IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR INCREASING

THE ADOPTION AND USE OF EFFICIENT

CHARCOAL COOKSTOVES IN URBAN AND
PERI-URBAN KIGALI

May 2007

This publication was produced for the United States Agency for International
Development. It was prepared by Winrock International under a subcontract
from the Institute of International Education.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................. 1

SECTION I: INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY............................................................. 2

SECTION II: CURRENT MARKET & SUPPLY SITUATION................................................... 4

SECTION III: STOVE TEST FINDINGS ....................................................................................... 5

SECTION IV: RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................ 8

SECTION V: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION........................................................................... 16

SECTION VI: MONITORING & EVALUATION PLAN ........................................................ 21

ANEXES

ANNEX 1. CHARCOAL STOVE SELECTION FOR A PROJECT IN RWANDA ......................... 24

ANNEX 2. THE COOKSTOVE SUPPLY CHAIN IN KIGALI............................................................. 43

ANNEX 3. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS ..................................... 49

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Rwanda depends on biomass for 95% of its energy, which is derived from fuelwood (rural areas) and
charcoal (urban areas) and used primarily for cooking. This dependency on biomass and a rapidly
growing population have placed enormous pressure on Rwanda’s
natural resource base, leading to a significant fuelwood deficit.

However, this problem presents a compelling opportunity to

significantly reduce the amount of fuelwood and charcoal used for
cooking. This implementation plan, prepared for the Kigali Institute
of Science & Technology (KIST) by Winrock International with
support from USAID, presents a comprehensive strategy for
reducing the consumption of charcoal in urban Kigali, through the
sustainable, commercial dissemination of affordable, fuel-efficient
charcoal cookstoves.
The current high-quality
Canamaké stove
The Government of Rwanda’s goal – to increase the use of fuel-
efficient cookstoves to 100% of households – is extremely ambitious. This document sets out an
implementation plan that builds on existing markets and capacities, so that significant results can be
achieved in a relatively short period of time.

Winrock found during its research that a highly-efficient improved charcoal-burning cookstove
already exists in Kigali, with approximately 40% market penetration. This stove, known as the
canamaké, was found in comparative household use testing to consume approximately 33% less
charcoal than other commonly used unimproved
stoves in Kigali. Furthermore, the stove was found
Key Findings: to be well-liked by the majority of households

Canamaké stove: 40% market penetration surveyed, while the supply chain is relatively well-
in Kigali developed, with approximately 100 informal sector

Canamaké stove uses 33% less charcoal businesses manufacturing approximately 3,500
than traditional stoves canamaké stoves per month. However, one
widespread version of the stove in particular is not
Summary of Project Design: as durable as it could be. As a consequence, the

3 year program to increase canamaké canamaké’s reputation has suffered with some
penetration to 80% of the Kigali market consumers.

The implementation plan calls for a three-year program to increase canamaké penetration to 80% of
the Kigali market (or around 7,000 stoves sold per month), while improving the quality and durability
of the stove. The focus on Kigali – by far the largest single charcoal consuming market in Rwanda –
is designed to achieve the greatest impact in the shortest amount of time.

The plan consists of two major components: (1) manufacturer training, certification and quality
control to increase supply and improve quality, and (2) marketing and promotion to increase
consumer demand as well as awareness of the proper use of the technology.

A detailed description of these two components as well as background information, Winrock’s

program design and research methodology, and supporting documentation are contained within this
report.

The authors of this report are confident that its recommendations create a solid framework for
addressing one of Rwanda’s most serious environmental problems. It is recommended that the
implementation be managed by a team with extensive experience in large-scale commercial
cookstove dissemination, due to the importance of this project to Rwanda’s national objectives and
the government’s desire to achieve results quickly.

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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY

Introduction
Rwanda depends on biomass for 95% of its total energy use. However, inefficient transformation
and use of biomass and a rapidly growing population have put Rwanda’s natural resource base under
intense pressure. Excessive cutting of trees for fuel, farming, and urbanization has led to
deforestation, soil erosion, and excess run-off that has reduced the lifespan of dams and hydro-
electric plants. Lack of energy in some regions has exacerbated food security and nutritional
deficiencies, undermining the country’s efforts to meet its development objectives.

According to the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), Rwanda is running a fuelwood
deficit of approximately 4.5 million cubic meters per year. Few households in the country have
access to electricity, and LPG is prohibitively expensive for most, meaning there is little alternative
to biomass for the bulk of the population.

The problem is particularly acute in Kigali, where the population (estimated at 800,000) is growing at
around 8% per year, and 75% of households cook primarily with charcoal. Due to current inefficient
methods of charcoal production, 9 kilograms of wood is consumed to produce 1 kilogram of
charcoal. As a result, urban charcoal-using areas place a proportionately heavier burden on the
natural resource base than rural areas, with Kigali taking the largest toll of any urban area in the
country.

It is within this larger context that the Government of Rwanda announced in May 2006 its desire to
increase the use of fuel-efficient charcoal cookstoves to as near 100% of households as possible.
Soon after, KIST requested technical assistance to help design a commercially sustainable program
that could achieve these objectives. USAID agreed to assist the Government of Rwanda at the end
of 2006, by engaging Winrock International to work with KIST’s Center for Innovations and
Technology Transfer (CITT). USAID/Winrock’s main objective was to identify and analyze various
fuel-efficient cookstoves for efficiency as well as for commercial and technical viability, and to make a
recommendation of which model to promote in the urban Kigali market. A detailed implementation
plan was then to be submitted for activities leading to greater adoption and use of the model
selected.

This implementation plan and supporting documents therefore set out a concrete action plan for
achieving that goal. The plan builds on previous advances, and uses the power of the Rwandan
private commercial sector to increase the production and purchase of fuel-efficient charcoal stoves
in a sustainable manner. Winrock International has called upon individuals with many years of
experience in successful similar projects elsewhere in Africa to carry out the research and compose
this plan.

While the plan focuses on Kigali as the largest market with the best potential for significantly
reducing charcoal usage in a sustainable, commercial way, it is envisioned that some of the secondary
towns likely will be served by the market linkages created by the project. However, additional
resources would need to be allocated to an additional program specifically targeting secondary
towns to achieve similar impacts (i.e. the 80% market penetration sought in Kigali) elsewhere.

Methodology
The project design team worked in Rwanda with KIST from February to April 2007, implementing
stove testing and baseline research in 90 Kigali households, carrying out a supply chain analysis on
existing stoves from the component manufacturers to the final retailers, and researching the
promotional techniques and strategies necessary to achieve the government’s objectives. In

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addition, initial research on the history of improved cookstove programs in Rwanda and elsewhere
in Africa was begun in December 2006, resulting in the identification of the ceramic-lined “jiko”
stove originally introduced in Kenya as the most technically and commercially viable improved
charcoal-burning stove for Rwanda.

Supporting documentation from the stove selection research, supply chain analysis, and household
survey and testing can be found at the end of this implementation plan, in the section titled
“Supporting Documentation.”

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SECTION II: CURRENT MARKET & SUPPLY SITUATION
Thanks to past programs that promoted the use of improved charcoal cookstoves, a variety of stove
models with efficiencies greater than traditional cookstoves are currently produced, sold, and used
in Kigali. These include all-metal models such as the DUB 10, all-ceramic models hand-made by local
potters, and the combination metal/ceramic stove known locally as the canamaké, which originated
as the Kenya Ceramic Jiko.

Cookstoves are sold in all of the main Kigali markets. In the approximately 10 principal market sites
identified, a total of about 60 vendors sell cookstoves. Not unlike many other places in Africa, few
shops outside of these main markets carry cookstoves for sale. The majority of stoves are bought
by households from vendors. Direct purchases from manufacturer shops appear to be much less
frequent. Some manufacturers do, however, sell their stoves door-to-door.

The retail price of cookstoves in Kigali varies widely depending primarily on the quantity and quality
of the materials used in construction. At the low end is the all-ceramic stove, possibly the second
most used stove in Kigali after the canamaké stove. The ceramic stove sells for approximately 250
RWF.

The unit retail price for single burner canamaké cookstoves varies from 600 RWF to approximately
2,000 RWF, with the average in the neighborhood of 1,000 RWF. Elevated multiple burner
canamaké stoves cost much more – on the order of 5,000-10,000 RWF – and appeal to upper-
middle income households.

Surveys of both cookstove vendors and randomly-selected households in various parts of Kigali
undertaken during this study indicate that the canamaké stove is the most popular existing improved
stove, with approximately 40% market penetration (percentage of households with one or more
canamaké stove). There are three major types of canamaké stove:

1. A low-cost, low-quality single-pot version made with thin metal and inferior quality ceramic
liners and lacking in basic design elements (e.g., ventilation door, pot rests, and cement in the
mixture that allows the liner to adhere to the metal casing);

2. A slightly more costly, higher quality single pot stove made with more durable metal and
ceramic liners (both a conical and a cylindrical version exist, see photo on p.3), and

3. The elevated multiple burner stoves mentioned above. The first and second categories of
canamaké stove (i.e., the single-burner stoves) make up the vast majority of stoves sold, with
the multiple burner stoves sold in small numbers to higher income households. Certain
stove models previously promoted, such as the all-metal rondereza, are no longer produced
due to the high cost of materials and labor, and were therefore not considered commercially
viable.

Due to the canamaké’s commercial viability in Rwanda, its popularity with charcoal users across
Africa, and the stove’s high fuel efficiency, versatility, and affordability, Winrock selected the
canamaké stove to be tested in a household survey in Kigali during the project design phase. (The
criteria for selection can be found in Annex 1, “Charcoal Stove Selection for a Project in Rwanda”).
The testing showed significant fuel savings over the other commonly used stoves.

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SECT1ON III: STOVE TEST FINDINGS
The stove tests and surveys were conducted in 90 randomly sampled urban Kigali households (see
supporting documentation section, Annex 3, “Household Survey Methodology and Findings” for
more information on the sampling technique). The surveys focused on those Kigali households that
are not currently using canamaké stoves, both
to determine the reasons for non-adoption of Table 2.1 - Canamake Fuel Savings Vs. Existing Stoves
this technology, and to compare charcoal
consumption before and after adoption of the 40%
canamaké stove. 35%
30%

Charcoal Savings
The stove tests revealed that the higher 25%
quality one-pot canamaké, representative of 20%
the model to be disseminated, achieved
15%
average fuel savings of approximately 33%
10%
over traditional all-metal and all-ceramic
5%
stoves.1 In other words, the canamaké stove
used one-third less fuel on average than the 0%

household’s existing stove. At this rate, the

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payback period for the stove would be one to

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two weeks, depending on the canamaké’s

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purchase price (between US$2-3) and the
Stove Type
user’s actual savings, which will vary
somewhat according to stove use and the
household’s current stove.2

Survey participants expressed positive feedback regarding the stove’s fuel efficiency, speed, heat
retention, and cleanliness (see table 2.2), with most
Table 2.2 What Do You Like About criticisms focused on the perceived fragility of the
the Canamaké Stove? ceramic liner (25% of respondents).

Fuel Efficient 94% Of those household stove users interviewed who

Lights fast/easily 39% had never purchased a canamaké stove in the past,
Cooks fast 31% the main reasons given were, first, that they had not
Retains heat 28% heard of it or were unaware of its benefits (33%).
Secondly, 25% thought the stove was fragile.
Attractive 11% Another 25% said they did not know where to find
Cleaner 10% the stove, while 23% were deterred by the price,
which ranges from 600 Rwandan Francs (RWF) for
Percentage of respondents indicating each the lower-quality version to 1200 or 1500 RWF for
positive attribute. the more solid version.

These comments give some important clues about challenges to be met in order to make this stove
more popular. First, while the quantity of canamaké stoves produced in and around Kigali may be
sufficient for current demand, the quality in many cases is not. Makers of the low-cost version are
known to use ceramic inserts that are painted to look as if they have been fired, when in fact they

1
This test stove addresses the design shortcomings of the lower quality version, by including a
ventilation door, well-fixed pot rests, and cement adhesive mixture to secure the ceramic liner. These
additional elements alone may offer fuel efficiency improvements over the lower quality version.
2
Compared to other African countries where the canamaké-type stove has been introduced, a
payback period of one to two weeks is very attractive. Elsewhere, because stove production costs
are higher and/or the price of charcoal lower, it typically takes three to six weeks for the financial
savings derived from the use of the canamaké-type stove to equal the purchase price of the stove.

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have not. Along with the appropriateness of the clay mixture and the thoroughness of the pre-firing
drying process, durability of ceramic stove liners is directly related to the temperature and/or the
duration of firing. The ideal firing temperature for this item is 920°C, which requires a professionally
made kiln. Since the potters who make all of the stove liners in Kigali work informally, they do not
have access to kilns of this sort, and their firing is done in the open, where temperatures probably
do not exceed 500°C. By breaking open a typical stove liner produced locally, it is possible to see
that the interior retains the gray color of unfired clay, even while the outside shows the brick-red or
orange color of fired pottery. Liners that have not been fired at all have a very limited life
expectancy. In order to increase the popularity of the canamaké stove, it will therefore be
necessary to improve the quality of the ceramic component.

The exterior metal cladding also requires improvement in some cases. The low-cost version of the
stove is usually made from very thin scrap metal recovered from USAID PL480 program cooking oil
canisters, or from old and badly-rusted roofing. This sort of metal has inadequate strength, and
either rusts through and collapses after time, or the seam binding the upper and lower halves of the
stove separates. These casings last anywhere from a few weeks to more than a year, depending on
the quality of the seam, the durability of the liner, and the care taken by the user (see Annex II in the
supporting documentation for additional information on stove production and stove artisans).

As for price, the better quality canamaké stove is no more expensive than the most popular metal
stove. There are some households with such limited means that they prefer to buy the cheapest
stoves available (such as the all-ceramic stove, which costs around 250 RWF, or the round metal
stove, which sells for approximately 600 RWF) even though they may break quickly and have lower
efficiencies. With good publicity, some of these households should be convinced to upgrade to the
better quality canamaké, since they would save money in the long term. For others, it may be
enough to inform them that the canamaké is price-competitive with the other metal stoves in
common use, and significantly more fuel efficient. Given the low cost of the canamake and quick
return on investment, micro-finance mechanisms should not be necessary to stimulate uptake.

The majority of the remaining reasons for non-adoption have to do with lack of awareness;
therefore, promoters need to do a better job of informing the public about the stove’s benefits.
While quality is being improved on the production side, a great deal of emphasis needs to be put on
marketing to improve the demand side. For effective publicity, the best strategy is to emulate the
private commercial sector through the use of mass media (radio, television, print), outdoor
advertising such as billboards, posters, and live demonstrations, and promotional giveaways. It
should be understood from the beginning that professional advertising is expensive and needs to be
managed professionally by experienced marketing specialists in order to have the desired effect.
Traditional development project-style billboards and leaflets will not suffice. If the project were to
neglect the publicity in an effort to save on costs, the effectiveness of the entire plan would be
jeopardized. It is therefore recommended that a robust marketing component be included in
project implementation. The details will be spelled out in the sections to follow.

To summarize, the following are the main reasons given for non-adoption of the fuel-efficient
canamaké stove:

 Perception of fragility and short life;

 Perception that the canamaké is expensive;
 Lack of familiarity with the product;
 Lack of information about the product’s efficiency and resulting financial savings;
 Unfamiliarity with sales points.

The most effective means of addressing these challenges would be the following:

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 Improvement of quality through re-training of selected artisans and branding of their
products under a new name and commercial identity created for the purpose; the publicity
campaign should seek to raise public awareness of this quality difference;

 A publicity campaign to raise public awareness of the canamaké stoves, present convincing
arguments about their advantages, and publicize sales locations. The campaign should
employ the means most likely to reach the target audience, such as radio, television, public
demonstrations, and signs;

 Improve the distribution network and product visibility with the addition of sales points at
shops in high-profile locations such as intersections, near bus stations, etc. Sales supports
such as display cages, signs and posters can be used; and

 Promote technologies for manufacturers that enhance quality and/or production efficiency.
These may include metal curlers for the production of the metal cladding, manual spindle
molds for the ceramic liners, and low-tech brick or earthwork kilns to raise ceramic firing
temperatures. The kilns in particular may require some research and development locally in
collaboration with potters and possibly brick makers.

