Nietzsche's Reading of the Sophists

Author(s): Scott Consigny

Source: Rhetoric Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 5-26
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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SCOTTCONSIGNY
Iowa State University

Nietzsche's Reading of the Sophists1

Until recently, scholars have tended to credit two nineteenth-century

thinkers, G. F. Hegel and George Grote, for initiating the modem
"rehabilitation"of the sophists.2 But in the past several years, an increasing
numberof scholars have begun to draw inspirationfrom the writings of another
nineteenth-century figure, Friedrich Nietzsche. Among those taking this
"Nietzschean turn," Mario Untersteinerutilizes Nietzsche's conception of the
"tragic"in his account of Gorgias's epistemology (101-205), a reading Eric
White supplements with Nietzsche's notion of the "dionysian"(38). Victor
Vitanza, characterizing Nietzsche as a "dionysian Sophist," draws from
Nietzsche's tropological model of language to illuminate the sophists' own
rhetoric("Sub/Versions"112; "Notes"131); and David Roochnik contends that
Nietzsche's critique of reason illuminates the sophists' own "misology"
("Tragedy"50, 155, 162). In the sphere of ethics, E. R. Dodds maintains that
Nietzsche's "immoralism"is similar to the egoism of Gorgias'sstudentCallicles
(387-91), and Daniel Shaw contends that Nietzsche's critique of morality
iterates the sophists' notion that "moralvaluations remain matters of opinion"
(339). Concerning methodology, John Poulakos argues that Nietzsche's
"genealogical" approach is most suited for interpreting the sophists
("Interpreting"219-21); and Susan Jarratt credits Nietzsche's method as
authorizing her own "re-reading"of the sophists (xix). But whereas they have
drawn on a variety of Nietzsche's ideas and interpretivestrategies to advance
what Jacqueline de Romilly characterizesas a "Nietzscheaninterpretation"of
the sophists ("Sophists"xi), none of these scholars has systematicallyexamined
Nietzsche's own quite specific and extensive writings about the sophists. The
untoward result is that we possess a variety of "Nietzscheanreadings"of the
sophists that tend to silence Nietzsche's own distinctive voice.
This tendency to overlook Nietzsche's own specific remarks about the
sophists is quite understandable,for Nietzsche never wrote a systematictreatise
on the sophists and instead discussed them in a ratherfragmentarymannerin a
varietyof texts over a periodof almost two decades. Further,with the exception
of three quite brief passages-in Human,All-Too-Human221, Dawn 168, and
the "Ancients,"Twilight of the Idols 2-Nietzsche did not publish any of his
remarksabout the sophists, confining his discussions to his 1872-1873 lecture
notes in the history of Greek rhetoric ("Descriptionof Ancient Rhetoric"and

RhetoricReview, Vol. 13, No. 1, Fall 1994 5

6 RhetoricReview

"The History of Greek Eloquence"), the 1872 essay "Homer'sContest," and

several passages collected posthumouslyin The Will To Power.3Because many
of these unpublishedremarks are even more fragmentaryand enigmatic than
his published writings and because some scholars have questioned the use of
the Nachlass as a reliable source of his views, it is understandablethat scholars
have tended to marginalize Nietzsche's own comments about the sophists.4 But
whereas this scholarly neglect is not surprising, it is nevertheless unfortunate,
for Nietzsche advances a complex and provocativereading of the sophists, one
that suggests avenues of inquiry that scholars have not yet pursued. In this
essay I examine Nietzsche's diverse writings on the sophists and attempt to
reconstructhis own account of them. To this end I first discuss Nietzsche's
"genealogical"method of reading, one with which he situates the sophists as
pivotal figures in the agonistic and creative culture of fifth-centuryGreece. I
next examine what Nietzsche delineates as three features of the sophists'
teachings: their rhetorical model of language, their critique of epistemology,
and their "immoralism." I conclude with a discussion of how a "neo-
Nietzschean" reading of the sophists may provide a direction for the
"Nietzscheanturn"in sophistic criticism and generate new perspectiveson the
sophists.

Nietzsche's Genealogical Method

Perhapsthe first striking featureof Nietzsche's discussion of the sophists is
his method. Nietzsche himself stresses the importanceof method, nothing that
"The most valuable insights are arrived at last; but the most valuable insights
are methods"(WP 469). Nietzsche uses a method that he labels genealogical,
one that may be seen as an application of his more general "perspectivist"
epistemology, in that it undertakesto situate an object of study from a particular
perspective.5 Nietzsche's genealogical method is explicitly "partial"in two
significant ways. First, his genealogy is interested or partisan in that it is
anchoredin his own interests as a thinker and writer. In his examinationof the
sophists in particular,Nietzsche situates his reading within a projectof cultural
renewal designed to affirm "Life"and provide an alternativeto what he saw as
the "motley"and "merely decorative" culture of his own time ("UH" 10).6
Nietzsche portraysthe tragic culture of Greece as a model for such a cultural
renewal, and he depicts Socrates and Plato, whom he identifies as among the
principalenemies of that culture, to be a source of the modem culturalmalaise.
It is in this context of articulatingthe genealogy of the Westernculturalmalaise
that Nietzsche discusses the sophists, whom he champions as the principal
adversaries of the "Socratic schools." As Werner Dannhauser observes,
Nietzsche's "quarrelwith Socrates is part of a vast historical drama which he
recounts and which features Socrates as the first villain and Nietzsche himself
Nietzsche'sReading of the Sophists 7

