The Nuclear Bible: US, EU, & Israeli Nuclear Proliferation

Study Estimating Thyroid Doses of I-131 Received by Americans From Nevada Atmospheric Nuclear Bomb Test, National Cancer Institute (1997)

Intro: Nuclear proliferation and negligence by nations of the West is continuing even today. The fact that the U.S. Government and the
E.U. are even talking about Iran, North Korea, or Pakistans nuclear ambitions and proliferation is comical and hypocritical in every sense. The United States along with Britain, France, South Africa and Israel have done more to contaminate and radiate more people and environments than all the Middle East Nations combined. The following nuclear incidents are only the incidents that have been declassified to date, but it is highly likely that many accounts of proliferation and negligence are still classified.

Date: August 6, 1945 (Super Bowl XLV (45) is on February 6, 2011) Source: Wikipedia Tite/Headline: The Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima Abstract: The release at 08:15 (Hiroshima time) went as planned, and the gravity bomb known as "Little Boy", a gun-type fission weapon with 60 kilograms (130 lb) of uranium-235, took 43 seconds to fall from the aircraft flying at 31,060 feet (9,470 m) to the predetermined detonation height about 1,900 feet (580 m) above the city. The Enola Gay had traveled 11.5 miles away before it felt the shock waves from the blast. Due to crosswind, it missed the aiming point, the Aioi Bridge, by almost 800 feet (240 m) and detonated directly over Shima Surgical Clinic. It created a blast equivalent to about 13 kilotons of TNT (54 TJ). (The U-235 weapon was considered very inefficient, with only 1.38% of its material fissioning.) The radius of total destruction was about one mile (1.6 km), with resulting fires across 4.4 square miles (11 km2). Americans estimated that 4.7 square miles (12 km2) of the city were destroyed. Japanese officials determined that 69% of Hiroshima's buildings were destroyed and another 6 7% damaged. According to the U.S. Department of Energy the immediate effects of the blast killed approximately 70,000 people in Hiroshima. Estimates of total deaths by the end of 1945 from burns, radiation and related disease, the effects of which were aggravated by lack of medical resources, range from 90,000 to 166,000. Some estimates state up to 200,000 had died by 1950, due to cancer and other long-term effects. Another study states that from 1950 to 1990, roughly 9% of the cancer and leukemia deaths among bomb survivors was due to radiation from the bombs, the statistical excess being estimated to 89 leukemia and 339 solid cancers. At least 11 known prisoners of war died from the bombing. 70,00080,000 people, or some 30% of the population of Hiroshima were killed immediately, and another 70,000 injured. Over 90% of the doctors and 93% of the nurses in Hiroshima were killed or injuredmost had been in the downtown area which received the greatest damage. Although the U.S. had previously dropped leaflets warning civilians of air raids on 35 Japanese cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the residents of Hiroshima were given no notice of the atomic bomb (Wikipedia, 2010).

Date: August 9, 1945 Source: Wikipedia Title/Headline: The Atomic Bombing of Nagasaki Abstract: On the morning of August 9, 1945, the U.S. B-29 Superfortress Bockscar, flown by the crew of 393rd Squadron commander Major Charles W. Sweeney, carried the nuclear bomb code-named "Fat Man", with Kokura as the primary target and Nagasaki the secondary target. The mission plan for the second attack was nearly identical to that of the Hiroshima mission, with two B-29s flying an hour ahead as weather scouts and two additional B-29s in Sweeney's flight for instrumentation and photographic support of the mission. Sweeney took off with his weapon already armed but with the electrical safety plugs still engaged. At about 07:50

Japanese time, an air raid alert was sounded in Nagasaki, but the "all clear" signal was given at 08:30 . When only two B-29 Superfortresses were sighted at 10:53, the Japanese apparently assumed that the planes were only on reconnaissance and no further alarm was given. A few minutes later at 11:00, The Great Artiste, the support B-29 flown by Captain Frederick C. Bock, dropped instruments attached to three parachutes. These instruments also contained an unsigned letter to Professor Ryokichi Sagane, a nuclear physicist at the University of Tokyo who studied with three of the scientists responsible for the atomic bomb at the University of California, Berkeley, urging him to tell the public about the danger involved with these weapons of mass destruction. The messages were found by military authorities but not turned over to Sagane until a month later.[63] In 1949, one of the authors of the letter, Luis Alvarez, met with Sagane and signed the document.[64] At 11:01, a last minute break in the clouds over Nagasaki allowed Bockscar's bombardier, Captain Kermit Beahan, to visually sight the target as ordered. The "Fat Man" weapon, containing a core of ~6.4 kg (14.1 lbs.) of plutonium-239, was dropped over the city's industrial valley. It exploded 43 seconds later [11:01:44] at 469 meters (1,540 ft) above the ground exactly halfway between the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works in the south and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works (Torpedo Works) in the north. This was nearly 3 kilometers (2 mi) northwest of the planned hypocenter; the blast was confined to the Urakami Valley and a major portion of the city was protected by the intervening hills. The resulting explosion had a blast yield equivalent to 21 kilotons of TNT (88 TJ). The explosion generated heat estimated at 3,900 degrees Celsius (4,200 K, 7,000 F) and winds that were estimated at 1005 km/h (624 mph). Casualty estimates for immediate deaths range from 40,000 to 75,000. Total deaths by the end of 1945 may have reached 80,000. At least eight known POWs died from the bombing and as many as 13 POWs may have died: One British Commonwealth citizen died in the bombing. Seven Dutch POWs (two names known) died in the bombing. At least two POWs reportedly died postwar from cancer thought to have been caused by the atomic bomb. The U.S. expected to have another atomic bomb ready for use in the third week of August, with three more in September and a further three in October. On August 10, Major General Leslie Groves, military director of the Manhattan Project, sent a memorandum to General of the Army George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, in which he wrote that "the next bomb . . should be ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after 17 or August 18." On the same day, Marshall endorsed the memo with the comment, "It is not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President." There was already discussion in the War Department about conserving the bombs in production until Operation Downfall, the projected invasion of Japan, had begun. "The problem now [August 13] is whether or not, assuming the Japanese do not capitulate, to continue dropping them every time one is made and shipped out there or whether to hold them . . . and then pour them all on in a reasonably short time. Not all in one day, but over a short period. And that also takes into consideration the target that we are after. In other words, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of the greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, and the like? Nearer the tactical use rather than other use (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: February 13, 1950 Source: Wikipedia Location: British Columbia, Canada Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Loss of (1) Mark IV atomic bomb Name: 1950 B-36 Nuclear Incident Abstract: On February 13, 1950, a Convair B-36B, serial number 44-92075 assigned to the 7th Bomb Wing at Carswell Air Force Base, crashed in northern British Columbia after jettisoning a Mark IV atomic bomb. This was the first such nuclear weapon loss in history. The Convair had been en route from Eielson Air Force Base near Fairbanks, Alaska to Carswell AFB in Fort Worth, Texas, on a mission that included a simulated nuclear attack on San Francisco, California (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: April 11, 1950 Source: Wikipedia Location: Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Loss and recovery of nuclear materials Name: B-29 Nuclear Disaster & Cover-up Abstract: Three minutes after departure from Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque a USAF B-29 bomber carrying a nuclear weapon, four spare detonators, and a crew of thirteen crashed into a mountain near Manzano Base. The crash resulted in a fire which the New York Times reported as being visible from 15 miles (24 km) The bombs casing was completely demolished and its high explosives ignited upon contact with the planes burning fuel. However, according to the Department of Defense, the four spare detonators and al l nuclear components were recovered. A nuclear detonation was not possible because, while on board, the weapons core was not in the weapon for safety reasons. All thirteen crew members died (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: July 13, 1950 Source: Wikipedia Location: Lebanon, Ohio, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic bomb Name: 1950 USAF B-50 Nuclear Incident Abstract: USAF B-50 aircraft on a training mission from Biggs Air Force Base with a nuclear weapon flew into the ground. High explosive detonation, but no nuclear explosion (Wikipedia, 2010).

Date: November 10, 1950 Source: Wikipedia Location: Rivire du Loup, Qubec, Canada Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Non-nuclear detonation of an atomic bomb Name: 1950 USAF B-50 Nuclear Incident Abstract: Returning one of several U.S. Mark 4 nuclear bombs secretly deployed in Canada, a USAF B-50 had engine trouble and jettisoned the weapon at 10,500 feet (3,200 m). The crew set the bomb to self-destruct at 2,500 ft (760 m) and dropped over the St. Lawrence River. The explosion shook area residents and scattered nearly 100 pounds (45 kg) of depleted uranium used in the weapon's tamper. The plutonium core (pit) was not in the bomb at the time (Wikipedia, 2010).

Castle Bravo Nuclear Test, 1954 Date: March 1, 1954 Source: Wikipedia Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Nuclear test accident Location: Bikini Atoll, Republic of the Marshall Islands (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) Name: The Castle Bravo Nuclear Fallout Pattern Abstract: During the Castle Bravo test of the first deployable hydrogen bomb, a miscalculation resulted in the explosion being over twice as large as predicted, with a total explosive force of 15 megatons of TNT (63 PJ). Of the total yield, 10 Mt (42 PJ) were from fission of the natural uranium tamper, but those fission reactions were quite dirty, producing a large amount of fallout. Combined with the much-larger-than-expected yield and an unanticipated wind shift radioactive fallout was spread eastward onto the inhabited Rongelap and Rongerik Atolls. These islands were not evacuated before the explosion due to the financial cost involved, but many of the Marshall Islands natives have since suffered from radiation burns and radioactive dusting and also similar fates as the Japanese fisher-men and their children and grand-children have suffered from birth defects and have received little if any compensation from the federal government. A Japanese fishing boat, Daigo Fukuryu Maru/Lucky Dragon, also came into contact with the fallout, which caused many of the crew to take ill with one fatality. The test resulted in an international uproar and reignited Japanese concerns about radiation, especially with regard to the possible contamination of fish. Personal accounts of the Rongelap people can be seen in the documentary Children of Armageddon (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: March 10, 1956 Source: Wikipedia Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Loss of (2) Nuclear Weapons Capsules Location: Atlantic Ocean Name: The 1956 B-47 Nuclear Disappearance Abstract: The 1956 B-47 disappearance occurred on March 10 over the Mediterranean Sea. Four B-47 Stratojets took off from MacDill Air Force Base in Florida for a non-stop flight to Ben Guerir Air Base, Morocco and completed their first aerial refueling without incident. After descending through solid cloud to begin their second refueling, at 14,000 ft, the Boeing B-47E-95-BW Stratojet, manned by Captain Robert H. Hodgin (31, commander), Captain Gordon M. Insley (32, observer), and 2nd Lt. Ronald L. Kurtz (22, pilot) failed to make contact with its tanker. The unarmed aircraft was carrying two capsules of nuclear weapons material in carrying cases (a nuclear detonation was not possible). Despite an extensive search, no debris was ever found, and the crash site has never been located (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: July 27, 1956 Source: Wikipedia Location: Lakenheath in Suffolk, England Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: 3 Nuclear weapons damaged Name: 1956 USAF B-47 Nuclear Incident Abstract: A USAF B-47 crashed into a storage igloo spreading burning fuel over three Mark 6 nuclear bombs at RAF Lakenheath. A bomb disposal expert stated it was a miracle exposed detonators on one bomb did not fire, which presumably would have released nuclear material into the environment (Wikipedia, 2010).

