On - Vakyapadiya - George Cardona

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AUTHOR: GEORGE CARDONA TITLE: The Sa|Almbandhasamuddes a (chapter on relation) and Bhart|Alrharis philosophy of language SOURCE: Journal of the American Oriental Society v119 no1 p88-125 Ja/Mr 99 The magazine publisher is the copyright holder of this article and it is reproduced with permission. Further reproduction of this article in violation of the copyright is prohibited. ABSTRACT - kyapadi -ya, In connection with a recent work on the Sambandhasamuddes a of the Va I consider some major issues concerning Bhartrhari, the tradition he represents, and - kyapadi -ya. I discuss theoretical principles how a modern scholar might approach the Va which have been set forth as a basis for dealing with Bhartrhari and evidence from the - kyapadi - ya in connection with these principles, chiefly what is referred to as Va Bhartrharis perspectivism. I take up in some detail one large issue: the status of the received high language, associated with a group of model speakers called s ist a, who - dhu) linguistic units (s use speech forms characterized as correct (sa abda) opposed - dhus to incorrect linguistic units (asa abda, apas abda), that are viewed as corruptions (apabhram s a), with respect to how meanings are understood by users. The principal issue here is: do apas abdas directly signify meanings for s is t as when they communicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to a - dhus translation technique such that the apas abda used calls to mind a sa abda, which then directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question: how one should consider the Vrtti and other commentaries in relation to what is said - rika - text. in the ka
ABBREVIATIONS
- kartri -: see Raghuna - tha S -. arma Amba - bha - sya: see Abhyankar. Bh: Maha -s - stri -. a Darpana: see Joshi, Sada iva S -pika - I: see Bronkhorst. Di - ja): see Subramania Iyer 1963, 1973. Hel(ara -yasu - tra - rthasan Jaimini graha: see Narayana Pillai. - tra of Jaimini: see Abhyankar and Joshi. JS: Mi mam sasu - : see Tripa - t hi -. Kala Kavyalan kara: see Durgprasd and Pans kar. Kujika: see Tripathi . - sa - : see Tripa - t hi -. LM: Laghumaju - bha - sya: see Abhyankar. Mbh: Maha Nirukta: see Bhadkamkar. - yasudha - : see Mukund Shstri. Nya - yasu - tra: see Ta - ra - na - tha Nya - ya-Tarkati -rtha et al. Nya Paddhati: see Subramania Iyer 1966. -ksa - : see Joshi. Pari - sa - : see Kapil Dev Shastri. PLM: Paramalaghumaju -s - bha - sya: see Narasimhacharya. RaPr: Ratnapraka a on Maha RjuP: Rjuvimala Pacika: see Subrahmanya Sastri. - sya on Jaiminisu - tras: see Abhyankar and Joshi. Bh: S abaras Bha S - rika - da -s S - stri -. lV: S lokavarttika on S abarabhasya: see Dva a S - mani volume IV.2: see Ka - ma - khya - na - tha Tarkava - gi -R TC IV.2: Tattvacinta c a. astri . TV: Tantravarttika: see Dvarikadas S -pa: see Narasimhacharya. Uddyotana: Annambhat tas Uddyotana on Kaiyat as Pradi Ud: Nages as Uddyota on Kaiyatas Pradi pa: see Vedavrata.
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The Sa|Almbandhasamuddel%sa (chapter on relation) and
- karanabhu - sana: see Bhatta - cha - rya. VBh: Vaiya VBhS: Vaiyakaranabhusanasara: see Joshi. -s - : see Nandkishore Shastri. VBhS-Ka ika -ya: see Aklujkar, Rau, Subramania Iyer. [Ka - rika - numbers are first VP: Vakyapadi given according to Raus edition, then according to Subramania Iyers edition, with page and line numbers from the latter.] - : Punyara - jas commentary on Va - kyapadi -ya, ka - nda 2: see Subramania Iyer VPTi ka 1983. - kyapadi -ya Vrtti: see Subramania Iyer 1966, 1983. VPVr: Va - kyapadi -ya is, without any doubt the single most important work in 1. Bhartrharis Va - ninian grammar, after the works of the three munis: Pa - nini, the long history of Pa Katyayana, and Patajali. It certainly is the most widely cited early treatise concerning what scholars generally refer to as Indian philosophy of grammar, not only among subsequent scholars in India in various schools of thought but also among modern - kyapadi -ya and scholars.(FN1) Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the Va Bhartrharis Maha bhas yadi pika. The work under review here, a revised version of - nda of the Houbens doctoral dissertation, treats principally one section of the third ka Vakyapadi ya, the Sambandhasamuddes a,(FN2) where in eighty-eight verses Bhartrhari treats questions concerning relations between linguistic items and meanings. The subtitle of his work reflects Houbens main concern, to which the central part of the book is devoted: The Sam bandha-samuddes a, Translation and Discussion of the Karikas (pp. 137-324), an annotated translation of the Sambandhasamuddes a, - ra - jas Commentary Praki - rn apraka -s followed by an appendix, Hela a on the Sam bandha-samuddes a (pp. 325-424). The other two major sections of Houbens book are Sam bandha in some early Indian traditions and in Bhartrharis Philosophy of - n d a and the immediate context of the Language (pp. 29-79) and The Third Ka Sam bandha-samuddes a (pp. 81-135). These are preceded by an introduction (pp. 1-27); the book ends with a bibliography (pp. 425-48) and three indices: a general index (pp. 449-53), an index locorum (pp. 453-57), and an index referring to textcritical - ra - jas commentary (pp. 457-60). observations on the Sambandhasamuddes a and Hela Houben exhibits an impressively wide-ranging erudition together with considerable attention to philological detail and to what other scholars have said. This can be brought home more vividly by noting the contents of this work in greater detail. In his introduction, Houben takes up Bhartrharis life and time (pp. 3-10) and the - kyapadi -ya and its interpretation (pp. 11-22), then considers research that has been Va done on the Sambandhasamuddes a and the notion of sambandha, relation (pp. 23-26). The introduction ends with a brief note on the present work (p. 27). The first major part of this book is divided into four sections. Most of the second - bha - sya discussion on the section concerning early grammarians is devoted to the Maha first part of the varttika siddhe s abdarthasambandhe lokato rthaprayukte s abdaprayoge - strena dharmaniyamh. In the third section, Houben considers views of Mi -ma -m - (pp. s a sa 46-47), Vais esika (pp. 48-53), Buddhism (pp. 53-58), and other schools: Sam khya, - nta (pp. 58-63) on the notion of relation. As Houben notes (p. 46), these Veda discussions ... are mainly based on presently available secondary literature.(FN3) The - kyapadi -ya consists of four subsections in which last section on sambandha in the Va the following topics are treated: the assumption that there is a beginningless relation between words and meanings (pp. 64-66), the relation between sounds and signifiers - na (pp. 66-75), the intimate relation between s abda language, artha reality and ja knowledge (pp. 75-77), and sam bandha and the primary unit in language (pp. 77-79). Part two of Houbens work is devoted to a description and discussion of the - kyapadi -yas third ka - nda. organization of the Va
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The third and largest part of Houbens book consists of three sections: General Remarks (pp. 139-40), Analysis of the Sam bandha-samuddes a (pp. 141-44), and - rika - s (pp. 145-324). The translation in turn is Translation and Discussion of the ka divided into two parts, each further subdivided into two parts, covering respectively - rika - s 1-38, 39-51, 52-59, and 60-88. Houben first gives his translations, then deals ka with grammatical and semantic issues concerning terms and syntax, and finally - rika - sindividually and in groupsin the light of what is said discusses the import of ka - ndas, elsewhere in the karika text, in the available Vrtti(FN4) on the first and second ka - ra - ja has to say. This leads to and, even more extensively, in light of what Hela - ra - jas redundancy. In the appendix containing the translation and comments on Hela -rn apraka -s - rika - s appears again, Praki a the transliterated text of the eighty-eight ka Houbens translations of these karikas is repeated with occasional slight variations to - ra - jas interpretation into account, and there is additional discussion of what take Hela Helaraja says. Houbens book affords an opportunity to consider some major issues concerning Bhartrhari, the tradition he represents, and how a modern scholarfrom whatever background that scholar bemight approach Bhartrharis major work. My discussion is organized as follows. First (section 2), I outline the theoretical principles Houben sets forth as the basis for his dealing with Bhartrhari, then (section 3) I consider evidence - kyapadi -ya in connection with Houbens principles, chiefly what he refers to from the Va as Bhartrharis perspectivism. I subsequently take up (section 4) one large issue: the status of the received high language, associated with a group of model speakers called - dhu) linguistic units s ist a,(FN5) who use speech forms characterized as correct (sa (s abda) opposed to incorrect linguistic units (asadhus abda, apas abda), that are viewed as corruptions (apabhram ), with respect to how meanings are understood by users. The principal issue here is: do apas abdas directly signify meanings for s ist as when they communicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to a - dhus translation technique such that the apas abda used calls to mind a sa abda, which then directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question: how one should consider the Vrtti and other commentaries in relation to what is said - rika - text.(FN6) Following this discussion, I take up (section 5) some points in the ka concerning Houbens translation.(FN7) 2. As I said at the outset, I think Houbens book demonstrates considerable learning. It is to be expected, then, that Houben will have his own particular views to propound and devote more attention to the views of some scholars than to those of others. The very breadth of the work and the attention paid to details both in the translations and in the annotations make it difficult to write a general review or to make critical remarks without seeming to be a nitpicker. What is more, in connection with a work such as this, there is the danger of being viewed as a traditionalist as opposed to a more open-minded modern scholar. Despite these risks, however, Houbens book exhibits qualitiesboth good and badwhich invite such comments. 2.1 The most important chapter in the introduction is the second, concerning the - kyapadi -ya and its interpretation. Here, Houben expresses his doubts with respect to Va generally held opinions concerning how one should understand what Bhartr hari intended to set forth and postulates three principles which, he says (p. 16), ... clarify, in my view, a great deal of Bhartrharis thought, and particularly of his treatment of the notion of sam bandha relation. Houben accepts (p. 18) that ... Bharthari did have some theoretical preferences.... At the same time, he expends considerable energy arguing against some scholars who - kyapadi -ya. Thus, he see certain basic ideas maintained and defended in the Va remarks (p. 15): According to Peri Sarveswara, the whole of the VP is to be
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- rika - s ... But what would happen if we were understood on the basis of the first four ka to take first other parts of the VP into account and return next to these introductory - rika - s?(FN8) On the same page, Houben later remarks that in the course of his ka study of the Sambandhasamuddes a he became convinced that ... attempting to understand Bhartrhari in the framework of linguistic monism would always leave some important characteristics of the VP unexplained. 2.2. In the same section of his introduction, Houben postulates the three principles I alluded to earlier. He states them as follows (p. 16): (a) different perspectives have their own validity; (b) there is a truth or reality behind the overwhelming diversity of words and discourse; (c) there is a permanent relation between linguistic unit and thing-meant. Principle (a) is adopted as guiding the interpretation of Bhartrharis work. Houben takes a strong stance in saying that Bhartr haris approach to issues of language, meaning, and reality may be qualified as perspectivistic, not simply in that he takes -ma -m into consideration views proposed by Mi saka, Vais esika, and various Buddhistic thinkers but also (p. 16) that ... the validity of different perspectives is accepted and that ... the validity of a single perspective is limited. In Houbens opinion, earlier scholars have failed to appreciate properly Bhartrharis attitude. Thus, in connection with his first principle, he says (p. 17): The principle manifests itself first of all in the complex argumentative structure of Bhartrharis exposition. His awareness of the limits of each single approach to reality explains why the VP has become to a very great extent a sam graha, an encyclopedia of different existing views on linguistic and philosophical issues. The importance of this encyclopedic approach has not been fully realized by many interpreters and critics of Bhartr hari. In the case of the Sam bandhasamuddes a we will see that some views which have been widely considered as the view of Bhartrhari on the subject, occupy, in fact, a certain well-defined place in a whole range of different, and within their limits acceptable, angles of approach. Too often, Bhartrharis statements have been interpreted in a polemic instead of an encyclopedic framework (this point I hope to elaborate at other places, e.g., in Houben, forthcoming, e).(FN9) Houben goes on to modify this by noting (p. 18) that Bhartrhari did have some theoretical preferences, although he had a basically constructive attitude towards ideas of other thinkers.(FN10) Principle (b) is later (p. 19) put in a different manner: The second principle says that it may be the case that there is a truth or reality behind the overwhelming diversity of words and theoretical discourse.(FN11) Houben notes that this principle prevents the first one from leading to total skepticism or nihilism. He also remarks, touching more closely on the central topic of his book, that this principle explains Bhartrharis arguing for the acceptance of a relation which by definition cannot be expressed as-it-is in that both the limits of language and a possible underlying reality are taken into account. - ninian grammarians maintained from the very The third principle is one which Pa beginning. Houben goes on (p. 20) to say that this has as a theoretical implication ... that thought and knowledge of a thing are always intimately, perhaps even inseparably, connected with language. 2.3. In connection with the thesis for which he argues strongly, that Bhartrhari presents other positions in a spirit of equality, Houben also considers, in the last - kyapadi -yas subsection of part 1, an important issue that is the centerpiece of the Va second ka n d a: whether words (pada) and their meanings (pada rtha) are to be - kya) and utterance considered real (sat) constituents of utterances/sentences (va
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- kya - rtha) or merely assumed units abstracted formally from indivisible meanings (va utterances and utterance meanings for the purpose of grammatical description and - nda of the Va - kyapadi -ya is concerned with the various ways discussion. The second ka - nda, Houben (pp. 78-79) makes in which a sentence is defined. Concerning this ka three observations that are relevant to his study of the Sambandhasamuddes a. The second of these is as follows (p. 78): - nda Bhartrhari discusses numerous views in a positive way, ... in the second Ka in accordance with his perspectivism and his encyclopedic approach to theoretical problems. Much positive attention is therefore also paid to views which accept words as primary units....(FN12) One gets the impression that Bhartrhari does not try to establish one view to the exclusion of others, but wants to show different views in contrast with each other. Throughout the - nda he is extremely conscious of the value of different viewpoints. second Ka That Bhartrhari has still a preference for the sentence as the primary unit is not - nda, but it is emphasized in a few strategical always very clear in the second Ka - nda. There, Bhartrhari refers to the process of apoddha - ra places in the third Ka abstracting from, analysis and to the idea of abstracting linguistic or semantic units from more comprehensive ones (3.1.1-2, 3.4.1-2, 3.7.164, 3.13.6, 3.14.144, 3.14.169). Among these places, only 3.1.1 refers to the sentence and the word and smaller linguistic units, in the other [sic] the emphasis is on the sentence meaning and the word meaning and/or word meaning and smaller semantic units. Houben goes on (pp. 78-79) to make his third point: if the sentence is ultimately considered the primary unit of language, then the Sambandhasamuddes a asks the wrong kind of question. The question asked in this samuddes a is: what sort of relation holds between words and their meanings? The entire discussion in the Sam bandha-samuddes a, Houben argues, becomes very tentative or hypothetical in this light, and he concludes his third point as follows: The validity of the discussion is limited by the acceptance of theoretical choices which are not without problems. It may be pointed out, moreover, that in the - nda Bhartr hari does not discuss just a single view in which the second Ka sentence is primary, but several views. What all views which accept the sentence as primary have in common is that the status of individual words (and corresponding word meanings) is strongly relativized. Houben ends this section (p. 79) emphasizing that, after all, those who upheld the primacy of constituent words included grammarians, the younger Bhartrhari among them: If it was so important to Bhartrhari to relativize the status of individual word meanings, one may wonder: who were the thinkers who did attribute a high -ma -m status to these? Interpreters of the VP have identified these with Mi sakas. In Who are Bhartrharis padadars ins? (Houben 1993) it has been argued that the upholders of the word include also grammarians and to some extent the author of the MbhD who may have been the young Bhartrhari. The tenor of Houbens inquiry which shows through in these passages appears - nda, he elsewhere, also, as when, in the final chapter of his summary of the third ka includes the following among nine observations (p. 132): - nda, as in the previous ones, there is a tendency to pay (2) In the third Ka positive attention to quite divergent views, and usually there is no absolute commitment to one view to the exclusion of others. The approach to the different problems may be characterized as perspectivistic. (3) Against the background of this perspectivistic approach, there are still theoretical preferences. It seems possible to locate the preferences evinced in
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- nda in the context of the discussions in the second Ka - nda. There, the third Ka the main problems were: is the primary unit in language the word or the sentence? is the individual word meaning primary or the sentence meaning? The preference evinced there for the primacy of the sentence and sentence meaning implied that individual word meanings, if at all they are accepted, have no independent status. The primacy of the sentence is usually no explicit argument - nda. Only at a few places the reader is in the discussions in the third Ka reminded of the idea that, in fact, the sentence and the sentence meaning are - nda the primary units. Apart from these places, it may be said that in the third Ka views in which word meanings are not well-defined individual basic units are generally preferred; there is no strong or absolute commitment to views which would imply word meanings as well-defined individual basic units. 3. The three principles which Houben sets forth are basic to his treatment of the - kyapadi -ya, and they are put in a manner that would appear to make materials in the Va disagreement difficult. It is nevertheless difficult to see how Houben can maintain some of his claims, at least in the strong versions he formulates, and some of what he says puzzles me. 3.1. Consider Houbens reaction to Peri Sarveswaras appreciation of the - rika - s (above, 2.1). One may choose to ask what would happen if, introductory ka instead of starting from the beginning, we studied other parts and came back to the beginning. It is nevertheless reasonable that an author begin his work by presenting his general thesis, and it is also reasonable to let this be a background for ones understanding of what follows. - kyapadi - ya begins with a description of brahman in ka - rika - s 1-4. 3.2. The Va Bhartrhari immediately introduces the theme of multiplicity and unity: though brahman is memorialized in the Veda as one, so that there is no separation between it and powers, it appears as though distinct from these powers; and it appears as distinct things by virtue of its several powers.(FN13) Moreover, the theme of imposition is also brought in at the beginning, where Bhartr hari says(FN14) that the six modificationsbeing born and so on(FN15)which are the sources of differences in being have their basis in the time-power of brahman, a power on which parts are imposed.(FN16) Bhartrhari goes on to speak of the means of reaching this brahman, namely the Veda. Once more, he immediately strikes the note of unity versus diversity: although one, the Veda has been memorialized in a form appearing as though it had many paths.(FN17) - rika - s(FN18) the topics which are to be Subsequently, Bhartrhari outlines in three ka covered in his work. Two types of meanings are distinguished: those which have a fixed nature and those which are obtained through extraction of partial meanings from putative complexes. Parallel to these are two kinds of linguistic units: those which are to be explained and those which serve to convey the former. Two kinds of relations are said to link linguistic units with meanings: a relation such that one is the cause and the other an effect and a relation such that a linguistic unit has the property of being naturally apt to make known a meaning. Moreover, such relations can connect linguistic elements and meanings in ways that can have two results: a relation serves as means with respect to merit or merely to the comprehension of meaning; the former holds for correct speech forms, whose use leads to merit, and the latter for incorrect forms in addition to correct ones. There can be no doubt at all that the Vrtti is correct when it says that the total content of the work which has been undertaken is summarized in these three verses.(FN19) There can also be no doubt whatever that - kyapadi -ya itself distinguishes between linguistic units that are to be explained the Va - n inis and those which serve as means to explain them in a grammarPa
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- dhya - yi -and between meanings that are fixed and those which are abstracted Ast a through analysis. Again, there is the distinction between unity and division, now resulting from abstraction. No one has denied that Bhartrhari brings in many of points of view throughout the -ya, but one cannot be faulted for considering it appropriate to appreciate the Vakyapadi - rika - s. In addition, Bhartrhari makes it clear entire work in the light of the introductory ka that he bases himself on a long tradition of usage and grammar. Thus, in VP 1.26, he says not only that the eight topics noted earlier are described in grammar both through indirect indications and direct statements but also that they are now followed according to tradition, to memorialize them. The Paddhati appropriately stresses that Bhartrhari here says he is not doing anything without precedent, only following a tradition in presenting the eight topics at issue, and that he does all this in accordance with - fancy) for the sake of novelty.(FN20) tradition, so that there is no invention (utpreksa - bha - sya,(FN21) that the correct Bhartrhari goes on to say, in accordance with the Maha linguistic units that are a means to merit are established from the tradition that stems from the s ist as. Moreover, no one can render purposeless this settled situation, so that - nini composed a smrti whose object is the correctness of speech.(FN22) s ist as like Pa After stressing again that pure reasoning by inference cannot replace what is established through tradition, Bhartrhari completes the section in question by saying that s ist as have undertaken grammatical teaching basing themselves on the teaching that has no authorthat is, the Vedaand smrti based on it.(FN23) - tya - yana and 3.3. Houbens third principle as formulated is a restatement of what Ka - nini -yas have maintained. The theoretical implication Houben draws from this, later Pa on the other hand, is not obvious. It is one thing to say that a linguistic item like ghat a bears a permanent relation with a referent, a pot;(FN24) it is another thing to claim that one cannot have knowledge of such an entity without language, that all or most cognitive episodes are verbal thoughts at some implicit level.(FN25) It is well known that for Bhartrhari any cognition of anything in the world is permeated by language. This stance is compatible with accepting a permanent relation between linguistic items and what they signify, but it does not necessarily follow as a consequence of this acceptance. 3.4. I also think some caution is called for in connection with Houbens first principle. As he recognizes, scholars before him have stressed Bhartrharis dealing with views of different schools of thought in a nonpolemical manner. Bhartrhari does not - rvapaksa to be refuted, thus establishing his organize his work as a series of pu - nta. There is no repeated iti cen na, iti siddha - ntah, or iti siddha - ntitam. In this siddha respect, Bhartr hari differs from such scholars as the Pa n inian grammarians - ges - ma -m Kaun d abhat t a, and Na a;(FN26) the Mi sakas Jaimini and Vacaspatimis ra;(FN27) Naiyayikas such as Jayantabhat t a and Gan ges a;(FN28) and many other defenders of tenets maintained in particular schools. This does not mean, however, that Bhartrhari should be considered not to have held definite views of his - kyapadi -yaagainst other positions. The own and to have arguedeven in the Va closest parallel to his way of proceeding is, I think, to be found in the work which - bha - s ya. serves as Bhartrharis major source of ideas to be developed, the Maha Patajali also presents arguments for various points of viewfor example, that a verbal - tu) can be defined as signifying activity (kriya - ) and being (bha - va)and base (dha - tras, without overtly and emphatically presenting a definitive interpretations of given su siddhanta. Yet his very argumentation leads one to seethough not alwayshis accepted view, since certain alternatives involve such a complex of principles and metarules to be applied that they clearly suffer from what commentators call pratipattigaurava prolixity in understanding and certain others clearly do not harmonize - dhya - yi -, in va - rttikas and in the Bha - sya. with what is said elsewhere in the Ast a
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- kyapadi -ya text calls for a great deal of study and 3.5. Although I agree that the Va that for any single student much may indeed remain unexplained, I also think that Houben has applied his first principle in a way that fails to pay appropriate attention to Bhartrharis defense of certain theoretically important positions. Consider in this - nda (see 2.3). context what Houben says about the second ka In this kanda, Bhartrhari devotes a large section (VP 2.64-87) to arguments in defense of the word and its meanings as valid. This section ends with a verse saying that all the principles of interpretation dealt with in what has preceded, principles that depend on word-meanings, would not serve to interpret sentences correctly if the individual word did not signify.(FN29) Thereafter begins a section the first verse of which asserts that there is no contradiction between what has been adduced requiring that one accept as real the individual words of utterances and the position stated earlier, that an utterance is an indivisible unit whose meaning also is indivisible. Even if the utterance meaning is indivisible, it is subject to having partial meanings extracted due to differences in expressive capacity one sees in different utterances.(FN30) One - t pika a - ni -yata - m a cuckoo should example will serve to illustrate. If A says to B (1) vana be brought from the forest and B does not know what pika means, the latter inquires about the meaning of this term alone, not about what the utterance means.(FN31) Therefore, one may claim, the word pikah is a separate independent constituent in (1), with its own distinct meaning. The answer to this is given as follows: a sentence such - d rksa a - ni -yata - m a bear as (1) is totally distinct from a sentence such as (2) vana should be brought from the forest. Nevertheless, people assume a similarity between - t, rksah and a - ni -yata - m mean and the two: they know what the extracted words vana they assume that (1) and (2) share some parts, so that they inquire about the putative part they do not know. But this is merely an analytic procedure applied to a unit that is used as a single indivisible entity in communication. A parallel is drawn between this and the way in which people perceive entities like a gayal (gavaya) and Narasim haVisnu as man-lion. Each of these is an entity sui generis. Accordingly, each is the object of a single cognition. Nevertheless, one understands in each a part that is similar to some entity of a different generic class: a cow and a man, respectively. Hence, one also understands (anupas yati sees subsequently) that in each of these there is a part which, though not there, is supposed to be there, a part which is not well known as coccuring with the other and which one has not seen with the othernamely, a horse and a lion. But a person who reasons this way is said to be confused, since what he is perceiving is a single indivisible entity in each case.(FN32) Bhartrhari does not just show that the arguments for assuming that words are the true units of communication can be refuted. He also emphatically argues against this position elsewhere, saying that, if a sentence meaning is considered not to arise directly from speech units, then a word meaning too will have to be dissociated from words, with the consequence that the direct relation between words and -ma -m meaningswhich a Mi saka too assumes to be permanent and not instituted by an individualalso will be given up.(FN33) -ma -m It is generally accepted that Bhartrhari is arguing here against Mi sakas. This is justified not only by the arguments advanced but also by the fact that Bhartrhari -ma -m - principle of interpretation according to which the direct directly alludes to the Mi sa expression by an affix that something plays a contributing role in an act takes precedence over what is understood indirectly through inference based on what must obtain in order for a stated provision to be effective or through the coccurrence of terms in an utterance.(FN34) - rila reacts to arguments which appear in the It is also noteworthy that Kuma - naya bring some Vakyapadi ya. Thus, in connection with sequences like dadhy a
