CWM - The Canadian War Museum History Award : First Place Award 1999 file:///G:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Laurence%20Gottlieb/My%20...

The Canadian War Museum History Award Les prix d'histoire du Muse canadien de la guerre First Place Award 2000 Premier Prix 2000
Essays are printed in their original language of submission. Les compositions sont imprimes dans la langue utilise pour leur rdaction.

Lyle Wood
Bracebridge and Muskoka Lakes Secondary School Bracebridge, Ontario

Wolfe and Montcalm Who Was the Better General? First Glance versus Researched Judgement
Upon first glance at the battle of Quebec 1759, a history student would naturally choose Wolfe over Montcalm as the better general. After all, Wolfe had won Montcalm had lost. Wolfe took the daring offensive, while Montcalm merely stayed on the defensive. Quebec was a key victory for the British in the Seven Years War. New France would now become the British province of Quebec. Both gallant generals died in the battle and before long, news of Wolfes brilliant victory was to be cheered in the streets of London. Thus, Wolfe was undoubtedly the hero, the victor, the martyr, and of course, the better general. A first glance does not always tell the whole story, though. To answer the question of who was the better general, we need to look more fully at the two men themselves, as well as at the strengths and obstacles they brought to the battle. It is no wonder that a history student might have trouble judging whether Montcalm or Wolfe was the better general, however, when the experts themselves are so divided. Romantic historians such as Francis Parkman, Christopher Hibbert, and George Wrong treat both men as true heroes. Revisionist historians, including C. P. Stacey, Laurier Lapierre and W. J. Eccles, expose the weaknesses of both generals, while Martin L. Nicolai concentrates upon Montcalms military shortcomings. Stacey further differentiates between the abilities of the "strategist" in long range planning versus the "tacticians" ability to conduct the battle on the field. Montcalm, he contends, was far stronger as a strategist but made fatal tactical errors, while Wolfe, on the other hand, was a dismal strategist whose strength as a tactician won the day at Quebec1. In many ways, the two leaders were fairly evenly balanced as they faced one another during the Quebec campaign. Both were established leaders, with impressive victories to their credit: Wolfes achievements as a brigadier at Louisbourg were matched by Montcalms victories over the British at Fort William Henry and Ticonderoga. Both were respected by their men and inspired deep devotion. Parkman says of Wolfe that, In spite of his impatient outbursts, the officers whom he had commanded remained attached to him for life; and in spite of his rigorous discipline, he was beloved by his soldiers, to whose comfort he was always attentive. Frankness, directness, essential good feeling, and a high integrity atoned for all his faults2. Assessments of Montcalm often reflect the same sentiments. Montcalms own French regulars held the same

1 of 6

11/04/2010 6:56 AM

CWM - The Canadian War Museum History Award : First Place Award 1999 file:///G:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Laurence%20Gottlieb/My%20...