Date: July 28, 1957 Source: Wikipedia Location: Atlantic Ocean Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Two nuclear weapons jettisoned (dumped overboard) and not recovered Name: 1957 USAF C-124 Nuclear Incident Abstract: A USAF C-124 aircraft from Dover Air Force Base, Delaware was carrying three nuclear bombs over the Atlantic Ocean when it experienced a loss of power. The crew jettisoned two nuclear bombs to protect their safety, which were never recovered (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: September 11, 1957 Source: Wikipedia Location: Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Fire, release of nuclear materials Name: Rocky Flats Nuclear Fire Abstract: A fire began in a materials handling glove box and spread through the ventilation system into the stack filters at the Rocky Flats weapons mill 27 kilometres (17 mi) from Denver, Colorado. Plutonium and other contaminants were released, but the exact amount of which contaminants is unknown; estimates range from 25 mg to 250 kg (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: October 11, 1957 Source: Wikipedia Location: Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: B-47 aircraft crash and nuclear weapon burn Name: 1957 B-47 Nuclear Incident Abstract: B-47 aircraft crashed during take-off after a wheel exploded; one nuclear bomb burned in the resulting fire (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: January 31, 1958 Source: Wikipedia Location: Morocco Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Nuclear bomb crash and burn Name: 1958 USAF B-47 Nuclear Incident Abstract: During a simulated takeoff a wheel casting failure caused the tail of a USAF B-47 carrying an armed nuclear weapon to hit the runway, rupturing a fuel tank and sparking a fire. Some contamination was detected immediately following the accident (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: February 5, 1958 Source: Wikipedia Proliferator: United States Of America Proliferation: Loss of (1) Mark 15 Thermonuclear Bomb Location: Savannah, Georgia (USA) Name: Tybee Island B-47 Crash Abstract: On February 5, 1958, the United States Air Force lost a 7,600-pound (3,400 kg) Mark 15 hydrogen bomb in the waters off Tybee Island near Savannah, Georgia. During a practice exercise the B-47 bomber carrying it collided in midair with an F-86 fighter plane. To prevent a detonation in the event of a crash and to save the aircrew, the bomb was jettisoned. Following several unsuccessful searches, the bomb was presumed lost somewhere in Wassaw Sound off the shores of Tybee Island (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: March 11, 1958 Source: Wikipedia Location: Florence, South Carolina, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Non-nuclear detonation of a nuclear bomb Name: 1958 USAF B-47 Nuclear Incident Abstract: A USAF B-47 bomber flying from Hunter Air Force Base in Savannah, Georgia accidentally released a nuclear bomb after the bomb lock failed. The chemical explosives detonated on impact in the suburban neighborhood of Florence, South Carolina. Radioactive substances were flung across the area. Several minor injuries resulted and the house on which the bomb fell was destroyed. No radiation sickness occurred (Wikipedia, 2010).

Date: July, 1959 Location: Simi Valley, California, USA Source: Wikipedia Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Nuclear explosion Name: Santa Susana Field Laboratory Nuclear Explosion Abstract: The Sodium Reactor Experiment was a pioneering nuclear power plant built by Atomics International at the Santa Susana Field Laboratory, nearby Simi Valley, California. The reactor operated from 1957 to 1964. In July 1959, the reactor suffered a serious incident in which the reactor core was damaged causing the controlled release of radioactive gas to the atmosphere (Wikipedia, 2010) Date: November 20, 1959 Source: Wikipedia Location: Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Nuclear explosion Name: 1959 Oak Ridge National Laboratory Nuclear Explosion Abstract: A chemical explosion occurred during decontamination of processing machinery in the radiochemical processing plant at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee. (Report ORNL-2989, Oak Ridge National Laboratory). The accident resulted in the release of about 15 grams (0.53 oz) of 239Pu (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: June 7, 1960 Source: Wikipedia Location: New Egypt, New Jersey, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Nuclear warhead damaged by fire Name: 1960 USAF BOMARC Nuclear Incident Abstract: A helium tank exploded and ruptured the fuel tanks of a USAF BOMARC-A surface-to-air missile at McGuire Air Force Base, New Jersey. The fire destroyed the missile, and contaminated the area directly below and adjacent to the missile (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: January 24, 1961 Source: Wikipedia Location: Goldsboro, North Carolina (Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina) Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Loss of two 24-megaton nuclear bombs Name: 1961 B-52 Nuclear Incident Abstract: A USAF B-52 bomber caught fire and exploded in midair due to a major leak in a wing fuel cell 12 miles (19 km) north of Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina. Five crewmen parachuted to safety, but three died two in the aircraft and one on landing. The incident released the bombers two Mark 39 hydrogen bombs. Three of the four arming devices on one of the bombs activated, causing it to carry out many of the steps needed to arm itself, such as the charging of the firing capacitors and, critically, the deployment of a 100-foot (30 m) diameter retardation parachute. The parachute allowed the bomb to hit the ground with little damage. The fourth arming device the pilots safe/arm switch was not activated preventing detonation. The second bomb plunged into a muddy field at around 700 mph (300 m/s) and disintegrated. Its tail was discovered about 20 feet (6 m) down and much of the bomb recovered, including the tritium bottle and the plutonium. However, excavation was abandoned due to uncontrollable ground water flooding. Most of the thermonuclear stage, containing uranium, was left in situ. It is estimated to lie around 55 feet (17 m) below ground. The Air Force purchased the land and fenced it off to prevent its disturbance, and it is tested regularly for contamination, although none has so far been found (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: March 14, 1961 Source: Wikipedia Location: Yuba City, California, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Plane crash with nuclear weapons Name: 1961 B-52 Nuclear Incident Abstract: USAF B-52 bomber experienced a decompression event that required it to fly below 10,000 feet. Resulting increased fuel consumption led to fuel exhaustion; the aircraft crashed with two nuclear bombs, which did not trigger a nuclear explosion (Wikipedia, 2010).

French Nuclear Test in Algeria, Africa Date: May 1, 1962 Source: Wikipedia Location: Sahara Desert, French Algeria Proliferator: France Proliferation: Accidental venting of underground nuclear test Name: 1962 French Bryl Nuclear Disaster Abstract: The second French underground nuclear test, codenamed Bryl, took place in a shaft under mount Taourirt, near In Ecker, 150 km (100 mi) north of Tamanrasset, Algerian Sahara. Due to improper sealing of the shaft, a spectacular flame burst through the concrete cap and radioactive gases and dust were vented into the atmosphere. The plume climbed up to 2600 m (8500 ft) high and radiation was detected hundreds of km away. About a hundred soldiers and officials, including two ministers, were irradiated. The number of contaminated Algerians is unknown (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: January 13, 1964 Source: Wikipedia Location: Salisbury, Pennsylvania & Frostburg, Maryland, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Accidental loss and recovery of an unknown (classified?) thermonuclear bombs Name: 1964 B-52 Nuclear Incident Abstract: A USAF B-52 on airborne alert duty encountered a severe winter storm and extreme turbulence, ultimately disintegrating in mid-air over South Central Pennsylvania. Only the two pilots survived. One crew member failed to bail out and the rest succumbed to injuries or exposure to the harsh winter weather. A search for the missing weapons was initiated, and recovery was effected from portions of the wreckage at a farm northwest of Frostburg, Maryland (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: April 21, 1964 Source: Wikipedia Location: Indian Ocean Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Launch failure of a RTG powered satellite Name: 1964 U.S. Transit-5BN-3 Nuclear Incident Abstract: A U.S. Transit-5BN-3 nuclear-powered navigational satellite failed to reach orbital velocity and began falling back down at 150,000 feet (46 km) above the Indian Ocean. The satellites SNAP-9a generator contained 17 kCi (630 TBq)[32] of 238Pu (2.1 pounds), which at least partially burned upon reentry. Increased levels of 238Pu were first documented in the stratosphere four months later. Indeed NASA (in the 1995 Cassini FEIS) indicated that the SNAP-9a plutonium release was nearly double the 9000Ci added by all the atmospheric weapons tests to that date. The United States Atomic Energy Commission reported a resulting three-fold increase in global 238Pu fallout. All subsequent Transit satellites were fitted with solar panels; RTG's were designed to remain contained during re-entry (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: December 8, 1964 Source: Wikipedia Location: Bunker Hill Air Force Base, Kansas, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Crash, fire and radioactive contamination Name: 1964 USAF B-58 Nuclear Incident

Abstract: USAF B-58 aircraft carrying a nuclear weapon caught fire while taxiing. Nuclear weapon burned, causing contamination of the crash area (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: January 1965 Source: Wikipedia Location: Livermore, California, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Release of nuclear materials into environment Name: 1965 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Nuclear Incident

