Client: Professor P. Purnell University Of Leeds, School of Civil Engineering Session 2012/2013
Group 12: Alexander Carr Ben Fadida James Kingman Honor Newman Romain Sidoti Joshua Wood II ABSTRACT To cope with our legacy and future nuclear waste production within the United Kingdom, a solution was required to facilitate the disposal of the nuclear waste. Geological disposal has been selected, by the UK government, as the preferred option for the long-term management of nuclear waste. Sizewell was selected as the most appropriate location to situate a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF). Detailed designs for the surface and subterranean facilities were developed, based on the NDA specifications, and the identified site. Transport of existing nuclear waste, by sea, directly from Sellafield to Sizewell was identified as the most appropriate method of transport. The GDF facility will remain operational until 2222, after which the facility will be backfilled, and the site redeveloped to ensure future safety. A combination of stewardship and archives, along with durable markers, have been proposed to ensure that knowledge of the dangers of the site are maintained over the many tens of thousands of years that the waste will remain radioactive.
III Table of Contents 1. Pre-Qualification Exercise: Preliminary assessment of proposed sites ......... 1 1.1 Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 1.2 West Cumbria ........................................................................................... 1 1.2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 1.2.2 Transport links ................................................................................................................. 1 1.2.3 Natural capital of the area ................................................................................................ 1 1.2.4 Community opposition ..................................................................................................... 2 1.2.5 Topography ...................................................................................................................... 2 1.2.6 Geology ............................................................................................................................ 3 1.2.6.1 Carboniferous rocks ............................................................................................................ 3 1.2.6.2 Permian, Jurassic and Triassic rocks .................................................................................... 3 1.2.6.3 Ordovician rocks .................................................................................................................. 3 1.2.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 4 1.3 Romney Marsh, Kent ................................................................................. 4 1.3.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 4 1.3.2 Level of Experience within Nuclear Industry and Employment Benefits .............................. 4 1.3.3 Transport Links ................................................................................................................. 4 1.3.4 Natural Capital of the Area ............................................................................................... 4 1.3.5 Community Opposition ..................................................................................................... 5 1.3.6 Geology ............................................................................................................................ 5 1.3.6.1 Sub-surface Unsuitability Test ............................................................................................. 5 1.3.6.2 Topography, Geomorphology and Flood Risk ..................................................................... 6 1.4 Selection of alternative site for geological disposal facility ........................ 7 1.5 Sizewell ..................................................................................................... 7 1.5.1 Community opposition ..................................................................................................... 8 1.5.2 Earthquake and fault zones ............................................................................................... 8 1.5.3 Topography ...................................................................................................................... 9 1.5.4 Flooding ........................................................................................................................... 9 1.5.5 Transport ......................................................................................................................... 9 1.5.6 Geology ............................................................................................................................ 9 1.6 Decision Making Procedure ..................................................................... 10 1.6.1 Weightings ..................................................................................................................... 10 1.6.2 Uncertainty .................................................................................................................... 11 1.6.3 Weighted Average Multipliers ........................................................................................ 11 1.7 Decision Matrix ....................................................................................... 12 1.8 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 13 2. Pre-Qualification exercise: Design Development ....................................... 14 IV 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................ 14 2.2 Waste Quantities for Disposal ................................................................. 14 2.2.1 Data Sources .................................................................................................................. 14 2.2.1.1 The 2010 UK Radioactive Waste Inventory (UKRWI) ........................................................ 14 2.2.1.2 The 2010 Estimate of Waste for Geological Disposal (EWGD) .......................................... 14 2.2.1.3 Nirex Report N/085 ........................................................................................................... 15 2.2.2 Assumptions................................................................................................................... 15 2.2.2.1 Nuclear New Build Program .............................................................................................. 15 2.2.2.2 Spent Fuel, Uranium and Plutonium ................................................................................. 15 2.2.2.3 Waste Quantity Conversions ............................................................................................. 15 2.2.3 Waste Quantities for Design ........................................................................................... 16 2.2.4 Waste Locations for Design ............................................................................................. 16 2.3 Transportation of Waste to Site .............................................................. 17 2.3.1 Modes of Transport ........................................................................................................ 17 2.3.1.1 Transport by Sea ............................................................................................................... 17 2.3.1.2 Transport by Rail ............................................................................................................... 17 2.3.1.3 Transport by Road ............................................................................................................. 17 2.3.2 Options for Transport ..................................................................................................... 17 2.3.2.1 Option 1 ............................................................................................................................. 18 2.3.2.2 Option 2 ............................................................................................................................. 18 2.3.2.3 Option 3 ............................................................................................................................. 18 2.3.2.4 Option 4 ............................................................................................................................. 18 2.3.2.5 Option 5 ............................................................................................................................. 18 2.3.2.6 Transport Option Preference Hierarchy ............................................................................ 18 2.3.3 Selection of Modes of Transport for Existing Sites ........................................................... 18 2.3.4 Logistics and Delivery Rates ............................................................................................ 19 2.3.4.1 Transport Vessels .............................................................................................................. 19 2.3.4.2 Accident Rates and Risk Assessment ................................................................................ 20 2.3.4.3 Summary of Logistics ......................................................................................................... 20 2.4 Design specification: Development of the brief ....................................... 21 2.4.1 Surface Facilities ............................................................................................................. 21 2.4.2 Underground Operational Requirements ........................................................................ 22 2.4.3 Waste Transport and Infrastructure Requirements .......................................................... 22 2.4.4 Safety ............................................................................................................................. 22 2.4.5 Sustainability and environmental impacts ....................................................................... 23 2.5 Preliminary Design of Proposed Sites in Sizewell ..................................... 23 2.5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 23 2.5.2 Location of Sites ............................................................................................................. 24 2.5.3 Constraints and Opportunities ........................................................................................ 25 2.5.3.1 Site 1 .................................................................................................................................. 25 2.5.3.2 Site 2 .................................................................................................................................. 25 2.5.4 Conceptual layouts for Surface Facilities .......................................................................... 26 V 2.5.4.1 Surface Facilities layouts ................................................................................................... 26 2.5.4.2 Decision Matrix ................................................................................................................. 28 2.5.5 Conceptual layouts for Underground Facilities................................................................. 29 2.5.5.1 Decision Matrix ................................................................................................................. 29 2.6 Emplacement Process ............................................................................. 30 2.6.1 Surface Handling Processes ............................................................................................. 30 2.6.1.1 Sea ..................................................................................................................................... 30 2.6.1.2 Unloading .......................................................................................................................... 30 2.6.1.3 Site check in ....................................................................................................................... 30 2.6.1.4 Waste Package Transfer Facility ........................................................................................ 30 2.6.1.5 Drift Tunnel ....................................................................................................................... 30 2.6.2 Surface Facility Process Flow Chart .................................................................................. 31 2.6.3 Underground Handling Processes (Nuclear Decomissioning Authority, 2010) ................... 32 2.7 Detailed design ....................................................................................... 33 2.7.1 Surface Facility ............................................................................................................... 33 2.7.1.1 Operational Site Layout ..................................................................................................... 33 2.7.1.2 Construction Phase Site Layout ......................................................................................... 35 2.7.1.3 Waste Reception and Handling Facilities .......................................................................... 35 2.7.1.4 Port .................................................................................................................................... 35 2.7.2 Underground Facilities .................................................................................................... 36 2.7.2.1 Underground Facility detailed design ............................................................................... 36 2.7.3 Construction of the Underground Facilities and Backfilling .............................................. 38 2.7.3.1 Excavation methods .......................................................................................................... 38 2.7.3.2 Construction Process ......................................................................................................... 38 2.7.3.3 Backfilling .......................................................................................................................... 38 2.7.3.4 Spoil Management ............................................................................................................ 39 2.8 Method Statement .................................................................................. 40 2.9 Risk Assessment ...................................................................................... 41 3. Prequalification Exercise: Post-Closure ..................................................... 42 3.1 Post Closure Management ...................................................................... 42 3.2 Near Term Post Closure ........................................................................... 42 3.2.1 Considered Near Term Post Closure Uses ........................................................................ 42 3.2.2 Recommended Near Term Post Closure Use .................................................................... 44 3.3 Long Term Post Closure Management Approaches .................................. 44 3.3.1 Passive Institutional Control ........................................................................................... 44 3.3.2 Active Institutional Control ............................................................................................. 44 3.3.3 Total Abandonment ........................................................................................................ 44 3.3.4 The Communities Legacy ................................................................................................ 44 3.3.5 Adopted Approaches ...................................................................................................... 45 3.3.6 Adopted Passive Institutional Controls ........................................................................... 45 VI 3.3.7 Adopted Active Institutional Controls ........................................................................... 46 3.4 Backfilling ............................................................................................... 46 3.4.1 Public Opinion ................................................................................................................ 46 3.4.2 Ethics ............................................................................................................................. 46 3.4.3 Costs .............................................................................................................................. 46 3.4.4 Safety and Safeguards .................................................................................................... 47 3.5 Project Timeline ...................................................................................... 47 Appendix A ................................................................................................... 48 Appendix B ................................................................................................... 49 Appendix C ................................................................................................... 50 Appendix D ................................................................................................... 51 Appendix E .................................................................................................... 52 Appendix F .................................................................................................... 53 Appendix G ................................................................................................... 56 Appendix H ................................................................................................... 58 Appendix I .................................................................................................... 61 Appendix J .................................................................................................... 64 Appendix K ................................................................................................... 65 Appendix L .................................................................................................... 67 Appendix M .................................................................................................. 70 Appendix N ................................................................................................... 74 Appendix O ................................................................................................... 79 Appendix P ................................................................................................... 93 Appendix Q ................................................................................................... 96 Appendix Project Implementation Plan .................................................... 100 Appendix- Meeting Minutes ....................................................................... 104 Appendix Full Brief ................................................................................... 122 Works Cited ................................................................................................ 130 VII Table of Figures
Figure 1: West Cumbria Topography .........................................................................................2 Figure 2: Water Flow in Cumbria ..............................................................................................3 Figure 3: Historic Coastline Contours ........................................................................................7 Figure 4: Earthquake history in the UK......................................................................................8 Figure 5: Geological Fault zones in the UK ................................................................................8 Figure 6: Map of Sizewell .........................................................................................................24 Figure 7: Sizewell site 1 area ....................................................................................................26 Figure 8: Sizewell site 2 area ....................................................................................................26 Figure 9: Surface facilities conceptual design .........................................................................27 Figure 10: Process flow chart ...................................................................................................31 Figure 11: Operational Site layout ...........................................................................................34 Figure 12: Underground facility detailed design .....................................................................37 Figure 13: Marker stone sketch ...............................................................................................45 Figure 14: Visitor center sketch ...............................................................................................45 Figure 15: Project Timeline ......................................................................................................47
1 1. Pre-Qualification Exercise: Preliminary assessment of proposed sites
1.1 Introduction The Government has undertaken a search for possible geological disposal facility sites on a purely voluntary basis, stating that a repository will only be put somewhere where the geology is suitable and there is a community that has volunteered to have it (West Cumbria Managing Radioactive Waste Safely Partnership, 2012). There are currently three local communities that have expressed interest in further exploring the opportunity of facilitating a GDF; these comprise of Allerdale and Copeland, which are both situated in West Cumbria, along with Romney Marsh in Kent. There is also Sizewell, in Suffolk, which, although has not volunteered as a site, is currently being assessed for suitability. As an incentive to encourage communities to accept the proposed geological disposal facility, the Government is offering community benefits packages that will include substantial long-term investment into infrastructure, services and skills that will benefit the community as a whole. 1.2 West Cumbria 1.2.1 Introduction Allerdale is one of six districts that makes up Cumbria, and is located in the West of the county, approximately 37km (Google Earth, 2012) away from the Sellafield site. Also situated in West Cumbria, Copeland is just 7km (Google Earth, 2012) away from the Sellafield site. West Cumbria has a long history of nuclear industry with the Sellafield nuclear power plant being commissioned in 1956. (Sellafield Ltd, Unknown). The question is being raised as to whether they should develop the area in to a local hub of excellence recognised internationally, or diversify. 1.2.2 Transport links The presence of existing transport links is important, though not essential, when choosing the location for the GDF. Due to the length of time the facility will be operational for, it is important to consider several different methods of transport for each location. The mode of transport used for moving nuclear waste could change, and the potential cost of this to the project must be considered. Both of the potential Cumbrian locations are close to existing rail links but lack sufficient road links. The nearest motorway (M6) is too far away from both of the sites to be used for regular transport of waste. For either Allerdale or Copeland to be chosen as the final location, significant improvement to the road network must take place, which would be difficult in an area with a large area of protected land. The nearest airfield is at Carlisle Airport, approximately 90km (Google Earth, 2012) by road from Copeland, and 45km (Google Earth, 2012) from Allerdale. 1.2.3 Natural capital of the area The presence of protected land and sites of special scientific interest could affect the decision on any of the potential locations. Although close to the Lake District, Eskdale, in the Copeland district, has an only small area of scientific interest surrounding it. There are small areas marked as nature reserves, although not in the immediate vicinity of Eskdale. Silloth has the largest areas of special scientific areas of all the locations that are being considered, with relatively large nature reserve areas. (Natural England, Unknown) 2 1.2.4 Community opposition Many locals believe that the reputation of the entire area would be diminished if a GDF were to be built in West Cumbria. Tourism brought in over 2.2 billion to the local economy in 2011 (Cumbria Tourism, Unknown). People would be less willing to visit on holiday, and potentially wary of moving to the locality. This would affect the tourism and property values. With the Lake District National Park being located in Cumbria, many people are opposed to the idea of storing such hazardous waste under one of arguably the most beautiful parts of England. Local residents rallied together in early 2012 and sent a postcard card to the Lake District National Park titled Remembering Chernobyl (Radiation Free Lakeland, 2012) demonstrating the fear the public share. There is also great uncertainty over what will be done with the spoil from the excavation of the underground facility. There will be approximately the same amount as that from the channel tunnel excavation (West Cumbria Managing Radioactive Waste Safely Partnership, 2012). Some 68% of Copeland residents and 51% of Allerdale residents (World Nuclear News, 2012) are in favour of further investigation into the possibility of a geological disposal facility. This shows that while there is great concern over the project, local communities are still in favour of further investigating the possibilities. 1.2.5 Topography The technical aspects of a particular area both underground (geology) and over ground (topography) should be considered when looking at the suitability of West Cumbria in hosting a geological disposal facility. A Topographic relief map of West Cumbria illustrating the difference in ground elevation of the partnership area reflects non-uniformity in the terrain. High mountainous areas lie in the eastern part of West Cumbria in the Lake District region. These mountainous chains continue south of Copeland but the terrain is much more subdued north of Allerdale on the Solway lowlands and along the coast of the Irish Sea.
It is clear from the color-coding of the above relief maps that the terrain is not leveled. The topography of the West Cumbria area should be sufficient to disregard it as an option for a geological disposal facility because "water flow is driven by the elevation of mountains and inevitably rises to surface as 'artesian' springs" (Smythe, 2010) as illustrated in figure 2 below.
0 m 1000 m Figure 1- West Cumbria topography (Smythe, 2010) 3 The high mountains of the Lake District will create a strong flow of water from East to West towards the Irish Sea, causing safety hazards as suitable aquifers from the Sherwood sandstone group are present along the coast. The Sherwood sandstone group is the main aquifer that is exploited in the area and should not be in contact with any nuclear waste in order to protect our present or possible future water drinking systems.
Different relief maps of geological disposal facility sites around the world in Sweden and Finland in Appendix A show that a low relief system was chosen as compared to West Cumbria (Smythe, 2010). 1.2.6 Geology The geology of West Cumbria varies enormously with a mixture of carboniferous, Triassic and Ordovician rocks. The Lake District area (Comprising North Copeland and South Allerdale) is mainly composed of the Ordovician group of rocks that includes the Eycott and Borrowdale Volcanic groups and the Skiddaw group. Towards the more subdued terrain of West Cumbria in the Solway lowlands as well as along the coast from St Bees towards Haverigg, younger carboniferous and Triassic rocks underlie these ancient rocks and thicken towards the Irish Sea and Solway lowlands (British Geological Survey, 2010). 1.2.6.1 Carboniferous rocks The Carboniferous Pennine Coal Measures Group is present north of Allerdale from Workington along the coast towards Carlisle. It is part of the exclusion area because "although coal seams to from a small part of the total thickness of the group, typically less than 10%, their presence has made this group of primary economic importance (British Geological Survey, 2010). 1.2.6.2 Permian, Jurassic and Triassic rocks The Sherwood Sandstone group is present in different formations around West Cumbria: Ormskirk Sandstone formation, Calder Sandstone formation and St Bees Sandstone formation. The Sherwood Sandstone group is the primary aquifer in the area and needs particular attention to ensure no radiation will contaminate potential exploitable groundwater resources that are currently exploited or could be exploited in the future (British Geological Survey, 2010). The sandstone formation is also "the main reservoir for oil and gas in the Irish Sea" (Jackson et al., 1995) and has the greatest potential for these resources so this needs to be part of the exclusion area. 1.2.6.3 Ordovician rocks The Ordovician Skiddaw group are predominant in the northern part of the Lake District and are suitable for hosting a geological disposal facility as they consist of clayey material of low permeability, a material already used in other geological disposal facilities such as in Sweden and Finland. However this Skiddaw group sits below the Lake District National park region, which is a natural domain that needs to be preserved. The Borrowdale and Eycott Volcanic group which are also of Ordovician age consist of Andesitic lavas and sills and pyroclastic and volcaniclastic rocks (British Geological Survey, 2010). These lie more predominantly in the central core region of the Lake District. The rock could be suitable for a geological disposal facility as pyroclastic deposits have porosity and permeability characteristics like those of poorly sorted sediments; however, the pyroclastic material might become welded and almost impermeable. (United States Geological Survey, Unknown) Waste Water flow West East Figure 2- Water flow in Cumbria (Smythe, 2010) 4 1.2.7 Conclusion The high potential of exploitable natural resources (coal, oil and gas, aquifers and iron ore) imposes constraints on the location of a possible underground facility in the partnership area. An exclusion area has been developed from information provided by the British Geological Survey memoirs in order to protect these potential beneficial natural resources from contamination by nuclear waste.
