or •In ountain Warf~re

red School,
1 60 •

• ' _,.04 . o.

A RESEARCH REPORT
Prepared at
THE ARMORED SCHOOL

Fort Knox Kentucky

1949 - 1950
R· 6

 ARMOR IN MOUNTA IN WARFARE

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED

BY

COMMITTEE 28 ~ OFFICERS ADV1,NCED COURSE

THE Afu~ORED SCHOOL

1949 - 1950

LIEUTENANT COLUNEL HENRY FRANKEL

NlA,JOR KENliJETH A. NOSECK

MAJOR VICTOR B. FOX

IVIAJOR iiALTEH H. WILLIAMS

WJ..JOR WELDON W. WILSON

CAPTAIN JERRY G. WALLACE

CAPTj,HJ JOHN W. HUGHES, JR

CAPI'An~ .JOHN H. IRVING

CAPTAHT NJilURICE L. YOUNG

FORT KNOX I KENTUCKY

MJ.Y 1950

 ?REFACE

This report h~s been orep~1"ed by ~ cowmi~tee of students of the

ch",pter l3.bout l3.rmored WI:lrf"lre for 8. pro.iected book. The ori,dn8.1 8.ss:ignment

spedfied thl3.t the Committe'3 would not limit its consider"!.tion to C1ne or two

"l.1"11'oreO units wh j.ch bl'l.r:l eng" s::ed in mountl'l in warffire, because such reports

8lre"dv h~d been written bv StlH3sTIt cortl11'ittees of former cl"!.sses of The

ArIrored School. Inste~d" this ComlT'ittes w'"'s t('l ~nq\ljre into the brol3.d fjeld

of aJl l3.rmored comhat in mount" ins, illustrl3.tinS!' the re-port with eXl>,.mples

lected from foreign l3.S ~ell "s American sources.

/---
• t () obtl3. in. It could be ·.rlep.ned from the qft"lr-action repC1rts of the

units jmrolvec, sub.i"let to the hherent eXl3.~;""erdio'1 of unit "lchie'-ement

common to suer, publ:ic,:;tir"lns. However, the dehdls were l)SU~lly l"!.cldnl?:.

Frequent incident"!.l 1'efarences tr> lIdifficult terr<"1 jn ll were common but the

moen possible, the Cow~!'itte'3 h"ls filJed in the olcture; based upon

ml!lp study, person8.l :inter.,rjew, or "I remember • • • 11 8.rticles in SI31''I1iC9

.iournl3.ls. even the l"ltter source TI:11st rem"lin suspect. The articles

freg1)ently extol the scintillp.t:in T f5 re, mlllneuver" "nd shock' action (If the

excellent source of pr"l.ctic~l S1)I""'F.lstjons. Hovrevflr, the',! seldoll1 O'''l.ve comb"lt

,j..Llustr'lticms which the COImTlittee b'3liev"Jd were sorely needed in order to

. nrel':.
3ent '3 ,'V"ell-r(lunoed picture.

if

~~ .. ~---~ --~~.
-
It is hoped thJ;l,t some futu't"e oommittee will comple~·e this wo't"k.

To do so will 't"eqUi't"6 qccess to Dep~rtment of the Army files. Th~t m~teri~l

possibly to be l'luP.'rrenteo by specifjc tnterrot!qtion of GerWlin Oi'f'iC6't"S who

f~u~ht in Itlily ~nd Sicily.

Future W't"iters on this sub~ect roilY find help~Jl these procedures

the C("Imrrittee crnscienti('luslv h'3s striven to follow in ttlis report: thoroue:h

d("lcllwentqti("ln of tl:1e text; limit~ti("l'(l ('If edjtorltll o--i. Y1 1('ln to ttl6 conclusion;

text is desired; !ind the jnclusion of I3ddition'31 useful infortnl'\tion in the

J;l, ppe nO. i xe s •

iii
-
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPI'ER PAGE

· . .. . . . , . . .
INTRODUCTION • ~ ... • '. • ~ '. 10 • .. .. .. .. • " .. • " •

Statement of Problem • • • • ~ ~ 1

SdUrees ~ ~ ~ 1

· . . . . . . . . .. . . .
• \ • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • " • • 10

~ ••• '. 10 •
1

Definition of Terms
· " • ••• . .. .. .
• • • • • • • •
GENERAL '. • • • • .. • • • " • • • .. .. • It " " • • • .. •
2

Terrain and Weather • • • • • • • · . .. • • • • .. ~ II 3

Lo~ 1st ioa 1 Support

·" .•
• • • • • • • • • 8

Special Considerilltions ................ ~ 20

ATTACK • • • t. . ... · . . .. .. · ... • .. • • • • · . ~.

28

Specifll Cortsider~tions

Techniques • • · .... •
• I
• • • •• · .. .
. . . . . . . " . . . . . . . . . ..

.. ... . , ,.
28

32

45

· " • • ".. . ·" " .. . . .. .:. .

Problems • '. • • • • • • • • • • .. " • • .. • " • • 'it ..

4. DEFENSE • • '... • • .. " "

61
Techniques
'. • • '. • • • • • " • to • • .. • • "

• . ,• • • • • . • " • • • • • • " .. , • . • ;
Problems
,
'
84

CONCLUSION • . " ~
:
~ • • . .. • • " " • • " " • ,; • • • 94

APPENDICES ~ • • ~ " .. " • • • ~ • • .. # • " • ~ ~ J • " J 4

I.

. . . " .. " , . . .
Armored Units in Mountainous Operqtions • 4 . . . . , ... 103
II. Factors To Be Considered " " "" " 107

-- iv
 LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE PAGE

T~nk on Icy Ro~d • • , • .. .. • • ,. .. .. • .. .. • • • .. • 5

E~cu~tion ot SP Howitter, Re~r View •• • II I> • 12

. . . , . . .. .. . . . . . .
EV'1cuation of SP Howitzer .. Front View •• • .. .. • • • 14

Tank Bo~~ed in Snow 16

.. .. . .
~

5. SP Howitzer in Mounts ins .. .. . • • • • .. ,. 35

6. Vill~ Verde Trail. Luzon. p. I. • .... 41 ••• ~ III •• 37

Pl!norl;lmio View. Vi11~ Verde Trail III • • • • • • • , _ 41

8. Tanke on MountJl in ROlld, Okina'W'l ,!" ........... . 43

~chine Gun Fire by Tlln~s, OkinJlwa • • • ....... " .• II 46

Sketoh MAp, Monte C~ssino. ItJlly • .. ill ..... • .... ,. .r 50

MA.P. SJlV6rne ~p 54

" • • >. • • • ie • , ,. ••• • ......

. · .... ........ :,' ....

.
12.. Tllsk Force Howze • • • • • .. ., 67

13.. Sketoh ~P.., Eqst Centr~l

- .. . . . . . ....

Tunisill .. ...
14. Aotion Ilt .Mqlkino ...... - . ........ ............., ..,. 80

15.. Tl'lnks, Mount Be lvedere, Itl'lly ....... '. -. ..........

: - 82

v
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCT ION

This is the report of '3. comtl'ittee investi~l'1ti on of the use of I'1rmor

in mount~inous ~rf~re in World W~r II. It oonsiders th~ emplo~nt of

l'Hmored units of 13.11 shes from section to d ivis:i.on. It \lMS the purpose of

this report to colleot for re'3.dy reference '111 '3.~il~ble ~teril3.l describing

comb"t experienoe in mount'3.in operptions.

Comb"lt in IIlountl3. ins is not unusu'i 1 in the 'IIistory of W'l3.rf'l re but it

represents ~n I3.ctivity in which tl3.n~s virtu13.l1y we~ un~nown until World Wl'1r

II. A thoughtful cons ider'ltion of mountq inaus I'1ral'1t of the world -- the

Rockies, Alps, Vos~es, Cqrpl3.thi~ns, Pyrenees, Url3.1s. Himl3.ll3.Yl3.s, I'1nd the

~
C :us -- will reve"ll their str~tf3~ic importl3.nce 13.11 n'ltur'll "lnd p('1litic~l

bound13.ries yit13.1 in g:lobl3.1 wl3.r. Any future conflict m~y well see l'lrg:e­

sC'lle oper"tions for the control of mount<;ins involvlng- the use of I3.rmored

units.

This study WI3.S b13.sed on m"teri13.1 obt13.ined fro~ offioi13.1 documents,

pedodicl3.1s, "l.nd books I3.~T~ihble "!t Fort Knox, supple.ented by interview qnd

p>9rsonl3.1 9-,rperience. Limi tl3.tions of tj mEl J:lnd qV"l j lqbte re ference mqterl"ll

pre'-ented "lny truly complete stud" but it is believed tbqt 13. representp.tive

cover'le:e bl3.s been obb::dned~ suff5cient t('1 justify conclusions.

In order to provide 13. lo~icql frl3.mework for the present'ltion of the

committee findings, this study h~s been org:l3.nized into three ch~pters: (1)

q ~ener~l discussion of those conditions comrron to 13.11 mountqinous o~r~tions;

(~~ specific discussion of those I3.ddition13.1 f",ctors peculi"lr to tl1B ~ttl3.ck;

'ln~ ,v) " discussion of those c('1 l1 siderl'itions pro,red by experience to be of

 In g:ener.;tl, the tern "mountl'li n l1 tnel'lns Ii hi!!;b elevB.tion of l~nd liS

opposed to 13. IIhill" which is B.ccepted to be B. lower elevl3.tion. HOwe'lTer, the

eXl'lct use of these terms v~ries in different loc"llities; for eXl3.mple,

• • • in 10wlB.nds, where tbe e levl3.ti('lns ~1:'e not numerous B.nd do

not reach B. greB.t hei~ht, 13. rise of eround of I3.bout 100 to 2.0 feet
is cl'liled B. mountl3.in, while in 13. mountl3.inous country ~n elevl3.tion
of 1000 feet to less thl3.n 2000 is often cl'liled Ii hill • • •• 1

For the purpose of this study, "mountl3.inous terrl3.in" hl'ls been defined

to include violent irregull3.ritv of the e"l.rth' s surf-ace rJ3.ther thl'ln mere.

"l.ltitude.

Nount'3in oper"l.tions were considered chiefly from the tl'lctlc13.1 point

of view, d1scussin~ logistic-al '3ctivities only to the extent of their in­

~nce upon the tl'lctical situJ3.tion.

Throughout this study the term ""lrmor" h~s been interpreted to me'3n

all I'lrmored units within the "1rmored division: B.rmored inf"ntry, I'lrmored

"1rtillery, J3.rmored engineers, -as well B.S t~nk unjts. However, combl'lt

illustrB.tions h8.ve been limited t(l those oper8.tions specificB.llv involving

the use of t~nks or t8.nk destroyers.

Resel'lrch included the recorded experiences of '3rmored units from I'lll

8.rmies, both Ilfriendlyl! 8.nd "enemylf. The comb4t illustrBtions presented in

thjs study were selected for re8.sons of relev<,111ce to the P'3rtjc11lqr pojnt of

discussion rlither thqn for the purpose of Attemptjne: to show the over"lll

supedority of one force or technique comptl.red with I'lnother.

- . - ... ------------.-.--- --- ----_._._------------­
NOTES FOR C}~PTER 1
.
l;;---rc lopedi~ Americanm ~ vol 26 (New York-Chicae.:o: Americannl!l. Corporl3.tion~
194f 5:31.

~-.-,-----------------------
 CHAPTER 2

GENERAL

Anqlysis of combqt reports from ~ll theqters where mounttlinous

operJltj (ms ""ere conducted in World )'{qr II lnd tCl1tas cert" jn definite con­

dit~}ons comlT'on to l'l,ll mountqin oper<>tions. re~p.rdless of mission or enemy

t~ctlcql effect on qrmored operqtjons in mount~inous terrqin, include

visibility, routes of qpprop.,ch. observ<l,tion, fields of fire, "lnd communic13.­

tions. Additionql f"l,ctors !'.ire those lo~istict:J.l prob'lems common to qll types

of tBcticnl operntion in mountqinous w"l,rf'lre: supply, tr"lnsport~tion, mqin­

ten",nce, .-md the prob lems pe rt'l in inf!: to mad ic<l. 1 se rvica s. But thlOlt is not
,..-..
t hole picture. Arising: fr('lm mC'lunblinous cond itions "l,re spec i'3.1 problems

obser"lr'ltion, <:lnd requiretOOnts for sp'3ci'l.l equipment for weqlJons, ,rehicles,

<lnd personnel <is well '!s for th~ sl)pportinR: '1rms rmd services. All these

f<1ctors will be ind:hridutllly cOJ:'si(ll'lred in this ch~pter jn"l,sm1.1ch '>s they

repr'3sent m'1,;or problems whjch <Jffect "1 rmorec1, oner<ltions of I3.ny chl3.racter in

wount~inous terr'l,jn.

Terrain p,nd N'el'lther

Americ'ln doctrine concerning p,rmored oper"ltion in mounbdnous warfare

recognizes tb~.t

• • • t"l,nks C"l,IJ~ot be employed to the best qdvllnt"lge in

mount"l,inous terr"l,in, "l,lthough they m'l.Y be used in l"l,rge units in
broad ,rBlleys ~nd on extreme pl'3.te~us. iHth the exception of their
use in such reg:ions they csm be employed only in sm!3.ll units for
r-"tmited objective opertlt ions. 1

Th~~~ limit'3.tions '3.re imposed by the extreme weqther ~nd terr~in conditions

 .lly ~ssooiqted with mount~ins.

Thqt these limitqtions '1re imposed by the ,rery n"l,ture of mountlOinolls

terrq,tn regl3.rdless of its geoll::r'iphic locl'l,tion is I3.mply I'lttested by the

simihrity of reports from 'ill theqters of WlOr where mount""inol1s t'3rrtdn WBS

encountered by qrmored units. For eXl3.mple. ""n observer in Itqly reported,

• • • the terrqin is mountqjnous, interspersed with occ""sion~l

nq,rrow'11'1l1eys. The rOl-lds through the mountl'lins "lre nl'.lrrow, steep,
"Ind present innumerl'lble defiles, ledge sections, ,:;nd I'l,re bridged
over steep r"J.vines. The vqlleys Imd pll'lins I'l,re cut ~y saries of
connecting drqinqge ditches tb~t comprise obstl'loles.

Terrl3.in in North Afric~ h"J.s been descrjbed lOS follows:

• • • The II Corps W8S to "l,ttqC~ hi~hly orgqnj~ed enemy

positinns in terr"lin 'is difficult "IS ol-ln be found in the wbole

bf.'lttle '1.re~. A belt of rug'C'ed hill country, 15 to 20 miles in

depth, hy between the Americ'1.n lines ~nd MATElJR• • • • The high

g:round "I v erl'l,ges 500 to 1000 fget "l,bove the nqrrow vf.3.11eys. Where

~ trees I-lnd brush "Ire RCl'l,rce .. th'3 ro('lry slopes steepen "It time jnto
)liffs. Th~ vqlleys offere~ little or no cover • • • • Only two
ht.l.rd surfll.ced rO"lds cr08S th'3 h5 lIs to l\IIATEUR. The se rOqds 'vere
of more "iIl'Portqnce to the II Corns oper~tions 'is lines of supply
tr"n "lS routes of qccess to ~,ATE,{JR.3

From the Pqcific Theqter, qn After Action Report gives "l very simill'l,r

picture of the terr"l,in encnuntered by the 775th Tqnk" B"l,ttlllion in Luzon.

The mountqjns on either side h~d some slopes of ~ gr~dient ~s

gre'"1t qS 65 degrees, up wh~c~1 t"lnk-s were bulldoted. It Wl:S even
TIecess~ry on wet d'iYS to tnk-e trucks ~nd jeeps up these slares in
the sqTre Il1qnner. Suit"lble routes or trqils weI'';'! seldom Ilv... Ul1ble
to the qrmor l1nd steep r,r~des resulted in exqsuerl1tin~ly slow pro­
gress for the tqnks. 4

The t8ctic8.1 effect of mount~inous terr'llin cIOn b'3st be summ<).rized by

the rp,port of I'In Army Ground Forc'JS BOl3.rd Obser,rer, I'Ifter detJ) iled crnsultJ)­

tions with nUIl1erous qrmored unit co~mp.nders in Itqly:

Doctrines set forth h'ive p.lw"lYs f>1vored the empl('lyment of

t~nks in l8.r~e numbers. However, from lessons le'irned in Bctul3.l

~oOIl1bt.l.t here during inolement W6"1ther in mount~inous country .. em­

)loyment of t~nks in ~repter strength thl3.n a comp~ny h~s its
limit~tjons. The most decidin~ limitqtion is the lack of terrqin

4
o

o
 ;0 m~neUV8r in. T~nks mu~t rem~in on ro~ds wb~re they qre ~ble

to move. , • , Throu~bout en~!lP.'8ments in the mountl'1 i ns, t~nks

were used in sm~ll numbers. The n~tllre of the terrqjn dictf:1ted

suoh employment, P.S it hl3s hel3n impossible to move t~nks ~oross

oountry. vVhe re t!1nks COll ld S 11P'port hlfqntrv s;ttflCK-S from fixed

positions, it WqS possible to use ~ few m~re, but even then the

field of fire WflS USUB]]Y so nt;.rrow ~nd the suit~ble pogitions

so sc~rce thl3t not more thqn one plBtoon o~uld be used.

It will be noted thBt this observer mAde specific mention of incle­

ment wes:;ther. It is ob,rious th8.t sellsons:; 1 ChS1nf!.es involvine: cond itions of

icy surf~.ces; snow or deep mud h~mpered movement ~nd qdded e:re~tly to the

hqz~rds of steep slopes f.1nd sh 0 rp curves. Where hie:h flltitudl!3s were in­

volved the effect of sudden chqn~es in wep.thp,r becqme even more m~e:nifjed.

Snow CO"lrer beq'~n e~.rlier in the fr 11 llnd l~sted lone:l3r into the spring, thus

prolonging the h'lrdships of w'int'3r operP.ctions.

Obser'r~tjon, too, is e::r'J~tly I1ffected by mountJlincus conditions.

oper~ting in the foothills of th0 Apennines hBd to fflce locfll peculi­

flrities wherein the night mists clenred rJlpidly from the mountqin sides by

ds.)y but left the vqlleys cO"lrered by thick fog throughout the greqter pflrt of

the Tflorning. 6 This condition vjrtur-tlly nullified the e:ood obs"3rvp tion 1f{hich

could b"3 obt~';ned on cOIDmflndln!! ground. In this connection .. the possession

of hir.:h ~round does not t11w8.Ys insur A excellent obsl".lr"lrl='tion in the mount~ins.

E,ren the possession of t1 lone: serj"3S of ridges does not me8n complete

coverr;.e: o of the ground below bect::t1J.se much dec,d spp..ce will be disco,rered, even

where successive obs'-lrvpt:lon posts with o"lrarlqpping: fields of observl3tion

Russi'ln experience in Wnrld VV"1r II indic~ted, "One condition es­

senti'll to success lies in fq"lror8ble ohoice of Observ8tion Posts.tt7 This

~'W8S substp.nti8ted by Americc\n experience in NorthArn Tunisifl qnd Sicily"

 ·~
r., )'19 unusw~llv t'ugr:red mount&:dns of It'31y forced modific8tion in our

t~ctjcs. No lonr0r WqS it possible to s~i~e ~ll domjn~tin~ hei~hts necess~ry

for observ~tion. In some instqnces the best obS8r'r~tion pojnts on the top of

mountnins could not be appro'lohed or occupioC', so ~rmor "lIlS 1 imited to sup­

porting infqntry 'lotion on the slo,~s,

...
Under these conditions it would seem lOf!:icA.l to suppose th,:;t J'lir

'\f{ould furnish the ide~l me",ns of observ~tion. However, e~rly in ·W·orld Vifl;lr II

it ~s discovered thqt the exoellent oo,rer of the Tunisiqn hills m13.de locqtion

of smf.11l tqre:ets such J\S jnfflntrv qnd IDlichine ~un positions almost impossible

to the ground observer w:i.th e:lqsses, let ",lone the 'lir observer. Air obser­

v!)tion sorties, therefore, e:aner~lly were undert~ken for the purpose of con­

firm'in!?; the pre sl'3nce or qbsence of enemy troops in def:3d e:round. But here

p~, the CO"1'6r 13. fforded '1nd ••• lithe trfdnine: of the enemy in ttIkine: p.dvan­

tqp:e of s1)ch cover frequently '''fl~.d9 the reslJlts of Jl.lr observt1tjon noe:~.tbretl ,8

A SUf! ere ste d s olut ion to tl'\ ; s nrob lew wou ld be q n '3. ir observS3.t ion post

c~.pqble of b!3jne: suspended i·mmobiJ·'1 wb:i le the observer. scrutinizes the terr~in

in e:r")!:'tt datqll. The So,riet hio:h comms:.tnd htJ.s studied the possibilities of

employing portA-ble helicopters, not only to ~fford qn ide!:!.l meJl.ns of 'lerin.l

observ~tion
.
but lilso for the leqdjne: units in the mount~ins. However, the

helicopter in its present stqge of d0velopment requjres the complete J3.tten­

ti.on of the pilot to 1=;\ degrer:J whic 11 mBlres debliled obs'3rv~tion virt1lqlly im­

possible. The two-plf:lce helicopter, howoiTer, hqs mA.ny possibilitj€ l s for this

type of ope r8t jon.

An experienced Amerjcqn helicopter pilot comwented on this problem:

~ From the st~ndpoint of obsl3rv~ti()n in tl-te mountf;.dns the heli­

optf3r is superjor to cmD'I rentjon'11 ~ircrf3ft. One importqnt fqctor

~s thqt this type is more suttf3d to limited lqnding ~nd tqke-off

 reJ!s usuf:ll1y ~"ITl?jlqble in IJ1('1unt~jnous terrqin. The two-place

helicopter (Typt:! I!3B) c~rries J!n obs~rver who IDliY dl3"1rote his en­

tire 13.t.tention to th /3 terrp..in" enjoying q wide R.r9j:} of vision

due to tbe construction of the plqne. Since no technicql skill

in flying is regujre of him. this observer m~y be qn officer

thorou~hly fqmiliqr wit~ th~ d9tQils of the situR.tion on the

ground. A ~elicopter c13.nnot be used qS qn imwobile obs~rvf:ltion

post in high q ltitudes bec~use of the rqre fied qtmosphere.. How­

e\rer" it is cl1pl1blo of belne: operqt~d qt Ii much slOt/ver speed thR.n

~ con"lrentionql qircrB-ft. Tbjs wo"ld pertrit det!1iled stu.dv of the

terr~in without presentine: th8 w'l{'tremely vulnl3rS)1)le tl1rget for

enemy g:round weqpons which c0TI'plete iwmobilj.tv in"lTobTI'}s. Sjnce

the ml3.int'3nQnce requirl9d for th9 h8licooter is ~pproxhr~tAlv ten

times thqt required for the lil3.json type ~ircr~ft" q greqter num­

ber of helicopt9rs would be regl)~red for constqnt co·n·er~ge of the

sector.9

In qddition to thu problem of lirritud ObS(3r"l;r!1tion, mountl1inous torrl1in

t":~l<QS more difficult tho trrnsr-itt~l of ir.forTI'tltion rog:'1rdloss of tlls "'.~en.ns of

corrl.unic'1tiol1 uS(1d. Rr,dio, f00t or mounted messtJngors, or liqison plt:tnes usod

for this purpose; ~rn soriously h~rdjc~pood by th~'l t'3rr rdn .. Th:is WflS espechtl­
~
:ue of r~dio. The It~lj~~ cnrDl1i~n dowonstr~tod thpt

• • • tho Tl~ountf.1.inous t?Jrrrtil~ ~ Iso influenced rl=\dio communicq­

t j ons. Thf) inti:! rf') renee I=\S f.l ro su It of b i e:h ridge s" pe s:). k-s" ~nd

hjll m~sses often necessitr.;t'3o ~rep,t Cl4.re in the solection of

st~t;. on sit e s, the 1T'(\'l:n:-lrnf3 Y't of stpt i ('Ins, J1 nd rt:l d j 0 r91q y. Als 0

th') need of tld0jtionfil r~din te('hrdciQl1s !.:Ind repnirmen WqS ~rtq,in

f'3lt.IO

L0~j~~Jcql Support

Experjence b~s shown th~t ~o obstqcle is insuperp,ble if troops ~re

properly equipped, clothed, supplied, ~nd trqined. Tbe bqsic principlos of

lop.:istics ~rt3 th"l s~l"'e,

country; howe1rer, the technlquos ,--f

whether COTT'b~t be in. mC'untqinous terro..in or flClt

lo~dstics will ~e cOYlsiderqbly diff8rent.

In mount,:;inous "IJV'1=\.rfqre th'j r1.H!:Red terrl1:in qncl extreme cliT'18,tic con­

(
ditions pqke log:istic~l support I'0re difficult tind lirrited. A study of ex­

~jence in ~Vorld VV~r II shows tht"~t T,1ountf:1.inous terrqin h8.d q t"lOfold effect

.ofdsticql requircn;:flnts. This effect Wf:1.S felt in ~n increp.sed derM~nd for

~ ies ~nd in restrictions of the f~cilities for the tr~nsportation of

those supplies.

A compil~tion of re~snns for an incre~sed demand for supplies by

troops operating in mountq inous terrl3. j n re,Tea Is:

1. More food is required because of the rue:ged work. The nor­

m'3.1 r~tion under qV8rqe:e conditi()ns is 3600 c13.1ories daily; in

mountains qbout 5500 calories is minimum.

2. Increqsed qm~unts of clotrin~ will be required because of

groqter cold.

3. Vehicles require trore fuel than norm~l because of steeper

e:rqd ient s •

4. Greater wear on tires and tracKS necessitates frequent re­

placelT'ent •

5. Marc fuel will be requir''Jd for cooking: because of higher

altitud,cJs. At 10,000 feet it r0quires three times Innl!:er to

. cook food than at sea le,m 1.

~). Amounts of ammunition used will bo grnqtor thqn normal due

to the dispersion factor caused by exag:~9rated tGrr~in.ll

The second effect of mountainous terrain on logistical support is the

sevare h~ndi.cqp in tho trqnsport~.ti("ln of the increased alT'ount of supplies.

It ~s found that mountainous qr0~S usu~lly nfforded a sing:le av~il~ble supply

route,. and it was froquently th8 rule that no roads existed qnd th~t the en­

tiro supply net h~d t~ be construct-cd. Even whore a road net existed it Wf3,S

often so narrow tlHl.t only 0r.e-1J1TQY traffic could be perT'litted. In North

Africe, the British First Army w~s finally forced to ~q~e all mount~in rOl3.ds

in its qrea one-way only, ofton ':i'q 1d.pg extrBlT'sly circuitous trips necessp"ry.

Air tr!:lnsportption of supnlios (\ff~jrs a partia 1 solution to tho prob ..

lorn.. This means of transportf"ttion expedites delbT6ry qnd eliminates most of

the difficulties encountered by surfl=lce tr~nsportJl,tion.

The history of World W~r II shows no experience in supplyin~ the

9
~
noue tonn~ges required by ~n ~rmored division operqting in mountainous

terrain, ~lthou~h Wlartime flying of the "Hump" end the subsequent success of

the Berlin airlift may be t~ken ~s proof th~t l~r~e tonn~~es mav indeed be

moved bv air. Restrictin~ f~ctors in the use of air for this purpose ~re

found in the haz~rds of h~d weqther. hi~h pee~s, as well ~s the restrictions

on a,nailable landin~ lire~s ~nd drop tones. Frozen lfikes hf1V8 proved satis­

f~ctory for this l~tter purpose, with oranee end cerise colored bundles and

chutes jncreesjne identificqtion qnd conseQuent reco~ry.

Oocqsiona 1 small-soa le ~ ir supply w~ s verv succe s stul dllrin~ the late

~r, and offered a vivid contr~st to the slower. more difficult ~round supply.

At ~ASSINO, 36 A-20's dropped 208 bundles in e few minutes. All were recover­

ed. Tb is drop represented e quantity of supplies which would have required

12

300 mules two dl=lYs to deliver by normql e:round lOOans.

",.,.--...

If infqntry tru ly trave 1s on its stom13.cb. then we mey Sqv that armor

travels on its maintenance effort. Ree:ardless of the technical skill or

blittle-wise leaders of ~n armored unit. its collective combat efficiency is

in direct proportion to its maintenance efficienoy. For an lirwored unit to

be efficient in mount~,d n wllrfare it shollld by all meSlDS have prior experienoe

in oonventionql warfare. Mountqin w~rfare multiplies those maintenance evils

comwon to convention~l w~rf~re ~nd provides qddition~l pitfqlls peculi'1r only

to mountains. Even 11Y'ith limi.ted b~ttle experience, qn 'lrmored unit soon

learns those critiC'll points of ~qintenqnce '1nd those essential items of sup­

ply th~t must h'1.V8 additj<'nql qttentj.on. constqnt check-ine, 'lnd st'lff super­
vision.

The technique of ordnance supply remqins the Sqm6 in mount'lln opera­

"-"".s 'is in conventionJ3.1 wtirfJire. Time 'lnd sp~ce f'lctors become more impor­

t'lnt -- the terrJiin ~nd rO'ld net is so restricted as to put Ji premium upon
10
~1hysiC~1 loc~tion of ordn~nce supply depots.
Thoro is gonor~lly q ~re~ter expenditure of time ~nd effort in

pl~nnin~ f~ctor. it may be st~ted th~t it gener~lly requires three times the

personnel ~nd throe ti~es the number of vehicles to ~chieva the s~rne end re­

sult in supply of ordn~nce p~rts.13 Here ~g~in ~ premium is pl~ced on ~

unit's prior comb~t experience bec~use thp.t experience. however limited.

will indic~te those hj,~h mort~lity pllrts thji:)t require extr~ r:tttention. Thus ..

the unit ~v est~blish ~n SOP of supply th~t e~sily c~n be exp~nded to

~ssimil~te the Ilddition~l vehiclos n,nd men required to resupply r:trmored units

in the mountqins. 14

The Ordnllnce Supply Officer of the 4th Armored Division co~ented up­

,~this fqctor •
• • • we entered the Ardennos C~mp~i~n with ~ consider~ble
overlolld of sp~re pr:trts th~t experience h~d indiclltec would
h~ve ti high mortqlity. I ~i ge~ting most of my resupply from
:METZ .. Ii dist~nce of qbout 100 mile;s. This trip Wlt:s mf:lde with
difficulty beo~use of the stGOp grqdes, congested ro~ds. ~nd
icy conditions. If tho Ardennes C~rnp~ign h~d l~st~d 10nger ..
we undoubtodly would hqve complete ly depleted our st0ck of
bo~ies .. tqnk trqcks. whoeled vehicle tires. ~nd b~tteries 0f
~ll types.15

Closely ~llied with thG problem of supply of ~rnored units oper~tin~

in ~ountqinous ter~~in is the problem of recovery of knocked-out or dis~bled

v~hicles. The nountPojns. with their lightly constructed ronds generqlly

hue:,;;ing hills /:\nd with rO'ld rBt".injn~ w~lls toe lie:htly built for qrmored

vehicles" presont problems ~11 tbeir own.,

The ...rory f:lot of positinni'r-e: t\ tqnk retrie"!"er to pllll out ~ -uehicle

th~t h~s slid orf ~ n~rrow mountqir r~~d S0metjros is tho work of hours.

~ li~htly c~~8tructod brid~es. oongested rO'lds, qnd l~ck of turnouts in

i1
\~

tho ro~d, will frequehtly mq~e it imnossible to tow ~ t~nk to the reqr. If

o telT'Der~ture is considerq l:l ly below fre ezj n p' thes ") dj "fic 1 )ltios must be

weil':hed qg"linst the qbsolute necessity of jmmediqtely retrie"ine: "I disqbled

16
'Q hic]e before it freezes to the g round.

