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[G.R. No. 136911. February 11, 2003]SPOUSES LEON CASIMIRO and PILAR PASCUAL, doing business under the name and style CASIMIRO VILLAGE SUBDIVISION, substituted by their heirs: EMILIO, TEOFILO and GABRIEL, all surnamed CASIMIRO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, former Thirteenth Division, NILDA A. PAULIN, MANOLITO A. PAULIN, SUSAN P. MARTIN, SYLVIA P. FARRES, CYNTHIA P. LAZATIN, CELESTINO P. PAULIN and UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION, respondents. R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, seeking to set aside our Decision dated July 3, 2002, which affirmed the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16165. The facts as set forth in the Decision are as follows: Respondents were the registered owners of a 25,000 square meter parcel of land situated in Pamplona, Las Pias City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-74375. Adjoining their property on the northern side was petitioners land, covered b y Original Certificate of Title No. 5975. Sometime in 1979, during a relocation survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Emilio Paz at the instance of respondents, it was discovered that the Casimiro Village Subdivision, owned by petitioners, encroached by 3, 110 square meters into respondents land. Respondents notified petitioners and demanded that they desist from making further development in the area. Subsequently, on March 13, 1980, respondents demanded that petitioners remove all constructions in the area. Failing in their efforts to regain possession of the disputed premises, respondents filed with the Court of First Instance of Pasay City an action for recovery of possession with damages against petitioners and the latters lot buyers, docketed as Civ il Case No. LP-8840P. Respondents alleged that 3,110 square meters of their property, which has a market value of P640,000.00, computed at the then prevailing price of P200.00 per square meter, have been encroached upon and fenced in by petitioners as part of the Casimiro Village Subdivision, and subdivided and sold to lot buyers. In support of their contention, respondents presented the geodetic engineer who conducted the actual ground relocation survey. In their defense, petitioners denied that there was an encroachment in respondents land. They presented Geodetic Engineers Lino C. Reyes and Felipe Venezuela from the Bureau of Lands. Meanwhile, defendant-lot buyers interposed a cross-claim against petitioners spouses Casimiro, averring that they were innocent purchasers in good faith and for value of their respective lots. On December 29, 1982, the Court of First Instance, Branch XXVIII, Pasay City, rendered a decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Casimiros sentencing the latter to pay the former the sum of P640,000.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from March 13, 1980 until the same is fully paid and to pay attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total amount due and the costs. On the cross-claim, cross defendants Casimiros are ordered to pay cross plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees. SO ORDERED. Ruling on petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch CXI, set aside its earlier decision, and held that the report of the engineers from the Bureau of Lands were more credible and accurate, and enjoy the presumption of regularity and accuracy. On July 15, 1987, respondents moved for reconsideration of the above Order, but the same was denied on January 19, 1988. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals on the sole question of the proper location of the common boundary separating the adjoining lots of petitioners and respondents. The Court of Appeals ordered that a relocation survey be conducted by a team of surveyors composed of a surveyor designated by the respondents, a surveyor designated by the petitioners, and a third member-

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surveyor chosen by the said two surveyors. Petitioners designated Engr. Nicolas Bernardo, while respondents designated Engr. Manuel P. Lopez. Upon agreement of the parties that the third member shall be from the Land Registration Commission, Engr. Felino Cortez, Chief, Ordinary and Cadastral Division, Land Registration Commission, was designated third member and chairman of the relocation survey. Petitioners complained of irregularities in the conduct of the relocation survey, namely, (a) the actual field work was conducted by a separate survey team composed of employees of the LRC without the knowledge and presence of Engr. Bernardo; (b) the relocation plan and computations were done without consultation and coordination among the members of the survey team; and (c) the relocation plan that was prepared by Engr. Cortez did not conform to the verification plan earlier approved by the Bureau of Lands in January 1982. However, the Court of Appeals found nothing irregular in the conduct of the relocation survey. Petitioners representative, Engr. Bernardo, admitted that he was furnished copies of the field notes and data gathered by the LRA team, but did not enter any objection thereto. If at all, Engr. Bernardos exclusion from the actual field work was rectified by the opportunity given h im to comment on the final report prepared by Engr. Cortez, which Engr. Bernardo did not do. After the survey, the Court of Appeals found that the final relocation survey report yielded the indisputable and inevitable conclusion that petitioners encroached on a portion of the respondents property comprising an area of 3,235 square meters. On November 11, 1996, a judgment was rendered as follows: The foregoing considered, We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the order of the trial court dated June 25 1987 and REINSTATE the decision dated December 29, 1982 as prayed for by the Appellants [spouses Paulin]. SO ORDERED. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review.
[1]

In denying the petition for review, we upheld the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, citing the rule that we are [2] not a trier of facts, and that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are [3] conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that this case falls within the exceptions when review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals is proper. According to them, the findings of fact of the appellate court were contrary to those of the trial court. Moreover, it was alleged that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals when it approved the Report of the Relocation Survey Team without the signature of petitioners representative therein, Engr. Nicolas Bernardo. Likewise, the inference of the Court of Appeals as to the conclusiveness of the survey report was manifestly mistaken because the same were arrived at without the participation and conformity of Engr. Bernardo. Finally, the assailed Decision was based on the assumption that Engr. Bernardo was furnished copies of the field notes and data gathered by the team of surveyors. In their Comment, respondents countered that this Court is not tasked with the duty to review findings of fact; that the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court are not contrary to each other; and that the Court of [4] Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Considering the seriousness of the allegation of irregularity in the manner of the resurvey, we resolved to take a second look at the evidence on record of this case, particularly those before the Court of Appeals pertaining to the composition of the resurvey team and the conduct of the resurvey field work. As narrated above, the Court of Appeals, upon agreement of both parties, ordered that a relocation survey on the questioned properties be conducted by a team of surveyors. The Court of Appeals Resolution reads: Finding the proposal well-taken as the only issue in this controversy is the correctness of the relocation survey to determine the true location of the common boundary between the lot of the plaintiffs and the lot of the defendants, the Court pursuant to Section 9 (3) of B.P. 129, hereby directs that a relocation survey of the strip of land in question in this case, be conducted by a team of surveyors composed of (1) a surveyor designated by the appellants, (2) a surveyor designated by the appellees and (3) a surveyor to be chosen by the said two surveyors. The resurvey shall be conducted in the presence of both parties or their authorized representatives. In view of the manifestation of defendants-appellees that they are willing to advance the cost of said relocation survey, reimbursable to them contingently as part of the costs of this action, should they win, the costs of such relocation survey shall be advanced by the defendants appellees.[5]

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Subsequently, the Court of Appeals designated the following as members of the survey team: (1) (2) (3) Engr. Manuel P. Lopez (for respondents); Engr. Nicolas R. Bernardo (for petitioners); Engr. Felino M. Cortez of the Land Registration Commission.
[6]

