Stopping the Countdown: Preventing Iranian Nuclear Admittance through American Acceptance

Maxwell E. Gigle

The paper that you are about to read touches upon the nature of US-Iranian political and economic relations. As of the moment, Irans nuclear program happens to be the largest debated issue between the two great powers. Some feel that Iran continues the program for the development of an atomic weapon; an accusation that Iran officially denies. Whether or not this is the case, the United States must assume the worst in order to plan for the worst, thus the following US policy recommendations take into account the capability of Iran as well as the future nuclear weapon possibilities in lieu of said capability. Realizing that this estimation may be found to be an overshot in retrospect, the policy proposals included in this paper will not, much less cannot, be damaging to US-Iranian relations in general. That being said, this paper will introduce the assumed problem and then make a statement as to where and how the United States should address the supposed increasing nuclear Iran. The decisions of world leaders would be much easier if all the issues that faced them fell into a black or white category to be decided by simple option number one or option number two. Unfortunately, this is never the case, for individual actors and issues always have one more facet decision makers must take into account. Today the United States finds itself confronted by yet another issue of opacity shrouded in a mess of gray minutiae: the scope of Irans nuclear program. Due to the serious nature of the United States accusations against the extent of Irans nuclear program, a black and white relationship has been created; Iran should not be allowed to continue nuclear research as it will only lead to the creation of a nuclear weapon. Based on Irans successful opacity of its nuclear research and development, United States policy towards a potential weapons grade program must prepare for a worst-case scenario: black, if you will. On the other hand, Irans white pleas of nuclear innocence may be justified if more evidence materializes to support Irans claim. Either way, the United States must embrace the reality of black while keeping in mind the possibility of white. For the best results in the long run, the United States must juggle each side and decide upon a solution that would address a mixture of each possibility; a solution in gray. In order to understand why such this topic must be handled with such gravity, a worst-case scenario in regards to Iranian nuclear capability and intention will be framed within the context of an Iranian internal governmental memo. Known history and determined capacity will be taken into account by the time the United States perspective on the complicated issue comes into play. By the conclusion of this report, several policy recommendations will have been proposed. In a perfect world, Iran would be kept from joining the Nuclear Club; yet our time for useful action may have
Maxwell E. Gigle is a graduate of the University of Connecticut with double majors in Political Science and International Relations as well as minor concentrations in Middle Eastern Studies and History. He has practical experience working with U.S.-Turkey political relations through the American Turkish Council and currently works on the Senate side of Capitol Hill.

passed. Due to this lack of room for error, all given proposals will benefit the United States strategic position in the world whether or not the Iranian application of nuclear research can be reversed. United States policy must reflect a win-win situation while moving towards a compromise mutually beneficial to Iran as well as the United States. Irans 1979 fundamentalist coup completely overthrew many positive under-pinnings of the previous pro-American government by setting up a theocratic republic in Iran. Though Iran has a functional Parliament 1 , constitution and a Presidential system, the Supreme Leader holds supreme rule by holding a monopoly over the dictation of policy, commanding the military, controlling civil rights and determining those who form the judicial branch of government. The 290 member unicameral legislative body drafts legislation, ratifies treaties, and approves the nations budget. To the ire of many Iranians, the Majiles is held in check by the Council of Guardians, an oversight body personally selected by the Supreme Leader. They alone have the power to interpret the Constitution and place laws into accordance with sharia (Islamic law). The Majiles and Executive Branch may hold a great deal of power, but in the end, are still tied to the will of the Supreme Leader through inherent restrictions of the system. Today, Supreme Leader Ali Khameini controls Irans security forces including the army, the Supreme National Security Council, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, as well as Irans elite guard, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC). In theory, the Assembly of Experts is the only group that has any power over the Supreme Leader. This group of clerics and learned academics hold the power to determine who runs for office in the Majiles, as well as who may be appointed to the position of Supreme Leader. In reality though, the group has never gone against the wishes of the Supreme Leader, thus negating any real threat the Assembly holds over the Supreme Leader (Iran Chamber Society 2008). So far, U.S. efforts have failed to stem or at least pierce the opacity of Irans nuclear research program. The United States needs to move away from todays closed model of relations to a more open, inclusive relationship holding respect to the Iranian perspective. Once a firmer base is set, the United States can expect better results from any attempt of negotiation with Iran. In order to comprehend the Iranian perspective 2 on the potential use of the Iranian nuclear program, a mock memo from Supreme National Security Council Secretary Saheed Jalil 3 to Supreme Leader Ali Khameini has been prepared and included before the inclusion of the U.S. foreign policy recommendation. 4