as the final hero"(272); and in his quarrel,Nietzsche suggests that the sophists
may be seen as his own "co-workers and precursors" (WP 464). Indeed,
Nietzsche lauds the sophists as seminal thinkers who have influenced every
subsequentadversaryof the Socratic schools, asserting that "everyadvance in
epistemological and moral knowledge has reinstated the Sophists" (WP 428).
Nietzsche thus advances an overtly partisan defense of the sophists, and he
never pretendsthat his account is in any sense a "disinterested"inquiry.
Nietzsche's genealogical method is partial in a second sense in that he
attends to a limited selection of material. Stated another way, Nietzsche
presents a "genealogy"in which he delineates one pattern of placement and
interconnection, and in which he deliberately ignores or suppresses other
possible modes of placement. He contends that we are "not to assume several
kinds of causality until the experimentof making do with a single one has been
pushed to its utmost limit (to the point of nonsense, if I may say so)-that is a
moral of method" (BGE 36). In respect to his treatment of the sophists,
Nietzsche uses this principle of selectiveness, one Arthur Danto labels
"methodologicalmonism" (216), by focusing his attention almost exclusively
on Protagorasand Gorgias. He mentions Agathon and Thrasymachusonly in
passing, without addressing their epistemological or ethical views; he never
mentions Hippias or Prodicus,and he explicitly excludes Critias from his list of
sophists ("DAR" 169). Moreover,Nietzsche is highly selective in his accounts
of Protagoras and Gorgias themselves. Concerning Protagoras, Nietzsche
discusses only one extant fragment, namely the claim to "make the weaker
argument the stronger"(HGE 215); and in so doing he ignores Protagoras's
famous assertions that the human being is the measure of all things (D80.B 1),
that two opposed accounts are present about everything (D80.B6a), and that he
is unable to know whetherthe gods exist (D80.B4).7 Equally striking is the fact
that Nietzsche does not mention any of Gorgias's extant texts, completely
ignoring the arguments of On Nature or Not Being, The Encomium of Helen,
the Epitaphios, and The Defense of Palamedes, and instead confining his
attentionto Gorgias'spoetic style, his use of rhetoricalfigures, and his putative
"extemporaneity"("DAR"25, 43, 81, 91, 171; HA 221).
Many scholars have challenged Nietzsche's genealogical method,
especially in regardto classical philology, precisely because of its "unscholarly"
partisanship and partiality.8But whereas his account of the sophists may be
aggressively partisan and egregiously selective, Nietzsche never claims
otherwise, and he suggests that in his effort "toreplace the improbablewith the
more probable,possibly one error with another"(GM Pr 4), he is simply more
"honest"than those scholars who mistakenly think that they are able to be
disinterestedand complete in their readings. He insists that "the 'disinterested'
action is an exceedingly interesting and interested action" (BGE 220); and he
contends that individuals who construct "systems"betray a lack of integrity in
8 Rhetoric Review

that they tend to be oblivious of their own interests. Consequently, he praises

those "philosophers of the future" who, like himself, have no intention to
articulatea "truth"that is for everyone. He notes that

It must offend their pride, also their taste, if their truth is supposed
to be a truth for everyman-which has so far been the secret wish
and hidden meaning of all dogmatic aspirations. 'My judgment is
my judgment':no one else is easily entitled to it-that is what such
a philosopherof the futuremay perhapssay of himself." (BGE 43)

Unlike the positivist who claims knowledge of the "facts" in themselves,

Nietzsche insists that "factsis precisely what there is not, only interpretations"
(WP481); and he repudiatesthe dogmatist'sassumptionthat "thereshould be a
'truth'which one could somehow approach"(WP451).

The Genealogy of the Sophists

Using his genealogical method, Nietzsche situates the sophists as central
figures in fifth-centuryGreek culture, depicting them as its "advancedteachers"
and perhaps most eloquent advocates. In order to understand Nietzsche's
account of the sophists, then, it is useful first to sketch his view of the culture in
which he situates them. Nietzsche presents his view of Greek culture in an
explicitly polemical manner, repudiating what he saw as the misguided
"Enlightenment" account of Johann Winckelmann. According to
Winckelmann, Greek culture was exemplary because of its "noble simplicity"
and "quietgrandeur,"qualities manifested not only in its art but in its "writing
from the best periods; the writings from the Socratic school" (27, 45).
Nietzsche rejects this reading, considering it a "comedy"to be "exposed"(WP
830), and ridiculing the notion of "'beautifulsouls,' 'golden means,' and other
perfection in the Greeks," their "calm in greatness, their ideal cast of mind,
their noble simplicity .... "("Ancients,"TI 3). In place of this reading,
Nietzsche insists that Greek culture emerged from a ferocious and often violent
energy, a surplus or plenitude of force. He observes: "I saw their strongest
instinct, the will to power; I saw them tremble before the indomitable force of
this drive-I saw how all their institutions grew out of preventive measures
taken to protecteach other against their inner explosives" ("Ancients,"TI 3).
Nietzsche does not deny that the Greeks produced great art and writing,
but unlike Winckelmann he insists that this art emerged from the Greeks'
ability to channel their "rich and even overflowing Hellenic instinct, that
wonderfulphenomenonwhich bears the name of Dionysus; it is explicable only
in terms of an excess of force" (TI 560); and he maintains that "one does not
Nietzsche'sReadingof the Sophists 9

know the Greeks as long as this hidden subterraneanentrance lies blocked"

(WP 1051).
In his mature works, Nietzsche characterizesas "dionysian"the ability of
an individual to establish unity from diversity, to direct and harmonize diverse
forces within himself in a productive and creative manner.9But whereas he
admires Greek culture for its distinctive individuals, Nietzsche insists that
individual Greeks did not mastertheir explosive energy in isolation. Instead,he
argues that the Greeks were able to master their violent instincts through
competition, in the institution of the agon or contest.10In the essay "Homer's
Contest,"Nietzsche observes that prior to the classical age, the Greeks lived in
a world of violence and destruction;and that it was only through the agon that
they were able to channel their drive toward annihilation and violence in
creative ways. He notes thatearly Greek mythology portraysa world of "cruelty,
a tigerish lust to annihilate"("HC"32); that the pre-Homericworld is one in
which "only night and terror and an imagination accustomed to the horrible.
What kind of earthly existence do these revolting, terrible, theognic myths
reflect? A life ruled only by the children of Night: strife, lust, deceit, old age,
and death"("HC"34).
Despite its horrors, according to Nietzsche, the Greeks joyfully embraced
the "terriblepresence of this [violent] urge and considered it justified" ("HC"
35) because it spurredthem into creative agons. Thus Nietzsche argues that all
"Greek artists, the tragedians, for example, wrote in order to triumph; their
whole art cannot be imagined without competition"(HA 170); that "Everygreat
Hellene hands on the torch of the contest; every great virtue kindles a new
greatness" ("HC" 36); that the very "soul" of the ancient Greeks was the
"personalcontest"(D 175); and that "withfestivals and the arts they also aimed
at nothing other than to feel on top, to show themselves on top ("Ancients,"TI
3). In effect, Nietzsche depicts competition and creativity as correlativefactors
in Greek culture, wherein individuals competed and attainedglory by means of
their ingenuity and creativity; and whose artistic works were in turn framed
within and conditionedby the protocols of the contests.
One consequence of this correlation of creativity and competition,
according to Nietzsche, was that the Greeks fostered a plurality of competitors
and geniuses and refused to countenancethe authorityof any one voice. Rather
than seeking the "unconditional"or the absolute, they encourageda multiplicity
of competing voices, each of which was recognized as emerging from and
rendered discernible by the specific constraints of the agon itself. Nietzsche
observes: "Thatis the core of the Hellenic notion of the contest: it abominates
the rule of one and fears its dangers; it desires, as a protection against the
genius, another genius" ("HC" 37). Rather than seeking a single authority,
then, the Greeks sanctioned a diversity of competing perspectives, and sought
through the institution of the agon to proliferatefurtherperspectives.A further
10 RhetoricReview