On July 10, 1992, Engr. Cortez submitted a report stating, among others, that the members of the resurvey team have agreed that the actual field work will be undertaken by five technical personnel, three of whom shall come from the Land Registration Authority and the remaining two shall be Engrs. Lopez and Bernardo or their respective [7] representatives. By February 9, 1993, the field work had already been completed, pursuant to the Report of Engr. Cortez to the Court [8] of Appeals. On May 10, 1993, petitioners filed a Motion to Require Engineer Cortez to Comply with the Terms and [9] Conditions of this Honorable Courts Resolution of March 21, 1990, wherein they complained that the actual survey field work was done without the knowledge and presence of their representative, Engr. Bernardo, in contravention of the appellate courts directive that the resurvey shall be c onducted in the presence of both parties or their authorized representatives. Subsequently, Engr. Cortez submitted his Report which states that the actual field work was undertaken by a survey team created by the Administrator of the LRA composed of Engrs. Cortez, Ildefonso Padigos, Jr., Porfirio Encisa, Jr., and Alexander Montemayor. The team found that petitioners property encroached on respondents property by 3,235 square [10] meters. The Report was signed by Engrs. Cortez and Lopez. Engr. Bernardo did not sign above his typewritten name. Engr. Bernardo filed a Comment, setting forth the alleged irregularities in the relocation survey. According to him, he never received notice of the time and exact date of the field survey, as agreed upon by the team; that the designation of the LRA engineers who undertook the field work was not authorized by the court; and that the official survey team [11] appointed by the Court of Appeals never met to perform the survey. On January 17, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion to require the chairman of the re location [12] survey team to comply with the resolution of the court dated March 20, 1990. Subsequently, it rendered judgment in favor of respondents, finding that the Report submitted by the Relocation Survey Team was arrived at after a careful and deliberate process of survey, computation and assessment of its technical findings. Hence, it sustained the finding that [13] petitioners property encroached on respondents property by 3,235 square meters. The reason for the requirement of representation of both parties in the resurvey team is to ensure that the interests of both sides are protected. If this requirement is breached, then serious prejudice can result. This is especially true in this case where the purpose of the resurvey is to determine the boundaries of the parties adjacent lots. The placing of boundary lines and demarcation points on the soil must be precise, and the smallest error in alignment may result in the loss of a large portion of ones property. Hence, it is crucial that each party must have a representative present to ensure that the fixing of the metes and bounds on the soil is accurately performed. Indeed, the requirement of notice and representation in the proceedings is an essential part of due process of [14] law. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held: Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation therein. The results of the survey and the land valuation summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly authorized representative. To reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, much less the notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner, however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL. (emphasis ours) [15] Poring over the records of the Court of Appeals regarding the resurvey of the subject properties, it appears that the actual field work was performed by engineers from LRA, without the representatives of petitioners and respondents being present. There was no clear showing that notices of the field work were sent to petitioners and respondents. Worse, the actual field work was undertaken by only four engineers, all of whom were designated from the LRA. This is in violation of the agreement of the parties that the actual field work should be done by five technical personnel, three of whom shall come from the Land Registration Authority and the remaining two shall be Engrs. Lopez and Bernardo or their respective [16] representatives.

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As stated above, the representatives of petitioners and respondents were not notified of and thus failed to participate in the survey. This is evident from the Report submitted by Engr. Cortez himself, stating that the actual field work was undertaken by a survey team created by the Administrator of the LRA composed of Engrs. Cortez, Ildefonso Padigos, Jr., [17] Porfirio Encisa, Jr., and Alexander Montemayor. It is clear that Engrs. Lopez and Bernardo were not present at the field survey. The failure of Engr. Cortez, as chairman of the resurvey team, to notify Engr. Bernardo of the actual field work to enable him to participate therein constituted as serious violation of petitioners right to due process, especially consideri ng that it resulted in a deprivation of their property to the extent of 3,235 square meters. The actual survey proceedings must, therefore, be conducted anew, ensuring this time that the interests of both parties are adequately protected. Hence, this case must be remanded to the Court of Appeals for the retaking of the survey of the boundaries on the parties respective properties. WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Decision dated July 3, 2002 in G.R. No. 136911 is SET ASIDE. The instant petition is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, which is ordered to forthwith cause the resurvey the boundaries on the parties respective properties by the team of surveyors agreed upon by the parties, and thereafter to decide the case accordingly. SO ORDERED.

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[G.R. No. 143540. April 11, 2003] JOEL G. MIRANDA, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO C. CARREON, MILAGROS B. CASCO, ELSIE S. ESTARES, JULIUS N. MALLARI, ELINORA A. DANAO, JOVELYN G. RETAMAL, MARIFE S. ALMAZAN, JONALD R. DALMACIO, JENNIFER C. PLAZA, RIZALDY B. AGGABAO, VILMA T. VENTURA, BENEDICT B. PANGANIBAN, JOSE L. GOMBIO, MELCHOR E. SORIANO, ZARINA C. PANGANIBAN, EMELITA D. TAUYA, EVANGELINE A. SICAM, MATABAI AQUARIOUS Q. CULANG, MELVIN L. GARCIA, JOHNNY N. YU, JR., LOIDA J. PURUGGANAN, EDUARDO S. VALENCIA, EDITHA A. REGLOS, HENRY P. MAPALAD, RAMIL C. GALANG, JUSTINA M. MACASO, MARTHA B. ALLAM, and ARSENIA A. CATAINA, respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision June 5, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36997.
[1] [2]

dated May 21, 1999 and the Resolution dated

In the early part of 1988, Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro, while serving as Acting Mayor of the City of Santiago because of the suspension of Mayor Jose Miranda, appointed the above-named respondents to various positions in the city government. Their appointments were with permanent status and based on the evaluation made by the City Personnel [3] Selection and Promotion Board (PSPB) created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the appointments. When Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his post on March 5, 1998 after his suspension, he considered the [4] composition of the PSPB irregular since the majority party, to which he belongs, was not properly represented. He then formed a three-man special performance audit team composed of Roberto C. Bayaua, Antonio AL. Martinez and Antonio L. Santos, to conduct a personnel evaluation audit of those who were previously screened by the PSPB and those on probation. After conducting the evaluation, the audit team submitted to him a report dated June 8, 1998 stating that the respondents were found wanting in (their) performance. On June 10, 1998, or three months after Mayor Miranda reassumed his post, he issued an order terminating respondents services effective June 15, 1998 because they performed poorly during the probationary period. Respondents appealed to the CSC, contending that being employees on probation, they can be dismissed from the service on the ground of poor performance only after their probationary period of six months , not after three (3) months. They also denied that an evaluation on their performance was conducted, hence, their dismissal from the service violated their right to due process. On October 19, 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 982717 reversing the order of Mayor Miranda and ordering that respondents be reinstated to their former positions with payment of backwages, thus: xxx Granting that the complainant-employees (now respondents) indeed rated poorly, the question that remains is whether they can be terminated from the service on that ground. xxx x x x, at the time of their termination the complainants have not finished the six (6) months probationary period. x x x, they may be terminated even before the expiration of the probationary period pursuant to Section 26, par. 1, Chapter 5, Book V, Title I-A of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section provides: All such persons (appointees who meet all the requirements of the position) must serve a probationary period of six months following their original appointment and shall undergo a thorough character investigation in order to acquire a permanent civil service status. A probationer may be dropped from the service for unsatisfactory conduct or for want of capacity anytime before the expiration of the probationary period: Provided, that such action is appealable to the Commission. It is, however, clear from the foregoing quoted provision that an employee on probation status may be terminated only for unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. In this case, the services of the complainants were terminated on the ground of poor performance x x x. Although poor performance may come near the concept of want of capacity, the latter, as held by this Commission, implies opportunity on the part of the head of office to observe the performance and demeanor of the employee
[5]