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SECTION IV: RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above findings, a number of recommendations are made below to improve the quality
and increase the supply of the canamaké stove. Moreover, recommendations are made to further
develop the market for the canamaké stove through marketing and promotion.

A. Improving Stove Quality

1. Ceramic Liners

a. Kilns

As described above, the ceramic inserts are generally the most fragile part of the stoves, cracking
and giving way in the middle where the air holes are distributed. This is largely due to poor firing
techniques, the use of unfired liners in some cases, and also due to improper use of the stove (such
as pouring water on the stove to extinguish the coals or inadvertently striking the liner to break
charcoal into smaller pieces). The estimated 50 ceramic liner-producing potters in Kigali have
mastered the mixing of clay with sand (or what appears to be kaolin clay) to create a mixture
resilient to heat. Under the circumstances, the best
way to improve liner strength is to increase the firing
temperature.

Increasing firing temperatures requires the adoption

of some sort of kiln which would enclose the heat
and concentrate it on the ceramic pieces being fired,
rather than losing much of the fire’s energy to the
surrounding atmosphere. Potters, living in
irregularly-built houses near the valley bottoms, are
among the poorest residents of Kigali. They have
few means to invest in kilns or other technologies,
and they often do not understand the strategy of The current kiln-less firing system does not permit
investing now in order to increase income later. adequate temperatures for optimal liner strength.
Moreover, many potters lack title to the land upon
which they are living and working, and can be ejected at any time. This discourages them even
further from making improvements to their facilities.

Given these constraints, the project must be sensitive to the affordability and sustainability of more
expensive professional kiln models that may be considered for promotion to the potters making
stove liners. Full subsidies are unlikely to be successful, as potters receiving free or highly subsidized
kilns would not have a strong incentive to use them productively, or possibly even for the purposes
intended by the project.

It would be best to devise a kiln model composed of locally-available materials that have little or no
financial cost to the potters. These might include:
 Pits dug vertically into the ground, or laterally into the hillside;
 Stones, unfired adobe bricks, or fired clay bricks to complete the walls and dome of the
kiln, resulting in a kiln similar in design, if not in materials, to those built by small-scale
brick makers in Kigali;
 Kilns covered by cheap scrap metal sheets.
It is understood, of course, that such kilns would not last as long nor produce the same results as an
industrial kiln. Low-tech kilns made of these materials may need to be rebuilt after each rainy
season, but if the potters were taught how to build them, they could maintain them as necessary.
Firing temperatures would not be likely to reach 920°C, but even if they could be raised by a couple

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of hundred degrees compared to open-air firing, the result would be stove liners with better
durability, and less fuelwood used in the course of liner manufacturing.

Having an enclosed kiln would solve another problem facing the potters, which is the difficulty of
firing during the rainy season, since rain extinguishes the fire and can damage the unfired pottery.
The ideal would be an enclosed kiln with some sort of roof made of sheet metal or natural materials.

Currently, potter organizations are generally weak or nonexistent; even brothers living side by side
work independently of each other. Low-tech kilns of the sort described above would necessarily be
small, but that is an asset in this case, since small, artisanally-built kilns would be suitable for
individual potter families. Building such kilns would not require cooperation amongst groups of
potters, nor would they be subject to the management problems that can hamper installations
managed by groups.

There are two clear financial incentives for potters to become interested in the use of kilns: first,
they could sell high-quality stove liners for slightly more than lower quality liners, earning perhaps an
added 50 RWF per piece. Secondly, the wood used for firing ceramics usually consists of stumps,
which are very laborious to gather and chop into firewood. Kiln firing would likely require less fuel
than open-air firing, which would mean less money and/or time spent gathering the fuel and more
time available for other tasks, such as preparing the clay and forming the liners. Productivity could
thus be increased. If this can be explained clearly to potters, some might initially opt to try the kilns,
assuming technical assistance from the project is provided. The early adopters would serve as
examples to encourage others. If half or more of the existing potters produce from improved kilns,
the supply of liners should be sufficient to achieve the project’s objectives.

The lack of an existing kiln model appropriate to the circumstances of Kigali potters is a challenge
facing the project. The project would need to hire a technician to develop and test various kiln
models to find one that works well and suits the project. The technician should do his or her
research by working directly with one or more of the potters at their production sites.
Considerations raised by the potters about capacity, materials, location, and other specifications of
the kiln should be incorporated, since this is the only way to be sure that the resulting model will be
acceptable to them and will be adopted.

Once a suitable kiln model is developed, the project technician can begin promoting it to the
potters. The technology should thereafter spread by example, with technical assistance from the
project and demonstration of the economic benefits of higher prices for stove liners, as well as the
potential to produce other new products with the improved kilns.

An alternative option might be to train Kigali’s small-scale

brick makers in the production of ceramic liners. The kilns
belonging to these producers have greater firing capacity and
achieve higher temperatures than those operated by the
traditional potters. However, the supply chain would have to
be reconfigured so that these new producers are connected
to the artisans and wholesalers. This additional source of
liners would aim to supplement, rather than replace, the
liners provided by traditional potters.

A consultant ceramicist specializing in innovative kiln

construction should be hired by the project to
assess the above kiln options as well as other possibilities, A spindle mold can double liner production.
including the USAID/Shell Foundation brick kilns in Nairobi.
The objective will be to identify the most affordable technical solution to the current problem of
poor quality ceramic liners.

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b. Spindle Molds

At present, potters use inexpensive metal molds to shape the stove liners. The resulting form is
generally uniform and good, though there are variations. The process of manually pounding a slab of
clay into the mold and shaping it by hand, scraping off excess clay, and using water to smooth the
surface is time consuming, however. As part of the research carried out for this study, Winrock
International constructed a more sophisticated manual “spindle mold” for stove liners and tested it
with several potters. This mold has a platform which holds a mold for the liner wall and a spindle on
which a radial blade is turned by hand to shape the interior of the liner. The results and the
comments from the potters were favorable. The spindle mold has two advantages: first, it gives
every stove liner a uniform shape and thickness. Uniformity contributes to reliable quality. The
second advantage is speed; skilled potters are able to make stove liners up to three times as fast
using the spindle mold as with the simple mold. One potter was able to produce seven stove liners
in one hour, or approximately eight minutes per piece. Molding by hand took approximately 20
minutes. Consistent use of a spindle mold by potters could probably double their output of stove
liners.

It would therefore be beneficial to have the spindle mold reproduced and adopted by potters.
Caution should be taken, however, not to manufacture these molds on behalf of the potters and
distribute them for free on the false theory that the potters cannot afford them. Every effort should
be made to make the spindle molds as inexpensive as possible, i.e., by using scrap metal of a requisite
thickness and minimizing superfluous elements. This could best be done by letting private welding
shops reproduce the molds for the potters, who pay for them (perhaps over time, or with a small
loan from the project). The project should provide technical oversight. It should be emphasized
that the molds increase productivity and therefore income, and therefore pay for themselves within
a short time. Under these circumstances the molds would be produced as inexpensively as
reasonably possible, and would therefore be accessible as low-cost investments leading to increased
liner production and higher revenues. Materials and labor for the mold cost approximately 15,000
RWF, not taking into account outside technical assistance.

Another means of promoting the spindle molds on a sustainable basis is to let the stove retailers pay
for them. The resellers have a financial stake in the productivity of the potters, since they purchase
the stove liners from them. A reseller can pay for the production of a spindle mold and lend it to a
potter who is his supplier of stove liners. Both the potter and the wholesaler should increase their
sales volumes and revenues. The spindle molds could also be lease/sold to the potters, preferably by
the manufacturer or stove retailers or else by the project, with each lessee paying a down payment
of pre-determined percentage of the total cost and regular payments thereafter until it is fully paid
off.

c. Entrepreneurship Training

As noted earlier, most potters have had limited exposure to formal education and their
entrepreneurship skills are undeveloped. This reduces their ability to weigh the potential costs and
benefits of production factors that are unfamiliar to them, such as kilns and spindle molds. By a
protracted program of demonstrations and technology lending they could still be convinced of the
value of a given technology, but that might take a long time and would not overcome the basic
problem of entrepreneurship. It would help the project to increase stove production, and help
potters to maximize their income, if the potters could have an opportunity to learn basic
entrepreneurial skills, such as keeping accounts, analyzing costs and benefits, and projecting future
production and income. Such programs exist, having been developed by donors like USAID and
their contractors. The KIST stoves project should research entrepreneurship training programs and
select one to offer to potters as well as blacksmiths. This would lead to greater professionalism and
quicker uptake of technologies and production improvements.

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II. Metal Cladding

The problems with thecanamaké’s metal cladding have to do with the raw materials, the
workmanship, and, to a lesser extent, limited productivity.

a. Raw Materials and Workmanship

There is competition for scrap metal in Kigali. The sources are typically the scraps of
textured sheet metal used in roofing and for the fencing around building construction sites; used
corrugated tin roofing; and old appliances such as refrigerators. A part of the scrap metal in Rwanda
is collected and shipped to Uganda for recycling, which reduces the supply available to artisans.
Some of them therefore resort to using inappropriate materials such as cooking oil canisters, which
are too thin for making sturdy stoves, or old and rusted roofing, which is also weak. The selection
of raw materials is not only based on availability, it is also motivated by price. Certain artisans seek
out cheaper materials in order to produce cheaper stoves.

Blacksmiths are generally better organized than potters. They work in groups of 2 to 30, and they
often have a production line or a division of labor within
a group whereby some members gather scrap metal;
some trace and cut out the stove parts from the raw
material; some shape the stove body, or the handles,
pot rests, and other peripheral parts; and still others
perform the final assembly. Some groups are equally
sophisticated in the use of their income, devoting a
portion for the purchase of raw materials for new
stoves, a portion toward salaries for the members, and
a portion toward savings for new or replacement
materials. Such groups therefore have their own funds
available for certain acquisitions.

Workmanship is another issue. In any group of artisans

there is a range of skills and abilities. Young apprentices A cladding manufacturer installs the
are the least capable of producing reliable quality work. canamaké stove’s ventilation door.
Some groups let the apprentices work on peripheral
parts while they develop their skills, while the master artisans perform the final assembly and quality
control. Others let the apprentices do everything with little or no quality control.

While there is not currently a stove supply bottleneck, one could develop if demand were to
increase significantly with a well-orchestrated promotional program. Low-cost, highly productive
equipment would address this constraint and make it possible for artisans to add other items (e.g.,
buckets and sprinkler cans) to the stove product line. A metal curler could be used for making the
metal casing seams, which has the potential for
increasing significantly the productivity of the
existing metal workshops.

It will be necessary to encourage artisans to use

better materials and monitor their quality. Simply
lecturing them will not do. The proper incentive
is financial, i.e., the promise of a higher sale price
for a better product. The project, through quality
branding and certification of artisans, should offer
the possibility of earning 100 to 200 RWF more
per stove that is well-made. This price increase
should not diminish demand if the publicity
A metal curler could increase the productivity of
metal cladding manufacturers.
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campaign is doing its job, and should be sufficient to encourage some artisans to improve their work.
It will also provide some funds from which to purchase better scrap metal for use as raw material. If
quality standards are not maintained, artisans will lose their certification, the direct benefits of
publicity, and the metal curler that could be lease/sold to them by the project.

b. Quality Certification

A mechanism is needed whereby consumers and wholesalers can identify quality stoves that
incorporate better ceramics, better metal cladding, and better final assembly. The project, as part of
its branding campaign, should survey potters and artisans and identify those whose work is worthy
of inclusion in a quality brand (perhaps after additional training). Certification should be offered to
these, along with a list of criteria and milestones necessary to retain the certification. These criteria
for the blacksmiths should include minimum metal thickness, and a ventilation door, well-fixed pot
rests, and the proper cement mixture for installing the ceramic liner.

The handiwork of certified artisans and potters should be identifiable by some means, such as a
distinctive stamp, that is difficult to counterfeit and will serve as a mark by which wholesalers and
other customers can be assured of quality. There should be a stamp for ceramics, in addition to and
different from the stamps already used by potters to identify their individual work; and another
stamp to be applied to the metal cladding before final assembly. These stamps should be
commissioned and paid for by the project and awarded to artisans who meet quality criteria to be
defined by the project, but it should be made clear that the stamps remain the property of the
project. If the standards are increased during the project, i.e., if a new technology becomes available
that leads to quality improvements, retention of the stamps could be made conditional on the
adoption of the new technology. If any certified potter or artisan ceases to produce acceptable
work, the stamps can be withdrawn by the project. This process should be managed by the project
staff, with simple signed agreements where necessary between the project and beneficiaries, and
support from the appropriate government authorities in the event of disputes.

Furthermore, the color of the quality stoves should be changed to further distinguish them. In most
of Africa stoves of the Kenya Ceramic Jiko type are shiny black; customers seem to like this because
the stoves do not look dirty after being put to use. Stoves made in Rwanda are painted silver,
perhaps to give them the color of new metal. Upon use they take on the color of soot and ashes,
however, and people consider them ugly. Given that women are the primary purchasers of
cookstoves and may appreciate the attractiveness of a stove more than male buyers, artisans
producing certified quality stoves should be encouraged to paint their products black or another
color shown through market research to be popular with the target market. Price should not be a
significant inhibitor since silver is one of the most expensive colors of paint on the market.

Of course, a new color can be easily imitated by non-certified artisans, so the stamps should be
regarded as the true mark of quality.

B. Improving Stove Distribution

All major markets in Kigali have at least one vendor of canamaké cookstoves, and in many cases
there are four to seven of them in one market. These vendors typically travel to the locations of
the potters and the artisans and place orders, which they later collect and take to market. Some
artisans deliver the stoves to the vendors. Market stalls that stock the canamaké typically sell other
stove models as well, and other kitchen and cooking implements.

Though distribution of the stoves is well developed, some improvements could be made. While in
some neighborhoods a majority of houses have one or more canamaké stove, in others the
prevalence is much lower. Kigali neighborhoods with low penetration of the high quality stove can
be targeted for recruitment of new canamaké stove vendors, and for local publicity to raise

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awareness of the product. For instance, project commercial staff should encourage merchants in
conspicuous locations, such as corner shops or the entrances to markets, to begin stocking and
selling quality-made canamaké cookstoves. After merchants have been selling the canamaké for a
while and it is clear that there is a sustainable market for the stove in the new neighborhood, the
project could provide merchants with a poster or billboard for publicity, and organize a public
cooking demonstration pitting the canamaké against other popular stoves, to let the public judge the
stove’s charcoal efficiency and speed of cooking.

In this way, underserved neighborhoods would become better served by the commercial distribution
network, and the rate of adoption in those areas and in general would be improved.

C. Improving Stove Marketing

There is an estimated 50% to 60% of the urban Kigali market to be reached with the message that
well-made canamaké stoves are available, save money, and are as affordable as other stoves.
Winrock’s survey research has determined that this potential market is most easily reached via radio
and TV advertisements, and by other visual means such as billboards and point-of-sale signs and
posters. Promoting any product in an urban market requires a well-developed strategy and
investment in media advertising. The project should be sure to set aside an appropriate amount of
funding for this purpose. The project should also hire a professional marketing individual or firm to
run its publicity campaign.

I. Branding

In order to make it as clear as possible to consumers how to identify good quality versions of the
canamaké, the high quality models should be given an entirely new brand name and commercial
identity, including a name, a logo, a slogan, and a radio jingle to be used in promotion. Quality
stoves should bear a stamp, both on the ceramic and the metal components, and the color of the
outer metal cladding should probably be changed from
the current silver. In these ways consumers will be
able to distinguish between high and low quality stoves
in order to get their money’s worth, and the poorer
version will not tarnish the image of the good one.

