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Davis 1
The ROLLING THUNDER Air Campaign
Evaluate the ROLLING THUNDER air campaign. Why did it not achieve what the
Introduction
Vietnam from 1965 to 1968 failed because the U.S. tried to achieve a quick victory using
a conventional warfare strategy against an adaptive and resilient enemy that was prepared
for a protracted war. The objectives of the campaign were to coerce the North
Vietnamese to halt the infiltration of men and supplies into South Vietnam and to force
them to negotiate a peaceful settlement. To achieve these objectives, the U.S. initiated a
costs on the civil population in order to drive Hanoi to the negotiation table. The
national unification. The campaign could not achieve these objectives because of three
main reasons. First, the rural nature of the North Vietnamese population negated
supplies and materials came from external Communist supporters. Lastly, the North
took place from March 1965 to October 1968 was intended to use conventional air power
to coerce the North Vietnamese government to stop its aggression against South Vietnam.
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The ROLLING THUNDER Air Campaign
The administration believed that a limited war could be prosecuted in Vietnam and that
conventional coercion strategies based on American military air power would force the
North Vietnamese to stop infiltrating personnel and equipment into South Vietnam and
force the North to the negotiating table. To achieve these objectives, the U.S. developed
a strategy based on military doctrine and deterrence theories developed during World
and military infrastructure through the use of U.S. military air power. Civilian advisors,
the Air Force, and the Army each detailed different strategies to compel the North to the
bargaining table. Additionally, other factors influenced each strategy: driven by the fear
of direct intervention by the Soviet Union and China, the target list was restricted and
limited to South of the 20th parallel and within the borders of North Vietnam and sought
The civilian advisors proposed threatening the North Vietnamese population and
economy. Coercive airpower would threaten the North’s industrial base to create an
incentive for them not to support the insurgency in South Vietnam. The U.S. would
achieve this by destroying the North’s nascent industrial base, controlling the use of force
to safeguard U.S. hostages, gradually increase of pressure on the North, and the
simultaneous coordination of military action and diplomacy (Pape, pp. 178-180). The
Air Force recommended a plan focused on raising current costs instead of future risks by
destroying, rather than threatening, the North’s industrial base. The intent was to use
speed and shock to obliterate all industrial, major transportation, and air defense targets
MAJ Ian S. Davis 3
The ROLLING THUNDER Air Campaign
in order to weaken civilian morale (Pape, pp. 180-181). The Army plan advocated the
infiltration of men and equipment to support the insurgency in the South. By massing
effects on the North Vietnamese lines of communication, the insurgency in the South
would be pushed past its breaking point through attrition of its resources an would not be
able to sustain itself (Pape, p. 181). The three proposals were sequentially executed in a
four-phase plan, but still failed to stop support to the insurgency in the South or bring
North Vietnam to the negotiating table. Although the unrestricted conventional strategic
bombing campaigns of World War II delivered devastating effects Germany and Japan,
the limited war against North Vietnam presented different factors that essentially negated
the intended coercive capacity of conventional air power (Clodfelter, pp. 73-76).
The nature of the enemy and environment negated the desired effects of
population and industrial centers of North Vietnam. While the nations of Germany and
Japan relied on urban industrial centers for their war making capacity, North Vietnam
civilian hardship to coerce North Vietnam, the U.S. did not target civilian centers of
gravity in order to achieve the desired effects envisioned by the architects of the U.S. air
campaign.
In 1965, the North’s industrial sector produced only 12 percent of $1.6 billion
gross national product and constituted 24 targets for ROLLING THUNDER (Pape, p.
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The ROLLING THUNDER Air Campaign
189). Generally un-industrialized, the predominantly rural-agrarian population was
immune to the intended brutal effects of the destruction of industrial and economic
infrastructure. Despite the fact that the North diverted an estimated 300,000 troops and
workers to repair destroyed military and industrial facilities, the North Vietnamese people
did not perceive the U.S. air campaign as an insurmountable hardship (Lewy, p. 384).
Because of the Johnson administration’s desire to limit collateral damage and negative
political perception, critical infrastructure that supported the agrarian economy, namely
the dike system, was not deliberately targeted (Clodfelter, pp. 84-134), (Lewy, pp. 396-
406),(Pape, pp. 189-190). The U.S. targeting strategy was not focused on the appropriate
North Vietnamese center of gravity to apply pressure on the populace and achieve the
minimize civilian casualties, also limited the coercive capacity of conventional bombing
strategies. Beginning in 1965, Hanoi initiated civilian evacuation programs in all major
cities and villages that reduced the population from an estimated 50 to 75 percent by
1967. (Pape, p. 190) The unrestricted air campaigns of World War II killed or wounded
Japanese and German civilians by 3 percent and 1.6 percent respectively. Conversely,
the North Vietnamese suffered and estimated 0.3 percent casualty rate during the
ROLLING THUNDER campaign (Pape, p. 190). Because of the disbursed, rural nature
ROLLING THUNDER failed to achieve its desired effects on the North Vietnamese.