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concerned (Charito Pandes, CSC Resolution No. 965592). At this point, considering that Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his post only on March 5, 1998 after serving his suspension, it is quite improbable that he can already gauge the performance of the complainants through the mere lapse of three months considering that the date of the letter of termination is June 10, 1998 and its effectivity date June 15, 1998 .[6] (emphasis supplied) Meanwhile, the COMELEC disqualified Mayor Jose Miranda as a mayoralty candidate in the 1998 May elections. His son Joel G. Miranda, herein petitioner, substituted for him and was proclaimed Mayor of Santiago City. He then filed a motion for reconsideration of the CSC Resolution No. 982717 (in favor of respondents) but it was denied in the CSC Resolution No. 990557 dated March 3, 1999. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36997. On May 21, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming in toto the CSC Resolution No. 982717. Forthwith, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but before it could be resolved by the Court of Appeals, several events supervened. This Court, in G.R. No. 136351, Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio M. Abaya and the COMELEC , set aside the proclamation of petitioner as Mayor of Santiago City for lack of a certificate of candidacy and declared Vice [7] Mayor Amelita Navarro as City Mayor by operation of law. On December 20, 1999, Mayor Navarro filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration (previously submitted by former Mayor Joel G. Miranda). On June 5, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of its Decision. On June 11, 2000, the Court of Appeals granted Mayor Navarros Motion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration. In effect, the CSC Resolution reinstating respondents to their positions stays. In this petition, petitioner Joel G. Miranda contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the CSC Resolution declaring that the termination of respondents services is illegal and ordering their reinstatement to their former positions with payment of backwages. In their comment, respondents claim that since petitioner ceased to be Mayor of Santiago City, he has no legal personality to file the instant petition and, therefore, the same should be dismissed. They insist that they were not actually evaluated on their performance. But assuming there was indeed such an evaluation, it should have been done by their immediate supervisors, not by those appointed by former Mayor Jose Miranda. In his reply, petitioner contends that as a taxpayer, he has a legal interest in the case at bar, hence, can lawfully file this petition. Section 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides: Sec. 17. Death or separation of a party who is a public officer. When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the Court, it is satisfactorily shown by any party that there is substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. It is clear from the above Rule that when petitioner ceased to be mayor of Santiago City, the action may be continued and maintained by his successor, Mayor Amelita Navarro, if there is substantial need to do so. Mayor Navarro, however, found no substantial need to continue and maintain the action of her predecessor in light of the CSC Resolution declaring that respondents services were illegally terminated by former Mayor Jose Miranda. In fact, she filed with the Court of Appeals aMotion to Withdraw the Motion for Reconsideration (lodged by petitioner). She likewise reinstated all the respondents to their respective positions and approved the payment of their salaries. Petitioner insists though that as a taxpayer, he is a real party-in-interest and, therefore, should continue and maintain this suit. Such contention is misplaced. Section 2, Rule 3 of the same Rules provides: Section 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. (emphasis supplied) Even as a taxpayer, petitioner does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. Not every [8] action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. It bears stressing

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that a taxpayers suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public [9] funds from taxation. The issue in this case is whether respondents servic es were illegally terminated. Clearly, it does not involve the illegal disbursement of public funds, hence, petitioners action cannot be considered a taxpayers suit. At any rate, to put to rest the controversy at hand, we shall resolve the issue of whet her respondents services were illegally terminated by former Mayor Jose Miranda. The 1987 Constitution provides that no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or [10] suspended except for cause provided by law . Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a government officer or employee may be removed from the service on two (2) grounds: (1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want of capacity. While the Code does not define and delineate the concepts of these two grounds, however, the Civil Service Law (Presidential Decree No. 807, as amended) provides specific grounds for dismissing a government officer or employee from the service. Among these grounds are inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. In the case at bar, respondents were dismissed on the ground of poor performance. Poor performance falls within the concept of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties which, as earlier mentioned, are grounds for dismissing a government official or employee from the service. But inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of sufficient time, hence, the probationary period of six (6) months for the respondents. Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is inefficient or incompetent requires enough time on the part of his immediate superior within which to observe his performance. This condition, however, was not observed in this case. As aptly stated by the CSC, it is quite improbable that Mayor Jose Miranda could finally determine the performance of respondents for only the first three months of the probationary period. Not only that, we find merit in respondents claim that they were denied due process. They cited Item 2.2 (b), Section VI of the Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994) which provides: 2.2. Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance x x xb. An official or employee who, for one evaluation period, is rated poor in performance, may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Due notice shall mean that the officer or employee is informed in writing of the status of his performance not later than the fourth month of that rating period with sufficient warning that failure to improve his performance within the remaining period of the semester shall warrant his separation from the service. Such notice shall also contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an explanation. [11] (emphasis supplied) Respondents vehemently assert that they were never notified in writing regarding the status of their performance, neither were they warned that they will be dismissed from the service should they fail to improve their performance. Significantly, petitioner did not refute respondents assertion. The records show that what respondents received was only the termination order from Mayor Jose Miranda. Obviously, respondents right to due process was violated. Moreover, respondents contend that the only reason behin d their arbitrary dismissal was Mayor Jose Mirandas perception that they were not loyal to him, being appointees of then Acting Mayor Navarro. This contention appears to be true considering that all those who were accepted and screened by the PSPB during the incumbency of Acting Mayor Navarro were rated to have performed poorly by an audit team whose three members were personally picked by Mayor Jose Miranda. The Constitution has envisioned the civil service to be a career service based on merit and rewards system that will [12] truly be accountable and responsive to the people and deserving of their trust and support. These noble objectives will be frustrated if the tenure of its members is subject to the whim of partisan politics. A civil servant who lives in ceaseless fear of being capriciously removed from office every time a new political figure assumes power will strive to do anything that pleases the latter. In this way, he will hardly develop efficiency, accountability and a sense of loyalty to the public service. Such a climate will only breed opportunistic, inefficient and irresponsible civil servants to the detriment of the public. This should not be countenanced. In fine, we hold that petitioner, not being a real party in interest, has no legal personality to file this petition. Besides, his motion for reconsideration was validly withdrawn by the incumbent Mayor. Even assuming he is a real party in interest, we see no reason to disturb the findings of both the CSC and the Court of Appeals. The reinstatement of respondents who, unfortunately, were victims of political bickerings, is in order. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 36997 is AFFIRMED. Treble costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 109920 August 31, 2000