Abstract: An accident at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory released 300 kCi (11 PBq) of tritium gas. Subsequent study found this release was not likely to produce adverse health effects in the surrounding communities (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: October 11, 1965 Source: Wikipedia Location: Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Fire, radiatuion exposure of workers Name: 1965 Rocky Flats Plant Nuclear Incident Abstract: A fire at Rocky Flats exposed a crew of 25 to up to 17 times the legal limit for radiation (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: December 5, 1965 Source: Wikipedia Location: Coast of Japan Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Loss of a nuclear bomb Name: 1965 U.S. A-4E Skyhawk Nuclear Incident Abstract: A U.S. Navy A-4E Skyhawk aircraft with one B43 nuclear bomb on board fell off the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga into 16,200 feet (4,900 m) of water while the ship was underway from Vietnam to Yokosuka, Japan. The plane, pilot and weapon were never recovered. There is dispute over exactly where the incident took placethe U.S. Defense Department originally stated it took place 500 miles (800 km) off the coast of Japan, but Navy documents later show it happened about 80 miles (130 km) from the Ryukyu Islands and 200 miles (320 km) from Okinawa (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: January 17, 1966 Source: Wikipedia Location: Palomares, Spain Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Destruction, loss and recovery of nuclear bombs Name: Palomares Nuclear Incident Abstract: A USAF B-52 carrying four hydrogen bombs collided with a USAF KC-135 jet tanker during over-ocean in-flight refueling. Four of the B-52's seven crew members parachuted to safety while the remaining three were killed along with all four of the KC-135s crew. The conventional explosives in two of the bombs detonated upon impact with the ground, dispersing plutonium over nearby farms. A third bomb landed intact near Palomares while the fourth fell 12 miles (19 km) off the coast into the Mediterranean sea. The US Navy conducted a three month search involving 12,000 men and successfully recovered the fourth bomb. The U.S. Navy employed the use of the deep-diving research submarine DSV Alvin to aid in the recovery efforts. During the ensuing cleanup, 1,500 tonnes (1,700 short tons) of radioactive soil and tomato plants were shipped to a nuclear dump in Aiken, South Carolina . The U.S. settled claims by 522 Palomares residents for $600,000. The town also received a $200,000 desalinization plant. The motion picture Men of Honor (2000), starring Cuba Gooding, Jr., as USN Diver Carl Brashear, and Robert De Niro as USN Diver Billy Sunday, contained an account of the fourth bombs recovery (Wikipedia, 2010).

Date: January 21, 1968 Source: Wikipedia Location: North Star Bay, Greenland Proliferator: United States Of America Proliferation: Rupture and/or Loss of (4) B28FI Thermonuclear Bombs Name: 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 Crash Abstract: The Thule affair or Thule accident was an accident on January 21, 1968, involving a United States Air Force (USAF) B-52 bomber. The aircraft was carrying four hydrogen bombs on a Cold War "Chrome Dome" alert mission over Baffin Bay when a cabin fire forced the crew to abandon the aircraft before they could carry out an emergency landing at Thule Air Base. Six crew members ejected safely, but one who did not have an ejection seat was killed while trying to bail out. The bomber crashed onto sea ice in North Star Bay, Greenland, causing the nuclear payload to rupture and disperse, which resulted in widespread radioactive contamination. The United States and Denmark launched an intensive clean-up and recovery operation, but the secondary of one of the nuclear weapons could not be accounted for after the operation completed. USAF Strategic Air Command "Chrome Dome" operations were discontinued immediately after the incident, which highlighted the safety and political risks of the missions. Safety procedures were reviewed and more stable explosives were developed for use in nuclear weapons . In 1995, a political scandal resulted in Denmark

after a report revealed the government had given tacit permission for nuclear weapons to be located in Greenland, in contravention of Denmark's 1957 nuclear-free zone policy. Workers involved in the clean-up program have been campaigning for compensation for radiation-related illnesses they experienced in the years after the incident. In March 2009, Time identified the accident as one of the world's worst nuclear disasters (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: May 22, 1968 Source: Wikipedia Location: Atlantic Ocean (740 km southwest of the Azores) Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Loss of nuclear reactor and two W34 nuclear warheads Name: The USS Scorpion (SSN-589) Incident Abstract: The USS Scorpion (SSN-589) sank while enroute from Rota, Spain, to Naval Base Norfolk. The cause of sinking remains unknown; all 99 officers and men on board were killed. The wreckage of the ship, its S5W reactor, and its two Mark 45 torpedoes with W34 nuclear warheads, remain on the sea floor in more than 3,000 m (9,800 ft) of water (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: May 11, 1969 Source: Wikipedia Location: Golden, Colorado, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Plutonium fire, contamination Name: 1969 Rocky Flats Plant Nuclear Incident Abstract: An accident in which 5 kilograms of plutonium burnt inside a glovebox at Rocky Flats. Cleanup took two years and was the costliest industrial accident ever to occur in the United States at that time (Wikipedia, 2010).

December 18, 1970 Nuclear Detonation Date: December 18, 1970 Source: Wikipedia Location: Nevada, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Accidental venting of nuclear explosion. Baneberry's radioactive plume rises from a shock fissure. Contaminants were carried in three different directions by the wind Name: 1970 Baneberry Nuclear Disaster Abstract: In Area 8 on Yucca Flat, the 10 kiloton "Baneberry" weapons test of Operation Emery detonated as planned at the bottom of a sealed vertical shaft 900 feet below the Earth's surface but the device's energy cracked the soil in unexpected ways, causing a fissure near ground zero and the failure of the shaft stemming and cap. A plume of hot gases and radioactive dust was released three and a half minutes after ignition, and continuing for many hours, raining fallout on workers within NTS. Six percent of the explosion's radioactive products were vented. The plume released 6.7 MCi of radioactive material, including 80 kCi of Iodine-131 and a high ratio of noble gases. After dropping a portion of its load in the area, the hot cloud's lighter particles were carried to three altitudes and conveyed by winter storms and the jet stream to be deposited heavily as radionuclide-laden snow in Lassen and Sierra counties in northeast California, and to lesser degrees in northern Nevada, southern Idaho and some eastern sections of Oregon and Washington states. The three diverging jet stream layers conducted radionuclides across the US to Canada, the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: December 12, 1971 Source: Wikipedia Location: New London, Connecticut, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Spill of irradiated water Name: 1971 U.S.S. Dace & U.S.S. Fulton Incident Abstract: During the transfer of radioactive coolant water from the submarine USS Dace to the submarine tender USS Fulton, 500 US gallons (1,900 l; 420 imp gal) were spilled into the Thames River (USA) (Wikipedia, 2010).

Date: 1975 Source: Fox News Location: South Africa Proliferator: Israel Proliferation: Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Name: Israeli Nuclear Proliferation To South Africa Date: May 24, 2010 Source: Fox News, Associated Press Title/Headline: Israeli President Denies Newspaper Report He Offered South Africa Nuclear Warheads In 1975 Abstract: Israeli President Shimon Peres on Monday categorically denied a report that he offered nuclear warheads to South Africa in 1975, when he was defense minister. The report published in the British newspaper The Guardian is based on an American academic's research and claims to cite secret minutes of a meeting Peres held with senior South African officials. Peres said Israel never negotiated the transfer of nuclear weapons to South Africa. "There exists no basis in reality for the claims published this morning by The Guardian that in 1975 Israel negotiated with South Africa the exchange of nuclear weapons," the president said in an English-language statement. "Unfortunately, The Guardian elected to write its piece based on the selective interpretation of South African documents and not on concrete facts." The article is based on a series of documents the South African government declassified in response to a request from American academic Sasha Polakow-Suransky, who is writing a book called "The Unspoken Alliance" about the close relationship between the Israel and South Africa. Appearing alongside the article, the partially censored documents show a formal request from the South Africans for nuclear-capable warheads, and minutes of meetings in which then-Defense Minister Peres listed weapons available for sale. But they do not appear to confirm any transfer of weapons, or any explicit offer from the Israelis to sell nuclear materials or nuclear-capable weapons to the South Africans. The documents accompanying the story do show Peres' signature on minutes from a meeting where the then-defense minister discussed payloads available in "three sizes," one of several phrases that Peres said The Guardian misconstrued. In response to the article, the South African government said it has dismantled all its nuclear weapons but did not relate to the 1975 claim. The British paper did not call the Israeli government for a response to the article, Peres said, adding that his office "intends to send a harsh letter to the editor of The Guardian and demands the publication of the true facts." The Guardian claims the documents offer the first documentary evidence of Israel's nuclear program. In 1986, another British newspaper, the Sunday Times, published pictures and descriptions from a former technician at Israel's main nuclear reactor, leading experts to estimate that Israel had the world's sixth-largest nuclear arsenal. According to its policy, Israel has never acknowledged or denied possessing nuclear weapons, though it is widely assumed to have them (Fox News, 2010). Date: August 1976 Source: Wikipedia Location: Benton County, Washington, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Explosion, contamination of worker Name: 1976 Hanford Nuclear Disaster Abstract: An explosion at the Hanford site Plutonium Finishing Plant blew out a quarter-inch-thick lead glass window. Harold McCluskey, a worker, was showered with nitric acid and radioactive glass. He inhaled the largest dose of 241Am ever recorded, about 500 times the U.S. government occupational standards. The worker was placed in isolation for five months and given an experimental drug to flush the isotope from his body. By 1977, his bodys radiation count had fallen by about 80 percent. He died of natural cause s in 1987 at age 75 (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: May 22, 1978 Source: Wikipedia Location: Puget Sound, Washington, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Spill of irradiated water Name: 1978 U.S.S. Puffer Nuclear Incident Abstract: A valve was mistakenly opened aboard the submarine USS Puffer releasing up to 500 US gallons (1,900 l; 420 imp gal) of radioactive water (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: September 18, 1980 Source: Wikipedia Location: Little Rock Air Force Base, Jacksonville, Arkansas, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Nuclear missile explosion with no detonation Name: 1980 USAF Titan-II Nuclear Missile Incident Abstract: At about 6:30 p.m., an airman conducting maintenance on a USAF Titan-II missile at Little Rock Air Force Base's Launch Complex 374-7 in Southside (Van Buren County), just north of Damascus, Arkansas, dropped a socket from a socket wrench, which fell about 80 feet (24 m) before hitting and piercing the skin on the rockets first-stage fuel tank, causing it to leak. The area was evacuated. At about 3:00 a.m., on September 19, 1980, the hypergolic fuel exploded. The W53 warhead landed about 100 feet (30 m) from the launch