21 Tir, 1387 Asr be Kheyr, Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Hosayni Khameini. As you requested, the future of Iranian policy as formulated by you has been discussed by the Council and decided upon. Of course, in your wisdom, you have set us on the correct path for the future with your recommendations. In recent years, the great nation of Iran has slowed down if not paused in its

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The Majiles. Keeping in mind that the author is neither Iranian nor part of the Supreme Leaders inner council, the Iranian Perspective analyzed is a worse-case-scenario perspective for the United States, as already explained. 3 Personal advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and personal friend of Iranian President Ahmadinejad. 4 In order to correctly interpret this memo, it must be kept in mind that the number one goal of an Iranian governmental official is state survival. Close on its heels is the desire for individual survival within the government. As with many governments around the world, both actions require a bit of risk while keeping a firm hold on security. With this in mind, Saheed Jalil writes to Supreme Leader Khameini.

nuclear research towards a working atomic weapon (National Intelligence Council 2007). Though a deliverable nuclear device would greatly enhance Iranian regional security and power, much needs to be taken into account before making a final decision on Irans nuclear future. Based on your recommendations, the Supreme National Security Council has decided the most prudent path to pursue would be to immediately continue clandestine Iranian research towards a deliverable nuclear device. Though estimates vary between our nuclear experts, a general consensus tells us that we will be able to successfully test a nuclear device in five years. Of course, as you are a wise leader, you realize the implications of such a decision. In order for a completely knowledgeable final decision to be made, all pertinent operational facts are laid out for your convenience within this memo. We pray that this vital information assists your respected analysis resulting in a final, esteemed decision. As always, roadblocks appear between our current status as a non-nuclear entity and nuclear realization. On 13 Esfand 1386 5 , the United Nations announced that measures would be taken to limit our ability to acquire new industrial technology, increase monitoring of Iranian finances and international trade, limit individuals passage and access to private assets abroad (Dareini 2008). The people of Iran hold the United Nations in high regard, thus the new sanctions have ruffled many domestic feathers, a reaction not to be taken lightly. In 1382 6 , an official poll by our own Yas-e Now newspaper concluded that 45% of the polled populace were in favor of change in the political system, even with foreign intervention (Clawson 2004). Though these statistics are four years old, it must be assumed that some of that sentiment still festers within our people. A wise leader must realize public sentiment should always be taken into consideration when deciding policy, for as much as we work to stifle negative opposition to our government, the people will always have the final option of revolution and coup. Another potential obstacle materializes with Israels rhetoric machine chugging to life once again. Israel has threatened to strike key Iranian nuclear sites, including our research center at Natanz, our uranium conversion facility at Isfahan and our heavy water reactor at Arak (Baxter and Mahnaimi 2007). Though such a strike would greatly hamper our ability to move forward with indigenous nuclear research, it would also vilify Israel and question any further action against our hollowed land. Israel has no legitimate right or enough evidential proof to enact any type of strike against Iranian facilities of any type. The whole world is well aware of the opacity of proof against our government, thus Iran is not afraid. As for fear, if our Western enemies knew of our current level of nuclear weapon research and development, the resulting panic would certainly hold dire consequences for Iran. This fact highlights the extreme need for program secrecy as much as it heralds Iranian pride for our people. As you know from previous briefings, there are two ways to develop a working nuclear weapon: uranium enrichment as well as plutonium processing. 7 Currently today we have around 15,000 P-2 uranium enrichment centrifuges across the nation (Gerami 2008). Recent estimates say that it would take only one year for 1,200 working centrifuges to produce enough enriched uranium for one atomic weapon (Albright and Shire 2008, 1). As you know, the heavy water method is our best way to produce plutonium 8 . As a benchmark to what our capabilities exceed, our reactor at Arak coupled