The Exclusion area map present in Appendix B illustrates the different natural resources present in Cumbria that need to be protected. The Sherwood Sandstone Group main aquifer, The Pennine coal measures group and oil and gas activities are present. (British Geological Survey, 2010) The large area of the National park in green only leaves a small portion of West Cumbria out of the Exclusion area. The National park needs to be preserved of its landscape and so construction within the park is not an option, knowing the Lake District national park attracts millions of visitors to the area every year (West Cumbria Managing Radioactive Waste Safely Partnership, 2012). So even though the Lake District National park area is the only region that has suitable geology (from section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3), the natural aspect of the area protects it and the topography is not suitable. The mountainous relief terrain of the region around the Lake District makes it even harder to consider building a surface facility.
1.3 Romney Marsh, Kent 1.3.1 Introduction Romney Marsh is situated in the South East of England, approximately 13 km (DigiMap, 2012) from the existing Dungeness power stations. 1.3.2 Level of Experience within Nuclear Industry and Employment Benefits In Romney Marsh, the presence of Dungeness power stations A and B means there is also local expertise in area with regards to the nuclear industry. The Dungeness power stations have created a large amount of jobs for the local population, accounting for 8% of the all employment in the Romney Marsh Area. (BBC News, 2012). Dungeness power station B is due to fully close in 2017 and Dungeness power station A to close in 2018 or 2023 if granted an extension. (BBC News, 2012). The closure of this power station in the near future will increase unemployment in the region. It is therefore possible that should Romney Marsh be approved as a location, some of the job losses that would come about from the closure of the power stations could potentially be offset. 1.3.3 Transport Links Romney Marsh is easily accessible by road. It is in close proximity to the M20 motorway, as well as two nearby A-roads, the A259 and A2070.Lydd (London Ashford) Airport is also within 10km of the town of New Romney. Rail links to the area are present, with a local railway station that has a direct line to the Dungeness power stations. However, it could be argued that an improvement to the railway links to the North would be required for Romney Marsh to be a feasible location. (Google Earth, 2012). 1.3.4 Natural Capital of the Area The presence of protected land and any sites of special scientific interest could affect the decision on any of the potential locations. There are small areas of Romney Marsh that are marked as sites of scientific interest, as well as smaller areas marked as nature reserves (Natural England, Unknown). 5 1.3.5 Community Opposition Despite the opportunities this project could bring for the residents of Romney Marsh, there remains strong opposition to the idea due to the health and environmental hazards that a GDF can pose. This worry is heightened by the fact that Kent is particularly vulnerable to flooding. This negative view on the proposal seems to be shared by Kent County council leader Paul Carter, who went on record saying that Kent County Council is totally opposed to initiating any process that even entertains the possibility of building a nuclear waste disposal site anywhere near or around Kent (Griffiths, 2012). He then went on to suggest a Countywide referendum should the idea be pushed through. This view is shared with the majority of the local residents. A local poll showed that 63% (BBC News, 2012) of the community are against the idea. This leaves little room for possibility of Romney Marsh being chosen as the location for the facility, with the government reluctant to select a location against the wishes of the local community.
1.3.6 Geology 1.3.6.1 Sub-surface Unsuitability Test The government managing radioactive waste safely White Paper (Department for Environment Food and Rural affairs, 2008) identifies a number of basic criteria that can be used to determine if the basic geology of a proposed site is unsuitable to host a geological disposal facility. The derived unsuitability criteria are summarized (table.1).
To be applied as an exclusion criteria Reasons/Explanations and Qualifying Comments Present at Romney Marsh? Coal Deposits Yes Intrusion risk to depth, only when resource at <100m No Oil and Gas Yes Intrusion risk to depth No Oil Shales Yes Intrusion risk to depth No Metal Ores Some Ores Intrusion risk only where mined at depth <100m
Disposal of Wastes/Gas Storage Yes Only where already approved at > 100m No Aquifers Yes Where all or part of the geological disposal facility host rock is located within the aquifer No Permeable formation at depth <500m Yes Where all or part of the geological disposal facility host rock would be provided by permeable formations that might reasonably be exploited in the future No Specific complex hydro-geological environments Yes Deep karstic formations and known sources for thermal springs No Table 1 - Initial sub-surface screening criteria (Department for Environment Food and Rural affairs, 2008)
6 The Romney Marsh area was tested, using the unsuitability criteria, and currently available geological data for the area under consideration (Appendix C). The results of the test are summarized (table.1). Six deep boreholes exist within the area surrounding Romney Marsh (Appendix C). These boreholes indicate that the predominant deposits in the depth range being considered as Kimmeridge Clay overlying the Corrallian Beds and Oxford Clay. All of these deposits can generally be described as sedimentary mudstones or siltstones. Kimmeridge Clay is known to generally contain significant quantities of Hydrocarbons (Gallois, 2004). In the Romney Marsh area, however, no commercially significant hydrocarbon deposits have been reported or licensed (British Geological Society and Lake R.D, 1987) (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2006) (Department for Energy and Climate Change, 2012). The hydrogeology of the Romney Marsh area is described as being of limited potential for water supply of uncertain quality (British Geological Society, 1977). The main source of water in the area is above ground storage with reduced reliance on aquifers (British Geological Society and Lake R.D, 1987). The permeability of deposits in the area is generally considered to be low with fissures acting as the main transport mechanism for flow (British Geological Society and Lake R.D, 1987). The Romney Marsh area is not categorized as unsuitable based on the sub-surface criteria suggested for initial screening. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that a suitable sub-surface geological setting could be found within the area to host a GDF.
1.3.6.2 Topography, Geomorphology and Flood Risk Romney Marsh is a flat low-lying crescent shaped expanse that is generally below high tide level (Appendix C). (May & Hansom, 2003) suggest that the marsh formed due to a sandy bar forming across a crescent shaped bay creating a lagoon that subsequently silted-up to form Romney Marsh. To the seaward side of the sandy bar a cuspate shingle foreland formed due to the prevailing eastward current transporting shingle from the Sussex coast. The cuspate foreland is constantly being eroded and reshaped by the prevailing currents with the exact position of the coastline changing significantly over relatively short time scales (fig.3). The environment agency currently assesses the majority of the Romney Marsh area to have a risk of flood of 1 in 75 years (Environment Agency, n.d.) It has been demonstrated, through the safe construction and operation of the Dungeness nuclear power stations, that it is possible to provide robust flood defences in the area. The current flood protection strategy is to replenish shingle, eroded from the south coast with shingle sourced from the north coast of the cuspate foreland (Environment Agency, 2010). The use of replenishment for the protection of the shoreline is under constant review. Estimates of the replenishment rate are in the order of 50,000m 3 per year with a year on year increase of approximately 880 m 3 /year (Maddrell et al., 1994). Due to the topography and geomorphology of the Romney Marsh area a significant flood risk exists that will continue to increase in severity with time. The safe operation of the Dungeness nuclear power station demonstrates that safe and economical flood defences can be constructed in the area. Siting a GDF in the area would, however, require a larger scale more longer term flood defence scheme potentially permanently altering a coast line that is described as being of international importance (English Nature, Unknown).
7
1.4 Selection of alternative site for geological disposal facility Even though West Cumbria and Romney Marsh were two areas that were put forward for further analysis from the stakeholders, it was felt necessary to consider other areas that could possibly host a geological disposal facility. This report will look at one other area in the UK that seems most suitable for hosting a geological disposal facility. This area will then be compared to West Cumbria and Kent in a decision matrix table in order to identify the most suitable site that could host the geological disposal facility. The starting point in proposing an alternative suitable location for a geological disposal facility is to rule out areas in the UK where it is unsuitable to dispose of nuclear waste. The remaining areas can then be investigated to identify whether the site meets the geological requirements for establishing a geological disposal facility together with other factors. The following criteria will be used to identify a site location for a repository in the UK: Locate site near running or closed down nuclear power stations. Site must not be located in an area which could significantly affect the surrounding natural environment. Site must be distant from earthquake prone areas. Site must not be within a rock fault zone. Site must have an average spacing of 100m between adjacent faults in the rock. There must be relatively low stressed rocks. Subsurface rocks should have a high thermal conductivity. The above factors are essential safety features for the location that will be selected for the repository (Olsson et al., 2009).
1.5 Sizewell Sizewell has been chosen as our alternative site and will be investigated in this report. It is located on the Suffolk coast and is home to two separate Nuclear reactors with one in the process of being decommissioned, and a third being proposed. It is a small village otherwise known for its fishing and tourism.
Figure 3- Historic Coastline Contours (British Geological Society and Lake R.D, 1987) 8 1.5.1 Community opposition As Sizewell has not expressed an official interest in the search for a GDF, there is little information available on the potential public opinion. Sizewell is already home to two nuclear reactors, and with another one in the planning stages, a level of public opinion towards the nuclear industry can be ascertained. There are many groups set on shutting down the Sizewell plants, however most of the arguments for this are to do with Nuclear power production itself and less to do with the Sizewell area. Every year a group of protestors hold a camp near the Sizewell plant (Stop Nuclear Power, 2012). This demonstration is designed to promote their views, and try to educate the local population on the dangers of Nuclear power. With the recent Fukushima disaster in Japan, and a recent study in France - (Shutdown Sizewell Campaign, Unknown) showing that children living in the vicinity of a Nuclear power plant have a higher leukaemia incidence rate - the public are very worried about the dangers of Nuclear power. 1.5.2 Earthquake and fault zones A map of geological fault zones in the UK as shown in figure 5 shows the North of England, Scotland, Wales, Southwest and West midlands as having a high frequency of fault zones as compared with the South East and East midlands. The identification of fractures within the bedrock at an existing geological disposal facility in Sweden was considered the biggest factor for long-term safety as it is essential to limit groundwater flow (Olsson et al., 2009). The effects earthquakes would have on altering the structure of bedrock was also considered to ensure long term safety of the facility. Historic data of earthquakes in the United Kingdom were studied to ensure that the future geological facility would not be close to any earthquake prone areas. Figure 4 shows that earthquakes have historically occurred numerous times in the west as compared to the east of the UK. This figure agrees with figure 5 which shows that the majority of the fault zones also lie in this region. The South-East, North-East, East Scotland and Southwest Scotland have reduced seismometer readings, making the South-East a suitable proposition for the location of the GDF.
Figure 5 Geological fault zones in the UK (Esri, 2010) Figure 4- Earthquake history in the UK (British Geological society, Unknown) 9 1.5.3 Topography The topography of the area is also important when looking at the suitability of a geological disposal facility. As mentioned previously in the report, the existing repository facilities around the world were all constructed on a low relief terrain with little variation in the regional topography. The relief map of the United Kingdom in Appendix D illustrates the height level of land above water, clearly illustrating the East midlands and South-East region as being the lowest relief terrains with little variation in the topography. This region was also identified as suitable in the previous section when looking at fault zones and earthquakes. 1.5.4 Flooding Andra, the agency in charge of the management for nuclear waste in France had identified the potential for flooding as one of the main criteria in deciding the location of its underground repository. Appendix D illustrates the flood plain zones in England. The East-midlands flood plain zones are significant compared to the rest of the UK which has limited flooding warnings. 1.5.5 Transport Sizewell, which is located on the coast, has a large shipping port located nearby at Harwich. There are no adequate road links currently to enable the movement of waste from the rest of the country to Sizewell. There are however rail links nearby, but they do not currently service Sizewell. The nearest airfield is Bentwaters Royal Air Force Base just 18km (Google Earth, 2012) away by road. Again, significant investments would need to be made to facilitate the disposal of waste at this site. 1.5.6 Geology The following table 2 from (Royal Haskoning, 2009) gives a description of the geology under the Sizewell B in sequential and descending order. Sizewell B power plant is situated very close to the potential geological disposal facility location in Sizewell.
Table 2- Geology of Sizewell B (Royal Haskoning, 2009) 10 The upper Chalk layer was found to be down to -150 m Ordnance Datum. The sequence of materials between the upper chalk layer and the pre-permian rocks which are below are not known due limited data information. With limited geological data available from the British Geological Society, Deep boreholes at Harwich were analysed and indicated that the pre-permian rocks start at -400 m OD and extend down to a considerable depth. This is why it was chosen that our geological disposal facility would be down to -500 m in depth. (EDF Energy, 2011). The report by produced by EDF also states that the Sizewell region lies within the Anglo-Brabant Platform, a crustal block that has suffered only limited deformation in the past 450 million years (EDF Energy, 2011).
The major aquifer present at Sizewell is the confined Chalk group. The Chalk and Crag aquifers are currently assessed as poor (quantitative) with poor chemical quality (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010). The Sizewell area is not known to have any other suitable natural resources underground (oil and gas, hydrocarbons, coal deposits). It is therefore reasonable to conclude that a suitable sub-surface geological setting could be found within the area to host a GDF.
1.6 Decision Making Procedure The site selection decision is based on a large range of interrelated and, in some cases disparate, considerations. The site selection method must, therefore, fairly compare these issues in an accurate and transparent manner. A comparative scoring system, based on a one to five scale with five being the best score, has been employed. Four critical considerations have been identified for the site selection; social issues, technical issues, proximity to transport infrastructure and cost. The score for each of the critical considerations is to be based on the average score of a number of sub-categories. This system allows a wide reaching assessment to be made of each of the critical considerations using a large range of data sources. The site with the highest average score across these four critical considerations will be carried forward to the design stage of the project. 1.6.1 Weightings Weighting have been applied to each of the critical consideration to reflect their various importance in relation to the construction of a GDF. The weightings, along with a rational for their derivation, is presented (table.1)
11 Table 3- Weightings for Decision Matrix table
1.6.2 Uncertainty Where significant uncertainty exists in the allocation of a score to a sub criterion the weighting applied to that sub criteria is to be reduced by 25%. This is to reduce the impact uncertainty has on the site selection process. 1.6.3 Weighted Average Multipliers Under the currently adopted procedure for selecting a site for a GDF two critical conditions must be met; the area passes and initial geological screening and the local population accepts the proposals. To account for these conditions in the decision-making process two multipliers will be applied to the weighted average for each of the sites. If a site does not meet the initial geological screening criteria the weighted average score will be multiplied by zero. If the site does meet the initial screening criteria the weighted average score is to be multiplied by one. This is to prevent any sites that are inherently geologically unsuitable from being considered. If a community has formally rejected a proposal for a GDF the final weighted average is to be multiplied by zero. If a community has committed to the construction of a GDF the final weighted average is to be multiplied by one. If a community is still at the decision-making phase a multiplier to be used that represents the probability that the community will accept the construction of a GDF.