complexs entry gate; its safety features operated correctly and prevented any loss of radioactive material. An Air Force airman was killed and the launch complex was destroyed (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: 1986 Source: Wikipedia Location: Hanford Nuclear Site, Richland, Washington Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Release of thousands of US gallons of radioactive liquids Name: 1986 U.S. Government Hanford Nuclear Disclosure Abstract: The U.S. government declassifies 19,000 pages of documents indicating that between 1946 and 1986, the Hanford Site near Richland, Washington, released thousands of US gallons of radioactive liquids. Many of the people living in the affected area received low doses of radiation from 131 (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: October 1988 Source: Wikipedia Location: Golden, Colorado, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Air and groundwater contaminated with radioactivity Name: 1988 Rocky Flats Nuclear Incident Abstract: At the nuclear trigger assembly facility at Rocky Flats in Colorado, two employees and a D.O.E. inspector inhale radioactive particles, causing closure of the plant. Several safety violations were cited, including uncalibrated monitors, inadequate fire equipment, and groundwater contaminated with radioactivity (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: July 26, 1994 Source: Wikipedia Location: Golden, Colorado, USA Proliferator: United States of America Proliferation: Illegal burn of radioactive material Name: 1994 Rocky Flats Nuclear Incident Abstract: Two scientists, Otto K. Heiney, 52, of Chatsworth and Larry A. Pugh, 51, of Thousand Oaks, were killed when the chemicals they were illegally burning in open pits exploded. After a grand jury investigation and FBI raid on the facility, three Rocketdyne officials pleaded guilty in June 2004 to illegally storing explosive materials. The jury deadlocked on the more serious charges related to illegal burning of hazardous waste. At trial, a retired Rocketdyne mechanic testified as to what he witnessed at the time of the explosion: "I assumed we were burning waste," Wells testified, comparing the process used on July 21 and 26, 1994, to that once used to legally dispose of leftover chemicals at the company's old burn pit. As Heiney poured the chemicals for what would have been the third burn of the day, the blast occurred, Wells said. "[The background noise] was so loud I didn't hear anything ... I felt the blast and I looked down and my shirt was coming apart." When he realized what had occurred, Wells said, "I felt to see if I was all there ... I knew I was burned but I didn't know how bad (Wikipedia, 2010). Date: January 8, 2001 Source: BBC, Alex Kirby Title/Headline: Israel Denies Depleted Uranium Use Abstract: As debate intensifies in Europe over the risks of depleted uranium (DU) weapons, Israel has insisted that it is not using them. It has rejected an allegation by a Palestinian minister that its forces are firing them in the current wave of violence. Israel is known to possess DU munitions, and a reluctance to use them now could indicate an awareness of the risks involved. And even some critics say it would gain nothing from resorting to DU weapons. A Ramallah newspaper, al-Hayat al-Jadidah, accused the Israelis on 19 December of using DU. It said the Palestinian Interior Minister, Dr Yusuf Abu-Safieh, had "confirmed that the occupation authorities have started using radioactive uranium ammunition to suppress the intifada". The minister said the Palestinian President, Yasser Arafat, was assembling a committee "to examine the situation". But the Israeli Embassy in London told BBC News Online the report was completely without foundation, and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were not using DU. It did not say why the IDF were not using DU munitions, nor whether they might do so in the future. Last November the independent Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group (PHRMG) asked the IDF about reports that Israeli helicopters had been using DU ammunition throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip. An IDF spokesman said no such ammunition had been used. The same month a US group, the International Action Center (IAC), called for an inquiry into what it said was Israel's use of DU weapons. IAC members say they picked up shell casings and metal fragments around Nablus and Ramallah which they believe contained DU. But the debris was confiscated from them as they were leaving Israel, so they were unable to test it for radioactivity. More than 350 people have been killed in the last three months in the violence between Palestinians and Israelis. Most of those who died have been Palestinians. Depleted uranium is a heavy substance, 1.7 times as dense as lead, and used in armour-piercing munitions. Many veterans of the Gulf War believe it is implicated in a range of medical problems they are suffering from, known collectively as Gulf War Syndrome. And members of the armed forces of several European countries who served in Bosnia and Kosovo now say they believe DU may have made them ill. Because of its ability to punch through armour, DU is prized as a highly effective anti-tank weapon. In its natural state, it is only mildly radioactive. On impact with a solid object it turns into a burning vapour. The US Defense Department and the UK Ministry of Defence accept that the resulting

dust can be dangerous, and say troops entering vehicles hit by DU weapons need to take precautions. But they say the dust soon ceases to be a significant problem, and is unlikely to move far from the site of the explosion, though independent authors have found it can be blown many miles. The US and UK military authorities say any risk from DU comes from its toxicity as a heavy metal, and that its radioactivity is negligible (Kirby, 2001).

Date: October 28, 2006 Source: The Independent, Robert Fisk Title/Headline: Mystery Of Israel's Secret Uranium Bomb Abstract: Did Israel use a secret new uranium-based weapon in southern Lebanon this summer in the 34-day assault that cost more than 1,300 Lebanese lives, most of them civilians? We know that the Israelis used American "bunker-buster" bombs on Hizbollah's Beirut headquarters. We know that they drenched southern Lebanon with cluster bombs in the last 72 hours of the war, leaving tens of thousands of bomblets which are still killing Lebanese civilians every week. And we now know - after it first categorically denied using such munitions - that the Israeli army also used phosphorous bombs, weapons which are supposed to be restricted under the third protocol of the Geneva Conventions, which neither Israel nor the United States have signed. But scientific evidence gathered from at least two bomb craters in Khiam and At-Tiri, the scene of fierce fighting between Hizbollah guerrillas and Israeli troops last July and August, suggests that uranium-based munitions may now also be included in Israel's weapons inventory - and were used against targets in Lebanon. According to Dr Chris Busby, the British Scientific Secretary of the European Committee on Radiation Risk, two soil samples thrown up by Israeli heavy or guided bombs showed "elevated radiation signatures". Both have been forwarded for further examination to the Harwell laboratory in Oxfordshire for mass spectrometry - used by the Ministry of Defence - which has confirmed the concentration of uranium isotopes in the samples. Dr Busby's initial report states that there are two possible reasons for the contamination. "The first is that the weapon was some novel small experimental nuclear fission device or other experimental weapon (eg, a thermobaric weapon) based on the high temperature of a uranium oxidation flash ... The second is that the weapon was a bunkerbusting conventional uranium penetrator weapon employing enriched uranium rather than depleted uranium." A photograph of the explosion of the first bomb shows large clouds of black smoke that might result from burning uranium. Enriched uranium is produced from natural uranium ore and is used as fuel for nuclear reactors. A waste productof the enrichment process is depleted uranium, it is an extremely hard metal used in anti-tank missiles for penetrating armour. Depleted uranium is less radioactive than natural uranium, which is less radioactive than enriched uranium. Israel has a poor reputation for telling the truth about its use of weapons in Lebanon. In 1982, it denied using phosphorous munitions on civilian areas - until journalists discovered dying and dead civilians whose wounds caught fire when exposed to air. I saw two dead babies who, when taken from a mortuary drawer in West Beirut during the Israeli siege of the city, suddenly burst back into flames. Israel officially denied using phosphorous again in Lebanon during the summer - except for "marking" targets - even after civilians were photographed in Lebanese hospitals with burn wounds consistent with phosphorous munitions. Then on Sunday, Israel suddenly admitted that it had not been telling the truth. Jacob Edery, the Israeli minister in charge of government-parliament relations, confirmed that phosphorous shells were used in direct attacks against Hizbollah, adding that "according to international law, the use of phosphorous munitions is authorised and the (Israeli) army keeps to the rules of international norms". Asked by The Independent if the Israeli army had been using uranium-based munitions in Lebanon this summer, Mark Regev, the Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman, said: "Israel does not use any weaponry which is not authorised by international law or international conventions." This, however, begs more questions than it answers. Much international law does not cover modern uranium weapons because they were not invented when humanitarian rules such as the Geneva Conventions were drawn up and because Western governments still refuse to believe that their use can cause long-term damage to the health of thousands of civilians living in the area of the explosions. American and British forces used hundreds of tons of depleted uranium (DU) shells in Iraq in 1991 - their hardened penetrator warheads manufactured from the waste products of the nuclear industry and five years later, a plague of cancers emerged across the south of Iraq. Initial US military assessments warned of grave consequences for public health if such weapons were used against armoured vehicles. But the US administration and the British government later went out of their way to belittle these claims. Yet the cancers continued to spread amid reports that civilians in Bosnia - where DU was also used by Nato aircraft - were suffering new forms of cancer. DU shells were again used in the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq but it is too early to register any health effects. "When a uranium penetrator hits a hard target, the particles of the explosion are very long-lived in the environment," Dr Busby said yesterday. "They spread over long distances. They can be inhaled into the lungs. The military really seem to believe that this stuff is not as dangerous as it is." Yet why would Israel use such a weapon when its targets - in the case of Khiam, for example - were only two miles from the Israeli border? The dust ignited by DU munitions can be blown across international borders, just as the chlorine gas used in attacks by both sides in the First World War often blew back on its perpetrators. Chris Bellamy, the professor of military science and doctrine at Cranfield University, who has reviewed the Busby report, said: "At worst it's some sort of experimental weapon with an enriched uranium component the purpose of which we don't yet know. At best - if you can say that - it shows a remarkably cavalier attitude to the use of nuclear waste products." The soil sample from Khiam - site of a notorious torture prison when Israel occupied southern Lebanon between 1978 and 2000, and a frontline Hizbollah stronghold in the summer war - was a piece of impacted red earth from an explosion; the isotope ratio was 108, indicative of the presence of enriched uranium. "The health effects on local civilian populations following the use of large uranium penetrators and the large amounts of respirable uranium oxide particles in the atmosphere," the Busby report says, "are likely to be significant ... we recommend that the area is examined for further traces of these weapons with a view to clean up." This