March 4, 2008. 2003. 7 In order to enrich uranium for nuclear uses, one begins with subliminated natural uranium being spun in centrifuges in order to separate U2-35 from the rest. A 5% completion of this process will create nuclear fuel used for nuclear energy while an 85% completion of the process will produce highly-enriched uranium for the use in nuclear weapons (Gerami 2008). 8 Basically what happens is a distilling process. Heavy water from nuclear power plants contains small amounts of the plutonium molecule needed for an atomic weapon the water becomes processed whereupon plutonium is gained for the use in nuclear weapons (FAS 1998).
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with our IR-40 can produce 16 to 18 tons of heavy water every year (Global Security 2006). Of course, our success hinges upon the functioning of all processes. Research and development into the delivery of such a weapon has slowed in recent years, our existing capabilities could easily be improved upon with the continuation of the program. Currently, our best surface-to-air method of delivery would be on a Shahab-6 liquid and solid propellant three-stage missile. With a range of over 5,470 kilometers 9 , our nuclear device could be detonated over any enemy in the Middle East or surrounding states (Vick 2000). Taking into account the necessary research, development, planning, creation, and erection of a deliverable nuclear weapon, a reasonable time frame of two to five years could be set for Irans admittance into the Nuclear Club. Though the recent American National Intelligence Estimate predicts a contradictory window of ten years, Iran does have the capability to surprise the entire world with a working nuclear weapon quite sooner than expected. Just imagine the reaction! Now that your Excellence has been reminded as to the extent of our capabilities, we, the Supreme National Security Council, must present exactly what reaction we feel will emerge with the presentation or detonation of an Iranian nuclear device. As our main concern is survival of the state and our god-fearing administration, the reaction of actors who may change the statue-quo must be attended to first. Though outside actors may invade, sanctions may be laid, and regimes may change, the people of Iran have the final say as to who rests in the seat of government. Much as the students and academics (backed by the military) carried and implemented our glorious revolution in 1358 10 , so can they change government again. Supreme Leader Khomeini insightfully placed checks against the general population in order to keep radicals restricted to a limited profile among the people. At the same time, if the entire population of young Iranians were to be galvanized against our present government, our only option would be to capitulate to the will of the masses. 11 Though no such movement currently exists, history has shown how the largest of reactions can be spawned in the briefest spans of time when the necessary stimulus is applied. Though Iranian pride runs strong for our nuclear program, the idea of an Iranian nuclear weapon is a bit more contested (Lynch 2006). Though many are excited about the possibilities presented by the increase of Iranian power and prominence within the Middle East, many are wary of the international reaction to such an advance. 12 Though our policies successfully control the general public, minority groups often find them somewhat abrasive. As seen by the recent increase of indigenous human rights NGOs, more and more Iranians are pressing for societal change if not for governmental as well. If the public reaction to the emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapon is not as positive as expected, a popular movement against our government may very well materialize. If the movement gains the support from an outside instigator such as the United States, our virtuous government might very well fail. Beyond the obvious reaction of jubilee from the United States and Israel, clandestine supporters such as Pakistan, China, and Russia may also react in favor to a popular Iranian coup. All states value self-preservation over alliances, thus the emergence of yet another nuclear entity would not bode well for the relative power of current nuclear powers. Our complete disregard of the NPT and IAEA standards has enraged many nations already. In fact, some analysts speculate that an Iranian detonation would effectively destroy the core of the NPT, opening the door for other nations to contemplate nuclearization (Lutes and Yaphe 2005, 44-48).

