Offshore Patrol Vessels Asia Pacific

Requirements and information pack 2013


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Introduction Indonesian Navy Indonesian Maritime Safety Coordination Organisation (BAKORKAMLA)

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Malaysian Navy
Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) Philippines Coast Guard Philippines Navy Royal Australian Navy Australian Border Patrol Command Royal Thai Navy Hong Kong Marine Police Indian Navy / Coast Guard Vietnam Navy Vietnam Marine Police Analysis: The Strategic Importance of the South China Sea OPV Asia Pacific 2013 About Defence IQ

OPV requirements in SE Asia ratchet up maritime security spending in the region

Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) are highly versatile ships designed to perform Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) management roles, including the provision of maritime security to coastal areas and effective disaster relief. Traditionally the OPV market in Europe and North America has been strong, however as these markets begin to shrink Asia, which currently accounts for over 40% of the global OPV market, has become a key target market for international companies. Few sectors in the defence market are booming like the OPV industry in South East Asia. As a brief overview of the opportunities in the region the Malaysian Navy is spending $2.8 billion on its second generation patrol vessels project (SGVP) while its Coast Guard, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, is upgrading its capabilities and acquiring a new fleet of OPVs over the next three years; the Indonesian Navy is looking to expand its fleet of ships from 120 currently to 274 by 2024; in the Philippines the Coast Guard is acquiring 12 OPVs and the Navy is looking to procure the same number. With the increase in non-traditional threats, such as the smuggling of narcotics, together with the growing military might of China, it’s never been more important for the countries in the SE Asia region to expand and maintain a robust maritime security presence. Not only this, but nations in the region – including their Navies and the often numerous Coast Guard organisations – must also begin to work together towards common goals to neutralise these threats. Facilitating and opening the channels of communication between these agencies, the Offshore Patrol Vessels Asia Pacific conference, which takes place in Singapore on the 16th – 17th April, will allow industry stakeholders to meet with senior military and government officials and discuss the latest OPV requirements in the APAC region. The discourse and debate will particularly focus on South East Asia. “Bringing together the best minds of the military and industry to brainstorm on OPV capabilities, challenges and requirements is important in enhancing maritime operations and security in the region,” Colin Simpson, Regional Director at Austal, said of the conference. “OPVs Asia Pacific will provide a great opportunity for the industry to meet with senior decision-makers to discuss how we can assist them in their challenges.”

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Indonesian Navy Requirement: Indonesia plans to expand its
fleet from 120 ships to 274 units by 2024.


The Indonesian Navy is the largest in South East Asia with over 74,000 personnel and around 150 vessels. It is aiming to become the most technologically advanced in the region too with its modernisation programmes. The most pressing operational requirement is for a corvette-type OPV – in 2007 the Navy received the first of four corvettes from the Netherlands at a cost of 139 million Euros each. The corvette can house surface-to-air missiles, surface-to- surface missiles, torpedoes, radar and sonar. The Indonesian Navy is also looking to acquire Brunei's UK-built OPVs which have never been put into service. Brunei offered the guided missile-armed OPV’s to Indonesia after procuring new patrol boats.

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Nakhoda Ragam class OPV
Originally procured by Brunei from BAE Systems, the corvette OPVs look set to be heading for Indonesian shores.

Type Displacement Length Beam Draught Propulsion Speed Range Complement Sensors and processing systems


F2000 Corvette 1,940 tonnes 89.9 m (295 ft) LWL, 95 m (312 ft) LOA 12.8 m (42 ft) 3.6 m (12 ft) - 4 x MAN B&W / Ruston diesel engine (total of 30.2 MW) - 2 x shafts 30 knots (56 km/h)[1] 5,000 nautical miles (9,000 km) at 12 knots (22 km/h)[2] 79 (room for an additional 24) - Radamec 2500 electro-optic weapons director - Thales Underwater Systems TMS 4130C1 hull-mounted sonar - BAE Systems Insyte AWS-9 3D E- and F-band air and surface radar - BAE Insyte 1802SW I/J-band radar trackers - Kelvin Hughes Type 1007 navigation radar - Thales Nederland Scout radar for surface search - 2 Quad MBDA (Aerospatiale) Exocet MM40 Block II missile launchers - 1 x 16 cell MBDA (BAE Systems) Seawolf surface-to-air missile launcher - 1 x Oto Melara 76mm gun - 2 x MSI Defence DS 30B REMSIG 30mm guns - 2 x triple BAE Systems 324mm torpedo tubes - Thales Sensors Cutlass 242 countermeasures