summer's Lebanon war began after Hizbollah guerrillas crossed the Lebanese frontier into Israel, captured two Israeli soldiers and killed three others, prompting Israel to unleash a massive bombardment of Lebanon's villages, cities, bridges and civilian infrastructure. Human rights groups have said that Israel committed war crimes when it attacked civilians, but that Hizbollah was also guilty of such crimes because it fired missiles into Israel which were also filled with ball-bearings, turning their rockets into primitive one-timeonly cluster bombs. Many Lebanese, however, long ago concluded that the latest Lebanon war was a weapons testing ground for the Americans and Iranians, who respectively supply Israel and Hizbollah with munitions. Just as Israel used hitherto-unproven US missiles in its attacks, so the Iranians were able to test-fire a rocket which hit an Israeli corvette off the Lebanese coast, killing four Israeli sailors and almost sinking the vessel after it suffered a 15-hour on-board fire. What the weapons manufacturers make of the latest scientific findings of potential uranium weapons use in southern Lebanon is not yet known. Nor is their effect on civilians (Fisk, 2008). Date: November 8, 2007 Source: Washington Post Proliferator: Republic of South Africa Proliferation: Nuclear Site Breached Location: Pelindaba, South Africa Name: 2007 South African Nuclear Site Incidents Date: December 20, 2007 Source: Washington Post, Micah Zenko Title/Headline: A Nuclear Site Is Breached: South African Attack Should Sound Alarms Abstract: An underreported attack on a South African nuclear facility demonstrates the high risk of theft of nuclear materials by terrorists or criminals. Such a crime could have grave national security implications for the United States or any of the dozens of countries where nuclear materials are held in various states of security. Shortly after midnight on Nov. 8, four armed men broke into the Pelindaba nuclear facility 18 miles west of Pretoria, a site where hundreds of kilograms of weapons-grade uranium are stored. According to the South African Nuclear Energy Corp., the state-owned entity that runs the Pelindaba facility, these four "technically sophisticated criminals" deactivated several layers of security, including a 10,000-volt electrical fence, suggesting insider knowledge of the system. Though their images were captured on closed-circuit television, they were not detected by security officers because nobody was monitoring the cameras at the time. So, undetected, the four men spent 45 minutes inside one of South Africa's most heavily guarded "national key points" -- defined by the government as "any place or area that is so important that its loss, damage, disruption or immobilization may prejudice the Republic." Eventually, the attackers broke into the emergency control center in the middle of the facility, stole a computer (which was ultimately left behind) and breached an electronically sealed control room. After a brief struggle, they shot Anton Gerber, an off-duty emergency services officer. Gerber later explained that he was hanging around because he believed (reasonably, in retrospect) that his fiance -- a site supervisor -- was not safe at work. Although badly injured, Gerber triggered the alarm, setting off sirens and lights and alerting police stationed a few miles away. Nevertheless, the four escaped, leaving the facility the same way they broke in. Amazingly, at the same time those four men entered Pelindaba from its eastern perimeter, a separate group of intruders failed in an attempt to break in from the west. The timing suggests a coordinated attack against a facility that contains an estimated 25 bombs' worth of weapons-grade nuclear material. On Nov. 16, local police arrested three suspects, ranging in age from 17 to 28, in connection with this incident. In response to the successful attack, the South African Nuclear Energy Corp. suspended six Pelindaba security personnel, including the general manager of security, and promised an "internal investigation which will cover culpability, negligence and improvements of Security Systems." It should be noted that Pelindaba's security was considered to have been upgraded after a break-in there two years ago (one individual was detained shortly after breaching the security fence). It is still unclear why the two groups of intruders sought to break into this particular facility. More important, however, is that had the armed attackers succeeded in penetrating the site's highly enriched uranium storage vault, where the weapons-grade nuclear material is believed to be held, they could have carried away the ingredients for the world's first terrorist nuclear bomb. As this incident shows, nuclear terrorism is a global issue, extending far beyond the familiar policy talking points of U.S. cooperation with Russia over its nuclear stockpiles, the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the face of threats from Islamic extremists, and concerns that if Iran acquires nuclear capabilities it could provide a bomb to sympathetic terrorist organizations (Zenko, 2007). Date: January 5, 2008 Source: Prison Planet, Infowars, Paul Joseph Watson Title/Headline: Israel Using Depleted Uranium Against Gaza Victims Abstract: Medics have found traces of depleted uranium in victims of Israels brutal attack on Gaza, according to a Press TV report, meaning the ultimate death toll could be far higher as future generations are plagued by cancers and birth defects. Norwegian medics told Press TV correspondent Akram al-Sattari that some of the victims who have been wounded since Israel began its attacks on the Gaza Strip on December 27 have traces of depleted uranium in their bodies, states the article. Following the conclusion of the first Gulf War in 1991, in which depleted uranium was used by U.S. forces, cancers and birth defects in Iraq soared and many veterans organizations agree that the weapon was responsible for the emergence of Gulf War Syndrome that has plagued hundreds of thousands of Gulf War veterans. Depleted uranium shell holes at the infamous Highway of Death in Iraq showed measurements 1,000 times more radioactive than background radiation. The residue of a DU weapon can be spread by the wind and infect humans not in the immediate area as well as the entire food chain. In 1999, the UN called for the use of depleted uranium to be banned worldwide but efforts to downplay its effects led by the Pentagon have blocked such a ban. Former head of the Pentagons 1994 U.S. Army Depleted Uranium Project Maj. Doug Rokke has faced constant harassment, including murder attempts, after going public in 1997 to expose the health effects from depleted uranium that the U.S. government and the World Health Organization

have consistently dismissed. Israels use of depleted uranium against victims of the Gaza bombing campaign provides further evidence that war crimes are being committed with the tacit approval of both the current administration as well as president elect Barack Obama (Watson, 2008). Date: May 21, 2008 Source: The Independent Proliferator: The United Kingdom of Great Britain Proliferation: Unguarded Secret Shipments of Weapons-Ready Plutonium Location: Cumbria, England en route to Cap la Hague, France Name: Secret British Plutonium Shipments Exposed By France Date: July 27, 2008 Source: The Independent, Geoffrey Lean Title/Headline: Ferry Shipments Of 'Terror-Threat' Plutonium End Abstract: Top-secret shipments of weapons-ready plutonium through British waters have been stopped, after their exposure by The Independent. The Department for Transport (DFT) said that it had taken "regulatory action" to prohibit the shipments from Sellafield to Normandy on an unarmed old roll-on, roll-off ferry, with few safety or security features. The prohibition, the first of its kind, was imposed after complaints by the French nuclear safety authorities. The shipments denounced by nuclear weapons experts as "madness" and "totally irresponsible" were carrying hundreds of kilograms of plutonium-dioxide powder, described as the ideal material for terrorists seeking to create a nuclear explosion or make a dirty bomb. Only 10kg of the plutonium, experts claim, would be needed to make a terrorist atomic weapon. John Large, an independent nuclear expert, called it "the most dangerous and worst possible material you could ship". The first shipment in the converted ferry Atlantic Osprey was about to leave Cumbria for a French nuclear complex at Cap la Hague in March, when the plan was exposed in The Independant. Peter Ainsworth, the Conservative environment spokesman, and Steve Webb, his Lib-Dem counterpart, condemned the shipment as a threat to national security and it was delayed for two months, finally taking place secretly on 21 May. The DFT refused to explain why it had acted, apart from saying that "the company failed to abide by the terms of its certificate of approval" . Sellafield Ltd has said it is appealing against the decision. It said: "We take this matter very seriously", adding: "We are unable to comment any further." Mr Baker, the Lib-Dem transport spokesman, said: "The Government was very lax in allowing this material to be shipped on such an unsuitable vessel (Lean, 2008). Date: April 15, 2010 Source: Infowars, Jerry Mazza Title/Headline: Depleted Uranium Is Destroying Life Abstract: I have long heard sound-bites or seen passages about depleted uranium that sounded more than dire. But given my own cognitive dissonance, and the fact that I was writing about many other dire topics at the time, I filed depleted uranium in my cranium for future investigation, which, given the human aversion to bad news, could have been never. But never was over in an exchange of emails about nuclear missiles in Israels arsenal. I received some startling nuclear information from San Francisco Bay View writer, Bob Nichols. It was an illumination long-time coming. I started at the end of Bobs article to find out who he was. His credits read Bob Nichols is a Project Censored Award winning writer and a San Francisco Bay View correspondent. A former bomb maker in a U.S. government factory in rural Oklahoma, he reports on the two nuclear weapons labs in the Bay Area. He can be reached at duweapons@gmail.com. His credenti als were impressive and so was the article he sent, PTSD, infertility and other consequences of war. In several, follow-up phone calls, Bob, in his gentle, mid-western drawl, filled me in on the picture of the imposing disasters caused by depleted uranium in Central Asia and in the Mid-East, in which hundreds of thousands of tons of depleted uranium had been dropped in the past 20 years . Bob pointed out that San Francisco itself was receiving fallout from the Berkeley National [Nuclear Weapons] Lab, and from the Livermore Laboratory in the South Bay area, managed by San Francisco-based Bechtel, a nuclear-capable corporation, boosted by San Franciscos Nuclear Nancy Pelosi and her friends at Bechtel as Bob commented. The University of California at Berkeley now earns more from weapons than from students. The San Francisco facilities have been part of the Manhattan Project, operating from pre-1945, contributing a dangerous amount of radiation to the area with weapons testing and leakages of material into the Bay. It was for this reason, Nichols told me, that he still lives in Oklahoma, though he has a real love affair with San Francisco. Yet he fears for its human and natural safety due to poisoning by the nuclear projects. In fact, he bemoaned the occasion of Fleet Week, the happy boys sent off to war by Mayor Gavin Newsoms Fleet Week an event responsible for a big chunk of the enlistments in the US Navy and marines who will probably come in deadly contact with another Bay Area product: depleted uranium, aka DU, and weaponized cer amic uranium oxide gas and aerosols, UO. As he wrote, Iraq and virtually all the rest of the Middle East and Central Asia have been continually dosed for almost 20 years with tho usands of tons of weaponized ceramic uranium oxide gas, also known as depleted uranium. When used as directed, the depleted uranium bullets, shells and bombs become a lethal uranium gas or aerosol. The poison uranium oxide gas aerosols last for billions of years and never stop indiscriminately maiming and killing, which is a war crime in itself. That was shocking to hear. So I did a bit of research to corroborate Bobs claims and came upon a number of YouTube pieces, one particularly powerful ten -minute piece called Depleted Uranium The Ultimate Dirty Bomb. It features Dr. Doug Rokke, US Army Health Physicist and Nuclear Medicine Sciences Officer, as well as the internationally known Geological Scientist and International Radiation Expert Leuren Moret. Please take ten minutes to listen to it. Dr. Rokke explains that as far back as 1973 [the Yom Kippur War], radioactive materials carpeted Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. He mentions too that DU radioactive contamination makes food and water unusable. He explains how the huge jolts of electrical energy in a small amount of depleted uranium can destroy human cells. Most notably, Dr. Rooke estimates that from October/November 1991 in Gulf War 1, 160,000 US soldiers were permanently disabled by US use of some 340 tons of depleted uranium. Ten years later that number had climbed to 221,000 and left 10,000 dead. Dr. Rooke, a victim himself of the lack of proper