To as much as 8,000 kilometers. 1979. 11 Nearly half of Irans 71 million person population is under the age of 25. Nearly two-thirds of the population is under the age of 30 (BBC 2008). 12 E.g.: United Nations sanctions.
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Muslim brethren in other Middle East nations such as Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia have previously considered following in our footsteps. If Iran were to emerge as a nuclear superpower, a resulting arms race might ensue between those who can develop 13 or outright buy 14 nuclear capability. Though Iran would enjoy the power that is attached to the bomb, your Excellence must reflect upon the ramifications of our neighbors trying to the powerful legacy we will inevitably create (Lutes and Yaphe 2005, 40-43). Of course, the United Nations and United States reaction must also be taken into consideration. Two perspectives accompany this debate: U.N. stagnation or effective response. If the United Nations is willing to take strict measures against Iran even before we have nuclear capability, one can only imagine what the response would be to a successful detonation. Alternatively, one may look to the U.N.s reaction to North Koreas nuclear emergence. General U.N. condemnation and limited military sanctions accompanied North Koreas Mehr 17, 1385 15 detonation, thus one may speculate a similar response for Iran (Kerr 2006). The United States response is another story. If Muslims were allowed to gamble, I might almost wager money on a detrimental reaction from the United States. Whether in the form of military hard power or a less noticeable usage of soft power, any direct U.S. reaction will probably affect Iran poorly. The United States indirect involvement could also hurt Iranian power as economic and commercial ties between the Great Satan and Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, India, China, and Russia could severely influence their leaders future decision making against the Islamic Republic of Iran. And yet, Beloved Leader, even in light of all potential harm to our glorious nation and government, the Supreme National Security Council still advises an opaque path to nuclearization for the glory of our nation. The reasoning is simple: we have more to gain than to lose. First and foremost, the power that accompanies a nuclear weapon goes far beyond the pure destructive nature of an atomic detonation. Hiroshima, Nagasaki, the Bikini Atoll, and Nevada will never be the same. With the correct delivery system, Iran would have the capability to destroy any city in the world, cripple whole economies, deter aggressive state entities and terrorize entire nations with a single threat. Though Iran would greatly value the nature of sole ownership over our nuclear secrets, the threat of nuclear secret sales to Muslim freedom fighters worldwide would hold as much power as a detonation in and of itself. Finally, Iran would finally hold the attentive ear of the international community, Allahu Akbar! Also, Irans long-sought goal of regional hegemony would finally come within grasp. Ancient Persian glory will once again rest in Iran, the natural leader of the Middle East. Several actors will have to react against their own interest in order to counter our regional hegemony. In the name of balance of power, Israel might publicly reveal its own nuclear program, alienating the United States into acting equally against both Iran and Israel. Pakistan might turn its missiles to the West, an ill advised move based on their level of pressure and unmatched capability of stronger India (Global Security 2004 and BBC 1/2008). China and Russia may disrupt our drive towards hegemony through economic measures, but our status as a pawn in China-U.S. and Russia-U.S. power struggles may be used to our advantage; if any of the big three loses relative power, Iran will be able to count it as a success towards regional hegemony (Truscott 2007). Though our nuclear weapon would ultimately be considered an Iranian weapon and not a Muslim bomb, Syria, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt and like-minded interstate organizations 16 may defend the emergence of Iranian power; an enemy of an enemy may be a friend. Finally, the largest

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Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey. Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates. 15 October 9, 2006. 16 HAMAS, terrorist organizations, etc.

reason why Iran should pursue a nuclear weapon is for the resulting glory to our nation. Only a handful of states have ever successfully detonated a nuclear device, thus the pride of the Iranian people would swell upon our inclusion on such a short and exalted list. Now that you have received our view of the pros and cons relating to the emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapon, the Supreme National Security Council would like to impress upon your judgment our perception of the actual marshaling capabilities of the United States of America, our strongest enemy. The United States does not have the physical strength to break through our national defenses without marshalling an unobtainable amount of military tied in conflict around the world. With world sentiment already firmly against American interests in the world, even the mighty United States would be hard pressed to find the support to attack a modernized nation such as ours. With U.N. sentiment already against unilateral U.S. military action, the United States would have to make serious concessions to use of ground forces or bombing campaigns on yet another uncertain target. Irans strong economy will be able to absorb any sanctions placed upon them by either the United States or as the United Nations. Our strong oil trade has sustained Iran through hard times before and will continue to do so in the future.17 Diplomatically, the United States cut relations with us many years ago, thus reviving ties with the Great Satan can do us no good. Lastly and more relevantly, the IAEA, U.N. or the U.S. nuclear inspectors cannot stop our progress towards a nuclear weapon. Theoretically, Iran does not have to give up our sovereignty over our land by allowing inspectors into our facilities. We have successfully deterred weapons inspectors in the past, and we can do it again. Upon your approval of research continuation, Iran can cast its smoke screen across the international body with our innocent messages of the Iranian Right for peaceful nuclear energy. True, our energy sector will need the peaceful nuclear capabilities to supplement our oil industry, but the desire to develop a nuclear weapon still resounds in our hearts as a feasible opportunity. Iran can stand on its own in this new age, and neither the United States of America nor the United Nations can stop our progress as a nation. And so, Great Leader, with this background information to further light your illuminated judgment, please pass on your decision as to whether or not Iran may resume their strides towards the glorious prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Your faithful advisor, Secretary Saheed Jalil