devotion to their leader as did Wolfes men and as for integrity, Montcalm was regarded as "a man of honour"3 who, like Wolfe, was an "exceptionally gallant fighting soldier."4 Matching Wolfes weakness in arrogance and irritability, were Montcalms impatience and imprudence in his relationship with his rival for authority over Canada, Governor Vaudreuil. In addition to being closely balanced in terms of their strengths, Montcalm and Wolfe were burdened by similar handicaps. Both men suffered opposition by those who shared leadership positions with them. General Montcalm was opposed at almost every turn by Governor Vaudreuil, who carried his jealous rivalry to such an extreme that he seriously hindered Montcalms ability to defend Quebec. General Wolfe, on the other hand, was resented by his brigadiers, Murray, Monckton, and especially Townshend, for having been promoted above them in spite of his inferior social rank, younger age, and shorter list of accomplishments.5 Montcalm and Wolfe faced each other within the larger context of the Seven Years War, 1756 to 1763, in which more than a million soldiers were killed.6 Instead of the 12,000 troops promised to Wolfe, only about 9,000 were sent with him.7 Britain could afford to send, however, powerful backing by the British Navy under Admirals Saunders and Holmes. France, on the other hand, overwhelmed by the European demands of the war, refused to send the reinforcements, arms, and supplies that Montcalm so desperately needed to save Quebec against the British onslaught in North America. Instead, Versailles under Louis XV and Madame de Pompadour chose to spend money on the continental phase of the war. A mere force of about 400 was sent along with armaments and provisions.8 The colony would have to look out for itself and rely upon the natural defences of Quebec to hold out against the British. "Before a shot was fired," therefore, "the French authorities had conceded defeat in Quebec."9 Montcalm would have the benefit of fighting on home ground, with provisions from the surrounding loyal countryside, the powerful support of the clergy, and the excellent natural defences of Quebec. Wolfe, on the other hand, was in foreign territory, had to capture the provisions his troops would require, and was daunted by "the uncommon natural strength," of Quebec, as he described the almost impregnable battle site in his letters home to Britain.10 Both generals were fighting in a land far away from their homeland, their families, and military resources. They were both professional, competent, leaders respected by their men but challenged by some of their rivals. Their colonial battlefield was merely one part of a larger continental war, but a great deal hinged upon the battle they would wage at the Plains of Abraham in 1759. Montcalms fatal strategic error came quite early in the campaign, with his belief that the British fleet would never be able to pass Quebec and operate above the colony. He failed to make use of Jesuit maps in his possession showing that "La Traverse" of the St. Lawrence River was indeed wide enough for British ships to pass through without being damaged by the guns at Quebec.11 Wolfes own brigadiers, especially Townshend and Murray, are said to have been livid with their General in the nights preceding the great victory. He refused to share the details of his plans with them. To some historians, this was not because he was slighting them or distrusted them, but rather because he himself was panicking and still unsure of where he would actually land his troops.12 He was desperate. It was mid-September. Soon the St. Lawrence would freeze and the British navy would have to withdraw to the Atlantic. Wolfes troops could not survive a winter without provisions in the hostile Canadian and Indian countryside. In a letter written to his mother, Wolfe expressed his impatience with his inability to force Montcalm out into the open in a battle: My antagonist has wisely shut himself up in inaccessible entrenchments so that I cant get at him without spilling a torrent of blood, & that perhaps to little purpose. The Marquis de Montcalm is at the head of a great number of bad soldiers & I am at the head of a small number of good ones, that wish for nothing so much as to fight

2 of 6

11/04/2010 6:56 AM

CWM - The Canadian War Museum History Award : First Place Award 1999 file:///G:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Laurence%20Gottlieb/My%20...

him but the wary old fellow avoids an action, doubtful of the behaviour of his army.13 Wolfe was already under pressure by Admiral Saunders to leave Quebec immediately. The General prevailed over the Admiral to gain a few more days. His time was up. He felt he was dying from the bladder disease that plagued him. He had to have his great victory. It had to be now. But how and where? In the early hours of September 13, 1759 the lightly guarded cliffs at the Anse au Foulon had been scaled by the heroic efforts of the British troops. Montcalm had misjudged his opponents true plans: Montcalm, who thought that the movements of the English above the town were only a feint, that their main force was still below it, and that the real attack would be made there, was completely deceived, and massed his troops in front of Beauport to repel the expected landing.14 Montcalm had committed another strategic error through his conviction that no large scale landing was possible in the Foulon area. With Wolfes troops advancing across the Plains of Abraham, the French supply line from Montreal could now effectively be cut off.15 Popular legend detracts from the brilliance of Wolfes plan by claiming that he had learned that the heights were lightly guarded due to the interfering Vaudreuil having moved the Guyenne Regiment to his own headquarters at the St. Charles River. However, there are no facts to support the legend.16 Wolfes plan had succeeded, and as the two opposing sides began to take their positions on the Plains of Abraham, the fate of Quebec was sealed by Montcalms decision to fight the British before the arrival of reinforcements under Bougainville or Lvis. If he had been able to hold off Wolfes troops for only a couple more days his troops may have been reinforced and the British navy forced to withdraw down the St. Lawrence to avoid the oncoming winter. However, Montcalms troops advanced too quickly, stumbling as they went forward and firing prematurely in their confusion. "The officers lost control of their men almost immediately."17 The well-trained British held their ground and withheld their volley until the French were within effective firing range. Faced with these challenges, Montcalms decision to fight the British right away was the significant factor in granting Wolfe the victory. In committing this extreme tactical error, Montcalm had been "outwitted and out-generalled."18 Suspicions have been raised that Wolfes victory came largely as a result of French and Canadian blunders, possibly even betrayal. If the success of the battle were indeed the result of French Canadian treachery, we would think less of Wolfes ability as a general. The Anse au Foulon was lightly guarded by the Vergor regiment by legend, the deliberate result of Governor Vaudreuil replacing the command of this post only days before the battle. It is rumoured that Intendant Bigot and his friend Cadet saw the inevitable fall of Quebec as a danger in exposing a long career of black market exploitation and graft: It is certain that Bigot and Cadet, and indeed most officials in Quebec, were looking for a French defeat as the only hope of covering up their swindling, which at last were being suspected in Paris. They may then have ensured that Wolfe got the information that a landing at the Anse au Foulon would be only half-heartedly resisted.19 The two officials perhaps felt their fate at the hands of the English would be kinder than that which might result from their being returned to the Court at Versailles to be tried for graft and corruption. Treachery has never been proven on their part; the allegations remain speculation only. However, it is certain that the lack of preparation by French and Canadian troops at the Anse au Foulon is an important factor in enabling