Critical Consideration Weighting Rational Social Issues 3 The population density of the UK necessitates that social issues be the primary concern regarding the construction of a GDF since it is not feasible to site the GDF in a sufficiently isolated location to avoid impacting on communities. Technical Issues 1.5 It was felt that technical issues are subordinate to social issues in relation to the construction of a GDF since Nirex identified numerous technically feasible site but failed to implement a GDF due to a lack of consideration of social issues. Proximity to Transport Infrastructure 1 Transporting waste safely to the GDF will be crucial to the success of the project. It maybe desirable for numerous modes of transport to be employed. New transport infrastructure will also represent a significant cost and planning obstacle to the project. It was, however felt that social and technical issues are more critical than those of waste transport. Cost
0.75 Whilst it will be desirable to achieve value for money during the implementation of the GDF the cost of the facility will not be critical to the implementation of the GDF since it is considered a necessity under the MRWS white paper. 12 Table 4 Decision matrix table 1.7 Decision Matrix
Allerdale Copeland Romney Marsh Sizewell Criteria Score Weight Score Weight Score Weight Score Weight Social Level of previous experience with the nuclear industry 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 3 Impact on tourism and community image 1 3 1 3 2 3 2 2.25 Natural capital of the area 1 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 Historical capital of the area 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 Population within the proposed area 4 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 Weighted Average Score 8.4 9.6 9.0 10.2 Technical Susceptibility of the area to flooding 5 1.5 5 1.5 1 1.5 4 1.5
Complexity of local topography 1 1.5 1 1.5 3 1.5 5 1.5
Reliance of local populations on subsurface aquifers 1 1.5 1 1.5 3 1.5 4 1.5
Avenues for spoil storage and disposal 2 1.5 2 1.5 4 1.125 3 1.5
Weighted Average Score 3.4 3.4 3.8 6 Transport Proximity to existing waste stores 4 1 4 1 1 1 2 1 Proximity to rail infrastructure 5 1 4 1 4 1 3 1 Proximity to road infrastructure 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 1 Proximity to airports 3 1 1 1 4 1 4 1 Proximity to ports 2 1 1 1 4 1 4 1 Weighted Average Score 3 2.2 3.4 3 Cost Facility cost 4 0.75 4 0.75 2 0.75 3 0.75 Weighted Average Cost Criteria Score 3 3 1.5 2.25 AVERAGE SCORE FOR EACH SET OF CRITERIA 4.5 4.6 4.4 5.4 Does the site pass the initial geological screening criteria? 1 1 1 1 What is the likelihood of the local council accepting the construction of a GDF? 0.80 0.85 0 0.75 Final Score 3.6 3.91 0 4.1 13 1.8 Conclusion From the decision matrix in section 1.7, the Sizewell location proves to be the best option for hosting the future geological disposal facility. Sizewell received a Score of 4.1 which is higher than the score received by Allerdale, Copeland and Romney Marsh. The Allerdale and Copeland sites had a lower score mainly due to their geological formation and the impact building the geological facility will have on tourism, with the Lake District National Park sited in Cumbria. West Cumbria has inconsistencies in the geological subsurface rock formations. There are also major aquifers in the area that are currently being exploited, creating a large exclusion area across West Cumbria. The variation in height of the land surface also means that the topography is unsuitable. The area of West Cumbria was supposedly known to be - basement under sedimentary cover (BUSC) ideally suitable to store radioactive nuclear waste beneath, however recent analysis has shown there are multiple fault zones in the structure of the rock, deeming the area unsafe to construct a repository (Smythe, 2011). Romney Marsh was not chosen from the decision matrix mainly due to social and political factors. Section 1.3.5 show that 63% of the local population was against the idea of having a geological disposal facility built in Kent. The social factor is a major issue as a geological disposal facility will only be put in a location where the local community has volunteered, which is why the social issue had a larger factor than any other issue in the decision matrix table. Romney Marsh is also prone to flooding which would require a substantial flood defence scheme to be conceived, adding to the cost and complexity of the operation of building the geological disposal facility. Sizewell is the location that has been chosen mainly due to its convenient location: It is in the South- East of England close to the sea, which is beneficial when looking at transport routes with being close to a port. The major negative impact about Sizewell was the impact Sizewell would have on tourism in the area. However, Since Sizewell already hosts two nuclear power stations and is planning to build another one; we decided it would not alter the area significantly.
14 2. Pre-Qualification exercise: Design Development 2.1 Introduction Sizewell was chosen as a result of the preliminary assessment of the suitability of all the potential sites that were proposed to host the geological disposal facility in Section 1 of the report. This section will look at the design of the geological disposal facility in Sizewell, both for the underground and surface facilities. An appropriate preliminary design and location for the surface facilities and underground facilities will be developed. More detailed design drawings will follow and will be produced on AutoCAD illustrating the civil/structural aspects of the GDF (surface facilities, waste transport and reception, underground access). The waste quantities that will need to be disposed of in the geological disposal facility will be explored in order to determine appropriate transport logistics for the operations of the facility. A Process flow Chart will be done for the emplacement of the waste from the port in Sizewell to the disposal area, as well as underground from the point of reception at the base of the drift tunnel to the respective storage areas of the waste packages underground.
2.2 Waste Quantities for Disposal The quantity of waste to be disposed of via geological disposal is a key consideration in the design of a geological disposal facility. In this section the data sources, assumptions and chosen waste quantities for the design of the geological disposal facility are presented. The reliability and accuracy of the chosen data sources is also explored. 2.2.1 Data Sources The two primary data sources that are utilised to determine the quantity of waste to be stored in a geological disposal facility are: the 2010 UK radioactive waste inventory and the 2010 estimate of waste for geological disposal. These documents were prepared by the NDA and DECC and can be viewed as the most accurate publicly available sources of information regarding the quantities of radioactive waste within the UK. A third document, Nirex Report N/085 was also used as a source of supplementary information regarding the packaging of the waste to be disposed of. 2.2.1.1 The 2010 UK Radioactive Waste Inventory (UKRWI) The UKWRI is the most recent inventory of what is currently classified as radioactive waste within the UK. The scope of the inventory extends to; HLW, ILW, LLW and some high volume low level waste (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011a). The inventory includes all currently existing waste and also estimates for waste which will arise in the future as a result of current processes. A break down is given of volumes of waste, volumes of waste when conditioned, volumes of waste when packaged and the resulting number of packages. Quantities of waste that exist and are predicted to arise are also given on a site by site basis for all nuclear sites around the UK. It is recognised that the UKWRI does not consider the following: Waste that would require disposal via the GDF route arising from the construction of new nuclear power stations in the future Spent fuel, Uranium and Plutonium is not currently considered waste and is therefore not included in the UKWRI Overpacking of HLW waste canisters for final disposal 2.2.1.2 The 2010 Estimate of Waste for Geological Disposal (EWGD) The EWGD provides a baseline inventory for geological disposal that is based on the UKWRI (see section: 2.2.1.1). The baseline inventory differs from the UKWRI in the respect that it reports the volume of radioactive waste and materials potentially destined for geological disposal (Department 15 of Energy and Climate Change, 2011b). The scope of the report also extends to the estimation of quantities of spent fuel, plutonium and uranium that may need to be disposed of via the GDF route. The EWGD also provides an upper inventory estimate. The upper inventory provides what is considered to be a realistic higher volume scenario (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011b). This higher volume scenario includes disposal of waste arising from eight new build nuclear reactors, the extended operation of existing nuclear reactors and the disposal of all defence uranium and plutonium via the geological disposal route. It is recognised that the EWGD has the following limitations: Waste quantities arising from a nuclear new build program is inherently uncertain since the AP 1000 and EPR reactor types, being considered for construction in the UK (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2011c), have never been tested Package numbers for each type of waste are not specified The upper inventory is based on a large number of assumptions 2.2.1.3 Nirex Report N/085 Nirex report N/085 is an inventory of all radioactive waste in the UK, prepared by Nirex, in 2003. The report details the packaging methods for various types of waste including; spent fuel, uranium and plutonium. Nirex report N/085 will only be used to derive information regarding the packaging of various types of waste. It is recognised that Nirex report N/085 has the following limitations: Does not consider how waste arising from new build reactors will be packaged Details speculative methods for the packaging of uranium and plutonium that have not yet been implemented 2.2.2 Assumptions In the preparation of this report a number of assumptions regarding the quantities of waste be stored have been made. The assumptions made are presented. 2.2.2.1 Nuclear New Build Program It is assumed that the nuclear new build program involving the construction of eight new reactors will go ahead. This assumption has been made in the context of shifting governmental policy towards nuclear power (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2012) (Harvey, 2012). 2.2.2.2 Spent Fuel, Uranium and Plutonium It is assumed that all spent fuel will eventually be disposed of via the GDF route. In light of the nuclear new build program assumptions made (see section 2.2.2.1) the upper inventory as specified in the EWGD is to be used as the final packaged volume. The 2010 baseline inventory for quantities of uranium and plutonium as given in the EWGD are to be used. This assumption was made on the basis that the majority of extra waste considered in the upper inventory is a result of the disposal of uranium and plutonium associated with nuclear defence activities. It is not considered likely that nuclear defence activities will cease within the anticipated time frame of the GDF. 2.2.2.3 Waste Quantity Conversions For planning purposes it is desirable to convert waste volumes to numbers of packages. Conversion factors for LLW, ILW and HLW have been derived based on the information taken from table A1.2 of the UKWRI (Appendix E). Conversion factors for spent fuel, uranium and plutonium have been derived based on information taken from table 5, table 12 and table 14 of Nirex report N/085 16 (Appendix F) The conversion factors were determined by dividing the packaged volume by the number of packages given in the relevant tables. The derived conversion factors to be used are: LLW 70.76 m 3 /package ILW 2.17 m 3 /package HLW 0.196 m 3 /package Spent Fuel 1.7 m 3 /package Uranium 0.580/3.30 m 3 /package Plutonium 0.890 m 3 /package It is recognised that these factors may vary for individual waste streams within each of the waste categories. It is, however, hoped that these global averages will provide a sufficiently accurate estimate for planning purposes. 2.2.3 Waste Quantities for Design The quantities of waste to be disposed of at the GDF are presented (Table.2).
Waste Type Final Packaged Volume for Disposal Including all Assumed Future Arising (m 3 ) Conversion Factor (m 3 /package) Total Number of Waste Packages LLW 150,000 70.76 2150 ILW 786,000 2.17 365,000 HLW 12,000 0.196 61,500 Spent Fuel 22,200 1.70 13,100 Uranium(1) 106,000 0.580/3.30 183,000/32,100 Plutonium 7,820 0.890 8,790 Table 5 - Final Packaged Waste Volume for Geological Disposal Considering All Future Waste Arising and Corresponding Package Numbers Note 1: It is not currently known how Uranium will be packaged for transport and disposal. Two methods have been suggested (Nirex, 2003), utilising the 500 litre drums and 3m 3 boxes. For planning purposes both methods were considered 2.2.4 Waste Locations for Design In order to determine the logistics of transporting waste to the GDF it is necessary to determine the distribution of radioactive waste around the UK. A spread sheet (Appendix G) was developed to determine the distribution of waste at various sites around the country. The basis of the spreadsheet was the UKWRI breakdown of waste quantities for each site around the UK (Appendix H). It was assumed that future LLW, ILW and HLW, not considered in the UKWRI, would be distributed around the UK in the same proportions as current waste. It is recommended that spent fuel, uranium and plutonium by conditioned and packaged at Sellafield. This recommendation was made on the basis that Sellafield already handles the reprocessing of spent fuel and therefore has the appropriate infrastructure. On this basis it is assumed that all spent fuel, uranium and plutonium must be transported from Sellafield to the GDF.
17 2.3 Transportation of Waste to Site 2.3.1 Modes of Transport As set out by the NDA (Nuclear Decomissioning Authority, 2010), there are three approved modes of transport that can be used to transfer nuclear waste to the chosen site at Sizewell. The approved modes of transport are rail, road and sea. Each method of transport has advantages and disadvantages, the strength of which will depend on the type and length of journey, and the amount of safety issues regarding the waste which is being transported. 2.3.1.1 Transport by Sea Sea transport is the most desirable method for transporting the nuclear waste, as it has been used successfully and safely worldwide for over 30 years (Nuclear Decomissioning Authority, 2010) One of the main benefits is the safety of the method of transport, as it will reduce the proximity of the waste to the human population. However, due to the level of handling required to allow ship transportation, it will be considered unfeasible to use this method unless the distance from the waste-producing site to the waste storage site is significant, and there is a large amount of waste to be transported. When these two conditions are satisfied, and the waste-producing site is situated within a reasonable distance to a port, sea transport will be selected as the method to transfer waste. 2.3.1.2 Transport by Rail Rail is the second most desirable method of transport for transferring the waste. It is considered a relatively safe mode of transport, although the waste is rarely kept away from the human population. The advantage of using the rail network for the transport of waste is that it requires significantly less handling in order to load and unload the train. It may still be feasible to transport smaller amounts of waste to the storage site, even over a larger distance. If there is no local or on-site port at the waste- producing site, rail will be chosen as the mode of transport. If there is no close or on-site railway station, the feasibility of the construction of a station will be considered, depending on the volume and nature of the waste produced at the site in question. 2.3.1.3 Transport by Road Road transport has been identified as the least favourable mode of transport to be used for the transfer of nuclear waste to the Sizewell site. It is seen as the least safe method, mainly due to the level of human influence that impacts upon each journey. Due to the safety issues involved with road transport, there are significant speed and routing restrictions for the use of this method of transport. It is estimated that around 45% of transport packages are likely to be too heavy for the use of road transport (Nuclear Decomissioning Authority, 2010). It is clear that some level of road transport will be required particularly for sites producing relatively low volumes of waste. Where there is no onsite railway or port facility it may be desirable to transport waste to nearby rail or port facilities by road. Road transport is also a feasible option for short journeys; however, it is unlikely that any waste producing sites will be sufficiently close to Sizewell for this to be viable. 2.3.2 Options for Transport For some waste-producing sites, more than one mode might be combined to create the most efficient transport route to the storage facility at Sizewell. The five combinations of modes that can be used are set out by the NDA as the following; (Nuclear Decomissioning Authority, 2012) 18 2.3.2.1 Option 1 Option 1 uses only rail transport to transfer waste. This option is only available for waste-producing sites with an on-site railway station. 2.3.2.2 Option 2 Option 2 again uses rail transport to transfer waste, but this option is for sites that do not have an on- site railway station, and so requires the use of HGVs vehicles and other road vehicles to get the waste to the railway network. 2.3.2.3 Option 3 Option 3 uses only road transport to transfer the waste to the GDF site. This option is available for all sites. 2.3.2.4 Option 4 Option 4 involves transport by sea. It is assumed that either the waste-producing site has an on-site or local port, and that rail transport will be used to and from sites where required. 2.3.2.5 Option 5 Option 5 again involves the use of transport by sea, with the use of road transport to and from sites as required. 2.3.2.6 Transport Option Preference Hierarchy Options 4 and 5 have been chosen as the most desirable options. Option 4 will be selected for any site with an existing onsite port. If a sufficiently large port exists within the locality of the waste producing site option 5 will be selected. Where no onsite or nearby port exists, options 1 or 2 will be chosen since rail transport has been identified as being lower risk than road transport. Option 3 will only be chosen when no other options are feasible since it is not possible to transport all packages by road and is also identified as the highest risk method of transport. 2.3.3 Selection of Modes of Transport for Existing Sites A total of 38 waste producing sites have been considered in the design waste quantity (see section 2.2.4 waste locations for design). Only sites producing significant quantities of waste destined for geological disposal will be considered for the purpose of this report. A site producing significant quantities of waste was deemed to be any site that the UKWRI reports as having a combined total of over 1000 packages (Appendix G Distribution of Waste Spreadsheet). The desired transport method for each of the sites producing significant quantities of waste has been determined based on the transport option preference hierarchy identified (Table.1).
Site Selected Option Justification AWE Aldermaston 2 The site it too far from the coast for option 4 or 5 to be practical. No on site rail link exists necessitating HGV transport to the nearby rail link in basingstoke. Berkeley 2 No local port means option 2 is the most viable transport mode for Berkeley. Bradwell 2 As Bradwell is so close to Sizewell, it would not be justified to use sea transport, so option 2 is the most viable. Calder Hall 4 Calder Hall is on the Sellafield site and can therefore utilize the onsite port to be constructed at Sellafield 19 Capenhurst 1 The onsite rail station at Capenhurst makes all rail transport the most desirable option. Dounreay 4 It is recommended that an onsite port be constructed to enable option 4 for the transport of waste to the GDF Dungeness 5 As Dungeness is near to the coast, option 5 is appropriate, with a number of local ports available, including Dover. Hartlepool 5 Option 5 can be used for Hartlepool, with local but not on-site ports available. Heysham 5 Option 5 can also be used for Heysham, with local ports available. Hinkley Point 2 There is no on site railway terminal, and no local port. Option 2 is the selected mode of transport for Hinkley Point. Hunterston 4 An onsite port exists at the Hunterston site enabling option 4 LLWR Drigg 5 Option 5 can be used for the LLWR in Cumbria, via the proposed on site port at Sellafield. Oldbury 2 The lack of an on-site port or rail terminal at the Oldbury power station means that option 2 is the most viable transport option for this site. Sellafield 4 Option 4 will be used for transport from the Sellafield site with an on- site port proposed for construction. Sizewell 3 As the Sizewell site is so close to the GDF, option 3 is a suitable transport mode. Torness 4 An onsite port exists at Torness making option 4 possible Trawsfynydd 3 Trawsfynydd nuclear power station is in an extremely remote location with no nearby ports and only local rail lines. Option 3 is the only feasible option without the construction of extensive new local infrastructure. Windscale 4 Windscale is on the Sellafield site and can therefore utilize the onsite port to be constructed at Sellafield Winfrith 2 Waste can be transported by road to the nearby Weymouth to London Waterloo rail line Wylfa 4 An onsite port exists at the Wylfa site. Option 4 is therefore viable. Table 6 - Selection of Transport Methods for Major Waste Producing Sites 2.3.4 Logistics and Delivery Rates The main challenge of siting a GDF in the east of England is facilitating the safe transportation of the large volume of waste arising at Sellafield to the GDF. A study has been undertaken to determine the logistics of this operation. The preferred transport option between Sellafield and the GDF has been identified as transport option 4 (section 2.3.2.4). Barrow-in-Furness is currently utilised as a port for waste being shipped overseas from Sellafield (Nuclear Decomissioning Authority, 2010). In light of the quantity of waste to be transferred to the GDF from Sellafield it was not felt to be sustainable to continue the use of Barrow- in-Furness. It was concluded that the construction of a port on the Sellafield site would lower the overall risk of the transport process and minimise the exposure of local residents to waste. It is also intended for an onsite port to be constructed at the GDF. 2.3.4.1 Transport Vessels The international maritime organisation requires that nuclear waste be transported using vessels that conform to the International Code for the Safe Carriage of Packaged Irradiated Nuclear Fuel, Plutonium and High-Level Radioactive Wastes on Board Ships (International Maritime Organisation, 2011). Pacific Nuclear Transport Limited (PNTL) currently operates a fleet of ships that conform to 20 these regulations (Appendix I). The specification assumed for ships transporting waste between Sellafield and the GDF (table 4) is based on those of the ships operated by PNTL.