consequence Nietzsche sees in the institutionof agon is the Greek emphasis on

play, their tendency and ability to encompass all of life within the horizon of
playful competition. He observes that "Whatis unique to Hellenistic life is thus
characterized:to perceive all matters of the intellect, of life's seriousness, of
necessities, even of danger, as play" ("DAR" 3). In this respect Nietzsche
depicts the Greeks as using the agon to "refine"violence, transforming the
potential destructivenessof physical combat into a creatively "playful"activity
that encouraged contestants to overcome not only their adversaries but their
own prior achievements and limits.
It is in the context of this integral relationship between creativity and
competition that Nietzsche situates the fifth-century sophists, the "advanced
teachers"of Greek culture. He points out that underthe tutelage of the sophists,

Every talent must unfold itself in fighting: that is the command of

Hellenic popular pedagogy. . . . And just as the youths were
engaged through contests, their educators were also engaged in
contests with each other. .... in the spirit of the contest, the sophist,
the advanced teacher of antiquity, meets another sophist. .... the
Greek knows the artist only as engaged in a personal fight." ("HC"
37)

In effect, Nietzsche's sophist is himself a competitive artist, and his

"teaching"is one that encourages creativity through competition. In the words
of one sophist's nephew, "No one of mortals before discovered a finer art than
Gorgias to arm the soul for contests of excellence" (D80.A8). Because he sees
the sophists as the principal teachers of Greek culture, Nietzsche asserts that
fifth-centuryGreek culture, "which had in Sophocles its poet, in Pericles its
statesman, in Hippocratesits physician, in Democritus its natural philosopher
... deserves to be baptizedwith the name of its teachers,the Sophists"(D 168).
Rather than portraying them as marginal figures in a culture whose highest
achievement is the "quietgrandeur"and "noble simplicity," Nietzsche depicts
the contentious sophists as the very embodimentof Greekculture.
Insofar as he depicts the sophists as central to Greek culture, Nietzsche
characterizestheir adversaries,Plato and the "Socraticschools," as the enemies
of the sophists' positive, life-affirming virtues. Nietzsche thus denigrates the
socratic schools as articulating what he characterizes as a "non-Hellenic"
response, one adumbratedin the escapism of the Orphic mystics who expressed
a "disgust with existence . . . a conception of existence as a punishment and
guilt" ("HC"34). Commenting on The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche remarks
that
Nietzsche'sReadingof the Sophists 11

The two decisive innovations of the book are, first, its

understandingof the Dionysian phenomenonamong the Greeks. . .
. Secondly, there is the understanding of Socratism: Socrates is
recognized for the first time as an instrument of Greek
disintegration,as a typical decadent. "Rationality"against instinct.
"Rationality"at any price as a dangerous force that undermines
life." ("BT"EH 1)

That is, the sophists channel and encourage the healthiest instincts of Greek
culture, while Plato, in the tradition of Orpheus, attempts to repress or escape
those very instincts. Nietzsche thus vehemently repudiatesthe notion that Plato
represents one of the great achievements of the culture, insisting that the
socratic philosophers exemplify a "non-Hellenic"withdrawal from the Greek
affirmationof "Life."He claims:

I Wasthe first to see the real opposition: the degenerating instinct

that turns against life . . . (the philosophy of Plato, and all idealism
as typical forms) versus a formula for the highest affirmation,bom
of fullness, of overfullness, a Yes-saying without reservation,even
to suffering, even to guilt, even to everything that is questionable
and strangein existence. ("BT";EH 2)

Iteratingthis pivotal antithesis,Nietzsche notes:

The Greek culture of the Sophists had developed out of all the
Greek instincts; it belongs to the culture of the Periclean age as
necessarily as Plato does not: it has its predecessorsin Heraclitus,
Democritus, in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it finds
expression in, e.g., the high cultureof Thucydides. (WP428)

Thus, while he praises the sophists for fostering and embodying the best
Hellenic instincts, Nietzsche condemns the socratic schools which, through
theiradvocacy of unconditionaltruthsand dogmatic moral rules, circumscribed
and diminished life.

The "Rhetorical" Model of Language

In his genealogy of the sophists, Nietzsche delineates three interrelated
contributionsthe sophists made to their agonistic and creative culture.The first
of these concerns was their emphasis on rhetoric,and what may be termedtheir
"rhetorical" model of language. In his lecture notes on rhetoric, titled
12 Rhetoric Review

"Descriptionof Ancient Rhetoric"and "Historyof Greek Eloquence,"Nietzsche

delineates the pivotal role of the sophists in the teaching and practice of
rhetoric, and their view that excellence in rhetoric constitutes the highest
cultural achievement. He notes that it is difficult for us to appreciate the
enormous importance the Greeks attributedto rhetoric, for "we have grown
unaccustomedto the tonal effects of rhetoric, no longer having sucked in this
kind of cultural mother'smilk from the first moment of life" (HA 218). But in
the culture of the sophists, "the education of the ancient man customarily
culminates in rhetoric: it is the highest spiritual activity of the well-educated
political man-an odd notion for us" ("DAR"3). Nietzsche adds: "To no task
did the Greeks devote such incessant labor as to eloquence. . . . Devotion to
oratoryis the most tenacious element of Greek culture and survives through all
the curtailments of their condition. . . . Hellenic culture and power gradually
concentrate on oratorical skill" (HGE 213) Even in their appreciation of
tragedy, according to Nietzsche, the Greeks considered rhetoric to be of
paramount importance, attending "the theater in order to hear beautiful
speeches" (GS 135). By privileging rhetoric in their curriculum,the sophists
deepened this appreciationfor rhetoric, providing the apparatusand training
needed for eloquent competition.
The sophists' privileging of rhetoric had a second profound effect,
according to Nietzsche, in that they tended to consider every use of language as
inherentlyrhetorical.Nietzsche notes that for the sophists,