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curds(FN35) Bhartrhari remarks as follows. Padas often lose through samdhi their presumed primitive forms. This being so, how can one determine the boundaries between padas? And how can one then discriminate a meaning for a word whose - rttika, Kuma - rila sets forth the lokava boundary has not been grasped?(FN36) In his S same argument in more detail while presenting the claims of those who maintain that a sentence alone signifies, as an indivisible unit. One should determine that a meaning M is associated with a word W through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka: if W is present, M is understood and if W is absent, the meaning M is not understood. Thus, - ja - (nom. s.) meaning king, then in the absence of this word, one should if one has ra - ja - (inst. s.), ra - ja not understand this meaning. Yet it is understood when one says ra being absent. Similarly, if one associates the meanings curds and cow with dadhi and gauh, respectively, then these meanings should not be understood when one says - m.(FN37) Kuma - rila goes on to answer such objections and to uphold dadhy atra and ga - rila reacts to the argument the view that padas are the true units. Similarly, Kuma presented in VP 2.16 (see above, with note 33): even though a sentence meaning does not directly derive from words, this does not have as a consequence that the word meanings are not directly related to such speech units. The word meanings can have no other source and are not conveyed merely for their own sake but with the intention of conveying a relational sentence meaning, so that, through these word meanings a sentence meaning is indirectly related to words.(FN38) On the basis of the evidence, I think it is difficult to maintain that in the second - nda of the Va - kyapadi -ya Bhartrhari is granting equality to the view of those who ka maintain the principles of interpretation which are based on accepting words as the - ma -m true units, namely Mi sakas, or to deny that he is indeed arguing against Mi mam sakas. 3.6. As noted earlier (2.3), Houben says that the upholders of the word -ma -m (padadars inah) are not just Mi sakas but also grammarians. In this context, it is worth emphasizing something which Houben is aware of but downplays.(FN39) That grammarians could and did operate with words as constituents of sentences is beyond doubt. This does not mean, however, that Bhartrharis arguments against padadars inah are also aimed at grammarians. The issue actually comes down to something that is brought out clearly in commentaries. - rika - in which Bhartrhari contrasts the adherents of the two Let us begin with the ka - rvaka - bheda - h kalpita - va - kyava - dibhih | views in question, VP 2.57: abhedapu bhedapu rva n abheda m s tu manyante padadars inah Differences preceded by nondifference are posited by those who maintain that the utterance is the unit of communication; those who maintain that the word is the unit of communication, on the - rika other hand, consider nondifference to be preceded by differences. The previous ka sums up two alternatives under the position that there is an indivisible utterance:(FN40) whether one assumes that there is a permanence of putative composites or of a single generic unit, those who uphold this position say that a single entity has a single meaning,(FN41) which never deviates from it.(FN42) The first half of VP 2.57 thus links with this preceding verse, stating that those who maintain the primacy of a sentence as a single meaningful unit that is indivisible and has a single indivisible meaning nevertheless countenance division of such units into constituents, only these different - h) and necessarily based on the true, whole, constituents are fictitiously posited (kalpita units. Those who maintain the opposed view say that the wholes are composite and are based on their constituent units. Under this view, it is appropriate that only words are based on the status of being real and sentences that are said to be single units - ja emphasizes this contrast.(FN43) are fictitiously posited. Punyara Bhartrhari goes on in subsequent verses to treat the related issue of whether one - pa - t ha) as the source of should consider the continuously recited Vedic texts (sam hita
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- t ha) or vice-versa.(FN44) The Vrtti on VP 2.58 notes some the analyzed texts (padapa views which merit mention here. First, an absolute opposition is made such that either - or the pada is permanent. According to some, the padas are products of the sam hita padakaras (lit., makers of words) or identical with words known from the oral tradition - which is a product of a human tradition and handed down; for others, it is the sam hita the padas are eternal. Still others hold that both are equally eternal, but in different ways: the pada text is handed down as an eternal entity which serves to convey - text is handed down as an eternal entity that is something else and the sam hita thereby conveyed. Finally, some maintain that there is only one eternal tradition - powers), of being divided handed down, and that these are simply two aspects (s akti and undivided, which play the roles of being what conveys and what is to be conveyed.(FN45) 3.7. With this, it is appropriate to come back to what is said in the Vrtti on VP - ra - ja rightly points out, the second ka - nda is where 1.2-26 (see 3.2), since, as Hela Bhartrhari reaches conclusions concerning the sentence as an object of explanation and its meaning as a fixed meaning.(FN46) - rapada - rtha (meaning gotten The Vrtti explains in detail what is meant by apoddha through extraction), sthitalaksano rthah (meaning whose character is fixed), and - khyeyah s anva abdah (linguistic unit that is to be explained). An apoddharapadarthathe meaning, e.g., of a case marker in a noun or a tense marker in a verbhas the following properties. It is absolutely fused in a single whole meaning, so that it is extracted from a putative complex in a guise that is gotten by inference and assumed, and only in this guise does its distinction from other abstracted part meanings become relevant. Such a partial meaning discriminated from other partial meanings has a form that is beyond normal communication.(FN47) Not merely is such a form outside the realm of actual communication, it is established generally in a way that the Vrtti speaks of as a fancy, thus emphasizing that it is an invented entity. In accordance with what they have understood, grammarians establish such partial meanings, which they reach through repeated exposure to them from their traditions.(FN48) Thus, under the assumption that different utterances contain the same component because of similarity in form, grammarians abstract component elements assumed to occur in what is actually an impartite linguistic unit and they do this for the purpose of carrying out grammatical operations which account for such whole units. The partial meaning that goes beyond normal communication is then adopted as what is signified by these component linguistic items abstracted through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka.(FN49) Clearly, this abstracted meaning (so yam - rapada - rthah) enters into grammatical talk, as when a grammarian like Pa - nini apoddha derives complex units from posited components. The Vrtti remarks that it also takes part in everyday talk involving parts, which is similar to that of a grammar.(FN50) That is, in everyday speech also speakers act as though sentences like those cited in 3.5 spoke of a distinct object, agent, and so on, separable from actions. - ra says atyantasam Vrsabha notes appropriately that the Vrttika srst ah, with ayantaabsolutely, in order to exclude a whole preceded by parts which are combined.(FN51) In addition, since the whole meaning from which parts are extracted is a single whole without actual parts, the form in which such a part meaning is abstracted is said to be assumed, something to be inferred. That is, to begin with there are no real parts associated with distinct meanings, so that reasoning through anvaya and vyatireka that such and such a partial meaning is associated with a particular part of a larger unit is an assumption, not a given fact.(FN52) Further, in normal interaction, as when some one acts upon being told to do something or refrains from doing something, such communication takes place through whole utterance meanings, not discrete part meanings.(FN53)
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The Vrtti also says, with respect to the linguistic units characterized as those to be explained, that for some the explanation has the word as its boundary, for others the sentence.(FN54) That is, some grammarians derive words like purusa-s (the man) and pac-a-ti (cooks) individually, as though they could stand alone, and others consider the derivational procedure immediately to involve words as related to each other in sentences.(FN55) Now, saying a unit is to be explained amounts to saying its meaning has a fixed character. In fact, the Vrtti later says that in grammar the meaning of either a pada or a sentence is considered to be fixed.(FN56) On the other hand, the Vrtti also emphasizes that a meaning is fixed only relative to a sentence. Meaning divisions within padas vary. They are not necessarily linked to units with fixed boundaries, since they are abstracted in various ways by different grammarians, who divide padas differently.(FN57) That is, so far as actual communication is concerned, the utterance or sentence (vakya) is viewed as the unit of communication and the unit of meaning is a single, indivisible utterance meaning. Utterances are broken up into words and words into smaller units for the sake of grammatical description, and such sub-sentential units are - stre) associated with meanings abstracted from utterances, but only in a grammar (s a can one legitimately consider a word an upper boundary of description or a word meaning a fixed meaning, just as only grammarians deal with items like bases and affixes. - kyapadi -ya ka - rika - s make the very same points. Thus, after listing eight 3.8. The Va different views concerning what constitutes a sentence and a sentence meaning, as - tya - yana and in Mi -ma - msa -, well as considering definitions of sentences proposed by Ka the second kanda starts by emphasizing the unity of the sentence and its meaning. Bhartrhari invokes as parallels the cognition of a variegated picture and the picture itself. As there is a single cognition which takes the entire picture into its purview, and this is then divided in imitation of the different things seen, there is the understanding of a sentence meaning in the same manner: there is one understanding, which is then artificially divided. There is a picture, which has a single overall form, but one describes it by means of colors blue and so on, which are distinct in character and represented as such. In the very same manner, a single sentence, which semantically is totally independent, is accompanied by an explanation by means of other words, which are semantically dependent.(FN58) Further, the extraction of words in a sentence is possible in the same manner that bases, affixes, and so on are divided from each - nda Bhartrhari says other in a word.(FN59) Similarly, at the beginning of the third ka that words are divided into two, four, or five classes by different thinkers and that such a division is made only on the basis of abstracting from sentences, just as one extracts bases, affixes, and so on from words. He also notes different positions concerning individual and generic property when one abstracts word meanings.(FN60) - nda. However, Of course, verses 24-26 are not the absolute beginning of the first ka they constitute a summary of the general topics to be covered. Consequently, it is - nda with a statement of topics appropriate to say that Bhartrhari introduces the first ka - ndas with a statement of his general thesis: he will take up and each of the next ka that the unit of actual communication is the sentence, associated with a sentence meaning, that words and word meanings are abstracted from such sentences through the same reasoning grammarians use to abstract bases, affixes, and so on from words. - kyapadi -ya(FN61) supports the 3.9. In sum, I consider that the evidence from the Va position that Bhartrhari does indeed have a well-conceived theoretical stance, which he -ma -m upholds, and that he does indeed argue against scholars, such as Mi sakas, who do not accept the primacy of the sentence and of sentence meaning. That Bhartrhari
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also discusses many different views and variations on them should not obscure this point. Nor should one expect him constantly to remind his audience of this central thesis. It is sufficient that this is established firmly and that a diametrically opposed - nda, the subject of which is the sentence and its view is refuted in the second ka - nda with a statement which again meaning. It is also sufficient to begin the third ka emphasizes that classes of meanings and the particular sets of words with which they are associated are abstracted from sentences and their meanings. The remainder of - nda is devoted to discussing such individual categories as well as the ways the third ka in which complex termscompounds and derivates with taddhita affixesare viewed. Finally on this topic, we have to confront the third point Houben makes in his discussion of sambandha and the primary unit of language (see 2.3), namely that if the sentence is ultimately considered the primary unit of language, then the Sambandhasamuddes a asks the wrong kind of question. I consider that the material considered above is sufficient to show that it is Houben who has missed the point. Bhartrhari can maintain that the sentence is the real unit of actual communication and still accept that through analysis one can and should abstract words and word meanings. This is necessary in order to carry out a grammatical description. Further, in everyday life people also accept words and word meanings, though here too these are to be considered abstracted from sentences and sentence meanings. In addition, there are scholars who accept the word and its meanings as the true units of communication. Accordingly, it is appropriate that, once he has established the primacy of the indivisible sentence, Bhartrhari proceeds to discuss classes of words and their meanings. Moreover, it is appropriate to begin with a discussion of generic property - ra - ja points out, different scholars and individual as word meanings, since, as Hela maintain that one or the other is the meaning of all abstracted words.(FN62) This includes finite verb forms, since, under the points of view Bhartrhari takes up, these too can signify a generic property that characterizes all instances of a given action and - ) can also be viewed as a being (satta - ).(FN63) an individual instance of action (kriya Given all this, it is proper to take up in the third samuddes a the possible views concerning a relation between words and word meanings. 4. In VP 1.25 (see 3.2, with note 18), Bhartrhari speaks of correct and incorrect linguistic units in connection with merit and the comprehension of meaning. This point is linked with a series of issues, which were objects of discussion starting at least with Patajali, concerning terms like (3) go (nom. sg. gauh) considered correct linguistic - dhus - vi -, gon- , gopotalika - , considered units (sa abda) and related terms like (4) ga i , gota incorrect linguistic units (asadhus abda, apas abda), both used in the same meaning (cow). The following issues are treated: A. Are the types (3) and (4) equally old or is one to be considered derived from the other? B. If one is derived from the other, does type (3) derive from type (4) or (4) from (3)? C. At the time that both types (3) and (4) are in use, does everyone understand the meaning in question when either (3) or (4) is used? D. Is there a direct word-meaning relation between (3) and the meaning and also between (4) and the same meaning or is only one directly related, the other indirectly related, and for what reasons? It is agreed that both types of terms convey given meanings. On other points, there are disagreements. The discussions concerning terms of types (3) and (4) can be summarized as follows.(FN64) 1. If both (3) and (4) are inheritances from time immemorial, they both simply signify the meanings in question.
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2. On the assumption that terms of type (4) are corruptions (apabhram s a) of (3), a conclusion compatible with this is that for those persons who know both types and are members of an lite stratum, the s ist as: 2a. Terms of type (3) directly signify meanings. 2b. Terms of type (4) indirectly signify meanings, through the intermediary of type (3).(FN65) 3. The fact remains that there are persons who normally communicate with terms of type (4). Accordingly, under 2, one has to assume further that the corruption which gave rise to (4) led to institutionalized terms that directly signify meanings at least for such speakers. Nevertheless, there are still two possibilities open: 3a. Type (4) now simply is part of usage and directly signifies, even for s ist as. 3b. Though institutionalized, type (4) is, by virtue of its origin, still considered to signify only erroneously. 4. These options are of import for considering whether or not both types of items - dhu. bear s akti, which in turn has to do with what one defines as sa 4a. If both types (3) and (4) bear s akti, and being sadhu consists by definition in - dhus bearing s akti, then the distinction between sa abda and apas abda is eliminated. This is something neither grammarians nor others find desirable. - dhu consists by 4b. Under 3b, it is possible not only to maintain that being sa definition in bearing s akti but also still to maintain the distinction in question, since items of type (4) do not truly bear s akti because they still are considered to signify through error. 5. While maintaining 3a, the distinction between types (3) and (4) can still be - dhu (sa - dhutva) is defined in a different manner: maintained, if being sa - dhutva is a property of that which can be explained according to the 5a. Sa - ninis. procedures of an authoritative grammar like Pa - dhutva is a property of that which is appropriate to the production of merit; 5b. Sa - dhu term entails merit which the use of an equivalent apas that is, the use of a sa abda does not. -. 4.1. Patajali brings in (3) and (4) several times during discussions in the Paspas a Thus, he notes that teaching correct linguistic units is briefer than teaching incorrect ones, since for each correct linguistic unit there are many incorrect ones. (3) and (4) - vt. 6, Ka - tya - yana are cited as examples of this situation.(FN66) Now, in Paspas a remarks that if there is merit in the knowledge of correct linguistic units there is also - ne dharma iti cet tatha - dharmah). Commenting on this, Patajali makes two demerit (ja points. First, demerit obtains for one who knows correct linguistic units because such - dhu terms, are a person also knows incorrect ones. That is, even s ist as, who use sa presumed at least to know apas abda terms for everyday interaction. Further, because there are many incorrect terms for each correct one, greater demerit obtains.(FN67) Patajali also makes the well-known and important observation concerning such terms: given that there is the same comprehension of a meaning through a correct linguistic unit and an incorrect one, the grammar serves to establish a restriction intended for merit: the meaning in question should be expressed by means of a correct term, not an incorrect one.(FN68) It is noteworthy that Patajali not only contrasts correct and incorrect linguistic units using the respective terms s abda and apas abda but that when speaking of one single item like go as opposed to the group of items (4), he characterizes the latter as apabhram s a with respect to the former. That is, these are not merely treated as incorrect speech elements contrasted with correct ones, they are also considered somehow to be corruptions with respect to the correct speech items. Patajali thus - vi -(FN69) are takes a stand on the questions A and B. Since items of the type ga
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considered to be corruptions, it follows that only the correct linguistic units are to be considered eternal, so that only these bear an eternal relation with meanings.(FN70) - tya - yana indicatethough not directly in connection In addition, both Patajali and Ka with the issue of s abda versus apas abdahow one might consider at least some - tra vt. 1, Ka - tya - yana gives several reasons why l ivasu apas abdas to have arisen. In S must be taught in Paninis aksarasamamnaya despite its restricted occurrence. One of these is to account for the citation of terms that result from incapacity. To illustrate, Patajali gives the example l taka. Someone is named rtaka, so that this term is to be - hmana woman has used l taka instead and used when referring to him. Say some bra has done this out of incapacity, because she is unable to pronounce r. This is an error, so that l taka as pronounced by the woman is a corruption of rtaka. On the other - hmana woman says l taka, that person is quoting, hand, if someone else says, the bra so that he is not himself using an incorrect form.(FN71) - tya - yana implicitly assumes that one Further, since Patajali states explicitly and Ka who knows correct speech terms also knows their incorrect counterparts, question C is answered at least in part: at the time that both types of terms were in use, the - dhus s ist as who used sa abdas also could use and understand apas abdas. The last question noted (D) is not dealt with in the Mahabhasya, but all the issues are considered elsewhere. -ma -m - yikas. 4.2. Let us begin with Mi sakas and Naiya - rvapaksa, Jaimini states that there cannot be any settled division with 4.2.1. As a pu respect to linguistic items such that only items of the type (3) go or of the type (4) - vi -, gon- , gopotalika - , etc., should be used, because there is no teaching ga i , gota concerning the situation where such usage would arise.(FN72) That is, there is no - ninis grammarwhose authority is accepted in this sphere, teachingsuch as Pa abaras arguments are as follows. The question whereby one could decide the issue. S at issue is: are (3) and (4) equally means of knowledge with respect to the object possessed of a dewlap and so on? In other words, should one consider go to signify the object in question as the single term with unbroken tradition of usage and then consider the other terms (4) corruptions, or are all the terms to be considered equally without beginning?(FN73) The immediate answer is that all should be considered to signify the object in question without beginning. The reason given is that the meaning in question is understood from (4) and that there was similarly a relation between them and this meaning a hundred years ago, earlier than that, and earlier still, so that (4) and their relation with this meaning has no beginning. Moreover, it has already been established that there is no creator of a relation between words and their meanings, this being a - dhu fixed eternal relation.(FN74) Consequently, both (3) and (4) are to be considered sa - dhayanti) the comprehension of the same in the sense that they bring about (sa meaning and both may be used in speaking. (3) and (4) thus have the status of - ni hand.(FN75) Such terms are uttered for a synonyms, much like hasta, kara, pa direct purposeto convey a particular meaningnot for some as yet unseen result that is to be brought about, and there is no teaching that instructs one to pronounce - dhu them for such a purpose. Therefore, it cannot be established that one term is sa - dhu.(FN76) and the others are asa - rvapaksa and establish a siddha - nta on the abara refute the pu 4.2.2. Jaimini and S basis of several arguments. A liguistic item can be such that an error has a part in it, since it is produced through articulatory effort.(FN77) It is thus possible to discriminate between (3) and (4) by considering the latter to result from errors in attempting to produce (3). A person may intend to jump on to dry land yet fall in the mud, to touch water once or once to spit out water with which he has rinsed his mouth, yet
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accidentally do this twice. In the same way, (4) can have come into use due to error and need not be part of an unbroken tradition of usage.(FN78) It is also contrary to principle that, unless otherwise definitively established, one assume more than one term for a single meaning.(FN79) Moreover, the choice is not arbitrary, since there is an authority concerning such usage that allows one to make a decision: the special authority of the learned.(FN80) A particular term that such authoritative persons teach alone as correct should be understood to be correct.(FN81) Further, people understand the meaning in question from (4) due to the similarity of these terms to (3), so that (4) do not have the capacity that (3) has to signify the same object in question.(FN82) Apabhram s a terms like (4) play a role in the understanding of a meaning by bringing to light the capacity which properly belongs to abara describes what is at play as follows. Due to their origins alone.(FN83) S - vi - when he wishes to pronounce a form of the term incapacity, someone pronounces ga go, such as gauh. Someone else understands that this person means to refer to an animal with a dewlap and so on, and that to this end he wants to pronounce gauh but - vi -. Thus learning from this situation, others also say ga - vi - when instead pronounces ga what they wish to refer to is the same animal. Thereby, this animal is understood from - vi -, etc. For ga - vi - and so on are similar to go.(FN84) Finally, Jaimini likens this to the ga situation where someone uses a form with a certain ending that is not appropriate, yet one understands what that person intends to say, thus recalling the form with the - gaccha - mi I am appropriate ending.(FN85) For example, someone might say as makair a coming from As maka, using an instrumental instead of an ablative form. The instrumental form as makaih is heard. However, in accordance with what is intended, the appropriate form as makebhyah is recalled, and from this the meaning from - vi - and so on, one has a As maka is understood. Similarly, when one hears ga recollection of go, and from this one understands the animal with a dewlap, and so on.(FN86) 4.2.3. The situation where a hearer interprets an incorrect form in the way noted can thus be treated as the first step in establishing for later generations that items of type (4) directly signify, without an intermediate step of recalling an equivalent of type (3). Such usage is then traced back to accidents in conversations where one speaker makes a mistake, another knows what that person intends to say, concludes that he meant to use a particular term and himself understands the intended meaning from that term. Still other persons assume that the form which was accidentally used actually directly signifies the meaning in question. This scenario is envisaged by others also. - karas Brhati - to JS 1.3.8.29,(FN87) S - lika - na - tha says that a Commenting on Prabha - kara intends to convey is the following. A person A, wishing to utter the what Prabha - vi - instead, due to a fault in his articulating speech organs or to not word go, utters ga being mindful or a similar reason. Through context, the adult B with whom A is talking understands what A intends to say, so that he understands the object signified by go and continues his conversation with A. The conversation is witnessed by two other people, who have not acquired the understanding that go is related as signifier to the object in question. These two mistakenly determine that B had directly understood this - vi - and not through the intermediary of go. They therefore mistakenly meaning from ga conclude that gavi is itself a signifier, and in this conviction they continue to use this term in their conversations with others. Following their usage, other children then - vi -, since they had not acquired the knowledge associating any other converse using ga - vi - is established as having word with the object in question. In this way, the use of ga a particular beginning.(FN88) - mani, where 4.2.4. Similar considerations are found later also, as in the Tattvacinta Gan ges a argues against assuming that apabhram s a terms as much as sam skrta terms
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directly signify. Having concluded that only a sam skr ta term bears the signifying relation (s akti), which is secondarily transferred to apabhram s a terms, Gan ges a has an opponent object: how can mlecchas and others of their kind, who do not know sam skrta terms, impose the s akti of such terms on other terms? This is answered by recounting how one considers the erroneous attribution of s akti to apabhram s a terms in times long past.(FN89) Due to neglect, some person A, instead of using go as he - vi -. A does this while conversing with B, who already has learned should, uses ga (vyutpannah) the signifying relation between go and a cow. B understands what A intends, so that he concludes that the latter meant to use go, and he understands the meaning cow from this correct term, thus carrying out his conversation with A. There is also a bystander, a child who wants to learn (vyutpitsuh) the relation between the - vi word and the meaning in question. He considers that B has understood cow from ga - vi - as bearing the signifying relation alone, so that he acquires the understanding of ga with a cow (gos aktatvena). Moreover, this individual then serves as a model for others - vi - is so related to a cow. In this way, it is established erroneously that to learn that ga apabhram s as have direct signifying relations with meanings.(FN90) 4.3. It is thus admitted that at some stage apabhram s a terms also directly signify meanings. Now, even if one insists that the signifying relation that holds between terms - vi -, etc., is ultimately due to an error, the fact remains that this relation of type (4) ga - vi - and such do signify, persons who use such terms does hold. At the stage where ga and do not know their sam skr ta equivalentsindeed do not know Sanskrit at allcannot be said to understand a meaning through recollecting a sam skrta term. - nini -yas Moreover, at this stage there can no longer be any question of error. Later Pa set out such arguments in opposition to Naiyayikas and Mi mam sakas. 4.3.1. Kaundabhatta presents the following arguments.(FN91) Under the assumption that s akti consists in a terms bringing a meaning to mind (bodhakatvam),(FN92) it is - vi - also have s possible to say that vernacular terms like ga akti, because these too convey meanings. Since there is thus no difference between items of types (3) and (4) - dhu, contrary in that both have this property, the latter also can be considered to be sa to the accepted view.(FN93) - yika - s and others have to this objection is given in the ka - rika The answer Naiya asadhur anumanena vacakah kais cid isyate.... Some consider it appropriate that an - dhu term convey(FN94) a meaning by calling to mind(FN95) a sa - dhu term.(FN96) asa In addition, four karikas from the Vakyapadi ya are cited in support of this position. - dhu term is According to these verses, an apabhram s a item that is used where a sa to be used serves as a means whereby a given meaning is expressed, but not directly: - dhu term. Apabhram it is separated from the apabhram s a term by the sa s a terms thus are causes for the understanding of meanings to arise through the intermediary of - dhu terms; they bring the meaning of a correct term to ones understanding recalling sa by apparently identifying with it.(FN97) An analogy is drawn with how adults understand a baby. A child learning to say amba amba mommy, mommy(FN98) makes a mistake in speaking and might say something indistinct, like bambamba.(FN99) Those who know the proper linguistic units, however, determine the meaning meant once the distinct form has been recalled. Apabhram s a terms, moreover, are not accepted, in teaching that continues tradition,(FN100) by authoritative persons who serve as models, in the way that synonyms are accepted.(FN101) Of course, actual usage is the main source for concluding that a given term has the capacity to signify a certain meaning and this is the same for both types of terms. Kaun d abhat t a therefore goes on to summarize reasons for considering that apabhram s a terms do not directly signify meanings, as follows. First, if terms of both
