corruption in its
forestry service and illegal logging in gen-
eral. So in fact, the prime minister of PNG
wanted to be compensated for complying
with his very own forestry laws.

The basic principle of REDD is not neces- namely indigenous peoples, local com-
sarily objectionable. In fact, the suggestion munities and women;
that industrialised countries should contrib- • these funds were shared equitably among
ute fi nancially to policies and actions taken countries that have already put in place
by developing countries to reduce emissions effective strategies to reduce their defor-
from deforestation and forest degradation estation and countries that have failed to
is very much in line with Article 4 of the do so until now;
Framework Convention on Climate Change • there were serious problems with cor-
(FCCC) and the concept of common but ruption and bad governance in the coun-
differentiated responsibilities. Reducing tries concerned; and
deforestation is a contribution developing • the reductions in deforestation are real.
countries can make towards global efforts to
mitigate climate change. As industrialised The problem with REDD is that there are
countries have a historical responsibility for simply too many ‘ifs’ to be true. Although
climate change, it is reasonable that they the overwhelming majority of policy papers
should fully compensate the costs of such on REDD published over the past years,
actions. So REDD could be a great opportu- whether by NGOs, indigenous peoples,
nity to combine climate change mitigation, governments, scientific institutions or mul-
forest conservation and income provision tilateral donors,1 have listed most if not all
for forest-dependent communities, if: of the conditions above as preconditions for
effective and equitable REDD strategies, few
• REDD actions were voluntary and addi- of these policy papers subsequently reach the
tional to deep emission cuts in Northern logical conclusion that REDD should thus
countries; not be implemented if these preconditions are
• the payments by these same Northern not met.2 This means that the REDD dreams
countries covered the full costs of these sketched in these policy papers are likely to
actions, and these funds were additional to become REDD nightmares in reality.
the significant ecological reparations they
are expected to pay to compensate South-
ern countries for the significant damage
1 http://www.redd-monitor.org/2008/12/08/accra-
climate change has already caused them; caucus-statement-on-forests-and-climate-change/
• these funds were spent on the conserva- http://research.yale.edu/gisf/tfd/pdf/stakeholders/
tion and restoration of forests and not on FERN%20REDD%20Position%20Paper%202.pdf
http://www.redd-monitor.org/2008/12/08/rights-
the establishment of monoculture tree based-climate-change-mitigation-and-adaptation
plantations; http://www.tebtebba.org/index.php?option=com_
• these funds were spent on policies and docman&task=cat_view&gid=62&Itemid=27
http://research.yale.edu/gisf/tfd/pdf/stakeholders/
programmes fully in line with the UN FERN%20REDD%20Position%20Paper%202.pdf
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_fi les/
Peoples (UNDRIPs); Books/BAngelsen0801.pdf
http://www.un-redd.org/LinkClick.aspx?fi leticket=
• these funds were shared equitably with gDmNyDdmEI0%3d&tabid=587&language=en-US
the actors that are actually responsible 2 A noteworthy exception is the recently published
for forest conservation and restoration, IIED briefi ng paper, Cotula, L. and J. Mayers (2009),
Tenure in REDD, Start-point or Afterthought?

REDD without emission reductions REDD markets versus ecological debt
The reality is that Northern countries are It is also unlikely that Northern countries
not willing to commit to deep reductions. will provide the new and additional fund-
The draft US climate legislation that is sup- ing necessary to pay for REDD on top of the
posed to be adopted this year is estimated ecological debt repayment Southern coun-
to lead to approximately 0 per cent domes- tries have demanded. The African Union
tic emission reductions by 2020 compared recently demanded between US$ 65 and
to 1990 levels (if all non-domestic offsets US$ 200 billion per year as ecological debt
are excluded).3 The chances that the US repayment. The additional costs for REDD
administration will take a position that is vary significantly with the kind of policies
more ambitious than this are close to zero. that will be implemented. However, the
While the EU has at least committed itself original REDD concept as promoted by
to 20 per cent reductions by 2020 even if PNG would imply that landowners will be
other Northern countries will not follow, granted a right to ask for compensation for
the chances that Canada, Australia, Japan or not cutting down that forest to produce, for
other industrialised countries will commit example, palm oil on their land. Oil palm
to significant emission reductions without plantation owners can earn between US$
the US are equally slim. 3,600 and 12,000 per hectare of plantation.
Considering that there are 1.5 billion hec-
The source of REDD funding is another tares of tropical forests, and that at least 50
important factor here. If fi nanced through per cent of these areas are suitable for oil
public funds, the reduced emissions from palm production, the world community
deforestation will at least be additional to would theoretically have to provide be-
the meagre emission cuts proposed. But tween US$ 2,700 and US$ 9,000 billion per
many Northern countries seem to be in year to compensate potential oil palm farm-
favour of funding REDD through carbon ers alone. The chances that Northern coun-
markets. This implies that REDD will, by tries will commit to paying those costs, on
defi nition, not contribute anything to emis- top of their ecological debt payments, are,
sion reductions, as every ton of carbon saved again, very slim. The fi nancial offer by the
by reduced deforestation will be compensat- EU made on 10 September 2009, less than
ed for by an extra ton of carbon emitted in three months before the Copenhagen Sum-
the global North. REDD without emission mit, is more in the range of US$ 1.5 to US$
reductions will simply mean the end of most 4 billion per year, some 0.1 per cent of what
of the world’s forests, as climate change it- would be needed for the PNG version of
self is the number one threat to forests and REDD alone.
other ecosystems.
Many institutions have argued that REDD
should be financed through a ‘basket of
funding options’,4 that is, by a combination
3 The legislation is still being discussed, but this is a
conservative estimate. Different US-based NGOs
have estimated that the bill will reduce emissions to 4 http://research.yale.edu/gisf/tfd/pdf/stakeholders/
1990 levels between 2024 and 2042. FERN%20REDD%20Position%20Paper%202.pdf

of public funds and carbon markets. As stated monocultures in non-forest areas. The Bra-
above, the first and foremost problem with zilian national climate strategy, for example,
this is that it will mean that REDD does not includes a target of 13 million hectares of
contribute to climate change mitigation, but additional tree plantations, of which only
rather to helping the North find cheap re- 2 million hectares will be planted with na-
duction options. Allowing carbon offsets for tive species. The more recent ‘planted for-
REDD and other projects will also seriously ests’ strategy sets a target that is more than
undermine Southern claims to reparations for double that. Most of these plantations will
ecological debt. By absorbing the little devel- either replace other ecosystems like pampa
opment space that Southern countries have (grasslands), cerrado (semi-dry woodland)
left, such offsets will significantly increase or caatinga (arid woodlands), and/or areas
inequities in the division of ecological space where forests might have grown back pro-
between North and South (FoE 2009). vided the land was left undisturbed.
REDD forests or REDD, indigenous rights

REDD monocultures and equitable sharing of benefits
Another major problem with REDD is the Indigenous Peoples’ Organisations (IPOs)
defi nition of forests that was adopted by have expressed strong concerns about the po-
the parties to the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. tential impact of REDD on their rights and
This definition includes not only a forest as interests, including their land rights. Consid-
commonly perceived, but also any kind of ering the significant amounts of funding that
tree monoculture, and even areas that are might be at stake, their fear is that indigenous
‘temporarily unstocked’ (a euphemism for lands will be subjected to land grabbing for
clear-cut) but waiting to be planted again at profitable projects. These impacts will be
an unspecified future moment. This flawed significantly aggravated if REDD is financed
defi nition will most likely be adopted for through carbon markets, as commercial fi-
REDD activities. As a result, REDD poli- nance is likely to flow towards projects that
cies might not only ignore serious forms of are able to reduce deforestation rates signifi-
forest degradation (see also Sasaki 2009) but cantly. Comparative research in Brazil re-
also the quite common forestry practice of vealed that deforestation rates in indigenous
replacing biologically diverse forests with reserves are between 1.7 and 7 times lower
monoculture tree plantations. than deforestation rates in surrounding areas
(Nepstad et al. 2006). The Center for Inter-
While some of the latest proposals include national Forestry Research has thus recom-
references to the need for ‘co-benefits’ for mended that payments for environmental
biodiversity and even reject ‘the replace- services should not be targeting indigenous
ment of natural forests by tree plantations’, peoples, as it would be highly inefficient to
these safeguards, even if accepted, will not pay people who were not planning to defor-
prevent significant amounts of funding from est their territory anyway.
being used for the establishment of tree

An analysis by the Global Forest Coalition nance systems promoting collective sustain-
of the impact of market-based conservation able management of biodiversity became,
in five different communities revealed that: under the impact of market-based mecha-
nisms, more likely to act individually and
[t]he use of market-based mechanisms in- pursue individual economic interests such
evitably means that the odds are stacked as jobs, profits and fi nancial rewards. The
against those in a weaker initial nego- position of women within the communities
tiating position. This includes people was also affected, as women’s interests are
with no legal land tenure and those un- more likely to be overlooked in commercial
able to afford the considerable expense transactions normally closed by men (even
involved in the preparation of environ- in communities where women previously
mental impact assessments, the delivery had responsibility for matters related to for-
of environmental services, the fulfi lment ests and biodiversity). Women have a disad-
of a range of quantifiable qualification vantageous position in monetary economies
criteria and the provision of upfront and in general, as they spend a significant part
operational fi nance, including insur- of their time on activities such as childcare,
ance against project failure. This implies household management, procuring clean
that market-based conservation mecha- water and other goods for the family, which
nisms will inevitably lead to increased are not rewarded in monetary terms.6
corporate governance over biodiversity
conservation, and erode the governance The challenge of equitable sharing of bene-
systems of (monetary) poor communities fits is felt not only on a sub-national level. By
and social groups including Indigenous defi nition, REDD will lead to much higher
Peoples and women.5 payments for countries that have failed to
halt deforestation until now, as these coun-
While carbon markets can, in theory, bring tries have deforestation to reduce. Recent
some economic benefits to local communi- proposals to include ‘enhancement of car-
ties, it is important to analyse any economic bon stocks’ (that is, reforestation, including
costs in terms of decreased food security and the establishment of monoculture tree plan-
food sovereignty and the loss of alternative tations) and land management practices are
sources of jobs and income related to, for unlikely to resolve these inequities, as those
example, the establishment of labour-ex- countries that have caused much carbon
tensive tree plantations. The most signifi- emission through both deforestation and
cant impact was the sense of disempower- other unsustainable land management prac-
ment felt by many community members. In tices will still receive far higher payments
all cases, local residents reported that their than countries that have practised sustain-
control over their forests and livelihoods able land management. African countries
had decreased because ‘the main decisions will not be able to compete with the likes
were now taken by other actors’. Thus, of Indonesia and Brazil in reducing emis-
communities that had their own gover- sions from land management. Thanks to its
5 GFC 2008. 6 ibid.

land-based emissions, Indonesia has joined indigenous rights’ instruments, these rights
the world’s three largest emitters. A country could easily be marginalised again. Indica-
like Ethiopia will have a hard time compet- tions are that the capacity of national IPOs
ing with that, even if it does decide to plas- themselves to engage in the national REDD
ter its countryside with 27 million hectares debate are a determining factor on whether
of monoculture tree plantations, as Brazil REDD will benefit them or not, and regret-
intends to do, according to its draft ‘planted tably many of them still lack that capacity.
forests’ strategy.
Last but not least, at the international lev-
Thanks to the vocal campaigns of IPOs el, REDD is in violation of UNDRIPs, as
themselves, especially at recent conferences the negotiations have continued until now
of the parties of the Climate Convention, without any meaningful participation by
concerns about indigenous rights seem to be indigenous peoples, despite the fact that a
taken seriously by at least some governments. REDD agreement by the FCCC will have
In this respect, it has been helpful that the a significant impact on indigenous territo-
two main multinational initiatives to finance ries, which are home to many of the world’s
countries’ efforts to ‘prepare’ for REDD, most precious forests.
the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility and the UN-REDD programme,
are respectively bound to instruments that
REDD corruption
demand consultation with and participation The need for good governance as one of the
by indigenous peoples in the development preconditions for proper implementation of
of policies that affect them. UNDRIPs even REDD has been emphasised by many inter-
specifies the right to ‘free prior and informed governmental and non-governmental in-
consent’, which means that REDD policies stitutions.7 Without good governance, cor-
should formally be implemented with ex- porations and other national actors will be
plicit indigenous peoples’ consent. It is im- inclined to claim overestimated or otherwise
portant to note that this pressure from the fraudulent emission reductions. In order to
main REDD donors has been helpful in con- calculate the reductions caused by a specific
vincing at least some governments to consult conservation project, one has to establish an
with IPOs in the elaboration of their REDD appropriate baseline in order to ascertain
strategies. For some countries, especially in exactly what proportion of the emission re-
Africa and Asia, this was the first time ever ductions is the result of the project. But es-
indigenous peoples were seriously consulted tablishing proper baselines and verification
on forest policies. of the added value of REDD activities has
proven a tremendous challenge. It is hard to
However, it is important to remain cautious defi ne what would have happened with a
here, as these multilateral donors are mainly
funding the preparation of REDD strategies.
7 http://www.unredd.net/index.php?option=com_
Once these strategies reach the implementa- docman&task=doc_download&gid=455&Itemid=53/
tion stage and support comes in from donors http://www.rightsandresources.org/publication_
and carbon markets that are not bound to details.php?publicationID=857

forest in a business-as-usual situation. De- themselves in 2002 to significantly reducing
termining a proper baseline: biodiversity loss by 2010, those countries
that still have high deforestation rates are
would either take the form of a reference obviously not complying with international
period in the past or a scenario which commitments. That makes REDD a recipe
could be used as a convincing projec- for disaster in countries like PNG, Brazil and
tion of the future trends of deforestation. Indonesia, in fact, in practically all countries
Unfortunately, there is little chance that that still, 17 years after the UN Conference
the future resembles the past; robust pre- on Environment and Development, have
dictions of future deforestation seem un- not succeeded in reducing deforestation.
likely given the complex interactions of
factors commanding the pace of defores-
tation, especially as most of them lie out-
Learning from success
side the forest sector. (Karsenty 2008) instead of paying for failure
Luckily, there are countries that have suc-
Another major problem is that of ‘leakage’, ceeded in reducing or even halting deforest-
which is inherent in forest-related carbon ation. These countries are complying with
projects. Leakage means that the environ- the relevant regulations, and they should be
mental benefits of a project are undermined rewarded for doing so through the provi-
or even completely negated because the de- sion of significant new and additional fi nan-
structive activities are simply moved to an- cial resources. Respecting indigenous land
other area. Protecting one forest area from rights and community forest management
logging, for example, makes little sense for has proven to be one of the most equitable,
the climate and provides few environmental effective and efficient policy incentives for
benefits if the logging shifts to a nearby area, forest conservation and forest restoration.
or another country. While these policies require far less fund-
ing than compensation schemes targeted at
Here again, the problems with REDD are compensating soy farmers for not burning
seriously aggravated if REDD is funded every hectare of their land, they still require
through carbon markets. If non-additional institutional capacity, sound monitoring
emission reductions from deforestation are and enforcement systems and resources to
used to compensate for real emissions in the develop socially just, participatory and in-
North, the net result will be increased emis- clusive forest conservation and restoration
sions and thus aggravated climate change. policies. Both the Convention on Biodi-
versity and the Framework Convention on
The fundamental dilemma with REDD is Climate Change that were signed in 1992
that deforestation itself is an indicator of bad oblige all governments to conserve forests
governance and thus a good reason not to and require developed countries to contrib-
implement REDD. As practically all coun- ute new and additional fi nancial resources
tries in the world (the US being the only to reward developing countries for the in-
exception) have not only ratified the Con- cremental costs of providing global envi-
vention on Biodiversity but also committed ronmental benefits through reducing de-

forestation. The fact that the overwhelming
majority of developed countries have not
complied with these legally binding agree-
ments does not imply that they do not ex-
ist anymore. Instead, as pointed out by an
increasing number of G-77 countries, the
failure to comply with these commitments
has created an ecological debt that should
be repaid on top of the new and additional
resources that were promised 17 years ago.
Literature
Cotula, L., and J. Mayers (2009), Tenure in Lovera., S. (2006), ‘Reducing Deforestation,
REDD – Start-point or Afterthought?’. Natural It’s the Money We Love’, Forest Cover 20.
Resource Issues NO. 15. London: Interna- October.
tional Institute for Environment and Devel-
opment. Nepstad, D., S. Schwartzman, B. Bamberg-
er, M. Santilli, P. Schlesinger, P. Lefebvre,
Friends of the Earth (FoE) (2009), A Danger- A. Alencar, D. Ray, E. Prinz, and A. Rolla
ous Distraction, Why Offsetting in Failing the (2006), ‘Inhibition of Amazon Deforestation
Climate and People: The Evidence. and Fire by Parks and Indigenous Reserves’,
Conservation Biology, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp.65-
Global Forest Coalition (GFC) (2008), Life as 73.
Commerce: The Impact of Market-based Conser-
vation on Indigenous Peoples, Local Communi- Sasaki, N. and F. Putz (2009), ‘Critical Need
ties and Women. for New Definitions of “Forests” and “For-
est Degradation” in Global Climate Agree-
Karsenty, A., (2008), ‘The Architecture of ments’, Conservation Letters, Vol. xx, pp.1-7.
Proposed REDD Schemes after Bali: Facing
Critical Choices’, Département Environne-
ments et Societés, Montpellier.