The power to discover and to make operativethat which works and

impresses, with respect to each thing, a power which Aristotle calls
rhetoric, is, at the same time, the essence of language. . . . the
rhetorical is a further development, guided by the clear light of the
understanding, of the artistic means which are already found in
language. There is obviously no unrhetorical 'naturalness' of
language to which one could appeal; language itself is the result of
purely rhetoricalarts. ("DAR"23, emphasis added).

Insofar as he depicts them as construing all language as inherently rhetorical,

Nietzsche suggests that the sophists consider every use of language as agonistic,
occurring only within contests between adversaries. Unlike the socratic
philosophers who present themselves as seeking objective "truth"rather than
rhetorical victory, the sophists would insist that every speaker is a rhetor,
inevitably engaged in a projectof demolishing and potentiallydisplacing his or
her adversary's arguments. Second, Nietzsche's sophists would consider all
language to be inherently creative, seeing in each use of language a fabrication
of a persuasive image or argument designed to persuade an adversary or
audience. As such, the sophists construe language not as a transparentwindow
Nietzsche'sReading of the Sophists 13

through which one may observe an independentand preexisting reality but as

an apparatus for weaving elegant and enchanting texts, each of which
articulatesits own perspective.
Nietzsche accounts for the agonistic and poetic aspects of the sophists'
model of language with what he identifies as the fundamentalinstrumentsof
language, the tropes. According to Nietzsche, the sophists maintain that "the
tropes are not just occasionally added to words but constitute their most proper
nature. It makes no sense to speak of a 'propermeaning' which is carried over
to something else only in special cases" ("DAR" 25). Stated another way,
Nietzsche's sophists would maintain that "Whatis called language is actually
all figuration"("DAR"25). Unlike a member of the "socraticschool" such as
Aristotle, who maintains that the fundamentalunit of language is the "name"
or "noun,"a symbol that represents or mirrors "actualthings" existing in the
world, Nietzsche suggests that the sophists would presumably consider the
fundamentallinguistic unit to be a creative maneuverin a verbal agon. For the
trope is a "turn"in a rhetoricalcompetition, analogous to a maneuveror "turn"
performed by a wrestler in a match. As such, a trope does not derive its
meaning by referring to an external, determinate reality that exists
independently of discourse and serves as its "foundation."Rather, the trope
acquiresmeaning within each particularagon in which it is used, and the only
criteria for its "proper"use are the ultimately arbitraryprotocols of the contest
itself. In this respect the tropes are not alterationsof a stable "literal"language
capable of objectively mirroring the world; instead, speech is "literal"only to
those people who fail to recognize that they have been captivated by its
metaphors, synecdoches, and metonymes. The tropes in this sense are
variations upon other tropes, devices with which a rhetor may fabricate a
persuasiveaccountthat may be accepted as "literallytrue."
Correspondingto what he identifies as the agonistic and creative aspects of
the sophistic model of language, Nietzsche distinguishes two branches of the
sophistic movement. The first branch is representedby Protagorasof Abdera,
who emphasizes the importanceof the competitive agon. Nietzsche writes that
"Sophism originated with Protagoras'sjourney through the Hellenistic cities,
which began ca. 455 B.C. He influenced Attic eloquence much earlier than did
the Sicilians. He promises to teach to hetto logon kreitto poiein: how one can
by means of dialectics help the weaker case to win out" (HGE 215). Protagoras
emphasizes the "combative"aspect of rhetoric, instructing his students in a
dialectical skill thus enabling them to overpowertheir adversariesin any verbal
competition on any subject.The second branch of sophistic teaching is that of
the Sicilian Gorgias, who emphasizes what Nietzsche characterizes as the
overtly "artistic"dimensionof sophistic eloquence:
14 Rhetoric Review

Innovation already begins with Gorgias: he came adornedfestively

and magnificently-like Empedocles he appeared in a purple
garment-with a worldwidereputationand presentedthe epideictic
oration:in it one wants to display one's ability; there is no intention
to deceive: the content is not the issue. Pleasure in beautiful
discourse acquires a realm of its own where it does not clash with
necessity. It is a refreshing pause for a nation of artists; for once
they want to indulge in an exquisite treat in oratory. The
philosophers,however, have no sense for this activity (for they had
no understanding of the art which lived and flourished around
them, nor of sculpture), and so their hostility is too vehement.
(HGE 216)

It may be observed that these two branches of sophistry are by no means

exclusive and that the agonistic and the artistic are correlativefor Protagorasas
well as for Gorgias. Thus, Protagoras uses poetic myths as well as logical
arguments to convince audiences and defeat interlocutors, a practice he is
presentedas exhibiting in Plato's Protagoras;and Gorgias may be seen as using
his artistic performances not only to challenge the prevailing tenets of the
culture, such as the culpability of Helen of Troy, but also to mock and
potentially subvertthe authorityof "rationalthought"itself.