It is suggested that the new brand create a “product

A jiko stove logo in Central Africa, with a family” of quality ceramic-lined stoves that appeal to
slogan that means “cooking without waste” multiple market segments. This would consist of two
in the local language. single-pot models (the conical and cylindrical designs
currently produced) as well as the higher priced
multiple burner stoves appealing to higher income households. In this way a single brand name and
promotional campaign would reach multiple socio-economic segments of the Kigali market.

The new brand should have a complete commercial identity of its own, complete with a name in
Kinyarwanda or English that sounds attractive to consumers and implies money saving; a
Kinyarwanda commercial slogan along the lines of the MTN mobile phone network’s “Everywhere
you go” or Source du Nil mineral water’s “Tasted, tested, trusted.” In addition, the brand should
have an attractive graphic logo for use in advertisements; and a radio jingle, which serves as a logo in
non-visual media. Creating a commercial identity for a product is a science in itself in which
professionals familiar with large-scale sales operations generate ideas, then test those ideas in focus
groups to measure their appeal, and finally settle on a name, a design, and a sound. The resulting
product identity should be attractive, modern, and highly memorable, and should emphasize the
desirable attributes of the product. Stove brands in other countries (e.g., Senegal, Mali, Ghana, and
Benin) have become household names and symbols of quality and efficiency. In some cases (e.g., the
diambar in Senegal), those brands have been extended to other products.

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The brand for the quality canamaké cookstoves should be established as quickly as possible at the
beginning of the project, because it must be ready before any advertising can be prepared.

There are several firms in Kigali that can design product identities, and there are many more that do
graphic design. Creating a jingle involves writing, recording, and copywriting original music, which is
expensive, but there are several studios and radio stations in Kigali that do this type of work.

II. Advertising

Media advertising – though expensive – is essential for increasing market share

in a large population such as Kigali. Approximately 20% of the urban population
– or 160,000 people – consists of adult women, and approximately 72,000 of
these cook with charcoal and do not have canamaké-type cookstoves. There is
no way to reach 72,000 women in a city by public demonstrations or direct
contact alone; mass media must be used. However, not all media are equally
effective. Most women surveyed, for example, do not read newspapers, so
print advertising should not constitute a large percentage of the advertising
budget. The same goes for other printed matter such as leaflets or flyers.
Radio would be the most effective, since almost all women in town listen to
radio. Television reaches about one-third of them.

Commercials should be run at those times of the day and on those radio and
television stations most listened to and watched by women. In addition to short
publicity spots of between 30 and 90 seconds, longer blocks of air-time Billboards can point the
(generally between 15-60 minutes) should be purchased or negotiated for way to sales points.
talk/call-in type shows about the stove. Regarding outdoor advertising, while
it is not known how many people see billboards and posters, placing them in
proximity to stove sales points should cause them to be noticed by many potential purchasers of
stoves. Distribution of t-shirts and other visual supports among the target audience is another
means of raising product awareness.

The advertising campaign must also address issues of proper stove use if efficiency goals are to be
attained, and stove quality maintained. Manufacturers and retailers will need to be trained in proper
use of the stove. Short instruction manuals (one page) should be supplied by retailers to buyers.
These manuals will guard against placing too much charcoal in the firebox, leaving the ventilation
door open too long, dousing hot charcoal with cold water while the charcoal is still in the firebox,
and breaking-up charcoal with a hard instrument in the firebox. Proper use of the stove will be
reinforced through the advertising messages.

III. Public Promotions

In addition to public cooking demonstrations and ‘stove contests’ mentioned above under
distribution, public promotion can take the form of a presence at public events and gatherings.
Some venues, such as women’s groups, religious organizations, and community meetings, may be low
cost opportunities to present and promote the stove and its benefits. Others, such as commercial
fairs like Rwanda Expo (which takes place each year in July), would be more expensive (renting and
staffing a booth, promotional giveaways, etc.), but could have greater impact.

IV. Coordinating Demand with Supply

A professional full-time marketing manager should also ensure that product demand does not
outpace supply. At present there is no supply bottleneck for canamaké stoves in Kigali, but that
could change with an effective promotional campaign. The project should not allow demand to

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outpace production; this merely creates frustration among both consumers and distributors, who
can lose confidence in the product if the supply is perceived as unreliable. The project’s marketing
professionals must be in constant contact with the technicians working on production and
distribution to be sure that the supply is adequate; if not, then promotion needs to be slowed or
suspended until supply can catch up.

Publicity often has a bandwagon effect; that is, it is capable of stimulating a great deal of interest in a
product for a while, but then loses its effectiveness over time as consumers grow accustomed to the
advertising messages. One way to prolong the effectiveness of advertising is to publish new adverts
at specified intervals, with each one having some surprising quality to it so that people pay attention.
Another strategy is to alternate the types of advertising used, i.e. radio and TV, different radio
stations and programs, billboards, etc.

While the publicity is still fresh, sales will begin to rise gradually in the beginning, but can climb more
steeply a year or so into the campaign if the investment is adequate. Assuming that supply keeps up,
sales gains can increase steadily throughout the second year. In the third year they will likely begin
to level off as the product reaches saturation levels and consumers buy stoves mainly to replace old
ones that wear out, rather than purchase them for the first time. Year 3 of the project should
therefore be devoted to consolidating the market gains made during the first two years, so that after
the project ends the sales continue at the same or similar levels. For this reason a three-year
project duration is advisable.

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SECTION V: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
A. Duration

This time line is for a three-year project in which intensive promotion of existing high-quality stoves
is pursued concurrently with improving the quality standards of stove producers. The idea is for
intensive activity from the beginning in order to begin registering significant results within the first
year. The second year would see the growth continue, arriving at the objective late in the third year
when the emphasis will be on consolidation of the gains made in quality and quantity. At the end of
the project modest growth should continue.

B. Targets

While it would be desirable to achieve 100% adoption of the most fuel-efficient charcoal cookstoves
among Kigali’s charcoal-using households, in fact there are some households that will be reluctant to
buy a given product because feel they cannot afford it, or they don’t like it for whatever reason.
Therefore, a 3-year goal of 80% is more realistic.

Table 3 shows how many stoves must be sold each month at present just to maintain the canamaké’s
current estimated prevalence. The baseline figures assume that out of the current canamaké market
penetration, 20% are high quality stoves lasting an average of 12 months, and 80% are low quality
stoves lasting six months on average.

Table 3: Project Baseline and Targets

Baseline
800,000 Population of Kigali (govt. estimate)
5.76 People per household (from survey)
138,889 Households in Kigali
104,167 Charcoal using households in Kigali
40% Present stove prevalence (from survey)
41,667 Canamaké stoves in Kigali per year
7.2 Stove life (months) (from field research)
69,444 Stoves sold per year
5,787 Stoves sold per month

Targets (Three years from project start)

80% Stove prevalence
1,000,000 Population of Kigali (8% yearly growth)
104,167 Canamaké stoves in Kigali per year
62,500 New stoves needed
10.8 New avg. stove life (months)
115,741 Stoves to sell per year
9,645 Stoves to sell per month

Under Targets in Table 3, the figure is given for the number that will need to be sold each month to
reach and maintain the desired 80% penetration level. After three years, it is assumed that the
prevelance of high-quality canamaké stoves will have increased from 20% to 50% of all canamaké’s
sold, and that they will last an average 18 months instead of 12 months.

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The increase in stove life from 12 to 18 months for the high quality canamaké is a reflection of
better ceramic firing techniques, better sheet metal and improved liner installation techniques. It is
still assumed that the poor quality canamaké will last only six months on average.

While canamaké type stoves in West Africa can last between 2-3 years, they are generally of a
higher quality and higher cost than those seen in Rwanda, due to the more limited numbers of
producers. Research on the lower quality, lower-priced stove, particularly in Kenya, suggests that
the stove generally lasts no more than one year.

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 C. Implementation Calendar

Table 4 below shows an indicative implementation calendar for project activities over the three year
project term, broken into quarterly blocks.

Table 4: Indicative Implementation Calendar

Year/Quarter→
Y1Q1

Y1Q2

Y1Q3

Y1Q4

Y2Q1

Y2Q2

Y2Q3

Y2Q4

Y3Q1

Y3Q2

Y3Q3

Y3Q4
Activity↓

Set-up & staff

hiring etc.
Brand
development
Training of techni-
cal trainer
Manufacture of
brand stamps for
artisans
Certification of 1st
group of artisans
Make adverts

Ad campaign

Expo Rwanda
Every year in July
Re-train & certify
other artisans (as
needed)
Kiln R&D
Kiln promotion
Enlist new sales
points
Monitor &
troubleshoot stove
quality
Monitor sales
Annual audits
Impact Tracking
Survey (mid-
project evaluation)
External evaluation
Closeout

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D. Project Personnel

The staffing pattern will vary depending on whether the project is implemented directly by
KIST/CITT or by a subcontractor specialized in commercial stove promotion. The following list of
employees and contractors is indicative and can be adjusted according to the circumstances:

 Project Director: Works exclusively and full-time on this project. Formulates work plans,
directs staff and executes contracts in the implementation of plans and achievement of
project goals; fulfills reporting obligations to the Government and any other funders;
maintains relationships with same; insures that audits, evaluations, and other required
functions are performed.

 Marketing Manager: Answers to the Project Director. Provides leadership and ideas for
marketing campaign; works with the Project Director to formulate marketing strategy; leads
the initial brand development with brand name and logo etc., manages relationships and
contracts with agencies hired for publicity purposes; coordinates stove demand stimulation
with productive capacity; oversees collection of distribution and sales data on a monthly and
annual basis. This individual must be experienced and skilled in radio, TV, and other media
publicity, and in the management of marketing campaigns with specific sales targets.

 Two (or more) Sales Agents: Answering to the Marketing Manager, ideally interns or
consultants, working three to four months at a time before being rotated out and replaced
by a fresh group; may be rehired when warranted by circumstances. Duties: Recruit new
retailers, connect retailers with suppliers, carry out consumer surveys, distribute
promotional materials, assist with the set-up and execution of public events such as
demonstrations and fairs, collect sales and distribution data.

 Technical Trainer: Answering to the Project Director. With the Project Director, develops
criteria for manufacturer participation in the new brand, and applies them to qualified
manufacturers, distributing brand stamps; re-trains artisans to improve their quality of
production; monitors manufacturing and sales rates by collecting monthly data from potters
and blacksmiths; works with the kiln technician to get low-cost kilns and spindle molds
integrated into potters’ production habits; provides intelligence on the scrap metal supply
and other existing or potential production constraints. This position requires a skilled
metalworking artisan with some instructional experience, even if informal; s/he should either
have extensive experience with cookstove manufacture, or should be trained for the stove
project by a visiting counterpart from a stove program elsewhere in Africa.

 Office Manager & Receptionist: Answering to the Project Director. Performs support
functions for the project including maintaining files, interacting with government agencies and
local service providers to keep the organization’s affairs current; handles calls, visits, mail,
and email.

 Kiln Technician: A Rwandan or resident foreigner will be needed to develop a low-tech kiln
model suitable to poor potters in Year 1. Duties: Meet with potters to assess their current
work, their resources, their interest in improved firing methods, and ideas for better kilns;
explore kiln designs that use pits, adobe bricks, fired brick, sheet metal covers, and other
available materials in an effort to develop a model that meets project specifications.

In addition to permanent and short-term employees, the following services would be contracted
locally:

 Comprehensive Media Management Agency: If KIST/CITT is to implement the project directly,

then it should engage the services of an advertising agency such as Créaxion SARL to

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 provide a comprehensive package of services including the following: brand, logo and jingle
development and testing; production of radio and television advertising and infomercials;
design and production of billboards, posters, point-of-sale signs, t-shirts, and other
giveaways; media planning, e.g., the allocation of the advertising budget into an ideal mix of
radio, television, and outdoor advertising; and the identification of additional sponsorship
opportunities as they arise.

 Entrepreneurship Training Services: A specialized organization will be contracted to provide

entrepreneurship skills training to potters and blacksmiths. This is necessary, particularly in
the case of potters, for them to be able to assess and make sound economic decisions about
investing to improve their production and their incomes. A program such as ‘Making Cents’
– a micro-enterprise training curriculum designed for developing countries – is envisioned
for this role, and can probably be identified in Kigali.

 Final Evaluation: An independent firm or organization will be contracted to carry out an

external evaluation of activities at the project’s close. The project’s internal data collection
and reporting system will be evaluated, achievements will be verified and compared to
targets, and project activities will be assessed for their effect on sustainability, income
generation, and charcoal conservation. These evaluations will be made available to the
Rwandan government, other donors, and the implementing organization.

E. Project Budget

Given the highly specialized expertise required, it is strongly recommended that the project utilize
an experienced manager with international experience in commercial cookstove projects. The
manager should be supported by an organization that could bring a full package of technical and
administrative support. KIST lacks the requisite experience to manage this project and has
furthermore been seriously depleted through recent senior staff departures; it would therefore not
be effective to place the chosen project manager in an agency lacking the capacity to provide
adequate support. It is imperative that the project have a strong management team.

An illustrative budget for project implementation is provided below (Table 5). The assumption is
that the project would have an expatriate manager and expenses related to support from the home
office. Being specialized in commercial promotion, this organization would have more in-house
publicity expertise and therefore would not need to rely as heavily on an outside advertising agency
for publicity management, so that subcontracting costs in these areas would be lower. The project
team would include local staff from the private sector. Implemented by such an international non-
profit organization, this project can be expected to cost around $1.3 -$1.8 million, when all costs are
included. This budget is for illustrative purposes only; depending upon the individuals and
organizations ultimately selected, the real budget may be lower or slightly higher.

Table 5: Estimated Implementation Budget for an International Organization

Expense Category Total Amount Over 3 Years
Salaries & benefits (for director and home office coordination) $298,000
Travel & per diem (for director, marketing/production consultant and $148,000
home office support staff, as well as ground transport for local staff)
Tooling and materials for metal artisan training $11,000
Materials for ceramist training and kiln development $6,000
Office equipment and other 31,000
Operating costs (office, local staff, housing, short-term consultants) $310,000
Advertising $145,000
Subcontracts (stove research, entrepreneurship training, bookkeeping, $120,000
audits, impact assessments, legal counsel)
Total $1,069,000

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SECTION VI: MONITORING & EVALUATION PLAN
An impact tracking system will need to be established to provide the project implementers with
information that will facilitate decisionmaking. This system will also provide useful information to the
government to assess whether the project objectives are being met.

This impact tracking system will be one of the monitoring and evaluation tools that will provide project-
specific intermediate and final evaluations. The purpose of these reports is to examine project progress in
relation to the objectives, as well as provide specific financial data and suggestions for changes in the
project strategy. Each year, the evaluator will monitor the project’s key impacts by applying a series of
standard indicators that evaluate the work progress.

Midway through the program implementation it is recommended that the project carry out an in-depth
household survey similar to the one conducted by USAID/Winrock during the project design phase. By
visiting a sample of households in urban Kigali, the progress of the program in terms of increasing the
market penetration of canamaké stoves as well as their fuel savings compared to other stoves can be
verified. Data from comparative cooking tests gathered from public demonstrations should also be
analyzed.

