A Cold Welcome: The Unequal Terms of Eastern Enlargement

DOROTHEE BOHLE
Dorothee Bohle is assistant professor in the political sciences department at the Central European University, Budapest.

he Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 represented a political breakthrough for the European Unions ambitious enlargement programme. Entry negotiations were successfully concluded with the most advanced candidate countries from southern and eastern Europe, which will join the European Union in May 2004.1

The closing of the negotiations was timely, coming after a decade of hesitation, insecurities and drawbacks. It seems that the European Union has finally drawn farreaching conclusions from the breakdown of state socialism. However, even after the Copenhagen summit, the signals towards the acceding countries remain mixed. Above all, it has become clear that the European Union is not prepared to grant its new members equal social and economic rights with the current fifteen EU states in the near future. The transition periods concerning free movement of labour deny nationals of the new member states a crucial right of EU citizenship. The financial arrangements leave the acceding states with significantly fewer resources per capita than the current members, as regards both agricultural subsidies and structural funds. The recent concretisation of the terms of enlargement provides a good opportunity for a more general assessment of the relation between the European Union and the countries of central and eastern Europe (CEE). How is the unequal treatment of the new members to be explained? Is it likely to be transitory, or are we witnessing the emergence of an enduring second-class membership? These are the questions that my essay addresses. It would be wrong to see enlargement as an event in the history of the European Union that is unrelated to its internal developments. Rather, enlargement has to be put in the context of an ongoing process of neo-liberal restructuringi.e., the freeing of market forces and the pushing back of the (social) interventionist statewhich has informed EU integration ever since the mid-1980s. Consequently, I first briefly review the main projects of neo-liberal restructuring in European integration and analyse the social actors supporting them. I then go on to show how this neo-liberal constellation determined relations between the European Union and the CEE countries during the 1990s. I conclude by discussing some of the consequences of the EU approach to enlargement for these countries and the new Europe.

Relaunching Integration

After a decade of stagnation on European integration, the project of the internal market, launched in 1985, marked a break with Eurosclerosis and brought new momentum to the integration process. The internal market project was clearly a neoliberal initiative. It emerged against the background of a perceived loss of European competitiveness vis--vis the United States and Japan, and aimed at restoring this by overcoming the fragmentation of the European markets. It was predominantly characterised by negative integration, i.e., the elimination of national constraints on trade and competition, and thus created a competency gap, in which national policy is severely restrained in its problem-solving capacity, while European policy is constrained by the lack of intergovernmental agreement.2 The Maastricht Treaty (1992) constituted a qualitative new step in European integration. At its centre lies economic and monetary union (EMU), the supranational core of the new EU system. Externally, EMU aims at regaining sovereignty within the global currency competition. Internally, it seeks to tie political actors to orthodox monetarist fiscal and monetary policies, leaving little room for distributive options and generous wage policies, and putting the different social and industrial-relations regimes in direct competition. EMU constitutes only one side of the European Unions new competitiveness architecture. Shortly after Maastricht, the European Commission published a white paper on Competitiveness, Growth and Employment which has since become one of the main intellectual reference points in the socio-economic policy debate within the European Union.3 In contrast to the earlier negative mode of integration, European innovation, industrial and infrastructural policies are openly promoted by the white paper. The concept and ideology of competitiveness has characterised European initiatives ever since. In 1995 a Competitiveness Advisory Group was set up, whose main task has been to put this ideology into effect. One of the most remarkable outcomes of this effort was the promotion of benchmarking, which is defined by the European Commission as
a tool for improving competitiveness and for promoting the convergence towards best practice. This involves the global comparison of societal behaviour [sic!], commercial practice, market structure and public institutions.4

Benchmarking clearly aims at deepening neo-liberal restructuring in all spheres of society.