Unless one is privy to the inside messages of the Iranian government, then one might never know how similar the previous memo is to its real version. At the same time, selected patterns arise from all relations, be they diplomatic or personal. Interest, pride, power, fear and the lack thereof all play on relations in much the same way. Known information about Irans nuclear capabilities, the

Whether or not this is true, Iranian economic supremacy through oil is a common view among Iranian government officials. When viewing the past, this is a correct assessment; Irans oil prices have only gone up in recent years, especially since two of their main two proximity rivals (the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Baath Party in Iraq) have been neutralized. A more realistic analysis of Irans economy lies in the facts that despite oil revenue skyrocketing, Irans GDP will still receive a hit. Recently, Irans unemployment fell to 10.3% (an eight year low), 2.9% of the population uses narcotics, and political corruption still rocks the government (Clawson 2007).
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assumptions about an Iranian officials psychological and institutional driven decision making 18 , and a leaning towards the worst-case scenario were used to craft the previous Iranian memo of nuclear policy suggestion. The following policy recommendations will address the possibility of U.S. impotency against the Iranian nuclear issue while still realizing that U.S. policy cannot roll over and pretend the issue has no credence to the future of U.S.-Iranian relations. The following policy recommendations highlight a new perspective as well as a fresh approach to the fairly old quandary of how the United States should respond to the potential future breach of international security. To realize the scope of such a project, the goals of the following recommendations are explained. The main goal of U.S. policy should be to negate any effects Irans nuclear program might pose to the United States. Two solutions present themselves. One is to forcibly control the situation while the other lies in letting events run their natural course. Physically controlling the situation with military action, bombing campaigns, or sponsored coup attempts would not work to our advantage due the lack of power the United States holds in-state: the odds do not favor success, thus the end does not justify the means. In order to succeed, the United States must work with Iran to solve the problem together or at least present the faade of working in Irans interest; publicly allowing events to run their course in an environment manipulated by the United States. Since Iran does not see an Iranian nuclear weapon as a problem, it must be U.S. policy to peacefully encourage a change in Iranian opinion. By opening relations and encouraging democratic reform, a peaceful precedent may be set between two enemies, fostering future diplomatic and nuclear cooperation. In order to take the first step towards a solution, the United States must re-open diplomatic relations with Iran and discontinue the feud-mindset of current relations. During the Clinton administration it was suggested that a consulate could be opened on the small Iranian island of Keesh (Afrasiabi 2000). Though this might be a good first step to establish contact, a larger followup must be quickly taken in order to pursue U.S. interest. Re-buying and re-staffing the American Embassy in Tehran is the best way to establish solid contact and open relations with Iran. Seized by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard after the 1979 revolution, the embassy serves as a shrine to antiAmericanism as well as another training facility to the Guard. Though the complex is still owned by the American Government, the building itself has been priced at $550 million and may soon be sold on the open market (Theodoulou 2007). The U.S. could easily procure the building once again and move the necessary State Department, Central Intelligence, military, and support personnel into its quarters. Beyond showing the Iranian people that the United States wants to resume open relations, it would open the door for desperately needed intelligence from within the heart of Iran (Weinberg 2007). Domestically, Iranian Americans and American Iranians would rejoice for an easier avenue for inter-state travel. The only foreseeable situational blowback would be for another hostage crisis to take place. In this instance, the bad-guy would be Iran, furthering international sentiment

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The previous memo was written with the following known characteristics about governmental decision making in Iran: the governments healthy fear of their supreme leaders power constantly battling with their realized responsibility to the nation for factual evidence and decent guidance; the power play between government institutions in Iran [The creation and pressure shadow networks play on the government. In Iran, for every government institution working directly with the central government, there is another one strongly vying for the power and attention that comes with the Ayatollahs favor. In this atmosphere, the resulting competition often becomes petty and useless for a working government]; the fact that any decision, no matter how minute, must have the go-ahead by the Ayatollah in order for that decision to be implemented; the use of ambiguous language and behavior to either cover political misdoings or to pad egos; and the view that it is more important to be involved with those making decisions than it is to be making decisions [Organized Chaos]; the all-important need for state, regime, and individual survival (Lutes and Yaphe 2005, 4).