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types (3) and (4) were considered directly to signify, one would have to conclude that all of them possess the capacity to signify, which involves prolixity. Moreover, they - dhu terms with the same cannot be considered synonyms in the same way that sa meaning are said to be synonymous. The latter occur as synonyms in all speech - vi -, gonareas, but terms like ga i , and so on are restricted in their distribution, each used - yikas and Mi -ma -m in a different area. Accordingly, Naiya sakas conclude that being a - dhu item consists in having the capacity directly to signify.(FN102) sa Kaundabhat ta then notes that in the second half of the verse cited abovethat is, - cakatva - vis - niyamah pun yapa - payoh Bhat t oji states his own view. The va es e va following is said to be the intention of this passage. If apabhram s a terms did not have the capacity to signify, there would not be any verbal cognition from them at all. Nor - dhu term, since does such a cognition arise from recollecting the associated sa - maras, who do not know sa - dhu terms, also understand speakers of a lower stratum, pa meanings from apabhram s a terms and not from sa dhu terms. Moreover, such understanding does not arise due to erroneous assignment of signifying capacity, since no factor enters into play that would cancel what could be the false assumption that apabhram s a terms convey meaning, so that the knowledge that such terms directly convey meanings is not falsely acquired and the knowledge that arises from hearing the terms also is not an error.(FN103) To buttress this position with what is said by - rika - s from the Va - kyapadi -ya are invoked. As interpreted earlier authority, two more ka by Kaundabhatta and his commentators, the first verse says the following. Apabhram s a terms acquired the status of being established as everyday usage due to a continuous - dhu tradition of speaking among faulty speakers.(FN104) Among such speakers, a sa term does not signify.(FN105) - dhu cannot be considered equivalent to being Of course, this means that being sa a meaning signifier. Hence, being sadhu is said to consist in lending itself to the - dhu is said to consist in lending itself to the production of merit, and being asa - rika - 38 of the Vaiya - karanasiddha - ntaka - rika production of demerit. The last part of ka thus states that a restriction is provided by the grammar with respect to merit and demerit.(FN106) - ges - dhu terms but 4.3.2. Na a too argues strongly that s akti resides not only in sa also in apabhram s a terms, because verbal exchange, which is the main source for learning the relation between speech units and meanings, is the same for both.(FN107) - vi - is used, one learns from usage that each That is, whether a form like gauh or ga is related as signifier to a cow. - ges In addition, Na a also argues against those who maintain that a meaning is - dhu understood from an apabhram s a term through recollecting a related sa term,(FN108) and he too has his opponents cite VP 1.177ab and 179 (see note 101) - nena in VP 1.177ab signifies a type of in support of this position.(FN109) Anuma knowledge, namely remembering, so that the verse speaks of a recollection whose - dhu terms. Those who know sa - dhu terms have such a knowledge of objects are sa these from an apabhram s a because the latter can recall the former due to its similarity - dhu term as its source. with it, since it has such a sa The first arguments advanced against this view concern people who know both - dhu and apabhram sa s a usage. To begin with, such people are known to understand - dhu terms. what apabhram s a terms signify even without recalling corresponding sa - dhu terms for certain meanings. There are also some who may not know particular sa Yet they still understand what is meant by the apabhram s a terms. The position being maintained would entail the unjustifiable consequence that those who do not know - dhu terms signifying given meanings could have no understanding of those meanings sa from the apabhram s a terms.(FN110) One could, to be sure, say that upon hearing an
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- dhu equivalent, such persons would apabhram s a term for which they do not know a sa assume that there must be some such term, so that they too understand a meaning only indirectly through such recollection.(FN111) This is not acceptable. The - dhu term from an apabhram recollection of a sa s a cannot be considered truly to bring a meaning to mind. For a verbal cognition to take place appropriately, one must perceive directly a signifying element characterized by a particular sequence of sounds that defines the item in question as signifier of a given meaning. This is not true of anything remembered, which is not perceived as actually uttered at the moment.(FN112) Nor does one have a recollection so vague that the entity signified by the apabhram s a item in question could be considered as referred to by a -m a - naya bring a pot, one does pronoun.(FN113) For example, if someone says gagari -m(FN114) by recollecting ta - m (it [fem. acc.]). not understand the meaning of gagari Finally, and most generally, it is known that only an actually uttered term has the property of producing a verbal knowledge, so that it is not possible for such a - dhu term that is not actually uttered.(FN115) knowledge to arise from a recalled sa - ges Na a next takes up arguments which invoke error in connection with persons who - maras use a word like know only apabhram s a usage. The claim is advanced that pa gagari instead of the sadhu word ghat a pot and understand this meaning from it. However, this results from a continuous error. Thus, one accounts for an erroneous -, although one does not learn a true s attribution of s akti to gagari akti for this term. At - instead of ghat a, and this error continued some time, someone mistakenly used gagari up to the present. This is unacceptable. Mistaking one term for another requires some similarity. The s akti that is said to reside in a term like ghata is learned not only with respect to an object qualified by the generic property of being a pot but also associated with a distinct sequence of sounds. One can see no property common to - and ghat a, so that claiming an error that continues to the present cannot be gagari justified.(FN116) This problem is circumvented in the manner outlined earlier (4.2.1-4). As before, - kyapadi -ya (1.177ab) is invoked.(FN117) This too is refuted moreover, here too the Va on the grounds that it is not possible to decide on the basis of given terms that certain ones are apabhram s as relative to particular sam skrta terms simply on the basis of what each signifies. Nor is it appropriate to say that those are sam skrta terms which s ist as acknowledge to occur universally, as opposed to apabhram s as, which have restricted dialect distribution, since it is accepted that s ist a usage also has dialect distribution: s avati is used as a verb meaning go in the Kamboja country but in the Arya country only the derivate s ava- corpse is used. Accordingly, apabhram s as have s akti.(FN118) - ges What is more, Na a finally notes, it is because of this that one sees that when - dhu term women, s udras, and children have a doubt concerning the meaning of a sa used, they determine what is meant through the apabhram s a.(FN119) - ges - dhu (sa - dhutva) in the same Further, Na a conceives of the property of being sa way as Kaund abhat t a (4.3.1): this is a particular generic property, revealed by grammar, that resides in a speech unit qualified by a particular meaning and defines - sa such a units having the capacity to produce merit.(FN120) The Paramalaghumaju - dhutva can consist simply in being what is to be explained by also considers that sa Paninis grammar.(FN121) - kyapadi -ya is invoked in the course of arguments 4.4. As has been shown, the Va supporting two positions: that apas abdas/apabhram s as signify only indirectly, through - dhus the intermediary of recollected sa abdas, and that both equally signify. Let us now consider more closely VP 1.175-83 and 27 together with the Vrtti. - rika - s state what authorities consider appropriate 4.4.1. The first two of these ka (icchanti desire, wish) to call an apabhram s a: a linguistic unit, such as goni , that is
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devoid of the purification endowed by proper grammatical formation, uttered when one wishes to use, for example, gauh. Authorities consider such an item an apabhram s a under particular circumstances: when it is linked to a particular meaning. Terms like asva and goni are treated as apabhram s as if they are used in particular meaning: asva - dhu terms, horse instead of as va, and goni cow instead of go. Such items are sa however, when used in another sphere, that is, in other meanings. In all such cases, - dhu is determined by a difference in the meaning that conditions being sa usage.(FN122) For example, goni used with reference to a receptacle that holds a certain amount of grain, etc., and asva referring to someone who does not have - dhu.(FN123) In addition, gon- dhu terms used money (a-sva) are sa i and asva can be sa also with reference to a cow and a horse, for a reason other than what usually determines the use of these terms for such animals: a cow is likened to a goni because it has a lot of milk, so that it shares a propertyholding a large amountwith the receptacle called goni , and a horse is spoken of as lacking money.(FN124) - vi VP 1.175 speaks of terms considered to be apabhram s a. Moreover, a term like ga is an apabhram s a in that it is used when a speaker intends to say gauh. That is, this - vi - are used is viewed as a corruption, and the Vrtti remarks that apabhram s as like ga due to a speakers incapacity, inattention, or similar cause. Further, these corruptions - dhus have sources, namely the sa abdas which a speaker intends to use in the first place. The Vrtti on VP 1.175 not only notes this but also cites the author of the San graha, who says that any apabhram s a has a correct linguistic unit as a source. Moreover, ultimately, there is no independent apabhram s a lacking such a source - dhu term for its source. It is, of course, (aprakrtih ): every apabhram s a has a sa undeniable that not every use of apabhram s a terms is due to error, since some - vi - and so on as normal everyday terms. This is explained as speakers simply use ga a generalization. Due to their becoming well known, some apabhram s as achieve the status of being normal everyday terms and thereby gain independence.(FN125) - vi - are considered ultimately to be corruptions of 4.4.2. Once apas abdas like ga - dhu terms, with which they coexist in a setting where speakers of the accepted norm sa must interact with others who use apas abdas normally, two views immediately are possible. First, one may refuse to grant status to apabhram s as, so that for s ist as a translation situation obtains: they interact with those who use apabhram s as normally but they understand in terms of their own usagesomething akin to a pidgin. Alternatively, they may accept a true diglossic status, using the accepted norm among themselves and interacting with others in their own vernacular. Of course, this is a question of degree, and if the speakers of the vernacular do not also control the model speech at least to some extent the s ist as themselves actually must interact in the vernacular. VP 1.177 operates with the model in which apabhram s as signify indirectly. They - dhu terms, with serve to make meanings understood, but only by bringing to mind sa which they are seemingly identified; only in this manner do they serve to bring to light the meanings of such terms.(FN126) The Vrtti brings out how this indirect signification takes place by invoking the parallel of gestures like constricting ones eyes.(FN127) - dhu terms make a meaning understood through Apabhram s as used in the sphere of sa - dhu terms, just as gestures such as constricting the eyes the intermediary channel of sa convey meanings through peoples being acquainted with conventions, so that the gestures themselves seem to take on the form of these conventions and are well established as such.(FN128) Although these gestures appear to convey meanings directly, this is only because conventions have been set such that they are understood to convey what certain utterances signify; the utterances which describe what these gestures will convey by convention are directly connected with the meaning, and it is
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only because one identifies the gestures and the conventional utterances that they seem to convey meaning directly.(FN129) Similarly, apabhram s as do not directly convey meanings. They only appear to do so because they are identified with the true direct signifiers. The Vrtti notes explicitly that VP 1.177 is stated in order to say that apabhram s as do not have direct signification.(FN130) - dhus 4.4.3. Although apas abdas might be considered corruptions of sa abdas, they nevertheless do indeed signify meanings, even should one insist that they do so - vi - and so indirectly. Therefore, the question comes up: why are apabhram s as like ga - dhus on not recognized as synonyms of sa abdas like go? In this context, the behavior is invoked of authoritative persons referred to as s ist a, who serve as models for speech and other modes of behavior. In connection with such issues, which depend on lore traditionally handed down, no governing cause is stated other than the - vi - and so on were indeed merely established custom of how these s ist as behave. If ga - nini would allow them also to alternative expressions to go and so on, s ist as like Pa be made known by rules of their grammarsthat is, would allow for their explanation - dhu by such rulesand they would use them.(FN131) They do neither. Further, a sa term is one which is used for a meaning, which is what prompts the use of words, on the assumption that it directly signifies such a meaning (pratyaksapaksena), and a - dhu terms.(FN132) meaning which directly prompts the use of words is conveyed by sa Hence, Bhartrhari says what he does in VP 1.178.(FN133) - rika - s concern how apabhram 4.4.4. The next three ka s as originate and are propagated to the point where they attain full status among certain speakers. The first situation is the familiar one. A child learning to talk makes mistakes because it does not yet have the full capacity of all its articulatory organs; even though it exerts itself to speak clearly in the desire to produce the correct word it has been told, it produces an indistinct sound. Adults listening to what the child is saying, on the other hand, determine the distinct word that is at the source of the indistinct sound made by the child and consider only that to be connected with a meaning, not its corruption produced by the child. Similarly, some meaning is expressed by an apabhram s a which is used when a sadhu term should be used, but this is not directly expressed. It is - dhu term.(FN134) separated from the apabhram s a by the sa The Vrtti here speaks of speech or language which has become mixed. In this - dhu terms, but s language, apas abdas are used in the sphere of sa ist as, who know - dhu grammar, understand sadhu terms through them, and it is only through these sa - dhu term is thus terms that they consider the meaning as being expressed. An asa nothing more than a means of knowing other terms, just as smoke is a means of knowing fire.(FN135) There are others, however, for whom the reverse holds, as is stated in VP 1.181, the Vrtti on which says the following. Apabhram s as, being used repeatedly by women, s u dras, ca n d a las and such, reached the status of being fixed among negligent speakers, so that conversation using them became more commonly established among such speakers. Moreover, now when a doubt comes up consequent on someones use - dhu term, one determines what is meant by means of the apabhram of a sa s a of that term. Further, people thus consider only the asadhu term to be the direct signifier and - dhu term on the side of what serves to recall another term.(FN136) they set the sa - rika - s of the first ka - nda deal with three positions. The first of these 4.4.5. The final ka - rika - . It speaks of verses begins with a transition from what was said in the previous ka this divine speech which has been defiled(FN137) by incapable speakers and goes on to note the contrary thinking on this issue of those who view speech as not being - m).(FN138) There are thus far two positions. A third position is eternal (anityadars ina - rika - . Under this view, there is a continuous unbroken brought up in the second ka
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- dhus stream of both sorts of speech unitssa abda and apas abdaso that there is no question of one deriving from the other. Nevertheless, these come down distinguished from each other, so that if a certain term is used when one means to express a meaning through another that term does not signify that meaning.(FN139) The Vrtti on VP 1.182 begins by recounting what is known from accepted tradition. In the beginning, the speech of self-luminous men was as free from any apabhram s as as it was from falsehood and such. Over time, however, due to its being associated with the memory of continuous repetition of earlier faults, speech went on getting mixed with apabhram s as to the point where this reached the state of being the norm, so that for speakers of this time such speech was treated as original, not a deviation from a norm.(FN140) This is one extreme view. Others go to another extreme. They - dhu speech forms maintain that there is no continuum of eternal sa - dinah)(FN141) and accordingly do not accept that sa - dhu terms are sources of (anityava merit. These people say that sadhu speech is established purely by convention, just - dhu terms as rules are established in contests between wrestlers, and that the set of sa is derived from the vernacular original in that it has its source in that.(FN142) - dhu forms is considered a modification that is established Moreover, this set of sa later,(FN143) and is determined by confused men(FN144) according to accent, grammatical formation, and such.(FN145) Finally, the Vrtti considers another position, that both types of speech forms equally come down in an unbroken tradition. Even those for whom there is no primal age or a divine speech which was unmixed with apas abdas accept an unbroken tradition, - dhu and asa - dhu handed down by the s ist as, establishing a difference between sa terms, just as they accept such a tradition, similarly handed down, establishing that some women may be approached and others not. Since this distinction is thus set, - dhu item like ga - vi - or one which, like asva, is a mistake whether a well-established asa and not well established, is used when one wishes to signify something using another particular termnamely go or as vaboth fail to signify in and of themselves. Whether - dhu term or, as with a meaning is understood through the intermediary of a sa conventional gestures such as constricting ones eyes, there is an immediate understanding of a meaning for people who have become confused by repeated use - dhu terms, what comes about is an understanding but nothing more.(FN146) of asa - nini -ya, for whom the grammar This is understandable from the point of view of a Pa serves to establish a restriction such that in particular circumstances one who can - dhu terms only. To be sure, there are and may well should express himself using sa always have been asadhu terms also, but for this person they do not signify if a speaker with whom he is engaged in conversation intends to communicate in the high speech. Note, moreover, that, in consonance with the entire tradition that the - kyapadi -ya represents, the Vr tti does not countenance still another view, which Va - dhu and asa - dhu terms possibly could also be entertained under the thesis that both sa come down in an unbroken continuum. This is that someone wishing to speak in the - vi - or gonvernacular and accordingly to use a term like ga i , might instead mistakenly use a term like gauh.(FN147) For, even if apas abdas are not considered to be - dhus deviants of sa abdas and are granted equal antiquity, they are not granted equal status. There is always an assumption that, if a mistake in usage takes place, it consists in using an apas abda instead of an intended s abda. This is maintained not -ma -m just by grammarians but also by Mi sakas; see 4.2.2. This is also understandable - tya - yana and in terms of how these usages coexisted. At least from the eras of Ka Patajali, correct Sanskrit usage coexisted with vernacular usage, viewed as relatively incorrect, and Bhartrhari considers this distinction to be carried on by s ist as. When speaking vernaculars to contemporaries, then, such speakers would hardly be viewed
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as using Sanskritic forms by mistake. Nor was a s ist as use of apas abdas in informal contexts viewed as damning. On the contrary, it is in the context where chaste usage is absolutely requiredespecially in ritualthat lapses into vernacular are censured. - nda in the way he does, Bhartrhari nicely rounds things out. By ending the first ka - rika - (VP 1.27) which immediately follows his summary For he thus harkens back to a ka of what will be dealt with (see 3.2, with notes 18, 19). The Vrtti on VP 1.27 draws - dhu and asa - dhu usage, which a parallel between the established distinction of sa comes down in an unbroken tradition, and other such established traditions. These concern: other means of achieving merit, which are positively enjoined; practices like killing living beings, telling lies, and stealing, which are forbidden; and acts like hiccuping, laughing, and scratching, which are neither enjoined nor forbidden. These all come down in unbroken traditions and are not subject to doubt.(FN148) In a - ninis grammar is a smrti, a work comparable manner, VP 1.158 reiterates that Pa which hands down a memorialized tradition, that is determined by the uninterrupted - rika - again draws a parallel with tradition of usage by s ist as.(FN149) The Vrtti on this ka the distinctions carried on in other smrtisbetween what may be eaten or not eaten ist as do not transgress the way of proper and so forthand grammatical tradition. S behavior that is set forth in these other traditions, and the grammar is a similar smrti, whose domain is what speech should and should not be used.(FN150) 4.4.6. As was noted earlier (see 4.3.1, with note 96), VP 3.30 also plays an - dhu and asa - dhu items. What the first half important role in discussions concerning sa of this verse says accords with what was said in VP 1.180cd (4.4.4, with note 134). - dhus The second half, on the other hand, assumes that sa abdas and apas abdas do not differ in that both signify, so that a restriction is stated with respect to merit and - dhus demerit: only the use of sa abdas gains one merit. This is reconcilable with the position that apabhram s a terms have come to gain established status over time, as portrayed in VP 1.181, except that here the understanding of meaning directly from an apas abda is not restricted to those speakers that are considered incapable. This is - nda, such that also reconcilable with the third view treated at the end of the first ka s abdas and apas abdas are both considered to have come down in a continuous stream. - kyapadi -ya passages 4.4.7. To summarize what can be said on the basis of the Va considered here: Bhartr hari recognizes, as did his predecessors, that both - dhus sa abdas and apas abdas are used and that the latter predominate. He also takes three possibilities into consideration concerning their relative status: - dhus Apas abdas are accounted for as corruptions (apabhram s a) of sa abdas, and at one primeval time there was a divine speech unsullied by such impurities. - dhus Both apas abdas and sa abdas have existed as far back as one can go, and there is no use insisting that the former derive from the latter through some sort of error. What people call apas abdas are actually part of the natural speech of people, - dhus without the adornment of grammar, and sa abdas have arisen from them via grammatical analysis. Bhartrhari also has to admit, as did Patajali, that even s ist as can understand - dhus meanings from apas abdas as well as sa abdas. That is, although there was among s is t as an accepted high speech, they also used vernaculars in their everyday encounters. Here too, however, there are different approaches: There is, to begin with, what we may call the translation thesis. A s is t a considers the apas abda a corruption and understands a meaning only indirectly, - dhus by recalling a sa abda that is linked directly as signifier with the intended meaning. For those who are not part of the s ist a tradition, it is not only true that
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meaning is understood directly from what s ist as call apas abdas, it is also true that even if they can communicate with s ist as, in case of doubt they understand through their apas abda, just as the s is t a may understand through the intermediary of sadhus abda. A s ist a might have to admit that he can indeed understand a meaning directly from an apas abda, even if this is a corruption and all the more so if it has as - dhus unending a tradition of usage as does any sa abda, but that is all he will admit. He will not go so far as to grant that the apas abda actually signifies in - dhus the same manner as does a sa abda.(FN151) - ra - jas comments on VP 3.30 reflect closely what is said in the ka - rika - s and 4.5. Hela Vr tti discussed in 4.4. He begins with what is, in effect, a paraphrase of VP 1.182(FN152) and notes that for learned persons(FN153) speech that has become defiled signifies not directly, as a corrupt speech, but only once it has had its original undefiled form made known. He specifies that the learned do not determine a meaning directly from an apas abda, so that for them there is no relation between apas abdas and meaning.(FN154) Helaraja then alludes to the tradition mentioned in the Vrtti on VP 1.182 concerning the primeval time when speech was devoid of apabhram s as and to the San grahas statement that any apabhram s a has a correct linguistic unit as its source, while emphasizing that apabhram s as do not signify, that they only bring to - dhu term due to similarity, and that it is from sa - dhu terms that meaning mind a sa comprehension results.(FN155) He immediately goes on, however, to speak of what prevails nowadays: impurities of speech have gained general currency in the same manner as falsehood and such, due to the prevailing lack of merit, so that meaning - dhu terms. is indeed directly understood from apas abda without the intervention of sa - dhu terms are means of attaining merit, Although this is so, one concludes that only sa on the authority of teachings that say one should not use mleccha - dhu terms. Accordingly, the speechapas abdasthat one should speak only using sa grammar follows suit and teaches these alone.(FN156) Further, since it is accepted that a diversity of entities is preceded by a unity and it is also true that there is a multiplicity of human views because they are not restricted, one concludes that a group - vi -, gon- dhus of apas abdas like ga i , and so on, has a single sa abda (go) for a source - dhus and not vice versa.(FN157) Thus, an apas abda has as its source a sa abda, which is the object of knowledge.(FN158) In addition, as the ultimate stage of knowledge is - dhus identical with the undifferentiated Brahman,(FN159) so the stage of the sa abda is the stage of knowledge, and as differentiation in the ultimate knowledge is false (vitathah contrary to fact), so is the apabhram s a stage of speech that consists in impurities false in contrast to the true form of speech that lacks these impurities. Accordingly, there is a difference in conception (vikalpah) that depends on whether one is considering the ultimate or something else.(FN160) - ra - ja then goes on to consider the Maha - bha - s yas evam iha - pi sama - na - ya -m Hela - pas arthagatau s abdena ca abdena ca (see 4.1), concerning which he says the following. This is stated only with respect to the stage of speech characterized as ignorance. Since Patajali states arthagatau (there being a comprehension of a meaning),(FN161) the possibility that he might be saying that apas abdas signify is not - ra - ja, is the following. Granted, to be granted respect.(FN162) What is meant, says Hela sure, in the stage of speech characterized as ignorance, people communicate for the most part with apas abda, so that there may well be just a comprehension of meaning - ra - ja, then, it is considered that through both s abda and apas abda. According to Hela Patajalis statement, of course, shows he concedes that one understands a meaning - dhus through both, but not that an apas abda is thereby on a par with a sa abda as a - ra - ja continues, because such usage is generally current, signifier. However, Hela
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Bhartrhari says it does not make a difference between s abda and apas abda so far as concerns comprehension of meaning, and the grammar establishes a restriction concerning merit and sin.(FN163) - rika - s from the first ka - nda 4.6. Houben emphasizes VP 3.3.30 and the associated ka - ra - ja has not understood Bhartrharis position, that the author of the in arguing that Hela Vrtti need not represent what Bhartrhari thought, and that those who have followed these commentators are mistaken. Thus, arguing against Virendra Sharma, Houben says (p. 25): - ges Sharma notes that Kaunda Bhat ta and Na a hold corrupt forms to be directly expressive, and say that it is the view of the grammarians. Sharma argues that this would be an alteration of the traditional view of the grammarians - ges (1977:239-249). In my view, however, Kaunda Bhatta and Na a agree on this - 30), while it is point with both Bhartrhari and Patajali (cf. discussion of karika - ra - ja who (following the ancient Vr tti) deviates from the traditional Hela grammarians view. The discussion of VP 3.3.30 to which Houben refers actually is fairly short, approximately five pages (pp. 237-42). 4.6.1. Concerning VP 3.3.30cd, in particular, Houben says (p. 238): The second - rika - 30 of our chapter, devoted to the other view, tells us two things: (1) there line of ka is no difference between correct and incorrect words in being significative or expressive of a meaning; (2) there is a restriction with regard to merit and demerit. He goes on to note that the same points are made in VP 1.27, then remarks (p. 239): The point that there is no difference between correct and incorrect word in being significative, is - rika - s 181-183. Houbens position is that one should not moreover elaborated in ka - rika - s found in the Vrtti (p. 239): accept the interpretation of the ka Usually, these karikas are interpreted on the basis of the ancient Vrtti. However, - rika - s in their own context one has to arrive at different on the basis of the ka conclusions, conclusions which are moreover in perfect accord with some relevant remarks by the author of the MBhD. This passage is therefore one of the reasons to keep what is said in the Vrtti strictly separate from what is said - rika - s, in whichever way one decides the authorship of these two in the ka works.(FN164) Houben nevertheless admits that to him parts of VP 1.182-83 (see notes 138-39) are not absolutely clear and remarks (p. 239): What is not directly clear from the Sanskrit, is which opposite opinion is being referred to in 182cd. Nor is the exact - m and aviccheda - d clear.(FN165) meaning of ubhayesa There is much in Houbens discussion that I find less than acceptable. Let me begin with a general point. I consider it objectionable that in a book of 460 pages, with verses cited twice and translations repeated, the author could not take a few pages to present in full his arguments concerning VP 1.181-83; that instead he merely tells us he intends to discuss problems on another occasion, although he wishes readers to accept his conclusion that the Vrtti does not represent what Bhartrhari intended. The arguments Houben does set down, moreover, are not cogently formulated. Thus, he says (p. 240): - rika - s 181-182, however, it is very likely that 183 In the light of the preceding ka was intended to refer also to the tradition of incorrect Prakrit words (which were the original and correct words according to the other group). In view of the fact that in some circles in Bhartrharis time (fourth or fifth century CE) the incorrect Prakrit forms were cultivated, and in the light of 181, which seems to refer to - rika - 183 would then also refer to someone who wanted to this situation, ka pronounce an incorrect Prakrit word, but knew only the corresponding correct Sanskrit word.