3 of 6

11/04/2010 6:56 AM

CWM - The Canadian War Museum History Award : First Place Award 1999 file:///G:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Laurence%20Gottlieb/My%20...

Wolfes troops to gain the heights. Also not proven to date is whether Wolfe knew that the heights were lightly guarded or whether he took a brilliant military gamble that paid off. Brilliance, sheer luck, or treachery each makes a big difference in coming to terms with whether Wolfe was indeed the better general. One hundred forty one years after the battle, many questions still remain unanswered. As recently as 1999, Chartrand stated in Quebec, 1759 20 that there still are no facts to support the idea of betrayal by French deserters or civil authorities. Thus, we still do not know for certain why Wolfe chose the Anse au Foulon. Without the assistance of information from the French, Wolfes plan is even more spectacular, and he is the better general. Thus, research and reflection support the original "first glance" thesis that Wolfe, the victor, the hero, the martyr, was indeed the better general at the Battle of Quebec, 1759. Both General Wolfe and General Montcalm were killed in the battle, so their effectiveness as generals has to be measured by what they had accomplished by that time. Both had achieved victory in the past, both were loved by their men, both caused suffering among the Canadians: Montcalm by strictly enforcing the requirement to serve in the militia at the expense of their families, and Wolfe more brutally so by destroying their farms, their harvests, and taking hostages.21 Therefore, it is the victory at Quebec that chiefly distinguishes General Wolfe from General Montcalm. Wolfe saw his chance, took the risk, and could as easily have lost. Aided by the power of the British navy, the effectiveness of the well-trained British troops, and the tactical errors made by Montcalm, however, Wolfe had won. French power in North America had been brought to an end, and in Britain Wolfe was hailed as the hero who had achieved this. "Measured by the numbers engaged, the battle of Quebec was but a heavy skirmish; measured by results, it was one of the greatest battles of the world."22 It was not until the British man-of-war Lowestoft sailed up the St. Lawrence in May, 1760 that the British victory over Quebec could be considered complete.23 It had taken Wolfe four months and several abortive attempts to find a way to penetrate the defences of Quebec. In taking the risk with his eighth strategic plan24 of the campaign at the Anse au Foulon, Wolfes gamble paid off and he would forever be regarded as one of the greatest of the British generals. Thus, at first glance, of the two leaders at Quebec, 1759, a history student may judge Wolfe to be the better general. After researching and thoroughly considering Wolfes brilliant tactics on September 13,1759 along with recognizing the fatal strategic and tactical errors made by Montcalm, the initial conclusion still stands: Wolfe was indeed the better general.