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Indonesian Maritime Safety Coordination Organisation (BAKORKAMLA) Requirement:
Bakorkamla is set to receive two offshore patrol vessels, the KAMLA-4801 and KAMLA-4802, which will be the largest vessels under its command – each vessel is said to have a budget of around $5.21 million and are 48 metres long. Currently Bakorkamla is operating eight Bimaran and 10 rigid inflatable boats.


In 2008 the Indonesian Sea and Coast Guard (ISCG) was mandated by National Law No 17 on Shipping to establish a single institution responsible for Indonesia’s maritime law enforcement. Bakorkamla was established to coordinate efforts for 12 national agencies in this field. Indonesia has an area of six million square kilometres of maritime jurisdiction. To help patrol this the country has the world's longest Integrated Maritime Surveillance Systems (IMSS) – a network that covers more than 1,205 kilometers of coastline in the Straits of Malacca and about 1,285 kilometers of coastline in the Sulawesi Sea.

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Royal Malaysian Navy Requirement:
Phase 2 of Malaysia’s $2.8 billion second generation patrol vessels project (SGVP), which is looking to build six OPVs at the Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd, is currently underway. Work has also begun on the littoral combat vessels (LCS) programme.


The SGPV-LCS, despite the LCS moniker, it will be a conventional hull design based on the DCNS Gowind. However, the RMN and Boustead/DCNS differ over the exact weapons and combat systems that will outfit the ship. The DCNS SETIS combat systems has been said to be the system selected by the Malaysian government for the SGPV-LCS despite the RMN preferring the Thales Tacticos system. This is because Tacticos is already being integrated into the RMN’s two Kasturi class frigates as part of the on-going SLEP for the Kasturis. Boustead and DCNS have recommended the Mica system for the SGPV-LCS’s surface to air missile but the RMN prefers the Raytheon ESSM. The RMN is said to want the Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace Naval Strike Missile instead of the MBDA’s Exocet proposed by Boustead and DCNS. This is despite the fact that the Exocet is already a significant part of the RMN’s current arsenal which would thus simplify logistical support. The main gun, which is not a source of contention, is expected to be the BAE Bofors Mk3 57mm. A factor is that Boustead Naval Shipyard’s parent company, Boustead Heavy Industry Corporation has an existing joint venture partnership known as BHIC Bofors Asia. Beyond the SGPV-LCS is the upgrade and service-life extension programme of the 2 Lekiu class frigates, both of which are close to 20 years of service. The RMN also has a requirement for at least 6 ASW helicopters which will operate off the SGPV-LCS with the US strongly promoting the MH-60R Seahawk to fulfil that requirement - though Eurocopter has also talked about offering a navalized EC725.

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Malaysian Navy’s second generation patrol vessels project (SGVP) 6 Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd BAE Bofors Mk3 57mm 2.8 billion

MMEA (Coast Guard of Malaysia) Requirement:
The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) currently operates a number of small patrol boats, or fast interceptor craft, as well as two dated OPVs. It’s now looking to upgrade its capabilities and acquire a new fleet of OPVs over the next three years.


Although MMEA is the leading maritime agency for law enforcement operations, their current fleet is not capable of conducting search and rescue and nor can it secure oil platforms in the South China Sea due to rough sea conditions and inadequate capabilities. While MMEA has requested funding for new OPVs the ultimate decision has to come from the prime minister’s office. MMEA is open to the private funding initiative (PFI), whereby private shipyards finance the construction of the ships which would then be paid back by the government over a number of years.

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Philippines Coast Guard Requirement:
Is currently acquiring 12 (40 metre) OPVs from Japan through a government loan agreement. The coast guard is also looking to buy a large (82 metre) OPV and a smaller (24 metre) OPV from France. In addition it is considering a number of second-hand ships from the French Navy, although these will come with technology legacy issues.