Green capitalism and the climate:
It’s economic growth, stupid!
Tadzio Mueller and Alexis Passadakis
‘For things to remain the same,

everything must change’ Tadzio Mueller lives
Sicilian aristocrat Tancredi, in Berlin, where he is
from the The Leopard active in the emerging
climate justice move-
‘The Chinese use the same sign for ment. Having escaped
“crisis” as they do for “opportunity”’. the clutches of (aca-
‘Yes, “Crisitunity”!’ demic) wage labour,
Dialogue between Lisa and he is currently writing a
Homer Simpson report on ‘green capitalism’ for the Rosa Luxemburg
Foundation. He is also an editor of Turbulence-Ideas
for Movement (www.turbulence.org.uk).
Alexis Passadakis
Is green the new black? studied political sci-
ence and global politi-
Remember the days when ‘the ecology’ cal economy in Berlin
seemed to stand in stark contrast to ‘the and Brighton. In recent
economy’? When capital, labour and gov- years he has worked
ernments stood side by side to see off the with different NGOs
challenge articulated by ‘mad’ environmen- and is currently a mem-
talists; when to admit the reality and threat ber of Attac Germany’s coordinating council. He is
of ‘climate change’ would place you far be- active in the emerging climate justice movement
yond the realms of acceptable discourse; and and co-organised the first German climate action
when green parties were perceived as stand- camp in Hamburg in 2008. Alexis lives in Berlin.
ing to the left of Social Democracy?
Alas, times and climes change. Not too long

ago a small revolution took place in, of all
places, conservative Germany. The local

version of the Financial Times, a newspaper an increasing number of financial capitalists
known around the world as the mouth- and industrialists? Our hypothesis is this:
piece for the more enlightened, forward- viewed from the perspective of capital, as
thinking fractions of transnational capital, well as a number of governments, what is
for the fi rst time in the history of German interesting about a GND is not whether it
journalism endorsed a party for the Euro- can, or cannot, solve the multiplicity of eco-
pean parliamentary elections. Big deal, one logical crises we are currently facing – we
might think, they probably endorsed the argue that this is, in the medium term, an
market fundamentalists in the FDP, or else impossibility – but whether it can internalise
they went for stability-über-alles by endors- these crises as an engine of growth and le-
ing Chancellor Merkel. But not this time: ‘If gitimation, thus solving several other crisis
you want to use your vote to support mean- tendencies currently affl icting global capi-
ingful change, then this time you should talism. It is not, to be clear about this, an
vote for the Green Party’. Why? Because the exercise in traditional ‘greenwashing’, but
party is, they argue, a ‘market-friendly en- an attempt to kick off, at the end of the neo-
gine of innovation’ that is pushing a Green liberal phase of capitalism, a new round of
New Deal (GND) that they describe as a accumulation and mode of regulation. And
‘stimulus package for the ecological tech- the point about the ecological crises, or
nologies of the future’ (FTD, 4 June 2009).1 ‘biocrisis’, is that it is neither solved nor ig-
And lest anyone think this is a German pe- nored in a green capitalist regime, but rather
culiarity, take it from the mouth of Tho- placed at the heart of its growth strategy.
mas Friedman, neo-liberal par excellence re-
cently turned ‘green’: ‘Making America the
world’s greenest country is not a selfless act
A world in crises: from the
of charity or naïve moral indulgence. It is economic to the biocrisis
now a core national security and economic The world is currently facing not just an
interest’ (Friedman 2008: 23). economic crisis but a multiplicity of linked
yet relatively autonomous crisis tendencies
This of course raises the question of why all so severe that a number of indigenous peo-
things green – green jobs, green growth, ples’ movements took the opportunity at
even a Green New Deal – in short, why the 2009 World Social Forum in Belem to
green capitalism has suddenly become so declare the current conjuncture a crisis of
attractive, not just to the editorial team of the Western model of civilisation. To start,
the Financial Times Deutschland and to Tho- there is the political crisis that has seen not
mas Friedman, but to an increasingly broad only global but also national governance in-
coalition of actors ranging from Achim stitutions – from the World Trade Organi-
Steiner at the head of the United Nations zation (WTO), the International Monetary
Environment Programme (UNEP), to Ban Fund (IMF), to national parliaments, par-
ki-Moon and Al Gore, Barack Obama and ties and institutionalised class compromises
green parties all around Europe, as well as – haemorrhage legitimacy and public sup-
port since at least the end of the 1990s. This
loss of legitimacy was briefly countered by
1 All translations into English by the authors.

the Global War on Terror, but this was at Crisitunity? New Deal,
best a strategy of domination in the face of a antagonism and green capitalism
breakdown of neo-liberal hegemony, which
ended up undermining the stability of the Of all the crises named above, there is some-
system more than it maintained it. Second, thing special about the last, the biocrisis. Far
there is the global economic crisis, the result from threatening to destroy capitalism, it
not ‘merely’ of the collapse of the fi nancial in fact contains the promise of solving all
sector, but of deeper causes such as a struc- the other major crises in one fell swoop.
tural lack of what Keynes would have called Recall that in a capitalist economy, crises
‘effective demand’ arising from decades of are not necessarily negative. The Austrian
successful neo-liberal class struggle from economist Schumpeter thought of crises as
above; and of the absence of a sustainable unleashing the force of capital’s ‘creative de-
engine of growth (Stern 2008), as a result struction’, a kind of radical diet that would
of which more and more profits had to be purge the unproductive and the unprofitable
made within ever shorter-lived bubbles. and make way, after running its course, for a
Third (in this non-exhaustive list), there is leaner and meaner economy to emerge at the
the energy crisis: supplies of fossil fuels, on other end. More importantly, nor is antago-
which the global economy has been based nism necessarily a problem – it is, in fact,
for some 250 years, are less and less able to precisely what is at the core of capitalism’s
match demand, which will, in the medium dynamism, of its infamous ability to profane
term, lead to drastic increases in energy all that is holy and melt all that is solid into
prices and escalating confl icts over ‘energy air. The core of the Fordist-Keynesian New
security’. Deal, which contributed significantly to the
at least temporary resolution of the Great
And finally there are the multiple ecological Depression of the 1920s and 1930s, lay in the
crises that are currently afflicting the globe in fact that the antagonism between capital and
different ways. While the most discursively labour was neither solved nor ignored, but
visible of these is no doubt the climate cri- internalised as the driving force of capitalist
sis, we are at the same time facing a drastic development.
reduction in biodiversity; desertification; a
fresh-water crisis; overfishing; the destruc- The economic situation that prevailed dur-
tion of forests, and several more: together, ing the ‘Roaring ‘20s’ in the US was in many
they constitute a biocrisis, a crisis of human life ways not dissimilar to the situation we faced
(bios) on this planet. While each of these has until recently: high corporate profits, a high
its relatively autonomous immediate causes, degree of fi nancialisation, a significant ex-
in the final analysis they are all the result of pansion of production as a result of increases
an antagonism between the requirements of in productivity. However, since wages were
human survival in stable eco-social systems stagnating as a result of an ‘excess supply’ of
and the requirements of capital accumula- labour (and in spite of increasing unionisa-
tion – or, more succinctly, between capital’s tion in the industrial workforce), at the end
need for infinite growth and our collective of the 1920s a crisis of overproduction/un-
survival on a finite planet. derconsumption hit – then, as now, there

was not enough effective demand in the offers governments and some advanced frac-
system (Rupert 1995: 79-81; Negri 1988). tions of capital the chance to at least tem-
porarily manage the abovementioned crises.
Keynes’s often cited ‘genius’ – most recent- Examples in the field of politics range from
ly by the Green New Deal Group (2008: the way the G-8, led by the German gov-
12) – simply lay in recognising the systemic ernment, outflanked protest movements at
relevance of an arrangement that was not their summit in 2007 in Heiligendamm by
technocratically imposed from the top, but talking about climate change, thus avoid-
rather emerged as the result of a multiplic- ing the delegitimising strategy of the move-
ity of often militant workers’ struggles and ments, and in fact managing to relegitimise
of the initially mostly defensive reactions of themselves; to the World Bank’s attempts to
capitals and the US government under FDR present itself as a ‘green bank’ (Young 2000);
(both acting under the impression of the all the way to the military’s use of climate
constant imagined threat of a Soviet-type change to push its agenda of securitisation
revolution). As increasingly well-organised and expansion (Wagner 2008). Economi-
workers put upward pressure on wages in cally, beyond the rather measly ‘green’ com-
certain key companies – for instance, at the ponents of recent recovery programmes, the
Ford Motor Company – these industrialists Financial Times (24 September 2009) as usual
in turn put pressure on the government to makes the case most convincingly:
generalise these high wage deals across the
economy, lest they suffer a competitive dis- If an industrial revolution to produce
advantage. Almost miraculously, the results energy with much lower carbon emis-
of this were that a) the high wages led to an sions gathers momentum in Copenha-
increase in purchasing power that allowed gen in December, there will be fortunes
for the absorption of surplus production; b) to be made…The scale of the task is vast.
the class antagonism, managed by the trade Limiting carbon dioxide emissions to
unions that were increasingly integrated into the levels scientists suggest would keep
the emerging ‘Fordist’ mode of regulation, global warming to no more than about
was domesticated; and c) high wages became 2°C would mean building nuclear power
the driving force of capitalist development as stations, wind farms and solar panels at
they forced companies to become ever more rates never seen before.
efficient in order to maintain their profit
margins. Thus began what would later be
seen as the ‘golden age of capitalism’.
Capitalism and the climate:
it’s economic growth, stupid!
What the class antagonism was 80 years ago, It is therefore quite conceivable, though at
the biocrisis is today, itself a product of an this point far from certain, that some kind
equally indissoluble antagonism – between of green capitalist project (such as the GND)
capital’s limitless drive for accumulation and might indeed be able to temporarily solve
our survival on a fi nite planet. The biocrisis, the economic and other crises. But what it
suitably internalised in the economic and certainly will not be able to do is to solve
regulatory machinery of a green capitalism, the biocrisis – for it is at heart a project of

capitalist renovation, which needs must Of course, some might now respond that
perpetuate capitalism’s dynamics, of which this argument, while possibly correct at
Marx wrote, long before the advent of the a very general level of abstraction (in the
neo-liberal project that the Green New infamous Marxist ‘last instance’ – the one
Deal Group falsely sees as having caused that never comes to pass), ignores some very
the climate crisis (GNDG 2008: 2): ‘Accu- concrete, positive steps that have been tak-
mulate! Accumulate! That is Moses and the en in the environmental modernisation of
prophets’ (Marx 1971: 621). Capital needs, capitalism, which have gone some way to-
or is, accumulation, and 200 years of actual- wards addressing some concrete needs and
ly existing capital accumulation has hitherto urgencies – for example, concerning climate
always destroyed the environment. change. International climate negotiations
at the United Nations Framework Con-
Why is that? Because money only becomes vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
capital (rather than the coins and bits of paper however, have precious little to do with the
we have in our pockets to buy stuff in or- climate, and everything to do with hag-
der to satisfy a concrete want, such as hun- gling over percentage points of economic
ger) when it is invested in the production of growth. Let us be quite clear on what glo-
goods that are then sold in order to achieve a bal climate change policies have achieved
return on the initially invested capital. Or in so far. First, ecologically: since the signing
short: money – production – more money. of the Kyoto Protocol, not only have total
This process involves a whole range of in- global greenhouse gas emissions increased,
puts and requirements, from labour to raw so, too, has their rate of increase.2 In addi-
materials, from machines to energy. And tion, a conference held in Copenhagen in
historically, although the relative resource March 2009 agreed that the pace of global
intensity of capitalist production might have warming was accelerating more rapidly than
decreased (that is, the same product can now hitherto predicted in the Intergovernmental
be made with fewer inputs of raw materials), Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) worst-
in absolute terms, capitalist production has case scenarios (Guardian, 12 March 2009). If
always required more and more and more progressive supporters of the protocol now
inputs – wild-eyed dreams of a capitalist uto- deploy the counterfactual argument that,
pia of ‘immaterial’ growth based on services without the treaty, things would have been
and the ‘digital revolution’ notwithstanding even worse, then this only reveals their utter
(Guardian, 4 May 2009). Just as the antago- strategic despair. We do not need counter-
nism between labour and capital cannot be factual arguments, but real and just emis-
solved within a capitalist framework – it is, sions reductions!
after all, the very constituent feature of the
capitalist mode of production – the antago- Second, politically: rather than address the
nism between capital and life in relatively full range of activities that negatively impact
stable eco-social systems cannot be solved, the climate – say, trade, agriculture and most
because there is a necessary contradiction
between the infi nite accumulation of capi-
tal, and life on a finite planet. 2 http://w w w.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/11
/061130190831.htm

fundamentally, the ‘fossilistic’ industrial sys- almost measly US$ 100 billion to US$ 2,000
tem – the UNFCCC maintains and rein- billion by the end of this decade. Notwith-
forces the illegitimate compartmentalisation standing the uselessness of economic fore-
of ecological concerns into a separate and casting, particularly in a recession, that is a
toothless regulatory regime, thus insulating lot of potential investment of dubious eco-
other institutions such as the WTO from logical but of defi nite economic value.
scrutiny and critique. In fact, the WTO’s
free trade policies, which usually lead to an There have, however, been two processes in
expansion of ecologically and socially de- the last 30 years that have generated ecologi-
structive industrial agriculture and increase cally significant emissions reductions. Rath-
the volume of international trade, have er than government intervention or green
significantly more negative impacts on the modernisation, these have been economic
climate than the UNFCCC’s policies have crises, that is, drastic reductions in econom-
positive ones. To date, the UNFCCC’s po- ic growth. First, this occurred during the
litical effect appears to be one of legitimating breakdown of the growth-oriented econo-
a destructive and unjust economic and reg- mies of the Eastern bloc, where a 40 per cent
ulatory system by channelling the attention reduction in Soviet GDP coincided with a
of potentially critical environmental groups roughly 40 per cent reduction in emissions
into meaningless negotiations; and project- (Harrison 2001: 3; Smith 2007: 22). Second,
ing the impression that ‘something is being during the current global economic crisis:
done’ about climate change, thus blunting citing a report by the International Energy
the potential for more widespread, mass Agency (IEA), the Financial Times (21 Sep-
movements for climate justice to emerge. tember 2009) writes that ‘CO2 emissions
from burning fossil fuels had undergone “a
Third, economically, which is where things significant decline” this year – further than
get interesting. In very short: without the in any year in the last 40…Falling industrial
UNFCCC, the idea of emissions trading output is largely responsible for the plunge
would almost certainly not have become in CO2’. Of course, this is not meant to sug-
global ‘best practice’ in official climate poli- gest that an uncontrolled breakdown in the
tics as quickly, or as universally (recall that global economy, with all the social devas-
the EU was initially opposed to emissions tation this would wreak, is currently desir-
trading, but was convinced to accept it by a able. But it does point to the need for a col-
man who would later receive a Nobel Prize lectively managed, just process of degrowth
for a slideshow). But given its relative lack of the global economy; of, particularly in
of ecological utility, why has the system be- the global North, shrinking our overdevel-
come so attractive to so many players? Quite oped economies.
simply because it offers a brilliant (if partial)
short- and medium-term fi x for the prob-
lem of over-accumulated financial capital:
Open ends
the ‘ecological’ consulting fi rm Point Car- Where to go from here? The call for ‘de-
bon calculates that the global market for growth’, for the want of a better word, has
emissions rights will grow from its current some unpleasant undertones. On the one

hand, there are its political shortcomings: cause capital that does not grow ceases to
how would a strategy that aims to shrink be capital), many are likely to ask whether
the economy gain the support of trade un- degrowth does not simply mean more crisis,
ions, which by and large remain wedded to more austerity – and even more upward re-
the Fordist growth compromise (since they distribution of wealth and power.
are unable to fight for more, what is there
for them to distribute but the benefits of To be sure, there will not be easy answers to
growth?)? How do we start leaving fossil fuels these questions. Clearly, the intellectual task
in the ground if the miners sitting on top of is to create convincing concepts for a glo-
them are, with good cause, fighting for their bal economy that does not rely on constant
livelihoods by trying to extend coal min- growth – in other words, for a post-capital-
ing and supporting the myth of ‘clean coal’ ist macroeconomics, if the slight misnomer
(as happened in the British climate camp in be allowed (compare, Sustainable Develop-
2008)? On the other hand, there is the fear, ment Commission 2009). But, unsurpris-
especially when articulating a critique of ingly, writing papers will not be enough.
growth from a position in the global North, Whether in regard to the question of North
that this ends up resurrecting Malthusian and South, or that of ‘environmentalism’
discourses of ‘overpopulation’, where – gen- and workers’ rights, the directions in which
erally – ‘post-reproductive wealthy white we will have to look can only emerge from
men’ lecture ‘the poor’ on how they should collective struggle, because it is in strug-
have fewer children (Guardian, 29 September gling together that we become capable of
2009). Finally, there is the small matter that recognising each other and internalising
we are currently living through an enforced each other’s interests. As another movement
period of degrowth (the world economic in another time once put it, caminamos pre-
crisis), and because in a capitalist economy guntando.
this necessarily takes the form of a crisis (be-

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Negri, T. (1988), Revolution Retrieved: Erderwärmung für die Militarisierung der
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Fixing the world’s climate ‘foodprint’
Anne Laure Constantin
In the framework of the global climate talks,

the international community is struggling
to identify agriculture’s potential for help-
ing to cool the climate. The discussions are
complicated by scientific uncertainties that
hamper decision-making.
One thing is certain and unanimously rec-

ognised: agricultural production is vulner-
able to climate change. Extreme weather
events, as well as changes in average temper-
atures and precipitation levels, are affecting Anne Laure Constantin joined
production capacities. A series of droughts the Geneva office of the Institute for
in a few key grain-producing regions in Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) in July
2006-07 contributed to the panic that led to 2006. Anne Laure came to IATP from
the food price crisis last year. More than 1 the French Committee for International
billion people are suffering from hunger in Solidarity, where she advocated on
2009, and the impact of climate change on international agriculture and trade issues.
food security is set to become more serious She has a Master’s degree in international
in the coming decades. relations from the Sorbonne in France.
Agriculture also contributes to climate

change, although the extent needs to be
better understood. According to the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), agriculture’s contribution to glo-
bal greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is ap-
proximately 12 per cent – the emissions are
mainly methane and nitrous oxide. Figure 1
shows the main sources of emissions.

