Thought ISSN 2161-2234

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Dueling Interveners: A Challenge to Frankfurts Conception of Free Will and Acting Freely
Jason Gray
University of California

DOI:10.1002/tht.8 Harry Frankfurt (1971, p. 520) argued that freely held second-order volitions, counterfactually related to corresponding rst-order desires, are sufcient for freedom of the will. An agent acts freely when her second-order volition is determinative of her effective rst-order desire. A difference between the two is that acting freely does not require alternative possibilities whereas freedom of the will does. Second-order volitions are a type of higher order desire that an agent has when she wants a particular desire to be her effective desire, that is, to be her will. Effective desires, rst-order desires that constitute the agents will, are responsible for moving the agent to action.1 However, I believe it can be shown that freely held second-order volitions counterfactually related to, determinative of, and corresponding to rst-order desires are sufcient for neither freedom of the will nor acting freely, as Frankfurt believes. In other words, I contend that the following may all be true about the same act of agency: 1. If my freely held second-order volition at t 0 had been different , then my rst-order desire at t 2 would have been different (t 1 being the time between consecutive second-order volitions and rst-order desires). 2. My freely held second-order volition at t 0 and my effective rst-order desire at t 2 correspond to one another, and would have corresponded to one another had my second-order volition been different. 3. My freely held second-order volition acts to determine (perhaps causally) my effective rst-order desire. 4. I lack free will and the ability to act freely with respect to my rst-order desire at t 2 and so I lack free will and the ability to act freely in general. For Frankfurt, freedom of the will is a function of a time dependent relationship requiring that the agent enjoy second-order volitions free from manipulation, corresponding effective desires and an appropriate relationship between them.2 If an appropriate relationship is to hold, then second-order volitions must be counterfactually
Correspondence to: E-mail: Jgray004@ucr.edu
Thought 1 (2012) 5661 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy

56

Jason Gray

Dueling Interveners

related to rst-order desires. An agents freedom of will consists in a difference in the former being sufcient to bring about a corresponding difference in the latter. Frankfurt (1971, p. 15) wrote, It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions, then, that a person exercises freedom of the will. It is an unrecognized complexity in the phrase securing of conformity on which my challenge is built. Willing addicts, unwilling addicts, and freedom of the will I begin my discussion with an examination of Frankfurts models of the unwilling and the willing addict. The unwilling addicts second-order volition is to not take the drug to which he is addicted, but his effective rst-order desire is to take the drug. The unwilling addict lacks free will because his effective rst-order desire to take the drug is not what he wants (at a second-order level) his effective rst-order desire to be. By acting against his second-order volition the unwilling addicts effective rst-order desire is (Frankfurt 1971, p. 13), a force other than his own. He lacks free will for this reason. However, it is not sufcient for free will to merely have second-order volitions that correspond to and determine effective rst-order desires.3 Frankfurts example of the willing addict illustrates this. The willing addict wants his second-order volition to take his drug of choice to be his effective rst-order desire. But Frankfurt (1971, p. 19) wrote, The willing addicts will is not free, for his desire to take the drug will be effective regardless. The willing addict is not free because it is a necessary condition of free will that secondorder volitions vary counterfactually with rst-order desires. But were the second-order volitions of the willing addict different he would merely nd himself an unwilling addict. These different orders of agency must not only correspond (or conform) to one another but effective rst-order desires must be responsive to second-order volitions such that if the volition was different, then the desire would have been correspondingly different. According to Frankfurt (1971, p. 15) . . . the statement that a person enjoys freedom of will means (also roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want. Frankfurt does not mean that if ones second-order volition about what one wants ones rst-order desire to be is not contradicted by the rst-order desire, then one enjoys freedom of will. He cannot mean this because Frankfurt believes the willing addicts will is not free. The willing addict does want, at the second-order level, the rst-order desire that he has, but that is the only rst-order desire he can make effective. What Frankfurt means by freedom of the will is that a change in the agents second-order volition would make it so that a correspondingly different rst-order desire was the effective desire. Only under that circumstance can one be said to be free to want, at the rst-order level, what he, at the second-order level, wants to have as his rst-order desire. Under that condition he is free to want what he wants to want. It is precisely this that the willing addict lacks and it is for this reason that he is not free, according to Frankfurt. One of Frankfurts most keen observations is that freedom of the will is distinct from acting freely. The latter can be seen as a way to account for morally responsible action without the presence of the former. According to Frankfurtdespite his lack of free willthe willing addict is morally responsible for his taking of the drug on the
Thought 1 (2012) 5661 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy 57