Up to six 40 metre OPVs are expected to be delivered from Japan by 2014, pending final approval. In addition, PCG thought to also need up to four more OPVs, between 82 – 100 metres, and will be requesting funding of 20 billion peso for the new vessels. Budgets for PCG are government controlled and it’s currently looking at a number of soft loans for the new ships with France, Croatia, Korea, Japan and the US all possibilities.

12 Japan 2012 40 metres Philippines Coast Guard current requirement

Offshore Patrol Vessels Asia, 16-17 April 2013

Philippines Navy Requirement:
Looks set to acquire 12 OPVs from 2018 and beyond. Functions and requirements differ from the PCG, with the Navy looking at antiair systems, weapons, protection systems, surface warfare and armour plating. Requirements will be finalised later this year although all vessels are likely to be at least 80 metres.


The acquisition of the OPVs is dependant on the budget allocated by the Defence Acquisition Office (DAO) within the Department of Defence (DoD). It is not yet known if the government will tender for COTS OPVs or if it will decide to just procure the body and then acquire the other technologies and systems individually. Similar to PCG, the Navy would prefer intergovernment loan deals to bolster the funding package.

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Royal Australian Navy Requirement:
Currently acquiring replacements for Armidale Class Patrol Boats, Huon Class Mine Hunter Coastals and Hydrographic Survey Fleet vessels. The programme, known as project SEA 1180, is currently in Phase 1 and is expected to cost AUS$ 1.5 billion with a decision on the OPVs to be taken by 2019.


The Navy’s Deputy Director of Mine Warfare and Clearance Diving and the DMO’s Director of Maritime Acquisition Support are charged with leading the project.

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Australian Navy’s SEA 1180 20 2019+ 1.57 billion

Australian Border Patrol Command Background:
Established in 2005 (under the moniker Joint Offshore Protection Command) to coordinate Australia's maritime domain awareness. BPC is responsible for the following threats: Illegal exploitation of natural resources; Illegal activity in protected areas; Irregular maritime arrivals; Prohibited imports/exports; Maritime terrorism; Piracy, robbery or violence at sea; Compromise to bio-security; and Marine pollution. Further boosting Australia’s maritime security capabilities, earlier in January Austal launched the first of its Cape Class Patrol Boats at the company's Henderson Shipyard in Western Australia; the vessel is the first of eight new boats being built for the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service under a design, construct and in-service support contract valued at approximately A$330 million.

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90 metre OPV
Displacement Length Maximum beam Top speed Range Crew size Embarked troops Endurance 1,800 tonnes 90 metres 13.5 metres 25 knots 5,500 miles 70 50 35 days

Royal Thai Navy Requirement:
Procuring a 90 metre OPV from a BAE Systems joint venture with Bangkok Dock. A requirement for 4 OPVs is still open and the Thai cabinet approved a plan to buy 2 frigates for 30 million baht over the next five years. The Navy is also requesting 3.29 billion baht to upgrade current on-board computer systems.


Future requirements will include greater focus on law enforcement and combatting non-traditional threats like smuggling of narcotics, as well as cooperation with other Navies on maritime security. The Thai Coast Guard ‘s ships are rotated monthly on loan from the Navy.

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Hong Kong Marine Police Requirement:
Tender for the first batch of small vessels expected to go out in the first quarter of this year, with the second round due in 2014/15.


VMPR strategy has seen Hong Kong Marine Police move away from larger vessels and looking towards medium and smaller craft to launch from forward command platforms. Main operations include search and rescue, illegal immigration, smuggling contrabands and adhering to the ISPS code. Currently has only about 123 vessels in total, which is not considered to be enough for the volume of water that needs to be covered.

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Indian Navy


Currently building up to 7 OPVs with joint ventures from international shipyards such as Fincanteri, Fassmer, and some other German shipyards.

Indian Coast Guard Requirement:
The Indian Coast Guard recently announced approval to acquire six new Offshore Patrol Vessels to enhance its maritime interests as the country continues to modernise and boost its national defence capabilities.