against the Islamic Republic. 19 It is up to the United States as the bigger nation to enact the first step by reestablishing diplomatic relations in order to regain the populaces trust once again, paving the way for the second policy recommendation. 20 No solution within international politics ever ignores the impact of economics upon the problem; thus Irans economic situation must be considered as one point of access to an otherwise closed system. Irans most apparent weakness could be found in its economic life support system: their aging and yet bountiful oil industry. In fact, it would seem that Iran is handing out the opportunity for control on a silver platter. Though Iran exports billions upon billions of dollars worth of oil, most of their domestic usage comes from oil imports. Speaking in Tehran at 2007s Iran Oil Refining Forum, Iranian Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri-Hamaneh related that Iran would be looking for foreign investment in their faulty gasoline-refinery system. The policy of attracting new investment for fundamental projects of refining industry is based on participation of the domestic and foreign private sectorThis will be an appropriate opportunity for cooperation between Iranian and foreign companies in macro and long-term projectsto administer Iranian refineries" (Payvand 2007). Although $20 billion has already been signed to Iran from foreign companies and governments, most of the investments have yet to be confirmed and paid, an eventuality questioned by some experts (GAO 2007, 3). If U.S. private-sector companies were to successfully approach Iran with a contract to invest in all of Irans reconstruction efforts as well as supply the contractors for the work itself, the United States would have the opportunity to tie itself directly to the Iranian economy. In order to fully take advantage of this prospect, the United States must push away all existing offers from the table and monopolize the contract 21 as any third-parties cooperation will split Iranian focus off of the United States intended goal; the strengthening of peaceful bilateral cooperation. If Iran takes to the previous policy recommendations and encourages a stronger future relationship, economic partnerships would be the next step after diplomatic relations. History has shown that private endeavors often precede public economic partnerships, thus Iran might find it easier to work with the private arm of the Great Satan: after all, business is business. Though this one economic partnership effort may alienate allies of ours, the overall loss must not completely push supporters away from American efforts for bilateral peace. In fact, another policy recommendation would be to stay in close contact with current allies of the United States. Our allies are our future eyes, ears, and strength; burning bridges is never a good idea in a political arena built on relationships. Russia and China should be major considerations for this recommendation. Each state holds existing economic ties to Iran but is not interested in watching another nuclear power emerge in the same region. A promise to lower the United States nuclear warhead count once again might entice each state to agree politically with the United States; an action that would kill four birds with one stone, so to speak. Furthering the aims of the START, SALT, and SORT treaties 22 , the United States could lead the world by example, further negating many entities fear and suspicion of supposed U.S. nuclear hypocrisy. At the same time, the United