Surveys should be conducted through interviews with consumers and manufacturers. The main figures
concerning reported impacts will include the following:

Number of economic participants, including manufacturers and buyers, that benefit from the
project

Total amount of supplementary revenue that participants earn due to the project

Private investment generated by the enterprises active in the project

More specifically, program effectiveness can be measured using the following criteria as it applies to
manufacturers and consumers:

Consumer savings (amount of charcoal and money saved)

Labor savings/cooking time

Enterprise income (manufacturers)

National savings (the amount and economic value of fuelwood and CO2 emissions saved)

To summarize, this project presents an opportunity to achieve something unprecedented – efficient

charcoal cookstove market penetration on an unparalleled scale, with an improved cookstove for
almost every pocketbook. Several key activities must be carried out in a tightly coordinated fashion
for this to be accomplished, however. First, the quality of a high percentage of canamaké cookstoves
must be raised considerably for consumers to have confidence in the product. The productive
capacity of individual manufacturers must also be increased considerably if the targeted sales totals
are to be achieved. Improved quality and higher quantities can be obtained through the introduction
of improved ceramic liner and metal casing production equipment, the use of higher quality raw
material for the metal cladding, and the establishment of a process to certify only producers capable
of meeting agreed upon quality standards. Second, branding (i.e., a name, logo, slogan, radio jingle,
and identifying stamp and color) must be undertaken in order to make it as clear as possible to
consumers how to identify good quality versions of the canamaké. Third, in close coordination with
the promotion of increased quality production and product branding activities, mass media
marketing will be critical to market development and therefore to the achievement of the project’s
sales objectives. Crucial to the accomplishment of this ambitious plan will be the involvement of a

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project manager and supporting organization with considerable experience implementing similar
projects, possessing the capacity to manage complex interrelated activities and an understanding and
appreciation for the role and complexity of technology and micro-enterprises.

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Annexes and Supporting Documentation

23 of 60
ANNEX 1. CHARCOAL STOVE SELECTION FOR A PROJECT
IN RWANDA

Prepared by Winrock International

April 12, 2007

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CHARCOAL STOVE SELECTION FOR A PROJECT IN RWANDA

Introduction

While charcoal contains more energy than an equivalent amount of air-dried wood, its production
tends to be very inefficient and can take a heavy toll on forest resources. In Rwanda, charcoal
production yields are particularly low, requiring nine kilograms of wood to produce one kilogram of
charcoal (Global Environment Facility 2005).

Despite this reality, however, charcoal is the preferred cooking fuel in urban Rwanda as in most of
urban Africa, with approximately two-thirds of households using charcoal as their main cooking fuel
in Kigali (General Census of Population and Housing, 2002). Compared to fuelwood, charcoal is
more convenient to transport, it takes up less storage space and does not deteriorate much in
storage. It is ready to use without laborious splitting and chopping, and it burns more cleanly than
wood, creating less smoke that can lead to respiratory illnesses and eye irritation. Even higher-
income households in Africa that also cook with electricity or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) often
cook with charcoal when less pressed for time because they prefer the taste of foods cooked with
this fuel. Rural households, however, are more likely to use fuelwood because of its lower cash cost
or the ability to collect it for free in some areas (Hyman 1985; Hyman 1994).

Given these perceived advantages and a high rate of urbanization in Rwanda, the charcoal market is
significant and growing, with an estimated value of $30 million in 2003. The urban population
increased from around 100,000 households to 300,000 households in 2002, and if the percent of
households using charcoal remained constant over that period, total charcoal consumption would
have been over 180,000 MT in 2003 (Van der Plas 2004). The price of charcoal was approximately
$250/MT in March 20073, a sharp increase in real terms since the year 2000
when the price was $60/MT (Electrogaz 2004).

Combining the low efficiency of charcoal production with Rwanda’s growing

urban population makes increasing the efficiency of charcoal stoves an
important priority. Charcoal burned in a typical all-metal traditional stove
leads to the loss of about 70% of the original heating value of the wood.
With an
improved cookstove, this loss can be reduced to closer to 50%. Cylindrical all-metal
Widespread adoption of improved stoves can significantly reduce the Imbabura.
burden on forest resources, and with a high price of charcoal, the consumer has much to gain as
well from making this investment.

Leading Contenders for a Rwanda Stove Project

While fuelwood is generally low-cost or free and used to cook over an

open fire, charcoal is generally purchased and burned in some kind of
stove. Users, therefore, have a financial incentive to use the fuel
more efficiently. The most widely used traditional charcoal-burning stoves
(or imbaburas) in Rwanda – as in most of Africa – are
constructed entirely of metal. There are two main models in Rwanda.
One is cylindrical in shape with a single wall, a firebox about two inches
deep, three metal pot rests, a metal perforated grate, and an
approximately 3x5 inch opening with no door along the outer body. The
other model is "Y-shaped" and features a more open firebox sitting on a All –ceramic stove.

3
The current per ton price of charcoal in Rwanda was calculated by Winrock International in March
2007 using the average price per kilogram of $0.25 for the most commonly purchased small unit.

25 of 60
rectangular box for catching the charcoal ashes. This stove is more robust than the other model, as
it is built of metal several centimeters thick, and therefore is more expensive and more durable.
Rwandans also sometimes use an all ceramic stove, which is very low cost (about US$0.40) but
deteriorates quickly (after a few weeks or months) due to dropping/mishandling or from extreme
changes in temperature during heating and cooling cycles.

Numerous types of fuel efficient stoves have been promoted in Africa over the past 30-plus years.
There is no one “perfect” model; the most appropriate stove for any country will depend upon local
customs (i.e., types of foods cooked and cooking styles), market characteristics (i.e., cost and
availability of materials and fuels), and consumer preferences. The most common types of improved
charcoal stoves promoted in Africa over the past 30 years generally fall into three categories:

• Ceramic-lined metal stoves

• Double-walled all metal stoves
• Single-walled all metal stoves

This study examines the history of these various types of stoves in Rwanda, drawing on lessons
learned from other countries, in order to recommend which stove should be promoted by the Kigali
Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) in Rwanda’s fuel efficient charcoal stove program.

1) Ceramic-Lined Jiko

Jiko is a Swahili word used for any type of stove. However, in this report, it
will be used to refer to the ceramic-lined jiko or KCJ, which was originally
developed in Kenya and further adapted by EnterpriseWorks Worldwide in
West Africa. The KCJ was inspired by the Thai bucket stove, which was
brought to Kenya by Keith Openshaw of the Beijer Institute of Energy and
Human Ecology in 1981. The Thai bucket stove is basically a straight-sided
metal bucket with a ceramic liner. Another key person in the design work
was Max Kinyanjui, a Kenyan potter.
Kenya Ceramic-lined Jiko (KCJ) stove
The design of the KCJ has evolved considerably over the years; a brief
history can be found in Appendix A. However, common to all versions of the stove are: 1) metal
cladding, 2) ceramic liner, 3) grate, and 4) door for draft control. The metal cladding protects the
ceramic liner and supports the cooking pots, which rest on the metal pot rests on the top of the
stove. The cladding can be made out of scrap metal drums or sheet metal. The ceramic liner,
typically fixed inside the top half of the cladding with cement and vermiculite (or ash) for durability
and extra insulation, improves energy efficiency by reducing heat transfer losses. The grate aerates
the combustion bed and channels heat toward the pot.

The KCJ is a portable stove that can cook one pot of food at a time, though it is possible to install
the same ceramic liner into different stove bodies. In Rwanda, the liner is sometimes installed in a
cylindrical metal body (though this is not recommended), and it is also used to build a more
expensive multi-burner stove which appeals to higher income households. This report, however, is
focused on the single-burner, portable, bell-bottom shaped stove.

The ceramic-lined jiko can be used for barbecuing if a grate is placed on top of the stove. It does
not require any changes in cooking methods over most traditional metal cookstoves and can accept
a wide range of pot sizes without a significant reduction in efficiency. Ceramic-lined stoves also have
advantages over all-metal stoves in preparing African foods that are simmered for long periods,
because the liner retains heat after the fire is extinguished. The jiko is not appropriate for slow
drying or smoking of fish or meat due to the high temperatures generated.

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With careful use, a well-built KCJ can last two-three years, particularly if households are cooking
with more than one stove. Users can reduce the life of the liner/grate or cement/vermiculite
insulation by dousing the stove with water instead of removing the charcoal before it is quenched,
shaking the stove to get the ashes out, or using too much kerosene to ignite the charcoal.

Although the metal cladding may last longer than two-three years, the ceramic liner may need to be
replaced at that time or earlier, if production processes are poor. This can be done at less than the
cost of buying a new stove, but in practice, most households have purchased a new stove rather
than replace the liner (Hyman 1985, Hyman 1986, Hyman 1987). In Rwanda a market exists for
replacement liners, but no data exists on households’ propensity to replace the liner vs. the stove.

In the late 1980s CARE helped a Rwandan entrepreneur to produce and market the KCJ under the
local name canamaké. CARE only promoted the stove for about a year in Rwanda. After the CARE
project ended, the Rwanda entrepreneur continued production of the canamaké stove (ESMAP
1991).

In February 2007, Winrock/KIST observed the KCJ in Rwanda’s capital Kigali in large numbers under
the local name canamaké. It is unclear whether the manufacturers are related to CARE’s initial
introduction of the product, whether they were trained by another institution, or learned to
produce the stove through another method.

The February 2007 canamaké retail sales price in Rwanda was between 600 – 2000 RWF, depending
on the size and quality of the stove. The 600 RWF stove is a lower quality product produced with
thin metal from discarded vegetable oil cans, while a higher-end version (using thicker gauge metal,
and a higher quality ceramic liner) sells for between 1200 – 2000 RWF. In markets where stoves
were sold, the canamaké represented approximately 40-50% of the average stove merchant’s
monthly sales, with the balance comprised of all-metal stoves and a small number of all ceramic
stoves. Winrock therefore estimates that the stove has achieved approximately 40-50% penetration
in Kigali households.

While the higher quality canamaké stove matches the design attributes described above, the lower
priced model involves several cost-cutting and performance
changing modifications, including the use of lightweight metal from
5-liter vegetable oil cans (0.4 mm or thinner, as opposed to the 0.6
mm – 0.8 mm thickness used in higher-quality stoves in Rwanda and
other countries), the omission of a door and sometimes pot rests,
and the use of no or very little cement to fix the liner in place.
These changes permit one of the lowest selling prices in Africa for
this technology, but they also cause a serious reduction in durability
and fuel efficiency as well.

2) All Metal Stoves--Rondereza Stove and Its Variants

The World Bank/ESMAP began implementation of a charcoal stoves

project in Rwanda in October of 1987. The rondereza was
originally disseminated in Rwanda as an all-metal, double walled,
bucket-shaped stove with an insulating layer of air between the two
walls. Initially, this was called the “Kigali-haut” stove. The name
rondereza, which means “to save,” was selected by households in
the field test.

The rondereza is an adaptation of the umeme stove, which was also

developed in Kenya. Umeme means “lightning” in Swahili and the
name conveys the message that this stove cooks faster than the
Umeme double-walled
metal stove

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traditional stove. Philip Hassrick, Eric Brunet, and Frans Claassen designed the umeme for UNICEF
in 1981.

The umeme/rondereza has 5 components: 1) an outer body with a door frame and a sliding door to
control the air intake, 2) an inner cylindrical wall body that serves as the combustion chamber, 3) an
inner cone for holding the charcoal, 4) an additional grate for large pots, and 5) a top ring that closes
the insulating chamber between the two walls and holds three prongs for the pot rests (Hassrick
1982).

The air space may also be filled with wood ash or soil. This is not commonly done and does not
increase the efficiency much more than just using air as the insulation and may double the 6.5 kg
weight of the stove (Sambali and Schneiders 1984). However, a thin layer of vermiculite may be
more effective as an insulator (Baldwin 1987). Also, cooking can continue for up to 2 hours after
the charcoal is extinguished if the air space is filled with damp earth (UNICEF Technology Support
Section, nd(b)).

Double walls serve two functions in a metal stove. First, the air space between the walls is a
moderately good insulator, but the insulating value decreases if the dead air space is not closed at
the top. Also, the reduction in heat loss does not improve as the thickness of the air space
increases. The two walls need to be mechanically rigid, but if the inner wall is attached to the outer
wall, the insulating value will be reduced due to thermal conductivity of the metal. This problem can
be reduced by using non-metal spacers or fasteners or by tack welding the walls in a few places.
Long continuous welds should be avoided. Second, the inner wall shields radiation of heat between
the fire and the outer wall. The exterior of a single-walled metal stove will get quite hot since it is
less insulated and poses a greater risk of burns for the cooks and children in the house (Baldwin
1987).

A major difference between the umeme and the KCJ is that the pots are supposed to be placed on
three prongs inside the umeme. The umeme was 28 cm in diameter. To fit inside the umeme, a pot
must have a diameter of 15 to 27 centimeters. Consequently, these stoves require use of specific
sizes of cooking pots that match the dimensions of the inner metal chamber of the stove. Although
smaller pots can be used inside the stove, this allows heat to be wasted, reducing the efficiency
improvement. Small pots can move around on the inner grate and may have to be held. If pots
larger than the inner surface area of the stove are used on top of the stove, the efficiency drops
substantially.

The metal work is more difficult for the umeme than the jiko and it must be done more carefully.
For example, the number and location of rivets and air inlets in the umeme is critical for the stove’s
efficiency.

The umeme stove body can last three-four years or more and can be repaired by metal artisans.
However, the metal grate may need to be replaced after 6-12 months at full use. If a grate is not
used and the stove is over-filled with charcoal, the stove might not light and, if it did, the metal could
burn out.

The umeme is more difficult to light than the traditional all-metal Kenyan stove when lit from below
because the grate can become clogged when stuffed with newspaper. Instead, the umeme is best lit
from above with a few small sticks of wood. Users can adjust the sliding door on the side to control
the heat.

In February 2007, Winrock was a regular visitor to the stove markets and stove manufacturers in
Kigali and found no evidence of the rondereza or umeme-type stove. In fact, only one manufacturer
was found who even knew what a rondereza stove was. He was able to reproduce a single-walled
version, but controlled testing found it no more efficient than the traditional metal imbabura stove.

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While the rondereza was described in World Bank/ESMAP reports as a double-walled stove, Van
der Plas (2007) and the Rwandan stove producer mentioned described it as a single-walled stove,
closely resembling the haraka stove described below in section 3. It is possible that the rondereza
was always a single-walled stove, or that the design changed from double to single-walled sometime
over the last 20 years.

3) Single-Walled Metal Stoves

The haraka is a variant of the umeme with a single metal wall.

Haraka means “fast” in Swahili. In effect, the inner wall of the
umeme is the single wall of the haraka, so it is slightly smaller. With
the haraka, the insulating second wall only extends from the bottom
of the stove to the grate halfway up. Small pots are surrounded by
only one wall when partly inserted in the stove while large pots sit
on the rim. The haraka has a handle for easier carrying and
swinging the stove for air circulation to speed up lighting. The
haraka weighs around 4.5 kg (Allen 1985; Sambali and Schneiders
1984; Schneiders and Mkallatta 1985; Hyman 1985).

UNICEF also promoted a single-walled, all-metal stove in Senegal.

Tests showed that that stove required a very precise fit between
the pot and stove wall to achieve its energy savings potential ---
differences of as little as 3 mm seriously reduced the savings. As a
result, Ellis and Ellis (1985) concluded that this “severely limit(s)
the usefulness of the single-wall design in most settings” and Haraka single-walled
metal stove.
it also had problems with “slow lighting”.

The price of the rondereza in Rwanda was around $6 in 1991 while the traditional imbabura stove
cost $5. However, the rondereza was claimed to last 18 months with some maintenance while the
traditional stove only lasts 9 months. Taking the stove life into account, the capital cost for stove
purchases over 18 months (in 1991 dollars) would have been $6 for the rondereza and $10 for the
traditional stove.

Van der Plas (2004) observed the traditional stove and two improved stoves being sold at three
markets in Kigali in March 2004 at prices ranging from RWF 400 to RWF 1,800, but unfortunately
did not disaggregate this price range by model and size of stove.

In early 2007, the main markets in Kigali where stoves are sold did not contain any stoves matching
the description of the rondereza or selling under the same name. In one instance, however, an all
metal single-walled stove was seen with an extended wall and a ceramic-jiko liner fixed inside as the
firebox. This stove was sold for 2,000 RWF (or about $3.60 using the exchange rate at the time)
under the name “rondereza plus,” but it is not widely available.