Embedded Neo-Liberalism
It is widely acknowledged that the neo-liberal restructuring of the European Union was strongly influenced by European transnational corporations. These forces, in close co-operation with representatives of the European Commission, often bypassed national governments in designing the next steps of European integration. Probably the central elite platform of these transnational business groups is the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), founded in 1983 on the initiative of Pehr Gyllenhammar, chief executive of Volvo, with the support of Etienne Davignon, a

European Commissioner at the time. Today, ERT consists of forty-five CEOs and chairmen of Europes most transnational and biggest corporations. Through intense lobbying activity at national and supranational levels, regular official meetings with the highest EU representatives, and strategic reports on burning issues of European integration, ERT has acquired privileged influence in European policymaking. However, ERTs influence alone obviously cannot explain the neo-liberal character of European integration during the 1990s. Rather, the project of European transnational corporations was able to capture the broader social and political scene against the background of a fundamental socio-economic crisis, which opened the terrain for experimentation with new ideological and political recipes. Of crucial importance was the legitimation crisis of Keynesianism. After repeated experiences of the failure of Keynesian recipes, European social-democratic and centrist forces, as well as employees and trade unions, became more open to neo-liberal ideas. Moreover, these actors discovered the European level to be one that allowed some of the problem-solving capacity that nation-states lost in globalisation to be regained. The incorporation of social-democratic, trade union and centrist demands into the neo-liberal European order is reflected in a number of policies and initiatives, above all, in the upgrading of structural and social funds, attempts at social regulation on the European level, and European employment policy. Thus, we may speak of an embedded neo-liberalism which has emerged in the European Union. According to Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, who coined this term, embeddedness addresses the concerns of European labour and social democracy, but this incorporation is done in such a way that these concerns are, in the end, subordinated to the overriding objective of neo-liberal competitiveness.5 The incorporation of subordinated forces through flanking policies and side payments is important, but insufficient to create public support for neo-liberal restructuring. Rather, a second, and in the long term much more contradictory, means of winning public support for neo-liberal restructuring in Europe is inscribed in the European integration process: the mobilisation of societies under a national(ist) banner.

Exploiting Nationalism
In order to see that this national(ist) mobilisation is inscribed in the project of neoliberal restructuring itself, it is necessary to review briefly the basic features of the mode of recent European integration. Since the 1980s, the European mode of integration has aimed at enhancing competitiveness at all levels of the EU member states. Thus, the European Union, partly through directly taking over and Europeanising certain state functions (e.g., monetary policy), and partly through reshaping significantly the framework in which nation-states operate, is developing into the interface that enhances regime competition between different national systems of governance. The bulk of the process of adaptation to this new competitive environment rests with the nation-state and national institutions, and it is at this level that European populations are being mobilised. Competition, however, as Wolfgang Streeck points out, is a pervasive force. It transforms social solidarity even where an economy successfully adjusts to intensified

market pressures, and its effects extend far beyond the firms and sectors directly exposed to it.6 Earlier, in the postSecond World War arrangement, solidarity relied on two principles, a social and a national one. Social policy was aimed at redistributing the results of market activities within the framework of the nation-state. This form of social solidarity has come under attack. Broader societal redistribution is considered to contradict the requirements of competitiveness in the global economy. Thus, social solidarity is increasingly being reduced to its national base. This can take a more inclusive form, as reflected for instance in the revival of (neoliberal) national corporatist arrangements. It is not clear, however, whether this benevolent form of national solidaritybenevolent and inclusive in the sense that success in the global competition is seen as an effort of the whole society, including marginalised groupsis strong enough to counterbalance the negative effects of structural change, insecurity, and growing inequality which go hand in hand with neoliberal restructuring. Competing with the benevolent form of national solidarity is an exclusionist malevolent one which has emerged in western Europe since the 1980s. This nationalistic mobilisation is represented by the radical right-wing populist parties, which combine support for neo-liberalism with xenophobia, thus offering the losers of neo-liberal restructuring a narrative of who is to blame for their fate. The radical Right thus manages to forge an alliance between segments of the working class (i.e., the losers, who become nationalistic and xenophobic) and segments of the new middle class, especially the private-sector segment, which strongly supports the programme of radical neo-liberalism. Thus, the main political challenge to the social forces supporting embedded neo-liberalism on a European scale comes from the new (extreme) Right, which does not question neo-liberal restructuring per se, but its embeddedness.