Table 7 - Specification of Waste Transport Ships 2.3.4.2 Accident Rates and Risk Assessment It has been reported (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2001) that even if a transport ship is involved in a collision the risk of nuclear material being released into the environment is negligibly low. This is due to the extensive safety measures in place to prevent the release of hazardous material. It was, however, felt that even if a relatively modest incident were to occur the public perception of such an incident and the associated delays could have a serious impact on the project. A probabilistic risk assessment was conducted to determine the total risk of an incident occurring during the course a single journey from Sellafield to the GDF (Appendix J Transport Risk Calcs). It was found that the probability of an incident occurring per journey is 4.0x10 -4 . The delay to the transport process associated with an incident occurring is difficult to determine since it would depend on the severity and cause of the incident. To estimate the potential delay to the project a major national project, delayed due to an accident, was sought. The delay to the space shuttle program following the challenger disaster was found to be 3 years (National Geographic, 2012). It was felt that an incident involving the transport of nuclear waste would have a similar impact on the national psyche and require an enquiry of a similar length prior to reinitiating the process. 2.3.4.3 Summary of Logistics It is anticipated that the time frame for waste to be emplaced within the GDF will be approximately 150 years. The logistics of delivering waste to the site was calculated (Appendix K logistics calcs) based on this timeframe. Delays to the transport program resulting from incidents during transport were also included in the logistics calculations. The main outcomes of the logistics study are presented (table.5)
Table 8 - Summary of Transport Logistics
Length 110 meters Breadth 20 meters Draft 7 meters Speed 14 knots Max Number of Packages 20 Deadweight 5000 tonnes Average Number of Transport Vessels Arriving at the GDF per Week 4.5 Size of Transport Vessel Fleet 6 Maximum Number of Packages Delivered Per Week 92 Anticipated Number of Incidents During Waste Transport 12 21 2.4 Design specification: Development of the brief 2.4.1 Surface Facilities Need multiple Access underground via three vertical shafts and a drift tunnel Need separation of ventilation systems from operations Need Security of access in case of a default in shafts Operational Requirements: o Separate waste handling lines for ILW and HLW packages. o LLW and ILW inspection, monitoring and emplacing process to be designed to handle as maximum delivery rate of 92 packages per week (see section 2.3.4.3) o HLW inspection, monitoring and emplacing process to be designed to handle a maximum delivery rate of 9 packages per week. o A facility management centre to control both surface and subsurface activities with an unobstructed view of the entire site. o Security installations at all entrances o Medical services and Health Building o Food Service Building o Training Building o Visitor Centre o On site power generation system with redundancy o Fire house o Access Underground: Two Vertical Shafts for Ventilation One Vertical shaft for emergency (people access or could transport waste if one of the other tunnels cannot be used) 2 drift tunnels to Transport waste underground (Sorenson et al., 2008) (Nuclear Decomissioning authority, 2010) (Andra, 2010)
Construction Support Facilities: Building requirements o Construction Management Offices o Rock Crushing Facility (Including Crusher and Storage Area for Rock to be Crushed) o Connection between dispatch rail siding and rock crusher to transport material off site o Excavated Rock Stockpile: Minimum Capacity of 3500m 3 of Enclosed Storage Space o Fire/Rescue Station: Full Fire Station (with support for minimum of 3 engines) and Mines Rescue Capability o Buffer Material Plant: Produces buffer material for sealing subsurface storage areas 22 o Workshops and Storage areas for construction plant and materials. o Access Underground: 2 Vertical shafts for ventilation and emergency use 1 Drift tunnel for movement of plant and materials between surface and subsurface 2.4.2 Underground Operational Requirements Develop design for low strength sedimentary rock (Chalk) Provide storage for 150,000m 3 LLW (See Section: 2.2.3) Provide storage for 786,000m 3 ILW (See Section: 2.2.3) Provide storage for 12,000m 3 HLW (See Section: 2.2.3) Provide storage for 22,200m 3 SF (See Section 2.2.3) Design facility with the capability to expand tunnels for future storage use. Ensure minimum separation of 500m between different types of waste. Facility must not hinder nearby Sites of Scientific Interest. (Sorenson et al., 2008) 2.4.3 Waste Transport and Infrastructure Requirements Provide a port to accommodate four transport ships. (Approximate dimensions 110m long x 20m wide with min operating depth of 15 meters) Provide unloading and transfer system capable of unloading transport ships within 6 hours of arrival (based on assumed cargo of 18 packages per ship) Provide rail spur to connect GDF directly with Leiston rail spur Provide eight 240 meter long sidings to accommodate trains arriving and awaiting dispatch Provide parking space for 26 unloaded HGVs Provide space for 2 HGVs carrying waste packages awaiting approval to enter site. Provide unloading facility for one HGV Provide parking for 100 staff Provide parking for 20 visitors to the site 2.4.4 Safety Provide a robust flood defence scheme for the site Ensure all above ground building designs are compatible with seismic design guidance Minimise the exposure of local residents to waste packages. Provide multiple emergency access routes by road to the site. 23 2.4.5 Sustainability and environmental impacts Mitigate the visual impact of the surface facilities on the local communities of Sizewell and Leiston Optimise building designs to reduce whole life energy use, embodied carbon and use of non- renewable resources Surface facilities will not encroach on areas that have statutory protection (SSSIs and SACs) Maximise opportunities to maintain and improve local biodiversity. Ensure access to local community services is unaffected during and after construction Maximise the onsite use/reuse of excavated spoil to minimise the quantities that must be transported away from the site
2.5 Preliminary Design of Proposed Sites in Sizewell 2.5.1 Introduction Sizewell has been selected as the most favourable area for the siting of a GDF. The surface facilities represent a relatively small part of the overall GDF construction project. It will, however, be the surface facilities that project the image of the GDF to local communities and those visiting the site. The selection of an appropriate site and design for the surface facilities is therefore a critical design consideration. The area around the Sizewell nuclear power station is relatively constrained. Areas of environmentally protected land and areas already scheduled for the development of Sizewell C are not suitable for the siting of the GDF surface facilities (fig 6: overview map showing potential sites). Siting the surface facilities to cause minimum disruption to the local communities of Leiston, Eastbridge and Sizewell was also a key consideration. Two potentially suitable sites were identified for the siting of the surface facilities (fig 6: overview map showing potential sites). The constraints and opportunities associated with siting the surface facilities of the GDF on either of these two sites are explored. Preliminary designs for the surface facility layout are presented and analysed to determine the most promising site and layout for further development.
24 2.5.2 Location of Sites
SITE 1 SITE 2 Figure 6- Map of Sizewell 25 2.5.3 Constraints and Opportunities 2.5.3.1 Site 1 Site 1 is located to the North of the existing Nuclear reactors and extends to the edge of Minsmere Level (RSPB Nature Reserve). The site totals the required area of 1km 2 , consisting mainly of farmland, a small area of woodland (0.1km 2 (Google Earth, 2012)) and one residential property (Ash Wood Cottages). Located to the East of the site is a large area of land sitting on a flood plain. To the North of the site a farmhouse is situated close to the boundary, two residential properties and a small lane (Sandings Lane) to the West, and to the South is woodland and one residential property. The site is located over 2.5km away from Leiston centre (Google Earth, 2012). Locating the GDF within Site 1 would require the destruction of 0.1km 2 of woodland, the purchasing of 1 residential property, and potential for disruption to another 4. Excluding the aforementioned properties the surrounds would be largely unaffected. The site gently slopes from West to East starting at 15m AOD falling to 9m AOD, this shouldnt present too much of a challenge for the site layout. Road access to the site would either be from the West of the site via Sandings lane (which would need widening to cope with the traffic), or via the South of the site as an extension of the current access road to Sizewell A, B and ostensibly C. the site is situated approximately 1km away from the coast which would mean waste could feasibly be transported ashore. To connect the site by rail, an extension to the Leiston spur would require roughly 2km of new track to be laid. Extra site space could be found by extending the site to the North, encompassing Lower Abby Farm which is a Grade II listed building, and to the south where Sizewell C temporary works is to be situated. Lowe Abby Farm house could potentially be incorporated into the site without the need to demolish it. Site offices will be needed, and could provide the site with a touch of traditional character. 2.5.3.2 Site 2 Site 2 is located to the south west of the existing Sizewell A reactor. The site 2 has a total area of approximately 1-kilometer square. Sizewell Gap to the South, Lovers Lane to the West and Sandy Lane to the North border site 2. The Sizewell Belts SSSI borders the site to the Northeast. The majority of site 2 is currently used for agriculture. Approximately 20% of the site is covered by existing flora. It will prove necessary to remove the two areas of flora to the north of the site. These areas of flora are generally poorly developed and not under any specific protection. It is not anticipated that the tree line bordering the south of the site will need to be removed. It may prove beneficial to extend and develop this tree line to mitigate the visual impact of the site on the community of Leiston. It is only anticipated that a single private property within the area of Site 2 would need to be purchased as a result of the construction of the surface facilities. Thirteen private properties share a border with the site. The five properties on Sandy Lane will be the most severely affected. Site 2 slopes from the southwest to the northeast. The southwest boundary of the site is approximately 15 meters AOD whilst the northeast boundary is 0 meters AOD. A cut and fill operation will be necessary to develop a level construction platform. It may be possible to utilize this cut and fill operation to raise the surface facilities above flood level or lower the surface facilities below the sightline of local residences. The current access road to Sizewell A and B passes through Site 2. It may also be possible to develop further paths of entrance and egress to the site from the bordering roads. A direct path between the Sizewell C construction site and Site 2 is not possible due to the presence of the Sizewell Belts SSSI. The eastern edge of the site is within approximately 300 meters of the coast making a direct route between a potential mooring and the site possible. It would only require a minimal length extension to the Leiston rail spur to provide a direct rail route into Site 2. 26 Leiston Common and Reckham Pits Wood are not designated as protected areas and it may prove possible to extend Site 2 into this area if necessary. It is undesirable to construct on this area since it is a popular area for recreation. It would also necessitate the compulsory purchase and demolition of five properties. 2.5.4 Conceptual layouts for Surface Facilities Four conceptual drawings for surface facility layout were done for this report. Two conceptual layouts for Site 1 and another 2 layouts were done for site 2. A more clear drawing of the two sites are presented in the two figures below showing the area that is possible to build on. All the layout drawings were performed on AutoCAD. After the drawings were done, a decision matrix table was filled for each site in order to identify the best possible site that this could host the geological disposal facility based on several criteria, as shown in Table 9
2.5.4.1 Surface Facilities layout The conceptual surface facility layout drawings are presented (Fig 9 - Drawing No. 01/03)
Figure 7- Site 1 area Figure 8- Site 2 area Construction Area Waste Handling Area Operations Area Road Waste Entrance Equipment Storage Link to Existing Road Network Link to Port Secondary Access Visitor Center Security road, site fence, spoil screening bonds and tree border Flood embankment Rail Sidings Construction Location 1 - Potential Layout 1 Operations Area Operations Area Waste Handling Area Equipment Storage Construction Area Construction Access 1 Operations Area Staff Access Waste Access Construction Access 2 Secondary Access Fire House Flood embankment Location 1 - Potential Layout 2 Waste Handling Area DT 1 DT 2 Construction Area Operations Area Waste Access Point Link to National Rail Network Link to Port Construction Access Point Staff Access Point Existing Road Flood Embankment Location 2 - Potential Layout 1 Waste Handling Area including DT Operations Area Construction Area Link to National Rail Network Link to Port Staff Car Park Existing Road Rail Sidings HGV's Parking Construction Access Point Flood Embankment Waste Access Point Slope Note: Site Founded at +5mAOD Location 2 - Potential Layout 2 28 2.5.4.2 Decision Matrix The decision matrix that got the highest score is shown below in Table 9. This matrix corresponds to Location 1- Potential Layout 2 in the surface facility layouts in section 2.5.4.1. For reference, the other sites decision matrices that obtained lower scores are in appendix L.
Design Option 2 On Site 1 (Romain) Description Separation of the site between the construction/waste handling area and the operations area Site far away from Leiston Site location very close to Sizewell C and port on the East side Embankment on East side of the site and waste coming in from South-East side (minimizing transport distance from port to surface facilities) Guard tower in middle of the site to ensure security of the site Design Criteria Max Score Awarded Justification Provide infrastructure with the capacity to deliver up to 2500 waste packages per year 5 5 Links provided to road, rail and sea. Provide eight 240 meter rail sidings 5 4 Space provided for the railway sidings. May be constrained by proximity to the Sizewell C site Provide flood defense to the site 5 5 Flood embankments provided. Site founded at 10m AOD therefore naturally above the flood level Minimise the exposure of local residents to waste packages 10 8 Waste handling areas and transfer of waste from port will is located as far as possible from residential areas. Multiple emergency access routes to the site 5 5 Four access routes provided to numerous areas of the site. How well is the visual impact of the surface facilities mitigated through the proposed site layout and landscape design 10 6 No specific landscaping features to minimise visual impacts. Support facilities (which could be designed to be architecturally pleasing) are situated on the boundary with Eastbridge How serious are any impacts the proposed development has on areas of land that have statutory protection 5 3 Flood defenses may have an impact on the Minsmere Level SSSI. Maximise opportunities to maintain and improve local biodiversity 5 2 Limited replanting of trees within the site Ensure access to local community services is unaffected during and after construction 5 2 Construction of link to Leiston rail spur will cause long term disruption to a number of local roads and properties. Maximise the onsite use/reuse of excavated spoil 5 3 Construction of embankments using the spoil. Minimise the overall cost of the project to achieve value for money 10 7 No specific features of the design would disproportionately alter cost in comparison to other potential designs. Total Score 70 50 Principle Advantages of Option: Distance of the site from Leiston. Distance of the waste handling facilities and link to port from Eastbridge. Connection with Sizewell C site. Clear division between construction and operational facilities and the support facilities.
Recommendations Develop measures to minimise the visual impacts of the site on the community of Eastbridge Develop the rail link to the Leiston rail spur Explore potential methods of enhancing local biodiversity as a result of the scheme Table 9: Decision matrix- Site 1 29 2.5.5 Conceptual layouts for Underground Facilities Six conceptual layouts for the underground facilities have been developed and are presented in Appendix M. The analysis of each of the options against the general design criteria is presented in the design matrix format. Upon selecting the conceptual layout for the underground facilities, weaknesses identified in the table will be used to make improvements in the detailed design. 2.5.5.1 Decision Matrix The decision matrix that obtained the highest score is shown below in Table 10. The conceptual design for site D is the design that will be used for the detailed design. For reference, the decision matrices of the other conceptual designs that obtained lower scores are in Appendix N. Table 10- Decision Matrix: underground layout D Design Option D Description Vertical access shafts are located at the center of the facility. Three adjacent areas extending North of the center point will be used to store HLW and SF. ILW is to be stored in linear arrangements to the south of the access shafts. Drift tunnel entrances are located at the two separate zones. Design Criterion Max Score Awarded Provide separate ILW/HLW emplacement vaults at a distance 500m apart. 5 4.5 Provide adequate area for locating essential services, including: Package Transfer , Reception/Marshalling area; Buffer Store, Spoil bunker, Forklift garage etc. 5 3.5 Maximise space usage of area 5 4.5 Minimise construction complexities associated with facility design 5 5 Minimise excavation of spoil from construction 5 3.5 Minimise overall length of transport and service tunnels 5 2.5 Maximise length of deposition tunnels 5 4.5 Ensure second drift tunnel can undergo construction/excavation whilst waste transfer can simultaneously be in operation. take place simultaneously 5 3 Provide two strategically located drift tunnels 5 4 Potential for future expansion 5 3.5 Creativity in design 10 1.5 Total Score 60 40
30 2.6 Emplacement Process A process for emplacing waste arriving at the GDF has been developed. Flow charts have been developed showing all of the stages between waste arriving at the site and being finally placed underground. The process has been developed based on available information regarding the checking and handling requirements for waste arriving at the site. The amount of time required to emplace a package has also been examined. The timings and peak package delivery rate will be used to calculate the number of handling facilities required. 2.6.1 Surface Handling Processes 2.6.1.1 Sea The maximum number of stillages that can be carried on a ship at one time is 18. To accommodate the amount of waste which is projected to arriving at Sizewell, 3 ships per week will be needed. Each stillage will arrive preloaded on a wagon. 2.6.1.2 Unloading When the ship arrives all of the stillages will be unloaded. The first 6 will be attached to a shunting wagon and transported to the site. The process will be repeated with the rest of the packages as and when the next batches are unloaded. The speed on this track will be limited for safety reasons 2.6.1.3 Site check in Each container will be checked with the consignment documentation before being allowed to enter the site. There will be sufficient sidings to hold a 1 week supply of rail wagons. 2.6.1.4 Waste Package Transfer Facility Prior to dispatch rigorous method of inspection will be employed to the packages to ensure the safety, nature and quantity are recorded. Once the packages arrive on site they will be cross-checked with the data obtained prior to dispatch. As the stillages enter the facility the lid will be removed to carry out radiological measurements and a visual inspection. Each package will then have to be removed and inspected - with measurements (dimensions and weight) of the packages taken - to confirm that no damage has occurred in transit. If there any discrepancies or damage to the packages they will be moved to one of two shielded temporary storage areas and later moved to be the maintenance facility for repair or repackaging. It is essential that an automated recovery unit is incorporated in the design so that in the event of any damage no human involvement is needed. 2.6.1.5 Drift Tunnel The waste packages will be loaded onto a drift wagon to be transported underground for emplacement.