A single-walled metal stove with a metal insert/firebox for a

price of between 800 – 1600 RWF has also been observed.
This stove appears to be an improved stove, originally
developed in Burundi with World Bank funding (called the
DUB 10 stove) (Van der Plas 2007). The DUB10 was
approximately as efficient in Winrock’s controlled cooking
tests as the original single-walled rondereza stove.

DUB 10 single-walled metal stove.

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Fuel Savings

With matched size pots, the original double-walled rondereza’s fuel efficiency should be about the
same as the jiko. Water boiling tests conducted in May 1996 at the Centre National de l’Energie
Renouvelables (CNESOLER), a Malian government lab, showed virtually no difference in
performance between jiko and a rondereza type stove (called the Nafacaman). The jiko had a fuel
efficiency of 28.97% compared to 28.11% for the rondereza. The jiko’s speed in boiling water was
39.2 minutes vs 37.8 minutes and power output was 3.975 Kw vs. 4.276 Kw (Dotson and Hyman
1999). With pots that are smaller than the inner wall dimensions of the stove, the rondereza’s fuel
efficiency may be lower than the jiko’s.

In addition, the ceramic liner of the jiko retains heat in simmering food after boiling and in keeping it
warm without additional charcoal use. This extra fuel savings is not captured in water boiling tests,
but can be measured in controlled cooking tests that replicate conditions for preparation of various
foods.

In 1999, ATI/Mali contracted with CNESOLER for controlled cooking tests of the jiko and
competing metal stoves. Charcoal consumption under real cooking conditions was 358 grams for
the jiko, 471 g for the nafacaman, and 743 g for the traditional all-metal malgache stove. The jiko
required 24% less fuel than the rondereza-type stove and 52% less than the traditional single-walled
metal stove.

ESMAP supported laboratory tests in Rwanda in the late 1980s that showed that the rondereza
reduced charcoal consumption by 39% compared to the traditional stove while the local model of
the KCJ (canamaké) saved 28 percent. However, these results seem questionable since the amount
of water that boiled off was 1.04 liters with the canamaké, but only 0.87 liters with the rondereza,
which may indicate that the canamaké was left on longer than necessary. The cooking time was 208
minutes with the rondereza, 220 minutes with the canamaké, and 237 minutes with the traditional
stove.

A subsequent household survey that included physical measurement of charcoal consumption over a
2-week period found a 35% savings over the traditional stove (ESMAP 1991). Based on the 35% fuel
savings and charcoal prices prevailing at the time, ESMAP estimated that the rondereza would have
used $108 worth of charcoal while the traditional stove used $166. Note that the local currency
had devalued from RWF 77 to RWF 125 per USD during the period, but charcoal costs in USD
were based on the old exchange rate and the local currency price had not yet adjusted to
devaluation-related cost increases.

Initial controlled cooking tests conducted by Winrock in Rwanda in 2007 showed that compared to
the traditional imbabura stove, the canamaké consumed 33% less charcoal. Compared to the
rondereza plus and the DUB 10 stoves, the canamaké consumed 34% and 37% less charcoal,
respectively. It is difficult to know why the canamaké stove performed better during testing in 2007
than under ESMAP tests in the 1980s.

The average price of charcoal in Rwanda is RWF 110-150 per kg ($0.20-$0.27 at the current
exchange rate of RWF 548 per USD), with prices varying by volume, season, and location. The
average current monthly household consumption of charcoal in Kigali is estimated at 75 kg
(Munyankusi, 2006). Assuming a 33% energy savings with the canamaké compared to the
predominant traditional metal stove (based on the preliminary results of controlled cooking tests),
the value of the savings would be $5.00 to $6.75 per month. This constitutes an annual savings of
$60-$81 per household, a very significant amount of money in a country where 52% of the
population lived on less than $1 a day in 2004
(http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/rwanda_statistics.html).

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Assuming a 15 month life for the jiko, the total savings in Rwanda over the stove life would range
from $75 to $101. At an average canamaké price in Kigali of 1000 RWF (approximately US$1.80),
the average payback period for replacing a new Imbabura stove is just 8-10 days. The canamaké
price varies by size, quality, and location-specific factors, while fuel savings can change depending on
cooking habits and which traditional stove the household used before.

Production and Sales

Stove sales figures are difficult to compare in different country contexts and need to be interpreted
cautiously due to differences in the degree of subsidization of the projects. Subsidization is not
sustainable in the long term and typically results in a drop-off in sales when subsidies are eliminated.
It can also hinder the development of the private sector production and distribution systems that
are critical in achieving widespread sales. Experience has shown that key factors in the expansion of
sales are a private-sector approach to production and distribution which leads to cost reductions
with competition (Hyman 1986). Prices for KCJ models in Kenya, for example, decreased by more
than 80 per cent from the initial price between 1982 and 1985 (Hyman 1985).

Most urban stove programs can be conducted on a commercial basis, since urban residents must pay
for fuel and therefore have an incentive to purchase a fuel saving stove. Micro-credit may be an
option for the poorest residents, who may have a difficult time gathering enough funds to purchase
fuel efficient stoves, which typically have higher purchase prices than traditional stoves, due to their
higher quality. Donor or government support will be needed in most programs for stove
development, testing, producer training, and consumer demonstrations. While the price difference
between the traditional metal stove and the improved stove in Rwanda may be small, sensitization
efforts may still be necessary to explain the rapid return on investment and thereby convince poorer
households to upgrade.

In the late 1980s, the Rwandan government supported training of stove makers and a publicity
campaign for consumers to introduce the rondereza with the support of the World Bank. Although
there was no direct subsidization of the variable costs of stove production, some stove makers
received support for “modernizing their facilities”. Initially, the project acted as a liaison between
producers and retailers, subsidizing transaction and transport costs, but this assistance was later
phased out.

UNICEF subsidized the production costs of the umeme and haraka stoves in Kenya in the mid-1980s
by arranging bulk purchases of metal from large companies at a price 40% below what artisans could
arrange for themselves through middlemen. However, the umeme was still more costly to produce
and buy than the KCJ in Kenya because it required four times the amount of metal and five times the
amount of labor (Sambali and Schneiders 1984). Moreover, although thin metal can be used for the
umeme stove walls, heavier gauge metal is necessary for the inner grate, pot rests, and upper grate
(Schneiders and Mkallatta 1985). The single-walled haraka does not require as much metal or labor
as the umeme, but is less fuel efficient.

The prevalence of inexpensive, low-grade metal from US-donated vegetable oil cans in Rwanda has
made the production of the canamaké stove extremely cheap compared to other stoves. Bulk
purchases of metal by a stove-promoting project entity for an all-metal stove may allow producers
to compete with the canamaké stove in the short-term, but over the long-term it is likely that a
rondereza-type stove (based on either the double-walled umeme or single-walled haraka) would
again be abandoned.

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Stove Production in Rwanda

The ESMAP project trained 50 metal artisans to make the rondereza stove, but not all proved
capable of producing good-quality stoves. There is conflicting information about the spread of the
rondereza and other improved charcoal stoves in Rwanda. Sales of the rondereza began in 1988 in
Rwanda and 400 stoves were sold in the first month, increasing to 1,200-1,500 per month by
December 1990.

Cumulative sales reached 6,000 on March 31, 1990 and 19,800 on December 31, 1990. ESMAP
estimated that improved stoves constituted 21.2% of the charcoal stove market in Kigali in
December of 1990. After that, monthly sales in 1991 were reportedly 1,500 to 2,000. The Ministry
of Public Works, Energy, and Water (MINITRAPE) had a higher estimate of 30,000 rondereza sold
through January of 1991 (ESMAP 1991).

Barnes, Openshaw; Smith; and van der Plas (1994) cited the same 1991 ESMAP source in reporting
that 25% of households in Kigali were using an improved stove. This appears to be a
misinterpretation because achieving 20-25% of the market for new charcoal stoves is not likely to
result in 25% of households using an improved charcoal stove.

Hall and Mao (1994) reported that the rondereza was being used by only 1% of the households
surveyed. This lower figure may be due the increasing ethnic conflict that led to civil war and
genocide in 1994. Nevertheless, more recent information in Rwanda is still contradictory.

A World Bank survey in 2002 found that 9% of the urban population used an improved charcoal
stove; however, it also reported that some 40% of the charcoal stoves observed in the survey were
improved ones (Van der Plas 2004). This may reflect some confusion as to what constitutes an
improved charcoal stove. It is also not clear what stove models are included in these statistics, but
they do not all appear to be the rondereza. Part of the difference between the two statistics may be
due to the fact that households with an improved charcoal stove may own multiple improved stoves,
while some households using a traditional stove may only have one.

Research and promotional activities for improved charcoal stoves ceased in Rwanda in 1993 and
have not been revived (Electrogaz 2004). KIST/Winrock’s initial investigation of rondereza
production and sales in Rwanda in early 2007 could not confirm the production or sale of any of the
basic rondereza model except for one manufacturer who had not produced the stove in more than
10 years. A single-walled metal stove with a metal insert/firebox does seem, however, to account
for about 5-10% of stoves sold in the market. This model appears to be the DUB 10 stove that
originated in neighboring Burundi (Van der Plas 2007).

Although affordability and fuel cost savings are important attributes of an improved stove, status and
style are also vital in achieving large sales volumes. Brewis (2005) notes that the Ghanaian jiko was
“sold as an up-market product with emphasis placed on the stove’s modern appearance both in
advertising and the design of the logo….The Gyapa is marketed using attributes such as being
modern and stylish, easy to light, cooking quickly, and saving money.”

Canamaké and other stove users interviewed by KIST/Winrock in Kigali in 2007 expressed a strong
preference for the canamaké over the traditional stove and confirm that it is significantly more fuel
efficient than the traditional stove by 25-50 percent. Additional data on comparative fuel savings and
cooking time as well as information on user experience and preferences will be collected during a
stove use survey to be implemented between February and March 2007.

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Conclusions

The design of the jiko is well proven and has gone through a lot of research, testing, and adaptation.
Moreover, the stove is already popular with consumers in Rwanda, and the technology is available
there for perhaps the lowest price of anywhere in Africa. So a renewed effort to improve and
promote the canamaké stove could allow for rapid impacts. In addition, any new stove model would
be competing with this widely used and inexpensive technology and would thus require substantial
resources – as well as a compelling value proposition to consumers – in order to gain a foothold.

The main disadvantage of the jiko is the need to work closely with ceramic liner producers as well as
metal artisans in the initial stages to ensure good quality control. Identification of a suitable clay mix
for stove liners can also be time consuming because it is basically a trial and error process unless
established pottery firms have already found raw material sources that can produce a strong and
resistant product. Liner molding should be mechanized using a jigger jolly (see Appendix A.1) to
enable production of a high quality product at a sufficient scale.

The Energia portal’s review of the Allen (1991) production manual for the jiko also concluded that,
“Many stove designs have been promoted as ‘the’ best stove for everyone, but few have truly broad
applicability. Yet the Kenya Ceramic Jiko should probably be on anyone's short list of designs,
because it has so many promising features. It is small and portable, relatively efficient and durable,
yet rather low-cost
http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:jxXoGlrJ9wAJ:www.energia.inf.cu/biblioteca/chapters/cookstov
.htm+Kenya+ceramic+jiko+%2B+sales&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=12&client=firefox-a

The rondereza’s main advantage is that it only requires working with metal artisans and not ceramics
producers as well. However, the double-walled rondereza as originally introduced in Rwanda is
likely to be significantly more costly than the jiko because it requires much more metal and labor to
produce. When used as intended with suitable sized pots inside the stove, the rondereza is about as
fuel efficient as the jiko, but it would be less efficient than the jiko without matched size pots. The
single-walled ceramic-lined “rondereza plus” is also much more expensive to produce than the jiko,
though its efficiency does not seem to be as high.

Even the single-walled stove with the metal insert/firebox currently found in Rwanda does not seem
to be cheaper or easier to produce than the jiko, and it is unlikely to be as fuel-efficient as either the
double-walled rondereza or the ceramic jiko stove. The preliminary results of ongoing controlled
cooking tests support this assertion.

Surveys of stove preferences in several countries – including Benin, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and Zambia
– have found that the ceramic-lined jiko is preferred over a rondereza-type stove by users who have
tried both stoves. The apparent exception is the ESMAP study in Rwanda.

The current widespread availability and low cost of the ceramic jiko in Kigali, and the scarcity of
rondereza variants suggests that – without any significant donor-funded push towards any particular
technology – Rwandan consumers have gravitated towards the ceramic jiko stove and away from the
rondereza. For this reason, Winrock/KIST should use the canamaké in its household testing efforts,
to gauge consumer satisfaction and fuel efficiency. Once that data is obtained, refinements can be
made to the stove based upon consumer feedback.

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APPENDIX A.1: EXPERIENCES WITH THE CERAMIC JIKO STOVES IN
AFRICA

In September of 1981, USAID funded the Kenya Renewable Energy Development Project (KREDP)
through the Ministry of Energy and implemented by Energy/Development International (E/DI). In
late 1983, KREDP subcontracted with the Kenyan Energy and Environment Organisation (KENGO)
for a 6-month field testing of charcoal and wood stoves, together with various NGOs in Nairobi,
Mombasa, and Kisumu. Following the field test, multiple manufacturers began production and sale of
the charcoal stove in Nairobi.

The first charcoal stove developed under the project was designed in 1982 and called the “pipeliner”
stove. It consisted of a traditional jiko lined with an extruded, fired clay pipe and fitted with a
separate ceramic grate. This design was later rejected due to the susceptibility of the liner to
cracking and separation from the cladding plus the difficulty of holding the grate in place and the
short life of the ceramic pot rests that rested directly on the extruded pipe.

The second major design was a Kenyan bucket stove with a cylindrical flat-bottomed clay liner that
was molded on a potter’s wheel, fired, and placed in a traditional jiko. This stove differed from the
Thai bucket in several ways. First, the sides of the stove were cylindrical rather than sloping.
Second, metal pot rests were attached to the cladding because Kenyan cooks use heavy pots that
need firm support and it takes considerable skill to carve clay pot rests for the liner.

Third, three short legs were attached so that the stove would not rock on uneven floors during
vigorous stirring of the Kenyan staple maize meal. Fourth, the air inlet door was made tighter to
allow better regulation of the power output for high and low heat. Fifth, the Kenyan stove had a
heavier metal cladding for greater durability. The disadvantages of the Kenyan bucket design were
that the stove was heavy and relatively expensive, the liner was susceptible to cracking and coming
loose, the grate tended to break easily, and it was not as easy to light.

The third design, the bell-bottom stove, was developed in late 1983 and refined further in 1984.
This stove has a waist-like shape that is narrowest in the middle, which provides a firmer assembly
because the cladding conforms to the shape of the liner. There is an insulating layer of a
cement/vermiculite mix between the cladding and the liner and also on the bottom of the ash box.
The insulating layer increases the lifetime of the cladding by reducing its exposure to heat and
oxidation and also holds the liner in place. As a result, the liner is less prone to cracking from
expansion in heating.

The first bell-bottom stove model had a liner that extended the full height of the cladding. It was
discontinued in November 1984. The second bell-bottom model has a liner that extends only half
the height. This model is the one that has been sold in large numbers. The advantages of the half
liner are that 1) the stove is more portable because it weighs less; 2) the stove has a smaller firebox,
reducing the possibility of waste from overloading it with charcoal; 3) the stove costs less since it is
cheaper to produce; and 4) the liner is less prone to cracking. The wide bottom of the stove makes
it more stable and easy to light. The large air inlet can also be used for roasting maize.

The earlier version of the half liner stove had a ceramic grate that was separate from the liner, but it
was found that a separate grate was more prone to cracking. The subsequent version has a one-
piece ceramic liner with perforated holes in the bottom that serves as a grate. Over time, the
thickness of the insulating cement/vermiculite layer was reduced to 1 cm and made more uniform to
reduce the bulk and weight of the stove, lower production costs, and decrease cracking.