11  7
Rice production Manure
(CH4) (CH4 + N2O)
12 
Biomass burning
(CH4 + N2O)
38 
Soil emissions
(CH4 + N2O)
32 
Enteric fermentation
(CH4)
Figure 1: Main sources of GHG emissions in the agricultural

sector (ITC - FiBL 2007, based on IPCC figures)
According to Greenpeace International, to climate change – is critical. The conver-

if land use, transportation, packaging and gence of multiple crises – a global economic
processing of agricultural products are in- recession, global warming, hunger and the
cluded in the calculations, agriculture’s con- depletion of natural resources, etc. – reinforc-
tribution to global greenhouse gas emissions es the need to identify integrated solutions.
is somewhere between 16 and 30 per cent.1
This proportion grows if we take a food
system-wide approach (including distribu-
The temptation of quick fixes
tion, consumption and disposal). Under the There is a strong temptation to hope that
IPCC’s classifications, these other emissions ‘miracle solutions’ will reverse climate
are accounted for by other sectors such as change. In the case of agriculture, techni-
forestry, transport and energy. cal fi xes and market-based solutions attract
most of the attention, particularly in the
In light of the significant contribution our framework of the initial discussions at the
food systems make to climate change and the United Nations Framework Convention on
urgent need to curb global greenhouse gas Climate Change (UNFCCC).
emissions, addressing our climate ‘foodprint’
– that is, the contribution of food production Genetic manipulations applied to plants and
animals are described as promising ways to
1 Bellarby et al. (2008), http://www.greenpeace.org/ reduce emissions from agriculture. In partic-
international/press/reports/cool-farming-full-re- ular, the livestock industry hopes that high-
port (accessed 29 May 2009)

tech breeding techniques or the use of vac- from agriculture at the UNFCCC. Few
cines will help curb methane emissions from other countries have clear positions in re-
cows and sheep – those represent about one- lation to the sector, despite its importance
third of all agricultural emissions according for food security, rural livelihoods and the
to the IPCC. New Zealand is leading an economic and ecological wellbeing of many
ambitious international research network on of the world’s countries. As a result, most of
this topic called LEARN.2 The seed industry, the options on the table seem only to take
Monsanto in the lead, is promoting drought- us further down the very same energy-in-
and heat-resistant crops. Climate change tensive path that created the current climate
mitigation and adaptation are becoming new and food crises. It is time for a real paradigm
arguments in the quest for profits by transna- shift to create low input, sustainable and re-
tional agribusiness companies. silient food systems around the world.
A newly formed international industry alli-

ance – the International Biochar Initiative –
Real solutions
is actively promoting the use of ‘Biochar’ as a
Build on agriculture’s multifunctionality
way to maximise the potential of soil carbon
sequestration, where 89 per cent of agricul- Absent from current international climate
ture’s mitigation potential lies, according to discussions is an essential aspect of agri-
the IPCC. Biochar is a process consisting of culture’s role in ‘cooling the earth’, multi-
the combustion of biomass, producing char- functionality. The International Assessment
coal that is then buried in the soil. Support- of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and
ers claim biochar could help turn unused Technology for Development (IAASTD) – a
land into gigantic carbon sinks. groundbreaking international and multidis-
ciplinary report endorsed by 58 governments
Finally, New Zealand supports the design in 2008 3 – stressed that ‘multifunctionality
of an ‘optimal global production pattern for recognises the inescapable interconnected-
agriculture’. In other words, let those coun- ness of agriculture’s different roles and func-
tries whose agricultural production is most tions’. Not only does agriculture provide
efficient in climate terms feed the world. the food we all need to live an active and
This might be tempting in theory – in real- healthy life, it is also a source of livelihood
ity though, the recent food price hike refor about 2.6 billion people, an engine for
minded everyone that food security is about economic development, a part of the cul-
access to food, not availability. New Zea- ture of many peoples and an integral part
land’s proposed focus on trade liberalisation of environmental management. Because the
to solve the climate crisis would come at the climate negotiations fail to take these differ-
expense of food security. ent dimensions into account in an integrat-
ed manner, the technical or market-based
At the time of writing, New Zealand is de solutions currently under consideration are
facto leading the discussions on mitigation bound to fail.
2 http://www.livestockemissions.net/ 3 http://www.agassessment.org/

Despite its importance, the climate cri- ger are also among those most at risk from
sis cannot be considered in isolation from climate change’.5 In the wake of the global
other global crises such as the global food food price crisis, there is increasing recogni-
security crisis. In this context, it would be tion that small-scale farmers and agroeco-
misleading to adopt an approach focused on logical production methods need to play a
reducing greenhouse gas emissions without central role in solving the global hunger and
considering other social, economic or en- environmental crises.6 IAASTD pointed to
vironmental aspects. Additionally, because the relevance of indigenous and traditional
agriculture is both a contributor to and a knowledge in building a climate-friendly
victim of climate change, we need to focus agriculture system. The UN Environ-
on solutions that contribute to mitigation as mental Programme (UNEP) and the UN
well as adaptation – not one or the other. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) point to the failure of ‘the
‘The way the world grows its food will great technological progress of the past half
have to change radically’ – IAASTD century’ in reducing hunger in developing
There are a number of ways to cut emissions countries.7 Finally, the UN’s Comprehen-
from agriculture. Out of the list of technical sive Framework for Action on the 2008 food
options outlined by the IPCC,4 some pro- crisis emphasised the specific role of small-
vide numerous co-benefits for agriculture’s holder farmers in building resilient food sys-
other functions. Rather than going through tems and eradicating poverty.
the technical options, we present a few prin-
ciples to guide a profound reform of food For all these reasons, small farmers and in-
systems that takes into account the need to digenous groups need to be central in discus-
curb our climate ‘foodprint’ and build resil- sions about agricultural mitigation strategies
ient food and farm systems. and policies. Via Campesina, an internation-
al network comprised of small farmers’ or-
• Adopt a rights-based approach to ganisations, is raising serious concerns about
agriculture and climate policies the direction of the current climate talks: its
Human rights enshrine the principles of call to mobilisation for Copenhagen is enti-
participation, accountability and transpar- tled ‘Stop! The UNFCCC is going off the
ency. Democratic decision-making around rails!’ Ignoring these concerns would be un-
food and climate policies is a challenge but wise and would compromise the likelihood
also a fundamental precondition to achiev- of an effective outcome.
ing sustainable solutions.
• Prioritise soil fertility, low-input farming systems
A rights-based approach calls for action fo-
cused on the needs of the most vulnerable. Nitrous oxide emissions from soils represent
As Germanwatch and Brot für die Welt put about 38 per cent of emissions from agri-
it, ‘it is generally likely that those already
suffering from undernourishment and hun- 5 Bals et al. (2008).
6 See, for instance, the UN’s Comprehensive Framework
for Action (2008) or UNEP-UNCTAD (2008).
4 For that, see Smith et al. (2007). 7 UNEP-UNCTAD (2008).

culture. The excessive use of agrochemical • Move away from monoculture, towards
products, particularly synthetic fertilisers, diversified production systems
is a major contributor. Greenpeace stress-
es that 50 per cent of the nitrogen used in Over the past three decades, the develop-
farming is lost to the environment8 – there ment of commercial agriculture around the
is a critical need to get rid of this overuse. world has favoured large, specialised farms
Chemicals are also responsible for land deg- organised around a monoculture. The de-
radation and water pollution. Reducing the velopment of soy cultivation is a particularly
quantities used, or using organic fertilisers illustrative case: the crop now occupies about
where possible, would have multiple ben- half the agricultural land in Argentina, Bo-
efits: reducing greenhouse gas emissions, livia, Brazil and Paraguay. Soy is mostly used
but also restoring water quality or reducing as animal feed in livestock operations.
production costs for farmers. Agricultural
policies – particularly in Annex I countries, There are numerous reasons why the viabil-
China and India – need to move away from ity of such a model is questioned. In terms
subsidising harmful fertiliser-use towards of climate policy, these farms are of particu-
incentives for low-input farming systems. lar concern because of the energy they re-
quire (machinery, fuel, chemical fertilisers)
In many developing countries, productiv- and because of their vulnerability to climate
ity will need to increase significantly in the shocks.
coming decades to meet the food needs of a
growing population without increasing the In contrast, diversified systems provide the
demand for new productive land that puts opportunity to develop synergies between
pressure on forests – conversion of forest into different types of production (for example,
agricultural land is a major source of CO2 crop rotations, use of animal waste to ferti-
emissions. Restoring or maintaining soil lise crop production) and increase the farm’s
fertility can contribute to this effort. More resilience in the face of climate shocks.
attention needs to be paid to numerous stud-
ies which have shown that sustainable agri- • Address livestock’s long shadow
culture, including organic agriculture, has The FAO’s groundbreaking report Live-
significant potential to increase yields.9 Or- stock’s Long Shadow, released in 2006, traced
ganic agriculture also allows an increase in all emissions related to meat production:
the amount of carbon sequestered in soils, as from deforestation to the use of fossil fuel in
do agroforestry systems and the use of cover production and transport of processed and
crops, for instance. Methods of production refrigerated animal products, to the produc-
which protect the carbon that is stored in tion of feed, to land degradation in grazing
soils need to be given priority, particularly areas, etc. It concludes that ‘overall, livestock
since they also provide benefits for produc- activities contribute an estimated 18 percent
tivity by enhancing soil fertility. to total anthropogenic GHG emissions’. In
a recent New York Times editorial, Nicholas
D. Kristof stressed that ‘[a]n industrial farm
8 Bellarby et al. (2008). with 5,000 hogs produces as much waste as a
9 UNEP-UNCTAD (2008).

town with 20,000 people’.10 Methane emis- US, the retail sector has loss rates of about
sions from liquid slurry are only one aspect 26 per cent. This represents an enormous
of this contribution to environmental con- amount of wasted energy and emissions as
tamination. well. The multiple crises we face today call
for a fundamental reorganisation of the way
The FAO report presents a series of options food chains are organised. Climate-related
for mitigation that need to be considered concerns will need to be central in this
urgently. It is also clear that serious recon- reorganisation, without underestimating
sideration of meat-based diets that prevail in other benefits for consumers and producers
Western countries, and are growing in de- associated with a decrease in the number of
veloping countries, is much needed. Dr Ra- intermediaries.
jendra Pachauri, chair of the IPCC, himself
launched this call: ‘Please, eat less meat: it’s a
very carbon intensive commodity!’
Conclusions: next steps
A shift towards practices that diversify mar-
• Rethink the organisation of ketable products, close waste loops and re-
thefood chain, and cut waste duce the need for external energy and fossil
Measuring the climate impacts of the post- fuel inputs will help mitigate the climate
production stages of the food chain (trans- problem, reduce energy use and pollution
portation, refrigeration, cooking) poses and create more adaptive food and agricul-
challenges. The emergence of the ‘food tural systems. This shift is ambitious and
miles’ concept – to identify emissions asso- requires the development of strong agri-
ciated with the air-freight of fresh products culture and food policies, with incentives
– has triggered considerable controversy, for climate-friendly practices and sanctions
emphasising the need for further research against harmful practices. To pave the way
and discussion of the issues. for this shift, below are a few recommenda-
tions for more immediate measures.
In a recent report,11 the UNEP emphasises
that ‘[c]hanging the ways in which food is a. An agenda for agriculture research
produced, handled and disposed of across Too much uncertainty still exists about the
the globe – from farm to store and from interactions between agriculture and cli-
fridge to landfi ll – can both feed the world’s mate change – more research is certainly
rising population and help the environmen- needed to overcome this gap. However,
tal services that are the foundation of agri- the focus of the research matters. Follow-
cultural productivity in the first place’. Over ing the assessment of the IAASTD, gov-
half the food produced globally today is lost, ernments need to recognise both that the
wasted or discarded as a result of inefficiency multifunctionality of agriculture calls for
in the human-managed food chain. In the multidisciplinary approaches to the sector,
and that local, indigenous knowledge must
10 New York Times (2008), ‘Obama’s “secretary of
be respected and more highly valued than it
food”?’, 11 December. has been to date.
11 UNEP, The Environmental Food Crises: Environment’s
Role in Averting Future Food Crises (2009).

Research needs to focus on how to make c. Refocus international climate negotiations
agroecological methods more productive There is no getting around the fact that cli-
and on how to disseminate better what we mate change is a global problem. It requires
already know these methods can achieve. In global solutions and fair systems to support
a recent report on organic agriculture and those who are most at risk (generally those
climate change, the International Trade least responsible for the problem). Multilat-
Centre stresses, ‘as 99 percent of the world’s eral negotiations are thus critical.
public and private research funds have fo-
cused on optimizing conventional and inte- But existing proposals and the dynamics of
grated food and farming systems during the the negotiations at the UNFCCC fall far
last decades, major progress and solutions short of the challenge and the emergency.
can be expected as a result of agro-ecolog- The global climate talks need to be refo-
ical and animal welfare research activities’.12 cused. First of all, governments must ensure
Substantial funding will be needed to sup- the meaningful participation of affected
port this new research agenda. groups, such as farmers’ organisations, in-
digenous peoples and environmentalists. At
b. Raise awareness and mobilise public opinion the same time, industry’s activism in pro-
‘History shows that most struggles for great moting quick fi xes needs to be controlled.
change – such as the abolition of slavery or The private sector’s contribution is vital,
the emancipation of women – started not as not least their capacity to innovate and dis-
the initiative of states but as the endeavour of seminate new technologies. There must be
ordinary people.’ These words of Amnesty criteria in place for any public support for
International Secretary General Irene Khan such initiatives, however, to ensure a desir-
are particularly relevant to the climate chal- able outcome beyond quick profits for the
lenge. There are many cases where ordinary fi rms involved.
people are ahead of their governments in
implementing climate-friendly practices, in The push to include agriculture as a specific
particular in their consumption habits. Food sector in the framework of the negotiations
is a sector where more outreach and dissem- strictly so that it can benefit from carbon
ination effort is needed so that consumers credits is troubling. Without even going
can make choices that will ultimately put into the reforms that would be needed to
pressure on policies. But more can and needs make the Clean Development Mechanism
to be done to raise public awareness about work for sustainable agriculture, it is clear
the relationship between their food and the that carbon prices would crash under the
climate. A good mix of ambitious leadership associated explosion of credits. The recent
and grassroots mobilisation will be neces- fi nancial crisis should be enough of a warn-
sary to move us in the right direction. ing against the risks of excessive speculation
on carbon markets. More research, scientific
evidence and pilot projects are needed be-
fore making decisions that could overhaul
the global landscape of agriculture.
12 ITC-FiBL (2007).

Finally, UNFCC Annex I countries need to
confront their historic responsibility, par-
ticularly in shaping existing food systems.
They need to contribute proportionately
to the identification and implementation of
comprehensive solutions. This can be done
through policy reforms, research and more
support to developing countries to build
climate-friendly food systems.
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Hungry: Six Reasons to Regulate Global Food hungsinstitut für biologische Landbau
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Bals, C., S. Harmeling, and M. Windfuhr
(2008), Climate Change, Food Security and Li-Ching, L. (2008), Sustainable Agricul-
the Right to Adequate Food. Stuttgart: Brot ture: Meeting Food Security Needs, Addressing
für die Welt, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe, Climate Challenges. Penang: Third World
Germanwatch. Network (TWN).
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P. Smith (2008), Cool Farming: Climate H. Janzen, P. Kumar, B. McCarl, S. Ogle,
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Warming Impacts of Food and Agriculture in the culture and Food Security in Africa, 2008.
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The right to the city – energy and climate change
Mike Hodson and Simon Marvin
Introduction
Cities are critical sites in our understanding Mike Hodson is
of both energy and climate change. They research fellow at the
are often simultaneously represented as be- SURF Centre in the
ing a significant part of the ‘cause’ of climate United Kingdom.
change, since urban areas and their inhab- His research interests
itants may be responsible for up to 75 per focus on city-regional
cent of global human energy consumption transitions to low-
and carbon emissions; as foremost among carbon economies,
the ‘victims’ of climate change, particularly the ways in which this
the vulnerable coastal megacities of the glo- may or may not happen and understandings of
bal South; and, as key sites of ‘innovative the lessons to be learned from such processes.
responses’, such as through the actions of
the representatives of large cities in the C40 Simon Marvin is
network.1 All cities face the critical chal- professor at and co-
lenge of how to ensure they can guarantee director of SURF. He is an
their long-term ecological and economic expert on the changing
survival in a context of human-made global relations between
ecological change – referred to as the An- neighbourhoods, cities,
thropocene period (see below) – that implies regions and infrastructure
greater uncertainty about climate change networks in a period
and the availability of critical resources such of resource constraint,
as food, water and energy (see Dalby 2007). institutional restructuring and climate change.
1 The C40 was formed in 2005 and is a group of the

‘world’s largest cities committed to tackling climate
change (because) cities and urban areas consume 75
per cent of the world’s energy and produce up to 75
per cent of its greenhouse gas emissions’‚ see http://
www.c40cities.org/

Strategically, we are interested in trying to one of the most precious yet most neglect-
understand whether emerging ecological and ed of our human rights. (p.23)
resource constraints lead to particular types of
response and to what extent these responses Critically, the questions we want to ask are:
imply quite different cities (Hodson and Mar- What does urban energy security mean?
vin 2009). In what follows we present two Which social interests are dominating the
different pathways that are currently being search for urban energy security, which so-
discussed. The question is: Is the response to cial interests are excluded and what conse-
environmental crises and resource constraints quences does this have?
based on the desire to develop relative auton-
omy for a city, as it seeks to withdraw from
reliance on national and international infra-
Cities as planetary terraciders/terraformers
structure to by-pass uncertain and vulnerable – Urbanatura in the Anthropocene
resources and develop its own local resources Cities are the material representation of to-
and thereby create a form of bounded securi- day’s energy-intensive economies, where
ty? For that response, eco-cities are the iconic carbon-based energy systems – oil, electric-
examples. Or alternatively, are responses to ity and mobility systems – have made the
constraint based on a wider concept of social huge agglomerations of cities and modern
needs, the right to a minimum level of en- industrial systems possible. Urbanisation
ergy service, and more collective ecological completely dominates the huge metalogisti-
security that addresses the needs of all com- cal systems made up of resource flows, en-
munities and attempts to build a concept of ergy, water, waste foods as well as flows of
global security? Here, the idea of relocalisa- people and goods that make up the contem-
tion movements is key. In this brief review porary world. The prefi x ‘meta’ helps us to
we critically assess emerging responses and view the city as an active intermediary, as a
the unsettling implications they have for the site of material transformation that antici-
conception of our collective rights to the city. pates, modifies and excretes the movement
As David Harvey (2008) argues: of resources, materials and people
The question of what kind of city we want Cities are connected through intensive air-
cannot be divorced from that of what kind line networks, logistical transportation sys-
of social ties, relationship to nature, life- tems, enormous energy and water grids as
styles, technologies and aesthetic values well as communication and ICT systems
we desire. The right to the city is far more interconnecting markets, production and
than the individual liberty to access urban consumption systems, people, organisations
resources: it is a right to change ourselves and governments. Yet in the contempo-
by changing the city. It is, moreover, a rary period there is a recognition that these
common rather than an individual right industrialised systems – not all located in
since this transformation inevitably de- cities, but certainly largely controlled by
pends upon the exercise of a collective organisations located in large global cities –
power to reshape the processes of urbani- have ecological effects that are beginning to
zation. The freedom to make and remake change the global ecological context within
our cities and ourselves is, I want to argue,

which cities attempt to ensure their contin- There is increasing recognition of the fact
ued reproduction (Luke 2003). that the metalogistical systems that make the
very notion of cities possible are actually re-
Geologists at the University of Leicester have shaping global planetary ecologies through
suggested that a new epoch has begun, which resource depletion, carbon production and
they call the Anthropocene (see Zalasiewicz pollution. In turn, these effects themselves
et al. 2008). It is proposed that this is the re- reshape the context within which contem-
sult of human actions whose critical mark- porary cities then have to ensure their own
ers include disturbances of the carbon cycle economic (and ecological) reproduction.
and global temperature, ocean acidification, It is possible to see that there are multiple
changes to sediment erosion and deposition, ways in which cities can be represented in
and species extinctions. This period coincides relation to climate change and resource
clearly with the development of industrialisa- constraint, but that these need to be under-
tion and the global growth in urbanisation stood through an existing system of uneven
that resulted in an estimated 50 per cent of economic divisions of labour between and
the world’s population living in urban areas within cities.
by 2000. Indeed, ‘the cover of GSA Today
in which this work appears makes the case While cities exist within a highly unified
rather strongly, showing the high-rise build- and integrated global space of capital flows,
ings of Shanghai fading out into the distance. particular cities vary widely in their access
It’s a stark reminder of how megacities like to ecological resources. Highly energy-
this one are transforming the planet’.2 intensive urban environments in the US
contrast with the cities of the global South,
where millions do not have access to clean
water, energy and basic telephones. The US
has almost 5 per cent of the world’s popula-
tion, but it generates about 25 per cent of
greenhouse gases. Americans’ ability to tap
into and control global ecosystems of fos-
sil fuel means that US cities are able to be
far more spatially expansive and destruc-
tive than if they had to survive solely on the
resources available in their national space.
Clearly then, global cities are able to exert
control over critical resources in competi-
tion with residents and refugees in other less
important and more ordinary cities.3
Cover of Geological Society of America. 3 As well as the differences between cities of the North
and South, there are of course also significant in-
ternal differences within all cities in terms of levels
of social access to critical resources such as energy,
2 See http://www.centauri-dreams.org/?p=1701 water and a clean local environment.