post-battle examinations for DU poisoning, spoke with a tempered but deliberate anger and frustration at the damage done to all, including civilian populations, combatants, and himself. Lauren Moret pointed out that as far back as 1943 depleted uranium usage, aka poison gas warfare was encouraged in a government memo shown on screen. She also tells us that the UN Human Rights Commission declared depleted uranium as illegal. The ultimate irony she points out is that in 2003 we attacked Iraq and Saddam Hussein for possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction, which turned out not to be true. Yet when we attacked Iraq in 2003, we dropped between 1000 to 2000 tons of depleted uranium, a known Weapon of Mass Nuclear Destruction in a three-week period. This is a war crime unto itself. This all jibed with Bob Nichols writings, especially the fact that the damage of depleted uranium is forever, lasting billions of years in the atmosphere, the earth and water, as it lasts on clothing, the skin, the human body, destroying vital organs, causing birth defects of all kinds, cancers, infertility, damage to the bones, brains, testicles and ovaries, which applies to civilians and animals as well. As Nichols writes, Uranium munitions, containing weaponized uranium oxide gas and aerosols, are used by presidential order in US war zones. Privates and corporals do not decide to use these poisonous uranium gas weapons on their own. No, that order comes from the American president. Uranium oxide gas weapons are called genocidal weapons. They maim and kill millions of people, their animals and their land. The actual targets by the US Expeditionary Forces are the populations of Central Asia and the Middle East, about a billion people. Remember that US forces themselves are the victims as well of these weapons, the worst imaginable blowback. In fact, Nichols points us towards a Middle Eastern country that requires all 18 -year olds to join national service for several years. This country even has a roughly comparable health care system to America for a population of 7,233,701, according to the CIA World Factbook. This country is Israel. Bob sent along an article from the noted Israeli paper, Haaretz , dated 3/21/2010: Study: Quality of Israeli sperm down 40% in past decade. Bob claimed the number was fudged somewhat because from 2004-2008 there was a 10 million sperm a year drop-off. Taken to 2015, all of the nation would be infertile. The motility of the tested sperm also indicated a drop-off. These samples were taken from healthy young people who do not smoke. In Israel, too, Haaretz writes, a study was published about a year ago, showing an increase of about 30 percent in defects in the male reproductive system. In addition, in the past decade, the number of cases of testicular cancer has doubled. Haaretz goes on to attribute the sperm drop to chemi cals in the ground and in drinking wateras impacting hormone levels and secondary sexual characteristics. The paragraph concludes with Studies published in Britain have highlighted a clear connection between continual decline in sperm counts and chemicals in the environment. In the next to last paragraph of Bob Nichols article, he writes of the Israeli situatio n, Since 20 percent live sperm is considered to be the beginning of infertility, Israel will be sterile in less than 10 years at this rate of decline. The estimated 7 million Israeli Jews will have no more children after that. This catastrophic development has already occasioned legislative hearings in Israels Knesset Israeli sperm concentration is just an example of what is happening to human sperm all over the Middle East and Cent ral Asia, by the choice and force of will of successive US presidents. The 800-pound gorilla in the room here is that young people tested (both men and women) are performing in the Israeli Defense Forces, and face massive amounts of depleted uranium in the US manufactured weaponry being used in the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians. The land, animals, and those involved in the conflict on both sides must be, by definition, poisoned by these toxic weapons of nuclear destruction. Thats the real story. The Israelis have performed a service in a way just by conducting a bona fide scientific analysis of the situation. In nearby Iraq, three-headed babies are turning up and a virtual Pandoras Box of birth defects that you can see here. Caution: these are not pretty pictu res, but they are true pictures of what the future could be as the present. Again, please read the entire Haaretz article and view the YouTube piece. Or check the more conservative Wikipedia for the 38-page article (which includes 13 pages of footnotes) linked here on Depleted Uranium. You can verify the information presented above and find more information as well. In fact, the first DU, which uses radioactive isotope-238 was manufactured in the 1940s when the US and USSR began their nuclear weapons and nuclear power programs. P.S. Depleted uranium bombs were also used on Serbia in the Bosnian War by President Clinton. The total world inventory of depleted uranium stands at 1,188,273 tonnes as of 2002. That is enough to wipe out life on the planet for billions of years. The United States leads the pack with 480,000 tonnes; Russia closely follow with 460,000 million tonnes; France, 190,000 tonnes; United Kingdom, 30,000 tonnes, etcetera. As to the Legal Status of DU, Wiki reports, In 1996 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) gave an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.[29] This made it clear, in paragraphs 54, 55 and 56, that internat ional law on poisonous weaponsthe Second Hague Declaration of 29 July 1899, Hague Convention IV of 18 October 1907 and the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925did not cover nuclear weapons, because their prime or exclusive use was not to poison or asphyxiate. This ICJ opinion was about nuclear weapons, but the sentence The terms have been understood, in the practice of States, in their ordinary sense as covering weapons whose prime, or even exclusive, effect is to poison or asphyxiate, also removes depleted uranium weaponry f rom coverage by the same treaties as their primary use is not to poison or asphyxiate, but to destroy material and kill soldiers through kinetic energy (Mazza, 2010). Date: May 8, 2010 Source: Press TV (Iran) Title/Headline: IAEA To Focus On Israeli Nukes In June Abstract: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will discuss Israel - the owner of Middle East's sole atomic arsenal -and its nuclear activities. The IAEA is allowed to refer nuclear proliferation concerns to the UN Security Council. The issue, which has always eluded IAEA's agenda with the help of the United States, has been included in the list of items to be brought up at the agency's gathering on June 7, the Associated Press reported. The matter is to be discussed under the subject of Israel's "nuclear capabilities" at the request of the body's 18 Arab members. The organization has avoided the issue since its inception and for more than half a century amid Israel's insistence on maintaining a policy of nuclear "ambiguity," under which the regime neither confirms nor denies having nuclear weapons. Tel Aviv has repeatedly brushed aside international calls for joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since 1958, when Israel began building the Dimona plutonium and uranium processing facility, it has allegedly manufactured scores of nuclear warheads, earning reputation as the sole owner of such weapons in the Middle East. Former US President Jimmy Carter has attested to the existence of the arsenal, which he said includes between 200 to 300 warheads. According to AP, the June meeting's agenda could change, should Washington and other Israeli allies raise strong objections to the measure (Press TV, 2010).

Date: June 2, 2010 Source: Infowars, Tehran Times Title/Headline: Iran Haze Contains Depleted Uranium Abstract: An Iranian lawmaker says the haze that arrives in Iran from Iraq is polluted with depleted uranium due to the U.S. militarys use of the prohibited weapon in the neighboring country. MP Mohammad-Mehdi Shahriari called for urgent measures to prevent the diffusion of the Iraqi haze over Iran. This is not an issue that can be easily neglected, said Shahriari, who is a member of the Majl is National Security and Foreign Policy Committee. Everyone knows that the United States has used depleted uranium during t he occupation of Iraq, and this has contaminated the Iraqi soil, which arrives in Iran once in a while and pollutes Iranian soil, the Iranian MP to ld the Mehr News Agency on Monday. The results of this polluted soil will be seen in the agricultural products in the coming years, it endangers peoples health, and its harmful impact could be transferred to the next generation, he added. Silence on this issue could create a humanitarian catastrophe in the country, the Iranian lawmaker stated. The aerosol p roduced during impact and combustion of depleted uranium munitions can potentially contaminate wide areas around the impact sites or can be inhaled by civilians and military personnel. Experts have calculated that from all sources that between 1,000 to 2,000 tons of depleted uranium munitions were used during a three-week period of conflict in 2003 in Iraq, mostly in cities, The Guardian reported in an article published in 2003 (Tehran Times, 2010).