31 2.6.2 Surface Facility Process Flow Chart
Figure 10- Process Flow chart 32 All waste The drift connects all surface waste transfer facilities to the underground disposal facilities. The entrance to the drift will consist of a building where operational personnel and drift wagons containing waste packages are located prior to being transported underground. Additionally, the drift will serve for air ventilation intake as well as exportation of liquid effluent. 2.6.3 Underground Handling Processes (Nuclear Decomissioning Authority, 2010)
LLW LLW packages would be off- loaded from the drift wagons by an overhead crane and transferred to the LLW temporary storage area. Before the number of packages in temporary storage reaches capacity, the waste packages are relocated to create space and allow additional waste from above ground to be received. At this time, LLW packages are transferred to the vault for disposal. The 4m x 2m containers are stacked in arrays one wide and three tall inside the vault. Emplacement begins at the rear end of the vault using an electric powered forklift and progressively makes its way back towards the entrance. A forklift garage will be located near the entrance of each vault for disposal and will be used to store the vehicle when not in use as well as being used as a maintenance area.
ILW ILW packages would be off- loaded from the drift wagons by an overhead crane and transported to the inlet cell for processing and monitoring before being transferred to the disposal vault. At the inlet cell waste packages will either be sent to the buffer store or onto the inlet cell processing line. Here waste packages enter the containment booth for monitoring. Once the waste packages are checked they are transported onto a bogie to the entrance of the vault. At the entrance to the vault an overhead crane emplaces each waste package in stacks of three wide and five high. Nearby the entrance to the disposal tunnel there is a separated area designated for the maintenance of transfer bogies and overhead cranes used for the emplacement of ILW. The maintenance support area will feature a decontamination zone and monitoring area. HLW/SF HLW and SF canisters will be transported underground in a specialised disposal canister transport container, known as a DCTC. The DCTC is transported to a transfer hall before being transferred to the disposal tunnel reception area. At the transfer hall shock absorbers, used to prevent damage to the canister during the descent, are removed from the DCTC. The HLW/SF canisters are then removed from the DCTC behind shielded doors within the reception area. Operators inspect the canister for any signs of damage from the reception area using CCTV equipment installed within the shielded area between the reception area and the entrance to the disposal tunnel. Once confirmation of no signs of damage to the canister has been received, it is then transferred onto a trolley for disposal in the tunnel. During this phase, the DCTC is returned to the transfer hall for monitoring and decontamination (if necessary) before being sent back to the surface for subsequent delivery. The canister is then laid horizontally upon a pre-placed bentonite block within the disposal tunnel. A mobile bentonite hopper containing pre- compacted bentonite pellets backfills the tunnel. This process is repeated at 3m separations for the emplacement of each HLW/SF canister. Additional support facilities The following support facilities will be found in the vicinity of the LLW/ILW area to check levels of contamination to groundwater: Effluent receipt/dispatch cell To collect liquid effluent arising from active areas. Sampling laboratory - To check for concentrations of radioactivity in collected groundwater. 33 2.7 Detailed design 2.7.1 Surface Facility The conceptual design of the surface facilities was developed into a final layout for the site during the operational phase of the GDF. It is envisaged that buildings such as administration, health monitoring and training will be of a standard commercial design. The waste handling building is, however, a unique building type specific to the GDF. A scheme design of the waste handling buildings was also developed. Construction issues are also examined. 2.7.1.1 Operational Site Layout An operational site layout (Fig.11 Drawing No. 02/03) was developed for the surface facilities. This represents the configuration of the site during the process of waste emplacement.
Drift Transport Maintenance Management Center Excavated Material Storage Rock Crusher Fire and Rescue Administration Plant Storage and Maintenance Construction Management Effluent Treatment Plant Visitors Center Staff Carpark Training Center Medical Center HGV PARK Buffer Material Handling Plant ILW Transfer Station 2 HLW Transfer Station ILW Transfer Station 1 To Road Improvements Drift Tunnel Drift Tunnel Package Maintenance Top of Bund +20m AoD Vertical Shaft Exits Top of Bund +10m AoD Top of Bund +10m AoD Administration Construction Facilities Drift Tunnel Entrances Process Management Waste Handling Facilities Repair & Maintenance Facilities Drift Train Routes Train Routes Bund Site Road Security Perimeter Site Boundary Material Conveyor Guard Tower Vertical Shaft Exits 35 The site is separated into waste handling, construction and administrative support facility areas. Three road and two rail access points into the site are provided. One road and one rail access point are specifically for the reception of transporters carrying waste. The waste handling facilities are screened from the surrounding area, and the rest of the site, by a series of bunds. A large 1.6km bund running west-east to the north of the site will also provide flood protection to the entire GDF surface site and the Sizewell C nuclear power station site. It was found during the detailed design phase that the surface facilities will require a smaller area of land than originally estimated. The land to the west of the site, which is not utilised, will provide a buffer zone within the security perimeter. This land will also be landscaped to minimise the visual impact of the surface facilities. 2.7.1.2 Construction Phase Site Layout A layout has been developed for the site during the initial construction period (Appendix O Drawings) when the drift tunnels and surface facilities will be constructed. Land directly to the south of the site is to be utilised during the construction of Sizewell C. The initial construction period of the GDF will commence after the completion of Sizewell C and it is hoped that the use of this construction area can be extended to the construction of the GDF. Once the initial construction period is complete this area of land will be returned to its original condition, as is currently intended once Sizewell C is complete (British Energy, 2008). 2.7.1.3 Waste Reception and Handling Facilities Three waste reception and handling facilities are provided (Appendix O Drawing No. 02/04 and 02/05). Two of the facilities will handle LLW and ILW. It was felt necessary to separate the HLW handling facility due to the increased risks associated with handling HLW. Each facility is divided into a number of 9 meter wide lanes (fig 12 sketch of section). Each waste handling facility also has a separate lane for the over packing of damaged waste packages. Each lane is serviced by an overhead crane with a safe working load of 80 tonnes. The crane is supported by 6 meter high reinforced concrete walls running parallel to the lane. The walls will serve the dual purpose of providing shielding to the lane. A lightweight steel structure will be provided to enclose waste handling lanes. The lightweight steel structure will be designed to be easily demountable. This will enable external crane access to the waste handling lane in the event of a mechanical breakdown or handling incident within the lane. Local borehole records indicate a 3-meter thick layer of peat beneath the site). In light of the significant quantity of spoil already generated by the construction of the GDF it was not deemed reasonable to generate further spoil by removing the peat from the entire site. A piled foundation solution was developed to transfer the building loading to the more competent sand strata at depth. 2.7.1.4 Port A port providing berthing for four waste transport ships is to be constructed (Appendix O Drawings). The port comprises two standard length piers extending 125 meters from the coast. Rail tracks have been provided on both of the piers with the intention of utilising a roll on roll off loading and unloading. The roll on roll off unloading method was selected, over the use of a crane system, since it will minimise the risk associated with unloading and also reduce the visual impact of the port facility. The port is to be used for the entire project lifecycle of the GDF. To ensure robustness a solid pier structure with gravity retaining walls was selected. 36 2.7.2 Underground Facilities A detailed design of the underground facility was developed based on the conceptual design of site D shown in Appendix M. The detailed design (Fig 12) illustrates that the underground facility is separated into two sections: The high level waste and spent fuel area to the left of the drawing and the ILW and LLW area to the right of the drawing. The reason for the large difference in surface area between the two different sections is because high level and spent fuel are disposed of in individual canisters and a minimum spacing of 3m between each canister is required. The section storing the ILW and LLW has a smaller surface area as the packages will get stacked with no separation requirement. There is a 600m separation between the HLW/Spent fuel area and the ILW/LLW area. This is a requirement set by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. There are two drift tunnels in this underground facility. One drift tunnel will be used for construction to transport construction materials and equipment down to the underground facility and the second drift tunnel will be used for transferring waste underground. Both drift tunnels are located in between the ILW/LLW storage area and HLW/Spent fuel storage area (label 15 and 16 on plan drawing). One vertical access shaft will enable the transfer of personnel down to the underground facility which is located centrally between the two disposal areas. There is a maintenance support facility for ILW and LLW that will ensure the maintenance of the mechanical/support equipment used to transfer waste package to their storage area. There is one vertical shaft for ventilation intake between the two disposal areas and one at the end of the HLW disposal area. Throughout the HLW disposal area, there are staff safe rooms in the event of emergencies. This is a safety measure that complies with the risk assessment proposed control measure on fire. These rooms will be a place of safe refuge and contain survival equipment. The shape of the Geological Disposal facility has been chosen to maximize the use of space as well to have a clear separation between the HLW/Spent fuel area and the ILW/LLW area. Dimensions of the cross sectional size of each type of tunnel was initially assumed based upon figures given in the NDA geological disposal facility report. These were then used to calculate the length of the disposal tunnels, transport tunnels and disposal vaults (Appendix R). It was then possible to design the layout of the facility. The total volume of spoil produced from underground excavations was then calculated (Appendix P). 2.7.2.1 Underground Facility detailed design The underground facility detailed design is presented in (fig 12- Drawing No. 03/01).
4890 m 800 m 800 m 5900 m 600 m 800 m HLW/SF Deposition Area 1 HLW/SF Deposition Area 2 HLW/SF Deposition Area 3 HLW/SF Deposition Area 4 HLW/SF Deposition Area 5 HLW/SF Deposition Area 6 100 m 100 m 5820 m 1 2 3 4 5 6 Detail A Underground Facilities Layout Detail B 9 9 9 10 11 12 10 13 14 15 16 7 8 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 24 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 Key 1 LLW Deposition Area 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 LLW Deposition Area 2 ILW Deposition Area 1 ILW Deposition Area 2 ILW Deposition Area 3 ILW Deposition Area 4 Drift Tunnel Entrance 1 Drift Tunnel Entrance 2 9 HLW/ SF Transfer Halls 10Inlet Cell/ Buffer Store/ Processing Line 11Effluent Reciept/ Dispatch area and sampling lab 12Maintenance Support Facility 13Forklift Garage 14LLW temporary storage area 15 Drift Tunnel 1 Surface Entrance 16Drift Tunnel 2 Surface Entrance 17Drift Tunnel 1 18Drift Tunnel 2 19 HLW/SF Emplacement Tunnel 20HLW/SF Transport Tunnel 21LLW/ILW Emplacement Vault 22LLW/ILW Transport Tunnel 23Staff Safe room in case of fire 24Access / Ventilation Shaft 38 2.7.3 Construction of the Underground Facilities and Backfilling Tunnelling and underground excavation are high risk activities and therefore require robust safety management arrangements throughout the length of the project. Project leaders will therefore establish plans and co-ordinate activities according to the most recent Construction Design Management and Nuclear Installations Inspectorate Regulations. 2.7.3.1 Excavation methods Subsurface facilities are to be constructed by a combination of two methods of excavation which include drilling and blasting as well as using tunnel boring machines. The choice of excavation method depends primarily upon tunnel length, the speed of construction and the associated cost. Tunnel boring machines generally have a high capital cost, however as they are able to excavate a greater volume of material than the traditional drill and blast method the cost per metre of tunnel boring machines is less. Consequently it is more cost efficient to use tunnel boring machines to excavate longer tunnels and more economical to excavate shorter tunnels by drill and blast. Therefore the underground transport tunnels and disposal vaults will be constructed using tunnel boring machines and the vertical shafts and drift tunnels will be excavated by drill and blast (Kolymbas, 2005). 2.7.3.2 Construction Process According to the 2010 NDA geological disposal facility design report, access to the underground facilities is estimated to continue up to 10 years before being able to accept nuclear waste for disposal from the surface. Construction of the underground facilities would begin with the excavation of the vertical shafts and drift tunnels. Upon completion of the drift tunnels a rail system will be installed in order to deliver construction materials underground for further excavation. At a depth of approximately 500m below the ground surface the main underground transport tunnels would be excavated with tunnel boring machines. Transport tunnels, disposal vaults and all support facilities in the vicinity of the ILW/LLW area will be constructed first. Following the completion of construction in this area, emplacement of waste packages will take place whilst excavation of the HLW/SF transport tunnels and disposal tunnels transpires simultaneously. At this point during the construction and emplacement of the waste, one drift tunnel will transport construction materials in/out of the facility whilst the second drift tunnel is used to transport ILW/LLW waste packages for disposal. Once support services for the HLW/SF area have been constructed, emplacement of HLW and SF canisters will begin whilst the on-going construction of the HLW/SF part of the facility takes place. Cross-sectional profiles of all waste disposal tunnels can be found in Appendix O (Drawing No. 03/03). The design of the vertical shafts and drift tunnels are based upon those determined by Nagra - the French Agency for the Disposal of Nuclear Waste. The vertical shafts have a diameter of 8m and extend 500m deep into the Earth, whereas the drift tunnels have a diameter of 5.5m wide and a total length approximately 3.3km long. During the drilling and blasting of the vertical shafts and drift tunnels, strict control measures will be maintained to ensure minimal damage is caused to the surrounding rock. Rock support will be used throughout to prevent ground movement and minimise the excavated disturbed zone by providing rock bolts, steel meshing and a surface of shotcrete. The design of the excavation will ensure as far as is reasonably practicable, that tunnels require minimal maintenance. The vertical shafts and upper 300m of each of the drift tunnels will be supported by a hydrostatic lining and nominal concrete lining to prevent the ingress of water. Although the influx of groundwater into low strength sedimentary rock is low, at depths of 500m, flow into open tunnels fluctuates due to the artificial high hydraulic gradient. Adequate ventilation and drainage will be designed to prevent deterioration to the hydrostatic and concrete lining that may result over time. 2.7.3.3 Backfilling Disposal vaults/tunnels, transport tunnels and underground infrastructure will be progressively backfilled upon the storage of waste packages. Backfilling will take place in modules/banks of disposal vaults/tunnels. For each of the ILW/LLW and HLW/SF parts of the underground layout, 39 there are 6 modules/banks of disposal tunnels/vaults (Section 2.7.2.1). Only after all the disposal tunnels/vaults have been filled with waste packages for a particular module, will backfilling begin. Storing and backfilling waste in this way acts as a safe measure so that waste can be easily retrieved if necessary before final disposal. ILW/LLW vaults will be backfilled and sealed with cementitious grout and HLW/SF disposal tunnels will be backfilled with pre-compacted bentonite pellets. The process of closure involves local and peripheral backfilling. Local backfill involves filling the space around and in the immediate vicinity of waste packages; peripheral backfill involves filling the void between the waste stacks and the walls of the disposal vaults. Upon the completion of tunnel backfilling, it is to be determined whether the vertical shafts, transport tunnels and drift tunnels will be mass backfilled. It is assumed, according to the NDA geological disposal report, mass backfilling will comprise of approximately 70% sand (crushed rock spoil) and 30% bentonite. (Nuclear Decomissioning Authority, 2010). 2.7.3.4 Spoil Management The excavation of the underground facilities will result in the production of 11,150,000 m 3 of spoil (Appendix P). A plan for the management of the excavated spoil has been developed (table.11) and the volumes of spoil that are to be disposed of by the various methods was calculated (Appendix Q). Where possible the spoil is to be utilised during the construction of the surface earthworks. Spoil will also be utilised for the construction of flood defences that have been proposed to the north of the Minsmere nature reserve (Environment Agency, 2009).
