NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

Failing to Mass: Shortfalls in the Joint Operational

Planning Process

By
MAJ Ian Davis

15 March 2010

Dr. Kalev Sepp

SO3880
History of Special Operations

Word Count: 2,524

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Failing to Mass: Shortfalls in the Joint Operational Planning Process

The Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) can be characterized as a battle

between legitimate states and a global network of affiliated belligerent states and dark networks

that rely on violence for achieving their goals.1 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

Report found that the rise of new powers, the growing influence of non-state actors, the spread of

weapons of mass destruction and other destructive technologies, and a series of enduring and

emerging socioeconomic trends will pose profound challenges to international order and that

America must take a Whole of Government (WOG) approach that integrates all instruments of

national power to advance our nation’s interests and support common goals.2 The WOG

approach is not a new concept. Clausewitz submitted that war is a mere continuation of politics

by other means, all wars may be regarded as political acts, and that purpose of defeating the

enemy in war is to induce him to make peace.3 If the desired end state of war is to return to

peace, then the WOG policies and plans must synchronize all of the instruments of national

power to achieve mass at the decisive point in order to achieve national objectives. While the

U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) uses the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) for

operational design, its bounded process limits WOG massing and synchronization of the

instruments of national power at the operational level to achieve strategic objectives.

This essay will discuss the current shortfalls in JOPP to synchronize the WOG and the

elements of national power. The gaps are generating inputs, operational synchronization of the
1
Jörg Raab and H. Brinton Milward, "Dark Networks as Problems," Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory 13, no. 4 (Oct, 2003), 413, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?
did=638288271&Fmt=7&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed October 19, 2009).
2
Robert Michael Gates and United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,[2010]),
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed February 10,2010).
3
Karl von Clausewitz, "On War," in [Von Kriege] (New York: Random House Modern Library, 2000),
249, www.modernlibrary.com.
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elements of national power, and transition from war to diplomacy. The outcome of the analysis

will offer recommendations to update the planning process to better incorporate the WOG in

operational planning.

Generating Inputs

WOG collaboration during problem identification is the first essential step to develop a

plan that synchronizes all of the elements of national power to achieve national objectives. Joint

Publication 5-0, Joint Operational Planning, provides the framework for conducting joint,

interagency, and multinational planning activities across the full range of military operations

based on the Adaptive Planning (AP) initiative. Adaptive planning is defined as “the joint

capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require.”4

Adaptability, and subsequently operational agility, is contingent on the commander’s

understanding of the external environment and his ability to rapidly adjust his plan in order to

achieve success. While the DoD is well suited to close with and destroy the enemy on the

conventional battle field, the subsequent insurgencies that followed the decisive combat

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the catastrophic consequences that can occur when

the instruments of national power are not synchronized on a common objective. “Shock and

Awe” is achievable not only through kinetic mass, but also by massing all the instruments of

national power at decisive points to cause enemy culmination and set the proper conditions for

transition from war to diplomacy.

The complexity of the COE, with a myriad of state and non-state actors, predicates the

necessity to leverage all of the instruments of national power- diplomatic, information, military,

economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL)- to protect national interests
4
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff., "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning," Joint Chiefs of
Staff,
 3

and defeat and elusive and adaptive enemy.5 Globalization and technology have changed the

nature of war. Modern warfare is not restricted to armed conflict on the battlefield, but involves

all means available to the enemy to wage war. In their book Unrestricted Warfare, Qiao and

Wang describe this new method of warfare as “modified combined war that goes beyond limits”

based on the principals of omni-directionality, synchrony, limited objectives, unlimited

measures, asymmetry, minimal consumption, multi-dimensional coordination, and adjustment

and control of the process6 Similarly, Arquilla and Ronfeldt use their book, Networks and

Netwar: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, show how the networked-form of warfare

leverages technology for operational capacity and allows spatially dispersed organizations to

swarm to defeat their opponents.7(Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and United States. Dept. of Defense. Office

of the Secretary of Defense. 2001) Countering a threat that is not restricted to using traditional

weapons of war and is not bound by a conventional battle field requires a WOG approach to

mass the effects of national power against a threat for crisis resolution in an “unrestricted”

manner. Proper application of power is contingent on proper problem identification and center

of gravity (COG) analysis of irregular threats in the modern world.

The current JOPP lacks a process for problem identification in the initial steps and

assumes that the outputs of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) have correctly identified

the problem and has synchronized the National Military Strategy with WOG objectives.