Sophistic Epistemology
The second contributionto Greek culture that Nietzsche attributesto the
sophists is in the field of epistemology. This contributionis integrallyrelated to
the sophists' rhetoricalmodel of language, for such a model implies that every
claim to knowledge is "conditional,"anchored in the contingencies of specific
rhetorical situations. In his account of Protagoras,Nietzsche observes that the
sophist considers rhetoric to be universal in its application, in that his
"dialectics was to make all other arts and sciences superfluous:how without
being a geometrician one can out argue the geometrician; and likewise on
naturalphilosophy, wrestling, the practical life of the state"(HGE 215). Using
his rhetorical "art,"Protagoras is able to undermine the dogmatic claims of
every self-styled "expert"to possess privileged discourses or methods that
enable them to speak "nonrhetorically"about any subject whatsoever. For if
every assertion is construedas the expression of a rhetor engaged in an agon,
and as such is conditioned by his or her own ethos and pathos, then no speaker
is warrantedin claiming that his or her assertions are unconditionally true.
Stated another way, Protagoraswould hold that every use of language is made
Nietzsche'sReadingof the Sophists 15

within a "game," wherein the validity of any assertion is determined by

arbitraryprotocols of each game, as they are interpretedby the participantsand
observersof that game, and not by reference to an "independent"or universal
criterion that governs all games. In Nietzsche's vocabulary Protagoraswould
construeevery assertion as inherentlyperspectival, eschewing the possibility of
a "nonperspectivalway of seeing," a "neutral"standpointfrom which to observe
the "worlditself."
Protagoras's refusal to countenance claims to unconditional or
nonperspectival truths has profound ontological consequences, for if every
assertion is an articulation of one's own perspective, then one is never
warrantedin claiming access to an independent "reality."Stated another way,
the "real world"for Protagorasis identical with the "apparent"world, in that
whatever a persuasive rhetor is able to render apparentbecomes "real"for his
or her audience. In this respect Nietzsche observes that for the sophist "in
general everything appears only as the speaker's power represents it" (HGE
213), an observation that recalls Protagoras'sremark that "humanityis the
measure of all things." Furthermore, since individuals and the contingent
rhetorical situations in which they engage are always changing, Protagoras
implies that the world of appearanceis itself subject to change. In this respect
Nietzsche maintains that Protagorasechoes Heraclitus, who "altogetherdenied
being" (PTG 51) and who depicted reality as a "flux"or process of "becoming"
(PTG 51). But Nietzsche suggests further that Protagoras's conception of
"becoming"is not a metaphysicalclaim about the ultimate natureof reality but
rather a statement about humanity's inability to acquire certain knowledge
about such a putative "reality."Just as Protagorasclaims that he is unable to
know anything about such transcendental entities as the gods, he would
presumablyinsist that he is unwarrantedin attributingany ultimate features to
the "worldin itself." Nietzsche seems to read Protagorasin this way, claiming
that he represents "a synthesis of Heraclitus and Democritus"(WP 428), the
latter of whom Nietzsche depicts as challenging the certaintyof sensation, and
as seeing the world as "utterlywithout reason and instinct, endless whirled. All
myths and gods useless" (WPh 6[21]). As a "synthesis" of Heraclitus and
Democritus, Protagoras would presumably repudiate as unwarranted any
metaphysical claim about an ultimate reality, a domain of "Being" that
transcendsand is independentof individual rhetoricalsituations.
In his discussion of Gorgias, Nietzsche suggests that the "Western"
sophist's artistic rhetoric has significant epistemological and ontological
implications, challenging the possibility of certainty and subvertingprevailing
truths about the ultimate nature of the world. Nietzsche observes that Gorgias
uses his overtly extravaganttropes to overcome the limitations of the prevailing
view of "reality,"one thathas been fabricatedwith a language that his audience
accepts as a literal representationof reality. Nietzsche notes:
16 Rhetoric Review

The severe constraint which the French dramatists imposed upon

themselves . . . was as importanta training as counterpointand the
fugue in the developmentof modem music, or the Gorgian figures
in Greek rhetoric. To restrict oneself so may appear absurd;
nevertheless there is no way to get beyond realism other than to
limit oneself at first most severely (perhapsmost arbitrarily).In that
way one gradually learns to step with grace, even on the small
bridges that span dizzying abysses, and one takes as profit the
greatestsupplenessof movement. (HA 221)

That is, Gorgias's overtly artificial figures of speech serve as self-imposed

constraintsthat enable him to overcome the prevailing conception of the "real."
Throughhis explicitly artificial "performances,"Nietzsche suggests, the sophist
affirms "an anti-metaphysicalview of the world-yes, but an artistic one" (WP
1048). For insofar as Gorgias presents his discourse as constructedfrom highly
artificial rhetorical figures, he suggests that his own discourses, despite their
persuasiveness, are themselves "fabrications,"and not literal truths about
"reality-in-itself."Through his own distinctly personal use of artificial figures,
the sophist draws attention to his own inescapable presence and thereby
underscores the fact that the views he offers are his own, and are not to be
mistakenas objective, universal "truths."

Sophistic Immoralism
The third contribution to Greek culture that Nietzsche attributes to the
sophists concerns their view of morality, one that is integrally related to their
rhetorical model of language and their critique of knowledge. In an assertion
that appears on its face to echo Plato's criticism, Nietzsche affirms that the
sophists are "immoralists"in that they "possessthe courage of all strong spirits
to know their own immorality"(WP 428). In this claim Nietzsche seems to
acquiesce to Plato's depiction of sophistic morality as the egoism articulatedby
Callicles, whose sole objective is to advance his own selfish interests. But
Nietzsche's notion of "immoralism"as it applies to the sophists is very different
from the egoism of Callicles. Since Nietzsche's sophists repudiateevery claim
to be able to articulate"objective"or nonperspectivaltruths about the natureof
reality, they consequentlywould reject the attendantclaim to be able to discern
and articulatedogmatic moral "rules,"prescriptionsabout how one "ought"to
behave and live. Instead, they would maintain that every assertion is made
within a creative rhetorical contest and that its putative "validity"or truth is
establishedby its persuasivenessor success in that particularcontest, dependent
upon the contingencies of the participantsand audience. This antidogmatism
Nietzsche'sReading of the Sophists 17

ushers in an "immoralism"in that one recognizes that every moral claim is

conditional, anchored in the presuppositionsand values of the speaker. Thus
Nietzsche asserts:

The Sophists verge upon the first critique of morality, the first
insight into morality:-they juxtapose the multiplicity (the
geographical relativity) of the moral value judgments;-they let it
be known that every moralitycan be dialecticallyjustified; i.e., they
divine that all attemptsto give reasons for morality are necessarily
sophistical. . . . They postulate the first truth that a 'morality-in-
itself,' a 'good-in-itself do not exist, that it is a swindle to talk of
'truth'in this field." (WP428)

