10 anthony brueckner 11

University of Cambridge Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9DA, UK

References
Avron, A. 2003. Transitive closure and the mechanization of mathematics. In Thirty Five Years of Automating Mathematics, ed. F. Kamareddine, 14971. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Heck, R. 2007. The logic of Freges Theorem. Forthcoming in a Festschrift for Crispin Wright. Isaacson, D. 1987. Arithmetical truth and hidden higher-order concepts. In Logic Colloquium 85, ed. The Paris Logic Group, 14769. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Isaacson, D. 1992. Some considerations on arithmetical truth and the w-rule. In Proof, Logic and Formalization, ed. M. Detlefsen, 94138. London: Routledge. Kreisel, G. 1972. Informal rigour and completeness proofs. In Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. I. Lakatos, 13886. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Mac Lane, S. 1986. Mathematics: Form and Function. New York: Springer-Verlag. Martin, R. M. 1943. A homogeneous system for formal logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic 8: 123. Martin, R. M. 1949. A note on nominalism and recursive functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 14: 2731. Myhill, J. 1952. A derivation on number theory from ancestral theory. Journal of Symbolic Logic 17: 19297. Shapiro, S. 1991. Foundations without Foundationalism: A Case for Second-Order Logic. Oxford Logic Guides 17. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Retooling the Consequence Argument

Anthony Brueckner
Joseph Keim Campbell (2007) raised a number of problems for Peter van Inwagen (1983)s much-discussed Consequence Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and freedom. Van Inwagen summarizes the argument as follows: If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things are not up to us. (1983: 16) Campbell criticizes the well-known formalization of this argument that is known as the Third Argument (1983: 93105). He says:
Analysis 68.1, January 2008, pp. 1013. Anthony Brueckner

retooling the consequence argument 11 02 If determinism is a threat to our free will, it is so only because there are true propositions about the remote past [prior to our existence]. If this is the case, though, then the Third Argument cannot provide a general argument for incompatibilism. That there is a remote past is a contingent truth about the actual world, one that is not essential to the thesis of determinism. (2007: 109) We can answer this objection to the Consequence Argument by retooling the formalization embodied in the Third Argument in such a way that it shows that on the assumption of determinism, for all times t relative to which there is a past, no human act is freely done at t. Van Inwagens Third Argument employs a sentential operator that works as follows: Np stands for p and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p (1983: 93). We will instead employ a slightly different sentential operator: N*p, t stands for p and no one has any choice at t about whether p. There are two rules of inference that govern our operator (which mimic van Inwagens (a) and (b)): (a*) For all t: from p deduce N*p, t (b*) For all t: from N*(p q), t and N*p, t deduce N*q, t stands for the material conditional. Following van Inwagen, let P be the proposition that the judge J does not raise his hand at time t. Let Po* be a proposition that expresses the total state of the universe at some time to* prior to t (to* could be one second prior to t). Let L stand for a proposition that expresses the laws of nature. Here is the New Third Argument: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) ((Po*& L) P) (Po* (L P)) N*(Po* (L P)), t N*Po*, t N*(L P), t N*L, t N*P, t assumption of determinism (1) (2), (a*) premiss (3), (4), (b*) premiss (5), (6), (b*)

One difference, we have seen, between van Inwagens Original Third Argument and the New Third Argument is that where OTA used N ..., NTA uses instead N* ..., t. Van Inwagen was accordingly forced to choose for his proposition about the past some proposition Po expressing the total state of the universe at a time in the remote past, before any humans existed. Suppose instead that van Inwagen chose a proposition Po expressing the total state of the universe, say, ve minutes before t, when the judge J fails to raise his hand. Then it would be question-begging for van Inwagen to use the premiss

12 anthony brueckner 02 NPo because that premiss stands for Po and no one has, or ever had, a choice about whether Po . Van Inwagen cannot assume mid-argument that ve minutes before t (when the judge fails to raise his hand), no one had a choice about what they did. Van Inwagens choice of Po, a proposition expressing the total state of the universe at a time to before any humans existed, leads to Campbells objection. Since NTA uses N* ..., t instead of N ..., we are free to use any proposition about the past relative to t in formulating the argument. Premiss (4) N*Po*, t is true because for any time to* before t, no one has any choice at t about whether the proposition is true. So let to* be ve minutes before t (when the judge fails to raise his hand), and accordingly let Po* be a proposition expressing the total state of the universe at to*. Nothing in Campbells paper calls into question the other premiss of the argument (6) and the same is true of the inference rules (a*) and (b*). Thus, we can conclude that given the assumption of determinism, no one including the judge has any choice about whether P (the proposition that the judge does not raise his hand at t). Proponents of freedom would hold that the judge has a choice about P, since they hold that he can choose to raise his hand at t. NTA shows that the proponents of freedom are wrong. NTA generalizes to show that given determinism, no human act performed at a time relative to which there is a past is a free act. A Campbellstyle objection to NTA will dwindle to this: NTA does not apply to acts performed at times relative to which there is no past. Adam was said to be created by God on the sixth day. So by NTA, none of Adams acts were done freely, since each act was performed at a time relative to which there was a past. Campbell considers an alternative Adam who exists in a deterministic world at the rst moment in time, trst (2007: 109). If Adam performs act A at trst, then for all the New Third Argument has shown, A is a free act. (Of course, there was no time during which this Adam could deliberate, even very quickly, before performing A!) By NTA, no subsequent act of Adams is free, and no subsequent act performed by any other human is free (supposing that the only human existing at trst is Adam).1 Is this limitation on NTA problematic? I do not see why, if determinism is the thesis that the past and the laws necessitate the future. On this

Campbell in effect argues that since there is no past relative to trst, van Inwagen cannot come up with a proposition about the remote past before Adam existed which, given the resources of OTA, can be used to impugn the freedom of Adams acts as they unfold after trst. (2007: 109) By contrast, NTA implies that only A is free.

the irrelevance of the consequence argument 13 12 conception of determinism, the assumption that there is no past relative to the time at which A is performed will quite naturally give rise to the consequence that there is no argument from the assumption of determinism to the conclusion that A is not free.2 University of California, Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USA brueckne@philosophy.ucsb.edu References
Campbell, J. K. 2007. Free will and the necessity of the past. Analysis 76: 10511. van Inwagen, P. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2

It is worth noting that as van Inwagen originally formulates the doctrine of deter02 minism, L together with a proposition expressing the total state of the universe at a time later than now necessitate a proposition expressing the total state of the universe now (1983: 65; Campbell 2007: 106). So a version of the Consequence Argument could be constructed using a proposition expressing some distant future total state occurring after the demise of humans about which no one has any choice. Adams act A, and all other human acts, could presumably be shown to be unfree by means of such an argument. The trick would be to nd a future total state that is causally isolated from human acts.

The irrelevance of the Consequence Argument

Lynne Rudder Baker
Peter van Inwagen has offered two versions of an inuential argument that has come to be called the Consequence Argument. The Consequence Argument purports to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with free will.1 It aims to show that, if we assume determinism, we are committed to the claim that, for all propositions p, no one has or ever had any choice about p. Unfortunately, the original Consequence Argument employed an inference rule (the b-rule) that was shown to be invalid (McKay and Johnson 1996). In response, van Inwagen revised his argument. I shall argue that the conclusion of the revised Consequence