Footnotes
1. C. P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1959), 170. 2. Francis Parkman., Montcalm and Wolfe. The Riveting Story of the Heroes of the French and Indian War, (New York: The Modern Library [1884], 1999), 351. 3. Ibid., 344. 4. C. P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle, 178. 5. C. P. Stacey, "Quebec, 1759: Some New Documents," The Canadian Historical Review, XLVII, No. 4 (Dec. 1966), 348. 6. George M. Wrong, The Fall of Canada. A Chapter in the History of the Seven Years War, Botley, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1914), 9. 7. W. J. Eccles, "The French Forces in North America During the Seven Years War." A. D. Gilbert, C. M. Wallace, and R. M. Bray. Reappraisals in Canadian History. Pre-Confederation, (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Inc., 1993), 5. 8. Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 185. 9. Jacques Mathieu and Eugen Kedl, The Plains of Abraham. The Search for the Ideal, Translated by Kathe Roth, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993), 80. 10. Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 393. 11. Laurier L. Lapierre, 1759. The Battle for Canada, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1990), 23. 12. Stacey, C. P. Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle, 175. 13. Wolfe, July 31, 1759 in Jacques Mathieu and Eugen Kedl, The Plains of Abraham. The Search for the Ideal, Translated by

4 of 6

11/04/2010 6:56 AM

CWM - The Canadian War Museum History Award : First Place Award 1999 file:///G:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Laurence%20Gottlieb/My%20...

14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Kathe Roth, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993), 87. Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 399. Stacey, C. P., Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle, 41. Ibid., 133. Martin L. Nicolai, "A Different Kind of Courage: The French Military and the Canadian Irregular Soldier During the Seven Years War," A. D. Gilbert, C. M. Wallace, and R. M. Bray, Reappraisals in Canadian History. Pre-Confederation, (Scarborough: Prentice Hall Inc., 1993), 184. C. P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle, 137. Christopher Hibbert, Wolfe at Quebec. The Man Who Won the French and Indian War, (New York: Cooper Square Press [1959], 1999), 123. Rene Chartrand, Quebec,1759, Order of Battle Series, No. 3. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1999), 80. Laurier L. Lapierre, 1759. The Battle for Canada, 219. Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 411. Christopher Hibbert, Wolfe at Quebec, 181. C. P. Stacey, Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle, 170.

Bibliography Chartrand, Rene. Quebec,1759. Order of Battle Series, No. 3. Botley, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1999. Eccles, W. J. "The French Forces in North America During the Seven Years War." A. D. Gilbert, C. M. Wallace, and R. M. Bray. Reappraisals in Canadian History. Pre-Confederation. Scarborough: Prentice Hall Inc., 1993. Hibbert, Christopher. Wolfe at Quebec. The Man Who Won the French and Indian War. New York: Cooper Square Press [1959], 1999. Lapierre, Laurier L. 1759. The Battle for Canada. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1990. Mathieu, Jacques and Eugen Kedl. The Plains of Abraham. The Search for the Ideal. Translated by Kathe Roth. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993. Nicolai, Martin L. "A Different Kind of Courage: The French Military and the Canadian Irregular Soldier During the Seven Years War." A. D. Gilbert, C. M. Wallace, and R. M. Bray. Reappraisals in Canadian History. Pre-Confederation. Scarborough: Prentice Hall Inc., 1993. Parkman, Francis. Montcalm and Wolfe. The Riveting Story of the Heroes of the French and Indian War. New York: The Modern Library [1884], 1999. Stacey, C. P. "Quebec, 1759: Some New Documents." The Canadian Historical Review. XLVII, No. 4 (Dec. 1966), 344 355. Stacey, C. P. Quebec, 1759: The Siege and the Battle. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1959. Wrong, George M. The Fall of Canada. A Chapter in the History of the Seven Years War. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1914.
Created: September 17, 1999 Last update: July 11, 2000 Canadian War Museum

5 of 6

11/04/2010 6:56 AM

CWM - The Canadian War Museum History Award : First Place Award 1999 file:///G:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Laurence%20Gottlieb/My%20...

Canada

6 of 6

11/04/2010 6:56 AM