An Unequal Relationship
Although the European Union repeatedly stressed its solidarity with the efforts of east Europeans to marketise and democratise their societies following the breakdown of state socialism, its commitment towards enlargement evolved only gradually and hesitantly over the 1990s. After an initial attempt to keep the CEE countries at distance by offering them association instead of membership, the European Union finally endorsed enlargement at its 1993 Copenhagen summit. Enlargement, however, was made conditional on a range of economic and political criteria. After 1993, the European Union started to develop a strategy to prepare the applicant countries for membership. The main thrust of this pre-accession strategy was to liberalise the external economic relations of CEE. In 1997, the European Commission issued for the first time its avis (opinion) on the progress of the applicant countries in meeting the Copenhagen criteria, and proposed a reinforced pre-accession strategy in its Agenda 2000, the blueprint for enlargement. On the basis of its evaluation, the commission recommended that entry negotiations be started with five of the CEE states: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia (CEE-5). This recommendation was formally endorsed at the Luxembourg summit in 1997, and in March 1998 entry negotiations

with the CEE-5 began. Eventually, in December 1999, the European Council, meeting in Helsinki, decided to open accession negotiations with all ten CEE applicants. At its Gothenburg summit in June 2001, the European Union finally opened the possibility that the most advanced candidates from southern and eastern Europe could complete entry negotiations by the end of 2002. At the Copenhagen summit in December 2002 the European Union successfully concluded entry negotiations with eight CEE countries, together with Malta and Cyprus. (Of the ten CEE applicants, Romania and Bulgaria were unable to complete the entry negotiations.) Despite the fact that the commitment to, and the framework of, enlargement evolved only gradually, from the early 1990s onwards a clear-cut and continuous pattern of relations between the European Union and the CEE states is observable. This pattern is characterised by an asymmetric power relationship and a high level of conditionality. Both features are instrumental for the European Union in pushing through a selective expansion of its deregulatory programme, while at the same time constantly postponing the extension to the CEE countries of the more inclusive aspects of the EU model. That an asymmetrical power relationship exists between the European Union and CEE is not surprising. Both in economic and political terms the European Union is the stronger element in the relationship, and after all, it is the CEE countries that want to join the club, and not the other way round. These basic initial conditions have, however, been continuously reinforced by the European Unions insistence on bilateral and differentiated treatment of each CEE state. The result of this bilateral approach is twofold: economically, the basis has been created for a regional hub and spoke structure, with each target state relating to the others via its relationship with the western hub; politically, the consequence has been a competitive race for EU membership among the CEE countries. This competitiveness has been reinforced by the high level of conditionality the European Union has imposed on membership. According to the Copenhagen criteria, membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. Furthermore, it presupposes the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the union. These criteria have been consolidated over the last ten years, with the result that conditionality has figured much more prominently in the recent entry negotiations than in previous enlargement rounds. The Copenhagen criteria, moreover, went far beyond the acquis communautaire the existing laws and policy arrangements of the European Union, which candidate countries are obliged to adopt. They also exceeded the unions influence in the domestic affairs of the member states. The European Commission has regularly monitored the progress of the candidates in complying with the Copenhagen criteria.

Market Radicalism
Which aims have been served by the high conditionality and the establishment of deeply asymmetrical bilateral relations? The answer is twofold. On the one hand, the European Union uses its influence in the region in order to export the core of its

deregulatory programme. On the other, it continuously postpones its commitment to extend the more inclusive features of the EU polity. Thus, ever since the Europe Agreements of the mid-1990s that set the framework for bilateral EUCEE relations, the main thrust of EU policy has been to secure the liberalisation and deregulation of the applicants political economies. This enables the European Union to secure wide influence over the emerging models of capitalism in the CEE states, and especially over their competition policies and industrial standards. Moreover, in contrast to the southern enlargement, where the new member states were obliged to liberalise domestic markets only upon EU entry, and often with temporary exemptions, the CEE countries are being required to open their markets before membership, without any linkage between liberalisation and membership.7 At the same time, the European Union has been very reluctant to extend to the CEE countries all those policies that would make their transition and adaptation easier, such as substantial financial aid, free movement of labour, or liberalisation of agricultural trade. The earliest example of this attitude is the selective protectionism incorporated in the trade sections of the Europe Agreements, where the European Union conceived of a battery of protectionist instruments that targeted precisely those sectors in which CEE had a competitive advantage: steel, textiles, clothing, chemicals, and agricultural products. Similarly, in the pre-accession strategy, which is primarily concerned with liberalisation of external economic relations and creating the conditions for free movement of industrial goods, services and, to some extent capital,8 labour and also agricultural policy were excluded from liberalisation. Finally, as regards financial aid, the European Union has supported its own members much more strongly than its poor eastern neighbours. Until recently, it was widely assumed that these asymmetries would disappear once full EU membership had been attained. However, the agreements negotiated in Copenhagen in 2002 indicate that, at least in the near future, the new entrants will be relegated to a second-class membership. In the field of free movement of labour, transition periods have been agreed upon. The free movement of persons is not solely an economic issue; it is also an essential EU citizenship right, which is thus being withheld from the nationals of the new member states. In financial terms, the per capita transfers of EU funds for the east European newcomers will be significantly lower than those for the current member states. According to calculations made by Karl Debbaut, in the first year after accession Poland will receive 67 per person, Hungary 49, Slovenia 41, and the Czech Republic 29. By contrast, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain currently receive 437, 418, 211, and 216 per capita respectively.9 This unequal financial treatment is the result of two EU policies. First, as regards direct agricultural subsidies, the European Union will initially pay the newcomers only 25 per cent of what the current member states receive, raising the amount in steps to reach parity in 2013. Second, the European Union limited the maximum transfer from structural funds to 4 per cent of the national GDP of member states. This disadvantages the acceding countries as their GDP is much lower than that of the current members.