The ceramic liners were initially molded by hand or on a potter’s wheel in Kenya. The approach of
hand molding, particularly by relatively unskilled women’s cooperative pottery makers, proved to be
fraught with quality control problems and was slow, making it difficult to achieve the volume of

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production needed to reduce costs and reach the take-off point for sales. Adding multiple stove
sizes to meet various cooking needs and family sizes also helped to increase sales. The most
commonly purchased size in Kenya had a diameter of 28 centimeters.

In mid-1985, Appropriate Technology International (ATI, now Enterprise Works/VITA) funded a

follow-up project for KENGO to promote informal sector production and distribution of the KCJ in
other towns besides Nairobi. For the ATI project, one of the organization’s engineers, Hugh Allen,
developed a jigger jolly for mechanized production of liners.

The jigger jolly consists of a small pulley, belt drive, large pulley
attached to a shaft with two support bearings and a wheelhead,
interchangeable mould, profile with an attached arm and
counterweight, bracing strut to limit vibration and lateral
movement, and foot pedal. The machine is made of mild steel and
is operated by a 0.75 hp electric motor. The molds can be made of
machined steel or aluminum, which is cheaper, but less durable.

The jigger jolly is easy to use. Workers only need two days of
training for its operation and it does not require the high degree of
skill needed to use a potter’s wheel. It takes 10 minutes to mold a
liner by hand, but only 1-2 minutes with the jolley. In addition,
hand-formed liners are more susceptible to cracking since too much
air is left inside the clay. Machine-formed liners also have more
uniform dimensions for a better fit within the claddings and a more
attractive appearance. It was only after this machine was in use
extensively that large numbers of stoves were produced in Kenya.

Senegal Electric jigger jolly for liner.

With USAID funding in Senegal, ATI developed a variant of the KCJ that is more appropriate for
West African conditions. In late 1989, ATI imported 50 standard-sized jikos from Kenya for field
testing and found that they were too small for food preparation for most Senegalese households. At
the same time, there was also a demand for a very small model for tea preparation. ATI
subsequently imported 30 larger KCJs (30 cm diameter) for market testing. After testing various
clay mixes and training manufacturers, commercial production of three sizes of this stove began in
1991 (20 cm, 30 cm, and 32 cm). The jigger jolly was used for liner molding.

Some other important changes were made in the Senegal model, which is sold there as the
“diambar,” which means “strong”. Since vermiculite was not available locally, ash from wood or
groundnut shells was substituted in the cement mix. The height of the stove was increased from
26.5 cm to 29.5 cm for better ergonomics. Small, metal hinges to hold the liner in place and curved
handles to make the stove easier to carry were added. Production improvements were also made.
Jigs and fixtures were developed to increase labor productivity and improve quality metal cladding
fabrication. Grog (pieces of fired clay) was included in the clay mix to make the ceramic liner last
longer in the diambar than the KCJ. A sample of 50 diambar stoves was monitored for durability
and all were still in use after 2 ½ years. The traditional metal stove in Senegal has an expected life of
about 9 months.

The original diambar I stoves in Senegal adopted the bell-bottom shape of the jiko. In late 1992,
Cheikh Gueye, an EnterpriseWorks project technician, developed a new diambar II design with a
conical cladding and separate round base. This change allowed producers to reduce the price about
15% because of lower labor costs. Both designs were being produced, but the diambar I was more
popular (at least through late 1994) because it has a more stable base.

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In late 1994, the retail prices of the diambar I stoves in Dakar were $3.11 for the tea stove, $5.50
for the 30 cm model, and $6.41 for the 32 cm model. The corresponding prices for the diambar II
stoves were $2.75, $4.58, and $5.50, respectively. The traditional stove cost $0.92 for a tea model,
$1.83 for a standard model, and $2.20 for a large model (Hyman, Singh, and Lawrence 1996). For a
household that needs a large stove, the capital costs of purchasing stoves over a 2 ½ year period
would be $6.41 for the diambar I and $6.60 for the traditional stove. (this data is over 10 years old.
Since Cheikh is working on the project, please get him to update the prices)

In late 1993, a study of 98 randomly selected households in using the diambar stove was conducted
in Dakar. The study included actual measurement of charcoal use over a 2-day period with the
diambar and another 2 days with another type of charcoal stove owned by the household – either
the traditional metal charcoal stove (malgache) or sakkanal. The Sakkanal is a single-walled stove that
is more efficient than the traditional stove because it is made from thicker metal and has an air inlet
door to control the combustion rate (Chatain and Madon 1988). It was promoted by the University
of Dakar’s Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur les Energies Renouvelable (CERER and the
parastatal Dociete de Domaines Industriels de Dakar (SODIDA) between 1980 and 1987. Fewer
than 10,000 sakkanals had been sold at that time (AFTPS 1994).

Households who used the diambar instead of the malgache consumed 47% less charcoal.
Households who substituted the diambar for the sakkanal saved 36% of their charcoal consumption.
Diambar owners also lauded the longer life of the diambar than the traditional stove made of thin
metal, which burns through as frequently as every 3 months. None of the respondents had to
replace a diambar or its ceramic liner in the first two years of use. Although the diambar has a
higher initial cash cost than the traditional stove, it brought a long-term savings on stove capital
costs as well as a fuel savings. Households who previously spent $15-$18 a year replacing malgache
stoves now spent just $4.60-$5.50 on one diambar, depending on the size.

Benin
In 1998, a pre-project market survey with 150 respondents was carried out in 4 cities in Benin –
Cotonou, Porto Novo, Abomey, and Bohicon. The households were loaned a jiko stove and asked
to test its use against their own charcoal stoves. The study included weighing of actual charcoal use
over a 2-week period – one week with the jiko and another week with their existing charcoal
stoves. Other stoves that were in use in the sample included the 1) traditional all-metal malgache; 2)
jante -- a traditional stove made of vehicle tires that is less fuel efficient than the malgache and is
mainly used for parties and festivals when larger quantities of food need to be prepared; 3) tambour
– another stove made from vehicle tires, but smaller than the jante; 4) CRS stove – a single-walled,
cylindrical metal stove for charcoal or wood; 5) colporte – hexagonal aluminum stove; and 6) a
double-walled cylindrical stove with sand or adobe between the two walls.

Overall, the jiko stove resulted in a fuel savings of 39 percent after adjusting for the number of
people taking their meals in the household. The Benin survey also disaggregated charcoal
consumption by household socioeconomic level and town, but there was little difference in the
results across either housing type or town. Over 97% of the respondents in Benin thought that the
jiko required less fuel than their other charcoal stoves. About 44% commented that the jiko cooked
quickly. Nearly 39% noted that the jiko was easy to light.

Stosch and Quaye (2002) reported on a survey of 72 poor and lower middle income households in
Greater Accra and the Central and Eastern Regions of Ghana who were given Gyapa and Ahibenso
stoves (Gyapa is the Ghanaian version of the jiko) to test in comparison with their traditional stove.
Each stove was used for a week. The measured average charcoal consumption per day was 1.75 kg
with the traditional stove, 1.11 kg with the Gyapa, and 1.30 kg with the Ahibenso. The Gyapa used
37% less fuel than the traditional stove and 15% less than the Ahibenso.

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Stosch and Quaye (2002) also discussed user comments on the three stoves in Ghana. The
Ghanaian jiko (called the Gyapa) was perceived as having the following advantages by at least 10% of
the respondents – consumes less fuel (70%), cooks fast/easy to cook with (40%), lights easily and less
fanning needed (40%), clean and can be used indoors (30%), healthy and does not radiate heat (10%),
and stable (10%). The perceived disadvantages of the jiko were heavy (30%) and breakable liner
(24%).

The Ahibenso is a single-walled metal stove with a well for placing the cooking pot inside. It can be
expected to have a lower fuel efficiency and a lower cost compared to the jiko due to the absence
of the double metal wall. Many respondents found that this stove consumed less fuel than the
traditional stove (45%). Other comments on this stove included clean and usable indoors (20%),
attractive and heat can be regulated (19%), and cooks fast/easy to cook with (18%). However, this
stove consumed more fuel than the Gyapa (25%), and was not considered durable (10%). Overall,
70% of the respondents in the Ghana survey preferred the Gyapa over the Ahibenso.

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 APPENDIX A.2: CERAMIC JIKO SALES IN AFRICA

Fisher (2006) noted that KCJ sales started slowly in Kenya, until a “tipping point was reached”.
Total sales of all of the models of ceramic-lined charcoal stoves in Kenya were around 13,000 at the
end of 1983, 66,000 at the end of 1984, and 84,000 through March 31, 1985 (Hyman 1985).
Walubengo (1995) reported that 700,000 of the improved jikos had been sold in Kenya and the KCJ
was found in over 50% of all urban households and 16% of rural households in the county. Sales
took off in the 1990s after reaching 18-20% of the market and the KCJ now accounts for over 65%
of charcoal stove sales in the country with 1.5 million sold (Fisher 2006).

Key factors in the expansion of sales are the private sector approach to production and distribution
and cost reductions with competition (Hyman 1986) plus greater experience gained in production
and sales. Prices for KCJ models have decreased by more than 80 per cent from the initial price
(Duke and Kammen 1999).

Commercialization of the KCJ began in Ethiopia in 1991 with DFID support. By early 1997, over
300,000 “Lakech” stoves had been sold and monthly sales were 4,000
(http://www.repp.org/discussiongroups/resources/stoves/Bess/Lakech.htm). Bess and Ottavia (2001)
reported that around 1.5 million of these stoves had been sold by that date and 65% of households
in Addis Ababa owned one. The price of the stove in Ethiopia had fallen from $10 to $1.

The improved jiko has also been replicated in many other countries, primarily due to the activities of
EnterpriseWorks/VITA in Benin, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal as well as CARE in Lesotho, Sudan, and
Zambia and Winrock International in Chad. EnterpriseWorks is continuing to track jiko sales in
Ghana, where it still has an active project. The prior sales data for other countries in the most
recent year available are also listed below.

Year (As of Metal Cladding

Country (Local Annual Cumulative Stove Sales
September and Ceramic
Stove Name) Sales Sales Agents
30) Liner Enterprises
14 137
Benin (Nansu) 2003 12,832 78,491
(number active) (number active)
91 120
Ghana (Gyapa) 2006 ND 128,995
(number trained) (number trained)
42 82
Mali (Sewa) 2003 10,781 79,781
(number active) (number active)
Senegal (Diambar) 2002 28,518 100,143 ND ND
Total 387,410

Sources: Wolfe 2005; Tsiliopoulis 2006.

Perry (2006) reports that recent sales in Mali have increased to 3,000-4,000 per month following
subsidization by the World Bank. An average figure of 42,000 was assumed for FY06 sales in Mali. If
the most recent annual sales numbers from Benin, Mali, and Senegal are extrapolated through
September 30, 2006 and added to the cumulative sales from Ghana, total sales in EnterpriseWorks
projects exceed 600,000. In actuality, the cumulative sales probably exceed this number because
annual sales tend to grow from year to year as the technology becomes more widely known.

Stoves similar to the umeme or haraka have been promoted in various countries, with relatively low
sales. Through early 1985, an estimated 4,000 umeme stoves had been produced in Kenya and
production appeared to be demand limited (Hyman 1985). Double walled metal stoves have been
commercialized in Botswana and Guinea (Baldwin 1987).

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A GTZ project in Mali subsidized a double-walled stove similar to the umeme in the 1990s, but the
fact that the World Bank has more recently switched to promoting the jiko is a reflection of the
greater popularity of the jiko with users.

Between 1987 and 1992, a Catholic Relief Services project sold 5,400 single-walled, all-metal stoves
in Benin.

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 References

AFTPSS. 1994. Review of Policies, Strategies, and Programs in the Traditional Energy Sector,
Workshop II: Proceedings. Ouagadougou: World Bank Africa Technical Department Private Sector
and Economics Division.

Allen, Hugh. 1991. The Kenya Ceramic Jiko: A Manual for Stovemakers, London: IT Publications (in
association with ATI and CARE).

Baldwin, Samuel. 1987. Biomass Stoves: Engineering Design, Development, and Dissemination.
Princeton: Princeton University Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Prepared for VITA.

Barnes, Douglas; Keith Openshaw; Kirk Smith; and Robert van der Plas. 1994. What Makes People
Cook With Improved Biomass Stoves? Washington, DC: World Bank Technical Paper 242.

Bess, Mike and Ottavia Mazzoni. 2001. “Poverty Reduction Aspects of Successful Improved
Household Stoves Programmes.” Boiling Point, no. 47: 8-9.

Brewis, Alan. 2005. “Ten Top Tips for Successful Scaling Up,” Boiling Point, no. 50: 5-6.

Chatain, E. and Gerard Madon. 1988. Diffusion Massive de Foyers Ameliores: Contraintes et
Perspectives. New York: UNDP>

Dah, Cunegonde and Cherifatou Mounirou. 1998. Etude de Marche du Foyer Jiko au Benin.
Cotonou: Appropriate Technology International/Benin.

Dotson, Brian and Eric Hyman. 1999. “Commercialization of the SEWA Stove in Mali,” Boiling Point,
No 42: 33-34.

Duke, R. and Kammen, D. M. 1999. “The Economics Of Energy Market Transformation

Programmes,” The Energy Journal, 20 (4), 15–64.

Electrogaz 2004. Project Implementation Services for Biofuels Demand Management Program
(Marketing and After-Sales Service Arrangements for Efficient Stoves and Kilns: Consultancy Draft
Terms of Reference. Kigali: Government of Rwanda.

Ellis, Patricia and Gene Ellis. 1985. Small Projects Assessment Package: Disk 3 Improved Charcoal
Stoves. Washington, DC: Peace Corps.

ESMAP. 1991. Rwanda: Commercialization of Improved Charcoal Stoves and Carbonization

Techniques Mid-Term Progress Report. Washington, DC: World Bank Energy Management
Assistance Programme, Report 141/91.

Fisher, Martin. 2006. “Income is Development: KickStart’s Pumps Help Kenyan Farmers Transition
to a Cash Economy,” Innovations (winter): 9-30.

Global Environmental Facility. 2005. Request for Pipeline Entry: Sustainable Energy Development
Project, Rwanda. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Hall, D.O and Y.S. Mao. 1994. Biomass Energy and Coal in Africa. London: AFREPREN.

Hassrick, Phillip. "Umeme: A Charcoal Stove from Kenya." Appropriate

Technology, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1982, pp. 6-7.

40 of 60
Hyman, Eric. 1985. The Experience With Improved Charcoal and Wood Stoves for Households and
Institutions in Kenya. Washington, DC: Appropriate Technology International.
"The Economics of Improved Charcoal Stoves in Kenya," Energy Policy 14 (1986): 149-158.

Hyman, Eric. 1986. "The Economics of Improved Charcoal Stoves in Kenya," Energy Policy 14
(1986): 149-158.

Hyman, Eric. 1987. "The Strategy of Production and Distribution of Improved Charcoal Stoves in
Kenya," World Development 15 (1987): 375-386;

Hyman, Eric 1994. “Fuel Substitution and Efficient Woodstoves: Are They The Answers to the
Fuelwood Supply Problem in Northern Nigeria?” Environmental Management, 18, no. 1: 23-32.

Hyman, Eric, Jas Singh, and Edward Lawrence. 1996. “The Commercialization of Efficient Household
Charcoal Stoves in Senegal.” Science, Technology, and Development, 14, no.1: 1-20 (Eric Hyman;
Jas Singh; and Edward Lawrence).

Kammen, Daniel and Debra Lew. 2005. Review of Technologies for the Production and Use of
Charcoal. Berkeley, CA: Energy and Resources Group and Goldman School of Public Policy,
Prepared for the National Renewable Energy Laboratory.