Disposal Route Volume (m 3 ) Percentage of Total Volume Construction of Bunds 2,269,500 20.4% Construction of Port 211,799 1.9% Management of tidal flood risk at Minsmere site. 300,000 (1) 2.7% To be recycled as backfill 5,575,000 50.0% Disposed of off Site 2,793,701 25.0% Table 11 - Spoil Management Strategy Note(1): Approximately 25% of the excavated spoil will be disposed of through the construction of the surface facilities and a local flood defence scheme. It is anticipated that 50% of all of the material excavated will be used as backfill once the packages have been emplaced
2.8 Method Statement The following table will provide a brief description of the work that needs to be undertaken for the construction of the geological disposal facility together with the associated construction hazards. Each hazard will be given a hazard reference number that will be used in the risk assessment section in section 2.9. The hazards for the construction of the surface facility buildings will not be included as these are standard building construction hazards that are not specific to the construction of the geological disposal facility. The hazards related to the direct construction of the underground area and the access drifts tunnels will be explored in this table and referred to in the risk assessment form.
Item of Work Brief description of Work Brief Description of principal hazards Hazard ref. no Support Facilities/ Setting out 1. Site Clearance and Leveling 2. Set up site; Install site fencing and security gates to keep members of public away from the site + mark out dirt roads 3. Mark out rock disposal area on site 4. Build parking space for construction vehicles and workers personal vehicles 5. Build Power Generator 6. Build Equipment Storage Area 7. Build Office Building 8. Build Food Services Building 9. Build Firehouse 10. Build Medical building 11. Build Decontamination building Waste Facilities 12. Excavation of Drift Tunnel for ILW
Compromise to ventilation Vehicle collision with personnel underground Fumes (drill & Blast) Fire Tunnel collapse during operation/ Tunnel collapse during construction Electrocution Groundwater flooding tunnels during excavation Loss of power in underground area Radioactive contamination of personnel
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 13. Excavation of 3 vertical shafts for Ventilation 14. Excavate vault/disposal area for ILW 15. Excavation of Drift Tunnel for HLW 16. Excavation of 3 vertical shafts for Ventilation 17. Excavate vault/disposal area for HLW 18. Build ILW checking facility 19. Build HLW checking facility 20. Building Waste logging facility Table 12- Method Statement
41
2.9 Risk Assessment The method statement in the previous section identified 10 principal hazards with their respective hazard reference number. This section will create a risk assessment on each hazard identifying their likelihood and severity. Control measures will be put forward for each for the hazards in order to mitigate the risks associated with each hazard.
The Likelihood and Severity are multiplied together to produce a risk product. The risk product gives a good indication of the overall risk associated with each of the hazards. It is important that the hazards with the greatest risk product are given close attention to and the proposed control measures are taken into account by the contractors on site in order to have a safe construction of this geological disposal facility.
Hazard
LIKELIHOOD (L) SEVERITY (S) Risk Product (RP = L x S) Proposed Control Measures 1. Compromise to ventilation 1.5 5 7.5 Ensure contractors on site are aware of evacuation plans and procedures. Have clearly marked out emergency routes underground that lead to fresh air bases where fresh oxygen supply can be found.
Ensure that the ventilation systems have regular maintenance and monitoring
Ensure ventilation systems have a built-in alarm system that can notify the workers in case the ventilation systems have been compromised 2. Vehicles collision with personnel underground 2 5 10 Maximise the use of conveyor belts underground where possible
Ensure that workers are equipped with high visibility jacket and the lighting is sufficient underground 3. Fumes (Drill & Blast) 3.5 3 10.5 Ensure that the geology in understood before drilling into the rock
Ensure emergency routes to safe rooms are clearly marked out 4. Fire
4 5 20 Ensure surface fire station is operating at all times and local fire suppression equipment are also present underground
Have clearly marked out emergency routes that lead to safe room which are fire proof Ensure any point underground has two different emergency routes so that if one route is blocked due to fire, the other route can be used.
Ensure alarm monitoring system is in operation and working. Have a fire drill regularly to keep contractors aware of the emergency procedures
5. Tunnel Collapse during excavation/ rock fall 4 3 12 Ensure all workers underground are equipped with hard hats
Ensure emergency routes are clearly marked out for trapped personnel
Ensure small medical facility is present underground to assist any injured worker 6. Tunnel Collapse during operation/ rock fall 1.5 4.5 6.75 7. Electrocution 2 4 8 Ensure that all equipment to be used underground have passed the safety checks
Ensure workers are briefed about the risks of handling electric equipment when in contact with water 8. Groundwater flooding tunnels during excavation 4 4.5 18 Ensure there is appropriate drainage and channelling on surface around drift 9. Loss of Power in underground area 3.5 2.5 8.75 Have a back-up power generator on site that can provide the required electricity for lighting and mechanical conveyor belts underground
10. Radioactive contamination of personnel 1 5 5 Ensure that the worker is treated immediately in decontamination rooms that are location on the surface 3. Prequalification Exercise: Post-Closure
3.1 Post Closure Management Due to the long lasting nature of the waste to be stored at the GDF it is necessary to consider the management of the facility for a period of thousands of years after the emplacement of the final packages of waste. The post closure management of the facility has been split in to two sections; near term post closure and long-term post closure. Near term post closure considers potential uses for the site after the emplacement of the final packages of waste when the surface facilities are no longer required. In the context of this project near term refers to a period of approximately 150 years after the emplacement of the final waste packages. The long-term post closure management strategy considers the management of the facility for the entire time period that the disposed waste is potentially hazardous. Considering the safe management of the facility over such an extended time period is outside of the normal scope of human consideration and must be given special attention.
3.2 Near Term Post Closure After the emplacement of the final packages of waste within the GDF the surface facilities will no longer be needed. Developing a strategy for the management of the site after the closure of the underground facilities ensures the long-term sustainability of the project. 3.2.1 Considered Near Term Post Closure Uses Following the closure of the underground facilities a use for the surface facilities must be identified. Whilst makers and information centres, that form part of the extreme long term management strategy, will be present on the site it will still be possible to utilise the vast majority of the site. A number of options are presented for the post closure use of the surface facility land. In the operational and decommissioning stage the GDF facilities will be managed by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority through the Managing Radioactive Waste Safely Directorate (Nuclear Decomissioning Authority, 2012) . Post closure MRWS will no longer be required to manage the site and an alternative management institution must be identified.
43 Considered Use Management Institution Advantages Disadvantages Centre for Nuclear Education Government The history of the site would enhance the status of such a facility
Such a facility may not be economically viable in the long term Much of the operational infrastructure would become redundant Rail and Locomotive Maintenance Facility Private Company Sidings and locomotive maintenance facilities will already exist on the site from the operational phase
Site has a direct link to the national rail network Sizewell is not in a prime location to service the majority of the national rail network
Cargo Management Facility Private Company Presence of large rail sidings and a port would minimise the need for additional infrastructure The basic need for the management of cargo will exist for at least the foreseeable future Such a facility may have significant negative environmental impacts on the local area
Ministry of Defence Depot Government Infrastructure will be in place to meet the needs of a depot facility An MoD presence on the site will provide enhanced security to the drift tunnel entrances The MoD or a similar organisation under government control will exist for at least the foreseeable future Such a facility may have negative environmental impacts on the local area Nature Reserve Government/Government Regulated Company Minsmere level nature reserve is directly adjacent to the site
Would be a positive influence on the local environment Considerable alterations necessitated during the construction of the GDF would make the establishment of a nature reserve challenging Infrastructure developed for the GDF would become redundant Table 14- Considered Near Term Post Closure Uses 44
3.2.2 Recommended Near Term Post Closure Use The recommended near term post closure use is a military depot. It was felt that the infrastructure serving the site specifically suited the construction of a depot. It was also felt that a government institution, such as the MoD is likely to survive in the long term where a private business may not.
3.3 Long Term Post Closure Management Approaches A number of approaches that address the issue of managing the GDF over the many thousands of years the waste remains hazardous have been suggested. An assessment of each of the methods is made and a recommendation for the long-term management strategy at the Sizewell GDF is made. 3.3.1 Passive Institutional Control The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico researched the best way to pass on the knowledge and dangers of the repository in the long run. The primary purpose of the PICs programme is to provide a permanent record that identifies the location of the repository and its dangers. (Department of Energy, 2004). PICs generally involve the construction of multiple monuments, information centres and markers around the site. Designing the inscription to be intelligible by people in the far distant future is a major challenge. An analogous situation is the attempts that were made to design a plaque, intelligible to an alien species, during the NASA pioneer project (National Space Administration, 2007). Despite the ingenuity of these messages there are still numerous criticisms regarding the ability of a totally alien race, or indeed distant future generation, to interpret them (Bellows, 2005). 3.3.2 Active Institutional Control Active Institution Control is seen as a short term concept. These are methods that need to be implemented by personnel such as good archives and security (fencing, gates, and guards). Active institutional controls have been adopted as the preferred method after the closure of the Onkalo repository in Finland (Nolin, 1993). A brief inspection of history would suggest that most institution, such a; kingdoms, sheikdoms and democracies, do not last for extremely extended periods of time. It is therefore easy to question the sustainability of active institutional controls in the long run. It has, however been argued (Tonn, 2001) that it is possible to design an institution that will last for the required time period. 3.3.3 Total Abandonment With accidental discovery being unlikely abandoning the facility, to be lost, offers security via secrecy. If all traces of the repository up to 50 meters below ground level were removed it is difficult to envisage a scenario that would lead to the accidental discovery of the facility. A major criticism of the total abandonment approach is the apparent paradox of always remembering to forget (Into Eternity , 2010). Allowing knowledge of the repository to be lost also raises issues regarding our generations responsibility to those in the future (Vial, Unknown). 3.3.4 The Communities Legacy The community legacy concept is based on adding value to local communities which forms a long lasting a durable bond between the community and the repository (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2007). The concept of the rolling future where subsequent generations take responsibility for the waste repository, modernising and updating the records and markers is considered to be a sustainable option by the (Agency, Nuclear Energy, 2008). The communitys legacy is restricted to the unequal timeframes of the local cultures lifespan compared to the half-lives of the nuclear waste. 45 Figure 14- Visitor Centre Figure 13- Marker Stone 3.3.5 Adopted Approaches A combined approach of Active and Passive Institutional Control will be adopted for the long term protection of the Sizewell GDF. The active institution controlling the GDF is recommended to be formed on the community legacy basis. The specific implementation of this approach is described. Total abandonment was considered neither practical nor ethically responsible for the long term management of a GDF. It was also felt that by effectively hiding such a complex and obviously man made facility it may even increase the tenacity of future explorers to open the GDF. 3.3.6 Adopted Passive Institutional Controls A large flat circular marker 1m thick, made up of a combination of stones, will be placed over the entrances of the drift tunnel. It has been shown that the use of a combination of granite and basalt with deep engravings between 15-20mm and 1-3mm thick offer the best long term durability (Hart, 2000). The design to be placed in the marker (fig 13) is intended to convey the message that the waste is dangerous and useless and not to be approached. Numerous languages will also be used on the marker with extra space for additional inscriptions to be made in the future if necessary.
The visitor centre (fig 14) will also serve as a permanent monument. The construction of the visitor centre will be extremely robust utilizing monolithic stone construction where possible. The architecture of the visitor center will aim to convey the message of danger.
46 3.3.7 Adopted Active Institutional Controls Active Institutional Control measures including active monitoring of the site area and good archives will be enforced as a short term concept subject to constant review. The institution tasked with the long term management of the site is to be formed around the local community with the aim of maximizing the involvement of those stakeholders with the largest interest.
A major responsibility of the organisation tasked with the management of the facility in the extreme long term will be the stewardship of archives. A dedicated archive team will maintain the quality of the records with a major update being performed at least once every generation to ensure the records remain legible and compatible with the technology, languages and knowledge of the time.
Physical copies of all of the documents associated with the GDF were considered to be the best media for long term information transfer. It is suggested that all records are printed on to so called permanent paper. This low acid paper, similar to the ancient Egyptian papyrus, is an accepted method for the long-term preservation of documents (Brown, 2005).
Methods of storing the information electronically were considered. Hard disks with a design life of a million years have been proposed (Clery, 2012) but any electronic solution was ruled out due to the pace at which data formats have become obsolete in recent times.
3.4 Backfilling UK regulation states emplacement of waste without intent to retrieve it at a later time. Retrieveability lies at the heart of the issues of whether to backfill. The key aspects of the decision making are; the public concerns, the safety and safeguards, long term monitoring costs, and finally the ethical issues. 3.4.1 Public Opinion It is important that decision making is all done by the experts. The public must have a say in the level of retrievability, and the consent of the local community is essential. The public opinion is difficult to predict, at one moment they never want to see the waste again, now theyre scared of irreversible decisions and favour the retrievable option. 3.4.2 Ethics Ethics deals with the trade-off between minimising future generations burden or maximising future choices. (McCombie, 1999) The ethical argument against retrievability believes we should be responsible for our generations actions and not pass on the burden, risks, and cost associated with dealing with the waste. The ethical argument for retrievability argues that future generations should have freedom of choice to act. Whether advances in technology could be a blessing or a burden. (Thunberg, 1999) 3.4.3 Costs If the repository is left with a retrievable option, and therefore monitoring, the financial and non- financial costs have to be considered. Although a lot of monitoring can be done using acoustics and satellites personnel monitoring is always going to be needed, and the cost of the health aspects must be accounted for. It is not only the health of the personnels that need to be considered. When leaving the repository open for retrievability there are risks associated with ground water etc. Who is liable for these costs? These financial costs cant be passed onto future generations. 47 2012- 2052 3.4.4 Safety and Safeguards Safety is the most important aspect. The safety of future generations must be secure. The health risks in the future must be less than what they are today. Without backfilling these cannot be guaranteed. Arguably we cannot we cannot predict geological changes or technical advances, so how can we predict future generations safest option? When dealing with safeguards, the retrievability of the waste for re-use, most of the waste is ILW and the French National Assessment Agency CNE has suggested there could be little or no justification for development of a retrievable capability as ILW has a lack of re-use value. (Richardson, 1999) Spent fuel has reuse value but the potential risk that it will be used for weaponry. Although this risk has been reduced with the dilution of spent fuels - dismissing its capability to be used in weaponry leaving it capable in the making of ceramics and alloys.
After taking into account all aspects, this proposal suggests that after a short monitoring period of 50 years the repository will be backfilled using Nirex soft grout and the entrance will be plugged with a 10 m plug preventing human intrusion. The safety of the waste is secured by preventing bines and surface water entering the repository. It still has the possibility to excavate and retrieve at great financial cost. These costs dont outweigh the health costs of monitoring personals, the possible cost of the risks of leaving it open, or the financial burden that leaving it open will cause future generations. (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1999).
3.5 Project Timeline A timeframe for the project has been developed (fig.15). A period of approximately 125 years will be required to transport all of the waste produced at Sellafield to the GDF (Section 2.3.4.3). Allowing for final design and consent it will be approximately 40 years before the first packages of waste can be emplaced within the facility. A further 10 years will be required to construct the drift tunnels and first disposal vaults. During the 125 year transport and emplacement period construction of the underground disposal vaults and tunnels and backfilling of those which have been filled will be on going. A final closure period of 10 years is provided for the closure and decommissioning of the facility. It was not deemed feasible to begin waste emplacement prior to the complete construction of the underground facilities. This decision was made on the basis that to construct all of the underground facilities would take a time period in the order of 100 years with a design and consent lead time of approximately 40 years. It was felt that the risk of continuing to store waste at interim storage facilities for the next 140 years far outweighed the slightly increased risks associated with constructing and emplacing waste concurrently.