C"Iptqin p. J. Linn, forrrer Bllttqlion Motor Officer of t.he 755th Tqnk

Bq ttqlion in It q ly, rel"ltes tl,"lt when his unit WIlS st<l.tioned in the vi cinity

of MOUNT PORCHIA, Il Cqn<l.di8.n un it whom they were relievinl1' turned over to

his unit "I pl"ltoon of fi"e M<t t'mks thqt were in firins< positions in ~n "Ireq

8nd hqd ~"lc ome com~letely frozen in. Cqotqin Linn's unit tri e d intermittent-

I v for q"l-)out fi "e weeks ti"' !Cet t he t"ll'1k-s out of t >- is pas ition but without

success. Finqlly. 'vhe n they V[or'l p.bout to le~nTe the qrell. they were oblil':ed

to turn the sqme t '1 nks ove r to their rolieving unit. The t<l.nks were still

i n th e SIlITe POSl. t·10nS. 17

n t"lnk-s stuck or knocke d out; some of them with minor dp.m8. ~e to the suspen­

sion system. All h'ld frozen f<.lst to th8 g round. To r e trie'Te the se tllnks,

it fin"llly becqTlie nocess q ry to use four M 32's (b:lDk- retrie,Ters) on e8.ch

t"ln~, with two lifting on eitte r e nd. Thus. throu ~h sheer physiclll force

tho t8.nk W"lS bro~en loose from th "l ~ round. Severq I tons of frozen dirt were

lifte d in tre process. T'lnk-s <.md di rt were loqded onto "I tqnk trllnsport er .

hquled to fln ordnqn ce de pot, <l.nd unlo"lded in such mllnnet" thllt they could be
•
winched inside "I ~ uildin ~ where the dirt finqlly t hllwe d surrici~ut1y to en­

"In J e Tf1o-vement Ilnd rep<.l ir of th e tl'\l'1ks .18

The pre<;8nt t;e n-ton ~' l l.1TTecker. while "I po"rerful <lTId l.lseful vehicle.

h"ls l im it"l d usefulness in the Tf10unt"l1nS for the nurpose of retrie~i~ e ither

whee l ed ~hicles or tqnks, Attempts to use it on st eep slopes fre quontly

(' 13
 Fivure o. 3 Armor in Mountainous ~fI rff! re
Evaouetion self nronelled 10~mm 0 itzer hich had nlun~~d 150 ye rds do,"n the side
of a steen the rno e8s~ of Manile, Philinnine I l&n ot.:.v~ ~er used
k
 o

1 ..
T '""
o

d bec~use of l~ck of power or tr~ctinn. Further h~ndic~ps were its

5 he I).nO limited xooneuverl'!bility JiS we 11 JiS its cC'mplete hck Clf protection

'l/!:"linst fire. 19 The M32 series t"lnk retriever h~s such obvious limitFltions

P.S ~ recovery vehicle thFlt it seems unnecossJiry to mention more thl'!n two of

th~ rr,ore serious limitqtions: (1) the nFlrrow tr'lck prohibits its use in soft

t~rr~in: ~nd (2) the open turret prohibits use of the vehicle under fire.

An JldditiClMl h'mdic~p tc", vehicle recovery is the f~ct thqt qrmcred

units 'irG often det~ched in plp.toon or section site units which frequently

~tt~ck ~long widely sep~r"lted corridors. This mqkes it virtuJilly impossible

for th~ t~nk compJiny retrievor to serve ~ll of the plp.toons or sections. At

best it c~n only follow the bulk of its unit vehicles qnd must mqke frequent

countormqrches tCl se rvice theI:l all.

The mFlintenp.nce org:JlnizFltion of Jiny unit fror.J Army tCl Comp~ny must
r
I exible enough to qd~pt its'Jlf tOFlny situFlti0n dictJited by the tFlcticFll

org<aniz'ltion <:lnd use of tre unit it is suppC"rtjne:.

In mountFlin ~rf~re th e dispersjon of division. bqttp.lion. ~nd

cOr:JpJiny size units in depth over Fl bro'ld frC'nt in SITFlll grC"llps (often re­

inforcod phtoons) requires th qt the mp.intenFlnce f'lcilitios should likewise

be dispersod. However. this dispersion of fqcilities should not be con­

fused with 'l decontr~lizqtion ~f effort. The comp'lny qnd bFlttqlion motor

offic~rs should koep '1 centr~liz ~ d c0ntrol ~nd supervision of '111 m~in-

tenqnce personnel qnd equipment to insure th ~ mJiximum utiliz~tion qnd direc­

tion of F\ll unit fl3.cilit50s.

Division 'lnd higher ordn~nce repFlir 'lnd supply units oust pursue '1

Cl"lnstFlnt Fl~ "' rossi'TQ r fl "lr-to-frClnt effort. not onlye.1s li"lison tc the front

)~ units but must ~lso furnish s~ll teqms C'f rep~ir speci~lists doin~ on­
15
-

01

0 '

the-spot third echelon work th"t wOl)ld ordin~rilv be dC"ne in el~borqtely

~
Jued shops. Such rep~irs ~s ch~n~ln~ of gun tub~s, ch~nzing tr~nsmission

be dC"ne in tho fo~~d units usin~ nrdn~nee personnel qnd the using units'

equipment; thereby cuttin~ dnwn b0th time of rep~irs ~nd the sp~ce f~ctor

required by tho ~d~nce shops ~s well P.s cuttin~ the r~~d utjliz~tion by

vehicles ll Which in itseJf is ('ne tf the ml\.ior fJ'lctors in mount'lin W"'lrfl3.re.

pl~toons mi~ht well ~tt~ch ~ noch~nic tn e~ch pl~tcon working ~w~y from the

bulk of the comp~ny.

The estl3.blishment ('f vehicle coll'3ctjn~ poj,nts <.It bl\ttl3.lion or lower

level frequently ''J'ill be impossible due tC' thf:J physiCl'l.l inl'\bility to find

sufficii'JI'!t ll:round sp<!ce or tl suit<:ble !'Irel1. Artillery emphc s m'3nts, medici'll

~·'Clhtions .. tlssembly I'1r6"1S, "lnc1 p.ttflck pC'sitir'ns will 1'\11 be competjng

f(,. g:rnund sPl'\ce in the TI'("Iunt<.lins. The individuJll mechp.nic frequently will

be ci"'nfrnnted with the choice (1f rm-the-spot repq.irs or !lbllndonlJ'ent Clf 1\

vehicle ll with the cnnsequent pnssibility of freezing:-in ,...f the vehicle, m~k-

ing its future r'Slcovery expensi~re in time I\nd eff0rt.

Pr('lblems of medici'll service f0r I'lrtnored units oper~tjng: in moun­

t"linous terrf;lin differ only in deg:ree 'With thC"se c0nfrnntinf':' units fiv.:hth'1e:

on level e:round. Difficulty in p,ccompliahing: medicp.l su~port ~pp~rently in­

cre~sos in proportion to the riso in ~ltitudo of the b~ttleground.

The mqjor problems fqc'n~ the mejicql servic~ of the qrmnred unit

~ro t~ose of individuql trqinin~ ~n~ those inherent to the physic~l oper~-

tion ~f tho medicp.l fqcility. In ree:~rd to the l~tter. tho meohqnics 0f

~up,ti0n of th~ wounded qre p~rticul~rly qcute.

17
 BefOre p~rticipqtiD£ in comb~t in the mountqjns the individu~l

s~1dier must be i~pressed with the need for ~reqter qttention to per8on~1

hygiene. Althou~h there ~ro fewer germs ~t high ~ltitudes th~n ~t low ~l­

titudes. mount~inous ~re~s pr~sent the sqme problems ~s the lowl~nds in

respect to the need f~r s~nit~ti0n. Thar8 is q ~ener~l tendency for

soldiers to becntnO crnstip'lted ""t h1i?:her 'l.ltitudes ~md c~nsequent lower

temperqtures. This is br0ug:ht Jlb0ut by the se-ldlers I persC'nl!ll dislike for

incnnvenienco 'lttendp.nt to di~~in~ in fro~en ground or the use of slit

trenches in cold wa~.ther. For this re'lSClD the soldier must be dven more

educ~tion concerninf!: his p'3rs<'1np.l h~bits neC9SSqry for the '[t\~intenl3nce of

he~lth. Although ho~t9d l~trines qllevi~te somewb~t this specific probleID 6

the "will for continued e::ood hel'l.lth ll rests entirely with the soldier.

,..--. Anmhe r c ntnr.1on tendency is to neglect W!3.shing ~nd clol!lnine: the body

t- "111S'" of sce>,rcity of w<lter. "'r~s'ing oftentil11es fr"'Ul the soldier's dislike

in .zoinK tn tre trr"Jble of 'C'eltine:: snew for this purpose. This nef!:lect re­

sults in seri0us skin infections Jlnd ~n ~ccumulBti~n of vermin. When b~th­

iDe: is impossible for re~sons OVBr which the soldier hqs no c~ntrol, the

soldier must be to.uKht to ex~mine hjs body ~nd to stimul~te oirculqtion by

rubb ing with '1 r"ug:h t<Wro 1 th8 reby keepi r\.~ skin inf'?ct i"ns t" '1 minit:lUm.

Tho feet require considerpblo speeil!ll "lttenti0n to r8~uce frostbite

!lnd t("l pr0vont "tron.ch foot.1I One cr tbe t:'th8r of these SerlOl.lS "lilments is

'llWl'lYs present in hh:h ID0untt;\ ins. Feet must be kept dry i'lnd sClcks 'lnd shoe

inner solos cho.nged d~ily. Principles of foot hygiene ~re vit~lly import~nt

'It incro~sed ~ltitudes boc~use "f lower te~per~tures "lnd fre6ting conditi"ns.
All sources of ~ter supply f(lr hum~n consumption must be rigidly
'olled from "l s"luit'lt ion st~ndpoint. Sold iers must be t~ue:ht tht't "l11
18
t~ined ~s tho dem~nd for ~tar ~t hi~h ~ltitudes is ~re~ter ~nd if ~ny

l,:tit;ude is porl~ittcd sorir'us illnesses r.JIl.Y result.

Evp.cu~tion of wounded p8rsonnel qlw~ys presents ~ diffioult problem

',vl, lor! is DtlG:"n:i fieC' t("'l q oonsidertlble extent :in mount"! inf"\lls torrla in. Most

it is often neoess~rv t~ trq~mrse ~xtremely rf"\u~h terr~jn. Parsnnnel who

litter pl'lt'ients beof!!.use ('\f dHfio 111ty I'.nc oqin in W'llkiM (Wer mount"linous

Speed of oVtiCUll.t i('\n is extrerre IV ir.p('\rt~nt. Sh("lck is incro~sod to 13.

~rQ"l.ter dogree followiru: oven slizht in.1urios beCl1usIJ nf the docr'3~sod tem...

per~turos of the p.tmC'sphero.•

".--.
Tho conser~ti('n of ml1np01ll3r in c"lrine: fer ctlsul'lltles 1J.1so present

"l. m~jor problem. Litters c"l.nnot be hqnd-c"l.rried oval" mountqins tn the ex­

tent they c~n be cl3.rried ~ver fl~t terr~ln with('\ut cqu8in~ extreme f~ti~e

to the litterbol1rers. In order t('\ decre~so these cl'lrryine: dist~nces_ madi...

C1;\l instp..llp,tions sho1Jld be kept well fOr'W"lrd.

Wounded parsnnne 1 shf"'uld bA locl'\ted Clnd eVl')cuJlted durin!! dqvli~ht

hC'urs becrmse tho decrop.sed tA1!1pGrtl.turos «'It night w()uld tend to I!re~tly in...

croqso f~t~litiQs. Nizht ov~cu~tir.n is qlso imprqctic~ble bec~use of ru~eed

terrq in "lnd should be Qtten-ptl3d nnly when "in <,pportunity for P. pre,ri,.,us

rope h~nd lines often must be pr('~ided. Ni~ht ev~cul3.tion ffiP.Y be the only

resort becl1uss ~f enemy cbs9rvqtjon qnd fire during dp.yli~ht h"'urs. When

e,r-- "tion must be cl1rriod <"'ut p.t ni~ht the wounded should b€l brought to 11

19

 '.

,;erad centr'll loc~tion durina:: the dfiY find mllde liS eomfort'lble 'is possible

in preP'!r'ltion fC'lr the nizht movement. Consider'lticn tmy be d'I'Ten to eV/iCUli­

tion by "l.ir ,if the terr"lin mfi'kes jt possible to l'ind l1'lison liircrJlf't. 20

Spoc!'ll Consider'ltion

Experience in World W~r II blis limply demonstr~ted the need for

61'Oci"3.1 trqinin;c l3.nd IicclimJlticn for I'!ll troops wh('l phn to operq,te in m('lun­

tfiin~. Physie~l find mentfil conditionin~. vehicullir oper~tion, mfiintenfince

of wc"l.pons, ~nd obs~rvo,tion will pr~sent unusufil problems; "IS will speei'll

oquipment for the ,rehicles. we~pons for individulils, liS well 'is those for
the supportins: "irms t:lnd sar,rices.
Russiqn experience reco~ni~ed the fqct thllt,

• • • oper"itions in tl('lunt'linous terl"'lin lire filWllYs compliOllteo. lind

~ difficult. They require tr~inod troops. plirticulfirlv for move~
nents over precipitous "md snow covgred terrp.)n. 2l

Even before C'ur entry int,.., World Wi'll" II it beclilmEl evident th"l.t spe ..

cil3.l tl"'ininll: w<l.S needed. 1.. Wi'll" De~,rtment memorp.ndum for the Secretl3.ry of
too G(.Jn(!r~l St~ rf st~ted,

. • • • I). G.. 2 report • • • 'lttributed tbe success of the Gerl!ll!l.n

Army in the B~lk~ns to the prosenoe of firmored 'lnd other units

specific~lly tr~ined for m0unt~in oper~tions. The Britisb

fp.ilure in Nor~y, on the oth0r h~nd, ~s c~used in p~rt by

htwinr,: no troops tr'lined to ('Ipor~tQ in m(')unt'lin terril in. 22

bdditionA.l evidence of the need for specific tr'lining in mount'lin('lus

~rf~re h~d ~lso been brou~ht to the ~ttention ~f ~ur W~r Dep~rtrnent from

~nothor source. Our Milit~ry btt~cho in It~lYI reportin~ on the It~li~n

f~ilure in the rU~ll:ed terr~in of Alb~ni~, s~id:

The divisi0ns were not nrgqnized, clothed, equipped, con­

ditionod, or tr~ined for either winter or mount~in fl~hting.
,.- The result w<\s dissaster • • • !'I.n sarmy whi.ch m"lY hl'l.ve to fjght
lnywhere in the world must h~~re "tn importsant pllrt of its
20
~-' ~jor units e8peci~11y or~~ni~ed. tr~ined. ~nd equip~d for fi~ht­

...nll: in the mount~ins I'md in winter. The I\rmy I'lnd equipment must

be on h~nd. ~nd the troops fully c~nditioned. fOE such units c~n­

not be improvised hurriedly from line divisions. 3

Bl\sed upon these consider~ti~ns. the W~r Dep~rtment ~ctiv~ted The

Mount~in Trl\ini~ Center ~t C~~p C~rson. Cnlor~do. on 3 Septgmber 1942. The

mneuvers in Februl'l.ry. 1943. showed sever~l serious defects whioh tM.y serve

t~ po5nt nut tbe specific problems of phvsic~l ~nd mentl'l.l conditionin~ which

my be fllced bv units initi~lly operqtin~ in mountllins. A letter which

Generlll N~cNl'l.ir wrote to the Comm~nC!inll: Gene-rill of The Mountl'l.in Trllinine: Cen­

ter summ~rized theso weqknesses •

•~ • •' Trl'liniIll!: did not ~ppe!l!r I3.dequ~te to comition personnel

for ~rchine: I'\nd ~neuvering under conditions of extreme cold ~nd

'ldverso weether •

• • • A high peroent"lj!!:e of the personnel fell cut due to sick­

ness" f~ti~e" frostbite" Sl.nd fep..r.

~ • • • Tr~ining pro~r~ms indicp..ted 1\ le~i of • • • exercise

ecessnry to properly condition men• • • •

The letter ~lso mentioned th~t morl'l.le seemed Ilbnor~lly low due to,

""1 high 'lllnrbidity rde littributed to • • • I'\lt1tude ~nd l~ck" of recrel'ltioml

fqcilities." This m~p.:ht seem to be fll1 evidence of mount"1in sickness" Ii pe­

culiQrly ~CUt0 tomporllry illness which must be considered in Ilny rellily high

mount"lins.

Field Mllnul'!l 70...10" Mount~in Oper'ltions, exphins:

The nnvice '\no. exoerienced climber q like f\re sub ,;ect to this

m'lll!!dy (i.e. mountJ'l.in sic1rn0ss) in 1'J1titudes ~s lov, qS 4000 to

5000 feet.. The cl!!use :is l1su,,11y poor ohvsicJll condition" l"lck of

llccliml1tizqti('n" or both. Symptons mIly be hel'\dllche" nI'\U861l,

vomitinll:, ll!!ck of lippetite, insomnill" I!!nd irritp.bility. This con­

dition my be relieved by r0st. In rl1ra c~ses the pp.tient must bo

t~ken to lower eltitudes. 25

Once ~cclilll",ted to high mountdns" units Wl.y suffer if they "1ra sudden­

21

 Vp.lley dise~se occurs when ~n indi~ldu~l ~cclim~ted to high

ltitudes returns to the low Jlltitudes. It is the opposite of

mountJlin sickness. While in the mount~ins there is ~n ~bnot~l

increqsa in the number of red blood cells ~o ~u~ment the oxy~en

Q~rryin~ powa~ of the blooe, this increJlsed power is not ne~ded

~t sefl. le,rel, I'Ind tho body literr:\11y hp.s too much blood. The

rasultin~ symptons I!re lflssitude, hel!dl3.che" noises in the e~rs"

ind1~ostion, irrit~bility, depr~ssien" for~et~llness. ~nd neu­

rJllgiJl-like PJl in. One or wore nf the symptons lIJI1y be present

'lt the St",U16 time. Depending on the individu'll. they disJlppe'lr

within Jl few dt\ys to P. few ~eks.26

In 'iny CJlse. even where the mountt'li.ns fire not sufficiently hl~h to

CJluse eithl3r mountp.in or "':>,lley sickness, thoy hll'l'\9 "l definite effect on the

physiology .,md pqtholoe:y of th9 ind:ividulll. This is beC'luse "• • • the humA.n

ore:~nism is sensitive to wetlthor ch'1nges Ilnc differi~ climte."

It is Jl e:enerlllly Jlccepted principle thJlt Jl good driver should be 'lble

t~ drive his ve~icle in ~ny torr"lin. but the pr"lctic~l interpret'ition of this

pr~ iple must c('lns ider tbe tvee ('If terrJl in the driver hJls hqd experience in.

E ,:;he civiliJln driver with his versllItile modern t)utomobile must le".lrn the

speciA.l techniques of mount'lin driving. A driver r'lted liS excellent on flJlt

l'1nd driving: mie:ht 61lsily be th8 c~,use of frequent mechp.l1iclll fqilure of his

~hic16 when Clllled upon to drive in mountqinous country.

In June. 1944, the Germt:m i..rmy rece ived A. r'lther l'lre:'3 consie:nment of

new Fqnzors from tho Reich. Bec~uS!'3 ('If tho extansi~ d'3struction of the r!3.il­

ro~d net Ilround FLORENCE, the tr~in hlle to be unlollded in MARRhpI, some 80

kilometers nt':lrthellst of FLORENCE on the north slope of tho Apennine Mountllins.

These new P~nzers hl1d been bro'k'an in suffioiently qnd were mqnned by we 11­

trqinod drivors froIn Gormqny, Tbe drivers' experiences extended, hC\W'e~rer,

only to norm~l Centr~l Europeqn cnnditions ~nd were in no wqy equql to the

C
­
spech,l dom"lnds which thn steep, windine: mountlli.n rn"!..ds of Itqly presented.
I'

uently much m3chl'l.nic'll d"mPJe"J 1"'9 sulted qnd qftcr 'i few dflYS the ~roup

22

 ~~ttered o~~ th~ entire m~reh rrute. Sineo ~bat ~t the towin~ equip.

ment wqs in use qt tre frnnt ~t th~t st~~e of the c~mp~i~n. the m~inten~nce

urHs h"H:1 to rQpq ir ths btolren..1own ~nzers on tho rOl'l.d. Beol'l.use of techni­

c~l ~nd or~~niz~ticn~l re~sone this procedure demqnded I'l.n excessive I'l.mount of

time .. pI'l.rticul~rly I'l.t thqt peril"ld when only q few we ll-trt'd ned rO'Pq ir men were

!'lV:; il'1b 10.

One Amaricl'l.n or~qnizl'l.tion, which hqd ~bout fnur months winter trqin­

ing I'l.t Pine Cl'l.mp, New York prior to entering comb~t .. suffered I'l.t leqst 30 per­

cent less r.8chqnic~1 braqkdovrn of truc~s thqn did com'Pl'l.rqble units without

this trl'l.ini~. The untr~ined vehicle driver often frdle to tqke intC' con..

siderl'l.tion the inherent built-in limitqtinns of power ~nd m~neuverqbility of

his vehicle -- either tr... cked ~r wheel.

,'-'" Undoubt~1dly "!11 dri"lrers qnd crew membsre need more trl'l.ining in, field

e),." -1.ients. Qu;te often ~ m:;hicle, stuck in the mud .. must ~it for mAin­

teIlAnce personnel when the drher qno craw members otmld retrieve the vehicle

with th8ir own equipment if tney hl'ld sufficient trqinine:.

A former pl~toon ser~e~nt of the 753d T~nk Bqttqlion in It~ly s~id,

I thinY the most glqring deficiency of t~n~ crews ~s their

ho lplossness when confronted with b~d terrqin. Only sin.ce I hl'l.ve
worked in field expedients instr11ctiC'n h"lVG I come tC' rep.lize how
!lUlny times I could h~'re kept r..y t"ln~ or t~nlrs nf my phtoon in
"lotion h,ttd I mown even the rudiments ('If field expedient work in
vehicle recovery.27

Night driving experienco 13.SS1)mes more' import~nce in mount,:; in oper,,\­

tions; not only bec13.use ~n orrer tllr'\y be f",tp.l tn the ind bridUt:l.l vehicle ~nd

c~rgo but p.lso becp.use in ~ r6strict~Q roqd net through ~ defile ~ vehicle in

column wb ich become 6 stuck- or d 1SI'Iblec ml~ht bloc~ the p.d~nce of "1n entire

u~ In such op,ses~ to cleqr thJ roqd of tho vehicle ~y require the use of

23

 ~.

h }ow~r to physio~lly roll the truok or li~bter vehicle off the ro~d; or

in the cp.se of h6~vier vehioles ~n ~xplosive oh~r~e properly pl~ced to blow

the t~nk off the r~~d necessit~tin~ rep~ir ~f the consequent d~mp.ge to the

rOl1d.

An E~ineer officer oommented on this technique of using explosivos

It is fe"l.sible I1.nd WIlS ~n infrequent pr~ctioe in oorrol3.t to

clo"l.r ro~ds of dis~bled vehicles with the use of explosives. To

blow P. mecium t"l.nk off 11 rnount~in tr~il would require from 100

tt"l 400 pounds of explosbro, dependine: up("ln the f',nglfJ I"f the "Ire­

hiola '!nd the width of the rc<!d. The explosive should be phoed

under the side nf the tllnk f:J.n:'l not under the tr"lok. The ex­

plosive should be of the nitro stqroh vliriety "l.nd with proper

pl<!oernent would not d"l.m~~0 tho ro~d beyond rep~ir th~t could be

effectod by men with picks ".nd shovels in ~ few minutes. 28

Oper"l.tions in mClunt"l. ins during the IJ'lst W'1r h","o indico::.tod th!'lt the

g:~est limit':l.tions of th0 me dium tp.nk were jts l'lck of flotl'l.ti"n "nd ltlck

01 Jility duo to the "l.bsenoe (If tlny tr'1cti(ln devioes. liJliny field expedients

were tried during World Wp,.,r II,; including the so-o~lled "duck bill," turning:

end oonnectors upside down, welding bits of met"l.l on the met"l.l tr~ok, "nd

usjn~ grousors ~n th~ fl'lt rubbeT tT~ck. Althl"ugh e~cb ("If the expe~ients

bJ'ld its ('lwn merit, ntme nf them VfflS c(,111pletely s"ltisfp.ctory. It "I.ppe"lrs

th~t those limih.tirns with the 9xc>9ptil'n of flottltirm !'ire still present in

the T.80 qnd T-84 t~nk tr~cks usod on the W~6 t~nk. ~nd the T-72 p.nd T-85El

tr~oks prf3sontly found on the .P:24 t"lnk. It is believed thSlt the proposed T... 91

trmk tr"!ok to b8 used on the T-37 tl'1nk with its thin, continul"'lus, deep chevron

~nd tho demountqble cushion block of rubb0r is I1ppronching the desired effec­

tiveness in tr"lction for "I. t"l.nk.

Bec"I.use of tho high mortqlity r~te of t~nk bo~ey wheels ~nd ro~d

w: it might well bo fe~sible ~nd desir~ble to o~rTy ~ minimum of one sp~re

24

~
eol on 'Sp.ch tllnk. Evon thou/1:h tho t"lnk crew does not hl1vo tho nocossqry

tools to cbrml'to bordes or roqd wheols, o~rryinl't the SP'lre wheel would

f'lcilit"ltlJ the chl1ndnl't of tho whoel in t;hl1t only '3. moch'mic with the

noceSl',l"itry tools would be reQuired for su~h mq inten"lnce. It hp.s beon sue::e:ost­

ad th~t in mount~in oper~tions the crew ,of "it t~nk be responsible for ~ll

echelons of m~intenl1nce on the suspe~sipn Byste~ Ilnd thqt the n~OOS6qry tools

for this ml1inten"itnoe should bo inolude& in the vehicle t s st~~e; The pro­

posed "Irmy truck "itpp"lrently includes "Ill or most of the desit"lb1e ohllrqcter­

Tho importnnce of ~dequqto logistio"itl su~pbtt for units involved in

qny type of mountl1in operqtidhs WI1S stressed by the exp~rjenoe of foreign

nrmios. Tho initi~l FinniSh sucoess ~gqinst Russiq in 1939 m"ity be I1ttributed

~o the Finn's I1dqptqtions for operl1tion in mount"lins I1nd extreme cold, "IS well

their I1bi1ity to hl1r"lSs ~nd cut the Russil1n supply lines. One fl1ctor in

tho It<J.li8.n f"l ilure in the B"'.lkllnf;! W"I s inl1dequ"Ite c lothine:,. equioment "lnd

conditioning. As 11 result, 25,000 wero killed 8.nd 10,000 froze to doqth in

Germl1n success€:s 11p.:l1inst Frl1noe in 1940 wore 1l1rl't()ly tho result of

Germl'm 'lbility to mo,'e 1l:.1r/1:o qrmored units through the mountl1inous terrl1in

of the Ardennes_ Their diff.iculty m~y well serve ~s 8. sU~l1ry to this study

of loei~tic~l problems imposed by mountl:.lin oper~tions. Gonerl11 KLEIST, who

crossed the Ardennes with three ~rmored oorps, the 1l1r~est conoontr~tion of

tl1nks I\ssembled up to thqt time in World Wl1r II. thus de::;cribes his ex­
poriences:

25
 .• ' •• The mliin probleIl1 ~s not tl'lcticl'l.l, but qdministr<l.tive -­
che complic~ted movement p.nc supply p.rr"ngeIl1ents. It WIiS essQntip.l
to utilize ~ll rOl'lds s.tnd tr"l.cks thl'lt were to qny do~ree prs.tcticqble
• • • • The torrqin ~s difficult-- mountliinous qnd wooded -- qnd
the rO'1ds, though they hqd ".\ P.:C'0d surfqce, were ofton steep qnd
full of bends., • • • The opposition W"lS not serjous. Thl'J.t Wl'J.S
fortunqte, for my tJ.rtillery h~d only 50 roun~s per bp.ttery -- tJ.S
the ~mmunition columns hqd boen dolqyed by the congest jon on the
rotl.ds throug:h the Ardennes.• 28

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 2

~ountl1in Oper<l.tions, FM 70-10 (WtJ.shin~ton: W"l.r Depqrtment, 1947),

ptOlrllgr'l.pn 58.

2Lt Col Joe C L~mbert, lIObaervers Notes .. It"l.ly.. 4 October 1943 to 29

Decemb.,r 1943." .. Ltr Hq li.GF, FHa 319.1/103 GMGB.I .. 7 Februqry 1944 .. p 30.

3To Bizerte With the II Corps 23 A ril 1943 to 13 Ml'J.y 1943 (Wqshi~­
ton: HistorictJ.l ivis ion, Wqr Depp.rtment ..

4After-Action Report, 775th T"l.nlrB.n.. Sept 194:3 to July 1945, p 7.

5"Lessons from the It"lip,n Cllmpqie:nll , TM 2, Hq Ml'OUSA, 15 Mqrch 1945,

P 107.

6Interview, Lt Col J G Felbor .. hutomotive DepP.rtment, The Armored

Scbool .. Ft Knox .. Ky.

7Lt Geners.tl Kqsilowitch.1 "Mountl1inous Tcrrqin in GenertJ.1" , Tho

Milit£l.ry Review Vol 24 No.6 (June 1944), p 72",,73. (Originl'J.lly printed in
Red Stqr, trqnslqted from Russis.tn to French to En~lish).

BnReport on 651 Air OP Squs.tdron Ri.F, North Africq, November 1942 to

Jf.lnuP,ry 1943" (Ltr by Com~ndintl: Officer 651 Air OP Squqdron RAF.. ]f.I::ly 1943) ..
P 2.

9Interviow, Cqpt J D wVells .. Armored Officers Ad'lrqnce Chss.1 1949-50..

Tho ~rmorec Schnol, Ft Knox, Ky.

10llLessons from the ItqliSln C'imp~ignll, TM,2, Hq Nl.TO, 10 MArch 1944.1

P 14.

11ttJun r.:1e "tnd Mcmntqin Operf.'.tions ll L-30, C('Imm"lnd l'J.nd St"tff Depqrtment ..
The Armored School, Ft KnDx, Ky.. p 6.

,..,--. 12 Ib 1d D
... · 4.
--'
26
 13Interview~ ~~i w H Willi~ms. former ~inten~nco Officer. 740th
Bn.. ETO.
14
Feloor .. op cit.

15Inter'lriew~ Lt Col C F Reynolds .. former Ordnl\nce Supply Officer"

4th Armore d. Di "ris ion.. ETO.

16Interviow.. M s~t Troy E T~rpley" Automoti~ Dep~rtment, The Armored

School .. Ft Knox .. Ky .. former CWO~ :M~intenqnce Officer 781st T"1nl<- Bn.. MTO.

17 Interview.. Cqpt P J Linn~ former Bn Motor Officer .. 755th T"1nk En..

l!\Villiqms ~ 0E cit.
19
Tqrp1ey.. op cit.

20Mountl'J.in Operqtions. :F'r.: 70-10 (W"1shine:ton: W"l,r Dep"lrtment .. 1947) ..

Pft ss im.