Budget for the Coast Guard has spiked in the past year as the threat alert of terrorism and piracy remains high. The ICG expects to be at a strength of 200 ships and 100 aircraft by 2018. The new OPVs will be built indigenously by PSU Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) and will have helicopter deployment capability. The Coast Guard currently has several Vishwast class OPVs, as well as Sankalp and Samar ‘advanced’ OPVs. The Indian Navy has six active South Korean Sukanya-class OPVs, the same class of vessel in service with Sri Lankan forces. Meanwhile, Indiabased company Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers Ltd (GRSE) is providing the Mauritius Coast Guard with a new OPV to be deployed from 2014 at a cost of £36.4 million, joint funded with India as part of a 2007 deal to strengthen ties and joint operations. The Mauritian vessel will provide both security and logistical support to the outer islands, supported by an onboard light helicopter and 60 crew members.

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Vietnam Navy’s SIGMA

4 Netherlands / Vietnam 76.2mm AK-176M (likely)

Vietnam Navy Requirement: Background:
Looking to acquire 4 SIGMA (Ship Integrated Geometrical Modularity Approach) ships from Dutch Schelde Shipyard. Early reports in October 2011 indicated that an agreement was in progress with Vietnam, whereby the first 2 SIGMA ships would be built in Vlissingen, the Netherlands, and the last 2 would be built in Vietnam, under Dutch supervision. That would represent a big step forward for Vietnam’s shipbuilding industry. SIGMA ships usually use Thales for combat systems and radars, and MBDA for missiles, but customers like Vietnam can change that if they want. Vietnam certainly has a long history with France, who would undoubtedly be interested in resuming some level of defense ties. On the other hand, compatibility with the Russian weapons on its other naval ships would offer advantages of its own. If they choose to change the SIGMA’s standard armament, the most likely substitutions involve incorporating a Russian 76.2mm AK-176M naval gun instead of Oto Melara’s 76mm, SA-18 very short range anti-aircraft missiles instead of MBDA’s Mistral; and/or Kh-53E anti-ship missiles, instead of the French Exocet.

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Vietnam Marine Police Background:
After becoming an independent body from the Navy in 2008, the Vietnam Coast Guard protects the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with search a rescue patrols to prevent smuggling, piracy, and trade fraud in Vietnamese waters. The Vietnam Marine Police has a cooperation agreement with its Philippine equivalent, while the Japanese Coast Guard is also a close ally. The service has 40 ships in service including 2 1200 ton OPVs and one 2500 ton Damen Offshore Patrol Vessel. Vietnam is said to be increasing its sea presence in the face of continued Chinese provocation in the region. The Damen DN 2000 vessel is 90 metres and can sail at 21 nautical miles per hour.

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The strategic importance of the South China Sea, by Moses Ekpolomo

Moses Ekpolomo is a research associate at the European Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS). He is also MPhil/PhD student in the department of War and Defence Studies, King’s College London. He covers the issues of energy security, natural resources conflict and the protection of energy infrastructural networks in high-risk countries, like Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea. He holds an MA Diplomatic Studies in Intelligence and International Security from the Diplomatic Academy of London, University of Westminster.

As China’s economic and strategic influence grows, neighbours are benefiting in both aid and trade. But the fear of a new hegemony in the region is ever more evident in international and territorial waters of South China Sea.

China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims for part or all of the archipelagos in the South China Sea, the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The region contains large untapped oil and gas reserves. It also includes some of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, with mostly crude oil from the Middle East for East Asian countries passing through. The strait of Melacca is an important passage that also links the archipelagos islands to the South China Sea and half of the world’s oil and LNG passes through it. While sovereignty over these islands is disputed between these countries, it is not clear which country the regions extensive natural gas and oil belongs to, but the interested countries perceive that it may and thus promote their claims to sovereignty.
The region is also important to the bordering states because of the value for fishing and as a strategic sea-lane. But the 1992 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Coastal states can establish sovereignty over their territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles off their coastlines, and an exclusive economic zone (EEZ), to 200 nautical miles off their coast.