Possibly to the extent of military action, whereupon the United States might have the legitimacy, international support, and physical capability to militarily control the situation, opening up a whole new can of worms. 20 Several Iranian nuclear situation policy packages have been publically presented for consideration; the following proposal is a tweaked version of Joseph Cirincione and Andrew Grottos Contain and Engage proposal (Cirincione and Grotto 2007). 21 France, United Kingdom, Spain, South Korea, Japan, Brazil, Thailand, China, Italy, Germany, Norway, Australia, Belarus, Malaysia, Netherlands, Oman, and Iraq (GAO 2007). 22 The current goal of the United States is to be down to 1,700-2,200 warheads by 1012 (VCI 2002).
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States would save money by dismantling its aging stockpile 23 and putting it to use in under-funded military or domestic programs. As many might suggest, a lowered nuclear capability does not equate to less American hard power: when a handful of warheads could wreak incalculable damage to a state, thousands do not provide extra protection. Finally, it is a moral decision action to take; in respect to the general health of the human race, the less nuclear warheads this planet must deal with the cleaner and safer our lives will be in the future. Today the United States continues to support import sanctions against all Iranian goods except those less than $100 in value, informational materials, foodstuffs, and the famous Persian textiles used as tapestries and rugs. All exports to Iran, including banking transactions and any materials that might be used to support Irans nuclear program, are forbidden under U.S. law (U.S. Dept of Treasury 2006, 1). The United States should continue to support sanctions on all nuclear equipment imported to Iran, the new U.N. financial, banking, and economic sanctions, and current American economic embargo sanctions. In fact, the U.S. should further restrict Iranian banking systems as well as continue to strengthen all efforts to block illegal weapon and nuclear equipment proliferation to Iran from non-state and state actors, actions that have proven to work in the past (GAO 2007, 3). Between 1997 and 1999, Iran spent nearly $1.5 billion on weapons (State Department 1999). Today, much of Irans +$46 billion imports go towards the procurement of weapons and equipment for nuclear research (GAO 2007, 4). While the United States will need to concede a degree power to Iran through negotiation, U.S. international leadership against the illegal proliferation of nuclear supplies must not be given up at any cost. Individual states are more apt to listen, agree, and work with a fair and equal power instead of a preferential determiner. At the same time, if Iran does not have a constant pressure from sanctions, U.S. private investment would have a high rate of failure. Finally, the United States should keep current sanctions due to the bargaining leverage they may present in the future. Finally, in order to directly deal with the Irans nuclear program, the United States should lead a multilateral charge in building and maintaining an International Nuclear Fuel Bank. As proposed by former Senator Sam Nunn, such a fuel bank would create a closely monitored IAEA managed low-enriched (5%) uranium stockpile for nations wishing to pursue nuclear energy. Such a stockpile would give developing nations no excuse to indigenously enrich uranium, further lending clarity as to the use of states nuclear program as well as giving the United Nations or other multinational entities a legitimacy to use preventative force. Currently, $100 of the $150 million needed to create the stockpile has been supplied. The remaining $50 million needs to be supplied before September 2008 or else funding will be withdrawn (NTI 2007). An added bonus will be the re-strengthening of the Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT], a document continually weakened by Iranian disregard for sanctions and U.N./IAEA/U.S. weapons inspections. In order to start the process of democratic reform, the United States should start funneling government funding into pro-democratic Iranian NGOs once the two nations have established a degree of economic and diplomatic cooperation. As columnist explains, For democracy to triumphcitizens must build links across ethnic and regional divides to challenge elitist hierarchies and rule by strongmen. This requires dense, vigorous civil societies, with independent organizations, mass media, and think tanks, as well as other networks that can foster civic norms, pursue the public interest, raise citizen consciousness, break the bonds of clientelism, scrutinize government conduct, and lobby for good-governance reforms (Diamond 2008, 3). The goal of this policy recommendation is to help financially nudge the Iranian people past their tipping point through the creation of political NGOs, whereupon more Iranian citizens will strive towards a more

In 1998 alone the United States spent $35 billion on nuclear weapon upkeep and research (Brookings 1998, 50). It costs only $70,000 to dismantle one nuclear warhead (Brookings 1998, 49). In between now and then, the United States is just wasting money holding onto weapons that will never be used.
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democratic Iran than support the current regime. Once this tipping point has been achieved, the populace should react in a manner similar to U.S. interest. Despite Iranian restrictions, 7,000 Iranian NGOs surfaced in 2003, a number that has only risen in recent years. Currently, most groups take the form of pro-civil and feminine rights but eventually pro-democratic NGOs will start to emerge from underground (WWICS). In 2006, Secretary of State Rice requested $75 million more tacked on to the previous years $10 budget for this exact purpose (The State Department 2006). $1.5 billion should be requested for 2008 and depending on the success of funding more should be requested for the years ahead. 24 By funding pro-democratic NGOs, the United States will have the opportunity as an encouraging actor to be able to push reform without having to physically wade into whole situation. In fact, the only act the United States would be guilty of would be funding prodemocratic entities within Iran, an acceptable endeavor in most constitution-based states. As the number of democratic institutions increase in Iran, horizontal accountability increases while the average citizens desire for a restrictive government decreases. Other policy recommendations that would help promote the U.S. public image for the specific goal of Iranian acceptance include promoting student and cultural and academic exchange programs; a goal directly targeting the future of U.S.-Iranian relations, the students of today. A budget of $10 million has been requested and approved for this endeavor but an additional 10% increase should be added to this allocation until relations improve (Lantos 2007). Governmentencouraged academic planning should touch upon what improvements can be made to the Iranian constitution while taking into consideration the cultural, historical, religious and democratic nature of the nation. Finally, the United States should take more of a leadership role in equally mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Though not useful towards the Iranian nuclear issue, non-partiality from the United States would resound deeply within the Iranian people by promoting the acceptance of the United States as a reemerging benevolent power. At this point, once United States policy has been carried out, all plans will come to fruition. Once the Iranian people have passed their democratic tipping point and are determined to bring about a more egalitarian government, the United States can assist in the efforts of emerging leaders by pushing reform and public diplomacy through the open NGO connection and reestablished Embassy. If need be the United States may also be able to cut the Iranian governments feet out from underneath them by restricting their own oil production and capability. Upon a change of government, the role of the United States would be purely advisory, as direct control of the coup or constitutional reform would bite into Iranian sovereignty, eventually bringing the United States back to square one 25 . Once a more pro-democratic government takes power, Iran may feel that it does not need a nuclear weapons program26 to further its goals in the world. At the very least, the United States will have a new economic and strategic partner in the Middle East: not so bad an alternative with Irans newly updated oil refining industry. If the Iranian situation does not change upon implementation of the listed policy recommendations, the United States image will still have improved in the international eye. Besides an automatically strengthened relation with Iran, less primed nuclear warheads will inhabit the world, stronger and clearer actions against illegally proliferating states will have a precedent to work with, a safe supply of nuclear energy will be available for all eligible nations, the IsraeliPalestinian conflict will be closer to conclusion, American and Iranian students will have a broader world-view through the enrollment in exchange programs, and the United States will have again resumed the position of the respected leader of the free world. One can only hope that this global improvement will include specific adjustments within the Iranian corner of the planet.