21K~silowitch .. oE cit" p •

22l1Est~blishment of ~ Cqmp for A. Di1Tision in Hie:h MC"unt~in Terr~in!l

yw..G-3 r\~Gmo for thA Secret~ry of the Gen'3rql Stqff.. bGO 353(8/9/41) (c) 17
'. 194 1 )" l'I1 s s im.

23uTr"l.inine: in Mount<lin <>nd Winter W'irf"1re" .. study 23. HistcricSl1

Sectio~ .. AGF.. 1946~ P 3-4.

24 AGF Ltr .. SUb.iect: Inspection Trip .. 331.1 (c) to CG MTC. C~mp Hl'Ile"
Colo .. 11 Mqrch 1943.

25Moun~.~.? Operlltions" FlliI 70.. 10 (W"1shinl!.ton: Wqr DeptJ.rtment" 1947) ..

P 60.

26 Ibid .. P 60.

27Interview.. Mr E B Smith. former Phto(1n Sgt .. Co B.. 753d Tqnk Bn,

lITO.
28
Int~rviow .. Lt Col John C H Lee" J r .. Instructor .. Comm"l,nd ~nd Stqff
DepQrtITl9nt .. The Armored School. Ft KnC'x, Ky.

29 Cqpt B H Lidcell H'l.rt .. The Germ~n Gener~ls T~lk (New Y(\rk: Williqm
Morrow qnd Comp~ny .. 1948), p 125.

27

 CF..API'ER :5

ATTACK

Conditions common to llll mountli in operlitions ree:~rdless of mission or

enemy ~ctivity h~ve been the subject 0f oonaider~tion in the foregoing chqpter.

In this ch~pter II specific discussion of those f~ctors peculi~r to the 'ltt~ok

will be presented. They ~re: (1) speci~l consider~tions de~nded by the

~tt~ok in mount~inous terr~in: (2) teohniques ~pplio~ble to the ~tt~ck; ~nd

(3) problems vmich mie:ht arise in the qttack in mount~inous terrain.

Special Consider~tions

The restricted m8.neuver, limited firepower, and difficult lodstical

support normally experienced by ~rmored units in mountqinous terrain ~re them­

,~ElS severe hqndicaps to progress. Any qrmored unit which hqs the mission

~ttackine: q well org8.nized enemy in such terr~in must cope with further

obstqcles imposed by enemy ore:"',nizp.tjon of defensi~te positions.

The e"lCoorience of the United Stp.tes Fjfth Army jn It13.lv ml!!y be tl'\1ron

liS ~n exqmple of meqsures ~n alert enemy will tqke to impede the prol!;ress of

• • '. 'rhe Germp.ns bee:~n the work of construct ine: defenses in

the Northern Apennines when Fifth Army WqS still ene:'le:ed • • • 200

miles to the south. Th'::l main line of the de fense, nqmed by the

Germ~ns the Goten Stellung or Gothic Line, wqs sited to t~ke mqx­

imum ~d,rqntqe:e of the rugP.:ed mounti'l ins <:lnd the Ii<1'i ted number of

roqds qcross them. • •• From his v~ntqe:e points on the hie:h

ground the enemy possessed excellent observl'ltion "nd hroq,d fields

of fire for qntit'ln~ guns qnd 13.utom~tic we~pons • • • • el13.borate

preparqtions were m~de a~ainst t~n~ ~tt~cks • • • reliance wqs

placed prim~rily on mine fields con8istin~ of six ~nd ei~ht rows

of <mtit'l.nk m1.nes h.id in 'an '11most continuous b~nd for 13. d1stqnce

of tvro milos •••.• It~lilln ;vorkers due:: A. deep V-shaped "lntit"lnk

ditch strene:thened witb pine loe: revetments. The ditch Bxtended

,~three and one qup.rter miles. Coverine: the mine fields ~nd qnti­
A.nk ditch w~s Iln intricllte network of infqntry positions ~nd

28
 ,unkers for ~ntit!!lnk !1:uns. i\;".ny of those hun'lr9!'s '.v6!"(J dug deep in­
to the sides or crests of the bills ~nd strengthened with up to six
foet of reinforced concrete .....l1'hich rendered th6m imp"lrvious to ~ll
but be~vy ~rtil18ry. Two of ths bunkers were topped by P~nther t~nk
turrets ~!'dtb only the lone:-b~rr0led 75mtl1 p':uns ~nd the turrets show­
ine: "l.bove e:r0und level • • • • Infqntry positions, consisting of con­
crete pillbox9s. tr~nches, ~nd foxholes connected by cr~wl trencbes
to l"'rge ~ he"l"lrily re jnforced personne 1 sbf:ll ters, werf':l protected by
<J.ntipersonn'Jl mine fields p.nd one or more 20 to 30 font wide b"lnds
of b~rbed wire. Autom"l.tic W6<J.pons were sited to cover the entqne:le­
tl10nts with low ~rqzin~ fire. 1

As tbe Germ~ns withdrew tl1''ly m"lde skillful use of nJ'lturql obstAcles

which they r';lndered more forrnidpble throue:h ingenious use of explos i,rf3S. They

de stroyed bdde:o s .. culv'1rts, t'lnd l00gr) ro~d s. frequently '!!lininl!: wh<J.te"lTer by-

p"'.SSi3S existed. Nllrrow str6~ts in C'riticl'l.l vill<J.f!GS werp, b10cked by de-

terr~in m'l.de more forrridt'lble by dcll1:ol:itions, <ind mine fields covered by fire.

qnd in m'1ny c>':ses raq1Jlrq ~ di.rect hit from he"'vy !1rtillerv to put th<9!!l out

fire c~n not be brou~bt to be~r up~n the openin~s~ embr~sures, or ~ntr~nces

of these positi0ns. Moreover, :i't"lfp,utry "il~ne could nDt oope with the b:mks

wbicb tr'3 enerry h",bitu"llly lrept cC"nC'9".led in phtoon "lna como<J.ny she grC"1Jps

for counterqtt8.cj intt.r

The solutio!1 to th''lse problems Jqy in the US8 of our

t<J.nks to 8CCOmpqny '3.11 ..tt'1cks wtHJ't"o jt W'lS possible to overcome the terrqin

Amoric>':. n doctrine couo0rning m0untr.; in W8.rf8 re Sb3to s,

• • • the inl'l.dequ"te r01ld n~t found in sO"lrsely settled tl10unbdn ~re"lS

enh"ltlces thf3 mi"litctry v<\lue 0f existlng rO"lds ~nd "ldds itl'port"l.nce to
heights which domj't"l'3.tc them• • • Critic~l terr"lin feAtures co~sist of
reights which domiu<cte ,Ttllleys "lnd lines of cotrmunic'1tiC'ns with ob­
~ervfjt:ion I'lnd fire. 2

This ",grees in pdnc:iple with Russi".ln doctrine which h~lds th<:t

29
 • • , one condition essanti131 to suooess lies in the f~vor~bla

choioe of obs~rv~tion posts w~ich ~re oommitt0d for the good

of tho qttJlc'k- with in p'3rfect "dew of th'3 ob;ective • • • • The

b"?-ttlEJ for highw"IVs. roqds of "lppro"lch, v"tlleys. built up

qrs"l.S develops upon heie.:hts !',nd ridges. 3

This fqct is further qtt~st~d to by Americqn experience in the

A mp..ior lesson from mount"" in fight:ini! in Northern Tunis i~

p.nd SicHy, thqt dorrinl1tinl!' heje:hts must bG s'lhed. ~rqlleys ~nd

nl'lturll.l ~pprOqCh0S must be ll."Iroidf3djl qnd units must work ~lo~

high ridges qnd force th"l en"lmy from his posit jon. W"lS f\P:Slin

demonstrqted in It~ly, Some modifioqtions of this principle

bf.lvn boen neoess"ry b(~CqUS6 of unusul'llly rug:eed mountt! ins. In

some inst":lncos the tOFB of mount~ins could not be qppro"lched or

occupied. <\nd th'3 inf<lntrv "lction s'~pported by "rmor W'ilS oon­

fined to the slopos, The n'1tur"l of the mount<dn rJl.ng:es <lnd the

orgrmizqtion 'ilnd construction of ",nemy positjons hqs h'3en fre­

quently ml'lde necess0ry the s'ljture of sell3cted terr<dn fe"ltures

ono ~ t q time. 4

An excellent eXl'\mple of tho lJSe of tJ),nks in the P"lcific is given by

754th Tqnk Bl'ltt'llion, Aft", r th9 b${tt lQ for IlflANILA thf) 754th T':mlr

B~tt"llion shifted to the hills '3~st of ViIAl'HLA '1-nd to the mountqinous BALETE

PASS I1re"l in North0rn Luzon. Here th"l terrS}in ~s totfilly llnsuit'lble for

t~n~ "Iction. yet th8Y did pl~y ~ pqrt in the fighting, The role of the tllnk

Wf;lS limited t" firhw ~t the enemy CJ'1ves 'md pillboxes froU1 fixed positions.

In ml1nv i.1'istI1DCeS tho t<inlrs did not hq~re sufficient motive power to g'3t into

position but hp,d to b'3 to'N'Eld into posit:ion bv 011e or tl'ore trl'lctors. For the

most pJ'lrt thjs type of ~ction chp.r0.cterized th'3 8rmorsd role in the moun­

t~ins of Luzon. 5

The use of t'1nks in th"l mounhdns of Itlllv is described in this

mr:\uner:

The use of hnlrs in th'J dt<J.ck on SAN PIETRO in It~ ly 1 ike­

~wise presented spf:lcj"l problems. It wP,.S hoped thp.t the qrmor
, TQuld gnt through th'" formidr b Ie de fens'::! s q nd ole <1 r the W"W for
the infp.ntry; however, eV8n h~d thl3re been no enemy opposition,

30
/
-­ the tarr13.:\.n itself would hp'~re beeJ"1 <!lTJ'1ost irr;possible for cross

country moireTJ'lent by tp.nks. First plpns cp.lled for COTJ'lpl1ny A,

753d T~nk B13.ttq lion. t("l mo"'3 with the 14~d Infl?ntrv 13. 10m!: the

Sqmmurco slopes, w'911 13.bov'3 the SAN PIETRO-,TE}:!"AFRO rOl!\d. The

r:r('ll;nd on either side ('If th9 n"lrrow rOl:!d WfiS r;. s'3ries of rock­

wp.11ed terrl'lces, three to se"e'O feet hizh, cov"Jred with olive

trees "nd scrub ~rowth. "nd broken by streqm beds, ~ullies find

oth"'<r irreguhrities. One qtteTl'lpt W8S l'1'l!\de to get the V'.nks

hir:h enough up on the slopes so thr;.t they could mo"re forW8rd

to th'3 ~tt"ck qlone: the upper terr~ces, PI1SS through our for­

w8.rd posit:'ions, "nd then drop down froTJ'l one t'?rrqce to the

next. The lllth En~ineers broke down terrl'lce Wf'Ills to ml1ke Ii

trp.il up to the cOm'rrl1nd post ("If the 3d Bqtt13.1ion, 143d Inf~n­

try. On 12 December when ~ t~nk tried out this route, it e:ot

only I1S fq r t)S th'3 second terrqce; repe~tGd e t'forts to o"'er­

corl'e the mud ",no the grqde r'3S'11ted only in the t"lnlr throwine:

11 trt:lck. 6

An extreme eXI1T1"ple of thA effect of the terrq in upon I1r\TIore d operq ..

tions in mount" jns m$),y be formd :in th'3 following qccount conCBrnine: Compqny

A, 775th Tqnk Bl1ttr;.lion.

___ Compl'lny A minus one phtoon I'\ttqched to the 43d Infqntry

)ivision, 8 Februqry 1945, P.t POZOHUBBIO, Luzon were initil'll­

Iy employed to set up rOl'\d bloc~s for the l03d Inf~ntry Di­

,rlSlon. L~terJO on 18 Februll.ry, the 3d pll'ltoon returned to

camp-my control. WhEln the 47)d Division W"lS I'9lie,rea by the

33d Division on 14 Februllrv, the Tqnk C01'npqny supDorted "ltt'lck"s

throurrh the mount,,- jus northsl'lst of POZORUBB 10. T"lnks Wl'lre

'lseo f0r direct fire purnos"3S "R:'linst cq~Tes Bnc'l E"un posjtions.

The dri~'e t('\w~I'ds BAG-UIC Vfl'\S h"llted I'lt this point 8S f'lr I3.S

the t"mks were concerned dU<:I to efficient demolition of bride::es

o'1eI' hrQ"e rivers "lnd ,Q:orges b'IT the f8n qticp.l Jr;.pl1nese. From

SISON the compqny movr,d into P, bi"oUJic I'lrl3e in thf') 'ricinity of

bGOO. The pl"ltoons "lltern~ted d8iIy supporting the Int'qntry

"lnd protecting the Engineers buildine:: r08ds.

Enemy rGS ist'lnce W"lS intSlnse throughout thi s very mount"l in­
oUs tArrr;.jn. M"lny hnd mines 1.vere encountered in the rq,rjnes
"lna I'lrtillerv ~nd mortnr fire ~s intense,
In the first week of April th<:'l 12M Infqntrv W'1S supnorted

qlong the GALH.IW rO"ld to ASIN.. This 'iI'''lS 6'lCtremeIv hl1!:l1rdous

work. T<1nk"s were c<lTI"llized bv high e::rollnd on the south <:md I'l

dry ri,rer bed or, the north. Vision wc.s limitec1 by hel'lVY

,iunde shrubs !';Ind trees. Tho J$l.p"lnese I'lttempted ml'luy night

infiltr"ltions in I3.n effort to destroy tqnk's. Spotlights were

inst<l.lled on t"lnks I'lnd the se when turned on temporl'lrj ly

blinded the J~p~nese 'lud IDI3.de them good t"lrgets for Tl"qchine

~un fire. .

Throughout liee.y the Comp"tny supported the 33d DjviS ion in

31
 -
ts ~dvqnoe up thl3 mount'iin tr'lil t~rd TRn!IDAD •. The rOlid ms
'ibout five miles in length "nd extremely hfiZqrdous goine: •. Ro~ds
~nd side rO'lds or trqils were ideP.l for enemy liwbushes. The 1st
Plqtoon on the 24th of June. working with 'In infp.ntry pqtrol
from the l36th Infqntryqnd one aqulld of the 10Bth Engineers.~s
limbushed by lin estim~ted 200 J'lPS 2000 Ylirds south of C'imp Thirty.
They used Mtchel chl3.re:es. e:ren'ldes. mee mortp.ra. 'lnd mqchine
guns. The tJ'lnks viera helpless qS they could n("lt elevqte their
e:uns to fire on the enemy on ridges 'lnd mlineuverine: wqs impossible
due to the mountqinous terrqin. With the help of li'lison 'lircrqft,
'il"t:i llery fire ,~s used on the enemy ~md they fin'llly withdrew.
T'lnk c'lsulllties J'lnd personnel c'lsu'llties were he'lV;; 'lnd the T'lnk
Comp'lny ,~s eV'lcuqted for rest ~nd reh'ibilit'ltion.

These combqt illustr~tions. qlthough they h~ve been selected from

widely sepqr~ted theqters of opertl.tions,. h'1ve oert"l.in b"l.sic fqctors in common.

These speoi'll consider"l.tions, refGrence ~rmored Iltt'lck in mountqinous terr'lin,

mllY be sumID'lrized 'lS follows: 1) onemy ore:'lniz'ltion of the terrqin will

greqtly mngnify th'3 n<1tur"'.ll obst"l.cles; 2) in P.:l3ner'll .. "l.ttl-l.ckine: forces will

h~ 'lS their ob.;ecti"res control of th"l heights; 3) inf'lntry must h'lve J'lrmored

S. Jrt to ~ssist the 'ldvqnce, to repel enemy Ilrmor'3d oounterqtt"l.ck, "l.nd to

destroy enemy we~pons sited in Ilrtillery-proof loc"ltions which only cp.n be

l''l'lched by direct fir~ wo 13. pons ; "!.nd 4) to fqcilitl3.te overcoming terrf'l in ob­

st"l.c1os in the movl'.ll11!3nt of t"l.nks, IJne:ineers "l.r!J essenti'll to "l,ny tllsk force •.

Techniques

Tochniques evolved for successful 'ltt"c~ by tp.nk units in mount'iinous

terril in merit det"l iled cons iderf'tion. Th:is discuss:i on will include objectives,

reconnp. iss"lnce, size of forces used, security. coord in<l.tion "lnd control,

SupportiD£ ~ir, "lnd s9rvices of supply, m~intenqnce. <l.nd cOIDmunic"l.tions.

In offensive comb~t in mount"l.ins, the qtt~cker se~rohos for "l breqk­

throue:h 'llon/?; ro;:;ds p"lss"!ble for "1"9hicl'Js "Ind oquipment. This seqrch is

usu~lly conducted "llong sev0r~1 rout~s simult"lneously, with the mjssion of

",-­
:1g the heig:hts "lnd ridg':]s dominr.:tine: high~ys. routes or "l.poro'\ch,

32
,..-....leys. <l.nd built-up ~reI'J.S..
Dominp.ting he:i!ghts thus bocome th'3 ob.;ectives
.~
O~ ~tt~ck. Frequently. becquse of ever-incre~sin~ ~ltitude of successive

ridges, the objectiv9s of necossity <l.lso b~como succAssive in ch~r~cter.

Thus, the "domin~tion" "lfforded by "tny e:ivan ob,iecti...-e is "1ntirely relP.tive

to the position of the I'J.tt<l.cker.

The 711th T~nk B~ttqlion employed the principle of successive ob- /

i
.iectivGs on Okin"l.wfi. The Jl'J.p"lnese took full tadvO'\nt<l.ge !?:i~ren by the cOI1lm'\nd­

in!?: ground. Ridges ~nd hill m~S6GS were defended which were perpendiculqr

to the Amerie~n ~dvp.nce. A b~ttle h~d t~ be f~ught for e"lch successive

ridfte, with the enemy defending both tht;! forwqrd p,nd reverse slopes. 8

As soon "tS the p.tt~cker h~s penetrqted the defense qt "lny point. he

rust h<l.ve "l~il"lble hi~hly mobile units to swoop dovm on lines of communieq­

tions in the re .. r of th'~ enemy forces. If this mfineuver succeeds, the de­

r­
ar mfiy be forced to withdr~w. FEre p.gqin qrmor~d units using every

qvc.il~ble route should be used bV the ..tt<l.cker to outfl"lnk ~ny delqyi~ posi­

tions which tho enemy m~y orgqnize, <l.nd to "lcceler"lte the spoed of tho with­

dr~wql. A Russi"ln ~onerql officer oxpl<l.ined:

As soon <l.S the foo commences "l withdr"lwql mO'T'3IU6nt .. "l

p"lr<l.llel pursuit begins on his fl'1nks. Very mobile troops, even

if n("lt vary numorous, r.Jl'lko US') of tr p,ils qnd p~ths in order to

strike ~ft0~rds P.t eert~in points p.long the rO"ld t~ken by tho

withdr~wing troops. This m~n~er of <l.dv~nce c~sily tr~nsforms ~

withdr<'lwp.l into q rotro'l.t <;nd e'ront'l~lly into "l. rout ... mostly on

~ecount of the loss of vehicles ~nd he~vy aquipment.~

The s6'lreh for w6l!k p0ints in the enemy defensive position "lnd the

determin"ltion of possible routes ("If p,ppro~eh, with terrflin ob,;eotives which

domin"lte those routes~ ph-cos <'\ f':ro"lter emph<'\sis upon reconnlliss<\nce.

As et'lrly ~s the Tunisi"ll1 C'3:rnpp.ign in V{orld':V'lr II, the vit~l 1m­

,"'--" nec of qdequ~te rec0nn~issqnce for qrrrored units bec<lme evid9nt. Expert

35
-
reconn'l iss<mce of routes of

. in pll3.nn i ng ph"lses.
'ld~Tl3.noe.

Se~rer~l
usu13.11y with enzineer qdvice. bec'lIOO

times. either side moved up 'llong wh'lt

they thou~ht ~s ~ zood cle'lr r~ute. only to find q dry wl'lsh. nine or ten

feet high. blocking the ~y. This frequently necessitl'lted withdr'lw"ll.lO

On the second'lry rOl)tes which tqnl(- columns were frequently forced to

USI? tho reconn'liss"lnce of str3'lm crossings presented I'l consider'lble probl':lm.

especi"llly in winter when the wooden brid~es hqd been WB'l~ned und~r the

pressur0 of ice. The .checkin~ of '3. bridg~ took "l. long time.

The enemy would p"l.rtil3.11y S"l.W through bridgo supoorts then

cover the cuts with ico. The r'Osult W'lS 'l furth:;r del'lY of the
'ltt"l.ck. in order to check e~ch bricgo "rerv thoroughly. When "l.
t'lnk fe 11 through "l. br ichIJ into "l m~unt'l in strop.m. the orewl'!
usu'llly could not bl? r~scued. The Germqn policy fin"llly evolved
Wl'lS to use fords through str'1f'\m heds whene~Ter possible. If "l.
~t'ln1c- hqd tl" crClC;S 03. brid~e. onIv th'J dri"rer rem"l.ined in th~ t"l.nk. l1

One solution to the problem of route reconn"l.iss"lnce ~s to use t'lnks

for th'lt purpose. The rOS1)lt"',nt report of which terr'lin could bo used for

the P'lSS8.i,cO of to.nks. w"'s b"l.sed upon qctu13.1 Qxpnrience r"l.th"lr th"l.n ,;UdgTOOnt.

This tochnique W'lS used in tho P~cific The"l.tor with c~nsider"lble success in

loc'lting those routes whoro t~nk's could or could n0t be used. In terr'l.in

wh·)re no In.tor"',l rO'1ds exist. nog'ltiw.l rep0rts 'lre "rery useful in pr3venting

unnOCoss'lry operp.tions of l"l.rg·r forces.

An After Action Roport of thp, 44th T'lnk B"l.tt'llion in Leyto notes:

T'lnks wore used 13 NO"Tembor to 18 NO"lTCmber (1944) on 1st

Cqvp.lry Division order for terr'lin roconnqissqnce to loc"lto
torr''lin suitqblo for t8nk omploymont in e~7ent of enemy hrel'lk
through. <lnd w'Jre gi"7on an qddition"l.l miss ion of seeking 13.
PI3.SS through the mount<dns be'b.oreen MOUNT B.I'"DIAN ~nd MOUNT
LiJ.O (west of Highwqy #2) th~t could be used for q tqn1c- route
to the ORMOC VJ"LLEY. Mount<dn terrqin orohibited qdv"l.noe 'lnd
~

34
o
o
o
 ,,-­
I no pass could be loc~ted alon~ the entire len~th of the mount~in
r"lnee from MOUNT BADlAN to MOUNT LAAO.
A medium t"lnk section from "B" Comp"lny WI;lS ~iven a simil"lr

mission in the ~re"l south of MOUNT LAAO but "llso turned bqck due

to ru~~ed terr"lin. Reconn"liss'lnce proved the terr'lin unsuit"lble

for t~nk oper"ltions. 12

Mountr:linous terr$lin not only influences the ob.1ective ~nd reconn"lis­

s~nce of the "ltt!1.cker but "llso exerts ''In "lppreci$lble influence on the s he of

the force utilized. The size of tp.sk forces will V$lry, of course, with the

mission, but 1'1. ~ener~l rule which ~ppe"lrs "lpplicoble to "lll units oper~tin~

in mount~ins is th"lt the t"lsk force must be sm$lll. We ID"ly consider "lS qn ex­

ample, the experience of the 757th Tqnk B$lttqlion operqtin~ with the 2d

French Morocclln Infqntrv Division.

\
Bec~use of the terr"lin difficulties qnd tho numerous forces

with whjch our armor WIlS employed by the French Commllnder, the

individu"ll t<;l.nk ph.toon w~s the fie:htine: unit. The Division'

~ front -;usu"ll1y WIlS divided into two or three ~roupments. These

~roupments norm!1.lly consisted of q medium tllnk compr:lny, Q light

tqnk comp"lny, ~ tqnk destroyer compqny. q reconn"liss'lnce com­

~ny.·qn en~ineer compqny. qnd qt lAqst'~ b~ttqlion of infantry.

Within e~cr e:ro1Jprnent W"lre s1'Mller forces nnrmqlly consistinf'!;

of q pl~tnon of eqc~ of the ~bove units with the e~ception of

inf""ntry whicr' furnished a company. Because of these numrous

sm~ll forces. we s"lldom had more thp.n one plp.toon workin~ in

the SC.m8 ~re!1..l3 .

The 2d Armored Gro1;p hlld simil~r experience in mountqinous terr'lin.

In mountqinous terr~in such qS th~t over which units of this

qrmored ~rout:' h"l"lr9 oper~ted in It"lly, the employment of t"lnks in

mass hqs been impossible. Seldom hqve t'lctical units l~r~er

th"ln the tank comp'lnY,been used. To d'lte (July, 1944). entire

tP.nk b~tt~lions hqve not boon employed ~s such under direct

a:roup control. For the most pl3.rt; t.mks and de stroyers h.wo

beon confin~d to existing rop.ds due to extremely steep qnd

rocky terrl1in, the presence of stono terr<:lcos find wqlls, deep

gullje s. 8.nd soft streqll1 beds .14

Tho British in Sicily discoverod thqt their t<1nks were lqrgoly ro­
stricted to r013.ds qnd thqt 8.S ~ result,

. . . . it Wf'lS often necessilry owina: to the np.ture of tho

.errl3.in to dopp.rt from the sound principle thl1t t8.n~ should

36
o

o
 be employed in mil ss "md not decontr'11 i'!.ed in ponnV Dt\ckets. T'3.nks
wero frequently usod in smql1 nlJmbers with 8ff0otiVEl rosu1ts. 15

The 1st Armored RO/l:imont of the United StqtEIS 1st Armored Division

h'ld P'li"tiou1qr success in f0rmine: t11sk forces g:ener~l1y composed of one m'3di ..

tim t'lnk cornp~ny. one ~rmor~d infl1ptry comp~ny. one plqtoon of 1ig:ht tqnks.
qi
ono phtoon of t"1nk destroyers, find one p111toon of ene:ineers. These tp.sk

forces 'Nere of q nocossity further broken down to the eQuiVl'l.lent of "l. rein­

fgrcod p11ltoon s izo .16

It is of importqnco toromomber thqt due to torr'lin fqctors these·

sm~ll t"l.sk forces usull1ly will bo operqti~ simu1tllnoous1y in locqtions where

~tu'll support is impossiblo "l.nd whore they m"ly h~VB ".Ibsolutely no knowled/l:o

of Ildillcent units opCJrqtiru: in pllrpllel corddors. This w'ill requiro the

p"lrent heSidqu<lrters to re!':ul"lte closely the movemont of (P'Ich unit. If one

",,-- sk force becomos hopelessly blocked jt mllY be fe"l.sible to fl"l.nk the enemy

with !Oln "ld:iqcent u'Q.1t ..

Combllt e~mples of this technique mentioned "lS ml'l.ny "IS fivo or more
•
rO"l.ds be im: usod by tho Sl'lmEJ unit qt thG S"l.me time. In c 1eqrinl! the VOS/l:O s

MOll:I1tq ins, for eX'l.mp1e, tho French 2d Armored Divis ion hqd q s ml'l.ny ".IS e i!':ht

t'lsk forces simultllneous1y in "lction, qnd m'l.de excellent /l:qins throu/l:h ru~~od

terrl1in with compl1rqtive1y few cfJ.su"llties.~,

Tho sml1ll t"l.sk force tochnique however hqs ~ serious dis~dv~ntllge~

since it often requires inGxperionced sUbordinqtes to m~ke doc is ions which

exceed their experience or qbility. This W'l.S true even in the c~se of the

Garm~n Army in Itl1ly, with tho benefit of '3.t le<lst five ye"1rs of w~rf~re be ..

hind it.

~ Ame't"ic'ln experienoe in offensive combqt in mountl1ins !;onerqlly

38

 Jt~nti~tod th0 conclusion th~t wh0nov'Jr decontrfJ.lhl'l,tion WAS IJxorcJsod. it

domfJ.nded th~ highest degroe of initiqtivo ~nd le~d~r8hip of tho smqll unit

comtr.I'l.ndar. Th~ rOllson for this would soom to ~pply in I'l.ny <l.rn1Y. Dot"lchod

plfJ.toon fJ.nd comp<l.ny comml'l.ndors fJ.ro sudd~nly c<l.llod upon to mqko indopendent

dacisions of th'1 typo which would usuP..l1v be m"l.rle qt bqttSl.lion or higher

lev') I. In qdditi('\!1. th"1 smJlIl upjt comml'lnder is frequently out of touch with

his htghor hQ<l.dqu<l.rtors ~nd hils limited knr.wlod~a of tho <l.ctivity of ~di~cent

units.

In It"l.ly• • • sound troop lOlldorship proved to bl) thl'} out­

st~ndin~ requirement in ~rmored comb<l.t. Tho severity of fight­
ing~ anomy rosist~nce. difficult <l.nd oXCOSSiVB hllrdship. ro­
suIting from tho wO'lthl)r <;;nd clim<:t9 fl.ll imposod fl. necossity
for ~ high'Jr st~n11rd of rnsponsibility Jlnd co~qnd ~bility
thlln evor bofore.

The commllnder must uso avory mOllns <l.v<l.il<l.blo to control the oper<l.tion

;ho oloments of his comm<l.nd. Tho use of mllrch objectives is one method of

coordin'lting tho movamont of his unit. Thnrofore. when thAr'3 I1r0 wull

rocognizJlblo t'1rr<l.in fO'1tures suit,::bly loc>:t'9d qlone: th'3 solocted routos of

'ldvnncc ~ it is ~ldvis'1blG t('l d'Jsign'1tn. thlJse torrl1in fe::::turos ~s TIJ."rch ob­

.ioct:lvo s.

wbonovor conditi~ns porm;t. In this m~nnor tho commqndor r8tqins wlch of tho

cC'ntrol tb'1t WO'Jld 0rdjn'lrily be lost b'3C'1llse of tho difficult t"lrrl'_lin.

Socurity in mount~in comb'1t is I1n 0~r present problom. Lone columns

moving 'llon~ <; sinf'"lo route of 'lppr08ch g:brA thp on'1my qn opportunity to

strike tho fl'1nks of 'In ~dv~ncin~ forco. Cross corridors provido oxcollont

~vonu(JS of Ilppro'1ch on the flr.mks <',nd br0k'on tarr;: in plrmits m$lximum CO'TCr

- ~ concof).lment. Ambushos clln b'3 propl1rcd in d'1filos with ell-1SG. To offsl3t

39

 the dofonde~'s ~dv~nt~~o in this respqet tho qttn.cker usuqlly sends p~trols

",-- high ground to srjcure tho '1dwlUce of his m'lin body.•

T"lnks should be protected in p'lssing throu~h dofiles,

On Mfly 20-31. 1944" one pl'1toon of lilrht tqnks oporqtine: with

tho 4th Division Mountl1in MorocMn (French) WtlS sPMrhep,ding "In
ndv'1nce throu,:rh mount"! ins. M'1neU'T'3r W'1 s impos s ib hl <IUd the roqd
h'1d nun;'3T'OUS blown bridge s. When '1nt i t'1 n'k' fire W'1S 1""3 co i ,rod or
when the column encountered blown bridges, the column W'1S forced
to h'11t until the inf~ntry moved <l.he'1d to dd"'O qwt>,.y <l.ntit"lnk
e:uns or CO'TElr the engine~rs rep"liring the rOl3.d. As "l result the
column moved no f<l.ster th"ln the infl3.ntrv could "ldv"lnce: in f"lct.,
sloWBr, since time ~s consumed in reor~"lnizing the column qnd
sending: th'3 t~nks Ilhe"ld. Two t"lnks were destroyed by encounter­
ine: the enemy in defiles wjthout inf"lntry su"'port. It would
hIll ve seemed perfer"lb le to h"l,rEl sent "l co,rerinl!." force of dismount ...
ed inf"lntry "lho'1d of the t~nks. qS in overy C"lse, inf"lntry h,.,d to
oome up" n.nyw,.,y. with <l. consequent loss of time. HOWBvsr.,.,t no
time WIllS inf,.,ntry design8ted to cle"ll" the routes, excl~t when I
emph"ltic"llly requested infn.ntry support qt CARPINGTO.