Thus, despite (or because of) the relative poverty of the acceding states and the comparatively high proportion of their population still depending on agriculture, they will have to wait ten years before receiving full direct agricultural aid, and structural transfers will be at a lower per capita rate than in the poorest of the present EU members. At the same time, and in stark contrast to its limited financial commitment, the European Union has insisted that the new entrants pay full budget contributions from the very beginning. As this would have turned some newcomers into net contributors to the EU budget, individual countries will receive lump-sum compensation. All in all, during the 1990s, the European Union managed, through a mixture of power and conditionality (stick) and the promise of membership (carrot) to push the CEE countries towards adopting a specific, neo-liberal reform model. This model is more radical than the west European one. At its heart are the regulatory reforms of the internal market. Moreover, reforms have been stipulated which are not part of the acquis. Finally, the requirements have been presented as self-evident. There is little debate within the European Union or the CEE states as to whether they are appropriate for economically underdeveloped countries with huge restructuring problems. How to explain this outcome, which prescribes a much more market-radical variant of neo-liberalism for CEE?

Transnational Capital
There are some obvious reasons for the discriminatory features of the EU enlargement agenda. The most common explanation is the huge difference in socioeconomic structures between the member states and the acceding countries. Thus, compared to the EU average, the CEE states are poor and underdeveloped. Given this development gap, the export of embedded neo-liberalism, with its associated social funding and rights, would be rather costly. Other explanations point to the fact that an enlargement incorporating ten or more countries is a complex procedure, requiring substantial reformfinancial, institutional and proceduralof the European Union itself. Thus, enlargement threatens to unravel the complex pattern of package deals and compromises within the European Union, may increase the tensions between its small and large states, and may weaken the authority of the traditional French German motor of EU integration. However, these arguments cannot totally explain the discriminatory nature of CEE integration. What must also be considered is the relation of forces within the European Union, and the (un)willingness of the main EU forces to overcome the obstacles to an enlargement on equal terms. In what follows, I will therefore take a closer look at these forces and analyse their different agendas concerning enlargement. Starting with the dominant group, i.e., transnationally oriented capital, this is definitely the most powerful supporter of enlargement, without whose backing accession negotiations could hardly have started. Furthermore, it is increasingly clear that this factor will set the pace of enlargement and to some extent the conditions of