Presidential guidance provides unity of action and effort to the WOG in order to execute national

5
United States and Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategic Plan for
the War on Terrorism, unclassified electronic version ed. (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2006), 38, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS66747; http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS66747 (accessed October
23, 2009).
6
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Arts, 1999),
181.
7
John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt and United States. Dept. of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense.,
Networks and Netwars : The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001).
 4

domestic and foreign policy. Although a situation may demand a military response to stabilize a

volatile situation, it does not negate the requirement for the simultaneous application of other

instruments of national power. This calls for greater collaboration between DoD and other

interagency partners at the strategic level and manifests itself as an integrated WOG force

package allocated to the Combatant Commander for execution of decisive operations. The

implementation of a problem identification step in the JOPP, designed to provide WOG

integration into the initial campaign design, will allow the combatant commander to ensure that

the outputs of the JSPS provide unified WOG solution in the operational design process.

When a crisis arises, be it a hostile threat, instability, or natural disaster, a collaborative

WOG approach to problem identification and COG analysis gives a multi-dimensional effort to

complex or “wicked” problem. 8 Operational Net Assessment (ONA) at the strategic level by

WOG stakeholders during COG analysis will identify critical threat vulnerabilities where

DIMEFIL can be applied that are beyond the capacity of the Department of Defense (DoD).9

Collaboration, synchronization, and synergy at the strategic level permits unified action to meet

national objectives and mitigate the loss of the initiative when the military action transitions the

supporting effort. Early determination of WOG priorities allows integration of non-DoD entity

requirements and priorities into the JSPS, specifically the Joint Operational Planning and

Execution System (JOPES).10 The comprehensive force package will provide an early “civilian

surge” to aid the combatant commander with operational design, campaign planning, and set the

8
T. C. Greenwood and T. X. Hammes, "War Planning for Wicked Problems - Where Joint Doctrine Fails,"
Armed Forces Journal International., no. December (2009), 18,
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/12/4252237 (accessed January 20, 2010).
9
Michael J. Hannan and NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT.,
"Operational Net Assessment: A Framework for Social Network Analysis and Requirements for Critical Debate,"
Defense Technical Information Center, February 15, 2010).
10
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WASHINGTON DC., "Joint Operation Planning," Defense Technical
Information Center,
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conditions for the seamless transition to post-conflict operations. The benefit of early

collaboration at the strategic level provides a comprehensive set of inputs to the JOPP and

identifies WOG operational and logistical requirements that commanders must incorporate into

planning and deployment.

Operational Synchronization

After receiving the JOPP inputs based on early WOG collaboration at the strategic level,

the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander can build a campaign design that simultaneously

integrates and synchronizes all of the instruments of national power at the operational level of

war. Unfortunately, this is currently not the case with the JOPP as it now stands. The current

process limits the commander to provide a military solution to what may not be a military

problem. A primarily DoD-centric, attrition-focused approach to crisis resolution violates the

principals of unity of effort and mass, and leads to lack of synchronization of strategic and

operational objectives. The lack of synchronization results in shortcomings in the campaign

design and the failure to allocated resources to mass both kinetic and non-kinetic effects.

In times of war, WOG force allocation would increase the JTF’s relative combat power

by giving him the capability to simultaneously attack the enemy’s DIMEFIL COGs. When the

operational plan is derived from the outcome of a WOG COG analysis at the strategic level, the

appropriate WOG assets will be allocated as inputs to the JOPP. This will ensure that the JTF

commander is properly resourced to employ the appropriate instruments of national power at the

operational level. The robust allocation of WOG elements to the JTF goes beyond the liaison

capacity and allows the immediate integration of DIMEFIL as the security situation permits

without delaying action for the follow-on “civilian-surge”. The additional WOG assets can be
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leveraged against the factors of time, space, and force and allow the JTF commander to deliver

the full ranges of DIMEFIL power to achieve “beyond limits” effects. These effects can be

leveraged against the enemy to simultaneously shape both the area of operations and the area of

interest. Furthermore, the additional relative combat power sets the conditions to mitigate the

collapse of governance and loss of essential services in order to prevent the catalysts of

insurgency.11 This early WOG integration into the JTF provides the commander additional

enablers to conduct transition shaping operations in parallel with decisive combat operations in

order to set the conditions for a seamless transition to governance by civil authorities and

reduction of combat troops.

When the JTF is in the supporting role during operations other than war, WOG

integration in the JOPP and JOPES is essential to deconflict assets and synchronize the area of

operations. The systematic process of the JOPP is exportable to other WOG agencies for crisis

action planning during disaster and relief operations and allows the synchronization and massing

of non-lethal effects in parallel with supporting civil-military operations. The increased

population-centric capability that the WOG provides to the JTF in the terms of field-based

subject matter experts on civil matters allows the early establishment of civil rule of law and set

conditions for the expedient reduction of the combat force footprint.