Air support is usoful to the '1tt"lc'k'ar "IS "l mcqns of extending his

reconn'1iss'1nce. "lS WBll "IS for 'ltt"lck of Gnemy lin"Js of communic~tion. Its

"""---'101" W'lS first demonstr"lted to Am-o;ric"n troops in tho Tunisiqn C'1mp'1ie:n. A

urief sumrnl3.ry of the highlie:hts of these €l'1rly "lir operl'ltions mqy serve to

brinl!." out the strong points "IS well ~s the limit,.,tions of this qrm.

In Fobru"lry of 1943. Amoricqn Ground 'Forces were generqlly stopped by

enemy control of th':3 mountq ins which run rou/l:hly north 'lnd south in Tunis ill.

Elements of the 1st Armored Dbrision were I3.t SIDI BOU ZID. fl3.oing "I high w~ll

of mount~ihs, defended by the anomy who prevented qny qttempt "It ground recon­

nl'l.iss"lnce. vVh'1t lily behind th'1t w'111 Wfl.S of" prime imnort'1nce, but onlY'1ir

reconnp.iss"lnce would Bob 6 th0 riddle.

T
However. no such support W'3.S 1'.Ivail~blo.

becqus€l our Air Corus wqs still strul!."gling with bqd we~ther ~nd limited ~ir-

fie Ids. Most q irfie Ids were b!3.ck on the oomp~rqt i ve ly leve 1 ground f$.r to tho

west. This in~rolvod much flight. shl;!rply limitine: qv~il"lble time over the '1reqs

of conflict. Air supr€lmA.cy hl'ld not yet been '1chie~red "lnd no photo roconnl;! iss'1nce
",-­

40
•

 lOS l.vorc '"'T8.il8.blo to pierce the b"lrrier. F"lst fighter phlTIcs c01-11(1 see

nothing in the< brok-en terr~in. As ~l result, the Germqn p..ttp.ck through FAID

PASS W8S q completo surprise. By 16 Febru8.ry they hqd pushed '''lS f8.r WEl~t ~s

KASSERIN~ PASS, qnd penetrqted it~ "ltt"lcking: in the direction of THALA 8.nd

TEBESSA. Thon the 1·vel",ther clor,r£ld, "nd more flir support beCIll11El "l'T<l.il<iblo for

direct ~ttllck ~nd successive fightor-bomber missions WElre flown on K~SSERINE

Pl:.SS throup::h which 1111 Germqn suppliA.s tr'1'tT131od. This thre8.t to his supply,

couplod with tho strength of th~l ground countBr!lttl1ck W".S instrument"ll in

forcing: Rom1"ol to withdrl"l.w. 19

Tho probloTPs of providh,!?: flir sup"'lirt by ID"l.ior ",ir force units were

r'~flectfJd in the difficulties f",cjnc: th'3 opor'ltion of e,ren the sm"lllest Ilir­

cr,dt. An Artillery Officer in It 0 ,ly exphined.

Air strips WElre difficult to loc",to close to the frontline

':;roops due to the restricted terr~in. There WElre times thqt the

"ir strip h'id to be locl1.ted 40 miles to the reJir, where ever

sufficient level ground could be found. With the dist~nces in­

V01-':1Od between tre front p,nd the '1ir strip .. there were times

when the front b~d c 1et'lr l!'l'.'l8.ther but the strip wqs fogp:ed in.

And 8.g8.in when the W88.tber over the Bjrstrip might be cleBr,

while the <;IiI' over the front b~d r13.1n or fog. As B. result, con­

tinuous 'iiI' cover W!3.S hl3.rd tc· ,,'et.

It \~s found through oper~tions th~t the L-4's were of

limited use in these 8,r':)8.S. ~fuere hrp':6 distB.TIces froTP the 8.ir­

strip to the front wer', irnrol,red much difficulty W'1S experienced

due to the limited g'3.S c8.p"lcity of the phne. For tr.is rG'1son,

L-5's with their ~re~ter ~~s CBp8.city were found more suitB.hlo

for this type of oper8.tion. 20

The logistic",l support of J)ny unit l')d"ITpnc j ne:: in mount"" ins will h'1'tr0

to be phnned on the b~sis of supply for numerous sm"lll columns 8.dv':.lTIcing

8.long widely sop8.r8.ted I1xes. One solution is offored by the experience of

the Service Comp~ny of the 775th T8.nk B8.tb.l:ion in the PB.cific Theqter.

The comp'1ny W8.S diyided six Wlys to furnish trucks for sup­

plies, '1IDrmmition .. 8.nd g8.so1ine to 8.11 comb'1t elements. The

r8.nsport,:;tion pl8.toon sent dr:i1r':Hs 'md trucks to h8.ndle thD

42
r i
I
 o

L! )T_,,'''''I'I T .... T
o

 --~,----

supply requiremants of the compqnios.. The motor rna int~nqnce

)l8.toon w~s ~lso dividod into ~roups which were on c~11 'lnd

~re frequ e ntly sent out whene~r hi~her eche Ion m~intenqnce

work WrtS requirod. The job w,:;.s m 11 done J3.S evidenced by the

fnet th'lt Service Compnny WqS qWl';.rded the Meritorious Service

Pl~que • • • for their effici~ncy in the Luzon Cqmpaign. 2l

Undo.r s~cial cold WG'lther conditions which were of'ton found in moun­

t<).ins~ such 8.S the GorYl\1lns met 'o n the Russian Front. snow fonces h'ld to be

built 'llong the supply routes on both sidos of the rOJ3.ds since frequent storms

blew ~~y IDJ3.ny d13.Ys work in q fow minutes. In the be~innin~, troops built the

f e nces too close to the rOtld. They Sh01lld be set "lbout ten metlJrs from tho

. ro<).d. Even when qn 'lrmy w~s equipped with tho best vehicles the delivering

of moSSq~OS ~nd supplies ~s impossible without the use of horses and sleighs

whon snow W8.S over 18 inchos deep. Tqnk units hp,d to roly p~rtly on the use

of horsos ~nd sleighs for their supplies. Two r08.ds were used, one for horses

one for vohicles. Germ~n supply rout e s hqd to be s ~ cured J3.t 8.11 times

uso Russit),n ski p8.trols frequently would mine th~ supply rO'lds. 22

M<).into~nce support, too, will bo vory difficult bocquso of the dis­

•
porsion fqetor. In ono 0'1S0, "1 t8.nk b<ltttllion in Itqly sont the bulk of its

ID'1intonqnce support <).long tho main <).xis of '1dv'1nce. E8.ch small group had ono

mechqnic qtt'1ched, with tho mission of milking t),ny imroQdic.te rep'1irs which

woro within his cap,:;.bilities. Whore tho vohiclo rep<:lir ~s boyond his

CF.l.pllbilitios, it WI'lS loft en th9 13.xis until the Ul'lintnw.nco could o"f\eullto it • .

Other units. using only three 'lXOS, found it possibll3 to qtt'1ch F.l.dditionql

maintont),nco personnel from 8.n ordn'lnce ~aint e n8.nce plqtoon to ollch column.

comp~ny in support of ~ c0mb~t oommqnd seldom functioned ~8 ~ unit. Frequent­

ly. pl~toon-sized instqllqtions b0cPIDe tho rulo. 23

44
 The problems of communic ~ tion5 in mountqins hqve qlreqdy been dis­

cussed in some detqil. They do not differ m~teri<llly for the J'ltt8ock. The

s80me terrqin limitqttons on r8odio trJ'lUsmission, I9spoci"llly Frequency

Modul<1tod, Ilpply. These fA.ctors phce ".I speci80l promium upon wire communicq­

tions or rlldio relqy. In one cqse, the 1st Armored Division oper'l.tinl1: in the

Apennines, ws;IS providod with pil1:eons from the Corp's loft, in order to keep in

touch with hil1:hor heqdqu'l.rtl9rs under qny qnd ".Ill conditions. 24

Slowly 8odY8oncing units frequently found th"lt the use of wire com­

munic<ltions in mountqins offered th e most reli"lblo IDe <lnS of communic"ltions.

The technique employed Wo.s to follow mq.ior qdv"lncing units with wire. As soon

"l S the unit WBS h80lted for I3.n q ppreciqble period of time, the wire 80rrived

~nd communicqtions w~s ostqblished.

A Field Artill ~ ry bqtt ~ lion oxocutivo officer commented on his ex-

r-oL'ience in keeping conmrunic <t tions functioning in th'3 It"llinn mount'lins:

The 125th Field Artillery B'lttqlion depended prirnl3.rily on

r '\d io for communic <)t ions. The difficult t e rrl'l in pre cluded 113.yilll1:

wirl9 in ml'\ny C"lses. ~p distrmces would show two miles to "l unit

'l.nd ground distqnce would frequently b e six to eight miles.

Rqdio communicqtions with SCR 610 WDS qlw'l.Ys good but gener<ll­

ly r e quired '1 r o l"lY stqtion. Relqy stqtiolls were qlWP.Ys locqted

on high e; round neqr th e fire direction cent') r <lnd W"lS frequently

c onne cted to the fire direction cente r by t e l e phone. Forwq rd

Ohsenre rs could usulllly c ommuni c ~ te one W'ly with tho fire direc­

tion cente r; th <lt is~ they c0uJd send or recei"e without r 9 1qy.

This cut down on r0113.Y tr q ffic. 25

Problems

"Impqsstlble torr <dn" qlw"lVs h"ls been th e nightmqre of the .bmker. Any

"ltt"lckor must expe ct to be fqcod with such terrqin ~t some time. Frequently~

movinl1: "l t'l.nk l.nto "irnpqss "l ble terrq inti wi 11 necess it~te A. tromendous qmount

of l qbor. The cotl'm£J.nde r must r oq lize th<lt th e presence of his t'l.nks beyond

r terr'l.in b'l.rrier will exort 'l. conside r 'l. blo effect in lowerilll1: the €lnemy1s

45

.J

1" ... ~
 ity to resist lind in r~ising the mor~le of our own troops.

Often. 11 B ine:le t"lnk "lppep..rine: in difficult country in 11 pl~ce which

the enemy considered "impassllble" c'lused mJiny cJisu"llties. The enemy is

usu'lllycounting: on this terr"lin obsblcle to ~up.rd his flllnk. "lnd probp.bly

will not be in q protective position to me~t · the Iltt"lck. The result is to

" .. . • d'3mor<J.l ize the enemy to Iln extent 1111 out of proportion to the

trouble it took in i!:0ttine: "1n improved route there." 26

When Comb"lt Com~nd B of the 1st Armored Division ~s p.mbushed on the (

ro~d to MASSA MARITTEMA, It"lly, it sent out 11 smllll det~chment in "I wide

flqnking: "tt"lck" ovor fl stTl"lll tr"lil. It succe'3ded becJiuse " • • • "1i!:"in the

GermJlns h"ld relied upon 'imPllss <:ble' terrllin to protect their fhnk." At

y were not Tr.lltll'llly supporting.

The question frequently "rose. "W"IS it worth the trouble Ilnd delllY
.- ' .

to t'11ro the t'lnks with ynu in tho "Itt"lck?" The 'lnswor wn.s n.lW'":ys, "Yes,"
-""­
- :.;->ao".­

boc <:\ us o of thoir shock effect on the enemy whic'n w<\s multipliod by their

unexpoctod '1 ppo~rqnce.

The TllEHSUres neCQSS '1 r -'r tn brjn£r tqr..ks 'lcross t'3rrl1 in ohst~' cl f3 s W'3ro

numerous Pond loni!:thy. I n ono C'1S0 ~ 11 ST':'1l1l t<J.sk force of Comb<!t Comrn'lnd B,

1st Armor e d Dhrision. W'lS movj r-,C!: north t0w'lrd VOLTERRA, It'lly. The 'lxis of

"Idvn.nco ~. s throuE:h wry difficult t o rr<J. )n . <J.nd voh:ic10s "1l3rn. forcod to

t!10,re S inl1:10 fi Ie <\ 101111: tho one rO'1 d le<\d ine: north.

In spots the tr n. i1 W'1 S so rn.strictod th<J.t jt bec'lnJO necoss'lry

to use picks '1U d sho'wJls to die: down the br.nks "llone:sido th e

trllil bn.fore thA tp.~ks could pro~ross.27

T1:e fqllflcy 0f the 11 impqss~ble tert·~ jn" W'":S exposed in "Inother cqse

41
 ;f.lnk f).ction by the 1st Armore d Divis ion • .

The t~nks (1st Armored Division) ~de their p.ttqck through

the CASTA MOllNTAINS. The Germ~ns employed II bqttsllion of Mnrk
IV t~nks ~nd q b~ttqlion of 50 ~rk VI Tiger T~nks r.nd th e 162
Infqrtry Di1rision. reinforced with self propelled l1:uns. Tho
most 11:1~ring: error tho Germl'\l1s mnde in thlJ ir de fonso WqS tho ir
r(.)li'11~CO on qpoqrElntly it:1pt.l.ss"lhle tort'''lin for fhnk protection.
R'lpo'1tadly thoy 113 ft ~ fhnk ungu<lrded only to disc0170r too
hte th'l.t 3 . comp'lny of M-4's W'lS sittjng on tho im~ss"lblo
~!r 'l. in. In tho c"lpturo of ROCCASTRADA. hC'1~rily minod hill
town in th '3 Comb-:: t Commllnd A s0ctor" ~ tt.lsk forco W'1S sent up
High~y 73" f.l two-l'lno ro~d tht.lt confinod tho column ri~idly
to f.l ~rch column fot't'ltion. Tho sm'lll Gormlln g'lrrison in tho
tOVIl1 h'ld no difficulty stopping th~ 'lrmorod forco, which could
o::lploy only '1 tf.l~k 0r tW0 0. t ~ timo. Hovre1~r. tho Comb'lt
CO~llnd COnmJ'1ndcr quickly sent !>. second t'lsk forca ."round to
the loft. A f'lint trdl" which showod on th e "ll)rllll photo­
grllphs, l a d north P'lst ROCCASTRADA" 'lnd intersocted Highw~y 73
'lR; ~ in 'lbov'3 the town. Tho trll ll Wf', S so nllrrow" rocky. stoep
'1nd twisto d th'lt tho Go rm'l ns lV1d not oven bothe red to mine it.
Tho rout o \'fOU Id h'lv(} boen difficult oven fnr 'l mule" but tho
t'lnks m'ln'l go d to worry th 0 ir W'l.y through.. • ~ The Germllns
wero forced to o VB.cunte their position with ho'lVY cllsu'llti'3s. 28

Sinco the k()y terr<liD f'J fJ tur(l s in IDClunt f! ins r:.r'1 primllrily i !l f'lntry

ob.;octive s th'J routo of th'3 p. ttflcking force will t:orm'llly b o 'I lone: ride::e

linos or other elov~t()d tnrr ~jn whcr(l they D IlY gllin t'lctic~l surprise Ilnd

whoro they m~y /).~roid th 'J costly losses \~ suI111y involved in '1n Ilttllck whore

th o IldYllnt"l gc of ons 'H"vp.tion is poss '3 ssod by th 'l defender. To p~llce tho

~"lnks on the ridge lino s whore thoy mAY closely support the p. tt"lck requir0s

/). e:rellt dOl>, l of work in prepllrine: c01 Tored tr~ils. 'md in m~dntf\ining the so

must be pll rt of 'lny forc o opor~ ti ng j n mount'linous t'Jrrdn. An officor of

tho 760th Tflnk B<:\ tt ".lion r e l'ltL'g his o xperienc0S :in thF3 MOUNT BELVEDERE

/). tt~ck in Itllly st p. tod th ll t Engino'3rs '1 r') fJ must jn mountllins for cloqrin~

numerous obstqcles. The y should b e pllrcelec out to tqnv units 'lS low IlS

----toon • . tngino o rs 11 1s0 f'lcilit8.ted th'J flow ~nd mo"u mAnt of supplies. 29

48

 The use of ~rmor in the ~tt~ck of SAN PIETRO, It~ly from the south

presented special problems. It ~s hoped th~t armor would ~et throu~h the

formid<ible defenses 'md cle<ir the ~y for the inflmtry. However. even if

there h<id been no enemy opposition, the terrain itself would h~ve been ~l-

most imp'lss'lhle for cross country movement of ~nnor • . First pl'lns c~lled for

Comp'lny A, 752d T'lnk B~ttalion. to move with the 143d Regiment along the
... _.-
",,--,_

SMJiMURCO slopes, well ab01Te the SAN PIETRO-VENAFRO road. The ground on either

side of the narrow rO'ld ~s ~ series of rock-~lled terraces, three to seven

fe0t high, covered with olive trees Ilnd scrub ~rowth lind broken by stream

beds, gullies, p.nd other irre~ul~rities.

One 'lttsmpt w~s m'lde to get th8 tqnks high up on the slopes so that

they could move forvrard to ~ttqck alon/t the upper terr'lces, PIiSS throu~h our

~-w.,.rd positions. Ilnd drop down from one terrllce to th0 next. The lllth

J.:Jagineers broke down terrf'lce Wl'1l1s to mllke 'l trl'1il up to the commllnd post of

the 3d B'ltta1ion, 143d Inf<intry Regiment. On 12 Docember 1943 when q tank

of Company A, 753d Tqnk Bl:lttqlion, tried out this route, it cOllld ~'3t only

'is f'l.r 'lS the second terrf'lce. Rep3s:lt 3d l'1ttempts to overcome the mud fmd the
f

~rllde r e sll1t0d only in the t'lnk" throwing its tr'lck. However, this oper'ltion

ShOW0d th'lt "wen with hllrd work by supportin~ engineers thf3 t.mk could not

mq ,k e Hs p'lss'l.ge, to go into th ':1 "lttf'lck.

The diversity qnd extent of eTlj!:ineer support is refloct'3d in tho

following compilf'ltion of work accomp1ish0d by the 16th Armored Engineer

B'lttalion, 1st Armored Division:

In a 21-dqy period, this bqtt'llion constrtlctf'ld 37 trB'ldway

bridg:lJ s, repllir'3d 12 bridgIJs, surf'lced F.lie:ht mt'l .ior fords, 'lnd gr"ld­

ed 150 miles of by-pllss roqds. 30

The problems of fire control Ilre much more difficult in mountllins.

49
 ~Ktith
';)6.
•• -
,

Fler / 0
\( l'\o.P
• 1
(
CI • A1" ,..t"'l

•
 ;, or inf~ntry. As ~ consoquence, nul' ~rtillory fir~s WBro P.t pnint t~r­

~ets r'1th'1r th'1n "It I;l.re"ls. Th3 torr<tin further derr"lncs "l. considerSlble in­

cr0'1S0 in tho ~mourrt of high '1n~lo firq duo to tho defill'.dec positi 0 ns of

both gun "l.nd t~r~Gt.

Tho prohloms of forw!>.rd 0bseriT"lrs lik-awls!'! wor"l complic~,tad by tho

difficult tcrr<tin. A hif2:her porcent~Hl:O (1f "lost" rounds W'1S experienced,

oven whor<3 thn q rtillory ~s firine: "l.t t:l. st~ti('\n"J,ry t~r"-0t. v¥hen thIJ t'lrJ:!:ot

W"lS moving over r('lugh ~round" ('11' "lI'h0re tho ~1'tj 110ry ~s firing in support
'''''''''

in mount<l ins "!.r'3 forced tl"l follow 8. wind i nj;t pqth, wit1-, C0nstqnt chl1ng:os in

dir<:lctions "Ind "Iltitude .. which complic'ltes comput"tion of support firos.

Consider for oX'1mple" tho prob10ms of tho officer who prep~rod firi~ d~t~

,.--.., support of troops <ttt">cking MONTE CASSINO ABBEY, in It'11y. By 6 Fobru<try

~~44, United Stqtes troops h~d pro~rossed qS f"l.r "l.S tho GARIGLIANO RI\~R ~nd

hr;l.d so izod h'11f 0f tho t ovm of Cl.SS HJO. Furthor pro£,:ress WI'.S h10cked by

enemy cl'\ntrol of th0 MONTE CASSIlW 1.BBEY, sited on fl hill m<tss some 500 motors

qbc'vo the v'llicy. Our forces, th'Jref0ro" executed !3.n encircling: T'1o~rE)ment,

precoded by succ0ssi'~ b~tt"l.lion concontr'ltions of qrtillory. Those conC0n­

tr<l.tinns wer:') phnned tC' follow '1 spir'll Pith" risin!<: il" elo1T"l.tion from 35 to

517 r:l0tors <l.nct with 11 ch<inge sO'Cewhere 'llong th'9 rO<l.d wherAby tho rie:ht k!un

W<l.S firing tho left portion of th0 concentr<l.tion. (See skotch ID<l.p. Figure 16)

ThE) <:0mput"l.tions, which took five d",ys to complete, m"lY well S'3r1TO 11.8 eloquent

testimony t('l the d i fficultios "f fire oontrol in mount'l inDus torr"'! in.

Sm~ll tl1.sk forco,sep<J.r",ted fr'0t:J th'3 1i1f'l.jn body" fr"3Quentlyw13re forced

~ rely upon their own reS01lrCes in <ill types of situ~ti('lns. Bec~usc of this

51

sopl3.rl3.tion from th0 ml3.in body" C;"IT(ln th8 sU1l3.llest t'3.sk force 1I'l"J.s coltlpased of
~
'lT6rql diff"Jrent typos of'troops.
Inf<l.ntry 'IIVl'lS essent::1."J.l to the successful

oporl3.tion of 13.11 tl3.nk unite.

Tho 755th Tl3.nk B",tt"l lion, for eXl1mple. found thf.lt f'l. comp"lrA.ti,re ly

l~rge nmount of ihf'3.ntry WI18 required. In the oporl1tion tow'3.rd TERELLE,

It13.1y it WIl8 11 C"lSO of too much !'.Irmor confined to the rO<l.d, "J.nd too few in:­

f"J.ntrYltlen O"\Ter '1 wido <),1'01). Consnquontly, th'3 t"J.t'lK-S wore requirod to pro..

"Tide their own security whioh roduced thom to th~ role of defensbro slow-

moving pillboxes.

An officor from this b<l.ttl1lion m'3.de the stl3.tement:

It h'3.s been demonstr'3.tod in every "J.ction th"J.t inf"J.ntrv support

is indispons"J.ble to tqnk "J.ction in U1ountl3.in fi~hting. The inf~ntry
must I3.dVl'\nce close to tho tllnks so th"J.t the fire of the enemy
m<l.chine guns will disclose their positions I3.nd then p8rmit the t"J.nK-s
to loc"J.tc their fire on these positions. If the inf"J.ntry does not
"J.coomp"J.ny the t"l.nks, the cnomy p~rmits the t"J.nks to t:ld"T"J.IlCe without
being fired on .. "ind when th0 inft:lt'ltry comes within r"l.ngG. the
U1Rohine e:11nS fire on thom f.lnd pin them to th"l ground. Tho tl3.nk-s
hl1,re thon I1dvqnced beyond those U1"J.chinl3 l1.'uns <at'ld in most insbmces
oqnnot turn <around "lnd fire on theUl beC"J.use of the n"J.rrow. winding
ro~ds they "Ire opor'3.ting on in Ulount"J.inous ~re"J.s.3l

In other bl!itt'3.lions thr; doctriW WI1S thl!it. "In mountqinous fighting

tho priml!iry mission of the) t~ml<s WIlS clO'se support of inf"J.ntry by C'lnnon l!ind

mt.\chine /1:un firo. 1I Tl'l.nl<s would stqy wi~h inf'3.ntry. Either t<:lnks or infqntry

might le'3.d, but sufficient distqnce WIlS ID'3.intt.\ined between these elemonts th"lt

l!in I'trtiller,,. concentro:!.tion on tho t'3.nks would not strike th9 inf"J.ntrY. The

inf"l.ntrv el"ment WqS essenti'3.l in reTI'ovint:: the ml3.in obst~cle to tt:lnlr 8.dVl3.nce

in mount!3.ins. the f'l.ntitt.\nk guns" These guns. situo:!.ted on the fl"l.nks to cO"lrer

Jl sm"lll stretch· of rO'3.d, wore afton difficult to discover. G"'~n "l.fter they

opened firo. To combl!it those /tuns, inf"l.ntry hl!id to l'Jo:!."re the r()l3.d. f'l.nd <\d­

V'3.nce "l.lone: tho rid/tos. Tf'l.nks used se"lT6r"J.l rounds of smoke fi red in the
~

52
~
rs:l.l direction of the 'mtit~nk gun, to permit th"l infp.ntry tn g:0t by the

interdicted spot on the rOJld.

Armored units in mount~inous t~rrp.in f~ce ~ discourq~in~ prospect of

one d"l.mned mountqin lI.·fter I3.nother. The b,ck of' spectll'lculqr pro~r()ss .. the
1I
Il

mud r"l.in , ~!1ow .. or wind.. tho perpetu~l slopes ""nd rocks .. t>nd the lqck of <:\ny
_J •

l<:\r~e to\vns for ~dOqU"l.t6 shelter .. ~ll h~ve ~ serious effect upon mor~lo. A

d ivis ion comm$?ndor wrote:

Too ~ny unit cOIDrn<:\nders expect to fi~ht b~ttl()s under ide"l.l

conditi0ns. When they find th<it conditions ~ro otherwise .. they
tond to fDa:}, j;;hl}~ _tho,ir.-Unit~L.llrfiLJ:lelp1oss. CnT:'1l7ll3.nders of tS1n1<s
'1;-d oth;;r~ c0I:lplllin thllt they liro unl1ble"to employ thoir units
qccordin~ to tho best t"l.cticp.l principles. This ~~y be truo .. but
tho commndcrs should undorst,"nd thS1t ided t~cticp.l cf"nditjrns
"l""ro seld0m rOtJ.lf?;ed in b",ttle. They must le<:lrn to rogf\rd cortliin
hl'lndic<ips "ts hqint!: entirely n0rtnl3.l. Ag:Slin most officers of
~rmored units contGmpl~to thoir use under conditions of 13. brel3.k­
thr0ugh. This .. of cours t ) .. is tho ide"ll; hrwmror .. the GOrm l3.ns ~re
...-...clevf)r in m":l:intqinine: 1'). continuous front llnd t'lke sooci",l pre­
:l3.utions tf" defend p.1:"Elp.s suit..ble for tqnks. Therefore. the con­
copti(,ln th"l.t t"lnks I3.re tn bo used ('Inly to bre<:lk thr0ue:h does not
fit in with th9 conditJ.('ns "13 they exist. Armor·lTD.lst w(lrk with
inf'lntry <is 'l te"l.m, whether or n(\"t ~ br'3"1kthroue:h is possible. 32

To bre~k tho etern~l monotony. Fifth Army instructed II Corps to:

• • • Rot~te units so ~s to withdr~w ~s m<iny tr00ps ~s possible

to reqr ~rcllS for rest, reequipping, I3.bsorpti(ln of ropll3.cements

~nd tr'linine: • • • Prmrido awry f"lcility for comfort ~nd wolf~re

of troops in rosorve positi0ns in fot"\'{qrd "1re'ls. If pr~ctic"1ble

:cless build im,:s 'lnd he'lv\, tent sloepine: 'lccoIn('ld'lti('lns will b9

utilizod. 33

Those instructions hQd qlrelldy been given vorblllly by the Army Co~ndor who

:WIlS well '"!W"1re ('If thE) full i:r:JPl3.ct of m(\unt·dnollS t'Jrr~it1 upon morl3.la 'lnd

cspoci~lly th~t of ~rmored units.

The followine: historiC'll eX'lmplo is pro sented with the objective of

furnishine: ~ highly r~'llistic SUMm'lry (If the rollin points co~ered in this

c~el". It is boliEnrcd th"l.t this ~ccount of cort"lin "lccomnlishments of Iln

Ih ,'ad unit in comb"lt throue:h mount~ inClus t"lrr'lin botter emphllsizes the

53

 ~A
~3
.
•

,
.-.-.,.
.J
.".---~--..-- .....
i
i
,;•
- ,.
~.

~ . 'oi.•• •~

':.~. . - . . . . . . . :--..-J.L..~~--_

$~
.~'t(:-
,~ __­
" /"<..-,.r---''"'''_.....
-I"
~

..­
eo. •

t~
~3 t""
I'C"!>I
•.. ,~'" 911('"'
I
~
FORCING
~

-­
d Fr . .. " '/ PE

_ _ _ _ TC '. r
THE SAVERNE
t. ~
F I Cr 1/
GAP
q 5

____ 't.ro" . . . t.1' o' a mor:d

.., ..
r ,tn, •
..
--- - - - -
,,­
ti~lity of ~rmor in the ~tt~c~ th~n would ~ mere synopsis of tro, body

of the ch~pt6r.

At the end of October 1944 the Seventh Armv line extended from the

RGNE-IvlARNE CANAL A.t ~ point east of LUNEVILLE, FrA.nce to the foothills of

the Vosges Mount~ins. Tbe SAVERFE PASS divides the Hif!:h Vos'!:es in the s011th

from the Low Vosf!:es in the north. The town of SAVERNE is loc~ted on the

e~stern exit of this pass. The High Vose:es re'1C\'1 elev~tions of o,rer 4000

feet. The Low Vosl<es. thrp)~h lower in elevl'ltion. ~re mot'13 he~vily forested

wHh steeper slopes whicr Dresent ~ mf"!'6 difficult milit~rv obstr:lcle tbm

t\'1e Hif!:h Vosges.

The ~re~ betw'een LUNE1TILLE and the RHINE RIVER consists of distinct

reidons. Between LUNEVILLE and th':l SAFRE RIVER in "l redon of forest !'Ind

l~<;; from SARREBOURG is t:ln open plate~u e~tendine: to the western ede:e of

tL ,AVERNE PASS. The Vos/tes i.V:('IuntJ'dns constitute the next redon. The

western ede:e is shaped lik'e tiers '",hi 16 th"l eastern ':ldf'-fl drops ()ff shArply

to the ALSATIAN PLAIN. The Germl'Jns had constructed a defense Ijne done: the

"''estern foothj lIs and t:lnothAr in the Vosges themselves. The line ~lon/t the

W\"lstern footrills, or the pre-Vosl!"1S ljne. h~d been constructed by GermJln

troops ~nd conscripted hhor. It w'?s coU'pJete with bl3rb"3d vdre "lntp.ngle­

menta. antitBnk ditches 8nd personn81 trenches. The m~in Vosges d"3fense

line consisted of strone: pojnts eyt'3nr'Jinf!: ':110m: the miUt8ry crest. Old

fortific~tions W8re lJtilhf'ld; pntjtCln 1r djtchAs were bl.lilt block'ing the

pr'inciP!'ll j:prenues of ~ppro~ch; <>.nr} Drep"lred mJ3.chine e:un positi("lns" fire '3.nd

communjcqtions trenches were plo:J,C'3d At strqtelZ'ical points. This W'3S the

e:round throue:h which the 2d Fr'3nch ArU'ored Dj,rision of the United Stqtes XV'
,,-­
AI )I'PS W'3.S to ",tt~ck.