President Johnson and his civilian advisors sought to wage a limited war to stop
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The ROLLING THUNDER Air Campaign
the spread of Communism based on contemporary coercive deterrence strategies that
would directly affect the Hanoi government, without causing direct intervention by the
Soviet Union and China, and maintaining the popular support of the American people and
the international community (Herring, pp. 1-12). Despite recommendations by the Joint
Chiefs plan of accelerated interdiction focused on directly affecting the flow of personnel
and equipment to the insurgency in the South, the Johnson Administration maintained
Haiphong urban complexes. Although U.S. air power destroyed military and economic
targets in the North, the incremental pace of the attacks and sources of external support
allowed the North Vietnamese to rapidly rebuild and reinforce their infrastructure.
An inherent flaw in the U.S. strategy was that it relied on destroying the North’s
war industry and economic infrastructure without factoring in external support from the
Soviet Union, China, and Europe. Despite U.S. expenditures of $250 million per month,
the targeting effort achieved limited affects on the North’s military and economic
capacity (Lewy, pp. 378-382). Additionally, despite causing $600 million in damage to
the North’s military and economic capacity, the Hanoi government received nearly $2
billion in foreign aid, which negated the damage (Lewy, p. 395). Conversely, the U.S.
lost approximately $6 billion in aircraft alone and spent nearly $9.60 for every $1 of
damage caused (Lewy, p. 381). External support to the North Vietnamese military and
economic infrastructure and the Viet Cong insurgency in the South, eventually outpaced
While the Johnson administration wanted a low-cost, limited war, the North
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The ROLLING THUNDER Air Campaign
Vietnamese were psychologically prepared to endure long-term hardship to achieve a
unified Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia under Communist rule. While the U.S. sought to
fight a conventional war of attrition, the North leveraged the Viet Cong to wage
protracted struggle (Krepinevich, pp. 7-16). Mao’s long-term strategy is not contingent
on a timeline and seeks to gain support for a popular uprising against a government based
a unified Vietnam under Communist rule. Supporters of the Hanoi government had the
resolve to endure long-term hardships and were largely unaffected by U.S. efforts to
insurgents in South Vietnam receive only 15 to 34 tons of supplied per day from the
North (Pape, p. 192). While conventional logistics flow from rear areas to forward units,
the Viet Cong relied on the local population to provide logistics to the insurgency through
solidified with a Communist doctrine that resonated with the rural population prepared to
endure hardship, and relatively low requirement for external support, did not make the
use of conventional air power a feasible option to increase civilian costs to meet
conventional coercion.
against the North Vietnamese population and industrial base. According to Clodfelter,
Vietnam, preserving the Great Society, securing a favorable American image overseas,
and maintaining the support of Western allies (Clodfelter, p. 118).These objectives drove
tight initial restrictions of bombing North of the 20th parallel, 30-mile radius from the
center of Hanoi, 10-mile radius from the center of Haiphong, and within 30 miles of
China. Furthermore, President Johnson and his civilian advisors severely micromanaged
the conduct of daily tactical operations and directed where, when, and how U.S. pilots
would execute the bombing missions. Their targeting guidance was often confusing and
not developed with input from the Joint Chiefs. Initially, only 94 of the Joint Chiefs’ 242
183). Arguably, the ROLLING THUNDER campaign could have stopped the flow of
support to the insurgency in South and brought the Hanoi government to peaceful
negotiation if it were not for the restrictions imposed by the Johnson administration.
While the restrictions imposed by the Johnson administration did cause internal
friction, they did not account for the failure of ROLLING THUNDER to achieve its
power was still ineffective at diminishing North Vietnam’s resolve. By October of 1968,
the U.S. attacks on North Vietnam destroyed 77 percent of all ammunition depots, 65
percent of all petroleum storage, 59 percent of the power plants, 55 percent of the
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The ROLLING THUNDER Air Campaign
bridges, 39 percent of the railroad shops, all of explosives, iron, steel, and cement plants,
12,521 vessels, 9,821 vehicles, and 1,966 railroad cars and engines (Lewy, p. 390).
Despite the destruction, there are no indications that North Vietnam was forced into a
position to meet the ROLLING THUNDER objectives. The North Vietnamese were
Conclusion
The ROLLING THUNDER air campaign failed to achieve its objectives because
the North Vietnamese were immune to conventional coercion through the use of U.S. air
power. The rural nature of the North Vietnamese population negated conventional
inability of air power to apply the desired effects on the North Vietnamese population. A
vast majority of North Vietnam’s military supplies and materials came from external
Communist supporters that the U.S. had no intention of targeting to prevent and
escalation of the war and the direct intervention of the Soviet Union and China. More
concept of protracted warfare to achieve a unified Vietnam, something that the U.S. and
the South Vietnamese Government did not have the will or capacity to counter. While
restrictions imposed by the Johnson administration did cause civil-military friction, it was
not lead to the failure of ROLLING THUNDER. ROLLING THUNDER failed because
a limited war that relies on conventional air power is ineffective in countering an enemy
Bibliography
Clodfelter, Mark. The Limits of Air Power: The American Bombing of North Vietnam.
Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
Herring, George C. "In Cold Blood: LBJ's Conduct of Limited War in VIetnam." In The
Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History # 33, by United States Air Force
Academy, 1-24. USAFA: United States Air Force Academy, 1990.
Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithica and London:
Cornell University Press, 1996.