Figure 15-Project Timeline Design Waste Emplacement Construction 2197- 2222 2052 - 2197 Contingency 48 Appendix A
sthammar, Sweden - Low relief coastal crystalline rocks Olkiluoto, Finland - Low relief coastal crystalline rocks Topography of Osthammar, Sweden (Smythe, 2010) Topography of Olkiluoto, Finland (Smythe, 2010) 49 Appendix B
Exclusion area zone map (British Geological Survey, 2010) (British Geological Survey, 2010) 50 Appendix C
Borehole records for the Romney Marsh Area (British Geological Society and Lake R.D, 1987) 51 Appendix D
Topography of the United Kingdom (WINDPOWER, Unknown) 52 Appendix E
Design Option 1 On Proposed Site 1 (Alex) Description Location of waste handling area to the east of the site to minimise distance between handling areas and port. Maximum separation of operations area from waste handling area to maximise safety to staff. Waste handling areas are maximum possible distance from local residents. Use of tree border to minimise visual impact of the site. Spoil utilised for flood defences and the constriction of the port. Design Criterion Max Score Awarded Justification Provide infrastructure with the capacity to deliver up to 2500 waste packages per year 5 5 Links to sea rail and road network. Provide eight 240 meter rail sidings 5 5 Space provided for the required number of sidings Provide flood defence to the site 5 4 Relatively short flood defence embankment required. Minimum level of site is 9m AOD therefore naturally above flood level. Minimise the exposure of local residents to waste packages 10 8 Connection to the national road and rail networks does not cause the waste to come into proximity to local residents. Connection to the port avoids residential properties. Multiple emergency access routes to the site 5 3 Two access routes by road that could be utilised in the event of an emergency. How well is the visual impact of the surface facilities mitigated through the proposed site layout and landscape design 10 7 Site is situated away from Leiston. Limited number of properties in close proximity to the site. Use of trees to minimise visual impact. How serious are any impacts the proposed development has on areas of land that have statutory protection 5 3 Flood defence may have an impact on the flood characteristics of the Minsmere Level SSSI Maximise opportunities to maintain and improve local biodiversity 5 2 Planting of trees to serve dual purpose of minimising visual impact and promoting bio diversity. Ensure access to local community services is unaffected during and after construction 5 2 Construction of link to Leiston rail spur will cause long term disruption to a number of local roads and properties. Maximise the onsite use/reuse of excavated spoil 5 4 Use of spoil for embankment constriction. Use of spoil for the constriction of the port. Minimise the overall cost of the project to achieve value for money 10 7 Will be able to utilise area already designated for Sizewell C construction facilities. Link to rail network will require significant investment. Total Score 70 50 Principle Advantages of Option: Location of site away from Leiston reduces the impact of the facility on local residents. Proximity to the coast improves transport link to the port. Proximity to Sizewell C construction area may provide a prepared area for the storage of plant and equipment during the constriction phase. Principle Disadvantages of Option: Difficult to link site to existing rail spur without impacting on local road network. Recommendations Investigate how the site can be linked to the rail network with minimal disruption to the surrounding area. Location offers the greatest potential for minimising the visual impact of the facility on the local population. 68
Design Option 3 On proposed site 2 (Josh) Description Waste handling area situated to the east of the site for proximity to the port. Drift tunnels are separate to the waste handling areas to enable construction staff to enter the shafts without exposure to the waste. Link to Leiston rail spur will cause minimum disruption to local services and roads. No specific landscaping to minimise visual impact of facility on Leiston. Flood protection require along the entire north and east boundary of the site. Design Criterion Max Score Awarded Justification Provide infrastructure with the capacity to deliver up to 2500 waste packages per year 5 3 Insufficient space provided for rail sidings minimising the potential for the use of rail to deliver waste to site. Link to port is optimised increasing the throughput of waste delivered by sea. Provide eight 240 meter rail sidings 5 1 Space for rail sidings compromised by location of rail entrance to site. Provide flood defence to the site 5 4 Flood embankments to be provided to the entire north edge of the site. No significant cut operation is to be performed to the site so level of site will naturally be above flood plain Minimise the exposure of local residents to waste packages 10 5 Site is close to Leiston. Link to port will cause waste to be transported in close proximity to Sizewell. Multiple emergency access routes to the site 5 3 Two access routes by road that could be utilised in the event of an emergency. How well is the visual impact of the surface facilities mitigated through the proposed site layout and landscape design 10 5 Office buildings will border the edge of the site visible from Leiston. It is envisaged that the office buildings will have a lower visual impact than the waste handling and construction facilities. How serious are any impacts the proposed development has on areas of land that have statutory protection 5 3 Flood defence may have an impact on the flood characteristics of the Sizewell Belts SSSI Maximise opportunities to maintain and improve local biodiversity 5 0 No specific features envisaged to provide a significant boost to local biodiversity Ensure access to local community services is unaffected during and after construction 5 3 Construction access may cause intermittent disruption to Lovers Lane Maximise the onsite use/reuse of excavated spoil 5 4 Use of spoil for embankment constriction. Use of spoil for the constriction of the port. Minimise the overall cost of the project to achieve value for money 10 8 Links to rail network will be short minimising cost. All other cost comparable to other proposed designs. Total Score 70 42 Principle Advantages of Option: Location of waste handling area is in close proximity to the port and the existing Sizewell A and B site. Construction area is positioned centrally to the site improving construction efficiency. Principle Disadvantages of Option: Lack of space for rail sidings. Proximity of site to Leiston. Lack of landscaping to minimise the visual appearance of the site. Recommendations Investigate an alternative inbound rail access location to provide sufficient space for the required number of sidings. Improve mitigation to visual impact. 69
Design Option 4 On Site 2 (James) Description Surface facilities sited on potential site 2. Waste handling checking and transfer facilities situated as far as possible from populous. Peat deposits removed from site prior to construction and entire site founded below the site line of Leiston with embankments rising towards Lovers Lane. Tunnel proposed to shield Sizewell from transport link between port and site. Design Criterion Max Score Awarded Justification Provide infrastructure with the capacity to deliver up to 2500 waste packages per year 5 5 Links provided to road, sea and rail. Rail sidings and HGV parking situated within the site. Provide eight 240 meter rail sidings 5 5 Space for rail sidings provided within the site Provide flood defence to the site 5 2 Flood embankments provided to defend the site but site will be founded at 0m AOD increasing the risk of flooding. Minimise the exposure of local residents to waste packages 10 7 Site is founded below the line of Leiston. Tunnel provided to prevent exposure to residents of Sizewell. Multiple emergency access routes to the site 5 4 Three access routes are provided to different areas of the site. How well is the visual impact of the surface facilities mitigated through the proposed site layout and landscape design 10 9 Site is situated below the site line of the residents of Leiston and will therefore have a minimal impact on existing views. Embankments provided to east of the site will impact on views from Sizewell Belts How serious are any impacts the proposed development has on areas of land that have statutory protection 5 2 Flood defences ma have an impact on the Sizewell Belts SSSI Maximise opportunities to maintain and improve local biodiversity 5 3 Cutting of existing peat will cause significant impact on local biodiversity. No specific measures are proposed to improve the local biodiversity. Ensure access to local community services is unaffected during and after construction 5 2 Construction of bridge to carry lovers land will close the road for an extended period of time. Maximise the onsite use/reuse of excavated spoil 5 3 Large quantities of spoil will be generated when the existing peat is cut away from the site. Minimise the overall cost of the project to achieve value for money 10 5 Cutting of site to 0m AOD will incur significant cost. Construction of tunnel to shield Sizewell is an additional cost Total Score 70 47 Principle Advantages of Option: Minimal visual impact since the site is founded below the sightline of Leiston. Principle Disadvantages of Option: Cost associated with the cutting of the site. Fundamental proximity of the site to Leiston increasing the risk level to a larger number of local residents. Flood defence embankments become critical. Recommendations Investigate the risk associated with flooding of the site. 70 Appendix M Conceptual Design Underground Facility Drawings
74 Appendix N
Design Option A Description Main transport tunnels are situated in perpendicular directions to one another and meet at the centre. Deposition tunnels for HLW and SF extend at a 45 angle from the North- South transport tunnel. Deposition tunnels for ILW branch at a 90 perpendicular angle from the East-West transport tunnel. Access shafts are centrally located whereas drift tunnel entrances are located at the ends of the East and West transport tunnels. Design Criterion Max Score Awarded Provide separate ILW/HLW emplacement vaults at a distance 500m apart. 5 2.5 Provide adequate area for locating essential services, including: Package Transfer , Reception/Marshalling area; Buffer Store, Spoil bunker, Forklift garage etc. 5 3.5 Maximise space usage of area 5 2 Minimise construction complexities associated with facility design 5 2.5 Minimise excavation of spoil from construction 5 1 Minimise overall length of transport and service tunnels 5 1 Maximise length of deposition tunnels 5 3 Ensure second drift tunnel can undergo construction/excavation whilst waste transfer can simultaneously be in operation. 5 4 Two strategically located drift tunnels 5 3.5 Potential for future expansion 5 1.5 Creativity in design 10 2.5 Total Score 60 27
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Design Option B Description Main transport tunnels extend from the centre in six equidistance directions. To maximise space available deposition tunnels extend at a 45 angle each to the main transport tunnel. The three upper branches would be used for HLW storage, the third branch in the clockwise direction would be used for SF and the remaining two branches for ILW storage. Design Criterion Max Score Awarded Provide separate ILW/HLW emplacement vaults at a distance 500m apart. 5 1.5 Provide adequate area for locating essential services, including: Package Transfer , Reception/Marshalling area; Buffer Store, Spoil bunker, Forklift garage etc. 5 1 Maximise space usage of area 5 1.5 Minimise construction complexities associated with facility design 5 1 Minimise excavation of spoil from construction 5 0.5 Minimise overall length of transport and service tunnels 5 1 Maximise length of deposition tunnels 5 1 Ensure second drift tunnel can undergo construction/excavation whilst waste transfer can simultaneously be in operation. take place simultaneously 5 2 Provide two strategically located drift tunnels 5 1 Potential for future expansion 5 4 Creativity in design 10 8.5 Total Score 60 23
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Design Option C Description The main East-West transport tunnel of the facility connects drift tunnels 1 and 2. ILW would be stored on the East branch and HLW & SF stored on the West branch, separated 500m apart. The main tunnels for the two zones of waste face away from one another at 60 to the East-West transport tunnel. Design Criterion Max Score Awarded Provide separate ILW/HLW emplacement vaults at a distance 500m apart. 5 2.5 Provide adequate area for locating essential services, including: Package Transfer , Reception/Marshalling area; Buffer Store, Spoil bunker, Forklift garage etc. 5 4 Maximise space usage of area 5 1 Minimise construction complexities associated with facility design 5 1 Minimise excavation of spoil from construction 5 2 Minimise overall length of transport and service tunnels 5 2.5 Maximise length of deposition tunnels 5 1.5 Ensure second drift tunnel can undergo construction/excavation whilst waste transfer can simultaneously be in operation. take place simultaneously 5 4 Provide two strategically located drift tunnels 5 4 Potential for future expansion 5 2 Creativity in design 10 5 Total Score 60 29.5
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Design Option E Description The design layout is based upon the radioactive symbol. The three main transport tunnels extend from the centre point of the facility whilst deposition tunnels branch perpendicularly to the main tunnels. Construction of the facility involves a complex operation as the deposition tunnels differ in length. Two of the three deposition tunnels would be utilised for HLW and SF storage and one tunnel for the storage of ILW. Design Criterion Max Score Awarded Provide separate ILW/HLW emplacement vaults at a distance 500m apart. 5 3 Provide adequate area for locating essential services, including: Package Transfer , Reception/Marshalling area; Buffer Store, Spoil bunker, Forklift garage etc. 5 2 Maximise space usage of area 5 1.5 Minimise construction complexities associated with facility design 5 2.5 Minimise excavation of spoil from construction 5 2.5 Minimise overall length of transport and service tunnels 5 4 Maximise length of deposition tunnels 5 2.5 Ensure second drift tunnel can undergo construction/excavation whilst waste transfer can simultaneously be in operation. take place simultaneously 5 3.5 Provide two strategically located drift tunnels 5 4 Potential for future expansion 5 3 Creativity in design 10 5 Total Score 60 33.5
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Design Option F Description The facility is separated by two main transport tunnels 500m apart. The separated areas contain different types of waste. Transport tunnels for each zone extend in perpendicular directions from the main transport tunnel. Design Criterion Max Score Awarded Provide separate ILW/HLW emplacement vaults at a distance 500m apart. 5 2.5 Provide adequate area for locating essential services, including: Package Transfer , Reception/Marshalling area; Buffer Store, Spoil bunker, Forklift garage etc. 5 1.5 Maximise space usage of area 5 5 Minimise construction complexities associated with facility design 5 4 Minimise excavation of spoil from construction 5 4 Minimise overall length of transport and service tunnels 5 3 Maximise length of deposition tunnels 5 5 Ensure second drift tunnel can undergo construction/excavation whilst waste transfer can simultaneously be in operation. take place simultaneously 5 2.5 Provide two strategically located drift tunnels 5 3 Potential for future expansion 5 3.5 Creativity in design 10 2 Total Score 60 36
79 Appendix O Design Drawings
3 3 4 4 2 1 1 2 Location 1 - Section 1-1 End of Site Ground Level/m (ASL) 13.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 End of Site 8.0 Location 1 - Section 2-2 End of Site Ground Level/m (ASL) 13.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 End of Site Location 1 - Section 3-3 End of Site Ground Level/m (ASL) 13.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 End of Site Location 1 - Section 4-4 End of Site Ground Level/m (ASL) 13.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 End of Site Key Existing ground level Removed Removed Auxiliary Facilities 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 Ground Level/m (ASL) Location 2 - Section 1-1 17.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 End of Site 15.0 End of Site Ground Level/m (ASL) Location 2 - Section 2-2 End of Site 17.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 2.5 End of Site Location 2 - Section 3-3 End of Site End of Site Ground Level/m (ASL) 17.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 Ground Level/m (ASL) Location 2 - Section 4-4 End of Site End of Site 17.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 2.5 Key Existing ground level 3 3 4 4 2 1 1 2 Location 1 - Section 1-1 End of Site Ground Level/m (ASL) 13.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 End of Site Slope 1 in 250 Location 1 - Section 2-2 End of Site Ground Level/m (ASL) 13.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 End of Site Slope 1 in 250 Slope 1 in 2 Location 1 - Section 3-3 End of Site Ground Level/m (ASL) 13.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 End of Site Slope 1 in 50 Slope 1 in 2 Location 1 - Section 4-4 End of Site Ground Level/m (ASL) 13.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 End of Site Slope 1 in 50 Slope 1 in 2 Key Bund Proposed ground Level Existing ground level Notes Proposed ground level at approximately 10.2m throughout site, apart from bung for flood protection Excavated Material Storage Rock Crusher Fire and Rescue Plant Storage and Maintenance Construction Management Effluent Treatment Plant HGV PARK Buffer Material Handling Plant To Road Improvements Drift Tunnel Drift Tunnel Temporary construction area Level Crossing Key Sizewell C Boundary SSSI Boundary Road Links to Facility Key Sizewell C Boundary SSSI Boundary Road Links to Facility Road Links within Facility Construction Facilities Drift Tunnels Rail Links for Construction Materials Crane, 80t SWL Inspection Zone Shield Walls 400thk. &Crane Support Waste Destined for Emplacement Management Zone Shielded Sliding Door Damaged Package Facility Transport Shielded Cell & Repackaging Area HGV Unloading Bay A A Steel Portal Frame &Cladding 65m 7 0 m Inspection Zone Shielded Cell & Repackaging Area Railway Shielded Sliding Door Key ILW (1) Transfer Facility Plan Management Zone Crane, 80t SWL Inspection Zone Shield Walls 400thk. &Crane Support Waste Destined for Emplacement Shielded Sliding Door Damaged Package Facility Transport Shielded Cell & Repackaging Area Steel Portal Frame &Cladding 65m 5 5 m Management Zone Crane, 80t SWL Inspection Zone Shield Walls 400thk. &Crane Support Waste Destined for Emplacement Shielded Sliding Door Damaged Package Facility Transport Shielded Cell & Repackaging Area Steel Portal Frame &Cladding 65m 4 5 m Crane, 80t SWL Shield Walls 400thk. & Crane Support Package on Wagon Light-Weight Steel Portal Framed Shell Crane track Notes: - Design slab for Blanket Load of 115kN/m - Piles to be 900mm =40m deep - Concrete Specification: 60mm min. cover; C45/55 Strength; w/c ratio 0.35; Cement content 360kg/m 5 m 10m 1 1 m ILW Transfer Facility Section A-A (Scale 1:150) ILW (2) Transfer Facility Plan (Scale 1:650) HLW Transfer Facility Plan (Scale 1:750) Construction Facilities Process Management Waste Handling Facilities Bund Key Original Ground Level Rock Core With Impermeable Membrane 2 :1 G ra d ie n t 50m 1 0 m Operating Layout Section (Scale 1:2000) 10m Bund Section (Scale 1:300) 9.6 m 40 m 9.6 m 100 m 5.6 m 100 m LLW / ILW Storage Vault LLW / ILW Storage Vault LLW / ILW Storage Vault LLW / ILW Storage Vault Detail A - LLW / ILW Storage Area Dimensions Processing Area for Waste Effluent Receipt and Sampling Area Transport Tunnel Ventilation Outlet Packages placed by free steered stacker truck 0.3 mof Sprayed Concrete 0.9 m 0.9 m 0.9 m 0.9 m 0.95 m Longitudinal Section Through ILW / LLW Storage Vault Scale 1:200 Waste Package Waste Package Waste Package 9.00 m Internal Tunnel Width 9.6 m External Tunnel Width 4.0 m Across Packages 4.9 m Across Wastestack 11.5 m External Tunnel Height 10.9 m Internal Tunnel Height 2.94 m 6.66 m 1.3 m Cross-section Through LLW Storage Vault 9.00 m Internal Tunnel Width 9.6 m External Tunnel Width 6.06 m Across Packages 6.51 m Across Wastestack 11.5 m External Tunnel Height 10.9 m Internal Tunnel Height 3.475 m 6.125 m 1.3 m Cross-section Through ILW Storage Vault SWL 80 Tonnes 40 m 2.5 m 2.5 m Transport Tunnel 800 m 5.6 m HLW / SF Disposal Tunnel HLW / SF Disposal Tunnel HLW/SF Reception Area HLW/SF Reception Area 20 m Detail B - HLW / SF Storage Area Dimensions 3.00 mspacing Longitudinal Section through HLW Disposal Tunnel Scale 1:80 Backfill Canister Emplacement Trolley Cross-Section through HLW Disposal Tunnel Scale 1:80 2.5 m Diameter Notes HLW canister Length 2m, diameter 0.94m SF canister length 4.6m, diameter 1.05m 3m spacing for both HLW and SF Bentonite used as backfill Ground Level Underground Facility Surface Facility Drift Tunnel Arrangement - East-West View Turning Area - No Gradient Drift Tunnel - Gradient 1 in 6 1500m 300m Turning Area - No Gradient Ground Level Underground Facility Surface Facility Drift Tunnel Arrangement - North-South View Drift Tunnel - Gradient 1 in 6 Drift Tunnel - Gradient 1 in 6 Turning Area - No Gradient Turning Area - No Gradient 100m 100m 250m 250m Drift Tunnel Layout - Plan View Surface Facility Drift Tunnel 1 Drift Tunnel 2 Key Drift Tunnel Site Port Link with National Rail Network Road Improvements Necessary Level Crossing Level Crossing Key Sizewell C Boundary SSSI Boundary Surface Facilities Boundary Road Links to Facility Rail Links to Facility Flood Embankment Railway Link from Port to Site Control Building Access Path Access Path Level Crossing 170.0 m 135.0 m B e r t h