In this vein Nietzsche sharply 'distinguishes his own reading from that
advanced by George Grote, insisting that "Grote'stactics in defense of the
Sophists are false: he wants to raise them to the rank of men of honor and
ensigns of morality-but it was their honor not to indulge in any swindle with
big words and virtues"(WP429).
But whereas Nietzsche's sophists would maintain that every moral
pronouncementis "interested,"and that every moral "truth"is a swindle, they
would not therebyaffirm a Calliclean egoism wherein each individual strives to
satisfy his or her desires. Indeed, Nietzsche suggests that the sophists would
oppose such an egoism, for he implies that they would reject the notion that the
"ego"or the "self"possesses permanence,just as they repudiate the assertion
that any entity may possess a permanent"being"outside the flux of appearance
and becoming. If the "self" is a fabrication, then the "immoralism"of the
sophists would counsel not the affirmationof one's egoistic desires but rathera
"self-overcoming"that encourages an ovenness to transformingone's desires.
Nietzsche attributessuch a viev/ to the culture of the sophists as a whole in his
notion of the "dionysian,"on. that affirms "passing away and destroying," a
life of "becoming,along witt, a radical repudiationof being ("Ancients,"TI 3).
And he speaks of the Greek sophistic culture as comprising a "leisure class
whose members make things difficult for themselves and exercise much self-
overcoming. The power of form, the will to give form to oneself' (WP 94).
Insofar as he presents them as the advanced teachers of this culture, Nietzsche
depicts the sophists as

Saying Yes to life even in its strangest and hardest problems; the
will to life rejoicing over its own inexhaustibility even in the
sacrifice of its highest types-that is what I called Dionysian. . ...
Not in order to get rid of terror and pity . . . but in order to be
18 RhetoricReview

oneself the eternaljoy of becoming beyond all terrorand pity-that

joy which includes even joy in destroying.("BT,"EH 3)

By affirming "self-overcoming,"the sophists do not posit their "own"desires or

values as invariable or foundational; instead, they use the agon as an
opportunityto challenge and therebyto overcome their own limitations, and in
this manner achieve a greater degree of excellence. Stated another way,
Nietzsche's sophists would reject the notion of a permanent"self"lying behind
each contingent rhetorical situation and eschew all unconditional rules that
inhibit personal development. Sophistic "immoralism"is in this sense a
repudiationof Calliclean selfishness, for the sophists would see one's desires as
being as contingent and conditional as one's most cherished beliefs; and they
would presumablyurge individuals to be open to abandoningthose desires that
inhibit their freedom and growth.
Just as he depicts the sophists' epistemological rivals to be the dogmatic
philosophers who privilege their own methodology as providing access to
unconditional truths, Nietzsche depicts the sophists' moral rivals to be those
same socratic schools who use dialectic "as a way to virtue (in Plato and
Socrates: evidently because Sophistrycounted as the way to immorality)"(WP
578). Nietzsche observes that it is because of the enormoushistorical influence
of the socratic schools that the sophists tend to be "pale and ungraspableto
us-for now we suspect that it must have been a very immoral culture, since
Plato and all the Socratic schools fought against it!" (D 168). Intervening on
behalf of the sophists in their "quarrel"with the philosophers,Nietzsche depicts
the sophists as champions of "this life," individuals who repudiatethe escapist
attempts to flee to a domain of unconditional truth and moral absolutism. In
this vein Nietzsche attributesthe "decline"of Greek culture not to the sophists'
professed immoralism but to the "theoretical"socratic schools, like Socrates
and his rationalistfollowers, whom he also considers responsiblefor the demise
of Greek tragedy (BT 15). Refusing to countenance the valorization of the
socratic thinkers,Nietzsche exclaims that one should not

judge the Greeks by their philosophers,as the Germanshave done,

and use the Philistine moralism of the Socratic schools as a clue to
what was basically Hellenic! After all, the philosophers are the
decadents of Greek culture, the counter-movementto the ancient,
noble, taste (to the agonistic instinct, to the polis, to the value of
race, to the authorityof descent) ("WhatI Owe," TI 3).

And he asserts that "Onecannot insist too strongly upon the fact that the great
Greek philosophers representthe decadence of every kind of Greek excellence
Nietzsche'sReading of the Sophists 19

and make it contagious-"Virtue" made completely abstract was the greatest

seduction to make oneself abstract:i.e., to detach oneself" (WP428).
In Nietzsche's reading the sophists' immoralism affirms the healthiest
characteristic of Hellenic culture in that it encourages individuals to enjoy
struggle, excel by overcoming their limits, affirm their own uniqueness, and
insist upon personal freedom. In this respect the sophist repudiates the
moralism of the socratic schools that Nietzsche denigrates as "the worst of
tastes, the taste for the unconditional"(BGE 31); and in doing so the sophist
distinguishes himself from the "slave," who "wants the unconditional and
understandsonly what is tyrannical,in morals, too" (BGE 46).

A Neo-Nietzschean Reading of the Sophists

I have argued that Nietzsche's reading of the sophists is openly partisan,
anchored in his assessment of the cultural malaise of his own time and his
commitment to cultural renewal and that his reading is highly selective,
attending to some fragments of the sophists only cursorily while overlooking
others altogether.The account he presents is thus uniquely his own, and in this
respect a strictly "Nietzschean"reading is precisely the unique interpretation
that I have attempted to reconstruct from his specific remarks. My
reconstructionof his account of the sophists may be of interest to Nietzschean
scholars, I suggest, in that it may illuminate featuresof Nietzsche's own theory
of language, epistemology, and ethics, indicating how he draws upon yet
departsfrom the Greek thinkers he praises as his "co-workersand precursors"
(WP 464). But reconstructingNietzsche's reading should also be of interest to
contemporarystudents of the sophists, in that it may enable us to articulate a
"neo-Nietzschean"reading of the sophists that draws upon Nietzsche's method
of reading and specific insights into the sophists'while being anchored in our
own interests and commitments. Such a neo-Nietzschean reading is worth
articulating,I submit, in that it may provide some possible new directions for
the contemporary"Nietzscheanturn" among sophistic scholars who have not
attendedto Nietzsche's own specific writings on the sophists, and enable us to
generate new perspectives on the sophists. In what follows I will delineate
several key featuresof a such a neo-Nietzscheanreadingof the sophists.
An indispensablefeatureof our neo-Nietzschean reading will be the use of
a "genealogical"method, one that encourages us to become aware of our own
presuppositions,values, or "biases,"and the ways in which they influence our
interpretations.Unlike neopositivist critics who attemptto articulate"objective"
readingsof the sophists, we must discern the ways in which our readings of the
sophists are determined by previous selections and interpretationsof their
writings, and how our own values and commitmentsmay enable us to generate
new openings into the sophists' texts. In Hans-Georg Gadamer'sformulation,
20 RhetoricReview