Karenzi, P.C. 1994. “Biomass in Rwanda” in Hall and Mao 1994.

KENGO. 1991. “Are World Bank Stoves Initiatives Effective?” RWEPA News, no. 5, Kenya Energy
and Environment Organisation Regional Wood Energy Programme for Africa.

Munyankusi, Laurent, 2006 (Rwanda Ministry of Infrastructure), personal communication.

Rwanda Ministry of Infrastructure. 2006. Proposal: National Program for Sustainable Framework
and Strategy for Development and Dissemination of Fuel Efficient Cook Stoves. Government of
Rwanda.

Sambali, J. and Heinz Schneiders. 1984. Projects on the Development and Production of Improved
Charcoal Stoves in Tanzania – A Survey and Laboratory Test Results. Dodoma, Tanzania: GTZ
Dodoma Rural Energy Project.

Schneiders, Heinz and K. Mkallatta. 1985. The Dodoma Stove After Eighteen Months – Results of
the Long-Term Investigation into the Utilization and Savings of an Improved Charcoal Stove.
Dodoma, Tanzania: GTZ Dodoma Rural Energy Project.

Stosch, Lisa and Catherine Bishop. 2002. 2000 Impact Report Showing Program Growth Since 1993.
Washington, DC: EnterpriseWorks Worldwide.

Stosch, Lisa and Wilhelmina Quaye. 2002. A Study of Fuel Consumption in Three Types of
Household Charcoal Stoves in Ghana. Washington, DC: EnterpriseWorks Worldwide.

Tsiliopoulos, Vicki. 2006 (EnterpriseWorks/VITA), personal communication.

UNICEF Technology Support Section, ND (a). The Haraka Charcoal Stove. Nairobi, UNICEF.

UNICEF Technology Support Section, ND (b). The Umeme Jiko. Nairobi, UNICEF.

Van der Plas, R.J. 2004. Biomass Energy in Rwanda – An Update. Washington, DC: World Bank
PRSC.

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Van der Plas, R.J. 2007, personal communication.

Walubengo, D. (1995) "Commercialization of improved stoves: The case of the Kenya Ceramic Jiko
(KCJ)", in Stove Images: A Documentation of Improved and Traditional Stoves in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America, Westhoff, B. and Germann, D. (eds.), (Commission of the European Communities:
Brussels, Belgium).

Wolfe, Jason, 2005 (EnterpriseWorks Worldwide), personal communication.

Wolfe, Jason and Ed Perry. ND. Reducing Charcoal Consumption and Creating Sustainable
Employment Through the Commercialization of Conservation Cookstoves: Opportunities for
Replication Throughout Urban West Africa. Washington, DC: EnterpriseWorks Worldwide.

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ANNEX 2. THE COOKSTOVE SUPPLY CHAIN IN KIGALI

Prepared
By
Winrock International

March 14, 2007

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THE COOKSTOVE SUPPLY CHAIN IN KIGALI
Critical to the design of an effective improved cookstove program is in-depth knowledge of the
supply chain that produces and markets cookstoves to consumers. The objective of this assessment
is to describe the current cookstove supply chain in Kigali, Rwanda and make preliminary
recommendations for its strengthening. The data presented in this report were collected over a
three-week period from late January 2007 to mid-February 2007 in a collaborative effort between
Winrock International and the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology.

I. Cookstove Production and Sales

A. Production
Production of cookstoves and their component parts (i.e., ceramic liners) takes place in numerous
neighborhoods throughout Kigali. The principal metal workshop locations are found in Kimironko
(Gasabo District), Nyabisindu (Gasabo District), Masoro (Gasabo District), Kakijiro (Gasabo
District), Urugero (Kacyru District), Nyamabuye (Gasabo District), Gashyekero, Gasharu 1
(Kicukiro District), Karambo (Kicukiro District), Murambi, and Rwampara (Kicukiro District). These
shops have the capacity to manufacture both traditional, ceramic-lined stoves (called the canamaké
stove in Kinyarwanda), and, in some exceptional cases, other improved stoves (e.g., DUB 10). In all,
approximately 50 metal workshops, employing several hundred workers, are found at the locations
cited above.

Usually working out of a room in their homes, potters are found in Nybisindu (Gasabo District),
Masoro (Gasabo District), Kigarama (Kicukiro District), and in at least three other locations in
Kicukiro District. Approximately 50 ceramics shops operate at these sites, usually grouped together
as in the case of Nybisindu, where thirteen potters run active ceramics operations. They produce
both all-ceramic stoves as well as the ceramic liner for the canamaké stove.

Most of these workshops are found in hard to reach locations in the backstreets of Kigali’s poorer
neighborhoods. In fact, only two metal workshops were identified within easy access of a paved
road.

B. Raw materials supply

Thin-gauge metal for cookstove construction is sought by cookstove makers amongst the city’s
scrap heaps and large enterprises that produce metal articles and, in the process, significant
quantities of scrap metal. TOLERWA, AFRIFOAM, and IPROTURE are perhaps the most prominent
of these large-scale producers of metal items. All of the lowest cost canamaké stoves are now made
from discarded vegetable oil cans from the US Government’s food aid program to Rwanda. This use
of such flimsy material is permitted by the ceramic liner, which protects the very thin metal from the
high temperatures emitted by the burning charcoal.

Clay for the production of the ceramic liner of the canamaké is mined in the many valley bottoms
that crisscross Kigali. Some of these ceramicists (unusual in our experience working with
ceramicists who produce ceramic liners for fuel-efficient stoves in other parts of Africa) purchase
metal claddings which, in combination with the ceramic liners of their own making, they use to
fabricate fully assembled stoves for sale. Even more unusually, one group of ceramicists in Masoro
(Gasabo District) has established a vertically integrated operation, producing both ceramic liners and
metal claddings themselves.

C. Sales
Sale of cookstoves occurs in all of the main Kigali markets (e.g., Kimironko, Kimisagara,
Nyamirambo, Bidiyogo, etc.). In the approximately 10 principal market sites identified, a total of
about 60 vendors sell cookstoves. Not unlike many other places in Africa, few shops outside of

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these main markets carry cookstoves for sale. In fact, the only one that has been observed is located
not far from Bidiyogo market.

The majority of stoves are bought by households from vendors. Direct purchases from manufacturer
shops appear to be much less frequent. Some manufacturers do, however, sell their stoves door-to-
door.

II. Main Actors: Stove Artisans, Ceramicists and Vendors

A. Artisans
Artisans fabricate all-metal stoves and the metal component of the ceramic-lined stove. As in other
parts of Africa, their equipment is rudimentary (hammers, chisels, and railroad rails that serve as
anvils). Not infrequently, these artisans work in the open air (or poorly sheltered spaces), with no
roof to protect them from the rain, which, in the case of Kigali, falls approximately 6 months a year.

Most of the cookstoves produced in Kigali are manufactured in workshops ranging in size from 2 to
30 workers, with the average number of workers per metal workshop estimated to be
approximately eight. These groups frequently pool their resources to search for and purchase raw
materials and, in cases where the stoves are sold itinerantly, to market the stoves. A single artisan
can manufacture 5-10 stoves a day, depending on the quality of the raw materials and the assembly,
type of stove produced, and availability of raw material. Workers in the most productive shops
actually produce about 10 stoves a day. It is rare, however, that this production level can be
sustained due to the lack of liners (especially during the rainy season) and metal for the cladding.
During the rainy season, many artisans do not have adequate shelter to protect them from the rains,
reducing productivity to well below what it could be. Artisans complain that metal for the cladding
is in short supply, forcing them to spend considerable time in search of it.

Depending on stove quality, raw materials for construction of the canamaké stove (i.e., metal and
ceramic liner) cost generally between 250 RWF and 700 RWF. Stoves sold wholesale directly to
market vendors exhibit profit margins of 50 RWF to 300 RWF. Artisans selling to individual
homemakers record higher margins but sell fewer stoves.

The majority of the stove artisans sell their stoves directly to vendors in the major markets of Kigali
(nine of twelve artisans interviewed stated that they sell their stoves directly to market vendors).
No current development projects seem to be providing a market for cookstoves, although they have
in the past. As might be expected, producers focus on those markets and neighborhoods that are
closest to their shop locations. For example, artisans located in Kimironko conduct most of their
commercial activity in the Kimironko neighborhood, selling what they can directly to vendors in
Kimironko market. More than one artisan group reported that their cookstoves are marketed,
although not directly, to secondary towns in addition to the Kigali market.

B. Ceramicists
Ceramicists produce all-ceramic stoves as well as the ceramic liners for the canamaké stove. Like
their metal artisan counterparts, these ceramicists have little improved equipment at their disposal,
producing ceramic products in the same way as they have for perhaps hundreds of years, if not
more. The only apparent improvement of significance appears to be the introduction of a simple
metal mold for forming the outer shape of the liners for the canamaké stove.4 A cooperative of 49
ceramicists, producing mostly fired clay objects for the upscale market in Kigali, possesses the only
modern wood-fired kiln, provided in the past by a donor.

4
A manual jigger jolly developed by Winrock’s Malick Lo is being tested by a group of Nybisindu
potters for the production of ceramic liners. Initial indications are that it increases quality and
productivity significantly and that the potters are delighted with the innovation.

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Most of the ceramic liners for the canamaké cookstove are manufactured by family producer units
comprised of at least three persons. Potter households with no children old enough to work
sometimes increase capacity through the addition of extended family members. These ceramic
production units are located close to areas where clay deposits can be found. Production of ceramic
liners for the canamaké stove usually alternates with production of other clay items. Based on a small
sample of household-based pottery production units, one of these units has an average capacity to
manufacture about 500 liners a month. Each liner typically sells for about 200 RWF. Stove liners,
when they are not used by the ceramists themselves to produce fully assembled stoves, are sold to
metalworking artisans or, less frequently, door-to-door to households as replacement liners.

Kilns used by traditional ceramicists form a weak link in the production of quality ceramic liners for
the canamaké stove. Comprised of precisely formed piles of dried clay articles and firewood covered
with scraps of rusty metal placed in an outdoor courtyard, these kilns perform relatively well during
dry weather, in some cases yielding high quality ceramic products. During the rains, however, these
kilns produce under-fired pieces as their porous construction allows the rain to penetrate inside the
kiln structure. Some potters do not bother firing during much of the rainy season, choosing instead
to market unfired liners to cookstove-making artisans. When fired canamaké ceramic liners are in
short supply during the rainy season, it is not unusual for cookstove makers to assemble such stoves
with unfired liners that are then painted over to conceal their true nature. Cookstoves fabricated in
this way are of course far less durable and fuel efficient.

C. Vendors
Vendors typically sell different types of stoves as well as other kitchen wares in Kigali’s major
markets, where they are grouped together in one section. Based on interviews with most of the
stove vendors found in Kigali, monthly sales per vendor vary between approximately 10 and 300,
with the average on the order of 80.

Interviews with five market vendors revealed that the number of stove suppliers ranged from one to
four, with two procuring canamaké stoves from just one supplier each and the two others obtaining
them from four apiece. The fifth vendor was supplied by three different stove manufacturers. While
these suppliers were usually located relatively close by, others – the bigger, more entrepreneurial
producers – originated from other parts of the city. In general, stove vendors stated that their
customers come from the surrounding neighborhoods. However, in the case of stove vendors
located in the larger markets that attract people from all over the city, the response was also
“Kigali”. None of the stove retailer respondents had put any resources into publicizing the canamaké
stove.

Stove retailers were also asked about the most common positive and negative customer comments
concerning the canamaké stove. They responded that the most common comments were that it
saves money but that it was not durable enough.

III. Market for Cookstoves

A. Market composition
With a population of approximately 1 million people, there are 150,000 to 200,000 households in
Kigali. Assuming that all of these households have a need for at least one new stove a year given the
limited durability of most stoves currently on the market, there is a market for a minimum of
150,000 stoves.

Based on a survey of the majority of cookstove vendors in Kigali and preliminary results of the
baseline and stove use survey, approximately 40-50 percent of all stoves currently sold are canamaké
stoves. Possibly another 5-10 percent of the market is comprised of different types of other
improved stoves. Traditional stoves – both all-metal and all-ceramic – comprise the remaining 40-55
percent of the market.

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B. Retail Price
The retail price of cookstoves in Kigali varies widely depending primarily on the quantity and quality
of the materials used in construction. At the low end is the all-ceramic stove, possibly the second
most used stove in Kigali after the canamaké stove, which sells for approximately 250 RWF.

The unit retail price for single burner canamaké cookstoves varies from 600 RWF to approximately
2,000 RWF, with the average in the neighborhood of 1,000 RWF. Elevated multiple burner canamaké
stoves cost much more - on the order of 5000-10,000 RWF – and appeal to upper-middle income
households.

C. Quality
Cookstove quality varies considerably. The inadequate working conditions and production
equipment described above have resulted in poor quality cookstoves in many instances. In addition,
many canamaké stoves are assembled with little or no cement in the mixture used to fix the liner to
the metal cladding, causing the liner to quickly separate from the cladding, which results in reduced
durability and heat efficiency. While stoves built with properly fired liners and cement mixture will
last at least a year or more, those constructed with under-fired or unfired or little or no cement in
the mixture may last only a few days or weeks.

IV. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Cookstove Supply Chain

A. Strengths
Two main strengths of the cookstove supply chain in Kigali have been revealed in the course of the
present assessment:
♦ Significant capacity to produce the canamaké stove as well as other types of all-metal and all-
ceramic cookstoves;
♦ The presence of significant numbers of producers in the marketplace has created strong
price competition, driving the unit price of the canamaké stove as low as RWF 600
(US$1.10).

B. Weaknesses
These strengths are countered by several weaknesses:
♦ Scarcity of good quality metal;
♦ Low capitalization of stove production units (e.g., lack of protection from the elements and
absence of equipment that increase productivity and improve quality) that negatively affects
quality and limits production, especially during the rainy season;
♦ Low quality production, reducing stove life and efficiency and causing some consumers to
abandon the more fuel-efficient canamaké stove for longer lasting, less efficient stoves.

V. Market Expansion Potential

Several interventions could be key to expanding demand and the capacity to meet the demand for
improved cookstoves:
♦ Promotion informing consumers of the benefits of the canamaké stove (as not all households
in Kigali seem to be aware of its advantages and maybe not even of its existence) and
educating both consumers and vendors on stove quality (so that they will reject low quality
cookstoves);
♦ Productivity and quality increasing equipment, e.g., manual jigger jollies for ceramicists and
metal curlers for stove assembly (currently being developed by Winrock), and shelter from
the rain for both artisans and ceramicists;
♦ Training of additional producers – first, non-canamaké artisans and then non-artisans
interested in canamaké production (if upgrading of the skills of the current producers is not
sufficient to meet demand);

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♦ Promotion of low-cost construction improvements (e.g., more cement in the mixture that
allows the ceramic liner to adhere to the metal cladding, doors to control ventilation, and
pot rests to protect the ceramic liner) that will lead to higher quality, longer lasting, and
better performing canamaké stoves without significantly increasing the retail price;
♦ A stamp identifying the producer of each stove to enable consumers, vendors, and project
staff to identify the source of defective stoves and take action to address the problem; and
♦ Quality stamps or labels for stoves of “certified” producers to act as incentives for
producers and as a quality guarantee for customers, effective at least during project
implementation, and after if a producer association or government authority can sustain it.

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ANNEX 3. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND
FINDINGS

49 of 60
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS

1. Survey Overview

USAID’s project design assistance to KIST/CITT began in January 2007 with a baseline assessment
and stove testing survey. The main goal of the survey was to measure the performance of the stove
recommended by Winrock’s stove selection paper (the canamaké or Kenya Ceramic-Lined Jiko
stove) compared to other commonly used charcoal stoves in Kigali. To accomplish this goal, 90
randomly sampled non-canamaké-using households (using a random-walk method) in 32 urban Kigali
administrative cells (also randomly selected) were visited seven times each over 15 days.
Socioeconomic status of each household was also estimated: 11% of households were classified as
rich, 40% middle class, and 49% poor.