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$1 billion or $2 billion, depending on prospect. 1979 26 Previous example: Libya in 2004.

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Gerami, Nima. Interview with Max Gigle. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 21, 2008. Global Security. Indian Nuclear Stockpile. Weapons of Mass Destruction. GlobalSecurity.org. April 28, 2004. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/india/nuke-stockpile.htm Global Security. Arak Weapons of Mass Destruction. Global Security.org. December 28, 2006. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/arak.htm. Gonzalez, Nathan. Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle Eastern Powerhouse and Americas Strategic Choice. West Port. Greenwood Publishing. 2007. Iran Chamber Society. The Structure of Power in Iran Iranian Laws, Government & Politics. http://www.iranchamber.com/government/articles/structure_of_power.php. Kerr, Paul. North Korean Test Provokes Widespread Condemnation. Arms Control Daily. Arms Control Association. November 2006. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/NKTest.asp. Lantos, Rep. Tom. H.R. 1400: Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007. GovTrack.us. March 8, 2007. http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-1400 Lynch, David J. Nuclear Program a Source of Pride for Iranians. USA Today. August 28, 2006. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-08-28-iran-cover_x.htm Lutes, Charles D. and Yaphe, Judith S. Reassessing the Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran. Washington DC. Institute for National Strategic Studies: National Defense University. 2005. Maoz, Zeev. Regional Security in the Middle East: Past Trends, Present Realities and Future Challenges. London: Routlage Publishers: 1997. National Intelligence Council. National Intelligence Estimate: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. November 2007. NTI. NTI Co-Chairman Sam Nunn Praises U.S. Commitment of $50 Million for IAEA Fuel Bank. Nuclear Threat Initiative. December 28, 2007. http://www.nti.org/c_press/fuel_bank_122707.pdf Payvand News. Irans Oil Industry Needs $15 Billion Investment: Oil Minister. Payvands Iran News. February 2, 2007. http://www.payvand.com/news/07/feb/1215.html The State Department. Arms Transfers. The State Department. 1999. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/18724.pdf The State Department. Presidents FY 2007 International Affairs Budget Request. The State Department. February 15, 2006. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/61262.htm

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Theodoulou, Michael. US Embassy is seized again to settle L270 million Compensation Order. Times Online. April 13, 2007. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article1647481.ece Truscott, Claire. UN Ready to Impose New Iran Sanctions. The Guardian. Guardian.co.uk. November 2, 2007. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/nov/02/iran.usa U.S. Department of the Treasury. What You Need to Know about U.S. Economic Sanctions: An Overview of O.F.A.C. Regulations involving Sanctions against Iran Iran. September 8, 2006. http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf. Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation (VCI). 2007 Annual Report on Implementation of the Mosow Treaty. The State Department. May 24, 2002. Vick, Charles. Missiles FAS.org. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/ 2000. Wienberg, David A. Re Open the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Haaretz.com. August 27, 2007. http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/896915.html Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS). Event Summary Iran/U.S. NGO Collaboration. November 3, 2003. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=4019 6