Consequently, we would expect significant security and access to energy sources under
differences in the capability of cities to re- the changed ecological conditions of climate
spond effectively to energy security and cli- change and resource constraint.
mate change. Critically, which cities have
the resources, knowledge and expertise,
social and institutional relationships, wider
Urban energy security – Relocalisation
governance capacity to shape systemic and as divisible or collective security?
managed (rather than project and piecemeal) Urban responses to the mentioned pressures
change in the social and technical organisa- are being developed in two quite different
tion of their cities and infrastructure? An- ways. First, there is a set of responses to these
thropocenic change creates a new urbanatura pressures focused on the development of
– a much more unpredictable context for the ‘new-build’ eco-developments. The second
longer-term development and reproduction set of responses focuses on more bottom-
of cities marked by climate change, resource up community-based approaches around
constraint, as well as energy, water and food relocalisation. Figure 2 compares these ap-
security issues (see Luke 2008). Now, cities’ proaches. Let’s look at each of these in turn
ability to ensure their longer-term economic in more detail.
and material reproduction will be dependent
on their ability to guarantee their ecological The fi rst focuses on new styles of develop-
ment projects, sometimes called eco-cities
Figure 1: Urban Energy Security Compared
neo-liber al responses f e at u r e ‘a lt e r n at i v e ’ r e s p o n s e s
Transcendence of limits Ecological constraints Work within limits
Commercial – banks, developers Community – NGOs,

Social interests
architects, utilities environmental groups, charities
Divisible Concept of security Collective
Productionist-scale economies Scale of solution Consumption – small local
Eco-urbanism – eco-cities,
Type of build Retrofitting – existing and new
regions, blocks and towns
Product of bounded
Consequences Mutual interdependencies
security and by-pass
Dongtan (Shanghai),
Exemplars Transitions Towns, Relocalisation
Masdar (UAE)

but replicable to other scales – eco-regions, point because the city of Masdar, whose
eco-blocks, eco-towns, eco-villages. These name translates as ‘the source’, will be
responses have at their core the claim that off-limits to automobiles. Solar power
they are able to transcend conventional plants in the surrounding sand, already
notions of ecological constraint – climate in early construction, will provide elec-
change and resource constraint – as they tricity for lighting and air-conditioning
build ecological security by internally pro- and for desalinating ocean water. Wind
ducing their own food, energy and other farms will contribute, along with efforts
critical resources. The 24 September 2008 to tap geothermal energy buried deep
issue of Scientifi c American announced that underneath the earth. The municipal-
‘massive developments proposed for the ity, which will ultimately aim to be zero
US, China and Abu Dhabi aim to reduce or carbon and zero waste, will boast a plant
even eliminate the environmental cost of city to produce hydrogen as well as fuel from
living’ (added emphasis, Biello 2008). Eco- the residents’ sewage, according to plan-
blocks have been developed as a new type of ners Foster + Partners. Perhaps most im-
urban ‘gated community’ development that portant for the desert city, all water will
is ‘resource self-sufficient (i.e. carbon neu- be recycled; even residents’ wastewater
tral) in its operation (or close to it), and if it will be used to grow crops in enclosed,
could replicate and spread throughout the self-sustaining farms that will further re-
world, this would be a major force in revers- cycle their own water. (Biello 2008)
ing global climate change’ (Fraker 2006).
Common to these different developments –
Scientifi c American then goes on to look at promoted by different sets of commercial,
three examples of eco-city development: developer, architectural and engineering
Treasure Island in San Francisco, Dongtan interests – is the notion of test beds, dem-
in Shanghai and Masdar in the United Arab onstrations or experiments of what might
Emirates. What all these cities seek to do is constitute new models of sustainable cities.
to reduce their reliance on external resourc- Critically, it is not clear whether at these
es of food, water and energy and extract scales it is possible to achieve their energy
value from waste streams, although the ex- and ecological objectives, given the disap-
tent to which this is possible varies between pointments with large multi-user buildings.
developments. For example, Dongtan and But these developments are also designed
Treasure Island are seeking to reduce ex- to be fi nancial as much as eco-technical
ternal energy and water requirements by up projects. Masdar’s property developer was
to half, whereas in the longer term Masdar quoted as saying: ‘We want Masdar city to
aims to be carbon neutral. be profitable, not just sunk cost. If it is not
profitable as a real-estate development, it is
A sheikhdom whose wealth rests on not sustainable’ (added emphasis, quoted in
black gold is building a city that will not Bullis 2009). There are, then, clearly com-
rely on any of it. Subterranean electric mercial limits to the development of eco-
cars – dubbed Personalized Rapid Tran- cities. As Gary Lawrence argued, the rea-
sit – will ferry passengers from point to son that Dongtan did not aspire to carbon

neutrality was partly technological but also any case will be developed for elites in order
because of the ‘need for the owner to make to help ensure their replicability. Third, they
a profit’ (quoted in Biello 2009). The inten- are strongly technocratic and productionist-
tion is to develop new models of develop- oriented, and fit logically with the claim
ment whereby the developer can extract that, by incorporating clever eco-technics
value from being an infrastructure provider within the design of cities, it is possible to
by internalising and commodifying resource carry on reproducing cities largely without
flows within the development. Ultimately, changing the organisation of society or the
the objective is to turn the whole develop- economy. Given such issues, one wonders
ment process, including the energy and in- about the relevance of new styles of urban-
frastructure, into a single financial product ism that are promoted for their ability to
that is replicable in other contexts. remarkably transcend eco-limits yet at the
same time do so in such a socially regressive
In this sense, eco-urbanism may represent an and market-oriented way, where success is
attempt to build privatised and bounded eco- reduced to their economic replicability.
logical spaces that can anticipate and transcend
ecological constraint and climate change for Our concern then is that eco-cities represent
their users. Consequently, there are clearly one particular response to the problems of cli-
limits involved in developing transcendent mate change, resource constraint and energy
urbanism. While it may be possible to create security in a period of particular ecological
contexts where it is commercially viable, this emergency and economic crisis. As such, we
is likely to mean these are designed, as in the should see them as the purest attempt to cre-
case of Masdar, ‘as a playground for the rich’ ate neo-liberalised environmental security,
(Friend quoted in Bullis 2009). not at the scale of the whole city or even the
planet, but in the form of a more bounded
For the developers of these cities, it is criti- divisible security in order to try to guarantee
cal to develop and test new models of ur- ecological security for elites.
banism and then roll these out in other con-
texts as a form of replicant eco-urbanism. But there are also other debates that include
Yet these new models assume a number of wider sets of social interests and try to put
key features that raise worrying issues about other social objectives on the urban policy
the degree to which we can talk about fair agenda. These include the Transition Towns
cities. First, they are being developed by a and Relocalisation movements being de-
limited range of commercial interests that veloped as local social and behavioural re-
explicitly seek to develop eco-cities as po- sponses in a number of urban contexts in the
tentially replicable global fi nancial products UK and US. For example, there are now 28
that can be developed in any context and Transition Towns in the UK:
transcend ecological limits. Second, their
success is partly measured by the degree to A Transition Initiative is a community
which they can be profitably reproduced, that is unleashing its own latent collec-
therefore reducing their replication to spe- tive genius to look Peak Oil and Climate
cific market-based circumstances, which in Change squarely in the eye and to dis-

cover and implement ways to address this This implies a more critical view of our re-
BIG question: ‘for all those aspects of life liance on energy and the resultant implica-
that this community needs in order to tions. Evidently, there would be significant
sustain itself and thrive, how do we sig- benefits in looking further at such alterna-
nificantly increase resilience (to mitigate tives and how they compare and contrast
the effects of Peak Oil) and drastically with the strategies involved around eco-
reduce carbon emissions (to mitigate the cities. There would be value in contrasting
effects of Climate Change)?’ The result- the different logics in terms of the social in-
ing coordinated range of projects across terests, the solutions developed, the balance
all these areas of life leads to a collective- between productionist and demand solutions
ly designed energy descent pathway.4 and the implications of such strategies. More
widely, there would be benefits in consider-
Such strategies seem to imply a more collec- ing how other constructions could be based
tive approach to innovation around climate on concepts, such as mutual interdepend-
change and resource constraints, one that is ence, relationality, trading and trade-off s,
not solely oriented towards technical fi xes, fair shares and environmental justice.
and a more socially and culturally driven ap-
proach to new solutions and configurations.
Critically, these are designed in context and
Conclusion
cut across all aspects of urban life. A key fo- There are a range of critical pressures to re-
cus is on resource reduction rather than re- internalise energy and other infrastructure
producing the productivist bias of commer- flows within the conception of urban devel-
cial approaches. To take another example, a opment. A new set of eco-technics is seek-
US network draws together over 172 urban ing to develop internalised metabolisms that
post-carbon groups world-wide. What is are simultaneously an attempt to build eco-
interesting about this network is that: logical security for the few and an attempt
to create new mobile fi nancial products of
The Relocalization strategy developed integrated urban development as a new op-
in response to the environmental, social, portunity for capitalist reproduction. Our
political and economic impacts of glo- argument is that the dominant logic of neo-
bal over-reliance on cheap energy. Our liberal responses is the creation of ‘bounded’
dependence on cheap nonrenewable security in new ecological enclaves for pre-
fossil fuel energy has produced climate mium users that ignore wider distributional
change, the erosion of community, wars questions about uneven access to resource
for oil-rich land and the instability of the politics. These are the ecologically secure
global economic system.5 gated communities of the 21st century that
seek to internalise ecological resources and
build strategic protection from climate
change and wider resource constraints.
4 http://www.transitiontowns.org/
(accessed 29 January 2008).
5 http://relocalize.net/about/relocalization
(accessed 29 January 2008).

Consequently, at the moment markets for back on the urban agenda. Movements such
new eco-developments are likely to exist as green jobs, Transitions Towns and Re-
only in premium sites – that is, world cities localisation are trying to develop an alter-
– where the premium product that is pro- native discourse about greater self-reliance.
duced is largely irrelevant to the claims of Part of this discourse are questions of social
reproducibility made by its proponents. It control – technology for whom by whom
is likely that eco-funding through bailouts –, attempts to link investment to local need
may be used to accelerate the development and the development of interdependencies
of such solutions in an attempt to reconfig- and mutuality rather than securitisation, al-
ure capitalist urban development. Of course, though these are more marginal and exter-
such premium ecological environments have nal to the dominant responses.
relatively little to offer to the real challenge
of re-engineering and systemically retrofit- Finally, if we are to build fair cities that ad-
ting existing urban environments to reduce vance collective planetary security, we need
energy and water use, accelerate low-carbon to think about linking these disconnected
technologies and provide affordable energy logics of development together rather than
for all users. allowing a dominant security-led approach
to sit alongside a much more marginal set of
At the same time, it is not even clear if the approaches. We need more interaction in the
claims made about the new self-reliant and following five ways. First, to bring together
autonomous developments are achievable. questions about which social interests are
There is a long history of eco-buildings and involved and excluded – we need to bring
districts not achieving the savings claimed users back into questions about resource
for them, as users behave in unanticipated futures. Second, to bring together over-
ways. In any case, we are usually only talk- technicised and over-socialised responses
ing about forms of greater autonomy and – we need socio-technical change. Third,
self-reliance – therefore, only relative forms to develop knowledge and expertise that is
of ‘by-pass’. Will centralised infrastructure not just about ‘new-builds’ and security, but
networks act as the provider of last resort about retrofitting the existing city. Fourth,
when local technologies fail? Critically, what we need to emphasise questions about need
about forms of mobility – especially inter- and the politics of interdependencies rather
nationally: how will these be provided? than bounded security for some. Fifth, it is
crucial to develop a debate about the con-
In contrast to these conventional responses, sequences of a new style of urbanism rather
there are alternative movements that are less than the creation of new urban eco-technic
commercially focused, more locally based, and fi nancial products as a response to eco-
less technologically fi xated, which are also logical crisis.
trying to put questions about relocalisation

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Acknowledgements
We are grateful to our colleagues in SURF,
Tim May and Beth Perry, for their support
in developing the ideas in this paper and to
Vivian Liang for excellent help in securing
the permissions for the figures and photo-
graphs illustrating this contribution. Our
thanks also to the editors of the report for
providing constructive and helpful feedback
on the paper.

part iii »
Mapping (and
walking) the terrain
of climate justice

Climate justice in the US
Gopal Dayaneni
Between a rock and a hard place,

or the global trash compactor
Most readers are probably familiar with
the 1977 science fiction blockbuster movie,
Star Wars. Remember the trash compactor
scene? That scene provides a nice metaphor
for the state of global economic and eco-
logical crisis. We are all trapped in a global
trash compactor. The walls are closing in.
On one side, we have climate chaos with
all its myriad consequences. On the other,
we have the wall of racial, gender, economic
and environmental injustice also closing in
on us. In the middle, we have us – every- Gopal Dayaneni serves on the planning
one. And as the walls begin closing in, what committee for Movement Generation
is the fi rst thing you do? You try to push Justice and Ecology Project, which works to
back. Many people concerned over the past bring a strategic understanding of ecological
30-plus years with the rapidly increasing crisis and facilitates strategic planning
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the for action among organisers working for
atmosphere have been pushing against the economic and racial justice. Gopal also
wall of climate chaos. Armed with the best serves on the board of the International
science, they have been demanding, and Accountability Project, is an active trainer
sometimes taking real action to slow the re- with the Ruckus Society and a member of
lease of carbon into the atmosphere and/or the Progressive Communicators Network.
get carbon out of the atmosphere.
Up against the other wall are the communi-

ties attempting to push back against the ad-
vance of ever increasing inequity, poverty,
violence and injustice. Those folks (for the

sake of the metaphor, we’ll call them the reb- down. We need to go R2D2 on a systemic
els) are primarily peoples in the global South level and address the root causes of the prob-
and indigenous peoples worldwide and poor lem. That is what climate justice is about. As
communities and communities of colour in David Pellow and Lisa Sun-Hee Park (2009
the North. These are the people who have forthcoming) of the University of Minnesota
been the victims of colonisation, environ- write:
mental racism, destructive development and
economic impoverishment in the name of People of color, indigenous communi-
progress. The North (and elites in the South), ties, and global South nations bear the
instead of pushing back, are running to the brunt of climate disruption in terms of
centre, staying as far away from the walls ecological, economic, and health bur-
closing in as they can, buying themselves dens. In addition, climate change infers
some time, but only time and not very much of a naturally occurring process rather than
it. As they crowd the centre space, more and a disruption created by specific human
more folks are forced up against the walls, al- activity. For these reasons, activists and
lowing those in the centre to ignore both the scholars have developed the concept of
walls closing in and the folks getting crushed. climate justice, which recognizes that the
But we are now at a place in which the walls struggle for racial and economic justice
are so close they can no longer be ignored. So is inseparable from any effort to combat
what do we do? climate change. Climate justice begins
with an acknowledgement of climate
We grab some big piece of metal and try to injustice and views this problem not as
jam it up there, thinking that a system de- an unfortunate byproduct of climate dis-
signed specifically to crush that stuff might ruption, but as one of its core elements,
be thwarted by it. Let’s call these the false and one that must be confronted if cli-
solutions. They are everything from the mate disruption is to be reversed.
techno-fi xes such as biofuels, ‘clean coal’
and geo-engineering, to the kinds of mar-
ket-based climate policies that we know
Rights-based climate justice
won’t work, but might, at best, slow the rate But what is the R2D2 of climate justice?
of collapse. Slowing down the collapse – that is Here is where the metaphor breaks down.
the best we can hope for from these false so- Our solutions will not come from folks on
lutions. And the best evidence we have right the outside of the crisis, but from coordi-
now says that those false solutions will make nation of forces within the climate justice
the situation worse – accelerating both the movement – where we recognise that we
ecological collapse and the inequity, there- have multiple strategic points of leverage
by making mitigation and adaptation that and that we must align these approaches.
much harder for the most vulnerable and Currently, the term ‘climate justice’ is used
least responsible. in many ways, but without some level of
strategic alignment in interventions, we will
So what do we do? We need to do exactly not achieve the level of impact necessary to
what they do in Star Wars. Shut the system lead us towards the real solutions we need.