55
 The 44th ~nd 79th Infqntry Divisions were to m~ke q bre~kthrou~b of

the ore-Vosges line, supported b:T the 2d French Armored Division. i~hen the

brol'\'kthroue:h h"ld been qccomplish"Hl, the 2d French Armored Divjsion WI':IS to

p~ss throue:h the two infl':lntry divisions qnd secure the 61':1st9rn portion of

the SAVERNE GAP. By the 19th of November the infl':lntry divisions hqd se­

cured '3 brM'kthrou!'.'h in the vicinit-. of CIREY. Though the wel':lther qt this

time WqS bqd, with ~ll the stre~ms in the ~one flooded, the Corps order now

regu ired the 2d French Armored Divis ion to exploit the CIREY bre~kthroue:h.

The 79th Inf'3ntry Dlvisj~n WqS to follow the "Irmor ~nd mop up.

M~.ior G'3nerl'll Philippe Fr"lncois Le Clerc decideCl to employ his

troops in the followi ne.: roonner:

a.) In generl3.l, the l'!dv'3nce w('luld followt'be less frequented routes

t9-1J~h tho Vose:es, north I'lnd sOl:th of the SAVERNE GAP, I3.void jne.: urbl!ln cen­

t"
b.) Smf:lll J;lrmored te",ms WQ1)ld be pushed through the brsl'lkthroul!:h 13.nd

probe for we'3k points. vV'hen one WB-S found, the m~ss of wnnor would be em­

ploved.

scribed.

Durj ne: th9 eqrly £;l ftern~on of the 19th of November, CeL moved out to

UfJ northe'3st froU' the '\dcinitv of CIREY in two t~sk force columns. By 1830

hours on t'be 20th, ono t'1sk force h'3.d reqched Dl',BO. In th"3 l'lte ",fternoon

CCV w<'\s committed to follow thE! 81"1ments of ceL. CCV rolled into thp. VOS!1''3S

in !l. downpour of r"lin "Ind w'ith 15e:ht~ bhzinl!:. CCR wtJ.s selected to protect

tho? Corps rie:ht fhnk., CCD mov'3d jn the left portion of th'3 ~on'3 tJ.nd lld­
~.

,T' north. AgtJ. in 6'3.ch comb"lt cOU1U'qnd WJlS subdj,rided into two tBS1r. forces.

56

~ 9re wet'e now eiltht am'lll teqms mo,rlntt. north '\nd northel'lst otrer unimpro'\ted,

n'l.rrow.- windine:,- 'lnd slippery mountt::lib t~ds~

Alone: every roqd. in I3ddition to their nf'ltur'll difficult tr'l.Verse

~nd the poor we~ther, mt::ln-m'l.de obst'l.cles were encountered time qnd time 'l.e:'l.in~

Ab'l.tis, old forts .. rO'l.d blocks m13.de of lo!':s I'llld cement "It irree:uhr inter v "l1s,_

f) 11 covered by fire it were met !'ind reduced. Althoue-h such obst'l.cles were

frequently bY-p"Issed. mt\ny could not be 'l,roided 13.nd ene:ineers qnd infl3.ntry

troops di rectlv supported bv t'l.nk fire 1111'ere used to red 1 lce them. Adverse

we'l.ther conditions, rl'lin 'l.nd some snow imposed an I3.ddition'l.l hl3.ndic'l.p !'is the

division front'l.l1y left the VosfCes 'l.no dE'lbouched onto the ALSATIAN PLAIN.

Two t'\sk forces h'ld en,reloped the SAVERNE PASS from the north qnd south, while

the southern forces turned north, circled 'l.nd entered the pqSS from the eqst.

Another ~tttlrked the town of SAVERNE from the north. By the 23d of November
.--.
3 key towns of PHALSBOURG qnd SAVERNE hl3.d been reduced.

Twenty-one miles, str'l.ight qcross, hqd been t\dv'l.nced. This W'l.S some-

wh'l.t less th'l.n 'l.rU10r W"lS in the h'l.bit of 'l.d~Tp,ncin[!' durintr the summer rf.' 1944;

throue-h tre'l.cherous mount'l.ins. The 'l.ctu'l.l dist'l.nce tr'l.veled W'l.S much p.:re'l.ter

th'l.n twenty-one miles. H'l.d 'l. unit other th"ln "lrmor 'l.tt.empted this 'l.tt'l.ck, with­

out the speed qnd fire power of I'l.rmor. it is doubtful thqt the SAV"ERNE PASS

would h'l.ve been reduced in triple the time it took the 2d French Armored Divi­

sion. On the other h'l.nd, the 2d French A~ored Division would h'l.V6 been

dehved considor"lhlv hqd they not been s')pported hy infl3.ntry.

The XV Corps h'l.d been opposed hv units of the 21st P'l.nzer Lehr Divi­

~. 25th P"'n'!:er Grenf:ldier Di,7ision, 130th pqnzer Lehr Division., 245th Inf'l.n­
• i . (

~ - Divis ion, 25~th Infl'1ntrv D1 vIs ion, 361st InfJlntry Di~is ion. 553d Inf"intlll'Y
57

"..-­
1 ion, t3.nd the 708th Inffintry Division in the fidVlmce I':IOross the VOSlS9S

to the b<mks of the REnTE RIVER. The Mtion across the Vosges to the Rhine

WfiS 113 d by the 2d French Armored Djviston. Even the shfirp slopes, forested

bills, steep cliffs in th~ Vosges rp.nge of mount~ins proved to be ~o unsur­

mount"!.b 1e obst")c le for armor in th'J exploitfition under the 'fIorst 11,119pther con-

d J' t ' .ln mlOIny va" rs. '34

lons

NOTES FOR CRAPI'ER 3

lilT he Gothio Line", Fifth Army History, Vol VII (Wl'lshington: Govern­
ment Print in~ Office). p 7.

2Field Service Ref!:uhtions, FM 100.. 5 (7ft3.shin/!ton: GOV'3rnment Print­

ing office, 1949), PJir~gr~ph 836.

3Lt Generfi1 Kfisilowitoh, "Mountl3.inous Terr"lin in Generfi1", The

Milit"lry Review Vol 24 No.6 (June 1944) p 72 "lnd 73. (Origin~lly printed in
Fr~tl7lr, trll.nshted from Russi~n to Frenoh to English)

411Lessons from the Itqli~n Campl'iie;n", TM 2, Hq NATO, P 22.

5M"l,; M T Hunt, "USEI of Armor on Luzon ll , student mono/!r"lph 75 (Ft Knox,

The Armored Sohool 1948), p 11 llnd 12.

6The VYintor Line, Historic"ll Divis ion, U S :Vl3.r Depl'lrt!l1lmt (14 June
1945), p 56.

7After-Action Report, 775th T~nk Bn, Sept 1943 to July 1945, p 7.

8Cl'ipt Neil W Dennjs, "A T"ln'k" COlPPl3.l1Y on O'k"in"lw"l", student mono~rqph

103 (Ft Knox: The Armored School, 1948), p 9 and 10.

9K"lsi1owitch. op cit, p 4.

10Bri~ Gen T J C"lmp, T~nkers in Tunisil'i (Ft Knox: Hq The Armored

Comm"lnd, 1943), p 6.
11 .
Interrogatlon Report 34, 7707 Mis, MIS CE}ITER (4 M"lrch 1947), p 20.
12
After-Action Report 44th Tl1nk Bn, December 1944, p 14.

~ 13After_~ction Report, 757th Tl3.nk Bn, July 1944, p 1.

14After.Action Report, 2nd ~rmored Group, July 1944.

58
 15Milit l'lry Reports on the United Nlltions Vol 12, WilD, Wl'lr DepA.rtment
(1843). p 10.
16After-Action Report, 1st Armored Division, 21 J une 1944 to 6 J u 1Y
1944, El'lssim
17"L0860ns froln the It!3.liSln C13.mp13.i~nn, TAil 3, Rq NATO. 12 lVp>.rch 1944,
p 29.

18After_Action Report, 756th Tl'lnk Bn, ~y 1944, P 5.

19lnterview, Cl'lpt H Simpson, Armored Officers Advp.nced Cl~ss, 1949-50,

The Armor~d School, Ft Knox, Ky.
20Intervlew, Lt Col W J Lind, former Executive Officer l'lnd S-3 of 125th
FA BN (L), 34th Infantry Divis ion.
21775th T'lnk Bn, oJ? cit, pl'J.ssim.
22Extrlicts from Interrogl3.tion Report 34, },J:S Center, Mp.rch 1947,
pl3.ssim.
23Interview, Cl'lpt Rl3.1ph N~rdlow, Instructor, Automotive Dep~rtment,
The Armored School, Ft Knox, Ky.
r­
24Interview, Cl'lpt Kenneth L Thompson, Communjcatjons D9pl'lrtment, The
A...Jored School, Ft Knox, Ky.

25 L 1n
" d, 01' C1"t •

26 M,ilitary Repox:ts on th9 United NA.t ions Vol 22, ,MID, W'l'lr Depl'lrtment
(1944 ) p 16.

27After-Action Report, 13th Armored Regiment, ~~y 1943, pl3.ssim.

28Lt Col R K Gottschl'lll, nlVlount~in GOl3.t M4", The Cavalry Journ'i1, Vol
LIV No.1 (Jan-Feb 1945), p 29.

29C"lDt Robert F Ivioore, "The Employment of Tl'ln1rs in the Mountains",

student monogrqph 55 (Ft Knox, The Armored School 1944), p 2.
.~- t l'llnS
30 tlMud , ~~un . l'lnd Armor,
II
rGpor t of Commlttee 17 ( Ft Knox, The
Armored School 1949), p 53 lind 54.
31 '
After-Action Report, 755th T~nk Bn, Februl'lry 1944, p 9.
32M~.; G61n Fred L VfSllker, The fh.dling List Vol XXVIII, The Infantry
School (July 1944), p B.

",-- 35Ltr Hq Fifth Army, Sub.iect: Current Oper"ltions, To CG II, IV, XIII
J, 6th South African Armored DiviSion, and 92nd Infl3.ntry Division, file

59
 2-Y2, No"'{rember 1944.

340per~tions Report, Seventh United St~tes Army, Vol II, 1944-1945,

P 397 I:md 412.

60

CHAPI'ER 4

DEFENSE

Speoiel Consider~tions

The cl~ssic story of the defense of ~ mount~in P'lSS, tbe Bqttle of

l'h'3rmopyl~e. conbdns severl'll eleroonts which '3.r0 still worthy of considerlition

in "l.ny study ef modern defensive methods in mount~jnous wqrf~re,

The D~sic outline of the o0fense ~t THERMOFYLAE is simple: The p~ss

WBS loc!"lted on the slopes of MOU1lT OETA, in Greece. It held ~ pl:lrttoull3lr

str~te~ic v~lue in history bec~use it w~s the only me~ns by which ~ hostile

Rrmy might penetrp.te from 'northern into southern Greece.

In Aue:ustl' 480 B.C •• Xerxes. rul'3r of the Persi!3.n Empire. inv~d6d

Greece witb I3.n I3.rmy drl'l.wn from "l.11 the peop'les of his r'3Rlm. The Greek"s

~ched THERMOFYLAE before Xerxes <)nd bis "l.T"my ~rrived therel' ~nd S''3t up 13.

c13.1 position gqve the 7000 Greek- defenders of the P"ISS, the 'lpDrotlch to which

W<lS only some 50 feet vfide. l To ridioule them, he sent the Medes '1nd Cissil',ms

'1l"ith instructions to tp"ke them prisonors 'lnd bring: them before him. 1Nben they

were unsuccessful aft".lr Il d~y's fie:ht:ine:. the kine: sent fOI'll'T'lrd his 10.000

"immortB.ls," an elite unit. But they, too, were unsuccessful. Few Greeks

werEl killod, but the Porsil'm losses wero excess:ively S6"1TElre .. The stqlemSlte

WIlS broken when 'l nt.lti,re f<:lmiliqr witl~ the country told Xerxes of q p~thwlOlY

which led "lcross the mount<lin. the llse of 'Nhic h w('!uld en<>,ble his troops to

outfhnk the Greek position. The Persiqns qdvtlnced IOllong: this trl'l.il .. Ilrriving:

in the re~r of the Greek" position soon ~fter middlOlY of the third dqy. Tidin~s

of the qpprol"lchin!1: Pers}llns qlrp.'ldy hr,d heen broug:ht to the Greeks by scouts ..

pl3rmitt:i:re: q withdr"lw1'll of the m"lin body, but thEl 1100 Greeks who rem!'lined

61

were ~lmost ~ll killed. 2

~

In the 2400 ye~rs since Thermopyl~el much new equipment ~nd m~teriel

h"IS b e en de ~~olonAd
v' r-' Howovsr, the chp.r~cter of mount~ihou~ terrqin, ~nd its

effect on def~nsivo oper~tions. rerr.~ins urtcM4~ed despite the de~lopment of

!'1odern ~rtillery~ p.tmor" ".nd I'!.ircr"lft. In mount"lins the defender clln stop

m~n:v I1tt~bks with few troops. The Gertlll'l.n dehying: ..ctions in Sicily I'!.nd

It~ly during: World Wflr II g:"l"l713 ~mple proof th"lt this still holds true todliY.

When Xerxes WqS stopped on the ~in roqd, he wqs forced to outflqnk

tho position by I';l. second~ry rop,d. To judge from its description. this rOlid

would se8m to ri'Q'q I those seC(lndt:lr" routes which United Stqtes units were

forced to use in Itlily, to by-pS'!.ss Germlin def':msjve positions: "This p"lth

"l.scended the jtore:e of the River ASOPUS, qnd the Hill ANOPAE; then pqssed over

tho crest of (MOUNT) OETA • • •"3

~ The defender must block the pqsses ~nd principS'!.1 Ilvenues of "pprol':l.ch.

HO~Jver, he cp.nnot n~g:lect secondqry routes. Those which he cl':l.nnot block by

troops or we .. pons must 'bo CO"lrGroo by obs')rvtltion. Leonjdlls, the Greek

commqndor, ~s "lbla to oxtriCl':l.t8 th~ ml':l.jor portion of his force due to the

f~ct th~t avon the circuitous route pursued by the Persil':l.ns wqs covered by

his scouts, who w~rned him of Xarxos' outflqnki~ mqneuver.

The defendor must hqvo ~ll-~round protoction for his strone: points.

FurthGrmore, th8 mor"llo of th0 defonse £!:~rrison must ~e strong ~n~u~h to with­

st"lnd isollCltion ~nd rcpep.t<ld ~tt"\cks. The im'Port~nco of individulCIl brq"lT"Jry in

this situlCltion is one woro lesson to bo g:"jned fr(l11i history. When tho Grook

forces were undo~ qtt"lC~ frorr both diractions. Xerxes used m~ssed ~rchors -­

~ very effectbro we~pon "I£!:"Iinst his rehtively unprotected opoonents. Wben

one of the Greek dGfendars comphined th~t," "Th", Persil'ln I'lrrows "Ire dlirkening
,~

62
~
. ky," tho Spt:l.rtq,n Dieneces is s~id to h~ve I'J.nswerod, "Good, then wo sh~ll

fi~ht in the sh.de." 4

The lessons of 480 B.C. still hold true. Consider these excerpts

from 'In "lrticle in "Red st"lr/' givl!ll! Russi"ln experience in defensive oper~ ..

tiona in mountqinous terr~in in World W~r II.

In the foothills, which ropresent "l series of low p~r~llel

crosts dissected by vl'l.lleys, tho defense often hl'l.S l'l. dis­

continuous cbl'l.rl'l.ctor bec~uS8 of the isolP.tion of tho sop.rp.te

h,3ights ",nd the limited number of ro~ds ~nd I3.pprMchos from the

r8l'l.r, qnd is dr~wn up on tho principles of defense on • brol'l.d

front. These peculi13.riti0s I3.r~ ~ccentuqted in tho mount13.ins

proper. Hero it is gonGrG.lly impossible to cre.to • continuous

front line. Units Ilnd somotim0s even sm.n e:roups occupy only

the individul'l.l promontories, mountl3.in pI3.SS'3s. roqds, qnd trqils,

forming points qnd centers of resist13.nco. They l'l.re isolp.ted

from one Ilnot'b'3 r c.ud "lequire "l. c"Jrt<> in independence of "lction.

These condjti(lDS Cr0'lte ~ f"l"Clr"tbla situtlti0n for turning Slnd

fl'1nldng t'he d·"fensive units. Turning "Ind flp.nldng "lre fUrther

helped bytht? poor field of vision I1nd th'9 del'l.d spqces.

,~ According t~ tho Ger~n field ml3.nulll, front13.1 I'J.ttp.ck is by

1 me~ns required for seizir~ ~ height or other mount~in po­

ltion. Tho GGrm~ns considor it onough to turn qud flqnk the

height, ~nd their m~nu~l recowmends q br6~k through on ~ nl3.rrow

section of the front.
Dospite those vul~0r",ble flSP')Cts of mountp.in defense, it

Cll!:'. be m~de thoroughly impregn".ble. Comb"lt exporience shows

thflt if the cororr"\nd'3r orgl'l.nizes the def'3nS0 wisely r,nd t<',kes

effoctbre ID3~surGs qg,."inst hostile turning ~nd fl~nking move ...

lL<;nts, "lll the efforts of tb3 enemy to come out on tha fhnk

"Ind ro~r end in fl3.ilur9. Moro01rar, tho flqnking units th"lm­

SfJ Ivos often fSet into I3.n unfA.~rorp..ble s itw'l.tion ~nd t:1'lke the ir

W'1y bllck to tho ir own forces with difficulty.

Thus tho best m0thod of countorllcti('n ~gqinst turnjne: Ilnd

fhnking movements is 13. development of de;fense in depth ~nd
strong security on the fl~nks. Org~nized defense in the moun­
tpins must first of 13.11 t",lrtJ C"1ro to secure the junctions j:md
6specict11y the opon fhmk • • • • This cO"lrering force is dispos­
ed in echo Ion 0n th'1 fl<mlrs fl'1d is in 1riSU<l.1 C01'1lTUnj.c<ltion with
the unit sending it out • • • • For qdequ$J.te security of .iunctions
qnd fl"\nll::s it is "llso necessl'lrv to h<"ve c0ntinuous reconn~issqnce,
rnlinble outposts, obst<lcles on tho open fl<lnks <lnd to thFJ reqr,
corroct dj spos itions of re S';rv'3 s, I'l.nd const",nt comrrunicl'J.tions
with Ildjllcont units.
But thjs still is pot 13.11. No expl"ldients will SIWe the de­

/~nse if it <lcts ir r"l solute lYe P"!SS i,rity 13.nd ,rp,cillqtion in­

it""bly le"d t" loss of th'J initip..tiv6" to th"l movement of the

63
 ens-r
.....1 on th$ flanks and rear , to the disinte~ratjon
of the combat
,
fonnation and finally . to the encirclement of individul'J.I units by
the I:lnemy. Defense in the mount a ins must always be distinguished
by an acti"lTity which includes • • • the forcine: of our will on
tbe enemy. Superior ity in stren~th is not at all necessary for
this. In mountains even such small units as platoons and squads
can perform tasks no~ possible for comoanies and battalions under
ord ina ry cond it ions.

Techniques

Althoul!.h the bas ic cons iderations in de fens bre combl'J.t in mountl':l. ins

are timeless, the development of techniques for the defender has been in­

fluenced 1}v the r'3finement of modern wel'J.pons. The firepower, mobility, and

shock action of armor tH~S h<;,d a profound effect upon the techniques of the

defense. Even wt>ere the defender :is WEll'J.k in armor, he is influenced by the

presence <;,nd probl'\ble emnloyment of enemy armored forces. This will effect

his organization of the terrl'J.in, engineer works, defense of mountain P'lsses,

,-- 'ld observ~tion posts. It influences his mel'J.sures to limit routes of

approach. I'J.S well I'J.S his employment of I'J.rtillery 'l.nd self-propelled I!.uns. In

further pJi:mnine: the defense, considerl'J.tion must be e:i "en to sl)pportinl!' air

'l.nd camoufla.re or concealment from both e:round and air obser'7'l.tion.

Orgl;lniz'l.tion of the terrqin is the key to success in defendin!r a moun­

t'l.in position. The defendin~ forces must correctly I'J.nalyze the routes of

enemy approach 'l.nd or~'l.nize the key terr'l.in features, the control of which

will block the qdvan~e. These criticql terr'l.in features are manned by strone:.

balanced, self.sustaining units ore:'l.nized for <;,ll~around defense. ~trols con­

st'l.ntly explore the balance of the sector to warn the stroTI/!. points of enmll

><roups of enemy 'l.ttemnt :in.,. to f1 Iter throufCh to the rear of the strone: points by

,-J.lnits are often critical points thl'lt require const'l.nt patrollinl!. or

/

64
 I
o~v'1tion to dotoct anomy units r;ttot"'ptinl!. to pJl"i0tr1';te th? def'3ns)ve

p. don.

COYlsid<1rint' tho probhw frC'lT,' the poil1t of ,,('iow <'f the <ltt'lcker r>r;y

help renuc'3 it to tre rniniT!11J'\'!" ess01,tj~ls. '1Vl-t;ln l'lttncldnr.:: " stron!!:l:v held do­

sl'illtul ~pplic"lti0n of the prjncipl1ls of w"-r. Frontl11 A.ttl'lclrs 9.ro by no

;"()~nS the only T"othoa of sehil'1'r Il r,1ount"1jn position .. The onet:ly will un­

doubtodly employ tho n imposs iblo n ~.ppr(\!\ch. The Gorl'1Qns oftrin l'lttomptcd to

fhnk '1nd isobt') tho mount<:in p"'sit:l"rl.s PT'd th'~n would l'ltt'3li'pt ~ brsq'\r­

tl:1rough on " n<J.rrow front.

This is prociso ly how thr::J Gorrr,''ms I;lctulllly did operqte in tho

foothills of tho Northern C"1UC"lsus. They tried to utilize overy

br8l1k in tho dofonsivo systrJrr. I)vr)ry con,renient hidden IlpprOl1ch

",nd difficult pf'lthWllY lOl3.dine: to the fhmlr or rOl'!r of th9 d,"fonso,

in order to outflqnlr qnd sejzo the hGj~hts. Sometiros tho Gorm~ns

~tried to wed!!o t1:let"solvos iY'tn I'lur dofense on "1 YlJJ.rrO'l( sector, en­

:;I;\voring; to 6U1org:e on tho lil'1.GS of c01T'run:ic'ltions "1nd il'1to the

A.1Ioya in ordor to sprc~d thJ EPP ~nd cr~~te ~ thr~~t on the

fll3.nks l'lnd rellr gf

tho units Ciof'Jnding thn f'lll.in positi('ns C'n the
nountqin slopes.

Tho defendire: force whjc'0 relies on lIiT!'pl;\ss~hlo" terr'lin for fl8.1'11:­

security in'ITjtes disPtster. E'lOl, un:it rrust pro~ride 13.11'010 fIqnk security, str ~

tho Approl'l.ch of onOtl1y form~tions, since he trust h~.~ro tirre to shift his ro-

SGr~TGs to moot thJ expected enemy ~tt<>,ck. For this r8p.son it hecor"GS extrome­

ly importqnt to th0 comrrA.nder th~t he set up q ~ood outpost system. Security

elements should be sent out fr0r tl"J outposts with th1') -:-ris,sion of gqinjng con-

t~ct with the enemy llt the groqt'Jst possible distqnce. It is jrlJort"1'1t to
~

65
,,-..
the ~tt~c~er under observ~tion in front of the m~in b~ttle position ~nd

to bring him under fire ~t tho eBrliest possible time.

strong: points form the b"lckbonl3 of ~ defensi"'lTe system in mount~inous

t8rr~in. These strong points ~r~ m~nnod by str~ll units from ~ squ~d to ~

plfltoon in strr:mgth ~nd !Ol.rf3 disposed in width pnd deoth throughnut the

bnttlr:> position. T~nks my be effecttv'31y enployed witl:' the strong: points

with tho mission of ~ntit'lnk ~nd lone: r<lnge fires p.g:qjnst the t:lttJ).ckers. Be­

C8USO of its mobility 1.'1nd DOW'3rf'ul ""rrnt:l.ment" the he"l"'lry tt:l.nl<'" will prob"l,bly be

used to pro'tTide excellent qntitqnk protection for the strone: point. In

mount8.inous terr~in wher') enemy fltt"l,cks cS'J.n be c8n~lized, well trqined tfl.nk

try from th'3ir tJ.rmor find destroy thr) qrIi'or in det'lil" while enf'il~de fire

~hin the defonsive position tl}.k8S C!'J.ro of' the l3.tt<;.cking inf<mtry. Armor

Iso very '3ffectbre Qg:"1inst infqntry ~ttSJ.cking: without 'lTr.1orod support,

~ccompl;).nying: his inff1ntry to tb'"l fil1"\l ob.iectivG.

TBnks used in strong points must be nrotGcte d by inf"lntry ~nd ~n

~doqu'1tG WA rning or s~curity syst'nr. sholl Id b"l El st~blished. An "l.tt"l.cl<" by T~sk

Force Howze of tho 1st Armored Division p~~inst q GGrm'ln stroDe: point shows

th'3 folly of q defender who s0tS up P, tqnk qS q strong point" without the

protoction of inf'~ntryrren or qdQqu~tc ~rning: system. T~s~ Force Howze WqS

op<Jr"lt in!'.: in the center of' tb'9 1st Arncred Divis ion sector during the pursuit

north of' RonE in the SUJ:l'l1'OOr of' 1944'.

The column 17!O''1ed saveri'll r.:ilos over mount<;dnous terr'lin whon suddenly

the Armored "'I7'3hicl r3s found trr:l!.!sc~bres h"l.lted in q .,r8ry d':np r~,rine. (See IDJlp.)

---- tnf~ntry pl~toon sent q p~rty to loo~ qround the bend where the ro~d beg~n

66

 -----u - :­
n ow'.
faC,e,__ _
Ca~, ·
st"*1-~._
a •••

~tv~« I[f ~
.VWt . . . . . . , .-" I~ If

the vicinity of C. From there 'he.was

, ,. •
f

I~
 -curve. The pl3,rty discovorod two Tiger Tl3,nks cov'3ring the rOllo from

positions qbout 200 y~rds beyond the S-curva.

The t~sk force comm~nder m~de immedi~t0 pll3.ns to knock out tho Ti~er

Tl3,nk stron~ point. An inf~ntry pl~toon W"l.S disposed on Point A, extendircg

'3.11'nl1: the hillside to Po:int B, ".s shown on sketch. On ~fgivan sign1'l.l 1'l.n M-10

Tl3.nk DAstroyer Wl3.S to proceod to Pojnt C ~nd fire on the first Tirror Tqnk.

The 1e'3.ding t1'l.nk pl~toon of the c~lumn Wl3.S instructed to send ~ tl3.nk 1'l.round

the bond following the M-10, como up 13.1one:side it, 1'l.nd ong~~o wh~tevor t1'l.r­

gl3t CO') 1d bo found.

A single bl3.zook~ gunnp,r fired the II st-=lrtine: sigIll'll.!! Tho shot W"lS

rDID1'l.rkqb1e in thl3.t the first Tiger Tqnk sust~ined 13. direct hit from 200 Yl3.rds.

Tho round c~usod ~ gro~t dcq1 of confusion but did not ponetrqto the thick

~ of thl') tSl.nk. The infqntry pht00n inst~ntly opBn':3d up with every

Vv_ ,Jon ..nd hundreds of rounds of sm~ll c"l.libor bullets richl"ted off the two

Tho M-10 mo~rod out to position C ",nd w~s closely follo'WOd by the tl3,nk

p11'l.toon, which procoedod to positinn D ~nd hit the first Tiger Tl3.nk repel3.ted1y.

But e~ch round bouncoG off tho t"l.nk ~nd into the woods. The tl3.nk destroyer

IvI~lO Will) 1'11s('l firin;,. In tho midst of this b"ldhm the GormFln cr8W triod to

I3.b~ndon the first Tie:or T"Ink. The crP.wVlls instt:mt1y cut dC'lW'n by nur infqntry.

The rem~inin~ Tiger T~nk st~rted t~ rGtre~t tow<:l.rds the 1qrge stnne bridgo

An M-4 rO"lched Point E I'Ind fired down the r01'l.d in ~n "l.tt0mpt to pre­

vent tho sacond Tiger T~nk fr0m osc"l.ping over th~ stone bridge.

In ~ few minutes the firin~ diad down. Both Tiger Tl3.nks h~d been
~
k d out "l.nd the rO<:l.d W'I'lS c 1e"lr for T1'l.sk Force Howz'3 to C('lrrt inue on its
ti'lSS ion.

cortrr::!",nC:0r r:",d nn infp"ntrv prnt8ctjnn <'nc in q(l,?iti0n ho f"11"Jd t" plf',ce ~n

7
nbs-,Tvor rn th; blind S-CUTW t,. wP,t'n of ~pprol'\chir'l~ Amot'ic"ln f"!T''''til''rs.

The loss nf ." strone: point by th', defend·)r Ctn'38 n0t rJ"lce SS"lri 1y do-

fiT'J ''In-:: by loc~l cI"Ilmter"ttqc"k-s whrmevf:lr the situl'\ti"n perwits. Ml"1ra(,'Irer,

On the E;;.st, eeB h"ld l'3ft R"ute 1 £.lnG tlJrnA(l !1rrth into the
mountqins nn th~ rO"ld tn MASSA, chnsen qS q mqin "lxis. TW0
thnUS'lnd y"lrds north ,.,f tb'1 hj ;:hwq~, th:; fC'rce hac t('l pqSS thrnugh
r - n;;.rTOW sqddle. On tht: f'?,r side of s"ldf!le, distributed qcross
sW'3.ll plqin, nine Tig'3r T~nks ~ited. As tho column nf eeB
'.l'~nks crossed the rise, th'3 TL:f.3rs struck. AlthnUl!h s')'ITf:)rql of
the T12:'3rS were d'3strf\yec', the Germ"lns ret;;. iTled cr"ntrnl of tho
position. A forco W"lS S-'l'1t "'.t"(\und th'3 rie:bt to fh.nk, to turn
the position. Shortly "lft')r thl3 fl~nking force stqrt8d their
qtt<1Ck, six Tircers qnd fl"l11r }',qrk IV tp.nks qtt!1c'\t"e ri from fnur
directi('lns '3.nd knocked OlIt f"ur M-10's .,nd tW'=l1ve light bmks. 8

q '\ritq1 role in m011nblins. Orp':<'Iniz"ltinn of I'lny positi('ln must include c~H'9fu1

ewer, the r'3 stricte,~ n"lture nf T7'l"unt<? j nons tArr"lin prev"lnts "-nv l<lrf!:"l so'!,le

ft'3nElr"ll counter<!.tt£.lcks. FUrth':!r # th'3 1 imiti?d I'\VIOI ihlJle r"utes mliy ho '9X"

pacted tn impede <l.ny p.ttempt to k0~1G the reserves rp.pid1y 1")17I3r <!, '.vide fr('\nt.

This is espechlly true where he8,Vlr t"lnks <!.t'':l imTo1,red. For th"lt rer;son

r"lSElrves mqV he heJd "It low!'!r 16'11'''31s qnc c<'rrtr'itted in sn'lOIll units which C"l.n
,....-.
69
 exploit thp, limit"':'! terr''lin 'l.v!3.H",ble. Since the p.ttqcker will 1j'Cl <\018 to
,,--.
, onlv q limited ",mount (If his p.TIl'or in "l.ny (lnEi "l.re"ll he m"l.~' be s'1CP6cted

t("l "l.tt'lck on numer(lus r0utes sinlllltt:neously. The sever",1 SIT'lll reser"'(l'9S of

t"e defender qre tr'1 ic18'31 force to "("'opel multiple "l.tt'l.clrs in restricted

terr'l.in.