CEFERINO A. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION C. ANGELES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Caloocan City, Regional Trial Court, Branch CXXI, and RUEL GARCIA, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City, on March 15, 1993 in Criminal Case No. C-40740 which acquitted private respondent Ruel Garcia of direct assault. The prosecutions evidence was as follows: Private respondent Ruel Garcia and his uncle, Pedro Garcia, were members of the Caloocan police. Shortly after midnight on November 7, 1991, they barged into the barangay hall of Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, looking for petitioner Ceferino A. Soriano, the barangay captain. Private respondent gave petitioner fist blows on the face four times with his left hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time cursing him, "Putang ina mo cabeza" ("You son of a bitch chief"). Although there were four barangay tanods (Manuel Montoya, Arturo del Rosario, Ramiro Samson, and Francisco Raton) in the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid of petitioner because they were held at bay by Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then left with their companions who had been waiting outside the hall. Petitioner was treated for his injuries in the hospital. Private respondent denied petitioners allegations. He testified that he went to the barangay hall in the evening of November 6, 1991 because his younger brother had been reportedly arrested and beaten up by petitioner. (It appears that the younger Garcia was involved in a brawl with Dennis Mones and a certain Ocampo. They were arrested and taken to the barangay hall. One of the boys, who was apparently drunk, vomitted while their names were recorded. Petitioner, therefore, ordered the three boys to be taken to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a check-up.) As private respondent saw petitioner near the door of the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his brother and the reason for the latters arrest. Apparently thinking that private respondent was trying to intervene in the case he was investigating, petitioner angrily told private respondent to lay off:"Walang pulis pulis dito" ("Your being a policeman doesnt pull strings here"). When private respondent insisted on going inside the barangay hall, petitioner blocked him and then pushed him on the chest. Private respondent also pushed petitioner, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and injure himself. All the time, private respondent claimed he had his gun tucked at his waist. Private respondent s uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home. In acquitting private respondent, respondent Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible that petitioner did not resist or even say anything when private respondent allegedly assaulted him and that none of the four barangay tanods who were near him came to his aid. She thought that if petitioner had indeed been attacked, he would have suffered more serious injuries than a contusion on the forehead, erythema on the chest, and a lacerated wound on the lower lip. Respondent judge also excluded from the evidence the testimonies of petitioner and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya on the ground that their testimonies had not been formally offered in evidence as required by Rule 132, 34 to 35 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Hence this petition for certiorari. Petitioner alleges that the decision is void because it was not rendered by an impartial tribunal. He contends that respondent judge was "hell-bent on saving the private respondent from conviction and had prejudged the case" as shown by the fact that (1) on August 26, 1992, before private respondents arraignment, she called the parties and their counsels to her chambers and urged them to settle the case, and, when petitioner refused, she did not set the case for hearing until after three weeks allegedly to provide a "cooling off" period; (2) that at the initial trial on September 15 and 16, 1992, respondent judge again called on the parties to settle the case. Petitioner alleges that, while respondent judge stated in her order of September 15, 1992 cancelling the hearing on that date that this was done to enable Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga to study the case as she had been appointed as private respondents counsel only on that day, the same was actually a pretext, the real reason being to give private respondent another opportunity to persuade petitioner to settle the case. The records in fact show that Atty. Sampaga had been private respondents counsel at the arraignment on August 26, 1992; (3) that respondent judge excluded the testimonies of petitioner and his witness, Manuel Montoya, for failure of the prosecution to offer formally the same when the transcript of stenographic notes shows this was not so and that, at any rate, the defense waived the objection based on this ground by crossexamining petitioner and Montoya; and (4) that respondent judge failed to find private respondent guilty despite the

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testimonies of three eyewitnesses (barangay tanods Montoya, del Rosario, and Samson). Petitioner therefore prays that a mistrial be declared and that the case be ordered retried before another judge. On the other hand, private respondent Ruel Garcia contends that, if at the outset, petitioner doubted respondent judges impartiality, he should have sought her inhibition right then and there; that it was not true respondent judge called the parties to her chambers on August 26, 1992 as only the arraignment took place on that day; that at said arraignment, his counsel, Atty. Emilio Bermas, was absent for which reason respondent judge designated Atty. Maria Lelibet S. Sampaga to assist him; that the schedule of the trial (September 15, 16, and 21, 1992) was not fixed by respondent judge but by the clerk in charge of the matter, taking into account the schedule of the other cases assigned to the court; that it was only on the first day of trial on September 15, 1992 that respondent judge first talked to the parties, and, upon learning that both were public officers, thought it proper to ask them if they were not willing to settle their dispute, and seeing the parties and their counsels to be receptive, she invited them to her chambers; that as petitioner later appeared to have second thoughts and, on the other hand, as Atty. Sampaga needed time to prepare for trial, respondent judge postponed the trial to the next day, September 16, 1992; that on September 16, 1992, respondent judge again called the parties to her chambers to see if they had come to any agreement, but as she was told by petitioner that "for him to withdraw his complaint against the private respondent, he must have to transfer his residence first," thus implying that he wished the case against private respondent to continue, respondent judge proceeded with the trial that morning. Private respondent contends that the instant petition does not have the consent and conformity of the public prosecutor but was instead filed by the private prosecutor who does not have the requisite legal personality to question the decision acquitting him. Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that this petition should be dismissed: A perusal of the judgment of the trial court showed that the parties were heard conformably to the norms of due process, evidence was presented by both parties and duly considered, their arguments were studied, analyzed, and assessed, and judgment was rendered in which findings of facts and conclusions of law were set forth. These conclusions of fact or law cannot in any sense be characterized as outrageously wrong or manifestly mistaken or whimsically or capriciously arrived at. The worst that may perhaps be said of them is that they are fairly debatable and may even be possibly erroneous. But they cannot be declared to have been made with grave abuse of discretion ( Bustamante vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 1991). 1 Clearly, there was no mistrial in this case which would warrant the nullity of the assailed judgment. The preliminary issue in this case is whether the petition should be dismissed outright because it was filed without the intervention of the OSG as counsel for the prosecution. This question is not a novel one. In the case of People v. Santiago, this Court held: The question as to whether or not U.P., as the private offended party, can file this special civil action for certiorari questioning the validity of said decision of the trial court should be answered in the affirmative. It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainants role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in 3 name of said complainant. The above ruling has been reiterated in De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals and Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., in which the legal personality of private complainant to file a special civil action of certiorari questioning the dismissal by the trial
4 5 2

10
court of a criminal case has been upheld subject to the limitation that the accuseds right to double jeopardy is not 6 7 violated. As explained by the Court in People v. Court of Appeals: 7 A judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without due process is void, does not exist in legal contemplation, and, thus, cannot be the source of an acquittal. However, where the petition demonstrates mere errors in judgment not amounting to grave abuse of discretion or deprivation of due process, the writ of certiorari cannot issue. A review of the 8 alleged errors of judgment cannot be made without trampling upon the right of the accused against double jeopardy. In short, petitioner must establish that the judgment of acquittal resulted from a mistrial so as not to place private respondent, as accused, in double jeopardy. In only one case has the Court categorically declared a mistrial, and that is the case of Galman v. 9 Sandiganbayan. Petitioner would have the Court draw parallelisms between this case and Galman where the Court nullified the judgment of acquittal of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines v. General Luther Custodio, et al." This cases is, however, a far cry from Galman. There, it was shown that evidence was suppressed in order to justify the acquittal of the accused. This Court held that "the secret Malacaang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan [Manuel Pamaran] and Tanodbayan [Bernardo] Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan [Manuel] Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined ignominious final 10 outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence." In contrast, petitioner does not allege any such irregularity in the trial of private respondent. He simply claims that respondent judges bias and partiality denied the prosecution a fair and impartial trial. Why respondent judge was biased for the defense petitioner does not say. It is noteworthy that petitioner does not even dispute private respondents allegation that respondent judge was not personally acquainted with him until she heard the criminal case against him. It is pertinent at this point to cite certain principles laid down by the Court regarding the disqualification of a judge for lack of the objectivity that due process requires. It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is 11 not enough; there should be evidence to prove the charge. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially weighed against a judges sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal 12 right to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source 13 resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. The arguments which petitioner advances by way of proof of respondents judges alleged bias are not persuasive. Respondent judges efforts to have the parties arrive at an amicable settlement is no t evidence of partiality for private respondent. She could have been motivated by factors other than a desire to clear private respondent of criminal 14 liability, i.e., the clearing of her court docket or, as pointed out by the OSG in its comment, in setting a good example considering that petitioner and private respondent were neighbors occupying public offices charged with the maintenance of peace and order in the community. As for the allegation that the trial was not held until after three weeks to give private respondent more time to persuade petitioner to amicably settle the case, it has been shown that it was not respondent judge but court personnel in charge of scheduling cases who assigned the dates of trial taking into account the court calendar. The cancellation of the September 15, 1992 hearing, on the other hand, was made to give private respondents counsel, Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga, time to study the case and prepare for trial. Although Atty. Sampaga had once appeared in behalf of private respondent, it was for the purpose of assisting the latter at the arraignment because the regular counsel was absent. As new counsel, Atty. Sampaga needed to study the case. A postponement to the next day, September 16, 1992, was not an unreasonable request. Indeed, this did not involve resetting the case since September 16, 1992 had been originally designated as one of the initial trial dates. Nor is there any showing that respondent judge decided the criminal case on grounds other than its merits. A reading of her decision acquitting private respondent shows that the same was made on the basis of her evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and of the defense. Because of the conflicting versions of the parties as to what really happened, her decision was necessarily based on her appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense.