Jason Gray

Dueling Interveners

grounds that his taking of the drug is over-determined by his second-order volition, because (Frankfurt 1971, p. 20), . . . by his second-order desire that his desire for the drug should be effective, he has made his will his own. This foreshadows some of Frankfurts later work in which he maintains that responsibility is rooted in the agent identifying with or being wholehearted in what they want. Frankfurt (1992, p. 12) wrote that wholeheartedness consists in, . . . his [an agent] being fully satised that they [his feelings or attitudes], rather than others that conict with them, should be among the causes and considerations that determine his cognitive, affective, attitudinal, and behavioral processes. This is the sense in which, although he lacks free will, the willing addict acts freely and responsibly. Dueling interveners: a counterexample to Frankfurts account of free will and acting freely Frankfurts analysis of free will and acting freely has a problem if a certain complication is added to cases involving Frankfurt-style interveners. In its original form a Frankfurt-style intervener (Frankfurt 1969, p. 82939) is a device that causes an agent to decide to do X, if and only if that agent shows some prior sign that he will not do X. If the agent chooses to do X voluntarily (i.e. only shows prior signs that he will X), the device does nothing. The use of such a device is particularly interesting in the cases of hierarchical agency I have been discussing. A Frankfurt-style intervener might be placed either before or after the agents second-order volition in order to produce the desired effect of guaranteeing that the agent wills, at the rst-order level, a particular action. In the scenarios that follow I suppose that the Frankfurt-style intervener is placed between the second-order volition and the rst-order desire. In those instances when the second-order volition indicates that the agent wants the same rst-order desire as the intervener, the device does nothing. However, when the second-order volition indicates that the agent wants a rst-order desire different from the intervener, the device res and causes an effective rst-order desire that is contrary to the agents second-order volition. In such a case, whatever the agents second-order volition had been, his rst-order desire would have remained the same (i.e. to do X). This placement of the intervener mirrors the situation of the willing addict with respect to freedom of the will. The willing addicts effective rst-order desire to take the drug, although over-determined by his second-order volition, cannot be altered by a change in his second-order volition. This is essentially the case with a single intervener placed between the second-order volitions and rst-order desires. In neither case is the agent free to have whatever will he wants. Frankfurt wrote: A persons will is free only if . . . with regard to any of his rst-order desires, he is free either to make that desire his will or to make some other rst-order desire his will instead. (Frankfurt 1971, pp. 1819) However, the willing addict and the agent subject to a single intervener can both act freely. They need only be wholehearted, i.e. fully satised, in identifying with their second-order
58 Thought 1 (2012) 5661 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy

Jason Gray

Dueling Interveners

volition as part of the causes and considerations that bring about rst-order processes. And in both cases it is their second-order volitions, ones with which they should identify and over which they can take ownership, that act as causes and considerations for their rst-order processes. But suppose an additional Frankfurt intervener was placed between the second-order volition and rst-order desire so that there are now two such devices. Assume that they have opposite purposes. Further, suppose that they operate only once and then become defunct, or incapable of operating again. To simplify the example consider a binary choice for president: Obama and McCain.4 Let me designate the rst Frankfurt intervener as device M, and the second intervener as device O. If device M detects a full-edged second-order volition to vote for Obamaa determination by the agent that he wants his effective rst-order desire to be a vote for Obama or if it detects any interference with a full-edged second-order volition to vote for McCain it will re, block the interfering signal, and directly cause an effective rst-order desire to vote for McCain.5 After ring the device becomes defunct and incapable of ring again. Device O operates on the same principle but functions to produce the opposite effect. If it detects a second-order volition to vote for McCain or interference with a second-order volition to vote for Obama it res, trumping the interference or undesired volition, and causes an effective rst-order desire to vote for Obama. Consider a voter with these two interveners implanted in her brain. After stepping into the voting booth, she forms a full and free second-order volition, at time t 0 , to vote for McCain. In that case device O will re cutting off our voters second-order volition. Device M will detect this and re subsequent to O. O is only designed to re once and since M res later than O (in response to Os ring), device M will trump O. Thus our voters effective rst-order desire at t 2 will be to vote for McCain, as she originally wanted at the level of her second-order volition. Take the opposite scenario: At t 0 our voter forms a second-order volition to vote for Obama. In that case M will re, but device O will re in response to M. Since M is voided after a single activation and, because O res after M, at t 2 our voter will have an effective rst-order desire to vote for Obama.6 This is a simplied case, but it seems that the rst two claims made at the beginning of this paper are true at t 2 . Whatever the freely held second-order volition of our voter at t 0 her rst-order desire at t 2 would have corresponded (or conformed) to it. In this scenario, when our voter freely forms a second-order volition to vote for McCain she casts her ballot for McCain. And when she forms a second-volition to vote for Obama she casts her ballot for Obama. Had she had a different second-order volition at t 0 from her actual second-order volition at t 0 her rst-order desire at t 2 would have been correspondingly different. However, in both scenarios our voters effective rst-order desire is the direct result of one Frankfurt-style intervener causing her rst-order desire and, unlike with the willing addict, her second-order volitions direct effect on her rst-order desire is cut off by the other intervener. There is reason to believe the third and fourth claims made earlier are also true. It seems clear that our voters will is not free, but nor does it seem she is acting freely either.
Thought 1 (2012) 5661 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy 59