The tqsk' nf sno;ineer llrdts :i n tbe defense in mount"l. ins is to pro~Tide

f'O't" de fense •

In locqtjng <:lnc construct:i't:w "l. syst'3rr, (If field fortificS'ltions,

"lnd "l.pprF3c:i8.tion of th":) tArr<dT' is prerequisite, since field f0r­
tific"l.tj("lns cnnsist prim"l.rilv of strengthening its dClfensive v>11ue.
Obst<l,cles hinder n("l"lT'3ment (If tb0 enemy "l.nd hold rim unc,er the de­
fonder's fire.
The positi("lns selecte~ hy th0 defender "l.re str"lnethened by
fteld f(lrtific"ltio!1s. Or:'in"l.dly the occupying troops C'n:<)nize
the ground "Ind construct thp fortific>1tjons. Duties (If engineers
"Ire to provide tools 'l.nd m'l.teri~ls "lnd to execute w0rks of gen­
6rql use • • • • All w"'rks of "l technic"ll n"l.ture th""t l3.1'"e beyond
,.--- the c"lpl'lbilities of occupyincc troops "lre prep"l.red bv the ~mgine8rs.9

Obst"l.cles ml3.Y be n"ltur~,l ("Ir "l.rt:ifici"ll. N"l.tur"l.l obsbwles include

such terr"J.j,n f'3"l.tur9S "l.S wQter cnurses, p(lnds, SWl'l.mps, >!lll1ies, steep slopes,

cre"l.ting '3. b~rrier. Thev J'l,re Sl1pole11'lented when neceSS<:lrv hy 'irtifjcj~l

obst"!.cles. These F'3.Y be wClrk's I'f d"lstr1)ct i nTI, such qs destroyed brid-res or

blJ:i Idin'!:s. rO'id crqt'1rs. inund",t i M'S" "l.nd fe lIed trees or telephone poles;

fjelds of steel r"l.il" 'l'{noden posts, heJ'l,'TY fences, ('dbs, c"lbles, wire r(llls"

'ind b'irric"lc1es. Works (If constt'l}ctjon must be design"'ld to deBl effectively

with the c'l.p"l.biUties ",no limit<:t:ioDs of '3nemv vehjcles which they "l.t''3 in­

tended to stop.lO

Works of dl3struction provi1e the 11'1'3.,;01' p"lrt [If th'3 I'hstl3.cles tl' the

70
~tt~cker in mountqinOU8 ~re~s. En~ifieer troops ~ceomplish thjs by the use

~molitions in the blockin~ of ro~ds by ct~ters. l~ndslides. blowing

btidli:es or culverts. diverting: the course of mount~in stre'lms. ~nd other

forms of demolitions. Demolitions to be effective must contemplqte the de­

struction of '1 structure, roqd. or trq i~. so th~t the ~tt'lcker will be forced

to repl'lce or rebuild r'lther th'ln rep~ir. Ro~ds m'ly be extensively d~ma~ed

by demolitions ~nd since the r~utes throt~h mount~in ~rep.s 'lre very limited.

the effoct will be to forco the ..tt ..cker ~ seek new ~venues into the moun­

tqin position.

An observer in ItJlly roported' :

As th9 Ger~ns withdrew they demoli8hed 111 brid~es. de­

molished ro~ds 'it critic~l points. fell~d l~r~e trees 'lcross

rO"lds. mined possible by-p~sses qnd blo~ked n~rrow streets in

critic~l villqges by dernolishing · buildin~s. All obst'icles were

protected by AT guns r:;.nd J;l.utom'1tl'c WElP.pC1tlS on slopes of connect.:._

ing rid~es. These weqpons were reinfor~ed by weqpons on other

~ ,ridges • • • Jlnd by rel!:istered I1rtillery. SP 88 /1:uns were clenr':

ly concel1led ~t critic~l points in fl'lts ~nd slopes ~ffording

commr:;.nding observ~tjon. Tqnks were kept in plqtoon 'lnd comp~ny

groups conceqled in drqws Jlnd hJ;l.ystncks to oppose infqntry qd­

vllnce where dirct l~ying weqpons ~nd "lrtplery were held up

by obstllcles. l

Bridges ~nd streflm cross in~s in rugged o<)ul'ltry I1re extreme ly criticlil

fel1tures where the defender bv skillful use of d(.molitions. tJlnk trqps.

felled troes. 'lnd qdequ~te covering fire can oft'ectively stop tho enemy in

his Ilttempts to force ~ crossing.

Ene::ineor erected obstl3.cle~ to be e ffectSve ITlUst be pillced to de lily

the enomy whoro he C'ln be hold under fire. or fO~~J him to seek new routes

into the position. Obst'1cles must bl3 oovered by fir(3' bec..use left unpro ...

tected they '1re eqsily ove rcome by the speci.. l equipment qnd troops of the

qttl;lcker. They .. re '1 "nrust" fClr effective de fAns '.) in mount"! inous terril in.

71

lAST CE~TRF\L
SeA
TO~(SIA
I~ I:
',000.000
(#( , -
I
1

" / /11 M~rs

,
I

s,d-b••
.' 2 ,'.1t I
II

,, ' .'.r

,. • ••• t ...

.''''
' •• .
'" I~,.
­
,

..

FUr 13

 when used wisely I3.dd gre"lt strength to the defensi,re position. The

extent to w'hich these obstl3.cles will be successful in del"lying 'in 'ittl?cking

enemy is pn excellent mo"lsure of the effectiveness of the defender's engi­

neers.

Frequently in roue:l:> terr"3.in the comb"lt will be reduced to I3,n !!engi­

neer's W"lr n in which engineers of the '1ttl3.cldng force must le'1d the ".d'r~nce,

const"l.ntly strbrinrr to neutrl3.lize th'9 obstJicles phced in the pl3.th by the

dofender's eng'l_neers. An eXl3.mple of 1tengineer's wqr" m"ly be found in the

comb"lt experiences of the 56th ,2;np.;ineer B'ltt"llion (11th United Stqtes Armored

Division) in the vicinity of PRUM.. Ge rmqny. The terrt=J.in "round PRUM is

chA.rl3.cterized by steep slo-pEls, numerous wqter ccmrses, he"ivy wooded '3.re8.s,

'3.nd qbruptly qrisine; h ills from 800 to 1900 feet in he ight.

On the ~orning of 3 M"lrch q tqsk force of the 11th Armored

Divisi0n with Sl plfltoon of Comp8,ny B, 56th Armored Dj1rision

B"l.tt"llion in support m01red through PRUM to storm t1~e 'towns of

SCE:iifARZHEIM <?nd BUDESCHEIM. At first the engineers repSl ired

rOSlds but were cqlled upon to clsA.r <:\ p."th throue.:h "i mine

fie Id.

On the marnine: of the 5th of M"OIrch the whole comp,my Il.S­

sistec by q phtoon from Comp.qny C, SOlssembled "it 008 to repll3.ce

two blown bridges. On 6 M'1rch, CCB struck with Sl-two-pron~ed

'itt"lck to seize "I crossinI': site on KYLL RIVER. B Compl'l.ny with

3d pl.qtoon of Compflny C "lttqchod ~ssembled to build q Bqiley

Bridge l1t 03EHBETTINGEN on the KYLL. Due to the extreme ly

limited roqd net, the rugged ch~rp,cter of the tBrr"lin, qnd the

rq in. snow, mud l1nd sleet the Bq'iley f!'\ iled to 8.rrive; so wl)rk'

'N'<l sst" rte d on l1 tr<38.d,JII'llY ford A,C ros s the 1" 1,r9 1".1 2

An officer with the 56th Bqttp.lion p.dds thjs eyewitness 8.ccount of

the 8.ction:

• • • Garml'm troops well dug in held the high ground on the

fqr shorc~ The old bridge h8.d boon complotely blown qnd tho

sito cO~J'ered with qrtillery.t I3.ntit8.nk" mortt:lr, qnd sm13.11 8.rms

fire. On the f'<Jr shore the rO>1d leqding fTom the b 10wn hridge

to the high ground W"l.S criss-crossed by hrg:e f",llen trees to

~ form offective "Ib8.tis. At tho point"where the r08.d stqrted up

into the hills. hold by the Germf.\ns" Wf'.S·11 hrge p.ntitp.nk' ditch

73
 which cut thl') rOlld Ilnd prev'mted Ilny by-p"l.ssing. The ditch vms

Ilpproximqtoly 40 feat ~cross Ilnd p.ppa~red to be ~bout two mile!

long.

B Compllny with "l.ll of C Comp~ny "l.tt~ched stllrted to work on

q ford just t~ the ri~ht of the old bridg8 site on the ni~ht of

6 M'1rch. At Ilbout 2300 h('l1Jrs the ford WIlS rf!.lf completed when

the; Ger1M.ns cOllnter~tt"lcked. In the ensuing fight e~inee?B of

B ~nd C Comp~nies drove the Germllns ~w~y from the ford sit~.

BOWQ~r, "l.rtillorv Ilnd sm~ll Ilrms fire on the site continued un­

tjl tho morning hours '1nd provented completion of tho ford.

About 0400 hours on the 7th of Mflrch two dozers with /ilpmored

c<:lbs wore out fl.cross tho river to remove the 'lb"l.tis from the

rOl).d on th~ fllr shore (GerlMn side of tho river.)

By d~ylie:ht ~bout h<:\lf of the rOlild h"l.d been cle~red, when

tho Gorm"l.ns st'3.rted thro'~ring AP shells '1t the dozers. The dozers

then withdrtJw to covElred positions "llone: tho bl'ink of the river.

B '3.nd C Compllnios, continued to work on the ford durine: the

morning of 7 Mf'J.rch, however the Gorm'1ns still held the high

ground on tho fl-lr shore fl.r.d the srmll ~nns <\nd '1rtillory fire on

tho crossinjl; sito ~de work oxtremely hllz"lrdous.

At 1600-hours the site ~s Ilb~ndoned. CCA h~d broken out of

their bridgeho'1d "I.t GERALSTEIN "l.ndlSCB moved to cross the KYLL

RIVER ~t GERALSTEIN following CCA.

El'1bor">to engineer "I.ssistJ1noo will be of little VIllue .. however, un­

d. control of p"l.sses throu£h thtJ mount"l.ins is held by the defender. These

p'lsses represent k0Y terrp.in fo~turos on tho np.tur~l ~venUGS of ~ppro~ch which

tho qtt~cker must us~ to move his t<:lnks, £uns, ~nd he~vy equipment. Control

hingos upon possossion of the critic~l hei£hts domin~tin£ p~sses.

An 'lotion ~t KASSERINE Pli.SS illustrl'ites tho import"l.nce of hold ini;

tho so he ights.

After ~ sust~inod period of ~otion ~~~inst the enemy, two

comp~nies of ~ t~nk destroyer b'ltt~lion were givon the mission

of holdin~ KASSE~RINE Fl,SS I3.gP..inst enomy tl3.nks qnd to est~blish

OPts for indirect l'\rtillery fire. At this time there W7Jr8 but

soven 75mm SP's in om oomp"lny <md ten 75mm SP's rem'linjn£ in

tho othar. Our friendly forces hold tho high ground on ejther

side of the pASS. The TD guns wore ct:treful1y dUj! in, c~moufll;l£"

od, "I.nd sl~htod nloll£ the ro~d. For three d~ys tha TD's with-'

stood tho ontire pressuro of tho Germ'lTI Armored force, consist­

inl1: of bmks .. ~rtillery, inf'1l1try, s\ir I3.tbwks, pnd mort'lr fire.

Evory t'lnk 'ltt'lok into tho pr:tss ~s beAtem b~ok wlth heAVY

~ 10ss08. Only whon tho enemy inffl.ntry c~ptured the high e::round
)n both sides of tho ~ss 'l~d wore m'lchine-e::unnfng the TOts did
they withdr"lw. 14 '

74
 Pl~nnihg f~ctors the defender must consider h~vp, been the subiect of

"0ussion by the Russillns~ Their defensive experience W<lS ~~ined ellrly in

HIl,ring se ized ~ p~ss, the qtt~ck obtll ins freedom of mneuver

~nd the possib ility of emerging in the fhnk Ilnd re'lr of whole
units ene:'l!!:Gd in defl3nse. For this rellson the units engllged in
defense <"'f pllsses detnllnd speci13.1 fortitude of soldiers Ilnd
officers.
After c'lpturine: the hej~hts ov~rlookine: the p~ss, the units
must hold them r:t "111 costs. Even if the enemy brc~ks through
the PIlSS "lnd its defenders Ill'e enCircled, they Yl'ust stllY nn, Bnd
dr'lw up 1l11-qround security on the heir:hts. Holdine: these heights
m'ly be of decisive import'lnce in the bqttle with the second eche­
lons of the 'ltt'lckin~ enemy. Besides th~t, the e:"lrrisons of the
heights will pin down Ip.r~e forces of the enemy, which will help
in tho hunching of tho counter"lttp.ck. Upon withdrllw'll of the foe,
thl'l encircled gllrrisons clln C8.use considerlOlble dllmq.ge, sinc~ they
will keep under inccssr:nt fire the entire course of the hostile
retre"lt through the mount'lin p~sses.15

The Russillns noted th"lt the Gerrn'lns frequently 'lttempted 13. thrust in

~8.rrOW sector, endellvorine: to brF.i<J.k throu~h into 11 v8.11ey 'lnd corne out on

fhnk Ilnd rellr of units defending the heights. Such ~n enemy mllneuver

wqs ~ll the morc d·:ID.~erous, 'lS it 'NilS often c'lrried out with 113.rge numbers of

infqntry "nd tllnks. If successful, it might lelld to deep fl~nkjng of whole

divisions of the defenders. Consequently, Russi8..n doctrine stressed thqt de­

fense of mount'lin v"llleys Ilnd passes into them deml3.nded pllrticulllr C'lre from

officers of ~ll rllnks. Th'3ir experience of fi~htjne: in the C8.UC8.SUS proved

th"lt for d j rect control of th"l ,r<:l lleys the enemy must secure the comm'lnd ing

heip:hts 'llol1P-" which th':3 v<l.lIey uSlllllly extended. Therefore, cross fire from

the 'ld.ip.cent mountr:ins Ilnd slopes W"lS the best w~y to defend the ~lley. It

wqs expedient to lell,re only sm<lll forces, reinforced with I3.ntitllnk fire units

on tho floor of the ,rlllley. Tp..nks "llso proved inv'llu8.ble to the defender. 16

In one ~rell our defense stretched ~lon~ the northern slopes

of 11 crest extending from ''lest to e"lst. Three regiments of hos­

tile inf'lntry, supported by trmk"s, broke throue:h on the .iunction

75
 between our units ~nd m~de for the p~ss. Tbe Gorrn~ns seized it

~'nd moved out into the v'llley between tbe mountJ'!ins. Two d'3.ys

.~ter more th'ln 100 t'3.nks ~nd ~bout two inf~htry re~imerts
undertook ~n 'lttp.ck 'llon~ '3. ~lley to the 6'3.st, in order to com­
pleto q deep fl'lnking of tbe ridgo from the south 'lnd to emerge
in tbe r~Ilr of our positions in the mount'3.ins. At this time our
comtn'3.nd shi fted tho rGserve units to the pl'3.cO of th"3 prospective
bre'3.ktbrou~h; this shut off the v~lley completely. Rjfle, 'lrtil­
lery, 'lnd t~nk units were consolid~ted on tho slopes cf the moun­
tllins • • • • In the center of thQ 'V<l.lley, whoso width Wl'\S sevan
to nino kilometers, q unit of ~ntit~nk ~uns ~s dispos~d. Thus
the entrqnce to th'J v'l.lley reprosented f.\ pocket of riM sub.iected
to 'l.rtillery 'lnd mortqr 'lcti0n frow three dir~ct10ns. The hostile
bmks moved tOW"'lrd tho centCfr of the 'V<l.lley in three echelons.
When they reqched thg zone of cross fire, the 'l.rtill'.'lry, he'3.vy
m'l.chine guns, ~nd t'l.nks disposed in'l.mbush opened up on them with
q c0ncentr'l.tion of fire. Pqrt of the 'lrtillAry unjts fired on
tbe inf'l.ntry, cutting it off from the tqnks. The Garm'lnA took
cover wh Ue the ir t~nks. h"l1T ing: suffered ~reqt d'3.m"lg:e, were un­
'3.ble to wi thst"!nd the pcwerfulb'3.rrqf!:e fire 'l.nd retre'l.ted.
After '3. whj le th8 enemy ren'311.,ed the litt"lck. Now his t<mks
'l.nd inf'lntry sep'lrlited ;nto throe g:roups. Two of them mov:-,d
~long the slopos, hoping to disrupt our fire elements lind open
the entr~nce to the v~l!ey. The third group ~tt~cked in the cen­
ter. Thus the enemy h~e SC'lttored his forces ~nd our units t~k~
in~ ~dv~nttJ.l!:e of th~t, crush'3d ~ll his groups in det<l il. At the
~"homent when the enemy '3.tt~ck hl'l.d re"lched its m'3.ximum intensity
Ind its tempo ~s stl;\rtiru!: to slow down und'3r the effect of de­
structive fire from thrs', directions, our t"lnks rushed out of 'lm­
bush "lnd counter1;1ttp.cked on th0 right fhmk !':rolJp of G'3rm'ln tqnks.
Immedi1'ltely sever~l hoatHe vehicies were set on fire '!nd tho re­
m~inin~ mnchines fell bqck~ not baing qbl~ to withst~nd tbe
pressure of our tqnks. 17 .

Russi."In success in this eng'3.goment demonstr'3.ted tl'le ilr.portqnce of con­

trol of thf1 heie:hts oV"lrlookinl!: v'l.lleys ~nd plisses. Such control WliS obt"lined

by correct org~nizqtion of the slopos qnd by deep echelonin/!: of units in the

vqlley. T'l.nks phced in "lmbush were V'3rv effective in dostroyinl!: the enemy

/ ~rmor .. thus pro"lTing their e:ro'3.t VIllue to '3. dt1fender in mountqinous terr'lin.
)

I A t'3chnique re l"lted to thB.t of controlling the p<:lsses is one of re­

bdnjng observ"Ition posts of 10\ suit'3.ble chtlr$icter. The defending force in

m0unt",inous terr'3.in must set up numerous OPTS to m~intliin consb:mt surveilhmce

~report the loc"ltion 8nd lictivity of the p.tt"lcker. FUrther, such

76
 'Vfl.t ion posts mllY bring down highly 'l.ccurllte qrtillery fire upon forces

in the defiles qnd bottlenecks which ~bound in rou~h tcrr~in. Such OP's m~y

hI;t;rG excellent rfl.dio cNJnnunicp.tion even with smfl.ll FM sets bec'luse of their

locfl.tion on high ground. Ample f~cilities for this type ~f coromunic~tion

m~y be found in '1rmorod unjts. In c~ses where t~e observ~tion post Cfl.n be

spotted by the ''It-b3.ckor, he m"l.Y be forced to divert ~ portion of his strength

to destroy it. Americnn ~rrnored units in Tunisi"l. soon lO'3.rned the Villus of

tI;tnk"s wit~ obs'')rvl'ltion posts for communicl'lt ions ''is we 11 'lS protection.

In the mousetrllp ~rBq south of MATEUR one of Cornp'lny C's plq­

toons (Slst Reconnqiss.mce B~tt'3.lion) h~d '1,n OP within 400 y~rds
of t3.n enomy pos itinn on DJ BADGAR. The enemy know th1'lt the OP
W'lS there ~nd fin"illy sent '3. plqtoon out to get it. The C Com.
p~ny lielltemmt in the OP S"lW them coming o:md f.J.lerted his two
"itt"icbed t'3.nks, which were in f.J, f'o~rered posttj(ln "l.bt"'ll.lt 200 Y'3.rds
in the rOl'tr. The t'3.nks CQ1.ne out, I!uided b;,{ r~dio, swunoc l'lroun¢l
the little knoll where the OF WqS 'lnd opened fire with c"inistor •
.,....-..The t'3.nks killed or wounded '111 but seven men. lS

The number of observ"ltion posts necessp.ry for <J.degu"lte w<'!.rnircg m~y be

decrel'lsed if tho defender C8'{} limi.t the routes of '3.')':>roqch tn his position.

Rcutes thrC'llgh m("lunt" in ~rep..s I'l.re limited to some degree by the nqturo of the

terrnin. An r)dded "ldv~ntr)ge m"l" be derived by the defender if he or(!:'lnizes

the gr0und wisely. The enemy should bE! f(lrced to ~ttqCk over r0utes of

~pproqch th~t tbe defendor desires hirr to use. If th" defense is to be suc­

cossful, the comn~nder of forces defending in the mounts-dns must force his

will on the enemy. If the enemy is ~llowed to choose t~e gr0und on which he

desires to f'lgbt, th8 defender immediqtely loses wh<:lte,rer sm~ll initil'l.tbre he

terr!>in is lost to the defender.

In Sicily the Arnericp..n troops frequently turned the mount~inous

in intn f!ood "ldv'l.ntl3.[e for offensi,T('l '1ction bv pro.iectini2: "icceler<\ted

77

)itp,ckS qlong the limited routes ,..,f Slpprol'loh.

The mountqinous terrJl.in in Sicily tended to c'lnqlize the move­

ment of tqnks in most qre~s. There were certqin ~re~s. however,
where tqnks could be used to ~dv~nt~~e in ~ssistin~ infqntry in
t!;Jlinin~ ground by rookiIle: lightnin~ thrusts, closely follollred by
the inf~ntry ~sSJlult. In such cJlses. Jlnd whenev~r such qn JlttJlok
~s made, the objective ~s tqken. The conditions fJlvoring
attJlcks of this nJlture presented themselves so seldom that the
enemy never knew when to expect a tank attJlck. 19

A bJl.ttle position orgJlnized to c~nalize the enemy therefore seeks

to prevent attficks over most I'i"lrenues of approJlch and forces the IlttJlr:ker to

move over routes p.nd into Ilrel'lS previously selected by th'9 defender. The

enemy seeks to surprise ~nd flqnk the defender's position by advancing on

th'9 lel'ist likely t'!.venues of I'lpprol3.ch into Il dofender1s qrel'l. Therefore.

the dofendjng: forces must block even the l1il1"possible" Jlvenues of approl'lch

and force the enemy to fig:ht over the terrain 'selected by the defense com­

mander. Because mountains ha~r6 limited road nets. the defender will hJl\Te
/,-.....
'iculty in the employment of hi s reserve in c('lunterJlttJlcking qn enemy

thrust, unless the enemy CJln be canalized into selected counterqttack arel3.s.

The three primary factors in limiting the routes of IlpnroJlch which

the 'lttacker may use to penetrqte a defensive posttiC'n in mountJlinc'us terrl3.in

would S'lppe'lr to be:

1. Deny secondJlry routes nf 'lpproach to ~ttJlckin~ forces, pre­

venting the positi 0 ns from being outflJlnked.

2. Limit the principle routes of Jlpproach in order to c'lnJlliz8

the enemy into JlreJlS f~vorable to the defense.

3. Have reservos he'lVY in Jlrmor Jlvaill3.ble as a counterJlttJlck

force to destroy enemy penetr'ltions or to prepJlre Jlmbushes.

The nature of mounta inous terr~ in with its limited routes of approach

I'lnd inadequ<lte vis ibility should 'lssist the defel1der in the successful execu­

~n of ambushes. The defender has e. ~re~t adv'lnta~o: his screening forces

78

.~
g iva him I'l.mple time to prep".lre the ".lmbush; he need only sit ".lnd W'l it

while the "ltt"lcker, limit8d in his routes of I3.pprol3.oh, W13lks into his trl3.p.

The followinr.: I3.ccount of 13. Russil3.n I3.ttl3.ck on 'i Germl3.n unit illustratos

the dec is iveness I3.nd de structiveness of suoh I3.n I3.mbush discussed in the fore-

In one of the mount".lin~us sectors of the Soviet-Germl3.n front,

Germl3.n tl3.nks h'id forced thGir w~" into "l VJ'llley. There were 'ibout
40 t~nks moving in column "llon~ the only rOl3.d. A cowpl3.ny of t".lnks
with l3.utoml3.tic riflemen under the cotnml3.nd of Senior Lieutenl3.nt
EROFEYEV w<'<s givon the tp.sk of stopping the enemy 'it the vill"J.~e of
MALKINO.
'I'he tf1.nk unit rel3.ched tho vilhg6 ".lfter .!:\ twenty kilometer
Ti'''lrch I3.nd deployed in line on the western side of the vill'l.e:e from
which direction the Gern~n tanks were expect0d to come. Trymmy
gunners '1nd inf'3.ntrymen in th8 vilhge took up their positions C'n
the flank of the t'mk compP.ny.. protect in!! it from sudden I3.tb\ck
by GerIllr'ln tommy gurmers. Such distribution of f(1rces hl'ls fre­
quently justified itself. In wooded hill country the Gerll'J'lns
ofton send inf~ntry I3.he<ld of the ir t'lnks. 'fhey comb the under­
growth striving to extermin'1to the crews of So,riet "lntit'mk guns
~nd to the point out thE) more negoti~ble slopes to their t'lnks,
be inl'; I3.t the S"lme time 13. fighting :p'ltrol qud the fi rst I3.ttacki~
W'lve. For this r8'lSOn Germqn tqnks sometjmes 'ippe~r suddenly
on the fl'lnks or in the re'3.r of the Soviet troops. Inf"ntry ob­
servers postGd on the fl'lnks of the inh"l.h ~ted point protected
tho t<mks from such surprises.
In the ~ftornoon Germl3.n t13nks IlpP9llred out of 'l stl1Sl.11 p'l.tch
of woods SNl€ two kilometers west of MALKINO. ViithC'ut stoppiI1/?:
they rco\'"ed tow'l.rds the vill"lP-:8 ''It full speed. Senior Lieuten'l.nt
EROFEYEV!S tl3.nks decidod to permit th!3 Germ'l.ns to get ~s close
'l.S possibb "lnd then shell thorn witz., controlled volleys. This
W'l.S 'l. correct decision for th,ry Germ'l.IlS were qd"lT'lncing without
reconnBiss'l.nce 'l.nd did not expect to meet with resistp.nco of
'3.rnorod vl')hicles jn IvIALKINO.
1J1lhen the 0nemy t"l.nks were within 1000 to 2000 !l1eters our
t"nks opened fire witr. their c~mnon. After the first few volleys
two Ger!l1"ln t'l.nks burst inti:' flJ:l1OOs. The r'3trI3.1P'der bee:'l.n to d8­
p'loy hA.stily on both side s of the rOlld. Deployment find the
'l.doption of b"l.ttle order occupied ~bout five minutes "lnd th·) Ger­
m"lns 'ld 1r"l.nced '3. f'3.rthsr 300 to 400 meters conducting un'lined
fire. Firo from our stl'1tion'lry t"lnks W'lS so Sl.ccurqte thr;t during
this time 'l.nother six enemy tf3,nks were knocked out •. H'l.l f of thom
were burnt. The Germ'l.n tt3.nks couldn1t wHbstl3nd our gun fire 'IDd
rotreqted. This W'l.S thEl TI1C'TIlcnt when re inforcem"mts qrrived 'l.t
~ Mb.LKINO. 90ns iatin£! of fln ~ntit"lnk bo.ttor'· ".lUG s8v8r'l.1 lorry
lO'l.ds of soldiers, "twongst them sO"lter'3.1 tqnk d8strC'vers with I'tnti­
t"lnk rifles.

79

 (to

S£Ccw-.o ENEM Y TTi C

IJ

 (NOTE: Before the second Germ$'J.n qtt~ck the Russi~n tf'lnk force

W'lS split I1nd phced in I'lmbush on both fl'lnks of the position.

The Ml'lin drive W'lS ~g'linst the Germ~n infqntry p.nd qfter dis­

persine: tho inf'lntr:,,'thc Russiqns concentr'lted on the German

t8.nks.)

Two hours l'lter the Germ~ns ~e:p.in 'ldv'lnced ~e:qjnst the vil~

If-lg-8 of 11,'IALKINO in the SI'Imo formnticlIJ qS before, one compl':lny on

either side of th8 ro~d. The Ger~n ~ttl1ck wp.s reinforced with

q bo,.ttq,lion of I'lutomqtic riflomon'qd,nmcin.e: 100 meters behind .j,

the t~nks. Suspectin~ I'l throp.t from the flp.nk, the Germqns "Id­

'Irqncod ''It full speed. As soon qS the t",nks' p.pproqched within

rqnge of qccurqte fire the ~unners I'Ind qntit"lnk (TDts) got into

'lction I'lnd opened withering fire on th~ enemy tqnks. The in­

fp.ntry wns pinned to eqrth by our fire but the tp.nks sep'lrqted

from the ir inf"lntry continu<)c t(\ qdvl1nce. Six GerT!1"1n tqnks

W0re qlreqdy in fl~mes. Their form"ltion wp.s disrupted. On q

~i'-Iret1 s ignl?l our tqnks opened rrJ'J.chi~O ~un fire on the infqntry

'lnd cnnnon firs on the tl'lnks • • ' • •

If the Russiqn defenders of the foregoing I'Ic(,0unt hqd had I'Irtillery

in support of their positi0n they might hq,rG p.ccomplished e,Ten Toore. For in

~ use of qrtillery. th'3 def'3nder in m0untqjnous terrqin p("Issesses eertqin

,inite ~dvJ).nt'3.;:res. A few of these I'Idvqntqges qre: his guns CqIl be dug in­

to lC'lc«tions whicb offer consjd'9r~(lle protecticn "Ig'3.inst enemy ct"'unterbp..ttery;

tho presenoe of deep Cp",r6S ",I1V offer ""dd4tic'Il'l1 protecti<'n to fire direction

centers I1nd e~Ten gun crews; "1nd tho prElpp..rl'ltion of b'lrrp..ges rtnd concentrqtions

op..n b"l oompleto. qS8umjrw; complete initip..l p..ccurp..cv of Ip..r~E1 c(,'Ilcentrqtions.

The p.rtillery G lements of the de fense gp..rris('m cp..n p..lso become

thoroughly fqmili"lr with meteorologicA.l conditions of the ~req A.ncl o".n set up

resultp..nt increqs() in qccurp..oy ("If unobser'Ted fire justifies the time qnd

High p.niSle fire is Jl neoessity in mountA.]n defense. F0r this pur­

p0se the 4.2 mort"lr would seem e~'en m("lre useful thl;ln the l05mm howitzer.21
~
'.s physicp.lly sT)'''111'9r "nd lighter, permittin!1: it to be mqnhqndled into the

81

 un i!1
lon on the crest
fiD'ht " nD' bv
 o

\.

 possible position, continue to be fired to hst possible moment .. and

then be quickly disphced to the next position. Artillery should be of the

self-propelled type for gre8.test effective use 8.ud should preferably be

mounte-l on a full tracked chassis. In Ittlly the ~rlTl8.n use of such ~uns

W!1S of e:ro'1tf:lst vl'Ilue to the defonso. Germ'1.n SP e:uns W('luld fire on IOl3.d

elements cnusing thclTl to deploy ",nd I'ldvl'l.nce slowly I'lnd c<?Uti(111Sly. By the

time our troops reached its suspected loc<ltion, the SP gun '!1.f'lS behind the

next bend in thQ r n 8.d, re$J,dy to r 9 peat the same performance. In th is w~y

the defense Vll'l.S <l.ble tC' k"<3Gp the "ltt""cker cC'nst8.ntlv off' b8.hnce, ne~rer k-now­

ing when he was gojng tn hit th"l !l1<l.in battle position.