it.10 Indeed, taking ERTs position as indicative of that of transnational capital generally, as early as 1991 ERT stated that the European Union should take immediate action in response to the new challenge and the window of opportunity offered by the astonishing developments in Eastern Europe.11 Whereas initially ERT remained rather vague about how to exploit this window of opportunity, since 1997 it has actively lobbied for enlargement to be speeded up. In a message to EU heads of state in 1997, it invited the European Union to reform its institutional structure in order to facilitate enlargement, and urged it to begin closer co-operation with the applicant countries. In 1999, ERT published its first report dealing exclusively with enlargement. It stressed that enlargement offers a golden opportunity to improve the competitiveness and prosperity of the whole European economy (existing EU members and new candidates alike).12 This report also reveals the significant degree to which individual members of ERT have been engaged in CEE. The rationale behind the support of ERTand of transnational capital in general for extending EU boundaries is straightforward. For transnational corporations, the inclusion of eastern Europe, its production facilities and its comparatively cheap and skilled labour is an opportunity to reorganise their production chains, and thus increase their competitiveness in European and global markets. The degree to which this is happening is evident first in an increasing flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the region, especially since 1994. The bulk of FDI (in terms of inflow) is directed towards the Visegrad countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic). Second, foreign investors are exerting increasing control over strategic sectors of the CEE economies. Thus, Hungarys leading export sectorsmachinery and food are operated almost exclusively by foreign firms, and its financial and telecommunication sectors are predominantly in foreign hands. Third, foreign capital uses its control position to effect transborder restructuring of the production process. For example, a remarkably high share (39 per cent) of Hungarys exports is high-technology in nature. Much of this is due to a new transborder division of labour, controlled by Western corporations, whereby Hungary undertakes the export-oriented assembly of imported inputs.13 For these reasons, transnational business supports EU enlargement. Although the economic opening of the CEE countries during the 1990s already allowed transnational capital to access their markets, production sites and labour, accession is expected to reinforce business opportunities significantly. Yet transnational capital is not lobbying equally strongly for the extension of the more inclusive features of the EU system, and there is reason to believe that it is not really interested in seeing the CEE states catch up in terms of social (or environmental) standards. Rather, exploiting differences in wages, and in fiscal, social and environmental standards, is a significant incentive for investment.

A Lack of Solidarity

If transnational capital is not pressing for the extension of the more inclusive features of the EU polity, what about other actors? At this point, it is necessary to examine the stance of Germany, which from the beginning has been the leading proponent of enlargement. Despite its general support, Germany is not ready to assume a heavier financial onus in order to make feasible the inclusion of the CEE countries on equal terms. On the contrary: not only does Germany want other EU countries to ease the burden of its disproportionately high transfers to CEE, but its emphasis on budgetary reform openly conflicts with the goal of eastern enlargement.14 Germanys position, similar to that of other net contributors to the EU budget, also reflects the disciplinary nature of EMU. Against a background of economic downturn and worsening budget deficits since the beginning of the new millennium, EU states have found it increasingly difficult to meet the Maastricht criteria. In this context, the willingness of political actors to opt for budgetary solidarity with the east European countries is severely limited. Moreover, as a result of its internal compromise of embedded neo-liberalism, Germany advocates a long transition period for the admission of east European labour to current EU member states. Thus, like ERT, Germany pursues a pro-enlargement policy without taking on responsibility for including the CEE countries on terms of equal social and economic rights. The weaker EU actorssocial-democratic forces, trade unions and the elites of the peripheral EU stateshave not offered the strongest support for enlargement. Thus, trade union support for enlargement is at best lukewarm, and on both the EU and national levels labour has lobbied strongly against the free movement of persons. The Austrian trade union confederation GB, for example, proposed an income criterion for free labour migration: average wages in the CEE countries had to reach 80 per cent of the Austrian average wage for labour migration to be permitted. Even if this extreme proposal (later picked up by Austrias far-right politician Jrg Haider) has since been abandoned by GB, it is nevertheless in line with a broader reflex of both German and Austrian trade unions to answer the challenge of eastern enlargement with chauvinist welfare approaches. Similarly, the elites of the peripheral EU states have repeatedly stressed that they are not willing to foot the bill for enlargement. All in all, for the weaker actors of the European Union, it is becoming clear that enlargement is not an EastWest winwin experience, as ERT judges, but that a united Europe ... has become a zero-sum game in which the extension of its benefits to the newcomers from the east will be achieved only at some real costs to the current members.15 Enlargement threatens to undermine the compromise of embedded neo-liberalism in western Europe and to weaken the bargaining position of the weaker actors. Given this threat, these actors try to defend their achieved rights at the expense of the newcomers. Thus, whereas the aim of integrating eastern Europe is shared by a limited, but powerful, number of actors who are mainly interested in exploring the regions economic potential, the idea of an equal inclusion of the CEE countries and of genuine (financial) solidarity enjoys virtually no support. As a result, EUCEE relations have been characterised by the attempt to create the best possible conditions for west European capital.