Jason Gray

Dueling Interveners

Her second-order volition is determinative of her will only because there is a second intervener there to cause a corresponding desire. Unlike the willing addict and the agent subject to a single intervener the effect of our voters second-order volition on her rstorder desire is cut off. It is not over-determination that accounts for her action. By virtue of the rst intervener blocking our voters second-order volition and the second causing the rst-order desire this intuitively seems a scenario where second-order volitions are too loosely connected to rst-order desires to account for acting freely.7 It does not seem ones higher order volitions count, in the way important for acting freely, in determining ones rst-order processes. However, our voters second-order volitions can be said to determine her rst-order desires just as in the cases of the single intervener and the willing addict, cases in which both agents act freely. But the functional relationship is clearly different, and it is my contention that the unique relational requirement of acting freely needs further explanation.8 I hasten to add that the prima facie difference in the cases, over-determination, is not a sufcient explanation because standard cases of acting freely presumably do not involve over-determination. Thus, over-determination is in no way a necessary condition of acting freely. I believe the case of the duel interveners shows that Frankfurts explanation of free will and acting freely are incomplete and require additional explanation. There are three intelligible attributions, and four intelligible permutations of these attributions, that Frankfurt could make to our voter. She is neither acting freely, nor has free will, she has both, or she lacks free will but is acting freely. In the case where Frankfurt would say our voter has freedom of the will additional explanation is needed since she acts freely only because a deviant causal chain, in the form of a second Frankfurt-style intervener, causes her rst-order desires. If he claims she is acting freely, then he must account for how she does so despite having no direct control over her rst-order desires because she is cut off from them. If he believes she lacks both, which I think is the most intuitively plausible position to take, he must amend the nature of the connections between second-order volitions and effective rst-order desires, since these connections do not, as they now stand, clearly exclude our voter from membership in these categories. Perhaps that explanation might occur in terms of the higher order guaranteeing the lower. Whatever the explanation the nature of the connections must be made more specic. The voter from the double intervener case lacks the connection to her effective rst-order desires needed for her to have free will or act freely. It is only the luck of external intervention that causes things to turn out for her in an agreeable way. And this luck bears little resemblance to that possessed by the willing addict (who happens to want the addiction he is stuck with) since in the double intervener case the agents second-order volition is cut off from but nonetheless determinative (in a counterfactual and perhaps causal way) her rst order desire. It is for this reason I contend that our voter neither has free will nor is acting freely. This does not necessarily mean she is not morally responsible for her vote. Although it might indicate that morally responsibility rests singularly on the shoulders of second-order volitions, whatever their connections to other elements of agency. Whatever the implications for moral responsibility, there is a want of additional detail in Frankfurts analysis of free will and acting freely.
60 Thought 1 (2012) 5661 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy

Jason Gray

Dueling Interveners

Notes
1 It is worth noting that external events could trump or thwart an effective rst order desire, so it is not as if they are sufcient to guarantee action. Rather they are sufcient to constitute the agents will to act. 2 I will focus on second-order volitions for the purpose of this paper. They are the strongest species of second-order desire, most relevant to free will. Frankfurt (1971, p. 86) wrote, it is having second-order volitions, and not second-order desires in general, that I regard as essential to being a person. 3 However, this seems to be a sufcient condition for acting freely. 4 With more complex cases where one has three or more choices it is not entirely clear how such devices would behave. I think 3 or more devices would result in all but one of the devices ring at once (i.e. those which did not correspond to the original second-order volition would all re) cutting off the original second-order volition. But all the other devices ring at the same time would just trigger the device which did correspond to the original second-order volition. When the other devices red that device would re and cut off the others. Even with a large number of devices it is conceivable that the scenario would work in much the same way as I propose in this paper. 5 Since the device monitors second-order volitions it seems reasonable that such a device would be designed to see that those volitions translate into effective rst-order desires so interference with a second-order volition the device is meant to allow would be sufcient grounds for intervention. 6 I am assuming that the interveners act in the temporal space between second- and rst-order considerations at time t 1 . I further take it that t 1 is not merely an instance but a time slice that can have some duration, however miniscule. For example in the case of a second order volition to vote for McCain device O would re at time t 1a and device M would re at t 1b . 7 To further press this intuition consider a case single intervener case where the intervener is defective and mistakenly res causing someone to have a rst-order desire to X while simultaneously cutting off their own second-order volition to have a rst-order desire to X (i.e. the device activates when it should not). In such a case, when a foreign intervener is responsible for an agents rst-order desire, it seems difcult to accept that the agent would be satised that their own second-order volitions played a role in their rst-order desires. 8 Merely pointing out that in one scenario a foreign device is doing the causing of effective desires is not enough. Remember the willing addict too has a force other than his own causing his effective desire, but can still be said to act of his own free will.

Acknowledgment I am grateful to John Martin Fischer, David Gray and Heinrik Hellwig for the helpful comments and suggestions made about an earlier draft of this paper. References
Frankfurt, H. Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy, 66 (1969): 82939. . Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. The Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1971): 520. . The Faintest Passion. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 66 (1992): 516.
Thought 1 (2012) 5661 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc and the Northern Institute of Philosophy 61