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The first of these verses clearly says that apabhram s as gained established status - dhu terms are not signifiers. over time, with the result that for some speakers sa - rika - s make it very likely that Houben does not demonstrate, however, how the two ka the final verse intended to convey what he claims. Moreover, although it is beyond dispute that vernaculars were indeed generally used, it does not follow that VP 1.183 thereby concerns speakers who wished to use a vernacular form but mistakenly used a Sanskritic one instead. Houben should have taken into consideration the repeated - nda ka - rika - s and Vrtti that the distinction between sa - dhu and statement in the first-ka asadhu terms is an accepted tradition and the view among Panini yas and others that - dhus misuse involves the use of apas abdas where sa abdas should be used. - dhu terms 4.6.2. Houbens arguments concerning the particular issue whether asa signify or not could also do with more precision. He says (pp. 240-41): - rika - 183 contains no indication whatsoever that What is important is that ka Bhartrhari would not [emphasis in original] accept that in some circumstances incorrect words express their meaning directly. It was precisely the point of 181 that incorrect words may be expressive among some speakers. And at two - n d a and 30 in the Sam other places, 27 in the first Ka bandhasamuddes a, Bhartrhari allows that incorrect words express their meaning directly. The Vrtti, however, suggesting that in 182 a different view is being discussed (different from the two views referred to in 181),(FN166) denies that incorrect words can be expressive. On this view, according to the Vrtti, the incorrect word, whether it has become well-established (as in the situation described in 181) or not (as in 175-180, where the speaker does intend to pronounce the - cakau correct word), is by no means expressive of the meaning (na va bhavatah). - dhu terms are those which are contrary to sa - dhu What VP 1.27 says is that asa oneseither in that they are not established from a tradition handed down by s ist as or in that they are not means of achieving meritalthough there is not a distinction between both types in that they both convey meaning.(FN167) This does not say - dhu terms explicitly that both signify meaning directly. Even under the thesis that asa signify indirectly, it is still true that they signify, so that they do not differ in this respect - dhu terms.(FN168) Similarly, VP 3.3.30 also says that there is no distinction from sa between the two types of terms in that they both have the property of being signifiers, but again this does not necessarily mean that both directly signify. Nor can one say - caka refers only to a direct signifier. This would be incompatible with VP 1.178, that va - dhu terms that they are not directly signifiers and uses sa - ksa -d which says of asa avacakah. If vacaka meant only which signifies directly, then avacaka would refer to - ksa - t directly would be otiose. Similarly, an item that does not signify directly, so that sa abhi dha can mean signify, express, without specifying whether this is done directly or indirectly, so that VP 1.180 can say that a certain meaning is signified by an - dhu term indirectly, as separated from its signifier by the correct term asa - dhuvyavahitah), which directly signifies it. Of course, va - caka and abhidha - yaka can (sa - yakah also refer specifically to direct signifiers. Thus, VP 1.183, in which abhidha occurs, says with respect to a term used when one wishes to use another one that it does not signify the meaning. The verse specifies the particular condition under - caka, but also goes on to stress that which this holds. The Vrtti (see note 146) uses va - tram) of the meaning in in both cases there is a mere understanding (sampratyayama question. That is, an apas abda like goni , which has become established, seemingly signifies, but this is in the way that conventional gestures convey meanings, and an apas abda like asva for as va signifies only through the intermediary. In connection with the same issue, Houben (pp. 241-42) appeals to the - bha - syadi -pika -: Maha
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As for the MBhD, its author evinces an awareness of both the view that incorrect words are not expressive (MBhD 1:10.14-15) and the view that they - rika - -author are (MBhD 1:26.13-14, 27.34-35). The author of the MBhD, as the ka and unlike the author of the Vrtti and Helaraja, does not advocate an absolute denial of the possibility of incorrect words being in some circumstances expressive. In footnote 380 (p. 241), appended to this passage, Houben criticizes Virendra Sharma, saying: Sharma (1977: 147-148) mentions only MBhD 1: 10.14-15 as proof of Bhartrharis denial of direct expressive powers to incorrect words, and neglects the other two places which would have compelled him to modify his position. In footnote 377 (p. 241), appended to the text where Houben says Bhartr hari allows that incorrect words express their meaning directly, he remarks: Exactly the same attitude -pika - passages are as follows: is evinced in the MBhD 1: 26.13-14 and 27.4-5. The Di - ye [te] tv apy apratya - yaka - h | esa eva pakso naite I.10.14-15: apabhram s a pratyayayanti ti But terms that are apabhram s as ... are not meaning conveyors. The position is just this: these do not convey meaning. - vabodham I.26.13-14: evam artha prati sarvo rthah s abdam apas abdam ca prayun kte | tatra s abdenasau pratyayyo netereneti niyamah kriyate In the same way, any meaning provokes both a s abda and an apas abda for the understanding of a meaning. This being so, a restriction is formulated: that is to be made understood with a s abda, not with the other. - t sa - dhuvad apas - api va - caka - h ity evam I.27.4-5: yady apy esah paksah sya abda - vabodhah | iha tv adrst am api drst am phalam tulyam artha phalam abhyudaya iti - dhu terms do, Though this view too is possible, that apas abdas signify as sa nevertheless, they have the same direct result: the comprehension of a meaning. In this case, however, there is an unseen result: prosperity. Clearly, the second passage speaks of a restriction that a meaning is to be - yyah) by one term and not by another, but it does not expressly say conveyed (pratya anything about an apas abda signifying directly. The last passage does indeed use - cakah. However, as noted earlier, this too does not mean that the term in question va necessarily signifies directly. Accordingly, I think Houbens use of directly is exaggerated. It is also an exaggeration to insist that the Vrtti does not allow that apas abdas do signify directly under particular circumstances. The Vrtti on VP 1.181 - rika - , that for speakers among whom (note 136) certainly does admit, as does the ka - dhu terms do not. apabhram s as have become established, they signify and sa In sum, I find that Houbens discussion of this issue lacks cogency. In addition, I consider less than straightforward the strategy of argumentation adopted in approaching the texts in question. Towards the beginning of his book, Houben makes it clear (p. 7) that he considers the author of the Vrtti to be someone different form - rika - s, whom he considers identical with the author of the the author of the ka Mahabhasyadi pika. Subsequently (p. 13), he recommends caution and remarks: Even for someone who would like to establish continuity and unitary authorship of the two works, it is necessary to make a sharp distinction between the two in order to prove this point. In his commentary on VP 3.3.30, he maintains the sharp distinction between the works but, as can be seen from what I have said, he also abandons a great deal of his caution. Here Houben argues on the basis of his own interpretations, which are supported by saying it is very likely that VP 1.183 meant to say what he - rika - does not contain any indication that thinks it did and, negatively, that this ka Bhartrhari would not accept that apas abdas can signify directly. Houben does not demonstrate that what he considers likely is supported by evidence and is not merely a feeling on his part. Yet, starting from his own interpretation, he goes on to argue that - ra - ja has somehow misrepresented what the ka - rika - text says. Hela
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4.6.3. The materials thus presented constitute for Houben (p. 241) ... the - ra - jas commentary on 30 should be evaluated. As background against which Hela - ra - ja as advocating an absolute denial of noted in 4.6.2, Houben characterizes Hela the possibility of incorrect words being in some circumstances significative. Here - ra - jas comments on again, he has exaggerated and his presentation lacks subtlety. Hela -m VP 3.3.30 (see 4.5) immediately set the tone by speaking of the learned (vidva sah). For him, it is they who do not determine a meaning directly from an apas abda, so that - ra - ja says there is no relation between such a term and a meaning. Now, when Hela that apabhram s as are not signifiers (avacakah), he clearly means they are not direct - dhu terms to signifiers, since he immediately goes on to note that such terms bring sa mind, from which one has a comprehension of meaning. He then speaks of the stage at which apabhrams as have become established, and relates this to what Patajali - ra - ja makes explicit the circumstances under which apas says. In addition, Hela abdas signify meanings directly, just as do sadhus abdas: at the stage alluded to in VP 1.181 - raja first brings and the Vrtti thereto. It is also with this very stage in mind that Hela in Patajalis comments (see 4.1) that a restriction is established such that one should - dhus use only sa abdas to signify meanings, which are equally understood from the use of such terms and apas abdas. - ra - ja says concerning the Maha - bha - syas Houben remarks in particular on what Hela samanayam arthagatau s abdena ca pas abena ca. In his comments on VP 3.3.30, Houben notes (p. 241): From the use of arthagatau in the understanding of meaning - ra - ja wants to infer Patajalis reluctance to accept that incorrect words have a Hela capacity to express the meaning. Later (p. 366), Houben translates the pertinent - ra - jas commentary as follows: From the expression arthagati, phrase from Hela understanding of meaning [it is clear that] [Patajali] is unwilling to accept that incorrect words have expressive power towards their meaning. He also remarks (p. 366, note 697): Note the plural in reference to Patajali, whereas Bhartrhari is referred - ra - ja in singular. Of course, having Hela - ra - ja say that Patajali does not wish to by Hela - ra - ja to accept that apas abdas signify directly suits Houbens thesis, under which Hela in effect denies what Patajali actually intended and interprets the issue in accordance - kyapadi -yavrtti, as opposed to the Va - kyapadi -ya itself. On the other hand, with the Va - ra - jas avakarnayanti refers to something Patajanli did. Houben simply asserts that Hela - syaka - ra in the He does not show that Helaraja elsewhere comparably refers to the Bha - ra - ja frequently refers to Patajali, using bha - syaka - ra and bha - syakrt plural. In fact, Hela and, as far as I can ascertain, always in the singular.(FN169) In view of the evidence, -rnapraka -s it is obviously not appropriate to consider that avakarnayanti in the Praki a on VP 3.3.30 has reference to Patajali. Instead, it is proper to consider this an instance - ra - ja here is reporting of an impersonal third plural form (see note 162). That is, Hela an opinion he knows of, one which agrees with what is said in the Vrtti on VP 1.183 - ra - ja also notes immediately thereafter that the author of the text (see note 146). Hela speaks of a non-difference in usage due to the fact that apabhram s as have become established and that under these circumstances the grammar provides a restriction - dhu terms to signify meanings in order to gain merit. such that one should use only sa - ninian tradition. 4.6.4. All this is in accord with what is said throughout the Pa Katyayana begins by saying that the grammar serves to establish a restriction intended for merit. Patajali explains this and says that the restriction is stated showing that, although there is the same understanding of meaning through an apas abda as well as a s abda, only the use of the latter results in merit. It is possible that in saying this Patajali considered that both types of terms signified meanings directly. On the other hand, it is also important to see that Patajali does not discuss this issue, so that a definitive conclusion is not possible. One can only surmise that this point may not even have been a source of contention for Patajali.
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- dhu and asa - dhu As I have noted (4.4), Bhartrhari elaborates on the issue of sa usage in a manner which can be understood as reflecting thinking that occurred over -ma -m the years not only among grammarians but also among Mi sakas and others (see 4.2), including differences of opinion on whether apas abdas signify directly or indirectly and for whom, as well as on whether apas abdas are to be considered truly - dhus corruptions (apabhram s a) of sa abda and how they came about if they are so treated. On the other hand, Bhartrhari does not enter into discussions concerning relative brevity and prolixity in assuming that several apas abdas signify a meaning signified by a single s abda, although we know this dispute goes back much earlier, -ma -m - su - tras (see 4.2.2). Further, by the time of since one finds it in Jaiminis Mi sa - ra - ja, the question of relative brevity and prolixity, centering around whether a s Hela akti should be assumed for an apas abda distinct from a sadhus abda had probably already come to have considerable importance in arguments, although this does not play an - kyapadi -ya or in Hela - ra - jas commentary.(FN170) As shown important role in the Va above (4.2.4-4.3), this issue came to play a large role in discussions concerning - dhu and asa - dhu terms. In this context, let us consider Na - ges sa as comments on the -pa to Bha - sya I.8.21-22. As I have pointed out (note 168), Kaiyata contrasts two Pradi positions: that apabhram s as have come to be established through usage, so that they - dhu counterparts, and that they simply signify directly without calling to mind their sa signify in the same way as sadhu terms. Nages a associates the first position with the - ya view already set forth in VP 1.181, but he puts this in terms familiar from Nya discussions: apabhram s as convey meaning through erroneous attribution of s akti (s aktibhramena). He also describes, in a manner that is familiar, how this comes about - vi - where gauh should be used and B (see 4.2.3-4.2.4): A mistakenly says ga - dhu term gauh , but a understands the intended meaning by remembering the sa - vi -, thus bystander C takes it that B has understood the meaning directly from ga mistakenly attributing to this the capacity to signify a cow. The error that has this - ges source is subsequently continued.(FN171) Na a then notes that Kaiyat a brings in the second position because there is no decisive factor to show that apabhram s as gained their ability to signify in this manner, so that s akti resides also in vernacular terms.(FN172) - ges It is patent, I think, that although Na a does indeed subscribe to the position that - dhu terms, he does not say exactly what apabhram s a terms signify as directly as do sa - ra - ja (see 4.5, with Bhartrhari says. He is concerned with the situation, noted by Hela note 156), such that apas abdas have already achieved currency and some speakers - sa - are also specifically communicate with these only. The arguments in the Maju -ma -m - yika opponents, and the issue of prolixity in assuming aimed at Mi saka and Naiya separate s akti relations between individual apas abdas and a single meaning occupies an important position. In addition, recall that, although Kaundabhat ta cites VP 3.3.30 - ntaka - rika - s (see 4.3.1), he does not attribute the ka - rika - to from Bhat t ojis Siddha Bhartrhari, despite the fact that he subsequently cites verses which he does explicitly - kyapadi -ya. Moreover, the first half of VP 3.3.30 now is said to attribute to the Va - yikas and others, the second half Bhattojis siddha - nta. represent the position of Naiya Given that Bhartrhari quite unpolemically entertains the view that apas abdas signify - dhu equivalents, Kaundabhat tas presentation too cannot through calling to mind their sa be said to agree in full with what Bhartrhari says. I therefore consider Houbens bald - ges assertion (p. 25) that ... Kaunda Bhatta and Na a agree on this point with both Bhartrhari and Patajali ... inappropriate and lacking in perspective. - rika - s which concern 4.6.5. In sum, Houbens discussion of VP 3.3.30 and related ka different views on the status of sadhu and asadhu terms is so intent on demonstrating - dhu terms directly to signify that he overlooks that Bhartrhari definitely allowed for asa
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something he himself makes the very basis of his own study, Bhartr haris perspectivism. With respect to this issue, as with regard to other major disputes, Bhartrhari does indeed present various points of view. He does not polemically attack - dhu terms are other positions, but he shows a clear preference for one: whether asa - dhu terms, even if both come down in uninterrupted considered truly corruptions of sa transmission, the latter are definitely given higher status. This is the tradition of s ist as, to which he adheres. -rnapraka -s 5. To my knowledge, Houbens is the first English translation of the Praki a - rika - s were translated into on the Sambandhasamuddes a. As he notes (p. 23), the ka - ra - jas English earlier by K. A. Subramania Iyer (1971), who also summarizes Hela comments. Concerning this work, Houben says (p. 23): His translations suffice to give a general impression of the subject matter, but are not always precise and are - ra - jas commentary than on the ka - rika - s of the VP. sometimes more based on Hela In some cases, Houbens claim is justified, and he has based his translation on a rigorously established text, so that scholars must be grateful for his effort in producing a disciplined translation of two difficult texts. Houben deserves thanks also for the - rika - s. Nevertheless, as I think I detailed discussions which follow the translations of ka have demonstrated, these discussions show that Houben is at times unjustifiably intent - kyapadi -yavrtti and Hela - ra - jas commentary. on attributing misrepresentations to the Va Despite their rigor and usefulness, some of the translations also do not do full justice to the original and in fact do not compare all that well with those of K. A. Subramania Iyer. I am aware that translations are happy hunting grounds for nitpickers and what many would consider among the most excellent could be subject to criticism at the hands of a determined critic. With all due deference, however, I think it appropriate to consider three examples in Houbens translation to make my point. 5.1. Houbens translation of the VP 3.3.1 (pp. 145, 331) is: The cognition of the speaker, the external thing meant and the own form [of the word] are understood through words which are uttered. The relation of these (namely, the cognition, external thing meant and own form) [with the words which are uttered] is well-established [p. 331: thing-meant]. K. A. Subramania Iyers translation of the same verse is (1971: 76) From words which are uttered, the intention of the speaker, an external object and the form of the word itself are understood. Their relation is fixed. Aside from the use of parentheses and brackets in one, both translations convey just about the same information, although I think one would have to accept that the second is clearer and more felicitous. One phrase which immediately strikes a reader in Houbens translation is cognition of the speaker, as opposed to K. A. Subramania - ra - ja, who Iyers intention of the speaker. Here Subramania Iyer follows Hela - nam - yah. This is appropriate. For the paraphrases ja prayoktuh with prayoktur abhipra translation conveys more precisely what the karika speaks of. Bhartrhari is not talking about any cognitive process or result of such a process. He is talking about a knowledge which a speaker has in his mind and wishes to convey to someone in words. Admittedly, this is a relatively minor point. Yet a translation should certainly aim to convey to readers the content of the original text in a way that is both precise and understandable, and currently fashionable jargon that fails to accomplish this aim should be avoided. 5.2. Consider now the same authors translations of VP 3.3.6ab (Houben, pp. 176, 341; K. A. Subramania Iyer, p. 81): - ya (inherence), they (are Houben: As regards samyoga (connection) and samava tacchabdah:) are called by that word (sc. relation) because they have (as it were) that property (sc. dependence).
