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3G Security Overview
3G Security Overview
Source: 3GPP
Myagmar, Gupta
1
UIUC 2001
BTS
A-bis
MSC
BSC
OMC
Mobility mgt
VLR HLR AUC EIR
Voice Traffic
Circuit-switched technology
Myagmar, Gupta
2
UIUC 2001
Authentication
Protect from unauthorized service access Based on the authentication algorithm A3(Ki, RAND)=> SRES Problems with inadequate algorithms
Encryption
Scramble bit streams to protect signaling and user data Ciphering algorithm A8(Ki, RAND) => Kc A5(Kc, Data) => Encrypted Data Need stronger encryption
Confidentiality
Prevent intruder from identifying users by IMSI Temporary MSI Need more secure mechanism
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
Transparency
Security features operate without user assistance Needs greater user visibility
Minimized Trust
Requires minimum trust between HE and SN
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
Key Transmission
Cipher keys and authentication values are transmitted in clear within and between networks (IMSI, RAND, SRES, Kc)
Channel Hijack
Protection against radio channel hijack relies on encryption. However, encryption is not used in some networks.
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
Unilateral Authentication
Only user authentication to the network is provided. No means to identify the network to the user.
Unsecured Terminal
IMEI is an unsecured identity Integrity mechanisms for IMEI are introduced late
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
Lack of Visibility
No indication to the user that encryption is on No explicit confirmation to the HE that authentication parameters are properly used in SN when subscribers roam
Inflexibility
Inadequate flexibility to upgrade and improve security functionality over time
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
3G Network Architecture
Circuit Network
Circuit Switch
IN Services
Mobility Manager
Call Agent
IP Core Network
Packet Gateway
IP RAN
2G
2G/2.5G
3G 8
Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
Explicit Integrity
Data integrity is assured explicitly by use of integrity algorithms Also stronger confidentiality algorithms with longer keys
Network Security
Mechanisms to support security within and between networks
IMEI Integrity
Integrity mechanisms for IMEI provided from the start
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
Secure Applications
Provide security for applications resident on USIM
Fraud Detection
Mechanisms to combating fraud in roaming situations
Flexibility
Security features can be extended and enhanced as required by new threats and services
Lawful Interception
Mechanisms to provide authorized agencies with certain information about subscribers
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
HLR
13
UIUC 2001
RAND
f1
f2
f3
f4
f5
MAC
XRES
CK
IK
AK
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
SQN
f1
f2
f3
f4
XMAC
RES
CK
IK
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
MESSAGE
MESSAGE
IK
f9
IK
f9
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
BEARER
BEARER
CK
f8
CK
f8
KEYSTREAM BLOCK
KEYSTREAM BLOCK
PLAINTEXT BLOCK
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
User-USIM Authentication
Access to USIM is restricted to authorized users User and USIM share a secret key, PIN
USIM-Terminal Authentication
User equipment must authenticate USIM
Secure Applications
Applications resident on USIM should receive secure messages over the network
Visibility
Indication that encryption is on Indication what level of security (2G, 3G) is available
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
GSM Compatibility
GSM user parameters are derived from UMTS parameters using the following conversion functions: cipher key Kc = c3(CK, IK) random challenge RAND = c1(RAND) signed response SRES = c2(RES) GSM subscribers roaming in 3GPP network are supported by GSM security context (example, vulnerable to false BTS)
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001
References
3G TS 33.120 Security Principles and Objectives
http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG3_Security/_Specs/33120-300.pdf
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001