11
True, petitioner is correct in his argument that respondent judge mistakenly excluded from the evidence his testimony as well as that of prosecution witness Manuel Montoya on the ground that the same had not been formally offered at the time they were called to the witness stand. For the fact was that petitioner and Montoya had been cross-examined at length by the defense and, therefore, the latter had waived objection to the failure of the prosecution to make an offer of the 15 16 evidence. It has been held in Go v. Court of Appeals, however, that divergence of opinion between the trial judge and a partys counsel as to the admissibility of evidence is not proof of bias or partiality. Besides, though respondent judge stated in her decision that the testimonies of petitioner and Montoya "cannot be considered by this Court as constituting part of the evidence for the prosecution," her decision shows that she actually considered the testimonies in piecing together the prosecutions version of the events and in evaluating the evidence in the case. The testimonies of petitioner and Montoya were after all referred to by the other witnesses for the prosecution, namely, del Rosario and Samson. Thus respondent judges decision reads in pertinent part: The allegation of the private complainant that he neither resisted the punches of the accused nor said anything to the latter is quite hard to believe. No rational man would allow another to hurt him without offering any form of resistance, for he is instinctively concerned [with] his self-preservation. It is more in consonance with human nature that when one is hurt, especially if the feeling of innocence is within him, to immediately retaliate to an unjust act. Another equally unbelievable allegation is that the four barangay tanods just stood and watched their barangay captain while he was being mauled. There were four of them inside the hall yet no one even dared to defend herein private complainant or stop herein accused. If they could not do it for their barangay captain and inside their hall, how can they be expected to protect the residents of their barangay outside their hall? Furthermore, if herein private complainant was indeed mauled, he should have suffered a lot more serious injuries than he alleged[ly] incurred. Considering their allegation that the barangay tanods were guarded at the point of a gun by Pedro Garcia, herein accused thus had all the time and opportunity to inflict on the private complainant as many serious injuries as he could. But the results of the medical examination belie this point. Well-settled is the rule that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense (People vs. Dennis Mendoza, 203 SCRA 148, G.R. No. 85176, October 21, 1991). After a thorough examination of the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the latter failed to fulfill the test of moral certainty and establish such degree of proof necessary to support conviction. "If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of one or more explanations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The constitutional presumption of innocence stands until overthrown by strong and convincing evidence, one of which will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt" (People vs. Gina Sahagun, 182 SCRA 91, G.R. No. 62024, February 12, 1990). The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are merely unfounded accusations insufficient to gain conviction. In the case of People vs. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287, G.R. 88400, April 6, 1990, the Supreme Court held: "Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The accused is protected by the constitutional presumption of innocence which the prosecution must overcome with contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt. Even if the defense is weak, the case against the accused must fail if the prosecution is even weaker. . . . If the prosecution has not sufficiently established the guilt of the accused, he has a right 17 to be acquitted and released even if he presents naught a shred of evidence." That respondent judge believed the evidence of the defense more than that of the prosecution does not indicate that she 18 was biased. She must have simply found the defense witnesses to be more credible. Indeed, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari cannot be used to correct a lower tribunals evaluation of the evidence and factual 19 findings. Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, the Court dismissed a petition forcertiorari filed by the prosecution from a decision of the Court of Appeals reversing that of the trial court and acquitting the accused of homicide and serious physical injuries on the ground that he acted in self-defense. The Court held: To show grave abuse of discretion, herein petitioner contends that Respondent Court of Appeals committed manifest bias and partiality in rendering the assailed Decision. It claims that Respondent Court ignored and discarded "uncontroverted physical evidence" which the trial judge had relied upon. Furthermore, it allegedly erred in finding that he had "base[d] his decision on the testimony of witnesses whose demeanor he did not personally witness." In addition, it supposedly harped on insignificant inconsistencies in the testimonies of some prosecution witnesses, while unquestioningly accepting the private respondents claim of self-defense.

12
Finally, the solicitor general maintains that the assailed Decision (1) failed to discuss the effect of Maquilings escape from confinement during the pendency of the case; (2) shifted the burden of proof on the prosecution to prove Maquilings guilt, although he admitted killing the victim in self-defense; (3) ignored the physical evidence particularly the downward trajectory of the bullets that had hit the two victims, thereby showing that private respondent was still standing when he shot them; and the shotgun wound sustained by private respondent, which disabled him and rendered him incapable of shooting the victims. It is quite obvious from the foregoing allegations that petitioner imputed grave abuse of discretion to Respondent Court because of the latters supposed misappreciation and wrongful assessment of factual evidence. However, as earlier stressed, the present recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorari; which is extra ordinem beyond the ambit of appeal. Stated elsewise, factual matters cannot normally be inquired into by the Supreme Court in a certiorari proceeding. This Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh them again, in order to ascertain if the trial and the appellate courts were correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. The mere fact that a court erroneously decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction. 1wphi1 Thus, assuming arguendo that a court commits a mistake in its judgment, the error does not vitiate the decision, considering that it has jurisdiction over the case. An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals shows no patent and gross error amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Neither does it show an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power arising from passion or hostility. 20 ... Finally, petitioners claim that respondent judge was biased is belied by his failure to move for respondent judges inhibition. Petitioners claim that he did not do so because of his "belief and desire for said respondent judge to finally return to her normal sense of fairness" is a feeble excuse. His failure to file such motion stands as one more stark difference between this case and Galman since the private prosecutors in the latter case lost no time in seeking the 21 disqualification of the members of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and partiality for the defense. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

13
[G.R. Nos. 132484-85. November 15, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, LEON, accused, JULLIVER DE LEON, accused-appellant.