we are inescapablysituatedin a "hermeneuticcircle" wherein "thehistoricityof

our existence entails that prejudices,in the literal sense of the word, constitute
the initial directednessof our whole ability to experience"(9). Correlatively,we
must become cognizant of the ways in which our commitmentslead us to select
the material we are considering and interpreting, and disabuse ourselves of
what Nietzsche calls the "idolatryof the factual"("UH"8), the illusion that we
can account for independently existing "facts themselves" in their entirety.
Given the diversity of our interests and our textual selections, our neo-
Nietzschean interpretations will presumably differ in many respects from
Nietzsche's own. Our interest in and commitment to feminism, for example,
may lead us to explore the ways in which the sophists advanced arguments
bearing on gender equality.1' Our commitment to multiculturalism,and our
interest in overcoming the misperceptions that perpetuate conflict between
different peoples, may lead us to attend to the sophists' challenge to
Athenocentrism,focusing perhaps on Gorgias's advocacy of panhellenism and
Hippias'sadvocacy of cosmopolitanism.12
A second feature of our neo-Nietzschean reading concerns our
understanding of the culture of fifth-century Greece and the sophists'
contributionsto it. As James Aune points out, most contemporaryscholarship
on Greek rhetoric,and consequentlyon the sophists, is "remarkablysanitized,"
in that it retains many of the tenets of the Enlightenment reading of Greek
culture that Nietzsche repudiated (122). In our neo-Nietzschean reading, in
contrast,we may draw upon and augment Nietzsche's account of Greek culture,
attending to the work of twentieth-centuryanthropologists,psychologists, and
artists, many of whom have themselves been inspired by Nietzsche's
suggestions. As Fredric Jameson characterizes this emerging "alternative"
pictureof ancient Greece,

the Nietzschean reassertion of the Dionysian and of the orgiastic

counterreligionof the mysteries,the ritual studies of the Cambridge
school, Freud himself (and Levi-Strauss'rewriting of the Oedipus
legend in terms of primitive myth), decisive reversals in classical
scholarship (such as the work of George Thompson, Dodds' The
Greeks and the Irrational, and the newer French classical
scholarship), and above all, perhaps, contemporary aesthetic
reinterpretationsof the Greek fact (such as Karl Orffs opera
Antigone)-all converge to produce an alternativeGreece, not that
of Pericles or the Parthenon, but something African, or
Mediterraneansexist-culture of masks and death, ritual ecstasies,
slavery, scapegoating, phallocratic homosexuality, an utterly non-
or anticlassical culture to which something of the electrifying
Nietzsche'sReading of the Sophists 21

otherness and fascination, say, of the Aztec world, has been

restored.(151)

Drawing upon these studies, we may situate individual sophists in novel ways,
generating entirely new "genealogical" interconnections. Attending to the
mythological beliefs and magical practices of colonial Sicily, for example, we
may situate Gorgias in a mannerthat underscoreshis awarenessof the power of
irrationalityand the limits of logos. 13 Drawing on the studies by RichardEnos
of the violent and unstable culture of fifth-centurySicily, we may delineate the
possible connections between Gorgias's writings and revolutionaryupheaval.14
And pursuing the suggestions of Martin Bemal in Black Athena, we may
explore the ostensible affinity of some nomadic Sophists for "African"and
"Oriental"cultures.
Using a genealogical method and attending to the sophists' roles in Greek
culture in these ways, we may supplement Nietzsche's account of the sophists'
conception of language and rhetoric. With Samuel Ijsselling and David
Roochnik, we may further explore the sophists' role in the "ancient quarrel"
between philosophy and rhetoric, examining the connections between the
sophists' "rhetorical"model of language and their challenge to conventional
"philosophical"inquiry.15Concerning the deploymentof figures of speech, we
may pursueNietzsche's suggestion that Gorgias uses figurationto overcome the
constraints of "realism."Specifically, we may examine the ways in which the
sophist challenges the "reality" fabricated in such established genres or
discourses as the Eleatic treatise, the discourse on Helen of Troy, the legal
apology, and the Athenian funeral address. Drawing on specific studies of the
linguistic conventions of these genres undertaken by G. B. Kerferd, Nicole
Loraux, James Coulter, Arthur Adkins, and others, we may examine specific
ways in which Gorgias appears to appropriate and subvert established
conventions.16 In these inquiries we may draw upon and supplement
Nietzsche's notion that the sophists perceived speech and writing as a form of
play. Drawing on recent discussions of play, and following the lead of Richard
Lanham and Roger Moss, who attendto the sophists' playful use of parodyand
paradox, we may explore such texts as the Defense of Palamedes, in which
Gorgias, adopting the persona of the mythical inventor of games, plays with
traditional myths, the conventions of the legal apologia, and with the values
and beliefs of his audience.17
Concerning the epistemology and ethics of the sophists, we may pursue
Nietzsche's insight into the differences between Protagoras and Gorgias,
exploring their respective views of knowledge and morality.One approachmay
be to draw upon Nietzsche's notion of the "tragic"to explore the thought of
some of the sophists. In this we may follow Mario Untersteiner, who
characterizes Gorgias as a "tragic"philosopher, and we may develop Eric
22 Rhetoric Review

White's contention that Nietzsche's conception of the dionysian illuminates

Gorgias's epistemology. Conversely, we may find that an equally fruitful
reading would place Gorgias in the comic tradition, associating him with the
Sicilian comic playwright Epicharmus and examining the sophist's
"carnivalesque" approach to knowledge.18 Another approach may be to pursue
the inquiries of Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, who draw on
Nietzsche's notion that the sophists' reliance upon cleverness and cunning
suggests a conception of knowledge that is antithetical to a platonic or scientific
quest for "certainty."19 In respect to ethics, we may explore the nature of what
Nietzsche calls sophistic "immoralism" in a variety of specific texts. With
Roger Moss we may examine the ways the sophists refine their "violence" and
"barely suppressed aggression" through the use of such tactics as paradox and
parody (216). And following Eric White, we may inquire into the ways that
individual sophists such as Gorgias are able to overcome their personal
limitations by "recreating" themselves in agonistic and epideictic performances
(38). Our interpretations of the sophists' conceptions of knowledge and morality
may differ dramatically from Nietzsche's own, given that our values, interests
and selection of texts will presumably differ from his. Yet insofar as we
acknowledge our own perspectives and articulate compelling genealogies of the
sophists, we may generate neo-Nietzschean readings that are faithful to the
spirit if not the letter of Nietzsche's own interpretation.