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UNCLOS limits the right to survey and to explore natural resources in EEZs to the coastal states, but non-adjacent nations are allowed to pursue other activities, including intelligence-gathering, as in all other international waters. China has signed and ratified UNCLOS in 2000 laying claim to the Paracel islands in South China Sea with a counter-claim by Vietnam. This makes conflict between China and Vietnam particularly robust. For example, in the last decade, the region has seen increasing militarization, and a number of its states have established military bases or naval stations. Fighting has erupted on several occasions. The most recent and significant violent confrontation took place in 2005 between China and Vietnam, leading to more than 150 casualties, which were mostly fishermen. In 2007, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines signed an agreement for a joint exploration of the disputed territory, a breakthrough that can contribute to reducing the chance of conflict in the region. But few regular principles of border-delimitation are applicable to the territory, due to the irregular coasts and numerous clusters of islands in the South China Sea. It looks like a “New Persian Gulf” crisis is emerging in this region, the drive to exploit oil and natural gas resources in the South China Sea is leading to two main types of border-delimitation conflict: sovereignty in an area whose status is disputed that contains or potentially contains oil or natural gas resources, and distribution of the rights to extracting an energy resources that transits a number of borders. For example, Brunei and Philippines both lay claim to the Spratly islands in South China Sea too; as a drive to exploit additional energy resources rather than buying from the world market and a border-delimitation conflict is looming ahead. Until recently, many disputed border areas - especially in the sea - have been left undetermined, since there was no concrete need for delimitation. Rising Tensions but No Permanent Solution However, with the discovery or the potential existence of oil and gas resources in many of these disputed zones, border-delimitation conflicts are emerging in a number of locations between states, especially in the South China Sea between China and Vietnam; Philippines and Brunei and, Indonesia and Malaysia. A vast number of the world’s border areas have not been delimited. This is especially true for countless maritime borders. Many states dispute the borders between them, but have left the issue unresolved, since there was no practical need for the delimitation. But once one of the countries involved in a border issue begins the exploration and production of oil and gas, the issue tends to move to the forefront. Nevertheless, in light of this regional states, and in particular China, it’s estimated the reserves of hydrocarbons to be found in the South China Sea to be over 50 billion barrels of crude oil and more than 20 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. The state-owned China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) sees the South China Sea as an “Oil Bonanza” and was scheduled to invest $30 billion in deep water oil drilling in the South China Sea in keeping with the initiative set for expanded drilling by the 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2016). But Vietnam, which is the third largest oil producer of 370,000 b/d in 2010 (BP), suffered a decline in 2011 due to exhaustion of its main oil field and has forced Vietnam to see location offshore in the South China Sea.

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This made the situation between China and Vietnam particularly difficult to resolve. Exxon Mobile, the U.S. energy company that signed an exploration agreement with Vietnam in the South China Sea, is exacerbating already existing tension. The Chinese authorities warned Exxon Mobil of possible consequences if it goes ahead with exploration in the Paracel Islands. Estimates of reserves vary widely. Based on a U.S. geological survey, the South China Sea has proven oil reserves of 7.7 billion barrels and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, a potentially huge bounty. Geopolitical and military tensions have heightened sharply recently in the South China Sea, China, Taiwan, and the Philippines have each escalated their rhetoric regarding the contested oil-rich Spratly Islands and deployed troops and military equipment to the region. The first dispute is the Spratly Islands are claimed in whole or in part by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. Two-fifths of global sea traffic travels through the South China Sea. Therefore, control of the region is of vital strategic interest to both the United States and China. For example, a second related dispute was in February 2011, a Philippine Forum Energy concluded a two-year survey of oil and natural gas resources in the region. But on 2 March 2011, Chinese patrol boats accosted a vessel belonging to Forum Energy in disputed waters. The Philippine Navy sent two fighter jets to confront the Chinese patrol boats. On 5 April 2011, the Philippines filed an official protest before the United Nations, contesting China’s claim to Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. In particular, Manila protested a map issued by China in May 2009 indicating its U-shaped claim to more than 80 per cent of the South China Sea. China escalated the dispute, when on April 14, it sent a letter to the United Nations stating that the Philippines had invaded and occupied Chinese territory. On May 2, China announced that it would be adding 1,000 personnel and 36 vessels to it Marine Surveillance Forces. These forces are directly responsible for patrolling the disputed waters and that any development made by CNOOC in the region would be conducted under their protection. A third dispute is between China and ASEAN. These two reached a common “Declaration on Conduct” (DoC) in 2002 in an attempt to minimise the risk of conflict. But efforts to turn it into a formal and binding code have got nowhere, partly because of China’s anger at ASEAN’s attempt to develop a common approach. China argues that ASEAN has no role in territorial issues, and insists on negotiating with the other claimants bilaterally. ASEAN sees this as an effort to pick off its members one by one. It argues that its own charter forces members to consult, as they do before each working group on the code of conduct. But China believed that, each of the claimants to the South China Sea would negotiate a separate arrangement with China independent of interaction with other powers in the region. The negotiations would also pointedly exclude any participation by the United States. The result is the all nine states that touch the South China Sea are more or less arrayed against a common enemy, China and therefore dependent on the United States for diplomatic and military support. These conflicting claims are likely to become even more acute as Asia’s spiralling energy demands and consumption is expected to double by 2030, with China accounting for half that growth make South China Sea the ever more central guarantor of the region’s economic strength.