vs. GEORGE

DE

LEON

(acquitted),

JULLIVER

DE

DECISION CORONA, J.: Before us on appeal is the decision[1] dated November 6, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 17806-MN finding appellant Julliver de Leon guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000). Initially, appellant Julliver de Leon was arrested and charged [2] together with his father, co-accused George de Leon, with the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs in violation of Section 15, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, in an Information that read: That on or about the 19th day of March 1997, in Malabon Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, being private persons and without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver in consideration of the amount of P10,000.00 to a poseur buyer white crystalline substance contained in two (2) separate sealed transparent plastic bag each with markings BB/AGN 97/A and BB/AGH-97/B with a total net weight of 5.1846 gram and 5.5693 gram respectively, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu which are regulated drugs. CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] They were also charged[4] with illegal possession of regulated drugs, in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended, in an Information that read: That on or about the 19th day of March 1997, in Malabon Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, being private persons and without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control white crystalline substance contained in four (4) separate transparent plastic bags marked R-MPM-1, R-MPM-2, R-MPM-3 and R-MPM-4 with a total net weight of 48.70 gram, 99.40 gram, 94.40 gram and 4.7556 grams respectively, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu which are regulated drugs. CONTRARY TO LAW.[5] Upon arraignment on May 28, 1997, both accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the trial ensued. The evidence of the prosecution showed that, after a month of surveillance on a person named Jojie, who turned out to be accused George de Leon, for illegal drug trafficking, the Drugs Enforcement Group of the Malabon Police Station decided to conduct a buy-bust operation on the said accused. Prosecution witness Ronald Ticlao, the police-aide who acted as the poseur-buyer for the operation, testified that, prior to the operation, he received ten pieces of marked one thousand peso bills which were photocopied. The serial numbers of the bills were also entered in the dispatch book. He was accompanied by a confidential informer named Nora Boysillo to transact with accused George de Leon. In going to the designated place of operation, he and Nora boarded a tricycle and alighted in front of accused de Leons residence along Kaunlaran St., Muzon, Malabon, Metro Manila. [6] Upon entering the compound, Nora Boysillo introduced Ticlao to accused George de Leon. George asked how much money they had with them and the quantity of drugs that they wanted to buy. Ticlao answered that he wanted to purchase dalawang bulto. George then asked for the money and Nora Boysillo gave him the ten pieces of marked one thousand peso bills. After counting the money, George called his son, herein appellant Julliver Baye de Leon. When

14
the appellant came out of the house, George told him to give the desired quantity of shabu to Ticlao and Boysillo. George thereafter handed the money to the appellant and then left the compound, telling Ticlao and Boysillo that the appellant would handle the transaction. Herein appellant then entered the house from which George came out. When he emerged from the said house, he was holding a yellowish envelope. He took two plastic sachets from the said envelope and handed them to Boysillo. Ticlao took one of the sachets and examined its contents. After verifying that what was given to him was shabu, Ticlao gave the pre-arranged signal to the policemen who were then observing the proceedings from outside the compound. Then, Ticlao and Boysillo left, and the police operatives met them as they were leaving the compound.[7] After the pre-arranged signal was given, police officers Alberto Nepomuceno, Rogelio Libuton, Rojas, Cruz, Maalac and Borda entered the compound to arrest appellant Julliver de Leon. On seeing them, the appellant ran inside his fathers house. Libuton followed the appellant and saw him throw a yellowish envelope inside the bedroom where he entered and hid. Libuton picked up the envelope, looked inside and found four transparent plastic sachets containing shabu. He turned over the envelope to police officer Melvin Maalac. He and Maalac affixed their signatures and the date of recovery on the envelope. They also marked the four sachets inside the said envelope. During the trial, Ticlao identified the two accused, the buy-bust shabu, the confiscated shabu, the pertinent entries in the police blotter containing the serial numbers of the marked money bills, the yellowish envelope from which Baye took the buy-bust shabu and the markings thereon.[8] SPO 1 Rogelio Libuton also identified their signatures and the date they wrote on the envelope, and their markings on the sachets, as the exact markings they made during the operation. They identified the marked bills as the same bills used during the operation; they were the same bills whose serial numbers were entered in the dispatch book and photocopied.[9] SPO 1 Alberto Nepomuceno and SPO 1 Rogelio Libuton corroborated the testimony of Ticlao. Furthermore, they testified that, in going to the place of operation, they used a Tamaraw FX vehicle, an owner-type jeep and a tricycle in which Ticlao and Boysillo rode. When George left the compound while the transaction was taking place, Nepomuceno ordered police officers Querubin and Agustin to follow George. [10] SPO1 Benjamin Querubin testified that he and SPO2 Agustin followed accused George de Leon right after he left Ticlao and Boysillo in the middle of the negotiation. Later on, Querubin received a radio message from SPO 1 Nepomuceno ordering him to arrest accused George de Leon who was by then having a drinking session with his friends about 200 meters from his house.[11] The buy-bust white crystalline substance[12] and the confiscated white crystalline substance[13] were sent to a forensic chemist for laboratory examination[14] and were found to be the regulated drug[15] known as shabu. For their defense, accused George and herein appellant denied that an entrapment operation took place. Defense witness Geoffrey Santos, a tricycle driver plying the Concepcion-Muzon route, testified that, between two and three oclock in the afternoon of March 19, 1997, three men whom he discovered later were policemen boarded his tricycle and directed him to go to Kaunlaran Street with two other tricycles. The tricycles unloaded the passengers in front of the gate of the residence of the accused. They entered the gate then drew their firearms. He denied seeing any female who accompanied the policemen nor seeing a Tamaraw FX vehicle along the street.[16] Defense witnesses Helen Navarro and Vicente Martin, neighbors of the accused, corroborated the testimony of Santos. Martin added that he knew the persons who boarded the tricycles were police officers because he recognized Maalac and Nepomuceno as police officers. He did not see Ronald Ticlao, any female companion or a Tamaraw FX vehicle purportedly used by the police officers.[17] Herein appellant Julliver de Leon narrated before the court that, in the afternoon of March 19, 1997, he and his wife were in his house when police officers Borda and Libuton suddenly entered. He woke up when a gun was poked at him. When he asked why the policemen were there, herein appellant was immediately handcuffed and brought to the sala. The police operatives searched his house but found nothing illegal. He saw Maalac in a radio conversation with another person outside the house. He heard the person on the other end say, Bok, positive nakuha na namin ang ama. Maalac replied, Kuha na rin ang anak. In turn, the person at the other end asked, Bakit pa kinuha nyo yan. Sakit lang ng ulo iyan. Maalac answered, Kasubuan na, marami ng tao dito. From his house, he was brought to the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon and thereafter to the Drugs Enforcement Group Headquarters of the Malabon Police Station.[18] Accused George de Leon testified on how the police operatives arrested him. At about the same time that the police operatives entered and searched appellant Julliver de Leons house, George, since late morning of the same day, was having a drinking spree with his friends along Kaunlaran Street in front of a house of a certain Aguila 200 meters away from his own house and the house of the appellant. Police officers Benjamin Querubin, Cruz and Agustin arrived and told