While there is some alignment, and the dif- the voices of those communities least respon-
ferent approaches to climate justice are in no sible for and most severely impacted by cli-
way mutually exclusive, greater alignment mate change, namely poor people of colour
is critical. Let’s explore these different takes and indigenous peoples, and demanded that
on climate justice. climate policy does not further exacerbate ex-
isting economic and environmental inequal-
As we approach Copenhagen, the question of ity, but redress it. According to Nia Robin-
what kind of global policy on the climate cri- son, director of the Environmental Justice
sis can emerge has very much dominated the and Climate Change Initiative, in an inter-
political imagination, and in this context cli- view with the author, ‘the successful creation
mate justice refers to a rights-based/justice- of climate policy can not happen without the
based approach to climate policy. Organisa- input of communities that have suffered as
tions that take positions that are broadly in a result of the US fossil fuel addiction. Our
line with declarations and statements in the government must begin to recognize these
international context on climate justice such communities as experts or run the risk of cre-
as the Bali Principles (2007), the Belem Dec- ating policies that will do as much harm if not
laration (2009) and others, are within the cli- more than climate change itself’. Just as the
mate justice fold. Additionally, a key theme environmental justice movement transformed
is the subordination of climate policy to UN the environmental movement by reposition-
rights declarations and conventions, such as ing human communities and equity at the
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous centre of environmentalism and brought a
Peoples. Policy initiatives emerging from this racial and economic justice lens to that work,
approach include broad opposition to a mar- the climate justice movement has pushed the
kets-based approach to carbon (carbon trad- climate movement in the US. Through the
ing), and even more adamantly, opposition movement’s orientation embodied in this use
to exotic market instruments, namely, off- of the term ‘climate justice’, we see emerging
sets; ramp-down to low-carbon economies; a ‘popular movement of movements’, led from
a phase-out of fossil fuels; and, probably most the grassroots. A key issue for the climate jus-
importantly, an ecological debt-based mech- tice/environmental justice movement in the
anism for financing and technology transfer US is articulating that even within the North,
from the North to the South. In this catego- there is a South; that this ‘South in the North’
ry we include a broad range of groups who is owed the same ecological debt (to indig-
share positions, who work domestically and/ enous peoples, to African Americans for the
or internationally and use a broad range of legacy of slavery and others); and that there
strategies, including research, international are communities disproportionately impacted
solidarity, analysis, public education, advoca- due to race and class.
cy and organising. This approach to climate
justice is also present in US climate policy.
Struggles-based climate justice
In the US, the environmental justice move- In recent years, also stemming from the envi-
ment has given rise to a climate justice move- ronmental justice and environmental health
ment that has simultaneously fought to raise movements, the use of climate justice has

emerged as referring to the grassroots strug- tion. Some of this is emerging from main-
gles of communities in the US and Canada stream environmental organisations and some
who are fighting against the root causes of from the youth climate movement. While we
climate change in their own backyards/ see lots of young people holding posters that
frontyards. Put another way, Fenceline and say ‘Climate Justice’, we did not see a clear ar-
Frontline communities fighting oil, coal, ticulation of a justice/rights-based agenda on
gas, tar sands, incineration, deforestation, etc. climate. In fact, many groups that are driving
Only more recently have these folks emerged the youth climate movement support policies
on the scene as part of the ‘climate’ issue. For that run counter to the established principles
example, communities fighting refineries and of climate justice. We are seeing more and
power plants across the country as environ- more of this use of the term by a broad range
mental justice struggles against point-source of groups who are now using direct action in
pollution have focused on health, poverty some form or other to address climate change.
and environmental racism as the core themes There is, again, overlap. Many groups that
of their struggles. Now, confronting the are engaging in creative direct action or civ-
root causes of climate change has emerged il disobedience as part of their strategy are
as a critical, unifying theme. This started in also advancing a rights-based framework,
the late 1990s, and really took hold after the are supporting the leadership of those most
2nd People of Color Environmental Lead- directly impacted and are attacking the root
ership Summit in Washington DC in 2002 causes of climate change. But many are not,
(10 years after the 1992 Environmental Jus- and differentiating between the two becomes
tice Leadership Summit). Examples are the critical. One way to think of this is that cli-
struggle against ‘mountain top removal’ in mate action is not always action for climate
Appalachia (the practice of blowing off entire justice. Depending on the theory of change
mountaintops to reach underlying mineral and strategies you are employing, the action
deposits), coal mining on indigenous lands must either, and ideally in combination ad-
and tar sands development in Canada. These vance a rights-based agenda consistent with
struggles have long been fought locally and the frameworks established collectively by
are now flashpoints of climate justice as local the international climate justice movement;
fights to address the root causes of climate take leadership from and be accountable to
change, while fighting for concrete improve- those most directly impacted and least re-
ments in the daily lives of communities. sponsible; or engage in community struggles
There is a strong focus here on accountability on the root causes of climate change.
to communities and on communities speak-
ing for themselves, while there has been less The strongest movement for climate justice
emphasis, until recently, on the questions of coming out of the US will be one where
climate policy. we have strategic alignment between these
groups, and there are many organisations
and networks that represent this alignment,
Climate action as climate justice? particularly the Mobilization for Climate
Also developing more in recent years is the Justice, the Indigenous Environmental
conflation of climate justice with climate ac- Network, the Environmental Justice and

Climate Change Initiative and the Envi- Literature
ronmental Justice Leadership Forum on
Climate Change, among others. We need Pellow, D.N., and L. Sun-Hee Park (2009,
a rights-based approach to climate policy forthcoming), ‘From Climate Change and
led by directly impacted communities and Climate Disruption to Climate Justice:
grassroots organising that takes direct action Analysis and Policy Considerations for Af-
in support of and with leadership from com- rican American Communities’, Department
munities on the frontlines of the chain of of Sociology, University of Minnesota.
production of climate change. As Clayton
Thomas-Muller of the Indigenous Environ-
mental Network observed in an interview
with the author:
In the US and across the globe, the

movement for Climate Justice has been
steadily growing, not simply demanding
action on climate, but demanding rights-
based and justice-based action on climate that
confronts false solutions, root causes of
climate change and amplifies the voices
of those least responsible and most di-
rectly impacted. Not only are we the
front-line of impacts, we are the front
line of survival. As Indigenous Peoples,
all of humanity is dependent on our tra-
ditional, sacred, evolved knowledge of
Mother Earth.
If we can create a people-powered, inside-

outside approach both in the US and inter-
nationally, we have a chance for a just tran-
sition to a sustainable future.

Climate change and human rights
Wolfgang Sachs
Tulun and Takuu, two tiny islands off the

coast of Papua New Guinea, are close to be-
ing swallowed up by the Pacific Ocean – vic-
tims of global climate change. The govern-
ment has sent emergency food supplies to the
islands, as the inhabitants have had to live on
fish and coconut since salt water flooded their
fields. Many fear that a distinctive culture
will vanish if the people of Tulun and Takuu
are forced to give up their native land.
Who are the winners and who the losers in

climate change? Burning fossil fuels (as well
as forests) has both huge benefits and huge Wolfgang Sachs is a senior fellow at the
costs. As to the first, access to fuel provides Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment
economic power. Thus, we see in the nego- and Energy, as well as an honorary professor
tiations for a post-Kyoto agreement nations at the University of Kassel, Germany
scrambling for allowances to use the atmos-
phere as a dumping-ground for greenhouse
gases. Climate equity in this context is about
equality among nations. As to the second,
however, causing the dumping ground to
overflow gives rise to numerous climate
threats, possibly to such a degree that fun-
damental rights might be violated. Climate
equity in this context is about human rights.
Dangerous to whom?
The 1992 United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change calls for the sta-

bilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations Impacts
at levels that ‘would prevent dangerous an-
thropogenic interference with the climate When the earth’s atmosphere grows warmer,
system’ (Article 2). But what increase in glo- nature becomes unstable. It is no longer pos-
bal mean temperatures is tolerable? Climate sible to rely on rainfall, groundwater levels,
negotiations have largely refrained from de- temperature, wind or seasons – all factors
fi ning what may constitute dangerous an- that, since time immemorial, have made bi-
thropogenic interference with the climate otopes hospitable for plants, animals and hu-
system (Hare 2003). What kind of threat mans. The most important impacts are likely
qualifies as ‘dangerous’? If the sea level rises to affect the natural assets that underpin hu-
by 20 centimetres? By one metre? A one de- man existence – water, food and health.
gree rise in average global temperature, or
three degrees? And in what timeframe: in With regard to water, it is important to note
20 years, or in 80 years? that 30 countries with a combined popula-
tion of over 500 million are currently con-
These questions appear to be technical, but sidered to be affected by water scarcity, a
in reality are highly political. What lurks be- condition that by the year 2025 is likely to
hind them are basic decisions regarding the affect some 50 countries with a combined
coexistence of people and nations on earth. population of about 3 billion. The hydro-
Because different impacts are associated with logical cycle is expected to intensify, which
different levels of temperature rise, who will essentially means more droughts and floods
be affected, how and to what extent largely and more variable and extreme rainfall.
depends on how far global warming is al- Generation-old patterns of rainfall may be
lowed to proceed. The dire effects of cli- shifting, severely impacting plants, animals
mate change will intensify global poverty and people. Several hundred million to a
and deepen social polarisation, since they few billion people are expected to suffer a
affect the poor more than the rich. Particu- reduction in their water supply of 10 per cent
larly the countries of the South, especially or more by the year 2050 in climate change
rural communities that depend directly on projections corresponding to a 1 per cent
nature, will come to feel the destabilis- per year increase in CO2 emissions. Regions
ing effects of global warming much more where water stress is likely to increase due to
abruptly than overdeveloped countries and climate change include Central and South-
urban populations. Therefore, any decision ern Africa, Central and Southern America
about what is to be considered a dangerous and the watersheds around the Mediterra-
level of impact is clearly a political and ethi- nean, while South and East Asia are likely
cal issue. It basically implies two valuations: to see an increase in water resources (Arnell
what kind of danger is acceptable, and what 2004). Finally, too much of the wrong water
kind of danger to whom is acceptable? It is can be dangerous as well. Rising sea levels
the response to the latter question that de- obviously increase the risk of coastal flood-
termines the degree of environmental injus- ing, which could displace large numbers of
tice involved in climate politics. people. Some of the most vulnerable regions

are the Nile delta in Egypt, the Ganges- regions where many people are already un-
Brahmaputra delta in Bangladesh and many dernourished, notably Africa.
small islands, such as the Maldives, the Mar- Finally, as public health depends to a large
shall Islands and Tuvalu. extent on safe drinking water, sufficient
food and secure shelter, climate change is
Furthermore, climate change will leave its bound to have a range of health effects. On
imprint on the conditions for food produc- the fi rst level, a shortage of freshwater caused
tion across the globe. In temperate zones, by climate change will increase the risk of
small increases in temperature might boost waterborne diseases, just as food shortages
yields for some cereals, while larger changes will increase the risk of malnutrition. On
are likely to decrease yields. In most tropi- a second level, climate change, by way of a
cal and subtropical regions, potential yields shift in background climate conditions and
are projected to diminish with most increases changes in regional climatic variability, will
in temperature. For instance, damage to the affect the spatial and seasonal patterns of the
world’s major crops begins when daytime potential transmission of various infectious
temperatures climb above 30ºC during flow- diseases. With global warming, the geo-
ering. For rice, wheat and maize, yields are graphic range of potential transmission of
likely to decline by 10 per cent for every 1ºC malaria and dengue is likely to increase. A
increase over 30ºC (Halweil 2005). If, in ad- rise in temperatures, for example, would re-
dition, there is also a large decrease in rainfall sult in an increased prevalence of malaria in
in subtropical and tropical dryland/rain-fed higher altitudes and latitudes. The human-
systems, crop yields would be even more ad- induced warming that the world is now ex-
versely affected. In tropical agricultural areas, periencing is already causing 150,000 deaths
yields of some crops are expected to decrease and 5 million instances of disease each year
even with minimal increases in temperature from increased malaria and diarrhoea, most-
(IPCC 2001). Moreover, it is expected that ly in the poorest nations (Patz et al. 2005),
the income of poor farmers will decline with though actual disease occurrence is strongly
a warming of 1.5ºC-2ºC above preindustrial influenced by local conditions. On the third
levels (Hare 2003). In fragile rural areas, such level, climate change will be accompanied
a change will aggravate the circumstances by an increase in heat waves, often exacer-
of people who derive their livelihood from bated by increased humidity and urban air
direct access to forest, grasslands and water- pollution, which would cause an increase in
courses. While global production appears to heat-related deaths and episodes of illness,
remain stable, differences in crop production particularly among the elderly and the sick.
between temperate and tropical regions are
likely to grow over time, leading to a sig- Summing up these possible effects of global
nificant polarisation of effects, with substan- warming on sea levels, water availability and
tial increases in the risk of hunger among the the incidence of malaria, it has been estimat-
poorer nations, especially under scenarios of ed that with an increase of global mean tem-
greater inequality (Parry et al. 2004). De- perature of 2-3 degrees above preindustrial
clines in food production will most likely hit levels, 20-30 per cent of all higher plants and

animals will be threatened with extinction; State Parties to the present covenant recog-
more than 100 million people living in delta nise the right of everyone to an adequate
areas will, under conservative estimates, be standard of living for himself and his family,
threatened with flooding and will have to including adequate food, clothing and hous-
move; and water stress is likely to increase ing...’ (Article 11) and ‘the right to the high-
for 1 billion more people every 30 years be- est standard of mental and physical health’
tween 2020 and 2080 (IPCC 2007). (Article 12). Influenced by this formulation,
which echoes Article 25 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the debate
Human rights on development has changed tack in the past
There has been injustice in the world since decades: overcoming hunger, illness and
time immemorial. Similarly, the expulsion misery is no longer seen as a matter of char-
of people from their land, the assault on ity or solidarity, but as a matter of human
their physical wellbeing and the withdraw- rights. The needs-based approach in devel-
al of their means of subsistence have been opment has been more and more replaced
standard instruments in the repressive exer- by a rights-based approach.
cise of power. But only since the middle of
the 20th century have such ways of degrad-
ing others been thought to involve contempt
Rights-based climate policy
for human rights. In today’s world, there is The dire consequences resulting from cli-
an international consensus that instances of mate change – in particular, several decades
humiliation and impoverishment have to be from now – will spread across the globe,
measured against the norm of guarantee- albeit in varying degree. Countries – and
ing the fundamental rights of every human regions within countries – are dispropor-
person. By birthright, people are considered tionately affected for basically two reasons:
bearers of rights that protect their dignity, higher impacts and higher vulnerability. As
regardless of their nationality or cultural indicated above, the adverse impacts of cli-
affi liation. These rights are equal, that is, mate change are likely to be more concen-
everyone enjoys the same rights; they are trated in areas of Africa, South America and
inalienable, that is, they cannot be forfeited; Asia than in the global North. Impact pro-
and they are universal, that is, every human fi les differ according to the kind of impact
being is a holder of fundamental rights. Es- and geography, but water stress and flood-
pecially in an age of globalisation, it is in- ing, declining agricultural productivity and
creasingly the discourse of human rights weakening ecosystem services, crop pests
that defi nes the terms of reference for dis- and human diseases are more likely to oc-
putes over power and its victims. cur in subtropical and tropical countries, in
coastal areas and in arid and semi-arid agri-
When human beings do not have the basic cultural areas. Higher vulnerability, howev-
capability to support themselves with dig- er, derives from the fact that in many places
nity, their human rights are under threat. at risk a great number of people already live
The International Covenant on Economic, in fragile conditions, economically and with
Social and Cultural Rights declares that ‘the regard to their health. The ability to prepare

for and to cope with threats varies widely justice, misses out on the universalist nature
according to income and living conditions. of human rights entitlements.
The impact of a hurricane in Orissa, India,
for example, may be much more severe than Furthermore, climate rights call for extra-
the impact of a similar hurricane in Florida, territorial responsibility. Climate distur-
USA. The poor generally tend to have much bances obviously exceed the jurisdiction of
lower coping capacities: they are more ex- individual states: they are, in fact, a strik-
posed to disasters, drought, desertification ing example of the transnational character
and slow economic decline. of threats in a highly interdependent world.
Under such circumstances, the human
Climate perturbations are likely to be super- rights obligations of states and non-state ac-
imposed on economic insecurity. As people tors cannot simply stop at territorial borders.
already living at the edge see themselves Rather, they must reach into other coun-
pushed into disaster, climate effects may tries as well. As the special rapporteur to the
trigger an infringement upon economic and Human Rights Commission on the Right
social human rights. This is not to say that to Food has recently stated: ‘Governments
climate-related threats (hurricanes or heat must recognise their extraterritorial obliga-
waves, for instance) to human physical in- tions towards the right to food. They should
tegrity under conditions of greater affluence refrain from implementing any policies or
may not constitute a human rights violation programs that might have negative effects
as well, but impacts in poorer regions often on the right to food of people living outside
exacerbate an already structurally precarious their territories’ (UNCHR 2005). When
livelihood situation. It is the compounded the right to food is threatened by climate
effect of economic insecurity and climate change, the principle of extraterritorial ob-
stress for large numbers of people that is at ligations becomes even more relevant, given
the centre of the question of how much cli- that rich countries are largely responsible for
mate change should be allowed as a human climate perturbations in poorer countries.
rights issue. Just as climate effects reach to the ends of
the earth, the geographical scope of respon-
However, climate-related human rights are sibility has become global as well.
matched by only imperfect, not perfect, du-
ties. Just as a violation of the right to food, However, this responsibility is in the fi rst
health or shelter can often not be traced place a negative one: it implies avoiding
back to the action of a clearly identifiable harmful action rather than intervening to
duty-bearer, so can climate effects not be provide the conditions for a life without
attributed to a culprit with a name and ad- privation. Under human rights law, gov-
dress. Who exactly should be held respon- ernments are supposed to carry out a triple
sible for hunger and widespread illness? But task with regard to the rights to food, health
the absence of culprits or judges does not and housing: they have the duty to respect,
nullify rights. A strictly legal conception, protect and fulfi l them. It would follow that
which maintains that there are no rights the same hierarchy of obligations applies to
unless they can be enforced in a court of climate rights: the right to live in freedom