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Subramania Iyer: Conjunction and inherence are called relations because they have the attribute thereof. Here again, I think it is fair to say that Subramania Iyers translation not only is more felicitous but also more immediately conveys precisely what the text intends. The - ya) are spoken of as point made is that conjunction (sam yoga) and inherence (samava relations because they have a property which defines what a relation is, namely the property of being dependent. Subramania Iyer translates the Sanskrit taddharmanoh because they have the attribute thereof, but Houben translates because they have (as it were) that property (sc. dependence). He also devotes much of his commentary - rika - to explaining this term, as follows (p. 177): on the ka -hi going with In this interpretation, the first word taddharmanos is a Bahuvri sam yogasamavayayoh. Helaraja takes it as an upama-bahuvri hi, and tad in the compound as a reference to sam bhandha, the topic of the preceding three - ya ka rika s. This gives the following: sam yoga (connection) and samava (inherence) have as it were the property (sc. dependence) of this (relation). That - -bahuvri -hi is not without reason, for if the compound is interpreted as an upama -hi, there would be the suggestion that relation still does it was a simple Bahuvri - -bahuvri -his are not uncommon in have an own property. And since upama Sanskrit, it is not far-fetched to interpret the compound this way, in a context in which identities and near-identities are of crucial significance. A translation without as it were or equivalent would use less words, yet say more than warranted on the basis of the Sanskrit compound. In my translation, tad- in the compound is taken as a direct reference to the property of dependence. In that case, if as it were is omitted there is still no suggestion that relation (pure and simple) is an entity having its own property. Because samyoga (connection) and - ya (inherence) are dependent in some respects, but independent in other samava respects, the words as it were have been added between parentheses. - ra - ja in a note appended to his translation Houben reiterates his difference with Hela -rn apraka -s of the Praki a.(FN173) I confess that I find the discussion cited above confusing. VP 3.3.5 says that there is no term which signifies a relation qua relation (svadharmena in its own quality)(FN174) and that, since a relation is absolutely dependent,(FN175) its characteristic form is not referred to by any particular nominal - ratantrya). term. Accordingly, a relation does indeed have a property, dependence (pa Moreover, Houben does not justify choosing his interpretation of taddharmanoh. He does not demonstrate why one should choose to say that tad in this compound refers - ra - jas interpretation is at least to dharma in 5 and to atyantaparatantratva in 4. Hela - cchabdyam in VP 3.3.6 well grounded in Bhartrharis own diction. Taddharmanos tu ta reflects a reasoning which is formulated in several places, both in grammar and in - ya. For example, in the Maha - bha - sya on 4.1.48, Patajali says that a term x is Nya used with reference to some Y that is not X, a proper referent of x, for four reasons: because Y is located in or on X, because Y has a property or properties that X has, because Y is located near X, and because Y is accompanied by X.(FN176) In consonance with such usage, VP 3.3.6 says that conjunction and inherence are termed - cchabdyam the property of having that for word, i.e., being so designated) (ta sambandha because they have a property that characterizes a relation. The property - ratantryam), as Hela - ra - ja rightly in question is being dependent on something else (pa notes: one considers that the defining feature of a relation is being dependent; conjunction and inherence have this feature with respect to substances and qualities, so that the term sambandha is used for them.(FN177) On the other hand, these are not absolutely dependent in that they can be independent entities served by other, - ra - ja takes taddharmanoh in the ka - rika - as equivalent to dependent, ones. Hence, Hela
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tasyeva dharmo yayoh .(FN178) Taddharman used here is then equivalent to taddharmadharma which has a property that is (like) the property of X, just as ust ramukha (camel-face) used of someone who has a face like that of a camel is - la used with reference to vowels that have tantamount to ust ramukhamukha and tatka - laka - la.(FN179) Of course, this the time duration of a given vowel is equivalent to tatka means that tad of taddharmanoh refers to a relation (sambandha): taddharmah = tasya dharmah property of that = sambandhasya dharmah property of a relation; taddharmadharma = taddharma iva dharmo yasya something which has the property which is the property of that. This makes good sense, since in VP 3.3.4-6 Bhartrhari is speaking of a relation and what its basic characteristic is, then speaks of what conjunction and inherence have in common with this. 5.3. Finally, consider Houbens translation of a passage from the beginning of the - rn apraka -s - pa - vivekenaiva hy arthapara - mars Praki a on 3.3.2 (123.11-2): svaru o bhidhanam ucyate vr ddhavyavaharat tathaiva sambandhavyutpatteh. Helaraja here says that only referring to a meaning as not distinguished from the term that signifies it is spoken of as signifying, and he gives a reason for this: because from the usage of elders the relation between signifier and meaning is learned (... -vyutpatteh) in this way alone. Houben translates (p. 333): For we speak of expression only if the thing-meant is grasped as being not different from the own form, because the relation arises in exactly that way [with the thing-meant being not different from the own form of the word] from the usage of the elders. He thus interprets vyutpatti here to mean - ra - jas view a arising. This is confusing. If Houben understands that in Hela - ra - ja is made word-meaning relation arises in the sense of being produced, then Hela to contradic what he says in his commentary on VP 3.3.1, where he emphasizes that the relation is not a matter of agreed convention established by men. How, then, should one understand that the relation arises ... from the usage of the elders? One - ra - ja is clearly using vyutpatti here in a does not have to make the effort. For Hela well-known sense, with reference to learning a relation. Similarly, vyutpanna refers to - dhu term and a given meaning, and vyutpitsu one who knows the relation between a sa refers to someone who wishes to learn such a relation; see 3.7, with note 49; 4.2.3-4, and note 110. - rika - s of 6. In his work, Houben has undertaken both to translate rigorously the ka the Sambandhasamuddes a and to explain these in a historical and theoretical - ra - jas commentary on these perspective. He has in addition not only translated Hela - ra - ja has verses but also attempted to demonstrate that in important ways Hela misrepresented what Bhartrhari meant to say and that he has done this by accepting interpretations found in the Vrtti. While attempting to maintain a neutral stance towards the question whether the author of the Vrtti is Bhartrhari himself, moreover, Houben nevertheless makes it clear that he considers the Vrtti to have misrepresented what is - rika - s of the Va - kyapadi -yas first ka - nda. said in important ka Houben is to be admired for his ambitious undertaking and for his learning. For reasons given above, I nevertheless consider that his undertaking has not succeeded in some important respects. I think he exaggerates what he calls Bhartr haris perspectivism. He also depends too often on vague argumentation and assumption - ra - ja have misrepresented when he attempts to demonstrate that the Vrtti and Hela Bhartrharis views. And, for all its rigor, Houbens translation at times either fails to - kyapadi -ya clearly or actually misunderstands what Bhartrhari convey the intent of the Va and Helaraja say. I suggest that, instead of seeking to find our interpretations of what Bhartrhari says as opposed to what we consider misrepresentations on the part of commentators like - ra - ja, we would do well patiently to consider with more receptive minds what all Hela
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these authors say as well as full evidence from scholars representing other schools of thought on common topics of discussion.
ADDED MATERIAL
GEORGE CARDONA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA This is a review-article of: The Sambandha-Samuddes a (Chapter on Relation) and Bhartrharis Philosophy of Language: A Study of Bhartrharis Sambandha-samuddes a in the Context of the Va kyapadi ya with a Translation of Hela ra jas Commentary, - rn a-praka -s Praki a. By JAN E. M. HOUBEN. Gonda Indological Studies, vol. II. Groningen: EGBERT FORSTEN, 1995. Pp. 460 + xv. I wish to express here my gratitude to scholars who helped me by reading a draft of this review. I have adopted numerous suggestions Ashok N. Aklujkar made regarding both style and content. Edwin Gerow suggested important stylistic revisions, which I have also adopted. Claus Oetke helped me sharpen thoughts on perspectivism and translation. Had it been possible, I would have taken his cue and gone much more deeply into both these issues in general and in connection with Bhartrhari specifically. Jon Yamashita made several suggestions and corrected many typographic errors.
FOOTNOTES
1 For bibliographic information see Cardona 1976: 295-305; forthcoming, 4.2; and Ramseier 1993. 2 On the cover and the title page sam bandha appearswith m for the bindu - rabut elsewhere sam representing anusva bandha. I shall uniformly write sambandha. 3 I consider this section the weakest part of Houbens book. Thus, in subsection 3.1 -ma -m - , he does not even mention Jaiminisu - tra 1.3.8.24ff., (pp. 46-47), concerning Mi sa where the issue is taken up whether terms like gavi , goni are to be granted authority in the same way that go is; see below, 4.2. - kyapadi -ya and to the Vrttika - ra, 4 In what follows, I shall refer to the Vrtti on the Va although I accept that Bhartrhari is the author of both works, as well as of the - bha - syadi -pika - . Recent arguments that have been proposed to show that Bhartrhari Maha - ra are distinct are not acceptable, in my opinion. For literature and and the Vrttika arguments against some recent claims, see Cardona forthcoming, 4.2.3. - hmanas characterized not only by their speech but also by their 5 These s ist as are bra moral behavior, and they inhabit a particular area in the subcontinent. See Cardona 1997: 550-54 (834). In a more general perspective, s ist as are the carriers of Vedic traditions governing behavior. 6 Another topic that brings up this question is that of how word and meaning are identified with each other. Due to limitation of space, I do not take this up. 7 A comment is in order concerning the physical aspects of this book. In general, the production is good. There are typographical errors, as is to be expected in any book of this size, but misprints are relatively few and mostly self correcting. One error that is not appears on page 241, note 380, where a reference is given to Sharma (1977: 147-148). The correct reference is to pages 247-48. More surprising is the fact that in both copies which I receivedone a review copy, the other a complimentary copy from the publisherpages 145-60 are missing and pages 161-76 are duplicated. Fortunately, M. M. Deshpande did me the favor of copying and sending the missing pages, for which I thank him. 8 I have omitted only a reference to Peri Sarveswara Sharmas article. 9 The article alluded to has been published: Houben 1992-93. 10 Similarly, Houben 1992-93: 2. 11 Italics in the original. 12 I have omitted references Houben gives here to two articles by him.
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- mna - tam -s - t | aprthaktve pi s 13 VP 1.2: ekam eva yad a bhinnas aktivyapa raya aktibhyah prthaktveneva vartate. - hitakala -m - las -s - h | janma - dayo vika - ra - h s ad 14 VP 1.3: adhya yasya ka aktim upa rita bhavabhedasya yonayah. - yate is born, asti is, exists, viparinamate changes, vardhate grows, apaks15 ja i yate diminishes, vinas yati perishes, ceases to be. E.g., Nirukta 1.2. - hita- is equivalent to adhya - ropita-, as the Paddhati notes (18.9-10): 16 adhya adhyahitah adhyaropitah kalah yasyah. - ptyupa - yo nuka - ras 17 VP 1.5: pra ca tasya vedo maharsibhih | eko py anekavartmeva samamnatah prthak prthak. - rapada - rtha - ye ye ca - rtha - h sthitalaksana - h | anva - khyeya -s 18 VP 1.24-26: apoddha ca ye s abda ye capi pratipadakah || karyakaranabhavena yogyabhavena ca sthitah | dharme -n - h sa - dhvasa - dhusu || te lin - stre ye pratyaye ca gam sambandha gais ca svas abdais ca s a sminn upavarnitah | smrtyartham anugamyante kecid eva yathagamam. - ptih. 19 VPVr 1.24-26 (65.1): trisv apy esu s lokesu prastutasya parisama 20 Paddhati 64.21-23: smr tyartham iti: na maya kicid apu rvam kriyate kintu - rtham ast apada - rthi -samanugama iti prakaranaprayojanam a - ha | yatha - gamam iti: smarana notpreksaya api tv agamanusareneti. - gama - t siddha - h sa - dhavo dharmasa - dhanam | 21 VP 1.27: s is t ebhya a arthapratyayanabhede vipari tas tv asadhavah. See below, $4.4.5. - narthika - m ima - m kas - m kartum arhati | tasma - n nibadhyate 22 VP 1.29: na cid vyavastha s ist aih sadhutvavisaya smrtih. - d akrtakam - stram -m | a -s - rabhyate 23 VP 1.43: tasma s a smrtim ca sanibandhana ritya s ist aih sadhutvavisaya smrtih. 24 For the present discussion, it does not matter whether this referent is an individual or an individual qua member of a class delimited by a defining generic property, an external existent, or a mental entity. 25 See Houben, p. 20. - karan asiddha - ntaka - rika -, - karan abhu - s an a, 26 In the Vaiya Vaiya and Vaiyakaranasiddhantamajusa, as well as abbreviated versions of the last two, the - karanabhu - sanasa - ra and Vaiya - karanasiddha - ntalaghumaju - sa -. Vaiya 27 In their Mi mam sasutra and Bhavanaviveka or Vidhiviveka. - yamajari - and Tattvacinta - mani. 28 In their Nya - rthopanibandhana - h | te sarve na prakalperan 29 VP 2.87: iti vakyesu ye dharmah pada - d ava - cakam. padam cet sya - kya - rthe s - d apoddhrte | va - kya - ntaravibha - gena 30 VP 2.88: avibhakte pi va aktibheda yathoktam na virudhyate. - rtham - dite | pika - di yad avija - tam 31 VP 2.72: nirjta padam yac ca tadarthe pratipa tat kim ity a nuyujyate There are words whose meanings are understood, and when their meanings have been understood, one asks what is ... concerning words whose meanings have not been understood. I have translated with plural forms under the assumption that padam and so on are generic singulars. The issue of how to interpret words like pikawhich are used among mlecchas but not among s ist asis taken up in the A ryamleccha dhikaran a of Mi ma m sa su tras (JS 1.3.5.10: coditam tu -yeta - virodha - t prama - n ena), where the siddha - nta is that such terms are to be prati understood in the meanings authorized by mleccha usage and not on the basis of etymological or grammatical analysis. - py ekaja - na - vr - | bha - gam - tyantarasyaiva 32 VP 2.90-92: gavaye narasim he ca te yatha ja - gam adrst am anupas - vaty sadrs am pratipadyate aprasiddham tu yam bha yati | ta asam vidam mudhah sarvatra pratipadyate tatha pikadiyogena vakye tyantavilaksane - nam asato rthasya manyate. For 2.90b, I have accepted the | sadrs asyaiva sam ja
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- na - vr te in accordance with Pun yara - jas commentary, where he reading ekaja -krte paricchinne sati by one paraphrases this with ekajanena abhinnena avrte visayi knowledge: one that is not split up, when ... is covered: when ... has been made the object of ..., has been determined. That is, a gayal or Narasim ha is the object of a single undifferentiated knowledge. The reading shown appears also in K. A. - tha S - s editions, as well as in A. N. Aklujkars arma Subramania Iyers and Raghuna - rika - manuscripts alone, reads unpublished edition. Raus edition, based on the ka ekajanad rte without.... Under this reading, the verse speaks of ones understanding a part that is similar to what pertains to a totally different generic class without actually having a cognition of such a part in a gayal or Narasim ha. In Aklujkars edition, 2.90 - gam adrst am anupas has vapy instead of capy and 2.91 is: aprasiddham tu yad bha yati - vat tv asam - dhah sarvam | ta vidan mu na pratipadyate. - kya - rthah pada - rtho pi tatha - bhavet | evam 33 VP 2.16: as abdo yadi va ca sati sambandhh s abdasyarthena hi yate. I have adopted the reading as abdo instead of - bdo on the basis of the Vr tti. The argument advanced in this verse is Raus as a - t ta Mi -ma -m obviously against Bha sakas, who let individual words signify their meanings and then have these word meanings come into relation to yield a meaning that is not signified by any speech unit. See Cardona 1983: 148-51. - marthyapra - itam - nusan 34 VP 2.73: sa yac ca vyaktyartham anusajyate | s rutir eva gena ba dhika lin gava kyayoh . This alludes to what is said in JS 3.3.7.14: - kyaprakaran astha - nasama - khya - na - na - m - ye pa - radaurbalyam s rutilin gava samava arthaviprakarsat, which is actually cited in the Vr tti on VP 2.75. Direct expression, indirect inference due to the capacity of something said to serve as as indication that something else must obtain, use of a term with another in a single utterance, the mutual expectation between the meanings of terms, collocation, and the use of a derived term are placed on a scale such that each later factor has less weight than an earlier one in case of both coming into play for interpreting a given statement. The - vibha - gapakso na yuktah | s - kyasamava - ye s - vis Vrtti on VP 2.73 (itas ca rutiva rutitva esena paradaurbalyasambhavat) begins by noting that this gives another reason (itas ca) why - gapakso it is not proper to consider an utterance as a single indivisible whole (avibha na yuktah). If both s ruti and vakya come into play (s rutivakyasamavaye), under this view it is impossible to make a decision, because it is not possible that one be less strong than the other, since there is no distinction in that there is simply s ruti. - tisamuddes Bhartrhari takes up the same issues in the Ja a (VP 3.1.75-76) and considers also the possibility that the referents of both terms are directly linked to the action. These issues cannot be discussed here. - jas commentary on VP 2.95. Punyara - ja here also 35 This example is given in Punyara emphasizes that the argument is made against those who assume that only padas are - ny eva satya - ni tada - dadhy a - nayetya - disam - ya -m - pavina -s - t padasya real: yadi pada hita ru a - bha - ve kam avadhim -tva - tadartho vivicyata - m ... niyatasya grhi - | agrhi -ta - vadhau s 36 VP 2.95: rupanas e padanam syat katham cavadhikalpana abde katham cartho vivicyate. - kya - dhikarana 178: tatha - ra - ja - rthava - n drst o ra - jety atra ca na - sty asau | dadhi lV, Va 37 S gaur iti napi mau vidmo dadhy atra gam iti. - kya - dhikaran a 230: as - bde ca - pi va - kya - rthe na pada - rthes v as - bdata - | lV, Va 38 S a a vakyarthasyeva naitesam nimittantarasambhavah. 39 Houben (1993: 160) remarks, It should be pointed out that even according to the view that the sentence is the primary unit, it is acceptable to divide the sentence secondarily into words and these into smaller parts. I cannot enter here into details -pika -. concerning passages from the Di - ja introduces this, saying sphot apaksam apy upasam - ha He says 40 Punyara hartum a ... to summarize the position that an utterance is sphota.