During the first visit, the surveyor explained the purpose of his/her visit and established the eligibility
of the household (uses predominantly charcoal, does not currently use a canamaké stove). If the
household was eligible and willing to participate, the surveyor began with a series of questions and
instructions on how to participate in the survey. Initial questions focused on the purchase and
consumption of charcoal and any other cooking fuels used.

Each surveyor arrived with a 20-liter plastic bucket, which served as a charcoal storage container.
The household put their own charcoal in this bucket (households were not given charcoal by the
surveyors), which was to be reserved uniquely for meal preparation and boiling water. Surveyors
carried scales which they used to measure the weight of the charcoal in the bucket. The amount of
charcoal (minus the weight of the 500 gram bucket) in the bucket at the beginning of the visit, and at
the end of the visit (after being filled by the head of household if possible) was recorded.

The amount of charcoal consumed between visits was calculated using the following formula:
The amount of charcoal at the end of the previous visit
Plus (+)
The amount of charcoal purchased or added to the bucket between visits
Minus (–)
The amount of charcoal remaining at the beginning of the next visit
The figure above was then divided by the number of days between the visits to determine the
amount of charcoal consumed per day. That figure was then divided by the average number of adult
equivalents (the number of people 12 years or older plus half the number of children under 12) who
ate each meal between the two consecutive visits. This yielded the ultimately desired statistic:
average amount of charcoal consumed, per person, per day.

During the first week of visits, the household used the same combination of stoves and fuels as they
had used before the survey. At the beginning of the second week (just before the 4th visit), the
surveyor brought the canamaké stove to the household. This stove (or stoves if the household uses
two stoves) replaced their existing charcoal stove for the second week. Otherwise, exactly the
same procedures were followed during each week.

During the last visit, the household gave feedback about the stove, and answered questions about
purchasing decisions for stoves, and media consumption habits. Households successfully completing
the survey were allowed to keep the stove/s and the plastic bucket to thank them for the time they
contributed during the survey period. In order to encourage honest feedback about the canamaké
stove despite it being given as a gift, participants were urged to give both likes and dislikes, and it

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was explained that neither the surveyor, nor Winrock/KIST, is involved in the production or sale of
canamaké stoves.

2. Charcoal Savings

The survey recorded average charcoal savings across the 90 households of 33.3% when
comparing the canamaké stove to all existing stoves (see table 2.1). Compared to the
traditional round metal stove (n=22), the canamaké saved 32.4% on average. Compared to the
square metal stove (n=22), the canamaké
was 34.7% more efficient. The canamaké Table 2.1 - Canamake Fuel Savings Vs. Existing Stoves

consumed 28.7% less charcoal on average

40%
than the traditional all-clay stove (n=17). 35%
For households using other types of stoves 30%

Charcoal Savings
or a combination of stoves (n=26), the 25%
canamaké saved an average of 35.2%. 20%
15%
See sections 6 and 7 below for detailed 10%
charcoal savings for each household and 5%

broken out by type of existing stove. 0%

y
al

al
ll

e
la

pl
ra

et
et

ti
ve

ll-

ul
3. Price of Charcoal O

A
e
nd

/M
r
ua
ou

er
Sq

th
R

O
The price of charcoal in Kigali varies slightly Stov e Type

according to the season and the unit size

purchased. Out of the 90 households surveyed, the most common unit sizes purchased are large
sacks (around 55% of households) and small plastic buckets (around 59% of households). Many
households purchase large sacks when money is plentiful and small buckets when finances are tight.

According to prices given by households and measurements taken at local charcoal sellers, large
sacks of charcoal weigh on average 35 kilograms and cost an average of 4634 RWF, yielding a per
kilogram price of 132 RWF, or US$0.24. Small plastic “Omo” buckets weigh on average 0.99 kg and
cost an average of 137 RWF, giving a per kilogram price of 138 RWF, or US$0.25.

4. User Feedback

Most participating households saved significant quantities of charcoal with the canamaké stove during
the survey, so it is not surprising that 94% of respondents found the stove fuel efficient (see tables
4.1 and 4.2). Just over one third said the stove was easy to light, and slightly less than a third
thought that it cooked fast. 28% liked the way the ceramic liner retained heat, and around one in
ten thought that the stove was attractive, or that it was cleaner (due to the ashes being contained
inside the stove) than their traditional stove.

The most common dislike of the canamaké was fragility or perceived fragility, while 14% thought the
stove was not large enough for their larger pots. One in ten complained that the stove was slow to
light, and 5% thought it was heavy. However, almost one-half of participants did not note any
dislikes at all.

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 Tables 4.1 & 4.2 – Surveyed Households Opinions about Canamaké
Stove*

Table 4.1 LIKES Table 4.2 DISLIKES

Fuel Efficient 94% Fragile 25%
Lights fast/easily 39% Too small 14%
Cooks fast 31% Slow to light 10%
Retains heat 28% Heavy 5%
Attractive 11% No major dislikes 45%
Cleaner 10%
* Out of 90 Kigali households surveyed

Out of the 90 households surveyed, 20% had never heard of the canamaké stove before they were
surveyed. 80% had heard of the canamaké stove, and out of this subgroup, 25% had purchased one
before in the past. Out of this quarter, two-thirds responded that they did not replace the stove
because the ceramic liner broke quickly. Out of the 53 respondents who had heard of the stove but
never purchased one (see table 4.3), 33% said that they were unaware of its benefits, 25% explained
that they had heard that the stove was fragile, another 25% did not know where to find the stove or
could not find a good quality version, and 23% did not make the purchase for financial reasons
(thought it was expensive or did not have enough money at the time).

Table 4.3 – Why Haven’t You Purchase a Canamaké Stove?*

Unaware of benefits 33%

Thought it was fragile 25%
Didn’t know where to find it 25%
Lacked money or thought it was 23%
expensive

*Asked of 53 of 90 respondents who had heard of the canamaké stove before the survey but never
purchased one. Some gave more than one reason.

5. Media Consumption Habits

95.5% of survey respondents listen to the radio, while only 33% watch television, and 20% read a
newspaper. Detailed information was collected by the surveyors regarding radio stations listened to
as well as specific programs and times of the day.

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Table 5.1: Most popular Kigali radio stations in target group

Total Listenership
Radio Rwanda 77%
Contact FM 50%
Radio 10 40%
Umucyo 37%
City Radio 21%
Sana 19%
Flash FM 14%
Radio Mariya 12%
Others1 11%
Sarus 10%

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6. Conclusion

The survey points strongly to the conclusion that the canamaké is an efficient and well-liked stove
with the target group (non-canamaké using households), with high potential for further increasing
market penetration. The low retail price (~1200 RWF) and average charcoal savings of 33.3%
indicate a rapid payback period (10-15 days) and substantial fuel and economic savings over the life
of the stove. Because approximately 40% of the non-canamaké-using public does not know about
the stove or has heard of it but does not know about its benefits, an effective marketing campaign
utilizing strategically placed radio and television advertising should increase sales to this group.

Raising market penetration will necessitate overcoming some significant challenges as well, primarily
surrounding the issue of quality control. Quality must be improved, and the improved quality must
be advertised, in order to convince former canamaké users to buy the product again, and to make
sure that stoves last longer for both new and repeat users. This will, both improve the reputation of
the product and maximize economic and environmental impacts.

7. Fuel savings for all 90 households

Kg/P/J Exist = Average kilograms of charcoal per person per day with existing stove
Kg/P/J Canamaké = Average kilograms of charcoal per person per day with canamaké.

Savings with
Kg/P/J Exist Kg/P/J Canamake Canamake**
K1 0.19 0.19 0.0%
K2 0.33 0.33 0.0%
K3 0.3 0.2 33.3%
K4 0.4 0.31 22.5%
K5 0.3 0.41 -36.7%
K6 0.2 0.21 -5.0%
K7 0.55 0.46 16.4%
K8 0.95 0.46 51.6%
K9 0.3 0.33 -10.0%
K10 0.18 0.14 22.2%
K11 0.7 0.61 12.9%
K12 0.98 0.79 19.4%
K13 0.59 0.36 39.0%
K14 0.79 0.35 55.7%
K15 0.44 0.39 11.4%
K16 0.52 0.59 -13.5%
K17 0.39 0.17 56.4%
K18 REMOVED* REMOVED* REMOVED*
K19 0.65 0.34 47.7%
K20 0.29 0.27 6.9%
K21 0.43 0.2 53.5%
K22 0.3 0.26 13.3%
K23 0.22 0.21 4.5%
K24 1.04 0.53 49.0%
K25 0.48 0.31 35.4%
K26 0.42 0.33 21.4%
K27 0.64 0.41 35.9%
K28 0.6 0.47 21.7%
K29 0.74 0.41 44.6%
K30 0.38 0.2 47.4%

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 Savings with
Kg/P/J Exist Kg/P/J Canamake Canamake**
K31 0.7 0.7 0.0%
K32 0.47 0.35 25.5%
K33 0.28 0.15 46.4%
K34 0.43 0.3 30.2%
K35 0.41 0.33 19.5%
K36 0.83 0.26 68.7%
K37 0.44 0.2 54.5%
K38 REMOVED* REMOVED* REMOVED*
K39 0.7 0.4 42.9%
K40 0.48 0.32 33.3%
K41 0.53 0.2 62.3%
K42 0.69 0.64 7.2%
K43 0.64 0.46 28.1%
K44 1.31 0.52 60.3%
K45 0.4 0.34 15.0%
K46 REMOVED* REMOVED* REMOVED*
K47 0.45 0.38 15.6%
K48 0.55 0.28 49.1%
K49 0.79 0.38 51.9%
K50 1.11 0.59 46.8%
K51 0.16 0.1 37.5%
K52 0.24 0.18 25.0%
K53 0.41 0.31 24.4%
K54 0.4 0.16 60.0%
K55 0.3 0.18 40.0%
K56 0.86 0.4 53.5%
K57 0.51 0.48 5.9%
K58 0.4 0.4 0.0%
K59 0.76 0.42 44.7%
K60 0.84 0.52 38.1%
K61 0.45 0.28 37.8%
K62 0.28 0.31 -10.7%
K63 0.87 0.33 62.1%
K64 0.22 0.09 59.1%
K65 0.35 0.18 48.6%
K66 0.18 0.11 38.9%
K67 0.27 0.26 3.7%
K68 0.35 0.29 17.1%
K69 0.24 0.12 50.0%
K70 0.47 0.33 29.8%
K71 0.44 0.24 45.5%
K72 0.47 0.35 25.5%
K73 0.42 0.26 38.1%
K74 0.3 0.23 23.3%
K75 0.34 0.29 14.7%
K76 0.34 0.29 14.7%
K77 0.56 0.4 28.6%
K78 0.29 0.28 3.4%
K79 0.55 0.51 7.3%
K80 0.13 0.13 0.0%

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 Savings with
Kg/P/J Exist Kg/P/J Canamake Canamake**
K81 0.34 0.22 35.3%
K82 0.92 0.56 39.1%
K83 0.21 0.16 23.8%
K84 0.71 0.4 43.7%
K85 0.98 0.63 35.7%
K86 0.38 0.29 23.7%
K87 0.59 0.28 52.5%
K88 0.23 0.12 47.8%
K89 0.31 0.24 22.6%
K90 0.25 0.18 28.0%
AVERAGE 0.492298851 0.32816092 33.3%

* Households removed due to irregular data or lack of cooperation.

** Four households reported increased consumption with the canamaké.
These findings most likely reflect changed consumption patterns during the
test period.

8. Fuel Savings by Existing StoveType

ROUND METAL STOVE USERS

Kg/P/J Exist Kg/P/J Canamake Savings from Canamake
K9 0.3 0.33 -10.0%
K10 0.18 0.14 22.2%
K18 REMOVED REMOVED REMOVED
K20 0.29 0.27 6.9%
K21 0.43 0.2 53.5%
K22 0.3 0.26 13.3%
K23 0.22 0.21 4.5%
K25 0.48 0.31 35.4%
K26 0.42 0.33 21.4%
K28 0.6 0.47 21.7%
K29 0.74 0.41 44.6%
K33 0.28 0.15 46.4%
K34 0.43 0.3 30.2%
K41 0.53 0.2 62.3%
K62 0.28 0.31 -10.7%
K64 0.22 0.09 59.1%
K65 0.35 0.18 48.6%
K70 0.47 0.33 29.8%
K74 0.3 0.23 23.3%
K82 0.92 0.56 39.1%
K83 0.21 0.16 23.8%
K85 0.98 0.63 35.7%
K88 0.23 0.12 47.8%
AVERAGE 0.416363636 0.281363636 32.4%

SQUARE METAL STOVE USERS

Kg/P/J Trad Kg/P/J Canamake Savings from Canamake
K3 0.3 0.2 33.3%
K16 0.52 0.59 -13.5%

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 SQUARE METAL STOVE USERS
Kg/P/J Trad Kg/P/J Canamake Savings from Canamake
K12 0.98 0.79 19.4%
K31 0.7 0.7 0.0%
K32 0.47 0.35 25.5%
K36 0.83 0.26 68.7%
K37 0.44 0.2 54.5%
K38 REMOVED REMOVED REMOVED
K43 0.64 0.46 28.1%
K44 1.31 0.52 60.3%
K45 0.4 0.34 15.0%
K48 0.55 0.28 49.1%
K50 1.11 0.59 46.8%
K53 0.41 0.31 24.4%
K55 0.3 0.18 40.0%
K56 0.86 0.4 53.5%
K57 0.51 0.48 5.9%
K66 0.18 0.11 38.9%
K68 0.35 0.29 17.1%
K72 0.47 0.35 25.5%
K75 0.34 0.29 14.7%
K81 0.34 0.22 35.3%
K84 0.71 0.4 43.7%
AVERAGE 0.578181818 0.377727273 34.7%

CLAY STOVE USERS

K1 0.19 0.19 0.0%
K4 0.4 0.31 22.5%
K24 1.04 0.53 49.0%
K40 0.48 0.32 33.3%
K46 REMOVED REMOVED REMOVED
K54 0.4 0.16 60.0%
K58 0.4 0.4 0.0%
K60 0.84 0.52 38.1%
K67 0.27 0.26 3.7%
K76 0.34 0.29 14.7%
K77 0.56 0.4 28.6%
K78 0.29 0.28 3.4%
K79 0.55 0.51 7.3%
K80 0.13 0.13 0.0%
K86 0.38 0.29 23.7%
K87 0.59 0.28 52.5%
K89 0.31 0.24 22.6%
K90 0.25 0.18 28.0%
AVERAGE 0.436470588 0.311176471 28.7%

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 HOUSEHOLDS WITH MIX OF STOVES OR OTHER STOVES
K2 0.33 0.33 0.0%
K5 0.3 0.41 -36.7%
K6 0.2 0.21 -5.0%
K7 0.55 0.46 16.4%
K8 0.95 0.46 51.6%
K11 0.7 0.61 12.9%
K13 0.59 0.36 39.0%
K14 0.79 0.35 55.7%
K15 0.44 0.39 11.4%
K17 0.39 0.17 56.4%
K19 0.65 0.34 47.7%
K27 0.64 0.41 35.9%
K30 0.38 0.2 47.4%
K35 0.41 0.33 19.5%
K39 0.7 0.4 42.9%
K42 0.69 0.64 7.2%
K47 0.45 0.38 15.6%
K49 0.79 0.38 51.9%
K51 0.16 0.1 37.5%
K52 0.24 0.18 25.0%
K59 0.76 0.42 44.7%
K61 0.45 0.28 37.8%
K63 0.87 0.33 62.1%
K69 0.24 0.12 50.0%
K71 0.44 0.24 45.5%
K73 0.42 0.26 38.1%
AVERAGE 0.520384615 0.336923077 35.3%

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