from human-induced climate perturbations 2ºC above preindustrial levels. It is obvious
has fi rst to be respected by avoiding harmful that such a target calls for mitigation com-
emissions nationally; it has, secondly, to be mitments far beyond the Kyoto Protocol.
protected against third-party emissions by Finally, human rights considerations also
countries or corporations through interna- imply vigorous measures to facilitate ad-
tional cooperation; and, thirdly, it has to be aptation to unavoidable climate change.
fulfi lled by upgrading people’s capability to Inasmuch as mitigation is insufficient, the
cope with climate change through adapta- polluter-pays principle requires that high-
tion measures, such as dam building, reset- emitting nations prevent rights violations
tlement or land redistribution. and offer compensation for damages caused.
Measures may range from upgrading health-
care, to investments in construction, to the
Mitigation and adaptation building of dams. Recent calculations sug-
In 2005, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference gest that US$ 10-40 billion annually will be
fi led a legal petition to the Inter-American required to fi nance such adaptation meas-
Commission of Human Rights demanding ures. And, of course, the polluter-pays prin-
that the US limit its emissions. This move by ciple requires that high-emitting nations of-
the people living in the Arctic represents the fer compensation for damages caused.
fi rst legal case brought against a high-emit-
ting nation in defence of economic, social Compensatory payments are necessary, but
and cultural human rights (Watt-Cloutier they leave the causes of pollution untouched.
2004). Many indicators suggest that global Cuts in fossil fuel use are imperative not
warming is threatening the ability of the only to protect the atmosphere but also
Inuit to survive as a hunting-based culture. to protect human rights. Since the Bill of
Rights was won during England’s ‘Glorious
From a human rights point of view, the clas- Revolution’, freedom from physical harm
sical policy responses to dangerous climate has been the core of the basic legal canon
change, mitigation and adaptation, ought that states have an obligation to guarantee.
to be pursued with additional urgency. As Yet millions of people are in the process of
to mitigation, human rights considerations losing this core of civil rights – food, shelter
need to enter into the defi nition of what and an infection-free environment. Only
constitutes dangerous climate change and this time, the threat of physical harm comes
recent moves in the UN Human Rights not from the state but from the cumulative
Council point in this direction. They direct long-range effects of energy consumption
attention to the most vulnerable sections of in the prosperous parts of the world. The
the world population, suggesting a frame need for low-emission economies in the
of evaluation that is consistent with the ba- South and the North is therefore far more
sic law that governs world society. A sur- than a question of an appeal to morality: it
vey of possible impacts (Exeter Conference is a core demand of cosmopolitan politics.
2005) suggests a target that avoids systematic Climate protection is not simply about crops
threats to human rights would need to keep and coral reefs – it is, fundamentally, about
the global mean temperature increase below human rights.

Literature
Arnell, N.W. (2004), ‘Climate Change and IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: Impacts,
Global Water Resources: SRES Emissions Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of
and Socio-economic Scenarios’, Global En- Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment
vironmental Change, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp.31-52, Report. Cambridge: Cambridge University
April. Press.
Exeter Conference (2005), Avoiding Dan- Parry, M.L., C. Rosenzweig, A. Iglesias, M.

gerous Climate Change. A Scientific Sym- Livermore, and G. Fischer (2004), ‘Effects
posium on Stabilisation of Greenhouse of Climate Change on Global Food Pro-
Gases. Exeter, 1-3 February (www.stabilisa- duction under SRES Emissions and Socio-
tion2005.com) economic Scenarios’, Global Environmental
Change, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp.53-67, April.
Halweil, B. (2005), ‘The Irony of Climate’,
World Watch Magazine, pp.18-23, March/ Patz, J.A., D. Campbell-Lendrum, T. Hol-
April. loway, and J.A. Foley (2005), ‘Impact of Re-
gional Climate Change on Human Health’,
Hare, W. (2003), Assessment of Knowledge on Nature, Vol. 438, pp.310-17.
Impacts of Climate Change – Contribution to the
Specifi cation of Art. 2 of the UNFCCC. Expert UNCHR (United Nations Commission on
study for the German Advisory Council on Human Rights) (2005), Report of the Spe-
Global Environmental Change for the Spe- cial Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean
cial Report, ‘Climate Protection Strategies Ziegler, E/CN.4/2005/47, 24 January.
for the 21st Century: Kyoto and Beyond’.
Berlin: WBGU. Watt-Cloutier, Sheila (2004), Climate Change
and Human Rights. www.carnegiecouncil.
IPCC (2001), Climate Change 2001. Synthesis org/viewMedia.php/prmID/4445
Report. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.

Energy, crisis and world-wide
production relations
Kolya Abramsky
Changes within the energy sector are accel-

erating dramatically. A variety of ecologi- Kolya Abramsky has worked over the last
cal, political, economic and fi nancial factors 10 years with a wide range of grassroots
are converging to ensure that energy pro- social and environmental organisations
duction and consumption become central to from around the world within different
the global restructuring of social relations in anti-capitalist networking processes. He
the years ahead. This is true of energy in has just completed an edited volume
general and the globally expanding renew- on energy- related struggles entitled,
able-energy sector in particular. The way Sparking a World-wide Energy Revolution:
in which the world’s energy system evolves Social Struggles in the Transition to a Post-
in the years ahead will be intimately inter- Petrol World, and is currently preparing
twined with different possible ways out of a global conference, to take place in
the world fi nancial-economic crisis (which late 2011, on anti-capitalist transition
is also increasingly becoming a crisis of le- processes towards a new energy system.
gitimacy and political control).
The multiple intersecting and mutually re-

inforcing crises starkly pose the need to con- newable energies has the potential to make
struct new world-wide relations of produc- an important contribution to the process of
tion and exchange that are substantially more constructing new relations of production,
decentralised, participatory and egalitarian exchange and livelihood that are based on
than the relations that currently exist. How- solidarity, diversity and autonomy and are
ever, climate change and peak oil require a substantially more democratic, egalitarian
massive and rapid reduction in CO2 emissions and ecologically sensitive than those that
and energy use, and hence also a fundamental currently exist. Furthermore, the construc-
change in how humans interact with nature tion of new social relations along the above
and the ecology they are a part of. lines is also likely to be crucial in avoiding
disastrous ‘solutions’ to the fi nancial-eco-
The process of building a new energy sys- nomic and political crises.
tem based on a greatly expanded use of re-

Some kind of transition to post-petrol ener- energy is essential to both production and
gy sources is virtually inevitable. However, sustaining life.
the outcome is not a technical given. It is
no longer a question of whether a transi- However, class struggle is inherently uncer-
tion to a new energy system will occur, but tain, and this is the central uncertainty of
rather what form it will take. Will it involve the transition process itself. Who will bring
a dramatic and rapid collapse, or will it be a it about, and for what purposes, for whose
smoother and more gradual process? Which benefit, and at whose expense? Importantly,
technologies will a transition include, and given that energy is relevant to class rela-
on whose terms and priorities? Who will be tions in general (since energy both replaces
able to harness the necessary global flows and enhances human labour), energy ‘cri-
of capital, raw materials, knowledge and sis’ and ‘transition’ are also relevant to class
labour? Indeed, will people even let their struggles in general, not just those that exist
resources, knowledge, skills and labour be within the energy sector itself.
‘harnessed’ from above and outside, or will
they strongly assert the possibility of using Many years will elapse before it is clear
their skills and energy to their own benefit whether capital can harness new combina-
and on their own terms? And, above all, tions of energy that are capable of imposing
will the process be chaotic, reinforcing al- and maintaining a certain stable (and prof-
ready existing hierarchies, or will it be part itable) organisation of work the way fossil
of wider process of world-wide emancipa- fuels did; or whether in fact a new energy
tory social change based on the construction system will not allow for this to occur, and
of new social relations? could actually strengthen the material basis
for anti-capitalist struggles. We are in the
early stages of what is likely to be a lengthy
Energy: key to production, and complex struggle, the outcome of which
but also to life will determine whether capital will be suc-
As the world’s energy system is on the verge cessful in its efforts to force labour (that is,
of far-reaching changes, it is also coming people throughout the world, as well as the
up for grabs. In other words, a struggle over very environment itself that green capital-
who controls the sector and for what pur- ism proclaims it wishes to save) to bear the
poses is intensifying. It is becoming increas- costs of building a new energy system, or
ingly clear, both to capitalist planners and whether labour, understood in its broadest
those involved in anti-capitalist struggles, sense (namely, social and ecological struggles
that some form of ‘green capitalism’ is on over production and reproduction through-
the agenda. We are told from all sides that out the world) is able to force capital to bear
it is fi nally time to ‘save the planet’ in order the costs. This struggle is already becoming
to ‘save the economy’. In effect, this means central in shaping social relationships and is
that the transition process to a new energy likely to become ever more so in the com-
system will be central to the next round ing years.
of global class struggle over control of key
means of production and subsistence, since

A question of relations of production, Northern countries where the effects of cli-
reproduction and consumption, mate changes have less immediately visibil-
not regulation and policy ity and impact. Nonetheless, it is becoming
increasingly clear that solutions will not be
The kind of massive and rapid reductions found at this level.
in CO2 emissions (and the corresponding
changes in the system of energy produc- The problem is one of production. The cur-
tion and consumption that are necessary for rent world-wide system of production is
this to occur) will not be possible without based on endless growth and expansion. This
very far-reaching changes in production is simply incompatible with a long-term re-
and consumption relations at a more general duction in emissions and energy consump-
level. However, dominant approaches to cli- tion. Despite the fact that localised and mo-
mate change focus on promoting regulatory mentary reductions may well occur, energy
reforms. This is true of governments, mul- consumption and greenhouse gas emissions
tilateral institutions and also large sectors of of the system as a whole can only increase
so-called ‘civil society’ (especially the major in the long run. All the energy-efficiency
national and international trade unions and technologies in the world, though undoubt-
their federations, and NGOs). edly crucial to any long-term solution, can-
not on their own square the circle by reducing
The stark reality is that the only two recent total emissions from a system whose survival
periods that have seen a major reduction in is based on continuous expansion. Leader-
global CO2 emissions have coincided with ship in an emancipatory transition process is
periods of very sudden, rapid, socially disrup- unlikely to come predominantly from above
tive and painful periods of forced economic from international regulatory forums, but
degrowth: namely the breakdown of the Soviet is more likely to come from autonomous
bloc and during the current financial-eco- movements self-organising from below in
nomic crisis. In May 2009, the International order to gain greater control and autonomy
Energy Agency reported that, for the first over energy production and consumption.
time since 1945, global demand for electricity This is not to say regulation is not important.
was expected to fall. Experience has shown It is essential. However, the regulatory proc-
that much time and political energy have ess is unlikely to be the driving force behind
been wasted on developing a highly ineffec- the changes required, but rather a necessary
tive regulatory framework. Years of interna- facilitation process to secure a legal and in-
tional climate negotiations, the institutional stitutional framework (as well as financial
basis for global regulatory efforts, have simply support) conducive to a grassroots process led
proven to be hot air. Unsurprisingly, hot air from below, which enables wider changes to
has resulted in global warming. Only unin- occur and deepens ones already under way.
tended degrowth has had the effect that years Furthermore, it is highly unlikely emancipa-
of intentional regulations sought to achieve. tory regulation that is strong enough to be
Regulatory efforts will certainly be pursued, effective could even come about without ma-
and they may well contribute to shoring up jor pressure, far greater than currently exists,
legitimacy, at least for a time, especially in from below.

The need to construct new human subsistence. These include land,
relations of production seeds, water, energy, factories, universities,
schools, communication infrastructures,
Leaving the necessary changes in the social etc. Especially significant in this context are
relations of production and consumption (of the major energy-intensive industries, such
energy, and more generally) to the logic of as transport, steel, automobiles, petrochemi-
accumulation of profit in the world mar- cals, mining, construction, the export sector
ket is likely to be both far too slow, given in general and industrialised agriculture.
the urgency of the climate crisis, and im-
mensely socially disruptive. And, given the It is, however, very difficult to imagine that
abovementioned effectiveness of unplanned it will be possible to bring about a rapid and
degrowth in reducing emissions relative to far-reaching process of collectively planned
international negotiations, an urgent ques- emancipatory change at the necessary pace
tion facing emancipatory social and ecologi- and scale unless these key means of generat-
cal struggles is how collectively and demo- ing and distributing wealth and subsistence
cratically to construct a process of planned are under some form of common, collective,
rapid and broad degrowth, based on collec- participatory and democratic control, deci-
tive political control and democratic and sion-making and ownership. Furthermore,
participatory decision-making over produc- it is crucial to make sure that they are used
tion, consumption and exchange. to meet the basic needs of all the world’s
population, rather than the profit needs of
‘Peak oil’ starkly poses the question of how the world market and the select few workers
to manage scarcity collectively in a fair and communities able to reap the benefits
manner in order to avert extremely destruc- of this. In other words, there is an urgent
tive power struggles that exacerbate existing need to decommodify these sources of wealth
inequalities (especially in relation to class, as much and as fast as possible.
race, gender and age). It will also be crucial
to seek to avoid the imposition of auster- However, following years of market-led re-
ity measures on people. Solutions that do forms and an unprecedented concentration
not actively strive to avoid pitting different of wealth and power, we are still very far
workers, both waged and unwaged, in dif- from this reality. This is true both in con-
ferent regions of the world against one an- crete terms and in terms of our collective
other are almost certain to result in a transi- aspirations and strategic approaches. Domi-
tion being carried out on the back of these nant political strategies for achieving change
workers and their communities. The failure are entrenched in seeking minor regulatory
of emancipatory movements to force capital reforms (at best, including state ownership)
to pay the burden would, in all likelihood, rather than a more fundamental shift in
prove immensely divisive and destructive. power relations pertaining to structures of
ownership and control.
Of particular importance in relation to
building a new energy system are the key Consequently, an urgent task for the years
means for generating society’s wealth and ahead is to discuss what kind of short-term

interventions might help to make such a po- South Africa or Iraq, they have faced harsh
litical agenda more achievable in the near- repression from state and military forces. In
and medium-term future. It is not a new many areas, what is at stake in these strug-
discussion. In the past, collective ownership, gles is literally life and death. On the one
management and control of key means of pro- hand, struggles over energy ownership have
duction (either in the form of worker, com- been at the heart of foreign military occu-
munity, cooperative or state) have been at the pations, such as in Iraq, but have also pro-
heart of radical proposals for social struggles. vided a key material resource basis for wider
Furthermore, emancipatory left-wing cri- emancipatory or even revolutionary social
tiques of state communism, socialism, social processes, such as in Venezuela or Bolivia.
democracy and their respective bureaucracies These are the struggles that currently defi ne
have not been based on a rejection of collec- the world-wide energy sector. They are a
tive ownership of key means of production. central, and frequently overlooked, aspect
Instead, they were based on a strong critique and cause of the so-called ‘energy crisis’. In
of the fundamentally limited nature of state no small way what is emerging is a crisis of
ownership as a model for democratic, par- capitalist control over the sector – though
ticipatory and self-organised social change this is certainly not the only cause of the
from below – on an understanding, in other energy crisis. Importantly, these struggles
words, that state control is in some ways sim- are likely to intensify in the future. Further-
ply a modified form of private ownership and more, they have by no means already been
capitalist class relations. lost by emancipatory movements.
While there are widespread and ongoing

Struggles for control of the means of struggles over the control of fossil fuel re-
(re)production in the energy sector serves, such as oil in Nigeria, Iraq, Ecua-
and energy-intensive industries dor, Venezuela or Colombia and Bolivia (to
name but a few examples), similar processes
Within the energy sector itself, the picture are also under way in relation to electricity
is one of intense struggle. Important strug- generation and distribution, infrastructure
gles over ownership and control of energy and pricing. Such struggles are occurring in
production and extraction processes, as South Africa, France, Germany, Dominican
well as over access and price are under way Republic, India, South Korea or Thailand
throughout much of the world. This has en- (again, to name just some of the struggles
tailed developing a range of different forms in the sector). Similarly, there is a world-
of ownership, including by communities, wide process of resistance to the privatisa-
users, workers, cooperatives, municipalities tion of forests, one of the main sources of
and states, which in differing degree chal- the non-commercial biomass fuels that meet
lenge private ownership and commodifi- the domestic energy needs of approximately
cation. Broad social sectors have been in- 2 billion people worldwide. Women, who
volved: energy users, affected communities, mainly collect and process these fuels, are
peasants, indigenous peoples and workers often at the heart of such resistance, espe-
both in the energy sectors and more gener- cially in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
ally. Frequently, for example, in Colombia,

Importantly, such struggles are also intensi- trade agreements, all with the full support
fying in relation to the globally expanding of national policies aimed at undermining
renewable energy sector. Since the 1970s, previous forms of democratic and participa-
many pioneering initiatives in renewable tory control.
energy have strongly emphasised coopera-
tive and local control. This has included The question of ownership of and control
farmers’ wind energy cooperatives in Den- over territories rich in renewable energy
mark, citizen energy projects in Germany resources is becoming increasingly impor-
(including cooperatives, buying local grids tant. In Mexico, indigenous communities
and all-women’s initiatives); or a worker- are being deceived and displaced so that the
owned cooperative in Spain that became country’s wind resources (among the best in
one of the important producers of wind the world) can supply electricity to major
turbines for the world market and was a multinational companies, such as the Mexi-
member of the Mondragon industrial coop- can arm of Walmart. In China, police have
erative group – a group that has existed for killed peasants protesting against inadequate
over half a century, involves many differ- compensation for wind turbines installed on
ent industrial sectors and has over 100,000 their land. In Denmark, rural wind energy
worker-members. These local and demo- cooperatives are fi nding it increasingly hard
cratic ownership structures mainly emerged to compete with private investors and are
in Northern countries, the major pioneers being taken over.
of new renewable energy technologies in
this period. However, there have also been Importantly, labour struggles are also
interesting examples in Southern countries, emerging in the sector, especially in relation
such as in relation to micro-hydro in Ne- to the production of the raw materials for
pal, wind in Argentina and household- and agrofuels. This includes sugar in Brazil or
village-level biogas digesters in India.1 Colombia; palm in Colombia, Indonesia and
Malaysia; and soya in Argentina and Para-
However, the processes that emphasised guay (among others). In Germany, a leading
democratic and participatory community- country in the production of wind and solar
controlled development of renewable ener- energy infrastructure, the major trade union
gies and that contributed importantly to the IG Metall is organising workers in the face
ability of the inhabitants of territories rich of poor working conditions in the plants
in such energy resources to build somewhat where the infrastructure is produced. So far,
autonomous and empowering development these struggles are more centred on working
paths, are now being frequently under- conditions, rather than workers’ ownership.
mined. This is because of the threats posed However, there are some exceptions to this.
by private investors, companies and free In Indonesia, workers in the palm planta-
tions have also taken steps to take over the
1 Collective and locally controlled renewable energy
mills. And in the weeks between the fi rst
infrastructure played a significant part in China’s and fi nal drafts of this article were written,
rural energy development during the early years of what is likely to be a historic turning point
the Chinese revolution, but this is a very different in the wind industry is unfolding in the UK.
story, requiring more time to go into than is avail-
able here.