Arrested: A high-risk operation by the Hawks' specialised tactical unit resulted in an international police sting at a Pretoria petrol station. Photo: CCTV footage Date: July 9, 2010 Source: Voice Of America News Proliferator: Unknown Proliferation: Attempted Sale of an Industrial Nuclear Device Location: Pretoria, South Africa Name: 2010 World Cup Final Nuclear Incident Date: July 10, 2010 Source: Voice Of America News ( VOA) Title/Headline: 4 Arrested In South Africa Trying To Sell Nuclear Device Abstract: South African police say they have arrested four men in the capital, Pretoria, for attempting to sell what they describe as an industrial nuclear device to undercover officers. The men - all South Africans - were arrested Friday at a Pretoria gas station, where they attempted to sell the device for about $6 million. Police say Interpol was also involved in the operation. They did not say where the device came from or for what industrial purpose it is used, but did say it contained radioactive material. The officials say the four will appear in court soon to face charges of possession of a radioactive device, as well as health code violatio ns for handling radioactive material in public (VOA, 2010). Date: July 23, 2010 Source: Nuclear Engineering International, Steven Kidd Title/Headline: Nuclear Proliferation Risk Is It Vastly Overrated? Abstract: The recent well-publicised outpourings of anxiety about the potential consequences of nuclear terrorism overlook the fact that nuclear weapons are usually a matter for states, rather than individuals. By Steve Kidd A significant amount of media attention has recently attached itself to the nuclear security meeting convened by US president Barack Obama and the five-yearly review conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which followed soon afterwards. The fear of so-called rogue nations acquiring nuclear weapons, or terrorist organisations creating outrages by misuse of nuclear materials, clearly remains strong. Many column inches also continue to be devoted to various North Korean nuclear activities and to Irans alleged intentions to pursue a weapons programme. There therefore remains a fear that this may cast a shadow over the nuclear renaissance, particularly as many people clearly believe that nuclear energy and bombs are merely two faces of the same coin. But it is surely not unreasonable to question whether these fears are being substantially inflated and possibly manipulated by various interest groups in order to suit their own purposes. There is, however, no doubt that nuclear materials could conceivably be diverted from a civil nuclear power programme into the production of nuclear weapons or alternatively, major fuel cycle processes (notably enrichment and reprocessing of used fuel) could be employed to produce weapons rather than fuel for civil reactors. Similarly, it is understandable that concerns over the security of civil nuclear facilities have multiplied since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York. The possibility of aircraft crashing into such plants has naturally now been raised, as have possible terrorist incursions at plants either to acquire materials for weapons or to misuse the facility to create an explosion or a major radioactive release. Rather like the risks of operating nuclear power plants themselves, these possibilities largely boil down to assessing very low probability events which may have big consequences. Human beings are notoriously bad at this and frequently reach what seem to be illogical conclusions. This is highlighted by a recent book by a US academic, John Mueller, Atomic ObsessionNuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda. Mueller argues very persuasively (but certainly also

controversially) that the impact of nuclear weapons has been substantially overstated both in terms of their likely destructive power (in the hands of any party other than one of the five recognised nuclear weapons states) but also in their real impact on human history since 1945. He emphasizes how slow proliferation of weapons has been in reality, partly because the difficulties of acquiring nuclear materials and developing weapons technology are much greater than commonly stated , but also because all but a few countries have no real interest in acquiring weapons, as they make little sense beyond supposedly increasing national prestige. Similarly, the task of the atomic terrorist is far from simple. If it were as easy as many people claim, why havent there be en any incidents, even when the controls on nuclear materials were far looser than today? And why do terrorist incidents (with the possible exception of the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995) usually involve low tech methods, such as people attaching bombs to themselves or taking over commercial airlines armed with box cutters and then flying them into prominent buildings? There may not be, in reality, any substantive black market in nuclear materials, despite the stories we regularly hear of nuclear trafficking. The comparison sometimes made with narcotic drugs is not reasonable; although drug seizures are known to be the tip of a very large iceberg, controls on the production, trade and transport of nuclear materials are much stiffer and potential buyers are very limited in number. First, security considerations have been addressed by deploying additional armed personnel at facilities and by other measures to prevent incursions, while new nuclear plants are designed with the possibility of an aircraft impact much in mind. Although such events are clearly not impossible, the entire 50-year history of civil nuclear power contains nothing to suggest that the risks are other than very remote. Little can be done other than what has been accomplished already and the risks should certainly not be allowed to dominate the assessment of potential future actions. Indeed, critics of nuclear power are very bad at keeping things in perspective and fail to apply similar degrees of scrutiny to other plans. For example, should football stadiums not be licensed for 80,000 fans, simply because a direct aircraft strike during a game could conceivably kill many thousands? Should the walls of the stadium have to be several metres thick? Proliferation of nuclear materials and technology and their integration into weapons are notably more substantive risks, particularly as they will likely involve sovereign states with their greater resources above those of a terrorist organisation. Critics of nuclear power emphasise that designing a nuclear bomb itself is not particularly difficult (even if, as Mueller emphasises, actually manufacturing and delivering a weapon certainly is). So much of the world anti-proliferation regime is based on controls on fissile materials; if the necessary plutonium or highly enriched uranium is not available either by diversion from civil uses or production in a local facility, a weapon is impossible. It is therefore necessary for nuclear power critics to focus on alleged weaknesses in the international nuclear safeguards regime or in the security of nuclear materials transport, plus the possible spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to countries who may have an interest beyond normal civil uses. While there is no room for complacency, the real risks are actually as remote as those associated with nuclear facility security and mean that attempts to stiffen safeguards even further will encounter reasonable objections. Nevertheless, over the past 35 years, the International Atomic Energy Agencys (IAEA) safeguards system under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been a conspicuous international success in curbing the diversion of civil uranium into military uses. Most countries have indeed renounced nuclear weapons, recognising that possessing of them would threaten rather than enhance national security. They have therefore embraced the NPT as a public commitment to use nuclear materials and technology only for peaceful purposes. Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguards measures applied by the IAEA, complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Safeguards require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and decla re detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. The aim is to deter the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful use by maximising the risk of early detection. At a broader level they provide assurance to the international community that countries are honouring their treaty commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. In this way safeguards are a service both to the international community and to individual states, who recognise that it is in their own interest to demonstrate compliance with these commitments (Kidd, 2010). All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards, while facility-specific safeguards apply in the five weapons states (USA, Russia, UK, France and China) plus the non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel). Iran and North Korea illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of international safeguards. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iran has allegedly set up equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade [see also Figuring out Fordow, NEI March 2010, pp20-2]. North Korea used research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium. The weakness of the NPT regime lies in the fact that no obvious diversion of material has been involved. In both countries, the uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the countries themselves built the nuclear facilities concerned, without being declared or placed under safeguards arrangements. The greatest risk of nuclear weapons proliferation has traditionally rested with countries which have not joined the NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities. India, Pakistan and Israel are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny. A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full NPT safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. This is the argument for moving to some kind of intrinsic proliferation resistance in the fuel cycle, where there are a number of ideas, previously floated many years ago, which keep on being revamped. One key principle is that the assurance of non-proliferation must be linked to assurance of supply and services in the nuclear fuel cycle to any country embracing nuclear power. Various proposals for fuel banks and multinational fuel cycle centres may aim to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel and services for bona fide uses, thereby removing the incentive for countries to develop indigenous fuel cycle capabilities. Yet there is clearly a risk here of dividing the world into good guys and bad guys, in a politic ally discriminatory way. Already, some international fuel cycle proposals have raised the ire of major developing countries like Brazil and South Africa. The real problem is that nuclear non-proliferation and security have powerful lobby groups behind them, largely claiming to have nothing against nuclear power as such, apart from the dangers of misuse of nuclear technology. In fact in Washington DC, home of the US federal government, there is a cottage industry of lobby groups dedicated to this. Those who oppose their scaremongering (and it essentially amounts to no more than this) are ca stigated as being in the industrys pocket or acting unresponsively to allegedly genuinely expressed public fears. Pointing out that very few new countries will acquire nuclear power by even 2030, and that very few of these will likely express any interest in acquiring enrichment or reprocessing facilities, seems to go completely over their heads. In any case, nuclear fuel cycle technologies are very expensive to acquire and it makes perfect sense to buy nuclear fuel from the existing commercial international supply chain. This already guarantees security of supply, so moves towards international fuel banks are essentially irrelevant, while measures supposedly to increase the proliferation resistance of the fuel cycle are unwarranted, particularly if