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Moreover, high energy prices and growing world demand have made many areas of interest commercially that was previously overlooked for exploitation due to their geographic, geological, or geopolitical complexity. And many of these are found in areas of contested sovereignty between countries. In the last decade, a number of direct military confrontations have emerged between states attempting to survey or exploit oil and gas resources in contested areas. In addition, oil and gas deposits that cross frontiers also create a unique set of challenges to the states that share the deposit. In contrast to mineral deposits, where the dividing line of the deposit is separable into clearly defined units, oil and gas deposits that extend beyond a dividing line can be exploited, wholly or in part, from either or both sides of the line. In the case of liquid deposits shared by two or more states, division is especially complicated, because no state can determine the precise amount of oil or gas that it owns, and such situation demands cooperation from all the involved states. But if exploitation by one of the involved countries in South China Sea in the disputed areas affects the state of the deposits and their accessibility by the other countries along the line, then there should be joint exploration development zone (JEDZ). This is due to the fact that sovereignty over natural resources is not applicable to the delimitation of liquid mineral deposits that overlie a number of borders. The sea lanes and oil rich water of the South China Sea have long been a global flashpoint. The extraordinary economic growth of China and the decline of the United States have resulted in a geopolitical confrontation which is moving the direction of armed conflict. China’s dependence on imported oil is a point of painful vulnerability. China thus seeks to drill in disputed waters and is conducting diplomacy and building its military to support its claims in the region. In conclusion, affected states in the South China Sea should cooperate in exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources that lie in the disputed borders to avoid a new Persian Gulf crisis that may disrupt world energy supply.

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The 3rd annual Offshore Patrol Vessels Asia Pacific 2013 conference is back this year, with a far more comprehensive, quality-led and value-driven programme. Featuring senior and key military officials from not only the Asia-Pacific region but also from the USA , OPVs APAC 2013 is not only the only conference in Asia dedicated to the planning of requirements and procurement of YOUR naval capabilities, gaining operational perspectives and best practices on the use of OPVs in maritime operations, but also the ideal platform for industry stakeholders to discuss and learn the latest strategies in enhancing naval fleet capabilities. OPVs APAC 2013 will also feature an unprecedented pre-conference focus day dedicated to naval acquisition projects and requirements.

For an operational perspective on naval and maritime operations you can hear from these speakers…
First Admiral Susanto, Head of Maritime Security Operations, Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Board (Bakorkamla) First Admiral Dato' Che Hassan Bin Jusoh, Director for Enforcement and Exercise, Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Captain Albert Mogol, Chief of Staff, Fleet Command, Philippines Navy Rear Admiral Kruoch Kim Thon, Deputy Chief of Staff, Cambodian Navy Captain Ronnie Gavan, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, Philippines Coast Guard Major Nguyen Khac Vuot, Maritime Operations, Vietnam Marine Police

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For a technological perspective you can hear from the following speakers on naval acquisition and procurement…
Major Hoang Van Canh, Requirements Division, Vietnam Marine Police Commander Jose Ezpeleta, Team Leader of the Defence Acquisition System Assessment Team for OPVs, Philippines Navy Commander Tito Andal, Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics, Philippines Coast Guard Senior Superintendent Dominique Ziemann, Marine Support, Hong Kong Marine Police

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