15
him that Captain Ona, whom he used to work for as a personal driver, was looking for him. When he replied that Captain Ona was attending a town fiesta in Batangas, they said that it was actually the Chief of Police who was looking for him. At first, he refused to go but went with them after they threatened him. They brought him to the Barangay Hall of Muzon, Malabon, Metro Manila, then to the Pagamutang Bayan ng Malabon and later to the DEG headquarters where the two accused met each other. There, SPO1 Nepomuceno told George that they arrested Nora Boysillo, a courier of a known big-time drug pusher named Biyo Nuez, also known as Biyo Kalabaw. Being Nuez kumpadre, he was asked to reveal the whereabouts of Nuez or at least to contact the latter by cellphone to determine where he was. He felt that acceding to Nepomucenos request would endanger his family so he declined to divulge any information about Nuez. [19] As a result of his refusal to cooperate with his interrogators, he and his son were arrested and criminal charges were filed against them. George alleged that he could not have transacted with Ticlao as he knew him to be a police aide when he was still the personal driver of Captain Ona. He said Ticlao and Boysillo testified against him due to his refusal to cooperate with the police concerning the whereabouts of Biyo Nuez. At the headquarters, Ticlao and Boysillo asked him to cooperate with the police operatives but he refused.[20] Several weeks after the incident, on April 27, 1997, Ritzie de Leon, appellant Julliver de Leons wife, filed separate complaint-affidavits before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Malabon against the raiding DEG police operatives for violation of domicile. However, the investigating prosecutor of the said complaint-affidavits, who happened to be the trial prosecutor of the subject criminal cases, dismissed the same.[21] On November 6, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: a) In Criminal Case No. 17805-MN for Drug Pushing (Section 15, Art. III, R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659): acquitting both accused, George de Leon and Julliver de Leon, on the ground of reasonable doubt; b) In Criminal Case No. 17806-MN for Illegal Possession of Shabu (Section 16, Art. III, R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659): acquitting accused George de Leon only on the ground of reasonable doubt. Accused Julliver de Leon is thereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to the prison term of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P5,000,000.00. Accused Julliver de Leon, being a detention prisoner, he shall be credited in full the period of detention he had already undergone in connection with these cases if he signed the written agreement allowing him to be treated while still a detention prisoner under the same rules governing prisoners already serving sentence by virtue of final judgments. Otherwise, he shall only be credited with 4/5 thereof. The shabu subject matter of these cases are hereby forfeited in favor of the government. SO ORDERED.[22] In acquitting George de Leon of illegal possession of regulated drugs and both George de Leon and appellant Julliver de Leon of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the trial court wrote: The Court cannot help noting at once the fact that George was arrested in a place at least 200 meters away from where the police claimed he transacted with them for the sale of P10,000.00 worth of shabu (T.S.N. Oct. 1, 1997, page 10) and that when he was arrested he was actually in a drinking spree with several persons who claimed he never left the place since they started drinking up to the time of his arrest, with nothing having been found in his possession that will connect him to either possession of illegal drugs or to the claimed buy-bust transaction. Also noted by the Court is the failure of the police to immediately pick him up and place him under arrest as soon as they have seen the signal from Ticlao that the buy-bust operation yielded positive results. According to Ticlao, it did not take long for him, after George told them that Julliver will take care of everything, meaning, the delivery of shabu for which they gave George P10,000.00 to give the positive signal. Nepomuceno and the other police officers acting as back-ups for Ticlao and Boysillo allegedly saw the signal at once and they immediately pounced on Julliver. They did not, however, immediately place George under arrest.

16
xxx xxx xxx

There also was no rebuttal testimony on the claim that George and Ticlao knew each other long before the incident, which would make the alleged sale of shabu to Ticlao improbable as George knew him already as a police aide All the foregoing, taken together with the testimonials of several witnesses to the effect that George was all the while with them in a drinking spree when he was arrested, cast doubt, even as the Court is not prepared to pronounce that the evidence in this case was merely planted by the police, on the alleged participation of George in these cases. If George really transacted for the sale and delivery of shabu to Ticlao and Boysillo, at the first opportunity he should have been placed under arrest. The recovery of additional shabu would bolster his alleged participation in the sale of shabu to the poseur buyer. With respect, therefore, to George doubt has cast in the mind of the Court concerning his guilt or innocence in these cases. In this jurisdiction, this doubt is mandated to be resolved in favor of his innocence. [23] xxx xxx xxx

But in convicting Julliver de Leon of illegal possession of regulated drugs, the trial court relied on the arresting police officers positive identification of appellant as the person who threw the envelope containing the sachets of shabu inside the bedroom in the course of the pursuit. The trial court did not give credence to the appellants defense of frame -up for the reason that the arresting officers would not have gone out of their way just to plant evidence against him. [24] Hence this appeal based on the following assignment of errors: I THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN, ALTHOUGH IT FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO BUY-BUST OPERATION THAT TOOK PLACE AND BY REASON OF WHICH IT ACQUITTED BOTH ACCUSED GEORGE DE LEON AND GULLIVER DE LEON IN CRIM. CASE NO 17805-MN, AND IT ACQUITTED GEORGE DE LEON IN CRIM. CASE NO. 17806-MN, IT DID NOT SIMILARLY ACQUIT GULLIVER DE LEON IN THE LATTER CASE FOR THE SAME REASON. II THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT IT WAS THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED GEORGE DE LEON (JOJIE) INSTEAD OF THE ARREST OF GULLIVER DE LEON (BAYE) THAT WAS UNPLANNED AND NOT ORDERED. III THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND DOUBTS AS TO HOW, FROM WHOM OR WHERE THE FOUR SACHETS OF SHABU (EXHS. F-1, F-2, F-3 AND F-4) SUBJECT OF CRIM. CASE NO. 17806, WERE FOUND. IV THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FIND DOUBTS AS TO HOW, FROM WHOM OR WHERE THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY (EXHS. H-1 TO H-10) WAS FOUND. V THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEG POLICE OPERATIVES VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF BOTH ACCUSED AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE. VI THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND OTHER MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.[25]

17
Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, provides that: Section 16. Possession or Use of the Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drugs without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. (As amended by Sec. 16, RA No. 7659.) Appellant Julliver de Leon contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of illegal possession of shabu because said conclusion was totally against its finding that there was no buy-bust operation that took place. Without the said buybust or entrapment operation, there was no valid basis for the warrantless arrest of the appellant. Hence, the DEG operatives violated the constitutional right of the appellant against unreasonable searches and seizures. And it allegedly proved his allegation that the police operatives planted the sachets of shabu due to his fathers refusal to inform them about the whereabouts of a certain Biyo Nuez. The appellant also asserts that the testimony of SPO1 Nepomuceno as to the manner of recovery of the confiscated and the buy-bust drugs was hearsay for the reason that he was not the one who recovered the same and only heard the details thereof from another police officer. We affirm the appellants conviction for illegal possession of regulated drugs. Appellants arrest for possession of regulated drugs proceeded from a valid buy -bust operation. Ticlao and Boysillo categorically testified on how the entrapment was effected. Their testimonies were corroborated in all material points by the arresting officers who actually witnessed how the transaction took place: accused George de Leon initiated the transaction by asking from Ticlao the quantity of shabu he wanted to buy; Ticlao asked for dalawang bulto; after receiving the marked one thousand peso bills as payment for the drugs, George called herein appellant; George handed the money to appellant and then left the compound; meanwhile, appellant went inside Georges house and came back holding a yellow envelope that contained the regulated drugs; after verifying that what was given by appellant was indeed shabu, Ticlao and Boysillo left and gave the pre-arranged signal to the police officers who then entered the compound and pursued the appellant; the latter fled and threw the envelope containing the regulated drugs inside a bedroom in Georges house. Herein appellant cannot rely on his acquittal for the illegal sale of regulated drugs to prove that no entrapment took place and that therefore his warrantless arrest for illegal possession of regulated drugs was unlawful. According to the trial court, accused George de Leon and herein appellant were acquitted of the crime of sale of regulated drugs because Georges participation in the transaction was doubtful -- the latter was arrested 200 meters away from the scene of the sale and there was a delay in effecting his arrest. Considering the clear and convincing evidence, it was not impossible for accused George de Leon to have participated in the sale of shabu. The distance between the place where he was arrested and the place of the transaction was only 200 meters. It was such a short distance that George could have easily initiated the deal, left the compound in the middle of the transaction, gone to his friends place and started drinking with them. We have always ruled that alibi is an inherently weak defense that is easy to contrive and concoct. For such defense to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime occurred. He must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. [26] We also rule that the delay in the arrest of George should not be seen as a loophole through which he can wiggle out of criminal liability. It was more in accordance with proper legal procedure for the police officers to arrest the accused George de Leon only after the poseur-buyer and the informant gave the signal confirming that the substance they received was indeed shabu. It was of critical importance to first get hold of the shabu before George could be arrested as that was the evidence that would pin him down for the sale of drugs. The entrapment operation paved the way for the valid warrantless arrest of appellant. Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that (A) peace officer or a private person, without a warr ant, may arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense xxx Consequently, any search resulting from said lawful warrantless arrest was also valid because the accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the person to be arrested (appellant) committed a crime in the presence of the arresting officers or the poseur-buyer.[27] Herein appellant was caught red-handed in the act of committing the offenses for which he was charged. He made the sale in the presence of the police operatives, the poseur-buyer and the informant. When he fled, he carried then