F o r
T r a n s p o r t
S h i p B e r t h
F o r
T r a n s p o r t
S h i p B e r t h
F o r
T r a n s p o r t
S h i p B e r t h
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T r a n s p o r t
S h i p Piers Beach Sea 50.0 m Key Rail Links to Facility Access Paths Port Boundary 93 Appendix P
94 Appendix Q
95
96 Appendix R
97
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Appendix - Project Implementation Plan Group Coherency No Confidence Mechanism If at any point a group member feels the teamleader does not have the confidence of the group they may call a vote of no confidence. To enact a vote of no confidence the group member must send an anonymous email to the group leader prior to a group meeting raising the issue of lost confidence. A confidential ballot will be held during the group meeting. The group leader may not participate in a no confidence ballot. Abstentions froma no confidence vote will not be permitted. If the majority of the group find they have lost confidence in the group leader a newgroup leader will be elected with the group leader taking over the duties of the replacement group member. This mechanismmay not be enacted later than 14 days prior to the final submission of the project to avoid undue disruption to the final hand in process. Conflict Resolution Where disagreement exists within the group, regarding a project decision, the conflict will be resolved by means of a ballot called by the group leader. Where a ballot results in no consensus being reached the group leader will make the final decision. Meetings Frequency Two weekly teammeetings, at 12 oclock on Monday and 12 oclock on Friday, are to be held. Where a group member is unable to attend arranged meetings this is to be communicated, via text and email, to both the group leader and secretary prior to the meeting. Absences will be noted by the secretary along with any appropriate mitigation. Interimmeetings may be called by any member of the group to raise urgent issues. None attendance of interimmeetings will be acceptable and without prejudice. Minutes Minutes are to be taken by the group secretary and circulated to all group members no more than 36 hours after the meeting concludes. Progress Monitoring and Deadlines A broad project schedule will detail the deadlines for the major aspects of the project. The group leader will be ultimately responsible for ensuring that these deadlines are met. Packages of work will be assigned to group members at the Monday meeting for the week ahead. Once a group member has accepted a package of work they will submit that package of work, in either draft or final form, to the; group leader, editor and secretary before the Friday meeting. It is the responsibility of the secretary to monitor the submission of work and communicate none submission to the group leader. The group leader will be responsible for monitoring the fairness of the packages of work attributed to group members. Where a group member feels the work share is not equal it is the responsibility of the group member to raise this with the teamleader. Where a group member feels their progress has been hindered by the actions of another group member this is to be raised immediately with the teamleader. Final Report Editors Powers Formatting of the final report is to be the sole responsibility of the editor. The editor is to have ultimate control of the final layout, wording and appearance of the report. The editor must seek approval fromthe group member responsible for a package of work if they feel a change is required to the content of the work. Referencing It is the ultimate responsibility of the editor to ensure that the final report is correctly referenced. Retrospective referencing of entire packages of work after they have been submitted to the editor will not be acceptable. Figures and Drawings Any figures or drawings included in the main body of text are to be printed at actual size prior to the final submission to check clarity. Printing and Binding It is the responsibility of the editor to ensure that the final report is correctly formatted in line with the requirements of the printers. The cost of the printing and binding will be shared equally amongst the group. THE FINAL REPORT IS TO BE PRINTED NO LATER THAN 24 HOURS PRIOR TO THE SUBMISSION DEADLINE. Design Documentation CAD Drawings The production of the final set of CAD drawings are to be the sole responsibility of the Design Documentation Supervisor. Where assistance is required in completing the work load the Design Documentation Supervisor may offer a package of work to be completed by another group member. Drop Box All documents that are collected as research for the project are to be placed in an online drop box folder. Files referenced in the main report are also to be placed in the drop box whenever possible. The structure of the folder is to be managed by the Design Documentation Supervisor. TASK Role Allocation All D Initial Research All D Geological Analysis - Cumbria RS D Geological Analysis - Kent JK D Socio-Economic Analysis - Cumbria AC D Socio-Economic Analysis - Kent JW D Precedent Study of GDF Facilities Abroad BF D Identification of Other Potential Sites HN D Develop Map Showing Location of Existing Waste Locations HN D Further Research of Other Potential Locations BF, RS, AC D Synthesis of Collected Information Into Decision Making System JK D Further Research into Transport Links JW D Write-up of Information Collected for PQE1 ALL D SITE SELECTION DECISION ALL D Editing and Completion of PQE1 Report Section RS D FINALISATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF PQE1 All D Set-up of AutoCAD Format and Site Maps JW D Specific Siting within Sizewell AC+JK D More detailed geological information of Sizewell JK D Transport and Logistics Study for Delivery of Existing Waste JW,JK D Develop Design Brief For PQE2 All D FINALISATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF DESIGN BRIEF D Analysis of Constraints and Opportunities for Identified Sites JK, AC D Generation of Conceptual Layouts for Sites All D Waste Transport to GDF JW+JK D Associated infrastructure and services AC+JK Analysis of Conceptual Design Proposals and Selection of Most Promising JK,BF ACCEPTANCE OF CONCEPTUAL PROPOSALS All Detailed design: Surface facilities JK D Deatiled design: Underground access BF D Detailed design: Waste ransport and reception AC+JK D Detailed design: Asscoiated infrastructure and services JK Construction plans: Surface facilities JW D Construction plans: Underground access JW D Construction plans: Waste ransport and reception AC D Construction plans: Asscoiated infrastructure and services JW D Generation of Risk Matrix RS D Generation of Construction Schedule RS D Editing and Completion of PQE2 Report Section RS D FINALISATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF PQE2 All D PQE3 Initial Research Into Proposed Methods HN D Development and Analysis of Proposals for PQE3 HN D PQE3 Final Proposal Decision Making Analysis HN D FINALISATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF PQE3 Proposal All D Editing and Completion of PQE3 Section of Report RS+JK D FINALISATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF PQE3 All D Final Editing and Checking of Report RS D FINALISATION AND ACCEPTANCE OF COMPLETE REPORT All D Printing of Completed Report JK D Oral Presentation Development JW D PROJECT SCHEDULE - UPDATED 4th December 2012 Week 6 Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 7 Week 8 Week 9 Week 10 Week 11 104 Appendix - Meeting Minutes
01/10/2012 13:00 Department of Civil engineering cafe Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Honor Newman Agenda Topics time COMMUNICATION AND ORGANISATION discussion It was discussed that work needs to be submitted to all in the same format to save on editing hours. Also sharing of information and work needs to be more consistent so it was discussed that a team dropbox would be a set up. A work schedule needs to be drafted. conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Formatting Romain Sidoti Dropbox Alex Carr Work Schedule James Kingsman 12/10/2012 time SITE SELECTION discussion It was discussed that the political factors for Kent and Cumbria need to be researched and written up. Another topic of conversation was the other factors of comparisons of site locations, and how they would clearly be shown and compared. Whether in a table or a matrix. A Map of current waste disposal sites, potential sites and waste production location. Further drop pin weighted site comparison map can be added after the matrix or table of site options has been done conclusion It was decided a table would be used for site comparison. Also a written section on why the chosen site was selected Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Write up on Kent Joshua Wood 5/1012 Write up on Cumbria Alex Carr 5/1012 Site maps Honor Newman 12/10/2012 Section on site selection /10/2012 Honor Newman Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, James Kingsman stood in for Honor Newman Meeting 2 Section 1 Tasks 35 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman 105
time SITE DESIGN discussion It was discussed that a site would be designed by collaborating designs from selected designs by other nations. conclusion Review of information gathered of other nations designs, so a preliminary design can be chosen. Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Preliminary design review Ben Fadida 05/10/2012 time OTHER TOPICS discussion Project implementation plan needs to be set. Also a pre-qualification exercise (PQE1)1set to be information ready and formatted soon. Another topic discussed was the organisation of AutoCAD. Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Project implementation plan James Kingsman 05/10/2012 Organisation of AutoCAD drawings Joshua Wood PQE1 Finished 12/10/2012 PQE1 Formatted 19/10/2012 CAD tempates Joshua Wood Secretary Date of approval Team leader Date of approval 106
05/10/2012 13:00 Department of Civil engineering group study room Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Agenda Topics time CRITERIA FOR WEIGHTING discussion A brief group discussion on what the weighting criteria would be and which factors thus far would have higher weightings. Who would do the weightings and how was decided. conclusion A matrix format was decided with weightings to be approved by the entire team Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Matrix James Kingsman time PROJECT GANT CHART discussion The project gant chart produced by James was reviewed and approved. The timetable was discussed with Ben taking charge do PEQ2, and PEQ3 to be edited and finished by 17th November 2012 conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines PEQ2 Leader, Start thinking about development of brief, design concept schedule, and breaking up into tasks Ben Fadida Honor Newman Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman Meeting 3 Section 1 progression meeting 40 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman 107
time FORMATTING discussion What format to write the text up and what referencing technique to be used were discussed conclusion It was decided that the font would be Times new Roman with main text at size 12, headings 16 and 14 for sub headings. A Harvard referencing technique would be adopted by all. Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines time INDIVIDUAL TASK discussion Sie problems and perks were discussed. Everyone's progress was reviewed and where they were going from there. Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Geology Ben fadida, Romain Sidoti 12/10/2012 Social economics of Cumbria Alex Carr 12/10/2012 Social economics of Kent Joshua Wood 12/10/2012 Transport Honor Newman 12/10/2012 Alternate sites Honor Newman 12/10/2012 Site maps Secretary Date of approval Team leader Date of approval 108
15/10/2012 12:00 Department of Civil engineering group study room Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Agenda Topics time PEQ2 & 3 discussion This meeting was called upon to start on sections peq2 and 3 and what level of design would be needed. Topics discussed were transport, security, sea levels, geology, design drawings and matrix, soil corrosion, backfill, and plans for site in the long run. conclusion Personal Responsibility Action Item Deadlines Alex Carr and James Kingsman Specific location Joshua Wood Download maps and templated for Auto CAD ???? Flood maps and look at rising sea levels Ben Fadida PEQ2 Brief Honor Newman Look into PEQ3 James Kingsman Geology of area Romain Sidoti PEQ1 editting Secretary Date of approval Team leader Date of approval Honor Newman Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman Meeting 5 Section 1 progression meeting 60 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman 109
15/10/2012 Department of Civil engineering cafe Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Ben Fadida Agenda Topics time COMMUNICATION AND ORGANISATION discussion Further discussions on the transport and the underground design of PQE2. Personal Responsibility Action Item Deadlines Alex Carr and James Kingsman Specific location Joshua Wood Download maps and template for Auto CAD ???? Flood maps and look at rising sea levels Ben Fadida PEQ2 Brief Honor Newman Look into PEQ3 Romain Sidoti PEQ1 editing Honor Newman Meeting 7 Progression meeting 15 minutes James Kingman Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman James Kingsman Geology of area Honor Newman 110
19/10/2012 Department of Civil engineering cafe Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Agenda Topics time discussion This meeting was called upon to discus the safest way to transport the waste. Rail, road and sea were all discussed. conclusion It was decided that sea was the safest mode of transport, with the minimum risk of civilian interference. A port would need to be constructed to deal with the amount of waste arriving. Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Evaluation of transport links Joshua Wood 26/10/2012 Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman Transport links Meeting 8 Transport 25 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman Honor Newman 111
22/10/2012 Department of Civil engineering cafe Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Agenda Topics time discussion In this meeting the amount of waste which is in surface storage facility around the uk, how much waste will be produced during the timeframe of construction of the repository, and it was discussed whether the repository could take international waste. conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Amount of waste James Kingman 26/10/2012 Meeting 9 Waste Quantities 35 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman Honor Newman Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman Waste quantities 112
26/10/2012 Department of Civil engineering cafe Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Agenda Topics time discussion The surface facilities were decided. The group split in 2 to establish the role of each facility conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines surface facility evaluation James, Josh, Ben, Honor Meeting 10 Surface Facilities 120 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman Honor Newman Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman What surface facilities are needed 113
29/10/2012 Department of Civil engineering cafe Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Romain Sidoti Agenda Topics time discussion The transport process was discussed as well as the process of the waste once on site through the surface facilities to placement in the vaults. conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Transport Process Josh, James Site Process Alex Carr Meeting 11 Process of waste emplacement 45 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman Honor Newman Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, , Honor Newman Process 114
Meeting 12 Surface facility Site Layout 02/11/2012 Department of Civil engineering study room Meeting called by James Kingman Type of meeting Secretary Honor Newman Timekeeper Honor Newman Attendees Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman Absentees Agenda Topics time discussion Locations of the facilities will allow for a efficient placing of the waste, so the layout was discussed. The number of sidings was discussed leaving sufficient space for a stoped construction line. conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Site layout design option Alex, Josh, Romain, James 16/11/2012 Site layout 40 minutes 115
Meeting 13 Construction of Underground Facility 05/11/2012 Department of Civil engineering study room Meeting called by James Kingman Type of meeting Secretary Honor Newman Timekeeper Honor Newman Attendees Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman Absentees Agenda Topics time discussion It was discussed what was to be done with the conclusion It was decided some of the spoils would be sold off as backfill, Some would be used in the construction of the port and bund. time Method of construction discussion How it would be constructed and how many drifts would allow for efficient construction and placing of the waste conclusion It was concluded that tunnel boring machines and explosives would be used. 2 drift tunnels would be sufficient to allow for efficient activity. Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Look into underground construction Ben Fadida 45 minutes Plan for the excavated material 116
09/11/2012 Department of Civil engineering study room Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Agenda Topics time discussion It was already decided in a previous meeting that sea was the favourable mode of transport, but where waste is stored inland road/ rail must be used. Rail is a fairly safe mode of transporting the waste. The rail line connecting the national rail to the site was discussed. Deciding on a location that avoid populated areas. conclusion time Road discussion Transport by road was discussed. conclusion It was decided it would be avoided where possible, as there was a high risk of an accident in close proximity to civilians. Also some of the packages are too heavy for road transportation Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Transport report Joshua Woods & James Kingman Meeting 14 Transport 35 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman Honor Newman Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman Rail 117
12/11/2012 Department of Civil engineering study room Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Alex Carr Agenda Topics time discussion It was discussed that different types of waste require different treatment and storage requirements conclusion It was decided that LLW would be stacked 1 wide 3 tall. ILW would be stacked 3 wide 5 tall. HLW would be layed in a pre placed bentonite block. Meeting 15 Process of Waste Emplacement Joshua Wood, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman Different waste requirements 70 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman Honor Newman 118
27/11/2012 Department of Civil engineering cafe Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Agenda Topics time discussion The drawings for the surface and underground were checked by the entire group. Any errors were noted for editing conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Surface Facility drawing editing Alex Carr 30/11/2012 Editing of Underground facility drawings Joshua Wood 30/11/2012 time PQE Editing discussion It was discussed that PQE3 needed further work conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines PQE3 Re-work Honor Newman 29/11/2012 Drawings Check Meeting 19 20 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman Honor Newman Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman 119
30/11/2012 Department of Civil engineering study room Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Agenda Topics time discussion Slides were added and the presentation was briefly timed conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Presentation Assembling Joshua Woods 01/12/2012 practice deliverance of speech Alex, Ben, James, Honor 03/12/2012 Presentation run through Meeting 20 Presentation run through 60 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman Honor Newman Joshua Wood, Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman 120
30/11/2012 Edward Boyle Library Group Study Zone , Level 8 Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Joshua Wood Agenda Topics time discussion Run through of group presentation. Any vital missing points were added. conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines Practice presentation till fluent James, Honor, Ben & Alex Presentation Run Through Meeting 21 Presentation run through 90 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman Honor Newman Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman 121
30/11/2012 Edward Boyle Library Group Study Zone , Level 8 Meeting called by Type of meeting Secretary Timekeeper Attendees Absentees Agenda Topics time discussion Layout, any additional editing were discussed. Abstract was written conclusion Action items Personal responsibility Deadlines further editing Romain Sidoti COMMUNICATION AND ORGANISATION Meeting 22 Final Run Through of The Proposal 90 minutes James Kingman Honor Newman Honor Newman Alex Carr, Ben Fadida, James Kingman, Romain Sidoti, Honor Newman, Joshua Wood 122 Appendix Full Brief
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