Transition to Diplomacy

Finally, the ultimate goal of war is to return to politics. This infers transition from the

main effort of military power to diplomatic power and subsequently DoD changing from the

supported to the supporting role. Because the JOPP’s previously mentioned shortfalls, transition

11
Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (U.S.), "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide," United
States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative,
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to diplomacy is tenuous at best. Recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq show the detrimental

effects when the civil rule of law during post-conflict (Phase-IV) operations is not part of the

initial campaign plan. Seth Jones argues that the cause of the Afghan insurgency is the collapse

of governance and the lack of essential services following the fall of the Taliban.12 Early

planning and allocation of assets for the WOG to immediately initiate Phase-IV shaping

operations on D-Day, as the security situation permits, will help alleviate the conditions that

spawn insurgency and promote a safe and secure environment. “WOG-forward” allows the JTF

commander to leverage DIMEFIL to simultaneously defeat the enemy COGs and reinforce the

friendly COGs.

With the proper inputs from the WOG, the JOPP is an effective planning tool to react to

any threat or crisis that may arise in the COE. Without the proper inputs, planning becomes

maneuver-centric and civil-military and other population-centric operations become a low

priority. This exacerbates the collapse of governance and sets the conditions for what Kilcullen

calls “the accidental guerrilla syndrome.”13 Ideally, the desired end state of this phase is the

transition of the military from the supported to the supporting role when transitioning from war

and returning to politics. Current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the aforementioned

shortfalls of the JOPP.

Conclusion

While the JOPP is a relevant tool for military planning in the COE, it is bounded and self-

defeating in terms of WOG integration into campaign design in order to mass the instruments

12
Seth G. Jones, "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency," International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2008),
7-40.
13
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla : Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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national power to achieve national objectives. Furthermore, the JOPP and JOPES process is

predominantly oriented on the application of military power versus problem identification and

the development of courses of actions that mobilize of the WOG and leverage all instruments of

national power to resolve crisis. The lack of WOG collaboration at the strategic level does not

provide the proper inputs to the JOPP and subsequently JOPES. This lack of proper inputs does

not synchronize the instruments of national power at the operational level which limits the

massing of kinetic and non-kinetic effects to achieve strategic and operational objectives.

Finally, the lack of synchronization does not set the proper conditions for the transition from war

to politics, and as seen in recent history, can negate the success achieved during decisive combat

operations. JOPP success is contingent on the proper inputs derived from the outputs at the

strategic level that mass all of the instruments of national power based on national policy.

Extending the bounds of the JOPP to include the WOG at the strategic level will allow

the JTF commander to leverage national power at the operational level and decisively defeat

modern threats in the COE. The first step for improving the JOPP is to add a “problem

identification” step, vice receive and analyze the mission, to serve as a mechanism for

interdiction of WOG assets into the campaign design. This will facilitate the synchronization of

national power during initial planning and ensure unity of effort. The next step is to improve

interaction and coordination at the strategic level to ensure the JSPS provides synchronized

inputs to the JOPP. Finally, all appropriate WOG entities must develop deployable mechanisms

to respond to threats to national interest. These mechanisms would be synchronized at the

strategic planning level and allocated for mission execution at the operational level. These

deployable packages could then be codified in JOPES and attached to the appropriate executing

agencies during crisis. The implementation of these recommendations will ensure the massing of
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all of the elements of national power on the decisive point and lead to decisive victory and a

rapid, seamless transition from war to diplomacy.

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Bibliography

Arquilla, John, David F. Ronfeldt, and United States. Dept. of Defense. Office of the Secretary
of Defense. Networks and Netwars : The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Santa
Monica, CA: Rand, 2001.

Gates, Robert Michael and United States Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review
Report. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010,
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf (accessed February
10,2010).

Greenwood, T. C. and T. X. Hammes. "War Planning for Wicked Problems - Where Joint
Doctrine Fails." Armed Forces Journal International. no. December (2009): 18,
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2009/12/4252237 (accessed January 20, 2010).

Hannan, Michael J. and NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY

OPERATIONS DEPT. "Operational Net Assessment: A Framework for Social Network
Analysis and Requirements for Critical Debate." Defense Technical Information Center.
February 15, 2010).

Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (U.S.). "U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide."

United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative.

Jones, Seth G. "The Rise of Afghanistan's Insurgency." International Studies Quarterly 32, no. 4
(2008): 7-40.

Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla : Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Liang, Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: People's Liberation Army Arts,
1999.

Raab, Jörg and H. Brinton Milward. "Dark Networks as Problems." Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 13, no. 4 (Oct, 2003): 413.

United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operation Planning." Joint
Chiefs of Staff.

United States and Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. National Military Strategic
Plan for the War on Terrorism. unclassified electronic version ed. Washington, DC:
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006.

von Clausewitz, Karl. "On War." In [Von Kriege], 249. New York: Random House Modern
Library, 2000.
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