This technjque was useful to units of the Unhed States 1st Armored

Eee:iment .. defend5.nz 8. mountqin PI'lSS in Tunisil3..

Durirw: the first week" we were near SID! BOU ZID we 1/',ere
u'?-rding the P"lss. We W(:Jr0 eq'.'iDped f(1r indirect firine:.
,,11 of our tanks lI{ere in tl-Jg vjcjnitv of the P8.SS • • • set
bl'tck 8.b("l'lt fiyo or six mil0s. jIe C<lme within 2000 y"rds of
tho Pl'l.SS Cl~·£:.Jry rr:ornine:, firoc int('l th"J p"ss, "nd pulled b"ck.
'No were ,iust b... ck of L£SSOU"j, ; (,lrrTl. INS. 22

Mountninous terr~in genort:l.lly offers the defender ~dequ~te f~cilitie8

for c":ITrouflqg:o in the br('lken I1;r('lund I;Ind wooded ~reqs. Conce'llment of the

tho dc;fondor. This is espoci.p.lly truE) of fori.lf"l.rd ('Ibser"l.1"!)ti0n posts which I;ICt

I'IS tho eyes <md e"l.rs 0f the defense comnmder. Their concol'llment is their

chief fnrm of ':lofense.

The enemy, r"3~~rdl(Jse nf l,is strnne::th, c'lnnot hit wh'l.t he

c"mnot see. In mountl'l in0us t"Jrr tl in, th<:: do fender m'l.V leqve

s1118.11 d9t8.chmonts on isol<ltcd PEll'lks "'lithin siv.ht of the prin­

cipl'l.l 8.""'lnUG8 ("If ""ppro'l.ch. If thGs; d!'Jtl;lchrr.ents <'ire well

cl'l.rrouflq~Gd, the m'ly continuo to infnrm th8 cefense of the

loc"ltion 'lnd qcti~Tity of tho ommy, long 'lfter the orig:inl3.1

,..-4efensi v e positif"ln h<:.s been penetr'1ted. Such forces p.re t:l.lso

oful in bringing: d0'JV'tl <l.ccurl;lto nrtill'Jrv fire upon f:ln 'l.d­

·mc:ing ClDOmy wh'J h'1s rEJ'lchEld prc'l.rr<J.llf':od loc'1tlons, such J).S

83
~
criticql defiles. 23

Within the strong points qnd the m~dn "I)<\ttle position" 8.11
possible rr.e'3.suros should bo t'3.ken to c"lmoufll'lge men" we"pons,
supplies" ~nd t'3.nks. This will effecti1r ely conce"ll the m"lin
defensive position from the enemy. '3.nd keep him const"lntly con­
fused '3.S to its eX'3.ct loc'3.tion. The occ'3.sionql p'3.tches of snow
<md b"lro rock mqy cl)mpliC"ltl3 the c"l.moufl'3.ge of t'3.nks; during
light snowf"lll the ch'3.n~ing l'3.ndscqpe m~y require the frequent
chqnidng of the color of individu'3.1 t'3.nks. Germp.n units in
Russi'3. frequentlycqrriod 13, buckot of ch'3.1k or lime in e'3.ch t"lnk
to permit the crews tC'l blend with the lq~2SC"l.PO by "lpplying the
whitening '3.gent" or removin~ it quickly.

During the summer months the Gormqns m"lde effective use of brp.nches

to pre~rent 8. ir observ'3.tion of the ir t"lnks.

In wooded qnd hilly pre"lS" cover "Ind cqmoufl'3.ge W'1S bottor.

Summer foli'3.ge trees offer better c"lmoufl'3.ge. There were fewer

losses fr"m qir 8tt"l.ck bec'3.USo of bettor c8moufl'1ge discipline

(everv "rmored vehicle WqS c01rered ....d th tree brp.nches '3.nd m'3.de

to hug the edges of hedges or woods so P.S to "lPpeqr from the

'3. ir to be '3. me re pro.iection of the £0 li'3. ge .)

In expect'3.tion of enemy '3.ir reconnqissqnce qnd qtt'3.ck" the defender

in mountqinous terr'3.in must t"lre 13,11 c"lmouflqge meqsures necessqry in '1ny

type of terr"lin. The len~ths to which q milit"lry unit is forc')d by hck of

qir protection m'3.Y be shown by these ststeroonts of '3. Gorm"ln qrrr:ored division

comm'3.nder:

• • • No vehicle W"lS permitted to mO"lre on the roqds during

the d'3.y unloss $?bsolut.ely nocessp,ry" 8.nd the bulk '\":,s conce'3.1ed

deeply in woods or scqttered in sm811 det'3.chments in vill'1ges. 25

The Division Comm'3.nder h'3.d seen personqlly to the c"l.moufl'3.ge

discipHne in tho noi~hborhood 'wen h'3."Irjne: det'3.chments witr brooms
to sweep '3.W'3.y tr'1ces of tire trqcks in fields IOInd rO'3.ds. He
cqlled these men IIbroomstick comm<:lndersl~26

Prob lems

Coordinqtion "Ind control of t'bo c1efendintr. g:'3.rrison presents se.,rer'3.1

problems. FreQuantly the defsnder will be 8ble to pro"lTide telephone communi­

~
)n throughout his position" since qmple time prob'3.bly 1s '3.v"lilqble for

84
 ~ inst~llqtion prior to the ~tt~ck. As ~ result, the defender m~y be ex­

,d to h8.ve ~t his dispoSJl.l excellent cornmunic~tion f~cilities. rel~tively

immune to the effects of the tertJl. in. In fixed de fenses he m~y eyen h8.ve

time to bury the wire 6 thus m~king it proof Jl.~8.inst enemy ~ir or 8.rtillery.

In wooded hilly country, t8.nk m~neuver must be pl~nned in det~il

from eVFJry viewpoint. Engineer prGP8.r~tion for t:outes of t~nk count'3r"ltt~ck

must be thorough 8.nd the demolitions must be coordin~ted with the withdr~w~l

of de l~ying forces. In p'lrtic1l1~r, e8.ch blnk must be "lble to ident ify its

own course for pl~nned countor~tt~cks. In close wooded terr~in this h~s

proved very difficult. One Russi13.n officer suggested th~t 8. thorough re­

he~rs~l bo given ",-nd th~t th8 b8.rk of trees be cut ~t driver's eye le~rel or

P'linted with q d'lb of lime. 27

In wooded hill countr'T 'in ~ble cC"l'nm",nder, llsing movement ~nd

controlled fire 1'fith the ~ction of smqll t~nk gr0upS, m~y m~ke

.~ 'oss ible succes sful ~cti nn <111:<\ i nst hrge enemy forces. Experience

n defend ini! monnt~ in v~ lleys hJl.s shown th<lt t~nks rendered ir­
repl'ice~ble ~ssist<lnce to inf<J.ntry when coopor~tion h~s been cor­
rectly org~nized.28

Grol3.t coordin~tion is dOr1l3.nded in phmninl1: ~rtillery support for the

defense, since it is 10gic8.1 to expect th'lt the 'ltt~cker will use "Ill l3.'r~il-

'1ble we~pons for counterb'lttery fire. If the defl3nder is 'l.ble to c00rdin~te

the ~ctivity of his obser"'Tl'ltion posts, ~nd m~intl1 in cO!:1munic<ltion with them,

. he C'ln permit gun crews to r'3m'3.in in protected loc~lities until the l'lst

possible moment. The effect of this coordin'ltion is 'l rrre~t impro'''3mont in

mor~le 'lnd ~ lower c'3.su~lty r~to 8.mong gun crews. This type of coordjn8.tion

W'3.S pBrfectly ~chi81Ted by Gorm~n forces in the Tl1njsi'l.n hills.

Tho enemy h8.d spent months prep8.ring those positions, 8.nd

when ~ttillery or 8.ir pounded 13. positi 0 n in prep'l.r~tion for ~n

att~ck, Jerry st'lyed in his dugout until the 'l.rtillery fire W8.S

~r'iised. Then he rem~nned his f!:Uns <lnd c~ue'ht our inf~ntry with

ithering fire in the hst few hlmdred Y8.rds. 29

85

 Air support quite ptoperly mlly be mentjnnQd ~t this point. Although

S 1<38s frequently Ji-\T'lil"lble th"ln Jirtillery support .. the defender'must

c"lrefully coot'din~te its use when it is "l"lmil'lble. The need fC"r 'lir support

in ID0untll.1.nous terr'3.in is re"llly no different for the I'lttl3.ck or tho defanse.

The technique of its use is the s~me; ~o hit tho enemy beyond the rll.~e of

qrtillery.

From the ~ir. q pilot unf~mili"lr with th0 lJindsc"lpe below will ex­

parience grcll.t difficulty in loc~ting pinpoint t~r~ets Jind in distin~uishin~

friend froIT. foe withollt "ldditionll.l identifyint" c'3vices. However, the de-

f'3nder should be in "I position to fqmili"lrize his supporting <1.ir with the

terr"lin by previous det"lilec reconn"liss"Ince "Ind reholl.rsl'J.l.

On the other hJ3.nc. if we "l.ssume th"lt ll.ny I'ltt'lcker possesses "l loc'll

superiority over the defense. we ml'lY qssume. "Ilso, thqt the defendor will

~'om be ll.ble to c0ntr01 the 'lir over his position. For th"lt rell.son, the

"Ind conce"llment for his own protection.

the Buh::e,.-" where the Am'3ric"ln defenders '3.ctuJilly possessed p.ir superiority.

When the weqther cl'3"1red, however, there WI'lS presented the unusul'll circum­

st"lnces of Il, defend-3r in rough terr"lin who enjoyed q ir sUp-'3riority O"lTOr tho

The following "lccount furnishes q det"liled "Inn striking eX'lmple of

the use of qir by '1 defender.

At 1000 hours on December 23, 1944 C"lpt~in P~rker 'lt his r~dio
heqrd thJit supporting plqnes ware on their ~y. Within ~ few
minutes he WqS tellin~ them where to strike. The stron~6st enemy
f'--' 'uildtipa at this time were west <md northwest of th'3 town(BASTOGNE),

86
 thre~tening: the sectors he Id by the 502d P~r~ohute Inf~ntry "l.nd
527th Glider Infqntry Rej!:iments (lOlst Airborne Divi.sion). The
infl'lntry front lines b'l.d been he'lring: l'\nd seeine: the "'.rrivS'll of
those concentrqtions durin~ the p~st two d"l.Ys. But beC"l.use of
the short~~e of qrtillery ~mmunition, there hqd been no re~l
chock 8.gq i1:~st them. The pll'lnes dropped low <md C<ltne in fl'lst
"IgP.. inst the anomy columns. gl'\ ining complete surprise. The Gor­
m~n vehicles W"lre on the ror.;d fqcinl! tow"lrd BASTOGNE when the
first b(lmbs fe 11 qmong them . . . . . On thl'lt first dl'lY the Ger­
m8.ns did not use tl"eir I'lntil'lircrqft gnns "l.gBinst 'iny of the
di1Te bombers.
If this reticonce w'ls due t" 1'\ desire to cover up the po­
sitions of the ~uns, it 'Iffl.S I'l 1riew qllickly chp.nged beo~use of
th'3 dl'l.UlI'lge the Ninth Air Force plA.nes h"ld done durin!!: the dl'lY.
For there8.fter the Germ'ln fl~,k Wl",S intense over the front I'lt 1'\11
times '1nd the "l.ir units hl".d W> furthGr hnurs of unopposed operl'l­
tion.
They tnl'l.do the most of their opportunity. The snow ~s ~re~t
qid. Cle~rly visible tr~cks pointed to forest positions which
were prompt ly bombed. The fj r fore sts burst into flqme s from
the fire bombs qnd befor0 the dqy W'lS ou.t th9 smoke from those
blqz jng phntl;\tions "l.nd from brewed..up enemy columns Ulf'l.de a
complete circle Slround the besiel1:ed forces untn it hit every
Doqrby to\\'11 p.t le~st once -'lith oxplosive '1nd fire bombs.
,-... The entire "iir oper~tion Wl1S c"\refully sY'steml1titod ~nd
then supervised in det~il. As phnes VV'3re I7.ssigned to the 101st
Di1rision by VIII Corps, they checked in with Cl1pb in Pqrker by
rqdio. He put them on q cleqr l~ndm~rk such ~s q rqilro~d or
highWBY P..S they ClX!'Oe in tOV'l'I'!.rd BASTOGNE. Sevor"l check points
wore then gi1Ten them fr(")m tl1e map. When the P.ppro£lching phnes
were definitely loc"lted, nn appro"tch cirecti(")n w~s given thqt
wOl11d bring th':3m str'llght in ovor the tqrg".lt. This procedure
eliminqted p.ll need for circlin~ qnd se~rchin~ qnd helped them
surprise the enBmy.. Vfuen tho bombs p.nd gun qmmunition were
expended, the phm) s were (lrdet'ed up to "t SP. fe ~ ltitude ta pa ..
tr(")l the perimeter of the oefensl3s or wet'e e:i~!en specific re­
connqiss"lnce rrissjons. The3r reconn"lissl>nce rer,orts were used
ps tho bDsis for givjug tqr~ets for succeed~n~ flights qnd for
gi~Ting: the gr(")und forces p,d~r<:..nce informl1ti('ln on the build up
of enemy strength. After the first f] ight thr:lre were r;lwi1Vs
tqrgets listed ~he~d. Cqptnin fprker, cqre~~lly monitorin~ the
~ir, 111so c"lms "lcross fligbts ~ssj~nod to otber ground forces
b~tt ling: in the Bulge which hqd no miss ions f('lr the ir bombs.
:tIe would then cqll to them "'rJd h'3 often succeeded in persu~ding:
them to drop the ir bombs in tbe BASTOGNE l'l.refl.. In "l few
minutes these pl~nes would brJ bp..ck on their ~ssjl!;ne(l. missions •
• • • (it WI'lS Sq id with enthus i"lsm) tlle effect 'W"!.S w0rth two
or three inf"lntry divisions.
It Wf'.S not unusu"ll during the siege to h<\VEi 8.n inf'mtr~n
~ cp.ll in tb~t five tqnks vrore coming "lt hi~ ~nd thBn see si~
P':'4?'s diving ''It the t<:nks within 20 minutes.30

87
 The defender in mountp.inous terr~in h~s the ~dvp,nt~g~ of choosing,

:8.11y spel3.kine:, where th8 fighting will ttlke pl~oe <md of being ~blc to

Il'I8.ke <il.d"lTl3.nCe logistic~l prep8.r~tions. His pl<mnintr cJ:in include prior pro­

vision of "Idequ'l.te supplie a eX"lctly where they will be needed. This frequent­

ly C'l.n be done lo~ in ~dv8.nce so thJ'l.t th8 minimum mO"l'.Hffint ('If supplies will

bp, rQquired I1fter the b<'l.ttle h"ls bean joined. Thus the defender enjoys III

relp.tivo ~dv8.ntp,ge in tho logistic'l.l support of his units <il.t the b'l.ttle po­

s ition. He C"l.n mO"lre his supplie s fOI"W"lrd without the h<md ict;ps presented by

o0molitions or terr~i.n bottlenecks. His routes 'ire open r.tnd his rOl'J,d move­

mont rel"ltbrely protocted, except for the <;lir 13.cti':rity of th'9 <'I.tt<'l.cker. Thus,

qdeqlJIOte t0nnll!1';e ID'l.y be provided flt successi,"".) defensbr6 positions.

Germ13.n technique in Itt:ll;r fe-llowed these linea. Their tl'1nks or i!:uns,

8.mply pro,rided with 8.t:1munition lliid down no 'I rby , would 'requcntly fire "Ill

po-- I'l.mmuniti0n llV1'lihble "it the positif'n bQfore they withdrew tn the nert de-

In contr~st, the ntt8.cker is frequently f"rced to leqrn th8 h<l.rd f13.cts

of mount8.in lo~istics through bitter experience, "IS AF.oric'l.n ~rmor~d units did

in Tunisi13. <'I.nd Itl'lly.

Due to ~ c0mbinqtion of t:19'1.ns .of tr$';nsport~tion, limited

r~ute s" unsettled W813.ther, obs) rved I'lrtil1ery fire, "lnd minas

~long tr"lils tlnd ml"lunt ... in routes, 'logistics in mount~in oper"l­

tions 13.re much more complic"lted th~n g()ner~lJy t'e~lite0. The

use of map dist13.nces • • • in time "ln~ sp~ce fqctors in moun­

t"dn operJ'ltlon • • • is of no v<>.1l.\a. 3

Little cnn be 'l.dded to tho effocts of terr~in qnd we~thGr th"lt h13.s

not q)roA.dy been mentjnned in thjs report. The oeculhr 'looustics nf moun­

t"lins, with the reverber<?tion usuI=Il in t'<"'oky slooes, ml'iy seri(,llsly or-nruso the

listeninR' nnsts ('f t~e defense. In <:ddttil"'n" th'3 frequent thick fC'gs prevl'i­

~ in the ,'<\lleys sometimes lbwer visibility tC' the point where enemy t~nks
,,-- y penotrqte undetected to or,tthin f'. fov/ Y"'It'ds of thr; defensive positions.

In the Ardennos, for oX8.mple. enomy tt'lnks wore "l.ble to' ponetr"l.to fqr into

At 0830 on the 19th of December. two Ti~er T~nks nosed out

of the fog: ~nd stopped within 20 Y"lrds of the ro"lch ine gun po­
sitions cO,,(713ring the northern sector.' The 57mm gun to the
right of tho rO"ld ~s within 30 yqrds of the ~"lnks. A medium
t"lnk with q 75mm gun WqS looki~ str"light "It thoro. Tho m"l­
chino gunnors ~longsido tho ro~d picked up their bqzookqs. All
fired "lot the S"l.me time "Ind in "I second th8 two Ti~er tqnks h"ld
bec0IDo just so much wrecked motq 1. Lqter, f'lll hl,lnds c1"1 imed
credit for tho kill.

... . . .. .. .. . . ... . .. .. .. . . . . . . . . . . .... .

Fog "l.t night is oven more confusin~ for the defenders; be­
cl,luse the difficulties ~re multiplied. For the men of CeE who
""ere within the tClwn the rest of the nif)'ht 1III'qS comp~rqti"'tTely
quiet. Their pe~ce W"IS punctured ~t times by the dropping of
q fe'" "Irtillery shells r....nd out beyond the W"all of fo~ they
could he"lr the nr>ise of 'n) 6ne1J1y buildup. There WIlS littlo
quiet. hO'iV"J..-rer. 11 long tr'J inf~!'try perimeter. Enemy tqnks in
twos Ilnd threes. sup'orted by jnfl3.1'1trY, probed tow"l.rds them.
¥filen "'''lrnod by smqll qrms or b"l.zookq fire, they checked qnd
bll'ued "l.'Mt:J.y qt tho positions from which they hl1d seen fhshes.
Tho "l.ccomp~nying Germ"l.n infqntry tried to infiltrqte through
the lims. Theso sm$).ll penetr'ltions '1nd the resulting fire
woro such th"l.t it Wl1S l1lmost impossible to m'lint<:\in wire com­
municqtions with the outnost. For tb(t p$).r"l.troopers these
hours v,re-ro <: nightm~re of surprise fire ~ ominous noise 0.nd
confusion. But when morning CBme the light reveqled th"l.t two
of th'J enemy t'lnks h"l.d beon kn0cked ('Ut bv b"l.!:ookq fi-re. 32

The defonder in mountqins will f"requently seek to delqy the IJ.tt"lclrer

until tho bJid wOl'.l.thor of l<:\te fqll <':Ind winter tips the strqtel:!:ic bql<>.nce still

further in f"Yor of the defonse. Their co'rttrol of the heights, their prior

prep'1rqtion, I3.nd their defensi,rG role "Ill 'Cl'per'lted in f"l."'tror of the Germqns

throu:;r.hout mQunt>3inous opet"<l.tions qg"l.inst lJinited st"l.tes forces in World 'ilqr

II.. As El$).rly ~ s Februqry of 1943, Time M'lg"l z ine expll1 ined th is fqct to the

Arnericl'.l.n people, concerning the Germ$).n position in Tunisi$).,

• • • ROIT'roel WqS jmpro"in" 8. position in which he ql-reqdy

held the 'I'la..-rqntl1ge. He qnd Colonel Gonerql Jurg;in Von A-rmin.

89
~ Comm~nder of tbe Axis forces in the North, occupied q rim of
comm~ndin£ heights from MATEL~ south to the M~retb Line. Behind
tb'3TIl W"lS the fht cCSlstql phin OVC1r which they could move rflpid­
ly q!!':q inst qny vulner"lble Sll1ied point. Gener"l Dwight Eisenho"ver
W"l.S f("'lrced to oper"lte qcross I'l mndo~ terrq in I'lt the t0ugh end of
q supolv line some 400 miles long. 3

In l"lte 1944, Fifth Army operqtin~ in It'lly still found out tb<l.t even

the w0",ther seemed to work in fp,vor of the defenders •

• • • With the be~inning of the f"lll r~ins, trqils ~nd

socond~rY rO"lds turned into 'muddy quqgmires, complic~ting supply
!"Ind service functions n.lre~dy m'1oe difficult by the distqnce the
Army h~d mcyved from b"lse inst"llhtil"'ns qnd dumps in tbe FLORENCE
~req. Fo~ qnd mist qccomo~nying the rSlin conceqled enemy troop
m0 v ements, qnd did much to c0unterb~ hmce our superiority in ~ir
power '>nd 'lrtillery. Even grC'und observers were frequently un­
"ble to direct the fire. Wellther conditinns promised to deteri...
or~te further "lS winter Qppro'lcbed. 34

An I'lppropriqte summqry of the problems fqcing p,rmored units in the

defense of mountqinous terrr-lin Tn'1Y be fmJnd in 'l report of '1 Germqn M'l,;or

The Germl3.n P'1nzer units, in reg~rd to organizqt:ic'U" equip­

ment, qnd trqinine:. were intonded prim"lrily frr 'lction on ter­

rqin like th'lt of Western, Centrql, f;lnd Eqstern Europe. Here

tbey were 'lble t("\ mJlk"e tho b@st llse of their strength" which

lies in their firepower, speed, I'l.nd mf"lbility. On the other

b'>nd. Itqly offered few opp0rtunities for tbe full employment

of these chqrqcteristics. except, perh~ps, in the regions '1­

r0und ROlE. 'lnd SALERNO, and s6"6r'-l1 other c(\~stql qre'1s . . . . .

T,... be sure, the Pq,nzer org'1niz'lti('ns of the enemy I'\re sub,;ect

to the s~m0 c0nditions. but the qttqcker qlwqys hqs the oppor­

tunity of choosing the mnst f~~orSlble turr~in Slnd by cqreful

rElc"nn,"iss''lDce Can prep'lre in ;"dv"lnce the c("lmroitment of bis

f"rc6s.

An import 9 nt c"nsider~ti0n for the commSlnd w~s tho cqlcu­

l!1.tion of time needed for "\11 'T'("I 1rements. Especi"llly in moun­

t!) ins. Il greqt d'iJq 1 more th1',n the tim:! usull11y required in

othor theqters of W"lr hp.d t(' he ~ll~Ned • • • •

The tr'lnsfer of one P",nzer d:ivision in the be~inning of

1944 (through snow cnverea m0untp,ins) from the re~ion south

of ROME to the Adri",tic no'll' I-ESCAEA required sever<J.l weeks

time. Therofcre tho l'1st units h'ld n0t A.rrived when the di­

vision W<J.S pulled b!1.ck tr tro ANZIO... ~~TTUNO bo~chheqd.

It was of decisive signific<'lDce thf1t the Pqnzer organizf3.­

"""--"ions w'.'ro fighting on th~ def'enshe durin£ the whole cf3.mpl'l.ign,

here'1s they were intended for "ffensi"l:-e /lction. Almost <\11

90
 the P~nzers P~nzer Grenqdier divisinns whicn c~me to Itqly in
!3.nd
194~ b~d g~ined their c~mbp.t oxperionce during the c~mpqi~ns in
Frp,nce ~nd RU8Si~. There, where the pr0blem c~nsisted mostly of
cprrying nut extensive 0ffensivr) movements ~f grs!'\t strqteg:ic
signifjc~nco their tr~dnine.: t;TIG prepqr~ti('ln h«d stC"od the test.
In Itqly these divisi~ns b~d t o ch~nge their t~ctics c0nsider~bly
~nd snmetimes pqid deqrly f0r their lessons. Tbe p.cticn here
e:enerl111y took plctce in the IDf'luntl'. ins or f0othills, ~nd the oppor­
tunity for mobile w!3.rf"tre wps s6"rorely limited. The Cflses wero
few in whicr counterqttllcks wit:'1 limited ob.iectbres were mounted
"lud in which t"l.nks h<ld the t'1sl{s ('If "Icc0!llpQnyjng ''lUd supporting:
the inf,mtry directly. Frequently tbese tllnks hl'!.d tn be employed
in rnl'!.ll grrups_ s0matiwes only one qt q time, beclluse the ter­
rqin did n"t permit them tC" le'l."T6 the rOf.l.ds Ilnd hig:hwqys. Gen­
erq lly they weref0rced tn !'per~te in direct cooperptiC"n with the
j:r:.fAntrv units; thqt is tr' sf'ly. they were hold in rO'1diness in
tte depth (If tbe b8.ttle pos itinn fr""'1T where thoy cC"uld drbre to
pre"Tinusly race-nnoitered positions "nd engl1ge the enemy qrn"r
whenev-'lr the enemy p.ttqcked or effected q penetrl'\tinn. The choice
of ~n "Issembly qro~ in the brttle positi"n wp,s usu~lly very dif­
ficult bectl,use cf the l~ck of the necess"lt'y cnV'3r fnr thqt type
0f l".n;e whicle. There WJJ.S rllrely suit~ble 1Teget"ltjnn, buildine:s
WfJro sCIon dostrC"yed by "!.rtillery fire ('Ir bC"mbing, qnd it W"lS dif­
ficult to cl'l.moufhge h"les in the grrund p,nc. the ir axits.

To.move into ~ssembly ~re~s outside the b'1ttle position prov­

ed inexpedient, becJJ.use l?,t t1;:) hegirming of p,.n !1tt"lck the fire (If
the enemy nrtillery JJ.nd f'lir frrce W<"IS generl;illy directed in such
strengtb on the re'~r "re<ts thf.\t eiTen ::::rmored vehicles cf"luld n(lt
g:ot int(l 'lcti"n ".It the proper time bec"'luse nf the destl"llction
they sl).ff'ered. 35

NOTES FOR CHAPl'ER 4

lEncyclopedi<3. Brittllnicl3." Vol 13 (Chicq!1:r> UnbTorsity, 1948)" p 941.

2Encycloped b Americqn"l _ Vol 26 ( New York-ehicr-p-:I'): .Am(lri'JJ.n~ Cor...

p0rQtjnn, 194§)~ p 546.

3 Ib id, P 546.

4 Ibid, P 546.

5M<lj R Milovqnov, "Counter'1cti("'TI AF!!l. inst Turning "nd Fhnktng M01re­

in tho Mount11.ins", The l~d litr;I'il Review, Vol XXII No.3 (June 1943),
(Origirmlly published in Red st<l.r, 9 Docomb0r 1942)

6 Ibid ; P 70.

7Ccl ~milton H Howze, IlTiger, Tiger", The Inf"lntry JOllrnlll_ Vol LXVI
No.2 (Februqry 1950), p 19 p,.nd 21.

91

 8Lt Col It K Gottschl3.11, !I1'L0unt'1in Go~t M4!! ~ Tr.o Cf\v<J.lry Journ'\l~

LTV No" 1 (Jq,n-Feb 1945) ~ P 29.

9Encyclopedip" Americp.np,,~ Vol 19 (New York-Chicf'lgo: A'O"oric8.llIl Corpora­

tion~ 1949)~ p 76.

10Ibid~ P 76.
llit Col Joe C L'lmbr::rt, "0bs';;rvcrs NC'tes, It"lly. 4 October 1943 to 29
Decembor 1943" ~ Ltr Hq AGF ~ File 319.1/103 GNGBI~ 7 Februllry 1944 ~ P 30.

12Uistnry of the 56th Armorec. Enj!:ineer Bf.lttalion, 11th Arm(lred Divis ion"
July 1945" P 15.
13 .
InterV1"Jw, Cqpt M L Yl"Iune:" J.rm(lred Officers Ad'IT"lnce C1ass~ 1949-50"
Tho i. rm('re d Sch 00 1 ~ Ft Knr-.x, Ky.

14"C(lmb"l.t Reports fr-;"m Thopters of Operations"" G-2 Tl'\nk Destroyer

Scbf'ol" FfJbrul'lry 1944, P 2.

15Ml
"1 ovqnov~ op C1"t "p 70 •

16 Ibid 70

-' P •
17Ib~d.
~ , p 70 ~n d 71 •

18Lt Col C J Hoy, "Mech'3.nics (If B"Ittlef:leld Reconn'3.iss"lnce l1 , Tho

C"l"lralry J0urn~.1, Vol LIII No.3 (j\.Ay-June 1944)~ p 24.

19Lt Col P L Godd'1rd, IlT<J.nks in Sicily" ~ Tho C"'~T'11rv JourWll, Vol LII
No.3 (N<>.y-Juno 1944), p 6 "me 7. -

20iVl,"i P SleS'lrev, !tUse of T-:.nk F(lrml'ltions in W('(lded, Hilly Cr'luntry",

The Milit,otry Re'Tiew, Vol L'X.III 1\;0. 3 (June 1943)~ p 67 "Ind 68. (Reprinted
from The T~nk (Bn~l~nd)).

21Lt Col T c;. Bibbo~ Jr, lI,sc0nomy in Killine:l!, The Field Artillery
Journq,l, Vol 39, • 5 (Septenlb'Jr-Octnber 1949)" p 210 I'\nd 213.

22 Bri g: Gen T J C"I'!11P, Tp.nkers in Tunish (Ft KnC'x: Hq Tho Armored Coro­
M'l nO. .. 1943),p 42.

23Intervitlw" Mf-l,i Frqnk B Cl'l.Y, Arrn0red Officers Ad"\T~nce Chss. 1949-50 ..

T~ Arrr'(\r0G School. Ft Kn0x " Ky.
24
Interr0f!:'1tion Report 34" 7707 Mis, MIS Cantor (4 lviP-rch 1947), p 20.

,,11' prlsoner
25," ' 0 f "T t
;"~r .Lnerrng8.Tt·1en Rop(lrt ( Lt Gan Fritz B'1ye r1a in),
(Ninth AF Ad,r) " 63/1945-3 7 3.2 (29 rv~y 1945).. p 6.

26 Ibid , Appendix I, p 1, p~rqgr~ph 3 (q) (4).

92
 27
Sles~rev~ op cit. p 67.

28

~~ p 68.

29Lt Col C J He>y" liThe Lllst D"IYs in Tunisil'l.lI ~ The Cqvl'llry Journ13.1"
Vol LII" No. 1 (J'lnu~ry-Februllry 1944). p 10. ­
30 Col S L A J.\Ij'1rsh"l.ll"
.. B"1stogne The First Eight D'lYs ( Wqshington: The
Inf~ntry Pross, 1946)" p 144 ~nd 146.

31 Lt C(ll G W. ,.chrr.aIzer,
S lin
.i:topnrt of Mount", in N'lrf<>.re " , IlL
vuser"lTOrs
pC'rt" Hq AGF ("iq:r 1945) Jt p 16.

32 M<>.rsh'l1l" op cit" p 56.

3311The Rim", Tirrr3 1:n.£!:I'l.Z jne (22 Febru13.ry 1943), P 5.

34Fifth Army Histt"lry, Vol VII (W'lsh ington: Go~rernment Print ing Office).
p 109 "nd 131.