Notes
i I would like to thankEdward
Schiappaand RichardLeo Enos for theirinstructivecommentson
an earlierdraftof this article.I would also like to thankDavid Roochnik,Thomas Kent, and Michael
Mendelsonfor sharingwith me theirviews of the sophistsandthe historyof rhetoric.
2 For discussionsof the seminal role of Hegel and Grote in the modem "rehabilitation" of the
sophists,see Sidgwick 323-71; Guthrie 10-13; Kerferd5-10; Poulakos, "Hegel"160-71; Jarratt1-6;
Schia!pa 3-12; Ochs 39-40.
I cite Nietzsche'swritingswith an abbreviationof the Englishtranslationof the title followed by
the sectionnumber:
"ThePhilosopher"("P"),in Philosophyand Truth;
Philosophyin the TragicAge of the Greeks(PTAG);
"Descriptionof Ancient Rhetoric" ("DAR"), in Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and
Language;
"TheHistoryof GreekEloquence"(HGE), in FriedrichNietzsche on Rhetoricand Language;
"Homer'sContest"("HC"),in ThePortable Nietzsche;
"WePhilologists("WPh")," in Arion;
TheBirthof Tragedy(BT), in Basic Writings;
"OnThe Use and Disadvantagesof Historyfor Life"("UH"),in UntimelyMeditations;
Daybreak(D);
Human,All-Too-Human(HA);
The Gay Science (GS);
Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), in Basic Writings;
The Genealogy of Morals (GM), in Basic Writings;
Twilight of the Idols (TI), in The Portable Nietzsche;
Ecce Homo (EH), in Basic Writings;
Nietzsche'sReading of the Sophists 23

The WillTo Power (WP).

4 Scholarswho criticize the use of the Nachlas in an interpretationof Nietzsche include Magus
218-35, and Clark 25-27. A defenseof a judicious use of the Nachlas is advancedby Nehamas9-10,
and Schrift15-16.
5 For a discussionof Nietzsche'sgenealogicalmethod,see Granier 190-200; Nehamas 100-13;
Schrift 169-98;and Hoy 20-38.
6 Discussions of Nietzsche'sconception of a cultural renewal inspiredby Greek culture are
undertakenby Tejara1-32;Lloyd-Jones1-15;Breazealexxiii-xxvii; Strong 135-85; and Del Caro593-
96.
7 Translationsof fragmentsof the OlderSophistsare fromSprague,The Older Sophists. Citations
follow the originalarrangementandnumberingof the fragmentsby Diels andKranz.
8 Accounts of the debate over Nietzsche'scontributionsto classical
philology are providedby
Kaufmann,"Introduction" to BT, section2; andLloyd-Jones3-15.
9 For a discussionof Nietzsche'smaturenotionof the dionysian,see Kaufmann281-82; Valadier
247-61; Strong 109-85; and Del Caro589-605.
10Nietzsche'sconceptionof agon is discussedby Lloyd-Jones6-7; Strong 149-52; and Hunt 59-
69.
11 Ancient Greek attitudestoward women have been examined by
Pomeroy and Keuls. For
specific discussionof the sophists'attitudestowardwomen, see Jarratt63-79, andSuzuki 13-15.
12For discussionof the sophists'advocacyof panhellenismandcosmopolitanism,see Untersteiner
283-84; Guthrie160-63; Kerferdl 156-60; and Hall 161-62, 215-17.
13
Recentdiscussionof Greekmagic that bearon the sophistsmay be found in Romilly, "Magic"
3-21; Lloyd 81-102; Lain Entralgo32-107; Faraone3-32; Scarborough138-74;andWinkler214-43.
14 For discussionof the politicalcontextof the sophists'writing,see Untersteiner
321-50; Guthrie
135-64; Kerferd139-62;andEnos 41-90.
15The sophists'seminalrole in the "ancientquarrel"between
philosophyand rhetoricis discussed
by Ijsselling 7-33, 103-14; and Roochnik, "Old Quarrel"225-46. For an alternativereadingof this
quarrel,see Schiappa,"Rhetorike"1-15, andCole.
16For a discussionof Gorgias'suse of style to adaptto and challengeestablishedconventions,see
Smith 335-59; Untersteiner 194-205; Coulter 31-69; Loraux 225-30; Adkins 107-28; Enos,
"Epistemology"35-51; White 24-31; Poulakos, "Helen" 1-16; Consigny, "Styles" 43-53, and
"Epideictic"281-97; Schiappa,"Examination" 238-57.
17Discussionof the role of play in
sophisticthoughtmaybe foundin Untersteiner163-65;Guthrie
193-95;Pease 27-42; Lanham1-20; and Roochnik 155-76.
18The
placementof Gorgiasin the comic traditionis suggestedbyNorwood83-113, and Demand
453-63.
19The sophists'use of cunningintelligenceor metis is discussedby Detienneand Vernant39, 42,
307; White 14-15; and Nussbaum19, 310.

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26 RhetoricReview

Scott Consigny's recent publications include "The Styles of Gorgias," in Rhetoric Society
Quarterly; "Gorgias's Use of the Epideictic" in Philosophy and Rhetoric; and "Sophistic Freedom;
Gorgias and the Subversion of Logos" in PRE/TEXT. He teaches the history and theory of rhetoric at
Iowa State University.

Carolina English Teacher

Journalof the SouthCarolinaCouncilof Teachersof English
Call for Contributors:
1995-96 Special Issue
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