they impose additional costs on the industry. It is likely that more countries will foolishly choose to acquire nuclear weapons. If they are really determined to do so, there is little really that the world can do to prevent themthe main effort has to be in dissuading them from this course of action. How many countries will have nuclear weapons by 2030 is hard to say, but there could well be a total of 15 by then. Mueller argues that this increase, in itself, will neither prevent nor cause wars, but will impose substantial costs on the countries concerned. Apart from the costs of weapons programmes diverting needed economic resources away from more productive activities, such countries are likely to be faced with economic sanctions which would create severe economic hardship for their citizens but be unlikely to deter them. So there has to be a better way. The problems of regions such as the Middle East will have to be resolved by negotiation, as the presence of many nuclear weapons states will solve nothing. In the absence of leadership by madmen, the spectre of mutually-assured destruction will merely maintain the status quo; acquiring nuclear weapons will grant a country more criticism than international prestige. Meanwhile, the commercial nuclear sector will hopefully be allowed to flourish without too many people chipping away at the margins by raising unwarranted fears about its activities (and imposing additional financial costs, which is what it eventually amounts to) (Kidd, 2010). Date: August 29, 2010 Source: Veterans Today, Gordon Duff Title/Headline: Crash Of Airbus 320 Outside Islamabad Now Believed Hijacked, Heading For Nuke Facility Abstract: Informed sources in the Government of Pakistan have told Veterans Today that they are developing hard evidence indicating the Air Blue Airbus 320 that crashed July 28th outside Islamabad was a terrorist hijacking tied to rogue American security forces operating inside that country. Sources indicate that the plane crash was an unsuccessful hijacking attempt intended to crash into the nuclear weapons facility at Kahuta, outside Islamabad. Such an attack may have been blamed on India and would likely have led to retaliation which could easily have escalated to a nuclear exchange between these two nations that have spent decades at each others throats. Suspicions were raised inside Pakistans military and intelligence organizations when American military contractors employed by Blackwater/Xe showed up on the scene immediately after the crash, seizing the bl ack box and other materials. There is no confirmation that parachutes or electronic equipment had been removed when Blackwater/Xe security relinquished control of the crash scene to Pakistani investigators. Royal Television in Islamabad, owned by the brother of the head of Pakistans powerful JI (Jamate Islami), the Islamic political party, has reported that investigations are underway tying Amer ican based contractors to the planning of the attack. Pakistans ISRP (Inter-Services Public Relations) has failed to confirm this but private sources indicate that an active investigation of these allegations is, not only underway but has established ties between an American group and the hijackers. Military and intelligence officials inside Pakistan, in concert with the American embassy, are withholding all official details of the investigation and are likely to continue doing so . This same facility had been the subject of an armed penetration by American contractors, believed to be employed by the State Department, in 2009. Four Blackwater employees, armed and possessing explosives were arrested outside the Kahuta nuclear facility in 2009. The four, driving a Jeep 44 and possessing advanced surveillance and jamming equipment of Israeli manufacture, were intercepted 1.5 miles from the Kahuta nuclear facility. The four spoke fluent Pushtu and were dressed in a manner as to resemble Taliban fighters. The order for their release, given by Minister of the Interior Rehman Malik, is an issue of considerable controversy between the civilian government in Pakistan and the powerful military. The passenger jet with 152 on board slammed into a hillside in what was believed to be Pakistans most serious air crash. At least 2 Americans were believed to be on board but, a month later, the US Embassy in Islamabad has left this unconfirmed. Reports received today, however, confirm that at least 5 Americans, military contractors said to be employed by Xe, may also have been on the craft but could not be identified as they had been traveling in local garb and had boarded with false identification. Xe is an American based military and intelligence contracting firm formerly known as Blackwater and has been the subject of considerable controversy for activities inside Pakistan. Sources indicate that the attackers stormed the cockpit in a hijacking attempt. The pilot is said to have jammed the flight controls, careening the Airbus 320 and all aboard into a hillside rather than allowing the plane to be used in a 9/11 type attack inside Pakistan or flown into Indian air space for a repeat of the 2008 Mumbai attack. Pakistan has, at times in error, referred to American contractors employed by the Departments of Defense, State or the Central Intelligence Agency as Blackwater. However, it is believed the majority of such employees are, in fact, members of that organization or is derivitive, Xe. The same group, often criticized for irregularities in Iraq, has been contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency to operate Predator drones inside Pakistan, operations that have resulted in a significant number of civilian deaths and said by political leaders of several factions to do little but recruit terrorists (Duff, 2010) Date: November 22, 2010 Source: The Washington Post, Associated Press Frederic J. Frommer Title/Headline: Report: Nuclear Weapon Drivers Sometimes Got Drunk Abstract: Federal agents hired to transport nuclear weapons and components sometimes got drunk while on convoy missions , a government watchdog said. In an incident last year, police detained two agents who went to a bar during an assignment . The Energy Department's assistant inspector general, Sandra D. Bruce, said her office reviewed 16 alcohol-related incidents involving agents, candidate-agents and others from the government's Office of Secure Transportation between 2007 through 2009. Nearly 600 federal agents ship nuclear weapons, weapon components and special nuclear material across the U.S. Two incidents in particular raised red flags, the report said, because they happened during secure transportation missions while agents checked into local hotels while on extended missions. In these cases, the vehicles were placed in "safe harbor," meaning they were moved to secure locations . In one case, in 2007, an agent was arrested for public intoxication. The other occurred last year, when police handcuffed and temporarily detained two agents after an incident at a bar. "Alcohol incidents such as these, as infrequent as they may be, indicate a potential vulnerability in OST's critical national security mission," the report warns. The report did not identify the locations for either incident, and the inspector general's office declined to identify them Monday, citing the safe harbor locations. The findings alarmed some lawmakers on Capitol Hill. "I was appalled to learn that some couriers responsible for transporting nuclear weapons and material were found to

be drinking on the job," said Rep. Jim Langevin, D-R.I., who chairs the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee. He said he would seek a full briefing from the inspector general. "We cannot tolerate any behavior that falls short of the level of excellence required and expected when it comes to protecting and handling our nation's most powerful and dangerous weapons," Langevin said. Rep. Edolphus Towns, D-N.Y., chairman of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, is seeking more information on the report and will be monitoring implementation of the recommendations, a committee spokeswoman said. "As the report suggests, a potential vulnerability in the secure transportation of nuclear materials is entirely unacceptable," said Towns. The Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees the agents, stressed that the report found no evidence of them driving drunk while on duty, or of a systemic problem. "NNSA's Office of Secure Transportation maintains a highly trained, highly professional force that has safely and securely transported nuclear materials more than 100 million miles without a single fatal accident or any release of radiation," said NNSA spokesman Damien LaVera. "Of hundreds of agents," he added, "the report identifies just two cases involving NNSA personnel being intoxicated while on overnight stops during official missions." LaVera said that the agency takes the cases seriously, and is working to evaluate the report and make additional improvements. He declined to say whether anyone was fired as a result of the incidents detailed in the report, saying he couldn't comment on personnel matters. The report says that current guidelines call for alcohol testing at least once a year and when there is reasonable suspicion of alcohol use; a ban on consuming alcohol within 10 hours before scheduled work; and sending home agents who have an alcohol concentration of 0.02 or more. "When alcoholrelated incidents have occurred, OST officials told us that they have taken immediate action to include removal of agents from mission status," the report states. The report recommends that officials consider actions such as a "zero tolerance" policy for alcohol incidents (Frommer, 2010) Date: November 7, 2010 Source: The Guardian, Matthew Bunn Title/Headline: Nuclear Smuggling: The Expert View Abstract: Insider thieves are the new nuclear threat. Protect the materials and prevent the terrorism. The dark netherworlds of nuclear smuggling still pose a terrible danger to us all. Terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons and the materials to make them. Unfortunately, it doesn't take a Manhattan Project to make a crude nuclear bomb numerous government studies have warned that a sophisticated terrorist group might pull it off, if they could get enough nuclear material. And with bits of highly enriched uranium (HEU) continuing to show up in the hands of hustlers and smugglers, the obvious question is: of which iceberg are we seeing the tip? Fortunately, controlling the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons plutonium and HEU, neither of which occur in nature offers a choke point on the pathway to the bomb. If we can keep terrorists from getting these materials, we can prevent nuclear terrorism. Already, years of co-operative efforts under the US Nunn-Lugar programme and related efforts have dramatically improved security for nuclear weapons and materials at scores of sites. Potential nuclear bomb material has been removed from dozens more, cutting out the risk of nuclear theft at those sites. These successes represent, in a real sense, bombs that will never go off. In Washington in April, leaders from 47 countries agreed to secure all vulnerable nuclear stockpiles in four years. Now the time has come to flesh out the specifics and move from words to deeds. The world needs to forge agreement that all nuclear warheads, plutonium, and HEU must have at least a common baseline of nuclear security measures in place for example, protection against a couple of small teams of well-armed, well-trained outsiders, or a well-placed insider thief. Countries where terrorists and thieves can pose more substantial threats need still higher levels of security. New measures to protect against insider thieves who have perpetrated nearly every known nuclear material theft to date must be put in place. Every country that has these materials needs an urgent review of each site where they exist, to assess whether the continuing use of these materials at that site is worth the costs and risks, and whether security there can provide effective protection. Over time, the world should phase out the civilian use of HEU, which is still used to fuel more than 100 research reactors around the world, many with minimal security measures in place. Overcoming complacency is the key to success. Many policymakers and nuclear managers around the world wrongly dismiss the danger, arguing that since they have never had an incident at their facility there is no need to upgrade security, and that in any case terrorists could not possibly make a nuclear bomb. They are wrong. Al-Qaida's nuclear bomb programme was in earnest, and progressed as far as carrying out explosive tests in the desert in Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks. Nuclear security measures around the world are demonstrably insufficient to cope with the capabilities and tactics terrorists and thieves have already used in non-nuclear attacks. We need a broad range of steps to counter this deadly complacency, from detailed briefings on the real threat to "red team" exercises, in which well-trained teams test security at nuclear sites. Another nuclear security summit is slated for 2012 in Seoul. The world needs intensive diplomacy and action on the ground between now and then, so that the leaders there will be able to say that the steps already taken and the further steps agreed to at that summit will be enough to keep the essential ingredients of nuclear bombs out of terrorist hands (Bunn, 2010). Date: November 30, 2010 Source: Jalopnik News, Matt Hardigree Title/Headline: The Military Is Secretly Trucking Hundreds Of Nuclear Warheads Across The U.S. Abstract: Nondescript 18-wheelers are secretly transporting nearly 1,000 of the U.S. Navy's 100-kiloton W76 nuclear warheads from a submarine base near Seattle to a plant in Texas. Worse news? It's by an agency recently investigated for problems with alcohol abuse. An item in Washington's Kitsap Sun this weekend confirms something we all expect to be true but is rarely talked about: the transportation of nuclear weapons across the United States. The quantity of nuclear warheads is astounding, with the report indicating as many as 1,000 of the approximately 30-year-old 100-kiloton W76 warheads are being transported from Naval Base KitsapBangor near Seattle to the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, nearly 1,800 miles away, for updates that'll extend the life of the weapon by 30 years. The W76 wahreads, currently used as the main warhead for the Trident 1 and Trident II Submarine-launched missiles, are designed to create a fireball more than half-a-mile in diameter if exploded. Transportation of these items will be carried out by the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Secure Transportation. Convoys of escorted and

unmarked nuke trucks like the ones pictured above will carry them on their journey. Numerous safeguards are in place according to the NNSA, including bulletproof sleeper areas in all trucks and a requirement that agents don't go for more than 32 hours without 8 hours of "stationary bed rest." Here's them bragging: The federal agents who do this work are trained to defend, recaptur e, and recover nuclear materials in case of an attack. Because of the highly skilled agents, NNSA was able to safely and securely complete 100 percent of its shipments without the compromise or loss of any nuclear weapons and components or a release of rad ioactive material (Hardigree, 2010).

Conclusion: Clearly, the US and its allies are the greatest purveyors of nuclear proliferation and negligence on the planet. Even more
disturbing is the fact that a great many of these so called nuclear accidents occurred on the 11th and the 26th of the month. Please see Chapter 44: Numerology of 26 & 11 (Date of Super Bowl XLV) for more info