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- rthata - m only one has meaning, 41 K. A. Subramania Iyers edition reads ekasyaiva which is found in the Vrtti on VP 2.75. - ya - na -m - ter va - parikalpane | ekasyaika - rthata -m a - hur 42 VP 2.56: nityatve samuda ja vakyasyavyabhicarini m. This follows karikas (VP 2.54-55) summarizing the position that a sentence is a composite of words whose meanings enter into relations with each other and the view that the sequence of words itself constitutes the utterance. - 2.57. 43 VPTi ka - vas 44 The contrasting views are set forth in VP 2.58: padaprakrtibha ca vrttibhedena - na -m - yonih sam - va - pada -s - . Bhartr hari goes on to varnyate | pada sam hita hita raya - bha - sya where Patajali speaks of padas as products which discuss places in the Maha - t has (padaka - ra - h) produce. authors of padapa - ny a - mna - yapada - ni s - | 45 VPVr 2.58: tatra kesacit pauruseya abdesu smrtipaksasya va - cit tu padaru - pa eva - mna - yah sam - pauruseyi - smrtipaksasya va - | kesa - cit tu kesa hita nityav ubha v apy etau sama mnayau padasamamnayas tu pratipadakatvena nityah - dyatvena nityah | kesa - cin nityasyaikasya - mna - yasya dve ete nitye itaras tu pratipa vibhagavibhagas akti pratipadakapratipattavyarupena vartete. - ra - ja, introduction to VP 3.1.1: iha pada - rtha - s t akaparatva - d va - kyapadi -yasya 46 Hela prathamaka n d ena prayojana dipada rthe nirn i te nantaraka n d opapa ditopapattibhir - kyatadarthayor - khyeyasthitalaks an ayoh - rthayor -t va anva pada nirn i tatva tadaupayikapoddharapadavicarah prakramyate. - poddha - rapada - rtho na - ma - tyantasam -d 47 VPVr 1.24-26 (65.1-3): tatra sr st ah sam sarga anumeyena parikalpitena rupena prakrtavivekah sannapoddhriyate | praviviktasya hi - ra - ti -tam - pam. tasya vastuno vyavaha ru - nuka - ren a yatha - gamam 48 VPVr 1.24-26 (65: 3-4): tat tu svapratyaya - vana - bhya - savas - d utpreksaya - pra - yena vyavastha - pyate. bha a - pravibha - ge s - tmani ka - rya - rtham 49 VPVr 1.24-26 (65: 4-6): tathaiva ca abda - bhya -m - pasamanugamakalpanaya - samuda - ya - d apoddhr ta - na -m anvayavyatireka ru s abdanam abhidheyatvenas ri yate. This point is also emphasized elsewhere. VP 2.12 - vaka states that vrsabha bull (cf. rsabha bull), udaka water (cf. udan water), ya food made from barley (cf. yava food made from barley) contain meaningless parts; they are analyzed, to be sure, and this is done by reasoning through anvaya and vyatireka, but anvaya and vyatireka are merely a means allowing one to speak of such - gair items in terms of grammatical operations describing them through derivation (bha anarthakair yukta vrsabhodakayavakah | anvayavyatirekau tu vyavaharanibandhanam). - rika - , Punyara - ja remarks as follows: There is no understanding Commenting on this ka - va in of the meaning of an element rsabha separately in vrsabha or that of udan, ya - vaka. However, how would one who does not know be instructed in the udaka, ya grammar except through reasoning by anvaya and vyatireka with respect to bases and affixes? Thus also, the only view that is appropriate is that an impartite sentence alone - vakayor vodaya - vas - nugamah is a signifier (nahi vrsabhe rsabhasyodakaya abdayor artha - stre padasya prakrtipratyayayor anvayavyatireka - bhya -m - katham kas cid asti api tu s a vina ajo vyutpadyeta | evaca niram s am eva vakyam vacakam ity eva yuktam). - rapada - rthah s - stravyavaha - ram anupatati 50 VPVr 1.24-26 (65: 6-7): so yam apoddha a s astravyavaharasadrs am ca laukikabhedavyavaharam. - ran am - rvakam iti pu - rva - vastha -m a - ha 51 Paddhati 64.26-65.1: apoddha sam sargapu atyantasam srst a iti | vibhagapurvakasam sarganisedhayatyantagrahanam. - t pr thakkriyety a - ha anumeyeneti | 52 Paddhati 65.10-12: katham niravayavatva - ha kalpiteneti anvayavyatirekabhyam bhaganumanat | tav eva niravayave katham ity a - m anvayavyatirekayor a - ha. Much later, Na - ges | asatyata a again makes the same point - t tadanva - khya - nasya when he says (LM 14): ... prativakye san ketagraha sambhava - pa - yena - sambhava -c - ni laghu ca kalpanaya pada pravibhajya pade
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- gakalpanena - bhya -m - bhya -m prakr tipratyayabha kalpita anvayavyatireka tattadarthavibhagam s astramatravisayam parikalpayanti smacaryah Since it is not possible to grasp a conventional relation with respect to each sentence and also because it is not possible to describe each sentence in a brief manner, teachers fictitiously divided up words and, by assuming bases and affixes as separate parts in a word, posited such and such meaning partswhose domain is solely the grammarthrough assumed anvaya and vyatireka. The assumption that one can thus carry out reasoning from anvaya and vyatireka with respect to putative parts in turn rests on the assumption that certain things that look similar are in fact the same. Bhartrhari makes this point frequently, as in VP 2.92 (see 3.5, with note 32); see also above with note 49. -thair na pravrttinivrttilaksano vyavaha - rah 53 Paddhati 65.15-16: yatah pravibhaktaih padr ... sam srst air eveti. - khyeya -s - h : kes a - cit pada - vadhikam 54 VPVr 1.24-26 (68: 5-6): anva ca ye s abda - khya - nam - kya - vadhikam ekesa - m. My earlier wording (Cardona 1976: 301: ... in anva va addition to the sentence, some take syntactic units (pada) as the units to be analysed) was poor, since one could misunderstand the intent. I should not have used analysed. - nini could be understood to work 55 The Vrtti goes on to give examples such that Pa - rapaks a in addition to the va - kyasam - rapaks a. I cannot under the padasam ska ska discuss this point here. - tre pada - rtho va - kya - rtho va - . The Vrtti goes 56 VPVr 1.24-26 (77.1): sthitalaksanas tu s s on to explain just what this meaning is. I do not think it is necessary to consider this here. - pu - rvapada - rtha uttarapada - rtho nyapada - rthah 57 VPVr 1.24-26 (66.4-67.1): tatha - tipadikr -tho dha - tvarthah pratyaya - rtha ity ekapadava - cyo py aniyata - vadhir bahudha pra pravibhajya kais cit kathacid apoddhriyate. - rthapraka -s - nuka - rena 58 VP 2.7-9: yathaika eva sarva ah pravibhajyate | drs yabheda vakyarthanugamas tatha || citrasyaikasya rupasya yatha bhedanidars anaih | ni ladibhih - khya - nam - kyasya nira - ka -n sama kriyate bhinnalaks an aih || tathaivaikasya va ks asya sarvatah | s abdantaraih samakhyanam sakan ksair anugamyate. In 2.7d, I have adopted - kya - rtha - nugamas tatha - , found in the editions of Raghuna - tha S - , K. arma the reading va A. Subramania Iyer, and Aklujkar, instead of Raus vakyarthavagamas tatha, for two reasons: this accords with 2.9d anugamyate and it is the reading reflected in - jas commentary. Punyara - pade vibhajyante prakrtipratyaya - dayah | apoddha - ras tatha - va - kye 59 VP 2.10: yatha armas editions have padanam upapadyate. K. A. Subramania Iyers and Raghunatha S upavarnyate is described, which occurs also in Punyarajas Ti ka. - kais - pacadha - pi va - | apoddhrtyaiva 60 VP 3.1.1.-2: dvidha cit padam bhinnam caturdha - kyebhyah prakrtipratyaya - divat || pada - rtha - na - m apoddha - re ja - tir va - dravyam eva va - | va padrthau sarvas abdanam nityav evopavarnitau. 61 Due to space limitations, I have omitted discussing evidence from the - bha - syadi -pika - , which, though understandably scantier than the evidence from the Maha - kyapadi -ya and its Vrtti, nevertheless is in harmony with it. Va - ja 3.1.2 (8.4-5): tatha - hi sarves a - m api s - na -m - pa - na -m 62 Helara abda padaru - ma - khya - ta - disvabha - va - na -m - tiva - dimate ja - tir eva - rtho na dravyam | dravyava - dimate tu na ja dravyam eva na jatih. Helaraja goes on to say that the use of va or twice in the - rika - indicates a third view: that a term signifies an individual qualified by a generic ka property. This need not be discussed here. 63 What is more, as is pointed out in the Vrtti on VP 1.24-26 (67: 1-2: sthitalaksanas - kyaru - popagrahah - go - tma tu va kalpitodde-s avibha vis is t a ekah kriya - rthagrahanopa - yapratipa - dyah), in the Pa - nini -ya scheme of things, the fixed vicchinnapada
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- tma - ), qualified by the ka - rakas meaning that is linked to a sentence is an action (kriya that participate in bringing this to completion, and this meaning is conveyed using the meanings of abstracted words as means. One such abstracted word is a verb form. Accordingly, a separate samuddes a is devoted to considering what an action is. - dhus 64 In what follows, I will use sa abda (or simply s abda) and apas abda (or apabhram s a where appropriate) to refer to terms of the types (3) and (4), respectively. In accordance with usage in various schools of thought, I will also use s akti (power, capacity) as a cover term to refer to several things: the capacity that a given term has to produce a verbal cognition (bodhakatva) of a given meaning and a relation that holds directly between a given term and a meaning. The latter is considered to be a - ) that a given meaning be understood from a term or that a term produce wish (iccha the cognition of a given meaning as well as a signifier-significand relation - cyava - cakabha - vasambandha). These positions are most prominently associated with (va - yikas, and Na - ges Kaundabhat ta, the Naiya a. 65 Conversely, if (3) is treated as derived from (4), the latter signify directly and the former signify indirectly, through the intermediary of (4). See 4.4.4. - ya - s - ya - n apas 66 Bh I.5.20-22: laghi abdopades o gari abdopades ah | ekaikasya - vi - gon s abdasya bahavo pabhram s a h | tad yatha gaur ity asya s abdasya ga i - dayo pabhram - h. gopotalika s a - ne dharma iti cet tatha - dharmah pra - pnoti | yo hi s - ja - na - ty 67 Bh I.10.6-8: ja abda - n apy asau ja - na - ti | yathaiva s - ne dharma evam apas - ne py apas abda abdaja abdaja -m adharmah | athava bhu ya n adharmah prapnoti | bhu ya m so pas abda alpi ya sah - h | ekaikasya s -s - gaur ity asya s s abda abdasya bahavo pabhram a h | tad yatha abdasya - vi - gon- dayo pabhram - h. See Cardona 1997: 549 (833). ga i gopotalika s a - pi sama - na - ya - m arthagatau s - pas 68 Bh. I.8.20-22: evam iha abdena ca abdena ca dharmaniyamah kriyate: s abdenaivartho bhidheyo napas abdeneti. See Cardona 1997: 547 (830). 69 Such items are not just nominals. They are also verb forms. Thus, in 1.3.1 vt. 12, - tya - yana says that one reason for listing verb bases in the Dha - tupa - t ha is to prevent Ka the class name dha tu from applying to a set of terms a n apayati and so on - va - dipa - thah pra - tipadika - napayatya - dinivrttyarthah). Patajali gives as examples also (bhu - ja - payati vattati and vaddhati. These are clearly Middle Indic equivalents of Sanskrit a commands, vartate occurs, and vardhate grows, with active rather than middle endings and phonological developments characteristic of Middle Indic. - nini -yas maintained this, as is clear from Ka - tya - yanas 70 From earliest known times, Pa - strena first varttika (siddhe s abdarthasambandhe lokato rthaprayukte s abdaprayoge s a - bha - sya, Bhartrhari dharmaniyamah). In accordance with this, as interpreted in the Maha says that great rsisauthors of sutras such as Panini, authors of varttikas and authors - syashave handed down the tradition that linguistic units, their meanings, and of bha -h s - rthasambandha -s the relations between the two are eternal (VP 1.23: nitya abda - mna - ta - maharsibhih | su - tra - na -m - nutantra - na -m - sya - na -m tatra sa bha ca pranetrbhih). - hman ya - r taka iti 71 Bh. I.19.21-23: as aktija nukaran a rthah | as aktya kaya cid bra - nukaranam - hmany l taka ity a - ha kuma - ry l taka proyoktavya l taka iti prayuktam | tasya bra ity aheti. - stratva - c chabdesu na vyavastha - sya - t. 72 JS 1.3.8.24: prayogotpattyas a - dayah s Bh 1.3.8.24 (II.182-83): gaur ga vi gon i gopotalikety evama 73 S abda - haranam | gos - sa - sna - dimati prama - nam - ga - vya - dayo py uta neti uda abdo yatha kim tatha - uta sandehah | kim atraikah s abdo vicchinnaparamparyo rthabhidhayi itare pabhram s a - dayah. sarve na - mah | kutah | pratyaya - t | prati - yate hi Bh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): sarva iti bru 74 S - vya - dibhyah sa - sna - dima - n arthah | tasma - d ito varsas - rthasya sambandha ga ate py asya
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- si -d eva tatah parena tatas - dita - | karta - ca - sya sambandhasya na - sti -ti a ca parenety ana vyavasthitam eva. Cf. JS 1.1.1.5: autpattikas tu s abdasyarthena sambandhah... - t sarve sa - dhavah sarvair bha - s itavyam | sarve hi Bh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): tasma 75 S sadhayanty artham yatha hastah karah panir iti. - ya hy eta ucca - ryante na - drst a - ya | na hy esa - m ucca - rane Bh 1.3.8.24 (II.183): artha 76 S s astram asti | tasman na vyavatist heta kas cid eka eva sadhur itare sadhava iti. - dhasya bha - gitvam. I have taken 77 JS 1.3.8.25: s abde prayatnanis patter apara prayatnanispatteh as an ablative stating a reason. This is the first interpretation - rila Kuma gives (TV II.211: prayatnanis patter iti purvoktanyayavadharitaprayatnabhivyaktir eva hetutvenopadis yate), although he goes on to give alternative interpretations, which cannot be considered here. - para - dhyeta - py ucca - rayita - yatha - s - mi -ti Bh 1.3.8.25 (II.210-13): tatra 78 S uske patisya - mi - ti dvir upaspr s - dha - t pravr tta kardame patati sakr d upaspraks ya ati | tato para gavyadayo bhaveyur na niyogato vicchinnaparamparya eveti. - yas - nekas 79 JS 1.3.8.26: anya ca abdatvam. Accepting many terms would require also accepting many separate relations between these terms and the single meaning, thus resulting in prolixity. - t. tatra can refer to the items under 80 JS 1.3.8.27: tatra tattvam abhiyogavis esa discussion or to the doubt concerning them. tattvam (being that) is best interpreted to refer to the properties of being correct or incorrect. The property of being learned (abhiyoga) characterizes the authoritative learned (abhiyukta) speakers who institute - rila (TV II.215) and Somes restrictions, that is, the tradition of grammarians. Kuma vara - yasudha - 310) explicitly bring in the connection with grammar. (Nya - upadis - dhur iti sa - dhur ity Bh 1.3.8.27 (II.215): ... yam abhiyukta 81 S anty esa eva sa avagantavyah | - nuru - patva - t. See note 84. 82 JS 1.3.8.28: tadas aktis ca - ca prakr tisa - ru - pyadva - ren a - pabhram - h pra - kr ti -m eva 83 TV 1.3.8.25 (II.214): yatha s a - pya -d s aktim avirbhavayanto rthapratipattav upayogam gacchanti tatha tadas aktis canuru abaras description of what occurs. ity atra varnayisyate. See below concerning S - vya - dibhyah ata esa -m Bh 1.3.8.28 (II.228): atha yad uktam artho vagamyate ga 84 S - dir arthena sambandha iti tadas -m apy ana aktir es a gamyate | gos abdam - n asya uccarayitukamena kenacid as aktya gavi ty uccaritam | aparena jatam sasnadima - rayituka - mo ga - vi -ty ucca - rayati | tatah s - pare pi vivaksitah tadartham gaur ity ucca iksitva sasnadimati vivaksite gavi ty uccarayanti | tena gavyadibhyah sasnadiman avagamyate - po hi ga - vya - dir gos -m abara says tadas | anuru abdasya. As shown, S aktir esa gamyate, and esam must refer contextually to the apabhram s a terms gavi and so on, so that -tatpurusa (= tesa - m as tadas aktih has here to be interpreted as a sast hi aktih) in which tad refers to sadhu terms like go, and as akti denotes the absence of s akti which - dhu terms have. pertains to them: apabhram s a terms lack the s akti which sa - c ca - vibhaktivyatyaye sya - t. 85 JS 1.3.8.29: ekades atva Bh 1.3.8.29 (II.228): ata eva vibhaktivyatyaye pi pratyayo bhavati | as 86 S makair agacchami ty as makaikades a upalabhyate | as makebhya ity eva s abdah smaryate | tato - vya - didars - d gos s makebhya ity eso rtha upalabhyate | evam ga ana abdasmaranam tatah sasnadiman avagamyate. The examples are well chosen: gavi and so on are Middle Indic, and in Middle Indic the instrumental plural and ablative plural merge, with the form etymologically equivalent to the Old Indo-Aryan instrumental serving both functions. 87 The passage in question concerns the issue noted above. The claim is advanced - vi - in signifying what that there is no occasion to assume that the use of terms like ga is also signified by go had a beginning, since it is not recorded in any smrti that such terms had their relation with their referent created by someone. This claim is refuted
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- vi - and so on. This occurs by showing how there can be a beginning for the use of ga in the way that a child pronounces while wishing to utter something else; e.g., katta - and vis n uh . (Br hati - III.143: ... na ca ga - vya - di - na -m and vin n uh instead of karta ghatadi nam iva sambandhasya karta smaryate | tasmad adimattaya avasara eva nasti - la - na -m | satyam yady avasaro na asti tv asau | dr s yate hi ba anyas abdoccaranecchayam api s abdantaroccaranam yatha kartecchayam katteti visnur vinnur iti). - bhipretam: kenacid gos - rayituka - mena 88 R juP III.143: idam atra abdam ucca - da - dina - va - ga - vi - ty ucca - ritam | tatra vr ddha - ntaren a kenacit apat ukaran ena prama - rah prakaranadina tadi yam vivaksam avagamya gos abdartham prati tya tena vyavaha - nya - bhya - m avyutpanna - bhya -m - ntyaivam avadha - ritam: ga - vi -s -d pravartitah | tatra bhra abda evanena yam artho vyavadha nena pratipanna iti | tatas ca tabhya m sa sna dimati - cakatvam - vi -s - ntyaiva - vadha - ritam | tatha - vasa - yinau tena s va ga ab dasya bhra abdena vyavahrtavantau | tadvyavaha rad bala apare vyutpattya vyavaharanti ty adimattaya - rasiddhih. vyavaha - va (see note 90). 89 I say this because Gan ges a uses the perfect babhu - di -na -m - nata -m - ropah 90 TC IV.2.642-43: nanu mleccha sam skrtam aja katham tacchaktya | ucyate | kenacid gaur iti s abde prayoktavye prama da d ga vi s abde prayukte - ya tato ga -m - tya vyavahr tava - n | yatha - huh : vyutpannas tena gos abdam unni prati ambambeti yada balah s iksyamanah prabhasate | avyaktam tadvidam tena vyakte - rs - vi -s - d eva - yam -m -tava - n ity bhavati nirnaya iti | pa vasthas ca vyutpitsur ga abda ga prati avagamya gavi s abdam eva gos aktatvena prati tyanyesam vyutpadako babhuveti | tatah prabhrty apabhram s e s aktatvabhramah. The reference is to VP 1.179 (see 4.4.4). Earlier (TC IV.641), Gan ges a cites also JS 1.3.8.26 (see note 79) to buttress one of - ges the arguments against granting aprabhram s a terms the s akti relation. Na a portrays the same situation; see 4.6.4. - karanabhu - sanasa - ra as 91 In order to shorten the presentation, I am taking the Vaiya my basic source, giving abbreviated references to the Vaiya karan abhu s an a, as appropriate. For the same reason, I do not deal with what Bhat t oji says in his - dhutva and whether apabhram abdakaustubha concerning what constitutes sa S s a terms signifydirectly or indirectlyas well as what is said on the same topic in texts such - and Uddyotana. as the Padamajari - rika - 37): tasma - d bodhakatvam 92 VBh 218 (end of ka s aktir iti mate na kas cid dosa iti siddham. Although this s akti is indeed a capacity that resides in words as signifiers, it is not strictly speaking a relation. - sa - dito bodhadars - d bodhakata - ru - pa - s - pi sya -t 93 VBhS 296: nanv evam bha ana aktis tatra - ca sa - dhuta - pi sya -t | s - dhuta - ya - vya - karana - dhikarane pratipa - dana -t | tatha aktatvasyaiva sa .... VBh. 218 (introduction to karika 38): nanv evam bhasadito pi bodhadars anat tatrapi -ka - ra a - vas - ca s - vis - d ga - vya - di -na -m - dhuta - pattih iti ced s aktisvi yakah ... tatha aktimattva esa sa - karanabhu - sanasa - ra is to the section of the Jaiminisu - tras .... The allusion in the Vaiya discussed above in 4.2.1. - cakah, glossed (VBhS 296) as bodhakah. 94 va - nena. In the Vaiya - karanabhu - sana, Kaundabhat ta says this means due to 95 anuma remembering a sa dhu term or due to erroneously attributing s akti (VBh. 218: - nena sa - dhusmarana -t s - d va - ). In his shorter work, he explains this with anuma aktibhrama - dhu terms (sa - dhus - ya a parallel: apabhram s a terms serve for recalling sa abdam anuma - dhu term) just as written symbols serve to recall spoken sounds; after recalling the sa - dhu. VBhS 296: asa - dhur ga - vya - dir they do not directly signify, so that they are not sa - nena s - ya va - cako bodhakah kais - ca lipivat tesa -m anuma abdam anuma cid isyate | tatha sadhusmarana evopayogo na tu saksattaddvacakatvam ato na sadhutvam iti bhavah. - nam atra smrtih anu pas - n ma - nam iti vyutpatteh Harivallabha (Darpana 296: anuma ca
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- ptija - nam tacchu - nya - na - m api s - bdabodhadars - t) notes that anuma - na here na tu vya a ana refers to recollection and that the anumana in question is not inference through knowledge of pervasion, since one sees that even those who do not have a knowledge - dhu terms. The of pervasion as applicable to inference have a verbal cognition from asa Vrtti on VP 1.180 invokes the example of fire and smoke (see 4.4.4, with note 135), - dhu term calls to mind a sa - dhu term as but this can be used as a parallel: an asa smoke calls fire to mind. - yika - di -na -m - dhim a - ha prathama - rdhena: asa - dhur anuma - nena 96 VBh 218: atra naiya sama - cakah kais - ca-katva - vis - niyamah punyapa - payoh. This is ka - rika - 38 va cid isyate | va ese va of Bhat t ojis Vaiya karan asiddha ntaka rika . Although the verse is taken from the - kyapadi -ya (3.3.30), Kaundabhat t a treats it simply as part of Bhat t ojis text upon Va which he comments. Given that Kaundabhat t a was Bhat t ojis nephew, there is no - karanabhu - sanasa - ra, Kaundabhat ta reason to doubt that this was intended. In the Vaiya introduces the karika saying that Bhat t oji answers in two ways the doubt set forth -s -m - sama - dhatte). However, he later (VBhS 298: ida - ni -m earlier (ity a an ` ka dvidha svamatam aha) introduces the second half of the verse saying that now Bhattoji states his own view. 97 The interpretation preferred by commentators is that apabhram s a terms are - dhu terms: Paddhati on VP 1.177 (141) (230.20-21: apparently identified with sa - da - tmyam iti: sa - dhus - tmata -m - ranta abda pratipadya; Darpan a 297: gopada ucca i ye - pa - t avena ga - vi - ty ucca - ritam | vastuto gopadam evedam iti ta - da - tmyena karan a - sama - na - ga - vya - dis - gava - dipada - rthasya praka -s - ity arthah; Pari -ks a - 297: bha abda aka - da - tmyeti: sa - dhuta - da - tm-yapraka - rakaja - navis -m - pya vety arthah. There is also ta esyata pra another interpretation, under which apabhram s a terms are identified with meanings just - dhu terms are; e.g., VBhSKa -s - 422: ta - da - tmyam upagamyeveti: arthata - da - tmyam as sa ika gagaryadis abde grhi tvety arthah. In view of the comparison the Vrtti draws between this identification and the way of communicating through gestures (see $4.4.4, with note 128), I consider the first interpretation preferable. 98 I assume that this has to do with a child learning to address its mother, so that the - maprasa - da Tripa - t hi - 1990: 129. Of course, amba - mbeti mother uses the vocative; cf. Ra - repeated. can also refer to the nominative amba 99 The reading bambeti yatha balah in VP 1.179a is known from commentators (e.g., -s - 423). See $4.4.4, with note 134. VBhS-Ka ika - ninis, but 100 smrtis astrena. In the first instance this encompasses grammars like Pa also includes other works, such as dictionaries, which have to do with the transmission - trena. of speech, and other authoritative works. There is also a reading smrtima - kyapadi -ye: te sa - dhusv anuma - nena pratyayotpattihetavah 101 VBhS 296-97: uktam hi va - ya | tadatmyam upagamyeva s abdarthasya prakas akah na s ist air anugamyante parya - dhavah | te yatah smrtis - strena tasma - t sa - ksa - d ava - caka - h amba - mbeti yada - ba - lah iva sa a s iksamanah prabhasate | avyaktam tadvidam tena vyakte bhavati nirnayah | evam - dhau prayoktavye yo pabhram - dhuvyavahitah kas sa sah prayujyate | tena sa cid artho -yate. These verses are cited in VBh 219 also after a short series of arguments bhidhi - pabhram - d bodho na sya - d iti va - cyam vyutpannasya that ends with na ca s a - ndas sadhusmaranad bodhopapatteh | uktam hi vakyapadi ya agamasamuccayaka ese Nor should one say that there would be no cognition from an apabhram s a item, since - dhu item. It has been said in the a cognition is accounted for from remembering a sa - nda in the Va - kyapadi -ya. The verses are VP supplement to the Agamasamuccayaka 1.177-80. I have given them as they appear in Aklujkars edition, which differs slightly from Raus. - na -m - ks a - d ava - cakatve kim - nam 102 VBhS 297-98: nanv apabhram s a sa ma - ra - des tulyatva - d iti cet | satyam | tattaddes s aktikalpakavyavaha abhinnesu tesu tesu
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- t | na ca parya - yatulyata - s - | tesa -m -d s aktikalpane gaurava an kya sarvades esv ekatva vinigamanavirahen a sarvatra s aktikalpana | na hy apabhram s e tatha | anyatha - sa - na -m - yataya - gan ana - patteh | evaca s - stu sa - dhutvam iti bha parya aktatvam eva naiyayikami mam sadi nam matam. Kaundabhat ta speaks of verbal communication and - ra - deh), since with respect to sa - dhu terms not only usage but also so on (vyavaha grammar and lexicon have authority. As can be seen the arguments are those - dhu and apabhram considered earlier ($4.2.1). The claim that the same sa s a terms are differentiated in that the former are used everywhere is not acceptable even from - ninian tradition, as Na - ges Pa a later notes (see $4.3.2, with note 118). - ha va - cakatva - vis - vah : 103 VBhS 298-99: idani m svamatam a es e ceti | ayam bha - na - m as - t | na ca sa - dhusmarana - t tato bodhah apabhram s a aktatve tato bodha eva na sya | ta n avidus a m pa mara n a m api bodha t | tes a m sa dhor abodha c ca | na ca - t tebhyo bodhah | bodhakatvasya - ba - dhena tadgrahasya - bhramatva - t. Cf. VBh s aktibhrama 220: atrocyate: apabhram s a na m abodhakatve tato bodha eva na sya t | na ca - dhusmarana - d bodhah | tam avidusa -m - yama - natva - t tasma - d aja - yama - natva - c ca ... sa ja napi s aktibhramat tato bodhah | bodhakatvasyabadhena tajjanasyabhramatvat. 104 These speakers are usually viewed as incapable of pronouncing in certain ways (viguna lacking a quality) due to some fault in their articulatory organs. E.g., Darpana, -ksa - 300: vaigunyam - pa - t avaru - pam. Vrsabha, on the other hand, says that Pari ca karana the speakers can be faulty also due to inattention, laziness, and deprivations such as thirst, and hunger: Paddhati 232.25-233.1: vigun es v iti: [a]s akti[h ] pramadalasyatrtksudhadi. - kyapadi -ye: pa - ramparya - d apabhram - vigunesv abhidha - trsu 105 VbhS 300: uktam ca va s a | prasiddhim agata yesu tesam sadhur avacakah | daivi vag vyavaki rneyam as aktair - trbhih | anityadars -m - de buddhiviparyayah iti. The ka - rika - s cited abhidha ina tv asmin va - nda of the Va - kyapadi -ya (1.181-82). VBh 220 are the next-but-final verses of the first ka - kyapadi -ye. Kaundabhat ta does not give introduces the same verses with uktam hi va - cakah is meant which an exegesis of the first karika cited but does say that by ava does not produce a verbal cognition of a meaning (abodhakah), and he notes that this is based on the position that the capacity in question consists only in producing a - cakah abodhakah | bodhakatvasyaivoktari -tya - s - d iti cognition. VBh 220: ava aktitva bhavah; VBhS 300: avacakah abodhakah. I will take up the second verse in connection - kyapadi -yavrtti interpretation (see $4.4.5). with the Va - dhuta - tes a -m - d ity ata a - ha niyama iti | 106 VBhS 301-2: nanv evam sa sya - ya sa - dhu - na -m - dhubhir bha - s itavyam iti vidhih | pun yajananabodhana sa papajananabodhana ya na sa dubhir iti nis edhah | tatha ca pun yajananayogyatvam - dhutvam | tatra pa - pajananayogyatvam asa - dhutvam. sa - ca s - dhanes v iva - pabhram - hakas 107 LM 125: sa aktih sa s es v api ktigra iroman er - rasya tulyatva - t. vyavaha - dhusmarana - t tato bodhah ... iti va - cyam. 108 LM 125-26: na ca sa - dhusv anuma - nena pratyayotpattihetavah | amba - mbeti yada - ba - lah 109 LM 125-26: te sa s iks yama n ah | avyaktam tadvida m tena vyakte bhavti nis cayah iti haryukteh | - nam atra ja - nam | sa - dhuvisayasmaranenety arthah | tadvida -m - dhuvida -m anuma sa | asadhoh sadhuprakrtikatvat sadrs yena tajjanam. - dhusmaranam - pi bodha - nubhava - t tadva - cakasa - dhus - nata -m 110 LM 126: sa vina abdam aja bodhanapattes ca. The second objection could equally apply with respect to persons - thas who know only apabhram s a usage. In my presentation, I have followed Vaidyana Kala commentary on the assumption that, being Nages as direct student, he reflects - notes that there are two sorts of persons who are learned the authors intent. The Kala - h): those who know each particular Sanskrit word and in Sanskrit usage (vyutpanna those who are lacking in such detailed knowledge. The second objection is intended
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- 127: nanu vyutpanna - dvividha -h for the second type of speaker. Kala tattadvacakasam skr tavis esajanavantah tadvikala s ca | tatra dyanam tatha bodhe pi - dhusmarana -d dviti yanupapattir datta | sa na yukta samanyajapakatvena rupena tatsa bodhasambhavat ata aha: tadartheti. - 125: etadarthabodhakam - dhupadam -ty anuma - na - d bodha 111 Kujika kicit sa bhavisyati iti matam nirakaroti: nartheti. - pakatvena smaran am - rthopastha - pakam 112 LM 126: tadarthaja tu na s aktatavacchedakanupurvyagrahat. - cakasarvana - masmarana - nanubhava - c ca. 113 LM 126: tadva - ges - used in the same sense as 114 In the present context, Na a brings into play gagari ghat a jug, water pot, jar. It is also possible in other contexts to consider this an -, known as a sa - dhu term synonymous with manthani -, referring apabhram s a for gargari to a vessel in which curds are put and churned; cf. Amarakos a 2.9.74: manthani - same. gargari - ritasyaiva bodhakatvena smrtasa - dhuto bodha - sambhava - c ca. 115 LM 126: ucca - d bodhah pu - rvapu - rvabhrama - c cottarottarabhrama iti 116 LM 126-27: na ca s aktibhrama - cyam pa mara n a m s aktyagrahe pi tadbhramopapattir iti va | ghat atvavis is t aghat a diru pa rthaniru pita y a ghat a dipadavr ttitvena gr hi ta ya - nupu - rvi -katvaru - pavis - dha - ranadharmadars - bha - vena ca bhinna esadars anasattvena sa ana gagari padadau bhramanupapatteh. - kenacid gagari -ti prayukte mba - mbetya - da - v iva ghata iti 117 LM 127-28: yadi tu as aktya - sya bodha iti sadhus abdasmaranat prayojyasya bodhe tat asthasya gagari s abdad eva - dyasya s - lakas - nyes a - m api | tad uktam -: bhramen a aktibhramas tanmu ca harin a tadatmyam upagamyeva s abdarthasya prakas akah | iti | ivas abdena tadupagamasya bhramatvam sucitam. Nages a also has the defender of this view invoke JS 1.3.8.28 - : tadas - nuru - patva - d iti abara (see 4.2.1), LM 130: tad uktam and S jaiminina aktis ca - s yakr ta - ca tatroktari - tya - s tadbha aktibhrama ity ucyate.... The section cited here, beginning with yadi tu ... ity ucyate (But if the following is said ...) gives the argument refuted immediately afterwards (see next note). - pratyekam 118 LM 130-31: ... tada tattatsam skr tasya tattadapabhram s ena vinigamanavirahat tesu s aktih | na ca sakalades as ist aparigrhi tatvam vinigamakam | - kambojes u vika - ra evainam a - rya - bha - s anta itya - dibha - s yari - tya s avatir gatikarma tattaddes aniyatasam skrtesu s aktisiddhyanapatteh. The reference is to a Mahabhasya - ges passage (I.9.24-10.1), where Patajali illustrates dialectal usage. Na a goes on to give an additional argument, involving Prakrit poetry, which I omit. -s - draba - la - na -m - dha - v arthasam 119 LM 131: ata eva stri u prayukte sa s aye tadapabhram s ena nirnayah. Presumably Nages a reflects the kind of situation found nowadays among panditas, who speak and write Sanskrit with what amounts to native control but normally interact in a vernacular. In Varanasi, even rickshaw drivers control a register of Hindi and Bhojpuri that is fairly Sanskritized, so that they can understand a great many Sanskrit words. On the other hand, even the best pandita sometimes cannot make clear in Sanskrit alone something he wishes to explain and then resorts - sa - ya - m). The situation Na - ges to invoking a term from the vernacular (... iti bha a speaks of was known much earlier, since the Vrtti on VP 1.181 speaks of this: see note 136. See Aklujkar 1996, Deshpande 1979, Hock and Pandharipande 1976 for recent discussions of issues concerning the use of Sanskrit at various times in Indian culture. - dhutvam - karan avyan 120 LM 139: sa ca vya gyo rthavis is t as abdanis t ah punyajanakatavacchedako jativis esah. - dhutvam - karan a - nva - khyeyatvam 121 PLM 49: sa ca vya punyajanakatavacchedakadharmavattvam va tadbhinnatvam asadhutvam. In accordance with manuscript evidence, I have emended tadbhinnam of Kapil Devas edition to tadbhinnatvam, which appears in my critical edition (19).