The New European Order

I have argued that both the deepening of the European Union and the concrete form of its eastward expansion are the result of a reconfiguration of social forces in the union since the mid-1980s. Transnational capital and supranational actors took the lead in both projects, but the outcome was different in each case. Through the incorporation of social-democratic, centrist and peripheral political forces and trade unions, restructuring in western Europe has developed into embedded neoliberalism. Transnational capital was also involved from the beginning in the incorporation of eastern Europe. Because of the lack of support of virtually all social forces within the European Union for granting the CEE countries equal economic and social rights, the concrete terms of the eastward expansion have been characterised by the export of a market-radical variant of neo-liberalism that offers the best possible conditions for west European capital. This narrow, interest-based and selfish approach has, however, produced a number of drawbacks which threaten to undermine stability in the new Europe. First, even if the European Union has managed (so far) to limit its internal conflicts about distributing the costs of enlargement (essentially by restricting and postponing these costs), there is increasing awareness that the benefits and burdens have been unevenly shared out. Thus, for some private actors, enlargement is indeed a winwin experience. However, proof that these private gains will have a public trickle-down effect both in the east and the west has not yet been offered. The European Unions previous (Keynesian) regime had a remedy for limiting and socialising private gains: redistribution. As the current ideological climate and relation of forces do not allow for much redistribution, something else must be offered in compensation. As argued above, this is nationalism. While the rise of nationalism and xenophobia does not necessarily endanger the project of enlargement, it makes repressive options for pushing through a very unequal economic unification more likely. Second, the integration of the CEE countries under the patterns described above has to date not produced the economic gains desired from their return to Europe. Rather, these countries are developing the characteristics of a semi-periphery: dualistic economic structures and precarious growth perspectives. Under the influence of foreign direct investment, part of their economies are being upgraded and transnationally integrated, although not on equal terms with the western core. The modernised segments coexist with the more problematic legacies of the old system: the ruins of heavy industry, agriculture, and the like. It remains for the already impoverished eastern nation-states to restructure these industries. Bridges between new and old segments of the economy remain scarce. It is this differentiation between a western core and a centraleastern semiperiphery which makes the prospect of a more equal European Union after enlargement unlikely. Even if the new members eventually enjoy formal and legal equality, and thus gain more equal access to the financial resources of the European Union, the real, socio-economic inequality is likely to persist.

ENDNOTES

1. These countries are Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta and Cyprus. My essay concentrates on the terms of enlargement for the east European countries. 2. Fritz Scharpf, Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States, in Governance in the European Union, ed. Gary Marks et al. (London: Sage, 1996), p. 15. 3. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Transnational Class Agency and European Governance: The Case of the European Roundtable of Industrialists, New Political Economy 5, no. 2 (2000), p. 172. 4. Ibid., p. 175. 5. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, The Struggle over European Order: Transnational Class Agency in the Making of Embedded Neo-Liberalism , in Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy, ed. Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (Houndmills, England: Palgrave, 2001), p. 87. 6. Wolfgang Streeck, Competitive Solidarity: Rethinking the European Social Model, working paper 99/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, 1999 [http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp99-8/wp99-8.html]. 7. Andras Inotai, Political, Economic and Social Arguments for and against EU Enlargement: A Survey of the Influence of Pressure Groups, working paper 101, Institute for World Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 1999, p. 7. 8. Heather Grabbe, A Partnership for Accession? The Implication of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants, working paper, Robert Schuman Centre, San Domenico di Fiesole, 1998, p. 11. 9. Karl Debbaut, EU Enlargement after Copenhagen, Socialism Today, no. 72 (February 2003) [http://www.socialismtoday.org/72/eu.html]. 10. Inotai, Arguments for and against EU Enlargement, p. 10. 11. Cited in Otto Holman, The Enlargement of the European Union towards Central and Eastern Europe: The Role of Supranational and Transnational Actors, in Social Forces, ed. Bieler and Morton, p. 174. 12. The EastWest WinWin Business Experience, ERT, Brussels, 1999, p. 5. The report can be found at [http://www.ert.be/pf/enf_frame.htm].

13. See Bla Greskovits and Dorothee Bohle, Development Pathways on Europes Periphery: Poland and Hungarys Return to Europe Compared, Polish Sociological Review 133, no. 1 (2001), pp. 328. 14. Adrian G. Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 185. 15. Tony Judt, cited in Hyde-Price, Germany and European Order, p. 202.

Copyright of Global Dialogue is the property of Centre for World Dialogue and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.