The country’s only wind-turbine compo- tion, transport or tourism is more pessimis-
nent manufacturing plant (owned by Vestas, tic. The dominant strategic discourse in this
the world’s largest producer of wind tur- regard from major organisations in these
bines) currently faces closure, with the sack- sectors is equally pessimistic. Ownership
ing of 600 workers. The workers occupied struggles have, by and large, already been
the plant for about three weeks. Demands lost. Over the last several years, most strug-
from workers and their supporters have in- gles in these sectors have revolved around
cluded government nationalisation of the demanding certain reforms in the produc-
plant, as well as converting it into a workers’ tion and labour process, as well as improved
cooperative. The workers have met with a user access. However, little space remains
combination of widespread social support as for serious struggle over (or even discussion
well as (limited) use of riot police and court of ) major changes to patterns of ownership
rulings. The issue remains unresolved. and control.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the im- At the more radical end of ecological cri-
portance of patents and the ownership of tique, there are many discussions about the
knowledge and technologies. Despite initial need for profound change in production
murmurings about ‘open source’ technol- relations. However, the organisations and
ogy and non-commercial technology trans- collectives with such perspectives frequent-
fers arising in the renewable energy sector, ly lack the social base necessary for such a
inspired by the open-source computer soft- process of change to happen. In particular,
ware movement, such a process is still virtu- they have little capacity (and sometimes
ally non-existent. even will) to contribute to serious debate
within trade unions and other worker or-
On a more general level, it is worth look- ganisations within these sectors, so their
ing at contemporary struggles over land and more sophisticated critique amounts to just
energy-intensive industries. Land is one of that: a critique without an accompanying
the most basic elements of subsistence for process of change. On the other hand, the
humans throughout the world, and is also dominant ‘green’ discourse, though often
essential for capital accumulation. It is both well-connected to trade union organisations
a key means of production and of the repro- working on sustainability from a worker
duction of human life. Collective owner- perspective, hardly talks about ownership of
ship and decommodification of land are still key means of production. Most campaigns
at the heart of many, if not most, rural and from this broad group of organisations push
indigenous struggles throughout the world for change within the existing framework of
today. It is in these struggles that the clearest social relations. Finally, the dominant trade
political discourse surrounding control of union discourse in these sectors favours tri-
the means of production can be found. partite bargaining, ‘decent work’ and social
peace, based on regulating production for
However, the outlook for struggles over private profit in an expanding world mar-
ownership and decommodification in en- ket.
ergy-intensive industries such as cars, avia-

Crisis as an opportunity for industry have recently sustained an occu-
reorienting our struggles pation of a car factory that lasted over two
months, involving close to 1,000 workers
However, the current economic-fi nancial and armed self-defence. It was only defeated
crisis also offers an opportunity to reopen after a prolonged struggle involving several
this discussion, since the old model of Key- thousand riot police. For the most part, with
nesian class compromise and stabilisation of the exception of the Korean car plants, these
struggles aimed at changing ownership pat- have been small processes. Nonetheless, they
terns of key means of production is dead, are of great importance and appear to be on
and in all probability will not be resur- the upsurge. Importantly, the industries in
rected. Furthermore, unless the discussion crisis are some of the key energy-intensive
on production is reopened, it is very likely industries, such as cars and steel, that are es-
that the ‘solutions’ found to the economic- pecially relevant to the issue of energy tran-
fi nancial crisis will be authoritarian. sition and worker/community-led conver-
sion processes.
Starting with the economic and fi nancial
collapse of Argentina in 2001, factory occu- The stark reality is that we are very far from
pations and self-managed industrial produc- bringing about the kind of change in pro-
tion and exchange have returned to the po- duction and consumption relations that is
litical landscape. In the wake of the current needed to solve the climate/energy crisis.
worldwide fi nancial and economic crisis, a We may in fact never be in a position to do
ripple of factory struggles, including worker so. However, if we are to have any chance
occupations and kidnapping of bosses, have of avoiding a socially and ecologically dis-
spread around the world, including in the astrous process of climate change and en-
US, the UK and numerous countries in forced change in social relations, it will be
Eastern Europe. Such struggles are largely important to at least pose the question of
defensive, related to redundancy condi- how this might come about. Until we face
tions, rather than proposing a new model up to this, efforts to tackle climate change
of ownership, production and control, and will go nowhere. The task of collectively
are still on a very small scale. Notably, the taking over the key means of production
Detroit car factories have virtually been left and decommodifying the major productive
to go under, or been given lifelines in order processes is immense. We are certainly not
to draw out their demise. Certainly, they yet ready. However, what is both possible
have not been taken over by workers and and long overdue is, at a minimum, to take
communities and converted into renewable some initial steps towards deepening a long-
energy production plants. Yet, albeit way term strategic debate about how, and for
too little, way too late, even the head of the what purposes, wealth is produced and dis-
United Autoworkers Union made a fleeting tributed in society, and how people’s subsist-
and cautious reference to worker occupa- ence needs are met, as part of a shift to a new
tions of the plants. This is a rhetoric that energy system. Through a process of debate,
has not been used in such places for many we will hopefully be able to slowly develop
decades. In South Korea, workers in the car collective interventions that contribute to

these goals, so that in the medium term, as unwaged), communities and users of en-
the economic-fi nancial and ecological cri- ergy and energy-intensive sectors across the
ses deepen, we may be able to do what is hierarchically divided world-wide division
not possible now and collectively plan the of labour. This will already be an impor-
process of production and consumption tant step towards bringing about a profound
based on a clear process of class struggle that democratisation of how wealth is produced
brings together workers (both waged and and distributed throughout society.
Some useful literature on energy,

labour and technology
Caffentzis, G. (2005), No Blood for Oil – En- Headrick, D. (1988), The Tentacles of Progress:
ergy, Class Struggle and War 1998-2004. www. Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism,
radicalpolYtics.org 1850-1940. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Caffentzis, G. (1990), On Africa and Self-Re-
producing Automata. http://www.midnight- Keefer, T. (2005), ‘Of Hand Mills and Heat
notes.org/pdfnewenc6.pdf Engines: Peak Oil, Class Struggle and the
Thermodynamics of Production’. MA re-
Corrigan, P., H. Ramsay, and D. Sayer (1978), search paper, York University, Ontario.
Socialist Construction and Marxist Theory: Bol-
shevism and its Critique. London: Macmillan; Midnight Notes Collective (1992), Midnight
New York: Monthly Review Press. Oil: Work, Energy, War 1973-1992. Brooklyn:
Autonomedia (Midnight Notes 11).
Corrigan, P., H. Ramsay, and D. Sayer
(1979), For Mao: Essays in Historical Material- Montgomery, D. (1980), Workers’ Control in
ism. London: Macmillan. America: Studies in the History of Work, Tech-
nology, and Labor Struggles. Cambridge and
Cowan, R. (1983), More Work for Mother: The New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ironies of Household Technology from the Open
Hearth to the Microwave. New York: Basic Noble, D. (1977), America by Design: Science,
Books. Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capital-
ism. New York: Knopf.
Headrick, D. (1981), The Tools of Empire:
Technology and European Imperialism in the
Nineteenth Century. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.

Degrowth, or deconstruction of the economy:
Towards a sustainable world
Enrique Leff
The degrowth wager

The 1960s were a period of turbulence in
the modern world. At the same time as
emancipatory and countercultural move-
ments (labour, youth, students, gender) ir-
rupted, an alarmist discourse emerged that
warned of the ‘detonation’ of a so-called
‘population bomb’, and suggested that rapid
demographic growth was the main cause of
the ecological crisis. For the fi rst time since
a nascent capitalism in the Renaissance set
in motion the machinery of production and Enrique Leff is a Mexican
market mechanisms, since the West had environmentalist and has as PhD in
opened history to a modernity guided by developmental economics. For many
the ideals of freedom and enlightened rea- years, Enrique was coordinator of the
son, one of the pillars of Western civilisa- UNDP Environmental Training Programme
tion cracked: the myth of progress impelled for Latin America and the Caribbean. He
by the power of science and technology, currently works in the Faculty of Political
converted into the most servile – and serv- and Social Sciences at the Universidad
iceable – tools of capital accumulation, and Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM).
of unlimited economic growth.
The environmental crisis thus questioned

some of our most ingrained beliefs: not only
human supremacy over all other creatures
on the planet and the right to dominate
and exploit nature for the profit of ‘man’,
but the very meaning of human existence,
grounded in economic growth and techno-
logical progress. This progress was forged

in economic rationality, shaped by the tools (1962) on the effects of the insecticide DDT,
of classical science, and set up a structure, ecological destruction has increased dramat-
a model, that established the conditions for ically, accentuating global warming caused
a notion that progress was no longer based by greenhouse gases and by the inescapable
on the co-evolution of cultures with their laws of thermodynamics, which have set
environments, but on an economic devel- in motion the planet’s entropic death. The
opment based on a mode of production that remedies generated by critical thought and
carried in its genetic code an imperative of technological ingenuity have been shown
growth – of limitless growth! to be hard to integrate into the economic
system. Sustainable development has been
The pioneers of the bio- and ecological econ- shown to be short-lived, because it is not
omy raised the problem of the relationship ecologically sustainable (Park et al. 2008).
between economic process and the degrada-
tion of nature, the necessity of internalising In its globalising drive, the economic system
ecological costs and deploying distributive has continued to obscure the fundamental
countermeasures to the market’s unbalanced problem. Thus, rather than internalising the
machinations. In 1972, a study by MIT and ecological conditions for genuinely sustain-
the Club of Rome for the first time high- able development, the geopolitics of ‘sustain-
lighted the Limits to Growth. This is where able development’ ended up commodifying
proposals for ‘zero growth’ and a ‘steady-state nature and over-economising the world:
economy’ first appeared. At the same time, ‘mechanisms’ for ‘clean development’ were
Georgescu-Roegen (1971) established the put in place, alongside economic instru-
fundamental link between economic growth ments for environmental management that
and natural limits in his book, The Entropy have gone a long way towards establishing
Law and the Economic Process. The process of (private) property rights over and the mon-
production generated by the economic ratio- etary value of environmental goods and ser-
nality that nests in the machinery of the In- vices (Brand/Görg 2008). Free nature and
dustrial Revolution is defined by an impulse natural commons (water, oil) have been pro-
to grow or die (unlike living beings, who are gressively privatised, while an entire market
born, develop and die, and human popula- has been created around buying and selling
tions, which usually stabilise their growth). pollution rights (carbon trading) and giving
Economic growth, industrial metabolism a price to nature (carbon offsetting).
and exosomatic consumption imply a per-
manently growing consumption of nature Today, confronted with the failure of all
(matter and energy), which not only runs up efforts to mitigate global warming, aware-
against the limits of the planet’s resources, ness of the limits to growth returns and,
but also becomes degraded in the process of with it, a clamour for degrowth. The de-
production and consumption, following the growth wager is not a merely critical and
second law of thermodynamics. reactive moral position; resistance to an
oppressive, destructive, unequal and unfair
More than four decades after the eye-open- power structure; a manifestation of alterna-
ing book Silent Spring by Rachel Carson tive beliefs, tastes and lifestyles. Degrowth

is more than a simple loss of faith, it is the with the construction of today’s productive
active awareness of the existence of a force rationality (Leff 1995).
right at the heart of the civilising process
that puts the quality of human life and life Degrowth implies not only downshifting
on the planet as a whole at risk. The call or unlinking from the economy. It is not
for degrowth should not be a rhetorical re- synonymous with de-materialising produc-
course in the arsenal of the critique of the tion, since that would not prevent a grow-
present model’s unsustainability, it must be ing economy from going on consuming and
grounded in solid theoretical argument and transforming nature until it reaches the very
political strategy. limits of the planet’s own sustainability. Ab-
stinence and frugality on the part of some
The call for degrowth is not a mere ideo- responsible consumers do not defuse the
logical slogan against a myth, a mot d’ordre to mania for growth at the centre of econom-
mobilise society against the evils of growth, ic rationality, which has inscribed in itself
or its deadly conclusion. It is not a counter- the impulse towards capital accumulation,
order that flees from growth, in the way the economies of scale, urban agglomeration,
hippies could extract themselves from domi- globalisation of the market and concentra-
nant culture, nor a celebration of communi- tion of wealth. To jump from a moving
ties marginalised by ‘development’. Today, train is not to change track. Degrowth does
not even the most isolated indigenous cul- not entail moving down in the economy’s
tures are safe from or can unlink themselves wheel of fortune – it is not enough to wish
from the effects of a globalisation driven for- to make it smaller or to stop it. Beyond the
ward by the engine of economic growth. But refusal of the commodification of nature, it
how to defuse growth in a process that has is necessary to deconstruct the economy.
in its original structure and genetic code a
force that impels it to grow or die? How to
do it without generating an economic reces-
From degrowth to deconstruction
sion with disastrous social and environmental The economistic strategy that purports to
consequences on a planetary scale? For if the contain the overflowing of nature by con-
economy itself, through its internal crises, straining it in the cage of modern rational-
cannot arrive at the level of growth desired ity, restraining it within economic instru-
by heads of state and entrepreneurs, then to ments and market mechanisms, submitting
deliberately brake growth would amount to it to dominant forms of calculation and val-
willingly kicking off a crisis with incalculable uation, has failed. From anxiety in the face
effects. It is for this reason that we must think of ecological disaster and disbelief in the ef-
not only about degrowth, but also about a ficacy and morality of the capitalist market,
transition towards a sustainable economy. the restlessness that demands degrowth is
The latter must be more than a mere ecologi- born. However, the solution to the problem
sation of existing economic rationality, it has of growth is not degrowth, but the decon-
to be another economy, grounded in other struction of the economy and the transition
productive principles. Degrowth thus implies towards a new rationality that can guide the
a deconstruction of the economy, together construction of sustainability.

The deconstruction of the economy implies fuel costs down again. The end of the oil
more than a mental exercise in order to un- era will not be the result of oil’s growing
ravel and identify the ideas and social forces scarcity, but of its abundance in relation to
that came together in giving birth to the nature’s capacity of absorption and dilution,
modern economy, daughter of the Enlight- of its transmutation into CO2. The search
enment and of the commercial exchanges of for economic balance by way of the over-
nascent capitalism. It entails a much more production of hydrocarbons in order to
complex philosophical, political and social continue feeding the machinery of industry
exercise. The economy exists not only as (and the production of agro-fuels) puts at
theory, as supposed science. The economy risk not only the sustainability of the planet,
is a rationality – a form of interpreting and but that of the economy itself. To free the
acting in the world – that has become insti- economy from its dependence on oil is im-
tutionalised and incorporated into our sub- perative in light of the catastrophic risks of
jectivity. The drive for ‘having’, ‘control- climate change.
ling’, ‘accumulating’ is in itself a reflection
of a subjectivity constituted within moder- Degrowth of the economy implies not only
nity’s rationality and economic structure. the theoretical deconstruction of its scien-
tific paradigms, but also of its social institu-
Deconstructing the unsustainable economy tionalisation and the subjectivisation of the
means questioning the thought, science, principles that try to legitimate economic
technology and institutions that create the rationality as the ultimate, inevitable mode
cage of rationality of modernity. Econom- of being in the world. Nevertheless, the
ic rationality is not merely a superstruc- various reasons for deconstructing econom-
ture to be investigated and deconstructed ic rationality do not directly translate into
in thought, it is a mode of production of strategic thought and actions that can defuse
knowledges and commodities. It is the na- the capitalist machinery. It is not simply a
ture-swallowing monster whose jaws ex- matter of ‘greening’ the economy, moder-
hale Faustian fumes into the atmosphere, ating consumption or enhancing alternative
contaminating the environment and warm- and renewable sources of energy within the
ing the planet. niches of opportunity that appear profitable
in the context of the increase in energy costs.
It is not possible to maintain an infi nitely These principles, even if converted into so-
growing economy that feeds on a fi nite na- cial movements, do not in and of themselves
ture: especially not an economy based on oil effect a defusing of production. Rather,
and coal, which the metabolism of industry, they constitute a mere normativity and a
transport and the family economy transform fl ight from the system, a counter-current
into CO2, the main culprit in global warm- that fails to arrest the overflowing torrent
ing. The problem with the oil economy is of the machinery of growth. This is why
not fundamentally that of its management we need to deconstruct economic reasons
as a public or private good. It is not the in- by legitimating other principles, values and
crease in its supply, exploiting protected re- non-economic potentials. We must forge a
serves and submarine fields, so as to bring strategic thought and a political programme

