Review of Stephen Jay Gould's, The Mismeasure of Man
Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 141 -145.
GARLAND E. ALLEN
Biology Department
WashingtonU niversity
St. Louis, Missouri 63130
Original Title
The Roots of Biological Determinism by Garland Allen
Review of Stephen Jay Gould's, The Mismeasure of Man
Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 141 -145.
GARLAND E. ALLEN
Biology Department
WashingtonU niversity
St. Louis, Missouri 63130
Review of Stephen Jay Gould's, The Mismeasure of Man
Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 141 -145.
GARLAND E. ALLEN
Biology Department
WashingtonU niversity
St. Louis, Missouri 63130
BiologyDepartment WashingtonUniversity St. Louis,Missouri63130
In The Mismeasure of Mani (W. W. Norton & Co., 1981), Stephen
Jay Gould traces the history in Westernthought of what has come to be called"biologicaldeterminism."This is the generalname for theories which hold that the roots of human social behavior and personality lie in the biology of individualsand groups (racial or ethnic) and thus determine fundamental aspects of social life. Gould treats examples of biological determinismstretching from Socrates' famous parableof the metals in Plato's Republic, though nineteenth-centurycraniometry and the early twentieth-centuryI.Q. testing movement,to more recent theories such as those about I.Q. and race and, finally, sociobiology. While not proposingthat this particulararrayof ideas necessarilyforms a direct line of descent, Gould does suggest that in Westernculture these theories share some common methodological roots and usually served similar functions in the broad social context of their times. He arguesthat theories of biologicaldeterminismover the years rationalized the status quo by postulating that social problems are caused not by environmental or social conditions, but by innate, biological factors. One messageof the book is that such theories are not merely products of a less enlightened past, but in variousforms are still with us today. One of the main argumentsGould advances is that all theories of biological determinism, past and present, have been based on bad biology and bad scientific method. Everythingfrom biased measurements to subconscious manipulationof data to outright fraudulence has plagued attempts to cast human social behavior in a largely biological light. As one example, Gould gives a detailed picture of the mid-nineteenth-centuryAmerican craniologist Samuel George Morton (1799--1851), who produced reams of data on cranial capacities of Indians, Negroes, and Caucasiansin his attempt to prove that the white race is superiorto all others. Gould demonstrateswell, from Morton's own publisheddata, that his uneven(and thus non-comparable)smapie sizes worked in the direction of Morton's own bias, by showing that whites had the largest, Indians the middle, and blacks the smallest Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 17, no. 1 (Spring 1984), pp. 141 -145. 0022 -5010/84/0171/0141$00.50. ? 1984 by D. ReidelPublishingCompany.
GARLAND E. ALLEN
cranial capacity. Other proceduralproblems - associated with trying
to obtain accurate and consistent measurementsfor skull volume plagued Morton's efforts, and those of his more eminent European successor, Paul Broca (1824-1880). In a clear and highly insightful way, Gould exposes methodological problem after methodological problem in the history of attempts to construct theories of biological determinism. Of the remainingexamples, I found Gould's treatmentof the early history of the I.Q. testing movement - notably the work of Alfred Binet (1857-1911), H. H. Goddard (1866-1957), Lewis Terman (1877-1956), and Robert Yerkes (1876-1956) -- particularlyilluminating, building upon and supplementingLeon Kamin'spioneering work of 1974.' Gould shows how Binet's originaltests - specifically were transintended to measure performance, not innate ability formed by the Americanschool of Goddard,Terman,and Yerkesinto tools for measuringinherited mental ability. The problems inherent in designing culture-free tests, in administeringtests in an unbiased, standardized way (especially to non-English-speakingimmigrantsat Ellis Island in 1912 and illiterate Army recruits at Camp Custer in 1918), and in interpretingthe results without reference to common prejudices,are well explicated and sometimes humorouslyportrayed. Most astounding is the overt self-delusion in which the l.Q. testers engaged as they dismissed the problems they encountered. Gould's book should make everyone who reads it a little more cautious about assigningcauses to complex problemsof humansocial behavior. One of Gould's most important insights, and a messagethat should carry beyond the specific examples he has chosen, is his view that the history of theories of biological determinism has involved the confluence of three methodologicalproblems: (a) The first is the fascinationwith measurementand quantification that has influenced so much of Science in the past 150 years, along with the belief that if something is assigneda numberit is real, objective, and "scientific." Gould makes it abundantlyclear that measurements always have to be interpretedin a given context: for example, cranial capacity can be measured,but the meaning of such measurements is neitherstraightforwardnor obvious. (b) The second problem is that of reification -- the notion that certain qualities (for examples, "intelligence" or "race") are valid 1. Leon J. Kamin. The Science and Politics of J.Q. (Potomac, Md.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1974), esp. chap. 1-3.