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- rahi -no yo gaur iti prayuyuksite | tam apabhram 122 VP 1.175-176): s abdah sam ska s am - dayah s - h sa - dhavo vis aya - ntare | icchanti vis is t a rthanives inam || asvagon ya abda - t sarvatra sa - dhutvam nimittabheda ca vyavasthitam. I have kept the reading prayuyuksite, which appears in editions other than Raus. This has support from manuscripts as well as commentaries and is also syntactically preferable. The reading prayuyuksyate is Raus compromise accounting for prayuyuksate, prayuyum ksate, and prayuyuksite found in karika manuscripts. - vapane gon- bhidha - ne ca - sva ity etayor 123 VPVr 1.176/140 (229.9): a i ti svaviprayoga avasthitam sadhutvam. - sa - sna - dimati hres a - dilin - ntara -t 124 VPVr 1.176/140 (230.1-3): tatha ge ca nimitta pravrttayor anyatra visaye labdhasam skarayoh sadhutvam eva vijayate | goni va gaur - rana - divisaya -d a - vapanatvasa - ma - nya - d abhidhi -yate | tatha - vidyama - nam iti bahuksi radha svam asya so yam asva iti. The same is said in the Di pika (I.9.26-10.3) on the - bha - sya passage (I.2.19) where the verse yas tu prayun Maha kte kus alovis ese ... is - dhuh kasmim - dhur ity a - khya - yate cited: sa eva s abdo rthavis ese kasmim s cit sa s cid asa - gon- sna - dimaty asa - dhuh | tatha -s - dimati sa - dhur na | yatha is abdah sa vas abdah kesara nihsva iti | asva iti nirdha ne sadhur naikas aphadilaksane | yadi tu goni s abdo pi nimitta ntara t sa sna dimati prayujyategon i va gon i tisa dhur eva sya t | as ve - svas - bha - vad va - rakam - ta sa sa - dhur eva. The Vr tti on VP va abdam dhana prayuji - sna - dimaty eva labdhasvaru - pa - h sa - dhutvam 1.175/139 (229.5-6: te ca sa vijahati | - ntare tu prayujyama - na - h sa - dhava eva vija - yante | na hy etes a -m artha rupama trapratibaddham asa dhutvam) ends on the same note: terms considered - dhu terms only when they have a particular corruptions of others lose their status as sa form used with respect to a particular meaning, and the very same forms are - dhu when used in some other meaning; their not being sa - dhu is not recognized as sa linked solely to form. - rah | na - prakrtir 125 VPVr 1.175/139 (229.1-5): s abdaprakrtir apabhram s a iti san grahaka apabhram s ah svatantrah kas cid vidyate | sarvasyaiva hi sadhur evapabhram s asya prakrtih | prasiddhes tu ru dhitam apadyamanah svatantryam eva kecid apabhram s a - prama - da - dibhir va - ga - vya - dayas tatprakrtayo labhante | tatra gaur iti prayoktavye s aktya pabhram s ah prayujyante. - dhusv anuma - nena pratyayotpattihetavah | ta - da - tmyam upagamyeva 126 VP 1.177: te sa s abdarthasya prakas akah. As Vr sabha notes, the ka rika is susceptible to different interpretations that depend on different syntactic connections. I consider the - nena in construction with sa - dhusu to be preferable interpretation which takes anuma both in that it maintains the integrity of the half-verse and in that the Vrtti on VP 1.180 agrees with this (see note 135). 127 Such gestures are considered to convey certain meanings without ones having to - bha - s ya on 2.1.1 (I.363.25-26) and 2.1.34-35 (I.388.3-4), use words. In the Maha Patajali remarks that many meanings are understood without the use of words: - h gamyante ksinikocaih pa - niviha - rais antarena khalv api s abdaprayogam bahavo rtha ca ... - hi sa - dhu - na -m - na -m 128 VPVr 1.177/141 (230.8-10): apabhram s a s abda vis aye - s tatha prayujyamana yathaivaksinikocadayah paricayad upagrhi tasvarupa iva prasiddha - dhuprana - dikaya - rtham - yayanti. The same parallel is invoked in the Vrtti on VP sa pratya 1.24-26 (72.3), 1.183 (235.5). - ksinikoca - dayo [na] sa - ksa - c chabda - rtham - yayanti 129 Paddhati 230.25-231.1: yatha pratya api tu pu rvam san ketava kyam ... upagr hi tasvaru pa iveti: tasya san ketava kyasya - pam a - tmani nives - pata -m a - padya sa - ksa - d iva pratipa - dayanti. svaru ya tadru - ksa - d abhidha - nam - ntaropanya - sah. 130 VPVr 1.177/141 (230.9-10): tatra sa neti s loka - d ete gos 131 Vr tti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.1-3): atha kasma abdasya ga vya dayah pary a ya na vija yante | na hi s is t asama ca raprasiddher anyad
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- res u smr tinibandhanes v arthes u nimittam abhidhi - yate | ga - vya - dayas etatpraka cet paryayah syur ete pi s ist air laksanair anugamyeran prayujyeram s ca. 132 Vrtti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.3-5): yas ca pratyakspaksena prayojakesv - dhuh | sa - ksa - t tu prayojakam - cyam artharu - pam arthesv abhidheyesu pravartate sa sa va - dhubhih pratya - yyate. Aklujkar suggests emending to asa - ksa - t and asa - dhubhih. On the sa other hand, tu can be justified, since there is a contrast in that the second sentence deals with the other side of the coin: the meaning that is to be signified in contrast to the term which signifies. -d a - ha: na s 133 Vrtti, introduction to VP 1.178/142 (231.5), VP 1.178: tasma ist air - h. anugamyante paryaya iva sadhavah | te yatah smrtis astrena tasmat saksad avacaka - mbeti yada - ba - lah s - n ah prabha - s ate | avyaktam 134 VP 1.179-181: amba iks ama tadvidam tena vyakte bhavati nis cayah || evam sadhau prayoktavye yo pabhram sah - dhuvyavahitah kas -yate || pa - ramparya - d apabhram prayujyate | tena sa cid artho bhidhi s a vigunes v abhidha tr s u | prasiddhim a gata yena tes a m sa dhur ava cakah . I have - mbeti and prabha - sate found in most editions, including accepted the readings amba - no pabha - sate. See 4.3.1, with notes Aklujkars. Rau has ambvambv iti and s iksama 98-99. - ya -m - ci sa - dhuvisaye pas - h prayujyante 135 VPVr 1.180/144 (232.8-10): san kirna va abda - laks an avidah sa - dhu - n pratipadyante | tair eva sa - dhubhis tadartham / taih s is t a - m. K. A. abhidhi yamanam pas yanti | anuma nam tudhuma ivagner asadhur itaresa - tha S - both have anuma - nas tu in the Vrtti text, but arma Subramania Iyer and Raghuna this is an error. The Paddhati correctly has anuma nam, which appears also in - nam here as a derivate signifying an Aklujkars edition. I have interpreted anuma instrument. - bhya - sa - t stri -s - draca - nda - la - dibhir apabhram -h 136 VPVr 1.181/145 (233.1-4): iha u s a prayujyamanah tatha pramadyatsu vaktrsu rudhim upagata yena tair eva prasiddhataro - rah | sati ca sa - dhuprayoga - t sam - pabhram vyavaha s aye yas tasya s as tena samprati - dhum nirnayah kriyate | tam eva ca sadhum vacakam pratyaksapakse manyante sa - numa - napakse vyavastha - payanti. The ka - rika - directly states that since apabhram ca s as - dhu term does not signify had become established among such speakers, for them a sa - dhur ava - cakah). (sa -rn - eti: sambhinna - ka - lusyam upani -ta - ) first glosses 137 Vrsabha (Paddhati 233.20: vyatiki -rna - with sambhinna - (mixed, identical), then adds ka - lusyam upani -ta - brought to vyatiki the state of being dirty. The Vrtti also interprets vyatiki rna to mean mixed, since it -ryama - na - (see note 140) in speaking of speech becoming mixed with uses san ki apabhram s as. Elsewhere, Bhartrhari refers to the impurities that affect speech and for - ram apavargasya va -n - na -m which grammar is the cure (VP 1.14ab: tad dva mala cikitsitam) as well as of the impurities affecting the body, speech and the mind, which are purified through teachings of medicine, grammar, and those teachings that concern - yava - gbuddhivis aya - ye mala - h samavasthita -h | the inner self (VP 1.174: ka - laksana - dhya - tmas - strais tesa -m cikitsa a vis uddhayah). These impurities of speech are apabhram s as. Accordingly, I have used defiled here. - va - g vyatiki -rneyam as - trbhih | anityadars -m 138 VP 1.182: daivi aktair abhidha inaa tv asmin vade buddhiviparyayah. - m aviccheda - d anyas - | yo nyah prayujyate 139 VP 1.183: ubhayesa abdavivaksaya - d iti: s abdo na so rthasya bhidha yakah . The Paddhati (234.20-21: aviccheda - dhvasa - dhuvibha - gasmaranasya - viccheda - t) relates the continuity to the distinction made sa between sadhu and asadhu terms: the recollection of these being distinct is without - tha S - (Amba - kartri - 1.183/155: ubhayes a -m - na -m arma interruption. Raghuna s abda apas abda na ca na dau sam sa re viccheda t) relates the continuity to s abda and apas abda.
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- yate: pura - kalpe svas -rajyotisa -m - na -m 140 VPVr 1.182/146 (233.7-234.2): s ru ari manusya yathaivanrtadibhir asan ki rna vag asi t tatha sarvair apabhram s aih | sa tu san ki ryamana - rvados a - bhya - sabha - vana - nus an - t ka - lena prakr tir iva tes a -m -m - d him pu ga prayoktn a ru upagata. - dinah. In view of what it says subsequently, the view 141 The Vrtti says simply anityava in question is that the sadhu terms are not eternal. This is a view explicitly mentioned -pika - on Maha - bha - sya I.6.12 (kim - hosvit ka - ryah), where in the Di punar nityah s abda a Bhartrhari contrasts two views (Di pika I.16.28-17.2): kecid evam manyante: ya evaite - krta -h s - s ta evaite nitya - h | prakrtau bhava - h pra - krta - h | anye manyante: iyam pra abda daivi vak | sa tu purusas akter alasyad va praki rna yatha svasti ti s iksamano balo - rayati -ti Some say that pra - krta terms alone are eternal. These are pra - krta in nyathocca that they have their source in the original. Others maintain that divine speech has become mixed with impurities due to the incapacity or laziness of men, as when a child learning to say svasti pronounces this otherwise. - cah paramo rasah 142 Commenting on VP 1.12, the Vrtti says that what is meant by va - dhu is the highest essence of speech is the mass of words whose status as sa established because they signify and are sources of felicity (VPVr 42.6-7: paramo - cakatva - bhyudayahetutva - c ca vyavasthitasa - dhubha - vah s - ho rasah : va abdasamu -yate). In the present context, this very set of words is viewed differently, by bhidhi - dhu terms neither eternal nor sources of merit. For them, those who do consider sa - dhu terms are not original but derivate, and the original stuff (prakrti) from which sa - ra) is the speech forms others call apas they derive as modifications (vika abda and - vah | apabhram s a. Vrsabha (Paddhati 234.15-16: prakrtau bhavam iti: prakrtih svabha - va), apabhram s ah svabhavikah) notes that prakrti signifies somethings nature (svabha but immediately goes on to say that apabhram s as are natural. That is, although from - dhu terms are eternal and original the point of view of those who maintain that sa apabhram s as are corruptions and only apparently have the status of original stuff (prakrtir iva), from another point of view these very terms are treated as established - dhu usage. norms that are sources of artificial sa 143 This is a view found elsewhere, as is well known. Thus, in his commentary on - vya - lan - ra 2.12, Namisa - dhu accounts for pra - krta in several ways. He first describes Ka ka it in the usual manner, as a derivate with the taddhita suffix an added to a pada N-7, with a seventh-triplet ending, to form a derivate meaning located in X (tatra bhavah: - dhya - yi - 4.3.53). He notes that pra - krtam thus derives from prakrti-i and means Ast a prakrtau bhavam, and that the source denoted by prakrti here is the inherent speech activity of all creatures, without the adornment endowed by grammar and such. He - kr ta is that speech itself (pra - kr teti: sakalajantu - na -m then says that alternatively pra vyakaranadibhir anahitasam skarah sahajo vacanavya parah prakr tih | tatra bhavam - pra - krtam), then goes on to give other explanations; see Pischel and Jha saiva va 1965: 14 (16). In the Gadavaho (93ab: sayalao imam vaya visanti etto ya nenti - ya - o) Va - kpati similarly says that all languages emanate from and go back to Pra - krta. va On tadbhava, see Kahrs 1992. 144 Vrsabha (Paddhati 234.16-18) remarks that sambhinnabuddhibhih refers to men who cannot discriminate between what women may be approached or not, what may - stika). He be said or not, and so on, and that this amounts to speaking of heretics (na is not alone in considering that sambhinnabuddhi refers to a special type of person, a - stika; Kaiyata does too (Pradi -pa II.389). na - dinas tu ye sa - dhu - na -m 145 VPVr 1.182/146 (234.2-5): anityava dharmahetutvam na - disadrs - dhva]sa - dhuvyavastha -m pratipadyante mallasamaya i m [sa manyante te prakrtau - na -m - ham a - caksate | vika - ras tu pas - d vyavastha - pitah bhavam prakrtam s abda samu ca - ra - dibhir nirnyah sambhinnabuddhibhih purusaih svarasam ska i yate.