that allow us to deconstruct economic ratio- device (the genetic code) of the economy,
nality at the same time as an environmental and to do it without provoking a recession
rationality is constructed. of such magnitude that it would bring about
yet more poverty and environmental de-
Beyond the task of dismantling the domi- struction.
nant economic model, it is a matter of un-
ravelling economic rationality while weav- The decolonisation of the imaginary sus-
ing new matrices of rationality to fertilise taining the dominant economy will not
new territories of life. This leads to a strat- emerge from responsible consumption or
egy of deconstruction and reconstruction; a pedagogy of socio-environmental catas-
not making the system crumble, but reor- trophes, as Latouche suggested when fo-
ganising production and consumption based cusing on the degrowth wager. Economic
on the principles of environmental ratio- rationality has become institutionalised and
nality; unlinking from the cogs of capital- incorporated into our way of being in the
ist market mechanisms and economic valu- world, homo oeconomicus. What is needed
ation of environmental goods and services then is a change of skin. The really-existing
as the dominating principle that organises economy cannot be deconstructed by an
the global economy; incorporating what ideological reaction or a revolutionary so-
would be the waste product into new eco- cial movement. It is not enough to moderate
logical cycles through ‘clean technologies’, it by incorporating other values and social
as promoted by an emergent geopolitics of imperatives. Deconstruction entails practi-
sustainable development (Leff 2002). This cal measures, or we will forever stay at the
reconstruction, however, is not only guided purely theoretical level, striking blindly in
by an ‘ecological rationality’, but by cul- the dark with our desires for a better and
tural forms and processes of resignification more sustainable world.
of nature. In this sense, the construction of
an environmental rationality capable of de-
constructing economic rationality implies
The limit to growth, the
processes of reappropriation of nature and resignification of production and the
re-territorialisation of cultures. construction of a sustainable future
Economic growth carries with it the prob- The limit is the end-point from which life
lem of its measure. The omnipresent mea- is constructed. It is from death that we re-
sure of GDP, by which national economies organise our existence. The law of the lim-
are evaluated in their success or failure, does its of nature has refounded the sciences and
not measure negative externalities. But the the human world is sustained by the recog-
fundamental problem cannot be solved with nition of its cultural and genetic limits in
a multiple scale or multi-criteria methods, the prohibition of incest. In the face of this
or with ‘green accounts’, the calculation of panorama of culture and knowledge of the
the hidden costs of growth, a ‘human devel- world, one should ask by which strange de-
opment index’ or an ‘indicator of genuine sign the economy has managed to bypass the
progress’. The point is to defuse the internal question of limits, as it attempts to rule the

world as a system of mechanical equilibrium tious and the speculation of fi nancial capi-
among factors of production and circulation tal. Nonetheless, for as long as the economic
of value and market prices. The limit to this process must produce material goods (hous-
unbridled process of accumulation has not es, means of transportation, clothes, food)
been the ‘law of value’, nor the cyclical crisis it cannot escape the law of entropy. This
of overproduction or under-consumption of is the ultimate limit of economic growth.
capital. The only antidote to this inevitable trajec-
tory towards entropic death is the process
The limit is marked by the law of entropy, of negentropic production (from: negative en-
which, as indicated by Georgescu-Roegen, tropy) of living matter, which translates into
functions as the limit-law of production. renewable natural resources.
The law of entropy reminds us that every
economic process, as productive process, is The transition towards this bioeconomy
trapped in an ineluctable process of degra- would mean a decrease in the rate of eco-
dation that advances towards entropic death. nomic growth as it is measured today, and
What does this mean? That every produc- a negative rate in time, while indicators for
tive process (like every metabolic process a sustainable, negentropic eco-technological
in living organisms) feeds on matter and production are developed. In this sense, the
low-entropy energy; that in its process of new economy is based on ecological poten-
transformation it produces consumer goods tials, technological innovation and cultural
with a residue of degraded energy, which creativity. In this way a post-growth society
fi nally expresses itself as heat; and that this and an economy in balance with the planet’s
process is irreversible. The advance of re- conditions of sustainability could begin to
cycling technologies notwithstanding, pol- appear. And yet, from environmental ra-
lutant residues are only partially reconvert- tionality emerges not only a new mode of
ible into useful matter and energy. And production, but a new way of being in the
this is what manifests itself as the limit to world, new processes of signification of na-
the accumulation of capital and economic ture and new existential meanings in the
growth: the de-structuring of productive construction of a sustainable future.
ecosystems, and their saturation with regard
to their capacity to dilute contaminants in Translated from Spanish
common environments (seas, lakes, air and by Rodrigo Nunes.
soils), which ultimately appears as a process
of global warming and the possibility of an
ecological collapse that crosses the thresh-
olds of the planet’s ecological equilibrium.
While the bioeconomy takes the material

conditions of nature as the root of produc-
tion, the ‘economy’ searches for a way out
through the dematerialisation of produc-
tion. The economy flees towards the ficti-

Literature
Brand, U., and C. Görg (2008), ‘Sustain- Entwicklung. Ökonomisierung des Klimas,
ability and Globalisation: A Theoretical Rationalisierung der Umwelt und die ge-
Perspective’, in Park, J., K. Conca, and M., sellschaftliche Wiederaneignung der Natur’,
Finger (eds), The Crisis of Global Environmen- in Görg, C. and U. Brand (eds), Mythen glo-
tal Governance. Towards a New Political Econo- balen Umweltmanagments: ‘Rio + 10’ und die
my of Sustainability. London and New York: Sackgassen nachhaltiger Entwicklung. Münster:
Routledge, 13-33. Westfälisches Dampf boot, 92-117.
Carson, R. (1962), Silent Spring. New York: Meadows, D.H., D.L. Meadows and J.
Fawcett. Randers (1972), The Limits to Growth. New
York: Universe Books.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1971), The Entropy
Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge Park, J., M. Finger, and K. Conca (2008),
MA: Harvard University Press. ‘The Death of Rio Environmentalism’, in
Conca, K., M. Finger, and J. Park (eds), The
Leff, E. (1995), Green Production: Towards an Crisis of Global Environmental Governance: To-
Environmental Rationality. New York: Guil- wards a New Political Economy of Sustainability.
ford Publications. London: Routledge.
Leff, E. (2002), ‘Die Geopolitik nachhaltiger

The rights of nature, new forms of
citizenship and the Good Life
– Echoes of the Constitución de Montecristi in Ecuador
Alberto Acosta
Every constitution synthesises a historical

moment. Crystallised in every constitution Alberto Acosta is an Ecuadorian economist.
is an accumulation of social processes. And He is a lecturer and researcher at the
in every constitution a certain way of under- Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences
standing life takes shape. And yet, a consti- (FLACSO) in Quito, and was formerly
tution does not make a society. It is society secretary of mines and energy as well as
that produces a constitution and adopts it president of the Constitutional Assembly.
like a roadmap. Besides, a constitution must
be more than merely the result of an exercise
in advanced jurisprudence, seen through the
logic of constitutional interpretations, and it
is certainly not the product of one or a few
enlightened individuals. Beyond its indis-
putably legal function, a constitution must
be a political project for a common life, to
be elaborated and given effect through the
active participation of all citizens.
From this point of view, the recent Ecua-

dorian constitution (produced in the city
of Montecristi), which remained faithful to
pent-up demands and responded to prevail-
ing expectations, assigns the undertaking of
structural transformation to itself as both a
means and, indeed, an end. In it are expressed
multiple proposals for radical changes con-
structed over the course of many decades of
resistance and social struggles, changes that
are often impossible for traditional constitu-
tionalists to accept (or even to understand).

The new state This has entailed devaluation of constitu-
tional law and of constitutions themselves,
A basic feature of the new constitution is with a loss of sovereignty by the people.
the declaration of a liberal constitutional
state based on notions of rights and justice:
a state that is social, democratic, sovereign,
The Good Life
independent, unified, intercultural, plurina- The Ecuadorian constitution calls on both
tional and secular. This defi nition opens up individuals and collectivities to achieve the
the possibility of a new, multiple-entry pact Good Life (sumak kausay). Society is invit-
of broad coexistence. Without claiming to ed to take part at every stage and in every
exhaust the defi nition of plurinationality, it arena of public management and planning
is important to highlight the way in which for national and local development, and the
this concept leads to a rethinking of the state execution and control of the plans for de-
in its overdue acknowledgment of indige- velopment (or rather, for the Good Life) on
nous peoples and nationalities, as well as its every level. The Good Life will never be a
acknowledgment of the presence of other gift from powerful groups. The construc-
national communities – a genuine qualita- tion of an equal, egalitarian and free society
tive leap compared to the Eurocentric, mo- will only be possible through the participa-
nocultural perspective dominant until now. tion of all. And its attainment will require
This is why it is necessary to reformulate contesting the privileges of present domi-
the relations of power between state and nant elites, without allowing new elites and
citizenry, so that the latter become the true new forms of domination to emerge.
sovereigns. The crisis of political repre-
sentation that has affected, and still affects, The true constituent process begins im-
many parliamentary systems implies a crisis mediately the constitution is adopted. This
of constitutional law inasmuch as ‘popular process demands a greater and more pro-
sovereignty’ is subject to various private de- found constitutional pedagogy, as well as a
sires. This contradiction of the demands of mobilised society that can propel the ma-
the citizenry creates a crisis of legitimation: terialisation of constitutional achievements
constitutional right has all too often existed – in other words, a process of constituting
on paper only. citizenship.
The task is to overcome the range of norms The consolidation of new constitutional
that were explicitly or implicitly agreed by norms into laws and a renewal of politics
the big economic agents that acted indepen- consistent with the proposed changes is a
dently of public powers in their relations task that calls on all in the city and the coun-
with each other or the state. Ultimately, try to continue on the path of mobilisation.
these norms, stemming from private inter- The emptying-out of the historical content
ests, including transnational agents (IMF, of the constitution must be prevented, for
WTO, Free Trade Agreements, to name just example, by way of new laws and institu-
a few sources of this transnational law), have tions.
determined political relations with the state.

Post-development? The rights of nature
The Montecristi constitution, and this is The rights of nature, which constitute ‘a ca-
perhaps one of its greatest merits, opens up tastrophe for the Roman-French legal tra-
a struggle over the historical sense of de- dition’, have been described as ‘conceptual
velopment. In fact, the Good Life brings us gibberish’. For those who wish to conserve
directly to an as yet unexplored age, that of the law (or defend the privileges of oligar-
post-development. With the Good Life, what is chies?), who are essentially unable to under-
rejected is the vision that purported to take stand the transformations taking place right
us down the road of perpetual accumulation now, it is difficult to understand that the
of material goods as an index of development world is constantly moving on. Through-
and progress, a road that leads nowhere but out history, each creation and expansion
to humanity’s self-destruction. of rights has always appeared as something
previously unthinkable. The emancipation
We understand once and for all that we must of slaves or the extension of civil rights to
look for alternative ways of dignified and African-Americans, women and children
sustainable living, ways that are not a mere were in each case dismissed as nonsensical.
caricature of the Western lifestyle and even For slavery to be abolished it was both nec-
less a continuation of structures marked by essary to recognise ‘the right to have rights’
massive social and environmental inequality. and to exert political pressure to change the
We will have to solve existing imbalances laws that denied those rights. In order to
and, particularly, to incorporate criteria of free nature from the condition of being a
sufficiency rather than try to sustain, at the rightless subject or a simple object of prop-
cost of the majority of the population and of erty, political pressure to have it recognised
nature, the logic of efficiency understood as as being entitled to rights is also required.
ever-accelerating material accumulation for
the benefit of a small fraction of society. To endow nature with rights, therefore,
means to politically secure its passage from
We are aware that these new currents of legal object to subject as part of a centuries-long
thought are not free of confl ict. In abandon- process of expanding who or what becomes
ing the traditional concept of law as a source a subject with rights. This is a process that
of right, the constitution has consolidated has been enriched by the struggles and con-
a juridical point of departure independent tributions of many peoples, not only those
of traditional visions. It should come as no from the Andes. It will not be easy to con-
surprise, then, that this new charter has gen- solidate these transformations, especially to
erated confl icts with traditional jurists, not the extent that they affect the privileges of
to mention with those who are used to hav- the circles of power, which will do every-
ing their word (and especially their interests) thing to stop the process of change. But one
become law. day, maybe not too distant, we will see a
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Na-
ture as an inseparable complement to hu-
man rights.

The confl ict and resistance that groups Freeing the flows of people
whose privileges are threatened can un-
leash, will – perhaps surprisingly to some In contrast with the course of capitalist glo-
– be positive for society as a whole, since balisation, which blocks the flows of peo-
they will evoke an organised response on ple, the Montecristi constitution proposes
the part of the majority. It is crucial to stress citizenship with universalised dimensions.
that the constitutional advances are not a The rights of those who have emigrated
gift of any one individual, but the result of have been consolidated: not only can they
struggle involving broad sectors of the pop- vote in Ecuadorian elections, but they will
ulation. Therefore, as part of the collective have their own representatives in the Na-
construction of a new contract of social and tional Assembly, with full power to initi-
environmental coexistence, it is necessary to ate political measures, including proposing
create new spaces of freedom and to remove laws. The state will create incentives for the
all the obstacles that prevent them from be- return of the savings and goods of expatri-
coming effective. ates, so that these resources can be deployed
as productive investment in the country in
The source of these contradictions lies in ways decided by the expatriates themselves.
the continuing power of a developmentalist Incentives will also be created so that they
theory and practice that are characteristic of voluntarily participate in social security.
an extractive (primary commodity-export- The constitution also grants similar rights
ing) economy – and which have not only to migrants and citizens: those living in the
failed to achieve the desired development, country for more than five years will be al-
but have also undermined our natural con- lowed to vote, without the need for bilat-
ditions. This stupidity continues, in fact, eral agreements with their countries of ori-
in all currently progressive governments in gin. It will be impossible to expel them to
Latin America. Despite their considerable countries where their life, freedom, security
advances in some areas, social in particular, or integrity, or that of their family mem-
they still have enormous difficulty in creat- bers, will be at risk because of their politi-
ing new styles of development. They show cal opinions, ethnicity, religion, nationality,
no sign of kick-starting a new mode of sus- ideology or membership of certain social
tainable natural-resource use to benefit the groups. Likewise, the expulsion of groups
whole of society and secure the rights of of foreigners is banned: migratory processes
nature. must be regularised.
Current governments – even in Ecuador – We do not wait for the world to change
remain tied to neo-developmentalist per- so that we can make advances in the field
spectives and practices that necessarily con- of migration: we act to change the world.
tradict the spirit of the Good Life. This is These proposals concerning human mobil-
why it is imperative not only to overcome ity appear in the wider context of furthering
neo-liberal practices, but also to strive to- the principle of universal citizenship, free-
wards a harmonious relationship between dom of movement for all inhabitants of the
society and nature, that is, the Good Life. planet and the progressive elimination of the

condition of being a ‘foreigner’ as elements social, economic and environmental rights
in the transformation of unequal relations and guarantees. It is also ingrained in the
among countries, especially those between principles that guide the economic regime,
global North and South. To that end, the which promote harmonious relations among
creation of a Latin American and Caribbean human beings individually and collectively
citizenship is promoted, as are the mobilisa- and with nature. It is, in essence, a mat-
tion of policies that guarantee the human ter of building an economy of solidarity, at
rights of border populations and refugees the same time as various sovereignties are
and the common protection of Latin Amer- recovered as central to the political life of
ican- and Caribbean-born individuals in the country. We cannot depend primarily
their countries of arrival and transit. on the revenues generated from natural re-
sources, but must rely on the efforts of hu-
man beings in coexistence with nature. To
Conclusion achieve this, it is necessary to expand so-
To sum up, if we want to change the world cial capacities, starting by recovering and
– and this is indeed the task – , it is insuf- strengthening multiculturality as an essen-
ficient and extremely dangerous to apply the tial element of change.
paradigm of development as conceived in
the Western world. Not only is this not syn- We are faced with the imperative of the
onymous with collective wellbeing, it also democratic construction of a genuinely
places the very life of humanity at risk. The democratic society, steeped in the values of
Good Life transcends the mere satisfaction freedom, equality and responsibility, which
of needs and access to goods and services. is dutiful, inclusive, equal, fair and respect-
From the point of view of the philosophy of ful of life; a society in which all can have
the Good Life, which embraces the essence equal possibilities and opportunities, where
of indigenous cultures and the proposals for individual and collective coexist, where
building a sustainable world being debated economic rationality is reconciled with
the world over, we need to question the ethics and common sense, where the rights
traditional concept of development. This of nature are a practical reality – in short,
‘development’ has led to generalised ‘misde- where a plurinational state and the Good
velopment’ ( José María Tortosa) across the Life are one and the same.
planet, including in those countries consid-
ered developed. Neo-developmentalism, or Translated from Spanish
‘senile developmentalism’ ( Joan Martínez by Rodrigo Nunes.
Allier), is not the path to development, let
alone the Good Life. The growth and great-
er availability of revenue has not in and of
itself secured the wellbeing of any country.
Let us insist that the permanent accumula-
tion of material goods has no future.
The Good Life has to do with a series of

The climate is changing in more ways than one. Not only has an increasing
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere been wreaking
havoc in the global biosphere, but there has also been a significant shift
in the way the issue of climate change is debated. From being a marginal
‘green’ issue, it is now central to many a strategy for political and
economic renewal. It has become ever more obvious that the image of
climate change is not primarily the drowning polar bear, but the farmer
without crops, the migrant without a home, the worker with no future.
Yet international efforts to slow climate change have not advanced much
beyond square one. At the same time, a new global cycle of struggle seems
to be coalescing around the call for climate justice, in particular in the
mobilisation around the 15th international climate summit in Copenhagen.
This collection of interventions contributes to the re-conceptualisation

of climate change as an issue of justice, and therefore also of
struggle. It further seeks to strengthen a climate and energy
politics that will prove capable of solving the multiple crises that
climate change is part of, and which humanity is facing.
Critical Currents is an
Occasional Paper Series
published by the
Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation.
It is also available online
at www.dhf.uu.se.
Printed copies may be obtained from

Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation,
Övre Slottsgatan 2
SE- 753 10 Uppsala, Sweden
email: secretariat@dhf.uu.se
phone: +46 (0)18-410 10 00

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critical

Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

critical currents 6 book_b.indd 1 09-11-05 11.17.56

In the spirit of Dag Hammarskjöld’s Critical Currents is an

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Ulrich Brand, Nicola Bullard, Edgardo Lander and Tadzio Mueller

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‘Man has lost the capacity to foresee and to

1 Quoted in Thelin, B. (2001), ‘Dag Hammarskjöld

Hammarskjöld Foundation. 1987, p.28.

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6 Critical Currents no. 6

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8 Critical Currents no. 6

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Ulrich Brand, Nicola Bullard, Ulrich Brand is a professor of

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10 Critical Currents no. 6

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12 Critical Currents no. 6

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14 Critical Currents no. 6

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Three of the editors want to warmly thank

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Global ecology and global markets interact

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24 Critical Currents no. 6

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Brennan, T. (2000), Exhausting Moder- Pateman, C. (1989), ‘Fraternal Social Con-

Foucault, M. (1990 [1976]), The History of UN Department of Economic and Social

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1 For a more detailed exposition of this argument cf.,

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