35Mp.,4 Gen :M~rtin Schmidt, HEmployment "f P<l.nzor Units in CentrBl It'l1y,
"["I r De pA. rtm:::nt Inte rr ng"lt i '"'n Re p<:'rt (July 1947).

93

 CRAPl'ER 5

cm;ctusIoN

This portion of the repnrt on "Armor in Mount"\inous Wqrf'3.re in i"lorld

WI'J.1" II" is d8votod to 'l summ"lrv of the conc Ius ions rel:\ched by the Committee

qnd 1:\ short discussion of those mndificqtions in current t~ctics, or~"lniz~-

tion, "lnc !T1"ltoriel which S80m desir~ble. It must be emph'3.sized th~t these

sU~~0stinns p.re editori"ll in ch~r"lcter. representing the considered opinion

tqtion is provided, the intent inn h'3.s been meroly t~ shed '3.dditi('\n~l light

or tr- pro 1T ide ''In unusu"ll vievrpoint. Tbe Committee fl3els th'lt "Imple .iustifi­

C$l.tjon for its conclusions "llr'3'3.dy h'3.s been presented in tbe body of this

report. Th"l presently org:qnized "lnd equipped ArIPored Dj'trision is the unit

tOWJl.rds which the Sugg0stions f·:;r ch"lnP:G, .. d~Tp.nced in th 1S study, "J.re !3, i!T16d;

s~fiC8.l1y, '1S the Armored Divisi('ln is "Iffectod bV the problems pec1l1hr

t~. .Ilount t:l. i n opo r"\t j ons."

At first g:l"J.nce it might '3.ppep.r tbp.t the employment of '3.rmored units

in D0untqins offers limited oPJortunities for '3.chievement or success. The

Corr:mittec feels th8.t the discussion to this point b<ls proved th'3.t this is

not entirely true. Time qi'ter time in Worle Wp..r II. t.mks were used in "in_

"lccossible" pll'J.ces t() the cb'3.e:rin of tbe vre"lk-heqrted or less ingenious

com~nd9r.

Cert"tin 'c0nsidcr~ti()ns I'lt ,T"lrhmce with open fir.:hting do <l.rise. Our

b~sic c()nc~pt 0f ~rmo~ed t~ctics must be modified only to tbe extent required

by the unusu<:llly rugced terr~in. Org<l.niz"ltion for combqt c~lls for !3, keen

~ppreci~tion of t8rr<l.in f<l.ctors. Lo~istic~l support of '3.rmored units in the

mount"lins presents ~n incre"lse~ w(lrk loqd f'l.nd dem<:lnds ingenuity on the P"trt
~,

94
 of '111 concerned .. An undorst8.nding of the nhysiC'llodc8.1 !'Iud risvcholoe:lc~l
",-­
foct of mount8.inous torrl'lin on personnel is t'Gquired. Some modificl3.tion

of the 1)quinment of tho Armorod Division will impro,re its trJ3.ffiOll.bilit~t'

mobility.. 8.nd firepOl'ler .. Adequ'lte equipment tind 11 80urtd Pt'ocombtit trt:lining:

~~m tiro prerequisites fo~ sudOess 0f I1rID0red units in tho mount~ins.

Ptesent I1trnorod tticticl1l doctrin~ is flexiblo enou~h fot' I'\pplic~tion

in 'TP,rvine: situ8.tions. The key to its 8.pplict:ltion in mountl1ins lios in the

chl1rtictoristics of tho mount'1ins thomsel,res. In gen0rJ3.1. tho rugp;od I1nd

close mount" inous terrJ3.in requires the employment of so,rerl1l columns sprotid

out like the fi~ers of 8. hl1nd. ~ll ·columns movin~ in one direction on J3.

bro!'ld front. El1ch column probes for 8. W8l1k point. Etich column is weighted

then pourine: throuJ:!:h the hole. to converge upon decisive points. This tl'lkes

/--'1st tid'Ttint8.lt8 of the inhoront mobility I1nd shock power of "lrmor. The ntitur­

.1 CO"lror "nd security pro,ridod by mountti inous tert'ti in m~y reduce the number

of trocps nocessl1ry for flqnk protoction. But it must nC'lt be tf\K-on for

side.

Throughout the operl1tion the I1tt'3.cK-or must h'3 w~ry of (WGr-oxtending

his forces. The width 0f his front is determined bv the depth he C1-1n pro~ridc

with supportine: troops. Tho comITI8.ndor mus-t use his rescrves to provido dopth

to his position. thus ~dding to fl~nk protection: tho more troops 8.v~il1-1ble

for reser"TG s. the widor his front C'l.n be. LllCk of 1l;1tsr1-11 rOlid nets limit

mutu8.l support by the ~tt~cker forces "nd llltgrl1~tes the problem of coordi­

!l1ltion. Limited ob.ioctj,·os p.re Ildhored to. The loe:jsticlll sunport is kept tiS

f'lr for~'ffl.rd ~s possible ,>nd protected from t'l'l.iding pl'l.rties mo'rine: on foot.
",--..

95
~ 1 fore~s ondoSlvdr to control thllt I!round wh ich '1 ffords good observ8.tion

Ilnd fields of fire., This f~ctor sometimes becomes more importqnt in determin~

in~ the plqn of mqneuver thlln the securing of q pqrticulqr terr~in feqture

simply bocquse it is held by the enemy•. True~ the enemy will usuqlly hold

tho key terrll1n feqtures~ but seldom cqn he defend them 8.11. Thus. the enemy

c8.n be encirclod qnd isol8.tod by 8.n qttllckine force operqtinl! on 8. bro8,d

front. The m8.ximum strength thqt the terrqin will pormit cqn thon be brought

fot"W'8.rd qnd committed in <l decisb'€ 3 qss8.ult qg:8.inst his defense.

In the defense q broqd front must be qssumed with 10c8.1 reserves 8,t

oqch strong point. The def8nse is chqrqcterized by docentr~lizod control.

Resorves mqy be committed piecemeql in this sense. It is emph8.sizod thqt in

qll mountllinous oper8.tions s~ll tqsk forces 8.re formed, eqch force self

supporting. This is neceSS8.ry becquse q lqrge body of troops cqnnot move

~ ~

ch f8.cility in the mount8.ins. During th~ conduct of the entire operqtion,

ooordinqtion qnd control is very difficult. This me~ns thqt detqiled prior

plqnning qnd strong leqdership qre qbsolutely nocess<lry. Eqch smqll force

oommqnder must be selected with groqt cqre since he must be grqnted qn un­

usu~l degree of quthority qnd independenc~ of qction.

The present org8.nizqtton of the 8.rmored division should permit it to

operqte over mountqinous terrqin without m<l.ior chqnges. It f~cilitlltos rqpid

orgqni,?;qtion of the smllll bqV'mcod teqms neC6SSqry in tho mountqins 8.nd its

offjcers qre experienced in the control of th'3se forces. However. the qr­

tillery now 8.V8.ihble in the l'lrmored di'~Tision does not qpoetlr I3.doqul'lto for

oper~ting in the mountqine. Tho or~l3.nic qrtillerv of the present I3.rmorod

division is designed to G'.:ive the comml3.nder minimum support fire durine: com­
~. : oporl'l, t'lons on qverl3.ge terrq·in. ~Tho compl3.rl3.tively long rl3.ne:os of the

96

r- 'mtil ".lnd 155rnm howitters will provide <ldequ"l.te fire support on leve 1 terr"l.in,'

HOll'rever. fire support in mount A in ope rqt ions demqnds q high proport ion of

close, hi!!:h <lnl1:le fire. The 4.2 inch mortqr is well suit"ld to pro 1r ide this

type of fire. so it is belioved th"l.t one or more b"l.ttl'llions should be qttqch~

od to tho division. A comp~ny of 12 mort"l.rs would provide tbe S"l.me supnort

P.S ~ l05mm howitzer b"l.tt~lion when massed fires qre employed "l.nd hqs the qd­

v!'tnt"l.e::o of clefJrine:: bie:h rn"l.sks I'lt short rqne:es. The compl'lny's three pll'ltoon

orl!;"l.niz"l.tion lends itself to detqchment for support of Sn1"l.ll te"l.ms. Tbo mor­

t".lr should be se If-prope lled. The 1N'9<lse I-type vehicle (M29 C"l.r!!:o Cqrrier), "l.

personnel c"lrrier. or the hqlf-tr"lck C"ln be modified to C"l.rry this we"l.pon.

Another component of the division qrtillery will be found insufficient for

r­be required to protect vital localities far in excess of its present cap!'t­

.lities. The division may be expected to employ srnlill forces over Ii rela­

tively lar!!:e areli} elich must h".lve AAAW protection. If the committee recom.

mendation is favorably considered. the division will acquire more mort"lrs.

Each mort"lr incre"lses tbe need for !'tnt 18, ircr"lft protecti on. Supplies will

move over ml2ny roads. throul!;h numerous defiles. and into widely scattered in­

stallations. It seems obvious that qn increasine:: amount of antiaircraft pro­

tection is required and th!'tt the clipabilities of the one battalion presently

a~ilable are not sufficient tor this type of operation.

The ratio of inflintry in the !'trrnored division is "ldequlite for moun­

tain operations. Inf"lntry provides close~in support to t"l.nks, points out

suitable tare:ets. "l.nd rn"l.y even lead the tanks through difficult terrain.

Tanks, in turn. give the infemtry direct fire support and antitlink protection.
r-­

97

 Engineers ~ssist in overcoming terrain obst~cles presented bv st~ep

slopes" stream, and enem:,r mines ot' deblolitiohs. The deml'!l.nd for their ser,rices

increases sharply due to the requirements imposed by mountain oper~tions~ Ser­

viee elements will require their help in road rep~ir "lnd ~inten~nce" head­

quqtters must be du~ into the rocky soil, and artillery emplacements must be

constructed. The front line units, too, will swell the demand for ene:ineer

services. Above all, en/Z:insers are essential for brin.e:in.e: tanks to "im_

possible" locl'l.tions to astound the enemy "ind assure success. The solution

would appear to be ~dditional engineer troops, preferably with he~vy equip­

mente
Adverse weather .. sC"l.rcity of roads jO mine fie Ids. and transportation

difficulties make the matter of supplyin~ an armored division a serious prob­

/--­ lem. The t"l.ctical employment of sm"lll task forces in

:oblem of control.
mount~in ~~/Z:r~vates

Weather I'Ind bl'ld roads tl'lX the endurance of supply ve­

tho

hicles. The commander has few roads from which to select a main supply route.

Normally the Main Supply Route will not sccomodate ~o-way traffic. Two rO"l.ds

should be selected when possiblo; one for fo~rd movement ~nd the oth~r for

return traffic. In mountains tho time-distance factor is gre'ltor thqn jn war­

fare over open terr~in.

Mountain fi~htin~ demands docentralization of the supnly offort with

I'l. minimum loss of overall control. Each task force employs combat trains

cqrryine: broken loads. This provents nUIDOrous round trips durin/Z: resupply

procedures. An incrFlased baeic IMd is carded by 1'111 vehicles" especially

Class III and V supplies.

Durin~ defensi,re operations supplies can be btought fot"'l'lard and dumped

r- '.side the battle position. The supply vehicles then can be placed nGt::Ir the

98

 · of the position or used for other purposes. If successive positions

are to be defended. thesl'lvehicles can be used to stock pile supplies in the

new are!'l.~ This procedure pres1)pposes th~t the forW'ird units will exh'iust

tbe pre'lTious ly dumped suppliss before Vl\c~tinll: the 11 reli.

All mount'1 in operl'ltions req1Jire phnnine: to the most minute data 11.

Coordin!'l.tion by the st~ff with qll commanders is of gre~t import~nce. More

dependence is pl!'l.ce upon individufl.ls than under normfl.l combllt conditions.

Mo,remem: of supplies fot'Wl'lrd is normally slower; therefore, !'l. grellter per...

centqge of fl.ll supply items are carried with assaulting units as a sllfety ffl.c­

tor.

tvlr:dntennnce support must ':le closely tier} in with supply. Like supply

fl.ctivities, the m~intenllnce effort is decentr~lized but central control is

/'''''-'1b:J.ined. Individual soldiers experienced in the ~rt I'\nd prfl.ctice of

....dId expedients is !'l. must. £,'fec""JqniC6 ShOllld be c<tp"lhIe of rBpairine: 'iny

type of vehicle. Restricted roqd nets wi 11 often prec Iude e'~~cul'l.tion of va ..

hicles to tbe re"l.r. On m!1ny occ'lsions, prompt recovery <:Ind rep<:dr of ve­

hicles lit the scene of dj fficulty becomes q requisite to 'ldv!1nce the unit.

The sp<>co f'lctor i.a of conC'3rn to tbe commfl.nder. He must see th"tt best poa­

slhle $=J.re'lS pre "I11oc~ted for 111'lintAn"'.nce "lcti'I'Tities.

The desil?:n of vehicles is 'i.ffected by the terrq.in. A btnk c~~ble of

climbing e;r'1dients !'l.S steep q.s 45 d'3g:reos', trl'l'rersing n'lrrow mount'1in trl3.ils,

qnd of ~uch construction QS to m8ke possible shp.rp turns is necess~ry. The

present t'?nk requ ires more horse pow·')r per ton. Engines ShOl11d be cl":lpqble

of functioning qt 12,000 feet ~ltjtude. The tr~cks of ~rmored vehicles such

as tho tl3.nk or personnel c~rrier should be wider thqn on present models.

,..-­
ty sev~n to thirty inches insto9d of the present 22 inch trqck should be

99

 j1)l'.\te. The ~ ir cooled engine <mo short r~dius turning ~bj 1 itv of the M46

t~nk is q step in the ri~ht direction, but this t~nk is too wide for moun­

tl'l.in oper"ltion. Its ~n will not elev"lte or depress sufficiently to meet the

extl'e~e r€ q uirements in mount8in fighting. The ground cle~r~nce of our qr­

mored vehicles. in genel'",l, is too low for use in mount~ins. A hi~h ground

cleQr'1nce without Sl1.crific in/?: low silhouette would be the ide~ 1 ch8.rl'l.cteris­

tic.

Sn'8.11 full-tr"tck- vehicles 'lpproxim'ltely 60 inches wide, C8.p8.ble of

turnin~ cOIPulete ly "Iround on 40 d'3l"l'ee slopes. J!Jnd h"l-ul in~ he8.VY pqylo"Olds be­

come neceSS"lry for personnel e~·rpCl)"ltion. Such vehicles would be excellent

for tho tl'''lnsport of supulie s c lose to the front line s t) nd would serve for

reconnp.issqnce p.nd p8.trol 8.ctivitv. FUll-trp,cked vehicles simil"lr to the

~..,red p3rsonnel cnrrier m~y h.."ve to repll'lce wh'3el vehicles for trl'msporting

t>_tlplifls from r(l~r l1.re"s to fr("lnt line units. They wCluld require modific'l­

tion in the Wfly of wider trl'lcks "md thG c<1pl'lbilHy of negooti"lting lro de~ree

turns in one motion.

No r-tt'mored unit should oper'lte in mount", inous country without prior

trllining: which would condition the troops to mountqin comb'lt. An Army Ground

Force report "lttributed Germqn successes in the B'llk~ns to the presence of

'lrmored units specific8lly tr'lined for mount '1 in oper~tions. Likewise" the

British f!=!ilure in Norwp,y W":lS c~l:sed by httvine: no troops tr!3.ined to oper'lte

in mount"linous terr<l.in. A progr-:m of tl'''lin:ing is neceSS'1.ry for physicl'll

conditjoning ~nd the de"'elopment "r inithtjve for self-cg.ra on the p"',rt of
the tr00Ps ... The extr!'). wor.'k" IOf1d, hll':her Il1titude. 8nd usu'llly severe

w8<lther conditi0ns phce I'!, pr0mium on (tood hG"llth. The sense of isohtion"
~.

of securit~T pro"lrided b:,r proximity to med iOI) 1 fqc iUt1es .. ~s found in

100

 ffi'll operAtion, incre~ses the need for strong nerves ~nd mentql st~minq.

Etleh soldier nrust reco:ive tr".iningo in self-<:Idministrqtion of first qid. He

shOl]ld be drilled in the rulos ".nd nrp,ctice of tnilit"lrv s~nit"ltion. Dili­

q:ence in s~fe conduct And individl1~1 t'llertness to d"lnr.er 'ire import"lnt in

mount~in comh~t.

Tr"ining in smqll unit t~ctics must be emphqsiz~d. TechnicAl trqin­

in~ in vehicle mqintenqnce, sefvicin~ of weApons, p,nd C"lre of individuql

equipment should bG stressed. All commqnders must be <!lert <mo experienced

1.n the employment of qttqched units. They must undo::rst"lnd the qpplicc,tion

of t"ctics peculil'lr to mounbdn fightine:. Et)ch individuj:>.l Sht:) 111d k-now how

to obt<dn thr;, m'lximum officiencv froIP hjs we"'oon. Sp.lv'l.ge t'lnd rep"lir ser­

vice will not b~ re'ldily ",t 1'''Ino. This "'.pplies equ"llly to yehicles "nd

~or equ ipment. Tl'!nk crewmen should bo trq inad to fight "'s i'rlf"lntrymen

,..dn U.e need ""rises; e spec iJ>.lly in 01)tgu()rd dutv wh j Ie in bivQlll'lc, or wr.en

the ir t"'nlrs 'lre immobi1 ized. Cooper8.ti(ln between tb3 foot soldier "md the

mounted soldier is pqr'lmnunt.

Troops should pr'1ctice plp.cinz vehicles :in the Trost difficult firing

n!)sj-t~ nns jn selected rU!l:P'Gd ter-t"n.in; "l.!'!d units should be reqllired te> fire

from t~ese p0sitjons. Field expedients should be emph~sized in 6V"lcuqting

he"l"ITilv "Irmored vel-1ic1es from ltimpfl.ss"lblel1 torr"in. All cmnrr,"lnders should

be tr"lined to find their l"~y throu9.:h the roughest terrl'lin. Const"lnt prl'l.ctice

in tr,,: i l find in~ will P'W off i":·men.sllrtlbly in comb"lt.

Modern "!rll'ored tl1ctics "'r'3 ,"mply flexible for 0ffanse or defense in

mount"linous terr"tin. Succoss in ths l,1se of qrmor under "ld,rerse conditinns

will Ulp.ke gren.t dem"lnds upon tho skill, equipment, time, "lnd Gner~y of the
.~
l"l.nd. The use (If c:rmor in unexpected phcGS mp..y me<1n tho difference be ..

101

 n victory ~nd defeat. It is certain th~t the emplo\~nt of armor justi­

fie s the effort invobr"ld. This study le~ds to but one conclusion: IT CAN

BE DONE.

102

·,r--.
APPENDIX I

Incident to qssembling d~t~ for this report~ the committee ~de ~

sur~rey of the 'lrmored units thlOl.t foueht in mountl1inous terr<:lin. This ~ppen-

dix show's the list of units, ~s to divisions qnd sepflrqte t"lnk b"lttp.lions.

qnd the c<lmp1'liJ?:ns foue:ht wh'3re mountp inous terr"lin WI'\S encountered.

P',rt two of this "lpnendix shows q further brel?kdown, dividin/?: the

<:',rmoroc units~ both qrmored divisions qnd sepl'l.r<'ltl9 to:m1< bqtt'llions, by th"3

PART I

Divisions C"lmpq ig:ns where Mount'! inous ~VJ).rfp.re were conducted

1st Tunisi"l, Nl'l.plos-Foggi<'l, Rome-Armo, N. Apennines

2nd Ardennes
3rd Ardennes
4th Ard i 3nnes
,r-­ 5th Ardennes
6th Arde I1nf3S
7th Ardennes
8th Ardennes
9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes

44th· I.eyte, Luzon, S'1m'::r Ishmd

70th Tunisi'l, Ardennes
19lst Nil pIe s FOl1;gi"l
701st Rhinehnd
702nd Ard :3nnes, Rhinehnd
f

707th Ardennes, Rhine l<'lnd

709th Ardennes, R'bjnohmd
711th Okirmwa
712th Ardennes, Hhjnehnd
735th Ardennes
736th Ardermes, Rhinehnd
737th Ardl) nne s
740th Ard';Jnnes
741st Ardennos, Rhjnelrmd
743rd Ardennes .. Rhjne l"lnd
. '(44th Ardennes
,,----745th Ardennes, Ehinehnd
46th Ardennes II Rhinelrmd
"48th Ardennes, Rhjnehnd

103

r­
750th A~dennes, Rhinel8.nd
751st Tunisi8., North Apennines
752nd Tunisil3., N~ples Fog~iq, Rome-Arno, North Apennines
7531'<1 Sicily, N~ples Foggi8., Rome-Arno, North Apennin~s, Rhine­
hnd
754th North Luzon
755th Nqp1es Foggiq, No~th Apennines
'756th N'3.ples Fo~giq, Rome-Arno, Rhine1'1nd
757th N"'p1'3s Fogg:il3.. Rome-Arno, North Apennines
759tb Rhin0hnd
760th Nqplos FOI':)!:il3., Rome-Arno, North Apennines
761st Rhinehnd, Ardennes
763rd Leyte, Okinn,wl;\
77lst Rhinell3.nd, Ardennes
772nd Rhinehnd
7'74th Rhinelqnd, A~dennes
775th North Luzon
777th Rhinehnd
77Ptrl Rhinehnd
78lst Rhinel'3.nd
784th Rhinehnd
786th Rhinehnd

Allied Divisions
,--.

1st British Tunisil3., North Apennines

6th British Tunisi'3., Ron:e-Arno, North Apennines
7th British Tunis it>. .t l'T!),pl'9s FOI.":p'il'\
5th C8.n<ldhn Rome-Arno, North Apennines
6t\-1 S(luth Afric~n Rome-Arno, North Apennines
1st Franch Rh5nehno, Centrl'll Ell rope
2nd Fr'3nch Rhj ne l",nc1 .. Cent 1''1 1 Europe
5th Fr'1nch Rhinehnd, Centr'11 Europe

104

 APPENDIX I
PART II

PAC IFIC THEATER

Tank B'3,ttalions Camp~igns Particip~ted in

44th Leyte,. Luzon, S~mp.r Is l'lnd

7l1th Okinl3.wl3.
754th North Luzon
763rd Le yte, Ok i nl3.wa
77th North Luzon

EUROPEA:' THEiSER OF OPERAT IONS

Armored Divisions

2nd Ardennes
3rd Ardennes
4th Ardennes
5th Ardennes
6th Ardennes
7th Ardennes
8th Ardennes
9th Ardennes
11th Ardennes

T"nk Blltt13. lion

70th lirdennes
701st Rhinehnd
702nd Ardennes, Rh:inehnd
707th Ardennes, Rhinehnd
709th Ardennes, Rhinehnd
7l2nd ,t\rdennes, Rh ine Illnd
735th Ardennes
736th Ardennes, Rhine l"nd
737th Ardennes
740th Ardennes
741st Ardennes '" Rhine l"nd
743rd Ardennes, Rhino hnd
744th Ardenne s
745th Ardennes I Rhinehmd
746th Ardennes, RhinAhnd
748th Ardennes, Rhino It3.nd
750th Ardeymes, Rhincl·md
753rd Rhino 1l1nd
756th Rh:inell'l.nd
759th Rhjno 113.nd
761st Rhjnehnd, Ardennes
771st Rh ine hnd, Ardenms
772nd Rb j ne l"lnd

105
 774th Rhinel"ind, Ardennes

777th Rhineh,nd

778th Rhineb.nd

781st Rhh16h,nd

784th Rhinel1md

786th Rhinehnd

MEDITERPJ'.NEAN TEE1,TER OF OPERATIONS

'[""or; d D5, vis ions

1st Tunisill. Nl'lples Foe::e:i1':l., Rome-Arno" North

Apennines

70th Tunisi~
191st Np.ples Fog:e:i1':l.
751st TuniSlll, Nc,rth Apennines
752nd Tunisi~, Nqples Foggil'l, R~me-Arno, North
I.pennines
753rd Sicily, Np.ples Fog~i~, Rome-Arno, North
Apennines
755th }kples Foe:/dn, North Apennines
756th NI3. ple s F('Igg'i~, Rome -Arno
757th J:.1"lples Foe:lri~,I Rome-Arno, North Apennines
760th N1':l.ples FOE!:e:il'l, Rome-Arno, North Apennines

100

 APFENDIX II

FACTORS TO BE CONSIDEHED IN MOUNTb.INOUS OPEPJ.TIOJ)TS

As "In "l.id for future mOl.mt'dnous operl'l.tions the committee hl'l.s f'"'und

cert~ in fqctors 11\0}; icr: phy "l.n import"lnt p"l.rt in mount"l in opor"l.tions. Adequ"lte

CCll1sidertltion of these fqctors rnnv help !i"lT0id llnnecessp.rily hiil:h C(lst in lives

'md oqlliprrent in futur') Qr1"1orod (lpor!'J.tions in lil(lunt"l.ins. Listed for the

r8<l.der l s c("InsidorG.tion "\"('0 s'31oct;;::d pertinent fl'lcts ''inC. f"lctors in mount"linous

operrtions:

1.. Mount" in wG'1thlJr is ch"l.r".lcterized both in suU'rrer ~nd winter by in­

c lemenc:,!~, or by l".lrge teIT'per"lture differences hr:l'b¥een night ~nd d<l.Y II 1'tnd by

SlH"aer, "nd 10c".ll17. "lC "ltmospheric d j st'lrb"lnc8S, such I'lS violent snow storms.

rl3. in "l.nd fo/!, •

." --'
2. Smoke from firee in th-::; v<il1ev will often rise in "l. column th",t

cl3.n be seen fClr miles.

3. Li/!,hts "It night C'1n be GO'3n from distp.nt v;siblt:j p6"lks.

4. It is difficult to m'lneU~Ter support qnd r'3S8rve units to execute

counterp.tt"'.ck plfJ.ns.

5. R"tion needs of the troops I'lre jncro"lsed bv the rigors of terr"l.in

6. Mountl'\jn rO"l.ds or tr<dls usually '1r0 unimpro,rod but plissl3.ble.

7. EVf'\cullticn of wounded in m('lunt<dn w'1rfA.re prQs€ n ts 11 difficult Drob­

lem.

efficioI"cy.

,,- 9. Low frequency 'Clmplitude modul"l.ted ro:;dio sets I'l.ro better suited for

-l'1tq in cotnmunj c«t j on thq.n 1<'.1;1.

107
 10. The use of rel~y sets on top of m~sks Wj~~id hj~h frequency

r~d10 sets in crossing these m~sks.

11. Long lines of sight ~fford excellent use of visu~l sign~l syst8ms

Ilnd "lssume incr"l~sed import':mce in the mountl3.jns.

12. Decentr".\liz~tion of comml;lnd is chllrl3.cteristic of mountl3.in oper"ltions •.

COmnJ"l.nders of 8ubordin13.t8 units must "lSsume more responsibility thlln usulll.

13. Combl3.t in high mountl;lins demllnds ~re~t det~il in pll3.nning "lnd

prop'l.rfC,tion.

14. Ad.il'l,cent units frequentlv "lre unl3.ble to provide mutu13.1 support.

15. Sm~11 forces of mount"lin troops C"ln prevent the movqment of mqin

forces by impeding qnd h"lr"lssing th~rn.

16. The focal points of mount"lj ns 'l.rl'l he ights.

17. Ad~nces "Ire m"lde 13.1ong ridges r'l.ther th"ln through the naturlll Ilvenues

ippro"lch.

18. Djstl3.nce is me'lsured in time rl3.ther th"ln spllce.

19. MountA.in terr'iln lends itself p"lrticuhrly well to surprise •.

20. In climbing by foot, the use of b8l1s of the feet ~lone should be

"lvoided.

21. ClimM.ng tire s the he"lrt "lnd lune:s; descendi~ C'l.uses !!:r6"lt muscuhr

fl3t il1:u':3.

22. Reconnaiss'l.nce of routos of m"lrch should b'1 m~d'3 r.md r01ltes s"llected

on the b'l.sis of tactiC'l.l security.

23. Cilre must be t'l.ksn to select an ob.iective which C'l.n be reached with ..

in time "lv"lil'l.ble.

24. The de fender.' should ~u~rd <1i"S1 inst surpriso r~ ids by 1'lrmored a laments
~
'ling of rOlld blocks .. mjnes, ~nd AT guns.

108
 Thll clipture of v'lnt"l/?;o points for I'lrti 11ary obserVl'l.tion must be

26. Once I?:"lined. cont~ct should neV"'lr bo lost. beC"luse it t~kes time

to r'loonnoit'3r onemy positions. <and I'l.void tIlmbush.

27. Dominnnt terrl'l.in provides the d~fender, ~nd donies the ~tt~cker

obs~rVl'l.tion <and firin~ positions.

28.e It is oft'Jn impossib1.; to turn whic1f:ls I'l.round on mount~in roqds.

29. Extensive engineer work is required for construction, m'linten~nce.

improvem~nt. <and rep~ir of routes of cowmunic~tion.

30. Roqds should not b0 built ~lon~ crcsts of ridges.

31. Underground w~tor giv1s considerqb1'9 troub1o in roqd m~inten~noe.

32. Medic'll ~id sections sboulu operqte close to front line troops.

tlt'lins.

34. Mountqin Wl9~thor c~n 0'" '3ith'Jr q dJingBrous obst",c1e to opert:ltions

or I'l. vp.1ul).b1e ,dd. ~ccordine: to how well it is understood ~nd whqt ~dVtl.ntfige

is tqken of its pecu1i~r chqrS'\ct',ri stics.

t'lnk oquipment.

36. The doop$r th~ snow, tho more it h"'m~)rs 'lnd c'lnq1i~Gs the movement

of columns.

37. Mov~) Silmrnunition I).nd r'ltions 'lS fl'lr fOrw<lrd Sl.S possjble durine: dqrk­

ness ~ in ordl1r to rJduce p"lcking ,,"nd h'lnd cqrry.

36. Trqffic control must b'J rigidly ml'1"intqined to pro'l''9nt tr~ffic con­

g0stion ~nd d~l~y.

".-..

109
 39, Prio~ to ~nd durin~ op0r~tions in stoep terrqin th~ s~fety devicee

of ~ll V8hiclos must be chockod continu~lly~ since fqilur~ on the ~rt of

~ny m~y hqVB dis~strous results.

40. In cold 'iYO'lthor "lnd hi~b mountp..ins, sp<3l)d of evqcu~tion is vit~l.

41. Litt'3r h'luls must be kept '1.8 sbort tlS tho t9.ctic-=al situ-=ation will

prJrmit.

42. Night eV"Icu"lti0n O"l.r'1r rou~h t"jrr"lin is g"lner<ll1y iIl1prllctic'lble, "Ind

tho r"lsults qr<; r"lrely corrmensurqte with the, effort.

43. During evqcu'ltion O"I.Tor q cliff or down ~ very stp.ep slope, the

cqsuqlty must be securoly fixed to th0 litter.

44. Cqrri~r pig~on8 ~r0 convsnient "lnd ~lu'lble rneSS6n£ers in tho moun.

bdns, '3 spociql1y for forw'1rd d'Slt'3-chments.

,--- 45. N'311 tr'lined moss(m~er dogs 'lrEl d0p:mdqble qnd m9.Y be useful in

.!bdn oper"ltions.

110

 CO MR1NfD ARM'S rlE SEi\ Ft CH lI8 RA ~'"

"J~1 L i'AVE~WO. 1H KS

: 1 ! I I'I I3I ,! 11695

11I i ; I,~ li:00324
1 11~' ~lrl il~ I I ! I I :~ 'li, 1 ~
2930