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threw the envelope containing the regulated drugs inside the bedroom in full view of PO1 Libuton, the pursuing arresting officer. There was therefore no need for a warrant to arrest and search the person of appellant. Appellant points out the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses testimonies on the number of vehicles used in going to the place of operation, and the owner of the jeep used in the operation. But minor variances in the details of the witnesses accounts, more frequently than not, ar e badges of truth rather than indicia of falsehood, and they often bolster the probative value of their testimonies.[28] The inconsistencies underscored by appellant do not pertain to the actual drug deal or to the subsequent arrest of accused George and appellant. We also consider as minor the contradiction between (1) the policemens joint affidavit of arrest, to the effect that appellant was arrested inside his house and (2) the testimony of the policemen in court, to the effect that appellant was arrested in the house of his father, accused George de Leon. Such inconsistency did not affect the credible testimonies of SPO1 Nepomuceno and PO1 Libuton that the regulated drugs were recovered inside the nipa house. SPO1 Libuton explained that they did not even know beforehand where appellants house was and they were initially of the impression that the nipa house where they arrested appellant was his (appellants) house. They only discovered the error after the entrapment operation.[29] According to appellant, the testimony of SPO1 Nepomuceno identifying the sachets of shabu as the same sachets recovered from him was hearsay evidence inasmuch as he was not the person who recovered it. We disagree. PO1 Libuton (the arresting officer who personally recovered the sachets of shabu from appellant and who turned over the said sachets to Maalac after marking the same with his initials) corroborated Nepomucenos testimony. Not only that. Even the defense itself admitted that Libutons testimony corroborated Nepomucenos. [30] In addition, Libuton categorically identified the sachets of shabu presented in court as the same sachets he recovered inside the de Leon compound due to the markings that he and Maalac wrote thereon.[31] Furthermore, during Nepomucenos testimony, appellant failed to object to the questions propounded to him (Nepomuceno). Consequently, he cannot now claim Nepomucenos testimony on the recovery of the regulated drugs to be hearsay. In his fourth assignment of error, appellant also claims material inconsistency between Nepomucenos statement that the marked money was found in the possession of herein appellant Julliver de Leon and Libutons narration that it was recovered from the person of accused George de Leon. A reading of the records shows that appellants observation is a desperate attempt to capitalize on what was clearly the prosecu tors honest mistake in utterance. To quote from Libutons testimony during the direct examination: xxx xxx xxx

Q. After taking the yellowish envelope what then did you do, if any? A. I looked at the contents of this yellowish envelope, sir.

Q. And what did you find (sic) the contents of this yellowish envelope? A. Four transparent plastic sachets which contents (sic) white substance believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.

Q. After finding out the contents of this yellowish envelope, what then did you do with this yellowish envelope together with the contents? A. Sir, we confiscated it and have (sic) it marked for laboratory examination.

Q. Did you turn-over it to somebody else? A. Yes, sir.

Q. To whom? A. Melvin Maalac, sir.

Q. How about the accused Julliver you said you yourself (sic) were you able to find him? A. Yes, sir.

Q. After finding him what did you do? A. We arrested him sir.

Q. If you see that accused Julliver de Leon again, please point him to us if he is inside the Courtroom? A. Yes, sir.

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Q. Please do so? A. Witness stepped down and approach (sic) a person, and when asked to stand up and asked his name, he gave his name as Julliver de Leon.

Q. Now, you said that the contents of the yellowish envelope were marked, who placed those markings? A. Sir, I myself and Melvin Maalac.

Q. In what place did you place those markings? A. A transparent plastic sachet itself.

Q. If you see those transparent plastic sachet containing shabu again, will be you able to identify it? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why did you say that you were able to identify the same? A. Because of my markings and the markings of policemen (sic) Maalac, sir.

Q. I am showing to your these four (4) plastic sachet (sic), please look at these and tell us what relations (sic) has this to the four sachets containing shabu you claimed you have recovered and marked? A. These were all the four (4) plastic sachet (sic) which contents (sic) methamphetamine hydrochloride that were recovered (sic) contained on that yellowish and marked?

Q. Why did you say that those are the same four plastic sachet (sic) containing methamphetamine hydrochloride you recovered? A. Because of my markings, sir.

Q. Please point to us the markings you placed and those placed by Maalac? A. RCL 1, RCL 2, RCL 3, RCL 4, which stands to (sic) my surname and the initials also of MPM, 1,2,3,4, which stands to (sic) the name of Melvin P. Maalac.

Q. How about the yellowish envelope where you found those four plastic sachet (sic) containing shabu you have just identified, if you see that yellowish envelope will you be able to identify it? A. Yes, sir.

Q. I am showing to you this yellowish envelope, please tell us what relation has that to the yellowish envelope you claimed contained these four plastic sachet (sic) of shabu you have just identified? A. This is the same yellowish envelope, sir.

Q. Why did you say that this is the same yellowish envelope? A. Because of the markings and the signature of Nepomuceno and Maalac with corresponding date 3-19-97.

Q. Aside from these four plastic sachet (sic) containing shabu contained in a yellowish envelope, what else did [32] you recover when you arrested accused George de Leon? A. Prior to our interrogation, sir, we recovered one weighing scale and other several pieces of transparent plastic sachet intended for repackaging such methamphetamine, sir.

Q. Aside from those you mentioned, what else you recovered? (sic) A. The marked money.

Q. How much did you recover? A. P10,000.00, sir. (underlining supplied)

In analyzing testimonies, the over-all impression or effect of what is said or done is controlling, not individual words and phrases alone.[33] The prosecution was asking Libuton about the circumstances surrounding appellant Julliver de Leonsarrest, he being the officer who personally caught appellant committing the crime in flagrante delicto. The public prosecutors line of questioning centered on Jullivers arrest and not on Georges. His questions no doubt referred to

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appellant Julliver alone not to George and interchanging their names in one question was simple absentmindedness. The truth was that there was no reason to ask Libuton anything about Georges arrest because it was not Libuton who arrested George. We thus consider the erroneous reference to George in one question as a product of inadvertence and honest mistake which the defense should not capitalize on in its effort to seek acquittal. One honest mistake in the course of a long testimony cannot dilute the credibility of a witness.[34] As a matter of fact, honest mistakes are not inconsistent with truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses.[35] What is important in the case at bar is that appellant was caught in possession of regulated drugs after a successful and legitimate buy-bust operation. We find no proof of fabricated evidence, contrary to appellants claim. Even the trial court did not believe appellants version of the events. To quote from the decision of the trial court, his denials will have to fail in the face of the positive identification made by the arresting officers of accused Baye (appellant) as the one from whom the more than 200 grams of shabu was confiscated xxx. [36] Frame-up, a shop-worn defense of those accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the Court with disfavor since it is an allegation that can easily be concocted. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity of official acts by government officials.[37] WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 17806-MN, convicting appellant Julliver de Leon of illegal possession of regulated drugs and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.