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- m api ca naiva pura - kalpo na ca daivi - va - g asan -rna 146 VPVr 183/147 (235.1-5): yesa ki kadacid a si t tes a m api gamya gamya divyavastha vad iyam sa dhvasa dhuvyavastha - ba - laprala - pavad arthesu nityam avicchedena s ist aih smaryate | tatranyas abdavivaksaya - cakau prayujyamano yah s abdo rudho yas ca na rudhas tav ubhav apy arthasya na va - dhuvyavahita - va - bhavaty arthapratipattir abhya - sa - d va bhavatah | tatra tu sa pramattana m aks inikoca divat sampratyayama tram ja yate. Aklujkars edition differs slightly from that of K. A. Subramania Iyer, which I have followed above. 147 For Houbens position on VP 1.183 see 4.6.1. - nya - ni - dhana - ni 148 VPVr 1.27 (82.1-4): yathaiva dharmasa - ramparya - gama - vicchedena - gata - ny anabhis -ya - ni vyavasthita - ni yatha vis ist opades apa an kani ca pratisiddhani him sanrtasteyadi ni as ist apratisiddhani ca hikkitahasitakanduyitadi ni - sa - dhvasa - dhuvyavastha - nam apy anavacchinnapa - rampar yam anabhis -yam tatha an kani yathagamad eva siddham iti. I have adopted here the text that agrees best with the - bha - sya and the Paddhati. Maha -a - navis aya - seyam - karan asmr tih | avicchedena s - na - m idam 149 sa dhutvajn vya is t a smrtinibandhanam. The second half of the verse is subject to different syntactic interpretations. If idam is coreferential with smrtinibandhanam and the latter is a -tatpurusa, both refer to a composition relative to a smrti, a tradition. Under this sasthi - na -m interpretation, s ist a smrtinibandhanam is a construction of the type devadattasya - na - m is construed with smrti, gurukulam (Devadattas teachers home) such that s ist a referring to the recollection (smrtih = smaranam) of s ist as. This recollection is carried on without interruption (avicchedena). That is, s ist as continue to carry on a tradition of correct usage, which is memorialized in the grammar. On the other hand, if idam is - karanam)in accordance with vya - karanasmrtih considered to refer to the grammar (vya -hi, then of the preceding half-verseand smrtinibandhanam is interpreted as a bahuvri this refers to the grammar as a work whose cause is the continuous recollection of s ist as. 150 VPVr 1.158/133 (212.8-213.2): yathaiv - su bhaks ya bhaks yagamya gamyava cya va cya divis a ya vyavasthita smr tayah ya - ca - ram - na vyatikra - manti tatheyam api va - cya - va - cyavis nibaddham sama s ist a esavisaya vyakaranasmrtih | smrto hy arthah paramparyad avicchedena punah punar nibadhyate - ca - ra - ya -m - v anibandhanas - ya -m - ca - ra - vicchedenaiva prasiddhasama ca smrta abda s istasama smaryate. I have adopted Aklujkars reading instead of Subramania Iyers - ca - ra - ya -m prasiddhasamaya . 151 This is made also a theoretical issue: must one grant s akti to apas abdas at the risk of prolixity or is there some way to avoid this? However, Bhartrhari does not go into this debate. - ra - ja 3.3.30 (143.12-13): daivi - va - g as -rna - ... anumitamu - laprakrtir 152 Hela aktair vyavaki vidusam vacika. I have shown a lacuna where K. A. Subramania Iyers edition has - divad (as that of a child, as that of a blind person). Aklujkar suggests balavad andha - lapada - mba - divad (as a childs word amba and such). Houben says the emendation ba - lavad amba - divad and translates (p. 364), like [the (p. 364 note 687), Emend to ba word] amba etc. [of incompetent persons] like children. I suggest one should also - labamba - divad, which has support from testimonia (see notes 99, 134). consider ba 153 vidusam. These are clearly the s ist as, speakers who know correct speech. As Virendra Sharma suggests (1977: 235) these same learned persons can be referred to - rika - , though Kaundabhatta and Bhat toji consider kais by kais cit in the ka cit to refer to other upholders of a particular view. -m - t sa - ks a - d avasyanti -ti 154 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.13-14): na hi vidva so rtham apas abda napas abdanam arthena kas cit sambandhah. - kalpe nrta - dibhir iva - pabhram - va -g 155 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.14-18): ata eva pura s air api rahita asi d iti brahmakanda uktam | avacaka apabhram s ah | te tu sadrs yat sadhus abdam
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- payanti tebhyo rthasampratyaya iti | tatha - ca san - rah s anuma grahaka abdaprakr tir apabhram s a iti. See notes 125, 140. - hulya - d anrta - divad va -n - na -m 156 Hel. 3.3.30 (143.18-144.1): adyatve tv adharmaba mala ru d hih | tatha ca vyavadha nenaiva pas abdebhyo rthaprati tau na mlecchitavai - pabha - s itavai sa - dhubhir bha - s itavyam iti s - strapra - ma - n ya - t sa - dhu - na - m eva na a dharman gatvam iti tadanusrtih s astrena. na mlecchitavai ... is an implicit reference to - bha - s ya I.2.7-8. The phrase tadanusr tih s - strena following after them by the Maha a grammar is like s ist air anugamyante in VP 1.178 (see 4.3.1, 4.4.3). - dhus 157 eva only: that apas abdas are preceded by an unsplit sa abda is alone concluded. The view expressed accords with Bhartrharis emphasis on granting primacy to indivisible units from which parts are abstracted; see 3.2. Similarly, in the - cya - sa - sarvas - na -m -s Dravyasamuddes a (VP 3.2. 16: va abda s abda ca na prthak tatah - na - tmanor iva), Bhartrari stresses the unity in the | aprthaktve ca sambandhas tayor na - ), that is, in Brahman, of all words and all things signified: that ultimate being (satta - prakrtih) spoken of in the preceding ka - rika - is what all ultimate original source (para words signify and these words themselves are not distinct from it, so that there is a relation between them only as though it were between two separate entities, although there is no true distinctness. - bhedapu - rvakatva -t 158 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.1-3): tatha ca bhedasya purusavikalpaniyamenanantatvad apas abdanam abhinnasa dhus abdapurvakatvam eva -yata iti s - . Hela - ra - ja literally says nis ci abdaprakrtir apas abdah siddha iti s abda eva vidya that the s abda alone is knowledge (s abda eva vidya ), but this is surely to be - visayah), as understood as based on a s abdas being the object of knowledge (vidya arma (Ambakartri 3.3.30, p. 260). The usage is comparable to noted by Raghunatha S - ), since Bhartrharis speaking of a sentence meaning as a flash of knowledge (pratibha it is the object of a single cognition. 159 The ultimate level of speech in Bhartrharis system is identical with Brahman; see the literature referred to in Cardona 1976: 302 with note 359. - vidya - vastha - bhinnabrahma - tmika - tatha 160 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.3-5): tad atra yatha sadhus abdavastha vidya yatha ca vidya yam bhedo vitathah tathapabhram s avastha -n - peti parama - rthataditara - vastha - pekso vikalpah. va malaru - bhidha - ne there being a signifying of a meaning. 161 He does not also say artha - lavadha 15.67: abhidha - ya ru - ksmam iti ma is 162 avakarnayanti. Cf. avakarnya in S upa sma gama iti prthasuter i ritam | vacam anunayaparam sa tatah sahasavarkarnya - ya sam niriya sadah. After delivering himself of the harsh statement and hearing with - la) quickly left the assembly. is scorn Yudhis t hiras conciliatory Dont go, (S upa - tha notes that avakarn ya means after hearing without respect (ana - darena Mallina s rutva). I take avarkarnayanti as an impersonal third plural of the type ahuh ... say. See 4.6.3. - das - peksam eva sama - na - ya - m arthagatau s 163 Hel. 3.3.30 (144.5-9): avidya a abdena - pas - syam | arthagata - v iti vacana - d artha - bhidha - nam apas - na -m ca abdena ceti bha abda avakarnayanti | avidyayam bhuyasapas abdair vyavaharad arthaprati timatram bhaven - mety arthah | ru - dhatva - t tu vyavaha - rasya - vis - ra a - ha | tatra ca s - stram na esam granthaka a niya makam: sa dhus abdair eva rtho vaktavyo na pas abdaih evam kriyama n am - ri bhavati -ti. abhyudayaka 164 This is accompanied by a note (373) in which Houben refers the reader to Bhartrhari and the ancient Vr tti (forth-coming, c) for additional discussion of the problem of authorship. His bibliography lists (p. 437) under Houben an entry forthc., - kyapadi -ya and the ancient Vrtti, which one must assume is meant. b Bhartrharis Va - kyapadi -ya and the ancient Vrtti (1): The Vrtti and An article entitled Bhartrharis Va - kyapadi -ya 1.46a a - tmabhedam - tmabhedas ... and an Vrsabhadevas Paddhati on Va / a
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- tha S - s interpretation arma addendum to this entitled Postscript: A note on Pt. Raghuna of VP 1.46 and Vrtti are scheduled to appear in the Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Houben kindly sent me copies of these papers, and, with the authors permission, I have discussed them in 4.2.3 of Cardona, forthcoming. 165 Houbens translation of VP 1.182 is (p. 239), Divine speech is nowadays (iyam) mixed up by incompetent speakers. But the propounders of the impermanent have with regard to this doctrine the opposite view. 166 In view of the content and the citation from the Vrtti given at the end of this paragraph, one must conclude that 182 and 181 are errors for 183 and 182. - gama - t siddha - h sa - havo dharmasa - dhanam | arthapratya - yana - bhede 167 s is t ebhya a vipari tas tv asadhavah. As the Paddhati points out, asadhu terms can be contrary by -ta - iti: s - ramparyen a - navasthita virtue of either of these (81.22-23: vipari is t opdes apa adharmasadhanam va). - ks a - d anuma - neneti ca bhedas tatha - py 168 The Paddhati (81.21-22: yady api sa arthapratya yanam abhinnam sa dhu na m asa dhu na m ca tulyam) points this out. -pa notes that, although Similarly, commenting on Bh I.8.21-22 (see note 68), the Pradi under one thesis apabhram s as do not signify directly, they nevertheless still signify - dhu terms. Kaiyat a goes on to note that some indirectly, through the intermediary of sa apabhram s as have gained established status through continuous transmission, so that - dhu terms to mind. He also remarks they convey meanings directly, without calling sa - dhu terms. Pr I.35: yady that some maintain apabhram s as signify directly jsut as do sa - caka -s - pi api sa ks a d apabhram s a na va tatha - n asa - dhus - nena - rtham - yayanti | kecic ca - pabhram -h smaryama abdavyavadha pratya s a paramparaya nirudhim agatah sa dhus abdan asma rayanta evartham pratyayayanti | - caka - iti. See anye tu manyante: sadhus abdavad apabhram s a api saksad arthasya va 4.6.4. - s yaka - rah: III.1: 235.16 (a - ha), 236.21-22 (manyate), 279.12, 296.18 (a - ha), 169 bha 299.4-5 (pratyacast e), 305.18-19 (codayati), 336.23 (na pratyacaksi ta), 338.25-339.1 - ha), 104.14-15 (samarthayate), 301.20 (manyate); III.2: 30.11 (necchati), 99.22-24 (a - ha), 353.11, 361.17-18 (na - tra niradiksat), 374.18 (pra - ha), 374.25 (pra - ha), 402.27 (a (adides a), 408.9-10 (pratyacakhyau); bhas yakarena: III.1: 107.14, 201.14, 202.6-7, 328.21; III.2: 3.2, 20.2, 124.3, 127.12, 127.16-17, 138.19, 166.4, 167.20, 314.27, - syakrta - : III.1: 235.17-18; III.2: 22.7-8, 287.6; 336.24, 356.15, 360.21, 386.7, 410.5; bha - syaka - rasya: III.1: 352.11, III.2: 285.7, 340.14-15, 349.5, 371.23-24. References are bha to pages and lines of K. A. Subramania Iyer 1963, 1973. These references are - syaka - ra, available from the indices to these volumes, although only the stem forms bha bhasyakrt appear in the indices. I have given references only to passages where - ra - ja uses case forms of these terms, omitting places where these appear in Hela derivates. I have also cited in parentheses verb forms, where these occur. 170 It is probable that Bhartr hari used s akti not merely in the sense of power or capacity but more specifically in the sense of the capacity inherent in a word to signify its meaning. I say this because a passage such as the Vrtti on VP 2.226 speaks of extracting s akti from the meaning of a whole compound, which is associated with many - ya - rtha - d anekas - rena...). That s aktis (VPVr. 2.266 [p. 247]: samuda akteh s aktyapoddha is, avyayi bhava, tatpurusa, bahuvri hi, and dvandva compounds are described by some in terms of semantics, such that they are respectively compounds whose principal meaning is that of the prior term, the last term, neither term, and both terms. The whole is associated with a single meaning but one can extract partial meanings. - d him a - gata - iti : te ca s - iti bha - vah | 171 Ud I.35: niru aktibhramen a bodhaka -t s aktibhramas cettham : kenacid ga vi ti prayukte gaur iti sa dhus abdasmaran a - vi -s - d eva - sya gobodha iti bhramah tanmu - lako prayojyasya bodhe pi tat asthasya ga abda nyesam api bhrama iti.
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- viraha - d bha - sa -s - ha : anye tv 172 Ud I.35: vastuto vinigamaka abdesv api s aktir evety a iti. Similarly, the Ratnapraka s a on the Maha bha }Alsya passage under discussion - na - ya - m arthagatau serves to refute those directly remarks that Patajalis saying sama - dhu pseudo-scholars who maintain that apabhram s as do not signify directly, as do sa - dhu terms. This is terms, and instead do so indirectly, through serving to recall sa because it conflicts with experience and with what the Bhasya passage in question, based on this, has to say and also because the understanding of meaning which - maras, who do not know sa - dhu terms, cannot have the arises from apas abdas for pa - dhu terms as intermediary. RaPr I.91: sama - na - ya - m arthagatav iti : recollection of sa - ks a -t etena apabhram s a na m sa dhus abdasma rakatvena rthabodhakatvam na tu sa - dhus -h sa abdavad iti vadantah pan d itam manya nirasta anubhavena tanmulakaprakrtabhasyena ca virodhat sadhus abdan ajanatam pamaranam apas abdair - yama - nasya - rthabodhasya sa - dhus - rakatva - sambhava - c ca. ja abdasmaranadva - ra - ja tat in taddharmanos refers to tasya 173 Page 341, note 567: ... According to Hela sam bandhasya; in my interpretation it refers to dharma in 5 and to atyantaparatantratva in 4. - bhidha - nam - sti va - cakam | atyantaparatantratva -d 174 na svadharmena sambandhasya rupam nasyapadis yate. That is, as Helaraja notes, only a genitive ending is used in conveying a relation qua relation. - t. Houben (pp. 170, 340) translates the second half of VP 175 atyantaparatantratva 3.3.4, Because it is extremely dependent, its form cannot be pointed out; earlier, K. A. Subramania Iyer (1971: 80, Being extremely dependent, its own form is never cognized) also translated using extremely for the Sanskrit atyanta. Both would have - ra - ja points out, what is at issue is that a done better using absolutely. For, as Hela relation is absolutely dependent, so that one can never refer to it separately as a relation by means of a term other than a genitive ending. In this respect, a relation differs from a quality (guna), which, though dependent, can be referred to as a quality - pam the color white. by means of a distinct term. For example, one can say s uklam ru - rair 176 Bh II.218.14-19: katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati | caturbhih praka atasmin sa ity etad bhavati : tatsthyat taddharmyat tatsami pyat tatsahacaryad iti | - tsthya - t ta - vat : maca - hasanti girir dahyate | ta - ddharmya - t : jat inam - ntam ta ya brahmadatta ity aha | brahmadatte yani karyani jat iny api tani kriyanta ity ato jati - mi - pya - t : gan - ya -m - pe gargakulam | brahmadatta ity ucyate | tatsa ga ghos ah ku - hacarya - t : kunta - n praves - sya on 6.1.37 (III.32.12) tatsa aya yasti h praves ayeti. The Bha - darthya - t), and also mentions such extended usage due to Y being intended for X (ta - tra this relation too is used frequently in interpreting terms in utras. Cf. also Nyayasu 2.2.62. - ratantryam - yayor 177 Hel. 3.3.6 (129.10-11): pa sambandhalaksanam iti sam yogasamava - disu tattva - t sambandhas dravyaguna abdapravrttih. - ratantryalaksano yayos tau 178 Hel. 3.3.6 (129.11): tasya sambandhasyeva dharmah pa - nau. taddharma - bha - sya on 1.1.70 (I.180.18-19): uttarapadalopo tra drast avyah | tad yatha 179 Cf. Maha us t ramukham iva mukham yasya so yam us t ramukhah kharamukhah evam tatkalakalas tatkalah tatkalasyeti. It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss here how such compounds are obtained and interpreted without assuming deletion of a term. - karana-Maha - bha - sya of Patajali, Abhyankar, Kashinatha Vasudev. 1962-72. The Vya edited by F. Kielhorn, third edition ... Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Abhyankar, Kashinatha Vasudev, and Ganesh Ambadas Joshi. 1976. -ma -m - dars -s Sri jaiminiprani tam Mi sa anam ... (Ananda rama Sanskrit Series 97). Pune: -s Ananda rama.
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Aklujkar, Ashok N. 1996. The Early History of Sanskrit as a Supreme Language. In Houben (1996a), pp. 59-85. - kyapadi -ya with the Vr tti and Aklujkar, Ashok N. n.d. Critical edition of the Va Helarajas Praki rnaprakas a on the Sambandhasamuddes a. [I have a computer file of this through Aklujkars kindness.] - ska (with Nighant u) Edited with Durgas Bhadkamkar, H. M. 1985. The Nirukta of Ya Commentary, by ... assisted by R. G. Bhadkamkar, volume I (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 73). Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. [Reprint of 1918 edition.] Bhate, Saroja, and Johannes Bronkhorst. 1993. Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartr hari, University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992. Asiatische Studien 47.1. Bern: Peter Lang, 1993. (Reprint 1994, 1997: Bhartrhari Philosopher and Grammarian, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartrhari, (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992). Delhi: Motilal Barnarsidass. - cha - rya, Manudeva. 1985. Brhadvaiya - karanabhu - sanam of S - Kaund Bhatta [A ri Bhatta - pa - li - Commentary on Bhat t ojidikshitas Vaiyakaranamatonmajjanam], Edited with Ru Notes and Appendix. Varanasi: Chaukhamba Amarbharati Prakashan. - bha - syadi -pika - of Bhartrhari, fascicule IV: A Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1987. Maha hnika I. Post-Graduate and Research Department Series 28. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. - nini, a Survey of Research. The Hague: Mouton. [Delhi: Cardona, George. 1976. Pa Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.] Cardona, George. 1983. Linguistic Analysis and Some Indian Traditions. Pandit Shripad Shastri Deodhar Memorial Lectures, first series. Pune: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. - nini, his Work and its Traditions, volume I: Background Cardona, George. 1997. Pa and Introduction, second edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. - ninian Studies. Delhi: Motilal Cardona, George. Forthcoming. Recent Research in Pa Banarsidass. Deshpande, Madhav M. 1979. Sociolinguistic Attitudes in India: An Historical Reconstruction. Ann Arbor: Karoma. str Pans Durgprasd and Wsudev Laxman S kar. 1928. The Kvylankra (A - vyama - la - , 2. Treatise on Rhetoric) of Rudrata with the Commentary of Namisdhu. Ka Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press. [Reprinted 1983: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.] - rika - da -s S - stri -, Sva - mi -. 1978. S - rttika of S - Kuma - rila Bhat t a with the a lokava ri Dva - rat Series 10. ri Pa rthasarathi Mis Commentary Nyayaratnakara of S ra. Prachyabha Varanasi: Tara Publications. Hock, Hans Henrich, and Rajeshwari Pandharipande. 1976. The Sociolinguistic Position of Sanskrit in Pre-Muslim India. Studies in Language Learning 1.2: 105-38. Houben, Jan E. M. 1992-93: Bhartrharis Perspectivism (3): On the Structure of the - nda of the Va - kyapadi -ya. Sambodhi 18: 1-32. Third Ka Houben, Jan E. M. 1993. Who are the Padadarsins? In Bhate and Bronkhorst 1993. Pp. 155-69. Houben, Jan E. M. 1996. Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit Language. Brills Indological Library, volume 13. Leiden: E. J. Brill. -s - stri -. 1939. The Vaiya - karanabhu - sanasa - ra by M. M. S - Kaunda a ri Joshi, Sada iva S ri Harivallabha, the Pari ksa Commentary by Bhatta with the Darpana Commentary by S - Kris - dasa - ra by ri Bhairava Mis ra, and a short Commentary by S na Mitra, with Tin arthava ri Khuddi Jha S arma. Kashi Sanskrit Series, 133. Benares: Chowkhamba. S Kahrs, Eivind, 1992. What is a tadbhava word? IIJ 35: 225-49.
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- ma - khya - na - tha Tarkava - gi -R - mani by Gangec - dhya - ya, Ka c a. 1901. The Tattva-Cinta Ra Upa part IV-volume II: C R abda-Khanda from Vidhivada to Pramana-catust aya-pramanyavada, - na - tha Tarkava - gi -R with the Commentaries of Mathura c a and Jayadeva Mic Rra; and with - dhya - ya Raghuna - tha C the A khya tava da and Nava da of Maha mahopa R iroman i. Bibliotheca Indica, new series, nos. 900, 908, 915, 918, 921, 927, 935, 943, 955, 960 & 977. Calcutta: The Asiatic Society of Bengal. [Reprinted 1990: Delhi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan.] - ges Kapil Dev Shastri. 1975. Na abhat t a-kr ta - da evam Vaiya karan asiddha nta-paramalaghumaju s a (mu la grantha anuva -ksa - tmakavya - khya - ). Kurukshetra: Kurukshetra University. sami Mukund Shstri. 1901-4. Nyyasudh, a Commentary on Tantravrtika by Pandit Smeshwara Bhatta. Benares: Chowkhamba. Nandkishore Shastri. 1934. Vaiyakarana Bhushan Sar of M. M. Kaund Bhatt with Kashika and Darpana Commentaries by Pt. Hari Shastri and Pt. Hari Vallabha Shastri, Explanatory Note by Pt. Guru Prasad Shastri. Rajasthan Sanskrit College Granthamala, 10. Benares: Bhargava Pustakalaya. - bha - sya de Patajali et le Narasimhacharya. 1973-83. Commentaires sur le Maha Pradi pa de Kaiyata: Mahabhasyapradi -pavyakhyanani. Publications de lInstitut franc Rais dIndologie, 51.1-10. Pondichry Institut franc Rais dIndologie. -yasu - tra - rthasan Narayana Pillai, P. K. 1951. Jaimini graha of Rsiputra Parames vara, - ya 1 Pa - da i to Adhya - ya III Pa - da iii. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 156. part I: Adhya Trivandrum: University of Travancore. - kr t Languages by R. Pischel, Richard. 1965. Comparative Grammar of the Pra Pischel. Translated from the German by Subhadra Jha. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. - tha S - . 1963. Va - kyapadi - yam, Part I (Brahma-Ka - n d am), with the arma Raghuna - tha S -. arma Commentary Svopajavrtti by Harivrsabha and Ambakartri by Pt. Raghuna - Bhavana Grantha-ma - la - , 91. Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University. Sarasvati [Reissued with new pagination, 1976, 1988.] - tha S - . 1974. Va - kyapadi -yam, Part III (Pada Ka - nda, Ja - ti, Dravya and arma Raghuna -s - ra - ja and Amba - kartri - by Sambandha Samuddes a) with the Commentary Praka a by Hela arma. Sarasvati Bhavana Grantha-mala, 91. Varanasi: Sampurnanand Pt. Raghunatha S Sanskrit University. Ramseier, Yves. 1993. Bibliography on Bhartrhari. In Bhate and Bronkhorst, pp. 235-67. - kyapadi - ya: Die Mu - laka - rika - s nach den Rau, Wilhelm. 1977. Bhartr haris Va - da-Index versehen. AKML XLII. 4. Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pa Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag. - kyapadi -ya-sambandhasamuddes - ra - ji -ya vya - khya - ke Sharma, Virendra. 1977. Va a Hela prakas a mem eka vivecanatmaka adhyayana (Vakyapadi ya Sambandha-Samuddes a: A Critical Study with Special Reference to the Commentary of Hela ra ja). Panjab University Indological Series, 9. Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand Vishva Bandhu Institute of Sanskrit and Indological Studies, Panjab University. - of Prabha - kara Mis - ma -m Subrahmanya Sastri. S. 1962. Br hati ra [on the Mi sa - trabha - sya of S - Pacika - of S - lika - na - tha, part III: Adhya - ya I abara] with the Rjuvimala a Su Padas 2, 3, 4 and Adhya ya II, Complete. Madras University Sanskrit Series, 24. Madras: University of Madras. - kyapadi -ya of Bhartrhari with the Commentary of Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1963. Va Helaraja, Kanda III, Part 1. Deccan College Monograph Series, 21. Poona: Deccan College. - kyapadi -ya of Bhartrhari with the Commentaries Vrtti Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1966. Va and Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva. Deccan College Monograph Series, 32. Poona: Deccan College.
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- kyapadi -ya of Bhartrhari: Chapter III, Part i. Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1971. The Va English translation. Poona: Deccan College. - kyapadi -ya of Bhartrhari with the Commentary of Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1973. Va Helaraja, Kanda III, Part II. Poona: Deccan College. - kyapadi -ya of Bhartrhari, An ancient Treatise Subramania Iyer, K. A. 1983. The Va - of Punyara - ja and the on the Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar, Containing the Ti ka - nda II, with a Foreword by Ashok Aklujkar. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Ancient Vrtti, Ka - ya-Tarkati -rtha, Amarendramohan Tarkati -rtha and Hemantakuma -r Tara na tha Nya -rtha. 1936-1944. Nya - yadars - tsya - yanas Bha - s ya, Uddyotakaras Tarkati anam with Va Varttika, Vacaspatimis ras Tatparyati ka & Vis vanathas Vrtti. Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 18, 29. [Reprinted 1982: Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co.] - t hi - , Ra - maprasa - da. 1990. Vaiya - karan asiddha - ntalaghumaju - sa - of S ri Tripa - ges - by S - Durbala - ca - rya, ri Na abhat t a [Part One] with Three Commentaries: Kujika - da ri Ba lambhat t a and Sarala (Hindi Commentary) by S ri Ra maprasa Kala by S - t hi -. Gan - na - thajha - -Granthama - la, 12. Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit University. Tripa ga - karan a-Maha - bha - s yam ri bhagavatpatajaliviracitam Vedavrata. 1962-63. S Vya - syapradi -podyotena ca vibhu - sitam). 5 volumes. Gurukul Jhajjar (Rohatak): rtena-bh a Hariyana-Sahitya-Sam sthanam.

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The Sa|Almbandhasamuddel%sa (chapter on relation) and

The Sa|Almbandhasamuddel%sa (chapter on relation) and

The Sa|Almbandhasamuddel%sa (chapter on relation) and

The Sa|Almbandhasamuddel%sa (chapter on relation) and

The Sa|Almbandhasamuddel%sa (chapter on relation) and

The Sa|Almbandhasamuddel%sa (chapter on relation) and

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