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entities simply because we invent a name for them. Using the history of Spearman's statistical identification of intelligence (symbolized by g) in 1904 and its critique, Gould shows by a simple, if slightly tedious, discussionof statisticshow L. L. Thurstonein 1935 subdivided g into several components (mathematical and verbal intelligence, for instance), equivalent to one another empirically, statistically, and logically. There was nothing absolute or "natural"about intelligence as a unitaryquality. (c) The third and final problem common to theories of biological determinism has been the a priori assumption that the traits under considerationare, in fact, inherited.Gould demonstratesunequivocally the circular reasoning in which such investigators as Terman, Cyril Burt, or Arthur Jensen have engaged by assuming that a trait is inherited, measuringit, finding that it appearsthroughoutcertain family lines, and then reassertingthat this proves it must be inherited. As Gould points out, the studies merely restate, ratherthan demonstrate independently,the originala prioriassumption. How are we to interpret Gould's fascinating explication in the broader context of the history of science? What sorts of conclusions, lessons from history, or comments on human social life are we to make? Here is where, in my own view, the author falls short. At one level Gould's book could be seen simply as a debunkingof science - an expose of its flaws, human frailties, and "dirty linen" (with conscious fraud being better documented here than in almost any other single work I know). But Gould anticipates this interpretationand tries to suggest a more significant and "positive" conclusion by arguing, I presumein Popperianfashion, that in science disproof is more positive than proof. This argumentis certainlytrue, though it is not very strong. While I would agree that it must be done, the mere disproof of illconceivedand methodologicallysloppy work is not terriblypositive. Gould's results create a paradox: on the one hand he points out that the various theories have not been maverick concepts espoused by a few zealous crackpots. The ideas, he forcefully maintains,were taken as mainstream, pioneering efforts in their respective periods of history. Yet at the same time the scientific aspects of the works themselves were so evidently flawed, even by the standardsof their own times, that their widespread acceptance becomes difficult to understand.Gould appearsto seek some deeper, historicalexplanations, but it is precisely here that the book stops short of the mark. The author provides no picture, no real hints of the social, political, and economic forces which contributed in specific ways to the rise and 143
GARLAND E. ALLEN
promulgationof biological deterministtheories in their own times. To
be sure, Gould points out that Morton'scraniometrywas used to justify slavery, Broca's anthropometryto justify imperialismand to oppose women's suffrage, and I.Q. tests (in conjunctionwith eugenic thought) to oppose eastern and southern Europeanimmigrationto the United States in the 1920's; but there is no hint of how these determinist argumentsfunctioned in their large-scalesocial context to shapepublic opinion and bring about specific social programsor legislation(such as the passage of immigration restriction laws in the United States in 1924). While I do not want to be guilty of forcing ProfessorGould'sbook into my own mold, his specific choice of subject and organizing themecalls out for an interpretation in the broader social, political, and economic context. For example, an analysis which saw each of these theories as fostered by the wealthy and elite in different stages of the development of Western capitalism would provide a causal (albeit, I am sure, controversial),organizing scheme for understandingsome-thing fundamentalabout the rise and propagationof theories of bio- logical determinism.To see such theoriesas not only somehow vaguely coming forth when needed to support the status quo, but as ideas pushed (paid for, directly encouraged,or chosen) by those with the economic and political power to do so would providemore of a useful framework,more of an insight into the relationsbetween science and society than the presentanalysisis capableof doing. Let me give one concrete example. The biological determinist argument against eastern and southern European immigrationto the United States was mounted through two interrelatedmovements: the eugenics movement and the I.Q. testing movement (Gould treats only the I.Q. movement, but that is sufficient). Both movements were born out of the Progressiveera concern with national and industrial efficiency, itself a product of chaotic, unstable economic and social conditions engenderedby the rapiddevelopmentof industrialcapitalismafter the Civil War. Industrialists and associated financiers sought greater control over the marketplace (prices), the workplace (un- ionization), and society at large (the threat of radicalism,and particularly Bolshevism,after 1917). By theses realitieswealthy elites were won away from laissez-faireto the support of planned capitalism, a major change requiringthe introduction of a special class of experts - scientific advisers, managers,and rationalplanners.The l.Q. testing and eugenicsmovementswere squarelyin that mold and were supported by the wealthy and elite because they provided a way of assigning 144
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people to their proper place in a complex society, and because, as Rockefeller Foundation adviser Wesley Clair Mitchell said in 1915, science and social science could be used to make people "contented with the divisionof the product [of their labor] ." I am not criticizing Gould for failing to advance this particular analysis(though I have reasonto suspect that he would be sympathetic to something like it); I am criticizinghis failureto suggestsome similar type of underlying historical causes which would tie together the variousepisodes he discusses.As it stands, TheMismeasureof Man leads too easily to either the idiosyncraticview of history (that is, that the examples given are simply bizarreoccurrencesoutside the mainstream of scientific work) or the conversenotion that the examplesare simply more extreme versions of the social biases we all have. Such views obscure the more fundamentalhistorical processesthat it behooves us to understandbetter if we are to prevent future transgressionsin the name of science similarto the past ones cited in this book. To use Gould's own style and conclude on a "positivenote," let me suggest that the present book, apart from being both informativeand interestingreading(with some good humor interspersed),has two very important, long-rangehistorical values. One is that it demonstratesthat biological deterministideas, however they arise, can have realand very serious consequences for human life and death. A boatload of German Jewish refugees was turned back from the United States in 1940 because of restrictions engendered by eugenicists and I.Q. testers in 1924; and over the past 40 years millions of Britishschoolchildrenhave been denied the chance to enter the universityas a result of their scores on eleven-plusor I.Q. exams (designed, in part, with the advice and full support of Sir Cyril Burt). Erroneousideas about people's innate biological worth are not mere cocktail-partydiversions;they can maim and kill, figurativelyand literally.A second historicalvalue of this book is that through his illuminatingresearchGould has providedmuch raw material on which future social, economic, and historical analyses can be based. That alone is a majorservicefor which historians,themselves less versed in the intricacies of anthropometry, factor analysis, and psychologicaltesting, should be eternallygrateful.